• Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    Here other objections:

    The major problem of your definition of “belief” [1], among others, is that - in a case of belief based on ignorance of the relevant facts - it either does not prove that “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” is a more accurate belief report than “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working”, or it proves rather the opposite, i.e. that “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working”.

    Here is why:
    - At a first glance, both competing belief ascriptions present Jack as drawing meaningful correlations between the perceptible clock , his wondering what time it is, and whatever other evidence necessary to find out what time it is with that perceptible clock. According to this coarse understanding of your definition of belief, one is allowed to use indifferently “that clock” and “that broken clock” to refer to the clock, as you do when talking indifferently about “a clock” and “a broken clock” [2]. But that means that both belief reports are equally accurate!
    - However, according to a narrower understanding of your definition of belief (which we must prefer to be more analytical), then it is true that Jack drew meaningful correlations between that perceptible clock, his wondering what time it is, and whatever other evidence necessary to find out what time it is, but Jack didn’t draw meaningful correlations between that clock and the evidences of its being broken, b/c otherwise we couldn’t claim that he ignored that that perceptible clock was broken! Therefore “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” for a case of ignorance of the relevant facts, indeed the former is true while the latter is false precisely because the former accurately reports between what relevant evidences Jack was drawing correlations [3], while the latter fails to do that!!!

    BTW, this line of reasoning shows another wider problem of your definition of belief. Indeed your definition of “belief” doesn’t allow you to distinguish true from false beliefs: since in both cases the believer draws meaningful correlations between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things.

    These two objections help better understand the probable reasons why you can not rely on your definition of belief (as you presented it) to prove your belief ascription claims. Indeed your definition of belief (despite being still very inadequate) is more apt to express the p.o.v. of the believer (or what the believer is aware of believing) then your notion of "unaware" belief based on a (for me, equivocal and unjustified) knowledge requirement [4]. And in fact, to support your belief report accuracy claims you still need a suitable linguistic report of the belief content we are aware to believe (which is captured by your definition of "belief") as input for the manipulative rendering of the belief content we are unaware to believe (that's how you select the proper linguistic form for a given belief content)!!! And this is already enough to show how self-defeating your line of reasoning is wrt to your own assumptions!!!
    Unfortunately due to the inadequacies of your notion of belief, you feel pushed to rely on another assumption (the knowledge requirement for belief ascriptions) to discriminate true from false beliefs and identify putative "unaware" beliefs to be reported.

    [1]
    Belief consists entirely of meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature with the biological machinery capable of doing so. — creativesoul

    [2]
    While words are not propositions, on my view, the content of Jack's belief is not words either. The correlations he draws at the time as a means for believing what the clock says do not include language use. Those words are not being thought by Jack at time t1. Jack is wondering what time it is, so he looks towards a clock to know. That's the way it happens. This is well established habit, to the point of it's being nearly autonomous. That is to say that it is something done without much thought at all about the clock aside from believing what it says. We do not look to a clock and think silently or aloud "I believe that that clock is working". We just don't. That's just not how it works. That is a metacognitive endeavor. Believing a broken clock is not. — creativesoul

    [3]
    Indeed this also consistent with your claim about not being aware of our own mistaken beliefs

    Belief contents express the point of view...
    — neomac — creativesoul


    This notion of "belief" cannot take account of language less, mistaken, and/or false belief.
    A mistaken creature's point of view does not - dare I say, cannot - include the mistake. Hence, when we ask Jack at time t1, what he's doing immediately after looking at the clock, he will not say "I believe that that broken clock is working". Rather, he will say something about finding out what time it is/was.

    He is unaware of being mistaken. He is unaware that he believes that a broken clock is working. From's Jack's point of view at time t1, the mistake is unknown.

    Inform Jack of what he needs to know and upon recognizing his own mistake, he will readily admit to having made it unbeknownst to him at the time. He will readily admit to having once believed that that broken clock was working.     — creativesoul

    [4]
    Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    ↪creativesoul



    > This notion of "belief" cannot take account of language less, mistaken, and/or false belief [1].
    A mistaken creature's point of view does not - dare I say, cannot - include the mistake [2].
    […] He is unaware of being mistaken [3]. He is unaware that he believes that a broken clock is working [4]. From's Jack's point of view at time t1, the mistake is unknown [5].

    I agree with claims 2, 3, 5. But totally disagree with claims 1 and 4.

    More specifically:
    • Claim 4 can neither be equated to nor be implied from 3
    • By comparing 3 and 5, it seems that you are equating the notion of “being aware that” and the notion of “knowing that”, or you are presupposing some co-implication between them but it would be better to spell it out appropriately because it is not evident at all: “awareness” is an ambiguous notion per se (e.g. are you familiar with the distinction between transitive and intransitive consciousness? Or the notion of higher-order consciousness? Or the notions of phenomenal and non-phenomenal awareness?). Also the notion of “knowledge” admits different understanding (e.g. internalist vs externalist notion of “knowledge”) and can not be conflated with the notion of “awareness” yet there might be some equations/co-implications between them, depending how these notions are understood. So I would agree on some equation or co-implication between claims 3 and 5, under the condition that we agree on the specific notions of “being aware that” and “knowing that” as applied in this case.
    • I’m noticing a potential claim shift though: from “S knowingly believes that p” to “S knows that he believes that p” or “S is aware that he believes that p” as claim 4 and the equation between “being aware that” and “knowing that” (from claim 3 and 5) would suggest. Indeed you never spelled out what “S knowingly believes that p” is supposed to mean until now. If “S knowingly believes that p” means “S is aware that he believes that p” then say it explicitly b/c there are different understandings of "knowledge" and "being aware". However if this is the case, there would be an additional problem: we are shifting focus from someone's belief about a broken clock to someone's belief about their own belief about a broken clock, which looks yet another bad move for you.

    So your claims 3,4,5 put together look twice equivocal: in the first place, wrt to the notion of "awareness" (if it is to be assimilated/correlated to the notion of "knowledge"); in the second wrt the content of such awareness (p or the belief that p?).

    > Inform Jack of what he needs to know and upon recognizing his own mistake, he will readily admit to having made it unbeknownst to him at the time. He will readily admit to having once believed that that broken clock was working.

    I myself can be mistaken and I can figure out what is proper or improper to claim of myself if I were in the situation of Jack. Now, after putting myself in his shoes, even when I recognize that I’m mistaken, I wouldn’t be "ready to admit" to having once believed that broken clock was working. And if I were so disposed it would be only for pragmatic reasons, not for accuracy concerns. So the “unproblematic understanding” argument does not prove to me that your philosophical understanding of Jack’s hypothetical situation is right.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    Much, arguably most, of the groundwork has already been offered, here in this very discussion... — creativesoul

    Where? can you give me a few links?

    It makes no sense at all to me to say that the cat's belief has content that expresses the cat's point of view. — creativesoul

    The challenge is: can you justify that claim in a way that is understandable to me (based on assumptions that we both share)?
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    Has nothing to do with failing to read the next few lines... — creativesoul

    Meaning? "Thus" expresses the idea that you are logically inferring your claim "a proper rendering of Jack's belief ..." from "Jack was mistaken" and "It is impossible to knowingly be", aren't you? If so then your argument [1] (as it is) is deductively invalid (in particular, it's a perfect example of non sequitur) and inconclusive (because you didn't conclude with the claim that you were asked to prove). In other words, there is literally nothing else to logically understand in there. Unless you are claiming that the "next few lines" weren't supposed to be an argument to logically support your claim that "At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working". But then what else? Can you spell it out?
    For now your argument looks nothing more than a wishful thought.

    [1]
    Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    ↪creativesoul


    > Maybe I am right if you do not.

    Of course, your claims may be correct even if you didn't demonstrate to me any good argument to support them. What I meant it's just that you didn't demonstrate to me you are right. To do that one has to provide a valid and conclusive argument from some assumptions. I didn't accept any of the assumptions specific to your view (your definition of "belief" and your knowledge requirement) nor I saw any valid and conclusive argument that from those assumptions concludes that "At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working" is a more accurate report than "At t1, Jack believes that clock is working" wrt to the example of Jack you gave us (which is a case of ignorance of the relevant facts)

    > A true belief cannot be false. A false belief cannot be true . It is impossible to knowingly be mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood.

    I totally agree with the part in bold, for semantic reasons: true and false are contradictory terms.

    Concerning the part not in bold, I'm not sure how you understand it. If it simply means that any of the 2 following claims is necessarily false or contradictory:
    • The claim "S knows that p and 'p' is false"
    • The claim "S knows that p and p does not occur"
    Then yes, I totally agree, and that again for semantic reasons: the notion of "knowledge" presupposes that "p" is true or that p occurs, but "true" and "false" are contradictory terms as much as "occur" and "does not occur", so those 2 claims are contradictory or necessarily false.
    If the part not in bold means something else (as it seems from your later posts) or the same but for different reasons, then you have to spell it out to me, coz I can't justifiably agree to something I do not even understand.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    the non-propositional content you attribute to Jack is... ..."Jack believes that broken clock is working" — neomac


    No, it is not.

    You are conflating the content of my report with the content of Jack's belief.     — creativesoul

    This objection is maybe based on my poor phrasing. I re-edited my text to better express what I wanted to say.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

    This is a perfect example of begging the question argument — neomac

    :worry:     — creativesoul

    I misunderstood your argument because this is how you presented it:
    Jack believes that broken clock is working.
    The above report is in proper linguistic form. It is accurate. It is true. It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working. That's all that was meant by "proper linguistic form".Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe
    So from the way you presented it, it wasn't clear where the argument was supposed to start.
    But if I misunderstood you, then I'll take back my objection that this specific argument was begging the question. One objection less against this specific argument.

    Yet I have another objection. Now that you made clear that your argument is only this:
    Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe.

    Then your argument (as it is) is a perfect example of non sequitur, logically speaking. I'll formalise it for you:
    premise 1: Jack was mistaken (p)
    premise 2: It is impossible to knowingly be mistaken (q)
    conclusion: a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe (c)

    p
    q
    -------
    c

    This is not a valid logic deduction!!! And it's not only fallacious, but it is still far from being conclusive because the conclusion is not that "Jack believes that broken clock is working" is an accurate report of Jack's mistaken belief, as I asked you to prove. So you simply provided a fallacious argument to prove a general claim about how Jack's mistaken belief should be rendered.
    In other words, you have yet to provide a deductive argument in a valid form (if that's what you are trying to do), which ends with the right conclusion. And once you did, then we still have to see if it is sound.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    @creativesoul

    Let's not forget that you made the following claim:
    We can set all the other stuff aside for now and focus upon what counts as belief.

    Then, we will see how much sense it makes to ascribe belief to another, because we will have some standard of belief for comparing our ascriptions/attribution to.     — creativesoul

    So I would expect you to prove that "Jack believes that broken clock is working" is an accurate report of Jack's mistaken belief based on your definition of "belief" [1]. Instead you are trying to support that claim based on a knowledge requirement [2].
    Now either your knowledge requirement is based on your definition of belief, but you didn't provide any (valid) argument that deduces this requirement from your definition of belief.
    Or your knowledge requirement is not based on your definition of belief, then your claim that "what counts as belief" would set a standard for comparing belief ascriptions is unjustified.


    [1]
    Belief consists entirely of meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature with the biological machinery capable of doing so. — creativesoul

    [2]
    Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

    It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working, because if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working, and thus we cannot believe that it is. That has nothing to do with the sentence being a contradiction and everything to do with knowing that broken clocks do not work. — creativesoul
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    Which is all it takes to show how convention has been in error... — creativesoul

    Well if we accept all your premises (and I haven't accepted any so far) maybe you are right, yet it doesn't prove that your report is accurate. I pointed that out b/c this is a problem internal to your theory, not b/c it's enough to prove that our common belief ascription practices are wrong (indeed I think the opposite).
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    ↪creativesoul


    > That question makes no sense on my view.

    Then we need your theory of meaning and truth for you to establish when sentences are true, false , or necessary false. Or do you mean that sentences are true, false or necessary false as a brute fact? And, BTW, shouldn't the belief content you attribute to Jack in your report "At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working" match the belief content as you describe it in your claim below in order to be accurate?
    You are conflating the content of my report with the content of Jack's belief.

    The content of Jack's belief are correlations drawn by Jack between directly and indirectly perceptible things. That would include the broken clock and his wondering what time it was, amongst other things less relevant.     — creativesoul
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    ↪creativesoul


    Here another objection for you: you claim that “At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working” [1] is accurate based on the idea that the proper rendering of a false belief should be put into a proper form that it will be impossible to knowingly believe [2] .
    Then here are some belief reports put into a form that it will be impossible to knowingly believe:
    1. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working
    2. At time t1, Jack believes that clock is working and that clock is broken
    3. At time t1, Jack believes that is not the case that clock is either broken or working
    4. At time t1, Jack believes “that broken clock is working” is true [3]
    3. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is not a broken clock
    5. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is not a clock
    6. At time t1, Jack believes that clock is not a clock
    7. At time t1, Jack believes that clock that CreativeSoul knowingly believes to be broken, is working
    8. At time t1, Jack believes that he knows that broken clock is working
    9. At time t1, Jack believes that he knowingly believes that clock is working and that clock is not working
    10. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working and 23765.3456 * 23.456 = 557439.9463936
    11. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working and planet Earth is flat and all elephants fly
    12. At time t1, Jack believes that working clock is broken
    13. At time t1, Jack believes that clock is working and a butterfly is not a butterfly
    14. At time t1, Jack believes that 0 / 3 = 5
    Since all 14 reports satisfy your requirement of being in a form impossible to knowingly believe, are they all equally accurate report of Jack’s mistaken belief?
    And if only 1 is the accurate report of Jack’s mistaken belief (or you exclude any of them as accurate), then your requirement is at best necessary but not sufficient to determine the proper belief report of Jack's mistaken belief.
    And you have to specify what the missing requirement is b/c otherwise you didn't prove yet At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working” from your own explicit assumptions!!!.

    [1]
    At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
    At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.
    You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is.     — creativesoul

    [2]
    a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

    [3]
    Jack cannot knowingly believe "that broken clock is working" is true — creativesoul
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    ↪creativesoul

    > Jack cannot knowingly believe "that broken clock is working" is true, because it is a contradiction in terms, necessarily false, etc. That's all about language use. Jack's belief is not.

    Why are you changing the example again?
    You should write: Jack cannot knowingly believe that broken clock is working
    And not: Jack cannot knowingly believe “that broken clock is working” is true

    > It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working, because if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working, and thus we cannot believe that it is. That has nothing to do with the sentence being a contradiction and everything to do with knowing that broken clocks do not work.

    Why are you changing the example again?
    You should write: It is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working
    And not: It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working.

    ↪creativesoul

    > There is no need for further explanation. I've more than adequately explained several times over in a variety of ways.

    That’s because probably you do not understand what I’m asking you to explain. Even though you should have understood because I gave you examples of the kind of answer I was expecting. Anyways, what you are doing is just joggling with truth claims such as:
    • Jack believes that broken clock is working (accurate belief report with appropriate non-propositional linguistic form)
    • Jack believes “that broken clock is working” is false (accurate belief report with appropriate propositional linguistic form)
    • “that broken clock is working” is false (accurate non-belief report with appropriate propositional linguistic form)
    • It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working (accurate knowledge report with appropriate non-propositional linguistic form)
    And you evidently take this joggling explanatory, because you take as your philosophical task to simply make such claims, contrast their usage so that others do not conflate them, and enforce their usage on your interlocutors without further questions to make you happy. But that has more to do with brainwashing than philosophy to me. And it shows that you are not open to challenges (while challenging others’ views), so why should others be open to your challenges?!
    When I ask you for an explanation, I’m asking you about what grounds the truth of all these truth claims of yours. What grounds the truth of all these claims must depend on relevant facts or logic/analytic rules that govern our representations. And if you want to compare the validity of your claims against other claims you should ground your arguments on relevant facts and inferential/logic/analytic rules that govern our representations that must be shared to make our views commensurable. That is why it's utterly pointless to constantly remind us your list of truth claims to prove anything at all. And that's why I keep you telling to not change examples and to provide the truth conditions for your claims in a way that is understandable to us without using your truth claims (which would beg the question) [1]

    Now since you insist to distinguish between sentences and belief reports with appropriate non-propositional linguistic form, and you still avoid to answer the very specific question I already asked you 8th times in a row (by changing examples and shifting attention from one truth claim to the other), instead of asking you the same question for the 9th time in a row, I'll ask you:
    • what grounds the truth of the claim “the sentence ‘that broken clock is working’ is a contradiction in terms”? My answer is because that sentence ‘that broken clock is working’ represents an object (i.e. that clock) with contradictory properties, namely the properties attributed to the object at the same time by that sentence are terms (i.e. “broken” and “is working”) that by definition are taken to be one the negation of the other. Do you agree? If not, what else grounds the truth of the claim “the sentence ‘that broken clock is working’ is a contradiction in terms”?
    • what grounds the truth of the claim “It is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working”? My answer is because the non-propositional linguistic form ‘that broken clock is working’ represents an object (i.e. that clock) with contradictory properties, namely the properties attributed to the object at the same time by that non-propositional linguistic form are terms (i.e. “broken” and “is working”) that by definition are taken to be one the negation of the other. Do you agree? If not, what else grounds the truth of the claim “It is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working”?
    • What grounds the truth of the claim that “if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working”? My answer is because “is broken” is a term that by definition is the negation of “is working”, so they are supposed to refer to the same property respectively as absent and as present, whence the validity of the inference between "we know it is broken" and "we also know it is not working". Do you agree? If not, what else grounds the truth of the claim that “if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working”?


    [1]

    Jack believes that broken clock is working.
    The above report is in proper linguistic form. It is accurate. It is true. It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working. That's all that was meant by "proper linguistic form". Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe.     — creativesoul

    This is a perfect example of begging the question argument (twice fallacious b/c besides begging the question, it’s also deductively badly formed, as it is!). You take as premises that “Jack believes that broken clock is working” is an accurate report and that that report is in proper linguistic form b/c it is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working, to conclude that Jack’s belief’s report is accurate b/c it is in a linguistic form that it is impossible to knowingly believe.
    The problem is that the claim that “Jack believes that broken clock is working” is an accurate report of Jack's belief, is precisely what needs to be proven, so you can not use it AT ALL as a premise of a probative argument. Indeed what needs to be proven must figure in the conclusion not in the set of premises !!!
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    ↪creativesoul

    I'm not talking about the sentence "That broken clock is working", I'm talking about the proper linguistic form that you claim to be impossible to knowingly believe when put into the belief report "Jack believes that broken clock is working". Isn't this proper linguistic form representing an object ("the clock") with contradictory properties ("broken" and "is working")? Because if it is not the case, then you should explain why it is impossible to knowingly believe it when using this proper linguistic form in your belief report.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    ↪creativesoul


    > I'll answer whatever questions you like, so long as they follow from what I'm arguing or are just plain ole simple questions about basic facts that seem to cause an issue for my position if and when my position is held in light of those facts. I've no problem at all bearing the burden of my claims. Questions based upon non sequiturs are another matter altogether.

    What I always asked you to argue from the start is to prove the following claim of yours:
    At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
    At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.
    You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is.
    Prior to continuing... Do you agree with that much?     — creativesoul

    So I’m following your arguments as long as they focus on what I’ve asked you to argue: to provide support for precisely that claim, and nothing else. And you should expect that kind of questions, because you are challenging our common belief ascription practices. So if you do not make your challenges worth following, I will simply dismiss them.
    Besides you have a default tendency of framing other people’s claims by assuming correct your assumptions, which again would simply make pointless any philosophical debate because you are begging the question. And, not surprisingly, this complaint of yours proves it once more: since I removed the part that triggers your framing attitude (like the expression "belief content"), then you accuse me of "non sequiturs" (even when I'm simply quoting your claims and asking questions about them) because you can not trap me in your frames to easily accuse me of conflating things.
    So my questions are either conflating things (when you can frame me) or arbitrary (because you can not frame me), therefore you are right. This is not how I understand philosophical debates, this is just your way to preventively censor any potential objections against your philosophical assumptions. Trying to retrain your interlocutors to conform their claims to your theoretical language, to validate your own claims is not philosophy, but - at best - brainwashing.

    > What is it that you believe can be gleaned here by virtue of this procedure of yours? What does that question have to do anything we've discussed? Explain to me the relevance of the question. If it is relevant, I'll be glad to answer it. Teach me something new. I'm always game for that.

    The relevance is that this is a claim of yours that I find questionable (indeed absurd), so until you provide arguments to support it, I’ll take to be unproven your claim that your belief report is more accurate. The reason why I find it questionable is because you are reporting of Jack that he believes something, which is contradictory because “broken” and “is working” represent contradictory properties of “the clock” (let's see if you can frame this). Indeed it must be so because this is the proper linguistic form which you claim it is impossible to knowingly believe.

    Thus, when Jack's false belief is put into proper linguistic form, it will be impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

    Jack can not knowingly believe that broken clock is working because “that broken clock is working” is a linguistic form of a contradiction.

    > At time t1, Jack believed that a broken clock was working. Jack's belief consisted of all the meaningful correlations he drew while wondering what time it was and then looking at a broken clock to find an answer to his question. The content of the correlations Jack drew at that time are the content of Jack's belief at that time. So, I simplified the answer for ease of understanding. The non propositional content included Jack's wondering what time it was, and a broken clock. That satisfies the criterion perfectly.

    I have objections against this claim too, and I have objections also against the claim that “It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood” but let’s do a piece at a time and do not mix everything since you can not clearly follow my objections.


    So once more (8th time): is “that broken clock is working” in your report “Jack believes that broken clock is working” a contradiction? Or, if you prefer, does “that broken clock is working” in your report “Jack believes that broken clock is working” have the linguistic form of a contradiction? If not, why not?
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    You are conflating the content of my report with the content of Jack's belief. — creativesoul

    I might conflate whatever you see me conflating if you continue to frame my questions. But I will return to such a claim of yours later because I suspect you are committing yet another big mistake.

    Anyway you wrote this:
    At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
    At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.
    You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is.

    Prior to continuing... Do you agree with that much?     — neomac
    I'm asking you (7th time): in the belief report that you claim more accurate, namely "At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock was working.", I see 3 items: broken, clock, was working. Explain what each of them stands for. Start from was working.
    It's always the same question, but I removed the part that triggers your framing (i.e. "belief content").

    P.S.
    Too often the questions of mine you think you are answering, are not my questions but the questions that you misunderstand as a consequence of framing my position.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    Could you elaborate? — creativesoul

    try again (6th time):
    spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) that are part of the belief content you attribute to Jack in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering "Jack believes that broken clock is working", is. You can start from |is working| — neomac
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    That's at least the fourth time I've said that and answered your question. It's fishy that you act as if I've avoided it. — creativesoul
    Then quote yourself when you explain what "is working" stands for. Because this is what I asked. And if you not find it, that's because you did not answer my question.
    So try again (5th time):
    spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) that are part of the belief content you attribute to Jack in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering "Jack believes that broken clock is working", is. You can start from |is working| — neomac
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    ↪neomac
    Yes, and the Mona Lisa has quite a nice frame.     — Bartricks

    Not to mention that there is lots to learn from the history of Mona Lisa frames too:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mona_Lisa#Frame
    https://artjourneyparis.com/blog/mona-lisa-story-behind-fame.html
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    So you're saying that those words in quotes are the content of Jack's belief at time t1? — creativesoul

    No. In the example "Jack believes that clock is working", the belief content is the fitness condition expressed by the completive clause, so it's the state-of-affairs (i.e. the object "clock" and its property "is working") in the real world that would make that belief content cognitively accurate or, to simplify, true. There might be something else misleading in talking like this though.

    ↪creativesoul

    > Logical notation? The form of belief attribution? "The logic”???

    By “logic” here, I’m generically referring to the rules of our common belief ascription practices.

    > How can anyone establish what counts as acceptable and/or unacceptable attribution of belief to another if there is no standard regarding what counts as belief?

    Of course there is a standard, but it’s implicit in our belief ascription practices. What is hard it is to spell it out. Also grammar rules are implicit in our language practices, but it’s a non-trivial task to abstract them. So there are cognitive rules that are implicit in our common belief ascription practices to identify beliefs, and my theoretical effort is to abstract those cognitive rules from our common belief ascription practices. But rule abstraction presupposes rule application. Yet again there might be something else misleading in talking like this though.

    > What exactly would we be attributing to another when ascribing some belief to them, if we did not already have an idea of what beliefs are?

    Right, this idea however is implicit in our common belief ascription practices. Indeed one learns the usage of the word “belief” from those competent speakers that utter belief ascriptions in the given circumstances.


    Look, I won't answer any more your questions if you do not answer my previous post. Coz it's the 4th time in a row that I'm asking the same question (that I already asked other times) but you avoid to answer it, which is fishy. So:
    spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) that are part of the belief content you attribute to Jack in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering, is. You can start from |is working| — neomac
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    To give the full non-propositional content is impossible. — creativesoul
    Impossible? We are discussing here if "that clock is working" is more or less accurate than "that broken clock is working". The full account I'm asking is about this and only this belief content attribution in this and only this example, not the belief of everybody in the universe present past and future.
    So again:spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) is, because you are using these three items to determine the non propositional content of Jack's belief in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering. You can start from |is working| , since you keep saying that Jack's non-propositional content is about a broken clock but you never mention "is working". Yet the non-propositional content you attribute to Jack is not rendered as in "Jack believes that broken clock" but as in "Jack believes that broken clock is working" and if the broken clock is the real world object than what "is working" in the real world? Nothing? A property? So spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) that are part of the belief content you attribute to Jack in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering "Jack believes that broken clock is working", is. You can start from |is working|
    BTW even for the claim "While it is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood" you have yet again to explain exactly why it is impossible to knowingly believe "that broken clock is working".
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    Presumably when you visit the sistine chapel you stare at the floor. — Bartricks
    Presumably because also the floors are worth watching.
    https://www.google.com/search?q=sistine+chapel+floor&tbm=isch&ved=2ahUKEwjKyamp8ZP2AhUEkFwKHcmZC64Q2-cCegQIABAA&oq=sistine+chapel+floor&gs_lcp=CgNpbWcQAzIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgYIABAFEB4yBAgAEBgyBAgAEBg6BAgAEEM6BggAEAoQGDoGCAAQCBAeUIYKWPQ0YI09aAVwAHgAgAE-iAG7CpIBAjI3mAEAoAEBqgELZ3dzLXdpei1pbWewAQDAAQE&sclient=img&ei=CiQVYsqcA4Sg8gLJs67wCg&client=firefox-b-d
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    What is the content of Jack's belief at time t1? — creativesoul

    I answered that already. Belief contents express the point of view (the intrinsic fitness conditions) of Jack's believing attitudes which best explain his behavior in the given circumstances at t1. In the case of false beliefs due to ignorance and not irrationality "that clock is working" is better than "that broken clock is working" because that clock is working can be either true or false, while "that broken clock is working" is contradictory so always false i.e. it can not adequately express a case of ignorance.

    It seems you do not fully appreciate the different theoretical tasks of your approach wrt mine. My theory of belief is based on what I take to be some pre-philosophical linguistic facts (common belief ascription practices). These belief ascription practices are not based at all on my theory of belief. These belief ascription practices are not based at all on a full blown theory of propositional content (like frege's or russell's). And my theory of belief is not based at all on a full blown theory of belief as propositional attitude (like frege's or russell's). Indeed my theory of belief and a theory of belief as propositional attitude may compete to explain the very same linguistic facts. That is why:
    - my primary task is not to develop a theory of belief, but to understand as much as I can the logic of our common belief attribution practices.
    - I don't care about your distinction between propositional and non-propositional content as such, as much as I care about how your view and the usage of this distinction may compete against our common belief ascription practices.
    - I don't care to specify further my theory of belief, because understanding and defending the logic of our common belief ascription practices it's more important to me than my theory of belief. That is also why you shouldn't care about my full-blown theory of belief coz I don't have one yet. And to critisize your view it's enough for me to counter your misconception about the logic of our common belief ascription practices as I understand them, or to question the internal coherence of your assumptions and claims.

    Your situation is different: you are developing a theory of belief and belief ascription in competition with a specific theory of belief as propositional content (whose source is still unknown to me) and our common linguistic practices. So your primary task is to provide the details of your theory of belief and then judge our common practices accordingly.
    That is why the primary explanatory task for you is to exactly and completely explain the difference between propositional and non-propositional belief content as you understand it in the relevant example which are always the same two (never ever change them):
    At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
    At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.

    That is why I asked you to give me the full non-propositional content which Jack is not aware of believing (and can not knowingly believe true) when you claim of him "Jack believes that broken clock is working". There are 3 items in this non-propositional content: "brocken" "clock" and "is working". What are these entities? What is the meaningful correlation that is drawn between them? And who is drawing this meaningful correlation between these 3 parts "broken", "clock" and "is working"? I take it to mean the real-world referents of the words you are using in your non-quoted belief ascription report. Is that right?
    "clock" is the real object existing in the world outside of our mind
    "broken" is the property this real object in the world truly has
    "is working" is the property that this real object does not have.
    Is that it? If not, spell out what these 3 items are, because you are using these three items to determine the non propositional content of Jack's belief. You keep saying that Jack's non-propositional content is about a broken clock but you never mention "is working". Yet the non-propositional content is not "Jack believes that broken clock" but "Jack believes that broken clock is working" and if the broken clock is the real world object than what "is working" in the real world? Nothing?
    There is no progress if you keep just repeating your distinction between propositional and non-propositional content (without offering an analysis of it) and then projecting it on to me as if I were committed to it, to make me play the role of one who confuses the 2. That's framing and question begging accusations.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    Broken clocks and wondering what time it is, — creativesoul

    I asked you to give me the full non-propositional content which Jack is not aware of believe and can not knowingly believe true when you claim of him "Jack believes that brocken clock is working". It's always the same example. In such content there is "broken clock" but there is no "wondering what time it is".
    There are 3 items in this non-propositional "brocken" "clock" and "is working". What are these entities? What is the meaningful correlation that is drawn by them? And who is drawing this meaningful correlation between these 3 parts "broken", "clock" and "is working"? I take it to mean the real-world referents of the word you are using in your non-quoted belief ascription report. Is that right?
    "clock" is the real object existing in the world
    "broken" is the property this real object in the world truly has
    "is working" is the property that this real object does not have.
    If not, spell out what these 3 items are, because you are using these three items to determine the non propositional content of Jack's belief.
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    ↪Bartricks


    > try harder

    What for?

    > Why are you crossing out 'Reason' and replacing it with 'reason'? It's 'Reason' not 'reason'. The source of normative reasons is traditionally called 'Reason' with a capital 'R' (because 'reason' is ambiguous).

    Your typo, remember? Anyway, I fixed it.

    > is sufficient to place the burden of proof on you

    I already proved my point. Suck it up and move on.

    > Why can't they be imperatives of multiple minds? Because a group of minds is not itself a mind and it is only minds that can issue imperatives. If there were multiple minds, then in virtue of what would their imperatives be the imperatives of Reason? Furthermore, it is a principle of Reason that one should not posit more entities than is needed to get the job done: one mind is sufficient. So, positing several would be a) incoherent and b) ontologically extravagant (there's a big word for you - you can blow that at people in the future). Note as well, that even if one can coherently posit several minds (and one can't) - and it is not ontologically extravagant to do so (and it is) - you would not have refuted divine command theory, for all you will have done is multiply the number of gods!

    Well at least nobody can say you don’t know how to glorify your intellectual failures.
    Here some charitable thoughts for you:
    • I didn’t claim that a group of minds is a (one) mind but since you suggested it, it’s not even clear why a group of minds can’t issue imperatives collectively like legal/judicial systems as institutional collective bodies or think about the concept of "General Will" by Rousseau or the "Collective Unconscious" by Jung.
    • “If there were multiple minds, then in virtue of what would their imperatives be the imperatives of Reason?” whatever that is supposed to mean, should I care? All I can say is that there might be different ways in which “Reason” and “imperatives of Reason” can be understood. So it’s on you to clarify their meaning and support related premises with adequate evidences. I’m not saying you are capable of this or willing to do this (I doubt both), I’m just saying it should be your task, not mine.
    • “a principle of Reason that one should not posit more entities than is needed to get the job done” what is the “job” to be done here? The Holy Trinity admits three Persons with the same devine nature. So the number of ontological entities to posit depends on the explanatory role they have to play. In Kant, the practical reason that issues categorical imperatives belongs to a plurality of human beings, so the fact that moral imperatives are universal and categorical is in not per se in conflict with the idea there can be multiple minds equipped of practical reason capable of issuing moral imperatives. And I'm not holding Kant's position or defending its consistency, I'm just using it to prove that your claims can be pertinently questioned.
    • "a) incoherent and b) ontologically extravagant" go back to square one
    • "ontologically extravagant (there's a big word for you - you can blow that at people in the future)" you aren't that useless after all, thanks! I will return you the favor asap!
    • “you would not have refuted divine command theory, for all you will have done is multiply the number of gods!”. If this was my intention (which is a wrong assumption), I still couldn't refute a theory before understanding well enough what it claims and it implies: in your 8 premises there are notions to clarify (what do you mean by Reason, imperatives, moral imperatives, source of moral imperatives, mind, etc.?) which make unclear meaning and truth conditions. Those 8 premises (as they are) are not evidently true for the reasons I already explained. Do you claim otherwise?! Because if you do, then this would just be the third most stupid claim one can find in this thread (which wouldn’t be a coincidence since you made also the first two).

    > Only 4 premises can be questioned for all of the others follow logically from them. But you can't see that, can you? Here: $<<<=X///

    Indeed, by randomly typing on a keyboard, you immediately look much smarter! So keep practicing!

    > If Reason is a mind then that mind would be omnipotent because she'd get to determine what is and isn't possible. And she'd be omniscient because she'd get to determine what is and isn't known. And she'd be omnibenevolent because she'd fully approve of how she is. That's why.

    Such unsolicited apodictic claims show how much you are into these old smelly scholastic farts. And that’s a second good reason why it’s pointless to argue with you about your DTC theory (especially if your preposterous terminology has not been adequately clarified). Scholastic junkies are just "ontologically extravagant entities" ;) which a principle of Reason requires me to simply get rid of (or laugh at, if in the right mood).

    > Now, do you have an actual argument to make that calls into question the truth of any of the four premises of my argument?

    No Fartrrricks. With you it’s not matter of truth. It’s just matter of very poor philosophical taste and lots of intellectual dishonesty. It would be stupid not to see it.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    I am attributing to him an attitude towards the broken clock such that he believes it to be a reliable source of information regarding what time it was. — creativesoul

    Notice that this claim is a de re belief ascription analogous to "Jack believes of that broken clock that is working" (which I was talking about a while ago) where the expression "the broken clock" is outside the completive clause of the predicate "to believe", and within the semantic scope of the one who makes the belief ascription. You are using it to disambiguate your own claim against the putative misunderstanding of others. In using it, you are proving that this form is more understandable than your own rendering. But even if you used it just as a temporary concession, what is more critical, is that this rendering allows you to keep unclear what constitutes non-propositional belief contents. Which is what you should still explain to support your claims.


    It seems that my objectors/detractors do not understand that the content of Jack's belief is not propositional. He is not drawing correlations that include the words "a broken clock is working". It is only if he were doing so, it is only if I said he were doing so, that I would be guilty as charged regarding attributing a contradictory belief to Jack. — creativesoul

    You have to prove that part in bold of your claim. What is exactly the non-propositional belief content that Jack is not aware to hold, namely "that broken clock is working" (without quotes)? Can you spell it out right away? Between what kind of things is Jack drawing correlations when you are attributing to him the non-propositional and unquoted content "that broken clock is working"? I see 3 items in there ("broken", "clock" and "is working"), what do they stand for as parts of a non-propositional content? Not words (b/c otherwise they would be propositions), then what else?
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.

    At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.

    You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is.

    Prior to continuing... Do you agree with that much?     — creativesoul
    Yes I do.
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    ↪Bartricks


    > But you need it spelt out as it is not immediately apparent to you. Like I say, a bad sign!

    Ma’am can you intellect that is not a moral imperative of Reason to prove you anything in this forum nor to do the job of clarifying your views for you?

    > All logic does is formalize what we can see by reason;

    So what? Formalisation would still be useful, among others, b/c “others need to be taught how to look properly”. We are here to engage in philosophical debates in a public forum as anonymous users and no background knowledge about formal logic and related notions is required to participate to this forum. So it’s matter of intellectual honesty to be clear whenever possible, especially if this doesn’t require much effort, and we are uncertain about what relevant assumptions we actually share on a given subject.


    > Anyway, you have said precisely nothing to address the argument.

    Ma’am can you intellect that is not a moral imperative of Reason to entertain you in this forum?


    > So all I was doing was showing you how the original was valid, for it seemed you could not see it by direct rational intuition (which is a really bad sign)

    OK since by textual formalisation you are still not seeing that your original argument is not logically valid, despite you persistently claiming otherwise, do you see at least my middle finger to you with your rational intuition? Coz if you don’t, you better take your rational intuition to an optician.
    In other words, since “you need it spelt out as it is not immediately apparent to you”, you made just the two most stupid claims in this thread. So suck it up and move on. You are fooling nobody, Bartrickster.


    > Do you actually have a criticism?

    Not yet, since your 4 deductions are so theoretically loaded that it’s even hard to understand how to unpack them. Additionally, no offense, but I don’t particularly enjoy exploring the extent of your intellectual dishonesty.

    However, since you keep claiming that only 4 out your 8 premises are open to question and unless this claim of yours simply means that Bartricks is open to address doubts only against 4 out of 8 premises (which I don’t care, of course), then I will counter that indeed all 8 premises can be questioned (which is why it's important and more honest to spell them out from the start). And by that, I mean there are pertinent reasons to doubt the meaning or the truth of the given premises, either because they are not so strongly supported by our more general background knowledge or because they are not analytically evident (especially if no analysis of the relevant notions has been provided yet). If these reasons are compelling or not it’s entirely another matter and can be settled only by adequate arguments.
    So here we go with your 8 premises and how one could question them (maybe there are other ways to question them, but my goal is exclusively to show that they can be pertinently questioned):

    > 1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they all have a single source: Reason
    > 2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason

    What are the reasons to support the first claim? We have societies with different law systems, so with different sources for legal behavior, why can’t it be the same for moral imperatives? Why should there be only one source for moral imperatives?
    What are the reasons to support the second claim? Why can’t we talk of imperatives of emotions (as Hume could suggest) or will (as in the DCT argument proposed in the main post)?

    > 1. If something is issuing imperatives, then it is a mind
    > 2. Reason issues imperatives

    What are the reasons to support the first claim? If the notion of “mind” is contrasted to the notion of “matter”, does that mean that a materialist view is incompatible with issuing imperatives? How so?
    What are the reasons to support the second claim? What is “issuing imperatives” by Reason supposed to mean? Why can’t Reason just produce or consist in possible state of affairs which are morally good (where morally good is an intrinsic property different from aesthetically good and instrumentally good) that then human reason can identify and take as a source for issuing moral imperatives b/c, say, humans are attracted to moral goods as much as to aesthetic goods?


    > 1. If Reason is a mind, then Reason is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God)
    > 2. Reason is a mind

    What are the reasons to support the first claim? Why are omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent attributed to Reason as a consequence of Reason being a mind? Also humans have minds but they do not seem omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Besides Reason can be understood also in kantian terms, and not as a sort of divine entity.
    What are the reasons to support the second claim? Why Reason is mind, and not mind and matter or just matter?


    > 1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they are imperatives of God
    > 2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason

    What are the reasons to support the first claim? Why are moral imperatives imperatives of God and not Gods? Why can’t Reason be shared between a plurality of divine entities as much as the divine nature is shared by 3 persons of the Holy Trinity?
    What are the reasons to support the second claim? The preposition “of” in “imperatives of Reason” is ambiguous b/c it can express both a subjective and objective genitive (i.e. “Reason issues moral imperatives”, “moral imperatives are about Reason”), but depending on how we understand “moral imperatives” (see also the other previous questions) this notion can be compatible maybe with only one of the 2 senses and not the other. Besides should we take this claim as an identity or as an inclusion? Can't there be immoral imperatives of Reason (think of the case of Abraham & Isaac)?

    There might be logic links between the 8 premises and the way we question them, but this depends on how these 8 premises are properly spelt out and how they are questioned. So nothing we can really decide a priori just from your 4 deductions.

    Conclusion: unless the claim that only 4 out of 8 premises are open to question simply means that Bartricks is open to address doubts against only 4 out of 8 premises (which I don’t care, of course), then all 8 premises (not 4, not 5, not 6, not 7, but 8, exactly all 8 premises out of 8 premises!) can be pertinently questioned. Q.E.D.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    If you claim that we can establish if “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working”, based on what we take belief to be, and your definition of belief is “meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”, then I expect you to show exactly how this definition helps you establish “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working”, all the more because you claim that your definition of belief is of “immense explanatory power”. But in your last post you never used such a definition. That’s fishy. — neomac


    There you go again, making claims for me that I've not made.     — creativesoul

    So you do not claim that “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working”? Because if you don’t then we do not need to revise our common belief acription practices, while I thought you wanted to challenge them.
    Or you do not claim that your claim that “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working” is based on your definition of belief as “meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”? Then why did you claim "We can set all the other stuff aside for now and focus upon what counts as belief"? [0]
    What is exactly that you did not claim that I misattributed to you in my quotation?

    ↪creativesoul

    Again, you didn't answer my questions.
    You claim that you do no have time to answer them, really any of them? you didn't need to answer all of them all at once, you could have answered just few but properly, and in my last two posts there was but one question. Instead you have time to repeat your claims at length and search my past quotes. Besides if you do not have time to answer question then why do you invite me to ask you questions?
    You claim that I attribute to you claims you didn’t make (even when I quote you!!!) without specifying what exactly these misattributions are, nor immediately providing an adequate rectification.
    You claimed to have already explained things (even in many ways), but I already questioned that they are successful for reasons that I already explained, and you didn’t challenge any of my objections as I have articulated them yet. And I can do it again: if you want to give an explanation of why your rendering of Jack's belief is better than what provided by common practice based on your definition of belief, then you have to take the 2 renderings, the one you claim right (e.g. "At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working"), and the one you claim wrong (e.g. "At t1, Jack believes that clock is working"), and compare them based on your definition of belief as “meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”, b/c this is what I did based on my definition of belief [1]. In your explanation you talked only about your rendering, i.e. there was no comparison (that's fishy). And you also changed the relevant example (that's fishy) [2]. In addition to that, also my last post was explanatory in the sense that it provided a list of claims conform to our standard belief ascription practices that are logically consistent with the assumptions you employ to justify your revisionist view and this shows that your assumptions are not sufficient to justify your revisionist view. I also explained why you are attributing a contradictory belief to Jack in the relevant example (both in the case of quoted and unquoted belief content), while you just kept repeating that is not contradictory without explaining why (something you should have done wrt to both your definition of belief and your quoted/unquoted belief report style [2][3]). While you, instead of addressing my objections to your claims for both quoted and unquoted rendering, as I articulated them, you just keep repeating your claims (e.g. "Evidently you do not see the difference between believing 'a broken clock is working' and believing a broken clock is working") again without clarifying why a quoted belief content like "'that broken clock is not working'" can be contradictory while an unquoted belief content like "that broken clock is not working" is not contradictory (and yet represent an impossible situation!) as I asked. That's fishy.
    Finally you keep using your standard rendering (distinguishing between quoted and unquoted belief contents ) based on assumptions that are under question, so it’s utterly pointless to use it to prove the strength of those assumptions (since it would bag the question).

    The philosophical game I find interesting to play does not consist in making claims to popularise what one finds intuitive and repeat it ad nauseam, but to provide compelling arguments to support such intuitive claims using appropriate analytical tools like logic inference, conceptual clarifications and definitions. You can challenge my views either by questioning the truth of the assumptions (impossible to do b/c the evidences are the linguistic facts of our common belief ascription practices that you intend to challenge) or the consistency of my reasoning based on those assumptions, or you can challenge it by proving that your views can do a better job than mine (e.g. in terms of explanation power). You catastrophically failed both tasks b/c your philosophical approach is flawed methodologically and substantially: substantially b/c of reasons I already explained around 15 posts ago of mine [4]. Methodologically b/c you can't support your claims other than by making question bagging claims (and framing my replies accordingly), suggesting preposterous propositional calculi [5], making more preposterous claims (let’s not forget these arguments [6][7]!) or attacking me personally with a behavioral pattern typical of those who are in denial (none of which are adequate analytical tools, of course). And I dragged this exchange now long enough to make definitely clear that you do not have any better dialectical strategy than repeating ad nauseam your preposterous claims and self-indulging accusations to my articulated and very specific objections.

    I spared you my sarcasm so far but I won't spare you my conclusion: you have literally nothing challenging to offer against our common belief ascription practices. And here I rest my case.

    [0]
    We can set all the other stuff aside for now and focus upon what counts as belief. Then, we will see how much sense it makes to ascribe belief to another, because we will have some standard of belief for comparing our ascriptions/attribution to. — creativesoul

    [1]
    I'm attributing a belief: beliefs are intentional cognitive states/events with intrinsic mind-to-world fitness conditions expressed through behavioral attitudes in a given context. These intrinsic fitness conditions constitute - broadly speaking - the p.o.v of the believer. So I take the task of identifying the intrinsic fitness conditions of a given belief in a given context as equivalent to providing an explanation of P’s behavior in a given context based on her cognitive intentionality. Since what better explains the cognitively-guided behavior of P at time t1 based on cognitive intentionality (i.e. P's belief at t1), to me, is the p.o.v. of P at t1 than any other alternative (like the p.o.v. of Q at t1, or the the p.o.v. of P at t2), then belief ascriptions about P at time t1 are accurate in so far as they match the p.o.v. of P at time t1. — neomac

    The terms "of" and "that it" are superfluous. We can remove them entirely and lose nothing meaningful. The simplest explanation is the best provided there is no loss in explanatory power. — creativesoul

    Indeed, there is loss of explanatory power, b/c by removing those parts you are attributing to Jack a contradictory belief so you can not distinguish a case of ignorance from a case of irrational belief, nor identify the different scopes in belief ascriptions (the p.o.v. of the one who makes the belief ascription about Jak is different from Jack's p.o.v). Not only, but if we assume that Jack's belief is a case of ignorance and not irrational belief, then your rendering is a case of misattribution, so it's a false explanation of Jack's behavior.
    Besides the explanatory power of belief ascription should be based on your definition of belief, as you claimed, this definition is “meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”. But you are not using it at all to prove that there is no loss in explanatory power. So how can you justify the claim that there is not loss in explanatory power?     — neomac


    [2]
    ↪creativesoul


    > Jack draws correlations between a broken clock and the time of day while believing a broken clock is working. Jack does not believe "a broken clock is working". Jack believes a broken clock is working.

    Seriously?! I don't get the structure of this argument at all, if it has one. For sure it is not a deduction. BTW what happened to the “meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things” in the case of “Jack does not believe ‘a broken clock is working’” and why are we talking “Jack does not believe ‘a broken clock is working’” instead of “Jack believes that a clock is working”?!     — neomac

    [3]
    I did see the difference. But I find your answer not only unsatisfactory but also fishy. Assuming your convention, you distinguish between quoted (“S believes that ‘p’”) and unquoted belief content (“S believes that p”). The first one is a propositional attitude and the second one is not. Here is the convention applied to the example of Jack: “Jack believes ‘that broken clock is working’” and “Jack believes that broken clock is working”, in both cases the belief content includes 3 items: “clock”, “broken”, “is working”. So it’s true but suspiciously incomplete to claim that the latter rendering of Jack’s belief has broken clocks as content. The non-propositional content of Jack’s belief has 3 items in it, not just broken clock, but broken clock is working.
    Besides what kind of entities are these items? Are they linguistic terms? Are they meanings? Are they referents in the real world? What are they? And isn’t there a meaningful correlation drawn between these 3 items since they are the content of Jack’s belief? What is this meaningful correlation? Isn't this correlation supposed to show an impossible situation b/c broken clocks do not work? And how come that it's impossible that broken clocks do not work if not for the fact that the same clock is attributed or appears to instantiate contradictory properties ("broken" and "is working")?
    Looking forward to hearing your answers.     — neomac


    [4]
    My reformulation was aiming at rescuing your proposal also from the line of reasoning you just drafted, which I find simply catastrophic, even if we forget the aforementioned objections. Why? Because “accuracy” as an intrinsic fitness-condition of beliefs is what grounds our expectations about our honest reports, like the expectation that a factual report about facts at time t1 should match them, and the expectation that a belief ascription to P at time t1 should match the belief prospective of P at time t1 (i.e. the way P would express her belief at time t1). While what you are trying to do is to blend the 2 distinct expectations in a belief ascription that matches neither the prospective of the believer nor the relevant facts: a broken clock is working is neither a fact nor the perspective of P at time t1, just a blend of what you take to be a correct description of the relevant facts ("the broken clock") with P’s perspective (“is working”). The utmost preposterous consequence of your approach is that all false beliefs are equated to contradictory beliefs (since, the belief ascription subordinate clause "a broken clock is working" is a contradiction). This amounts to a categorical confusion between epistemology and logic: a false belief is not a contradictory belief (!!!), since a contradictory belief is always false, while a false belief could have been true, and this depends on the relevant facts not on its internal logic. Indeed this would also make the believers look always irrational, when they could have been simply ignorant about the relevant facts.
    Why would you do such a catastrophic move? My impression is that you are misled, by your unaccounted knowledge claims (“we find ourselves discussing another's belief that they themselves do not know that they have”), into thinking that belief report accuracy is based on knowledge (track knowledge or lack thereof). This is wrong for 2 reasons: 1. belief ascriptions by S are themselves beliefs and do not warrant S’s knowledge of the relevant facts, nor need for such a warrant 2. knowledge ascriptions about P presuppose belief ascriptions about P (and not the other way around). In other words, a theory of belief ascription can not settle issues about belief and belief ascription by presupposing knowledge, b/c knowledge presupposes belief, therefore accurate belief reports should be understood in terms of intrinsic fitness-condition of belief, not in terms of extrinsic fitness-condition of belief (as knowledge is).     — neomac


    [5]
    Can Jack look at a broken clock? Surely. Can Jack believe what the clock says? Surely. Why then, can he not believe that a broken clock is working? — creativesoul


    [6]
    >It is not contradictory at all, not in least little bit, to believe that broken clocks are working while doing so. so. The reason why is simple:when believing such things we do not knowingly do so! We are unaware of the fact that we believe what a broken clock says when we do. We cannot knowingly do so.

    What did you just write?! That’s the craziest thing I’ve heard so far! Contradiction has to do with logic not with your awareness. The fact that one does not realize to have a contradictory belief doesn’t make it, not in least little bit, less contradictory. And the problem is not that we are not aware of a contradictory belief, the problem is that a false belief is not a contradictory belief! (Not to mention, again, the unaccounted knowledge ascriptions…)     — “neomac

    [7]
    > Do you not find it odd that Jack would agree, if and when he figured out that the clock was broken?

    Seriously?! By “Jack” you mean a fictional character in a story that you just invented? Oh no, that’s not odd at all, it would be indeed much more odd if you invented stories where fictional characters explicitly contradict your theories, and despite that you used those stories to prove your theory.     — neomac
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    The terms "of" and "that it" are superfluous. We can remove them entirely and lose nothing meaningful. The simplest explanation is the best provided there is no loss in explanatory power. — creativesoul
    Indeed, there is loss of explanatory power, b/c by removing those parts you are attributing to Jack a contradictory belief so you can not distinguish a case of ignorance from a case of irrational belief, nor identify the different scopes in belief ascriptions (the p.o.v. of the one who makes the belief ascription about Jak is different from Jack's p.o.v). Not only, but if we assume that Jack's belief is a case of ignorance and not irrational belief, then your rendering is a case of misattribution, so it's a false explanation of Jack's behavior.
    Besides the explanatory power of belief ascription should be based on your definition of belief, as you claimed, this definition is “meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”. But you are not using it at all to prove that there is no loss in explanatory power. So how can you justify the claim that there is not loss in explanatory power?
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    ↪creativesoul


    First three methodological considerations:
    1. If you want to answer my questions you should specify which ones by quoting them and then answer them. If you think they are flawed, you should specify which ones by quoting them and explain why they are flawed. I don’t see that you are doing that in your post, even though you explicitly invited me to ask you questions. That looks fishy.
    2. If you claim that we can establish if “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working”, based on what we take belief to be, and your definition of belief is “meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”, then I expect you to show exactly how this definition helps you establish “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working”, all the more because you claim that your definition of belief is of “immense explanatory power”. But in your last post you never used such a definition. That looks fishy.
    3. In your last post you kept repeating the same claims you already made. But if I didn’t find your claims intuitive nor challenging as they were for the reasons I already explained, it’s pointless to keep invariably repeating them on and on. You should find other ways to make your case look stronger, unless you do not care to promote further your revisionist view, despite you being committed to it (you are the challenger of the common belief ascription practice, not me).

    So since we stalled, I’ll make a last attempt to make you sharpen your claims or your reasoning.

    Let’s start with these two excerpts:

    > Jack's belief cannot be both true and false and time t1 [1]. Thus, it makes no sense whatsoever for us to ascribe belief to Jack that is, could be, or could have been true [2]. False belief cannot be true [3].

    > It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood [4]. Thus, any correct ascriptions of belief attributed to Jack at time t1, must come in a form that it is impossible for him to knowingly believe [5].

    As I understand your claims (correct me if I’m wrong), you take claim [2] to be justified by [1] (and/or [3]), and your claim [5] to be justified by [4].

    Here are my claims. There are 2 distinct tasks in our common belief ascription practices: one is to identify a belief (and report it accordingly) and the other is to assess its truth-value (and report it accordingly). And the latter presupposes the former. Besides, a belief that is not analytically false, can be either true or false (for logic reasons).
    Now let’s apply my claims to the usual example:
    • At t1, Jack believes that p (first task)
    • At t1, p is false (ex hypothesi)
    • At t1, Jack mistakenly believes that p (second task)
    • if at t1, Jack mistakenly believes that p, then at t1, Jack believes that p (logic dependency between the 2 tasks)
    • If the belief content p is ‘that clock is working’, then p is not contradictory (not analytically false) and p can be either true or false.
    Now, let’s add your claims [1], [3] and [4] that I render as follows (if I’m wrong, provide the correct rendering):
    • It is false that at t1 Jack’s belief content (i.e. ‘that clock is working’) is true and false.
    • If the belief content ‘that clock is working’ is false, then the belief content ‘that clock is working’ is not true, and vice versa.
    • If the belief content ‘that clock is working’ is false, then it is false that Jack knows that clock is working.
    According to our common belief ascription practices, these 8 statements are all perfectly intelligible individually and logically consistent between them. Do you agree?
    If you agree, then your claim [1] and/or [3] are not logically sufficient to deduce claim [2], and your claim [4] is not logically sufficient to deduce [5], so some logic requirement is missing in your line of reasoning, i.e. your line of reasoning is not conclusive until you fill the gap successfully.
    If you disagree, quote the statements that are logically inconsistent or unintelligible, and explain why.
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    I don't believe he's a troll — EricH

    I don't care if he is a troll. He's got the intellectual creepiness of a troll, though.

    AFAICT his positions seem consistent. — EricH

    I don't know what you are referring to when talking about the consistency of his position. All I can say is that I learned about his positions on this and another previous thread. The first time his line of reasoning looked catastrophic to me from the start to the end, while now it just started very badly, but later it improved. However his attitude was less hysterical the first time than this time.
    This time his line of reasoning started very badly b/c he made the stupid claim that the following argument is deductively valid, which is obviously not.

    1. Moral imperatives are imperatives of reason
    2. Imperatives of reason have a single source: Reason
    3. Only a mind issues imperatives
    4. Therefore, moral imperatives are the imperatives of a single mind
    5. The single mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God).     — Bartricks

    Indeed the logical form of this argument (as it is) is something like:
    If m then r
If r then s
If i then n
—————
p
q
    And only nutcases and Bartricks would dare to call this line of reasoning deductively valid. BTW since he is using quantifiers (e.g."single source", "single mind"), his argument may look even messier if you put it into a predicative logic form, instead of a propositional logic form. So the claim that his first argument, as it is, is logically valid is the most stupid claim one can find on this thread up to now.
    Later he presented 4 deductions to counter my accusation against his deductively invalid argument, to support the idea that his deductively invalid argument was indeed valid. But this is just the second most stupid claim one can find in this thread b/c the 4 deductions provided by him do not present the propositional logical structure of the first argument, as I asked.
    Conclusion: I can grant you that his 4 deductions express a line of reasoning worth examining, (at least wrt the first argument), even if they do not argue in favor of the DCT argument of the main post of this thread, still they were preceded and then accompanied by the 2 most stupid claims one can find in the current thread. He could have simply said something like: "All right, the first argument is not deductively valid but what I meant is that I can provide a better version of it, which is deductively valid, here it is...". Instead he preferred to put up a hysterical straw man show, only proving his intellectual dishonesty on top of his two stupid claims (indeed the two most stupid claims one can find in this thread).
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    Bart's an obvious troll. Why are you responding? — Banno

    I can handle trolls. And also trolls might have interesting things to say.
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    ↪Bartricks


    > No, it is valid.

    Of course it's invalid, no matter how many times you keep boring us with your stupid claim. You should formalise your first argument as it is to prove that it is formally correct. But you can’t. Why? Because you need 4 deductions to make your first argument look formally acceptable, that’s why. And to claim that these 4 deductions back up your claim that your first argument is deductively valid, would be just the second most stupid claim in here. So you contributed with the two most stupid claims one can find in this thread. Kudos.

    > And note, bolding false assertions does not an argument make.

    Right, but if you can claim that your first argument is a valid deduction without proving it (and you didn’t prove it yet), I do not feel compelled to provide an argument to affirm that your claim is stupid.

    > I and 2 of the first argument are open to question, as are the first premises of the next two.

    One can philosophically question all 8 premises of your 4 deductions. Your premises are theoretically loaded so much that one could question any of them.

    > Now, you've got nothing philosophical to contribute, have you?

    BTW is your intellectual dishonesty a moral imperative from Reason?

    > Thus far you have made none at all, just Barticks baited - which didn't go so well, did it?

    Bait all you want, little ant. I’ve got enough thick skin for you.
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    Haha, you really don't know your stuff. Undergrad are we? — Bartricks
    Indeed there is lots I could learn from your intellectual dishonesty. But no, sorry, not interested.

    The first argument is obviously deductively valid. — Bartricks
    Let me stress it once more (from the abyss of my public humiliation you are so sadly fantasizing about): as it is, your first argument is obviously deductively invalid and it's utterly stupid to claim otherwise. You wouldn't need a sequence of 4 deductions, if it was valid as it was.

    Here are the 8 premises that one can question:
    1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason reason, then they all have a single source: Reason
    2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason reason

    1. If something is issuing imperatives, then it is a mind
    2. Reason issues imperatives

    1. If Reason is a mind, then Reason is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God)
    2. Reason is a mind

    1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they are imperatives of God
    2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason

    Now, each argument was deductively valid, yes? — Bartricks
    Yep

    And they are also sound. Deal. — Bartricks
    Nope.

    "But you made a typo in your first premise, so I win and your argument is stupid and dumb and just so stupid. So there." — Bartricks
    Don't worry, your stupid claim still remains the one I pointed out for the reasons I explained. Typos can be excused, of course, I'm not intellectually dishonest as you are proving to be the more you talk, but it was still worth mentioning it for clarity.
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    What's next is the sinking feeling that you are massively out of your depth followed by humiliation — Bartricks
    Sure ma’am.

    First let me stress my initial claim:
    It's the most stupid claim I've read so far in this thread to consider this argument (as it is) deductively valid. — neomac

    What you have just now provided is a list of 4 deductions that do not correspond at all to the formalisation of the argument you provided (as it is) which consisted in 5 propositions (where the 4th one seemed a conclusion from the first 3 premises):

    1. Moral imperatives are imperatives of reason
    2. Imperatives of reason have a single source: Reason
    3. Only a mind issues imperatives
    4. Therefore, moral imperatives are the imperatives of a single mind
    5. The single mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God).     — Bartricks

    This argument, as it is, is deductively invalid. And it’s stupid to claim otherwise. You needed a sequence of 4 deductions to make it look acceptable. So now the audience has 8 possible premises to question (instead of 3 or 4) when assessing the soundness of your DCT argument. Which also means that it would have been intellectually more honest to provide this argument from the start.

    BTW the first 2 premises of your Bartrickstein argument seemed to distinguish between “reason” and “Reason”:
    1. Moral imperatives are imperatives of reason
    2. Imperatives of reason have a single source: Reason

    So you should still adjust your first deduction accordingly.
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    Is that argument form valid? — Bartricks
    Yep, what's next?
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    ↪Bartricks
    go on.
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    ↪Bartricks

    can you formalise your argument or not, logic pimp?
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    If you don't know that it is deductively valid it's because you don't know what that means. — Bartricks
    Indeed I have literally no clue what "deductively valid" means to you. But in logic, "deductively valid" has a very specific meaning, not whatever stupid claim comes to your mind. So pls, formalise your argument and show to the world the deductive validity of your argument according to your stupid claim.
  • An Objection to Divine Command Theory
    @SwampMan
    Your counterargument looks more as a strawman wrt the DCT argument you have proposed:
    • It’s not evident that that DCT argument is committed to such a claim of yours: “A common way to think about God, both in philosophy and religion, is as the greatest possible being. A being which we can not even imagine anything to be better than.” Even if this assumption sounds plausible (due to our background knowledge), depending on how it is properly unpacked it may lead to different consequences.
    • It’s not evident that all the “good characteristics” attributed to God by the definition “God is the greatest possible being” are so judged wrt a moral standard (is omniscience, omnipotence or being eternal morally good?) while the DCT argument seems focused on standards for moral evaluation.
    • It would be more consistent with the DCT argument to explicitly claim “those properties are only morally good because God wants them” instead of “those properties are only good because God possesses them”.
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