Play along!

Have any of you ever seen updog?

"I want to fuck you like an animal
I want to feel you from the inside
I want to fuck you like an animal
my whole existence is flawed"

9 Inch Nails

Humor, not humour.

Pertaining to this:

In my opinion I would rather have a post of mine deleted than changed. If you don't like what I write, delete me or ban me. But don't change my words. The original title was perfectly clear and refers to a quote of Einstein. And the moderators of this site are clearly no Einsteins. — fishfry

I'll weigh in because I'm an expert in all that is American. So you know, when this issue first arose, I posted in the mod section that I thought the dustup between Fishfry and Sap was unnecessarily combative, and I thought Sap was being testy. (Yes, we bitch at each other). It's clear now there was a significant miscommunication. I like Fishfry didn't get it.

I don't know if it has to do with grammar as much as American bravado or defiance, but it's not to be taken literally. It simply seeks to emphasize how important it is to Fishfry that you not fuck with his posts. As in "Coach, play me or trade me." If the Coach said, "I'll neither play you nor trade you except as I see fit," the player would think, "Why is this peckerhead ignoring my plea [ yes, definitely a plea, not a directive] to get some playtime."

When Sap took it literally and said (as I took it), "Don't tell me what to do; I'll change shit as I see fit because you're like everyone else," I thought "Damn, who pissed in Sap's Cheerios this morning?" I truly did. I'm now relieved to learn though that Sap and Baden are rational and tempered, despite their functional illiteracy.

Carry on - as you guys say.

The days of sneaking away someone's dad's Playboy seem like such innocent times compared to today's internet. Whatever damage he did by publishing his R rated pictures is unrecognizable by the damage done by the porn now openly available.

Surely. Don't you?

Perhaps you could distinguish red from other colours before you learned the word. More likely you learned the word and the colour at the same time as you were encouraged to pick up the red block. — Banno

And how important is this empirical point to your general language theory? If I could know red prior to language, does your whole philosophy unravel? I'm just asking because you seem to hinge a tremendous amount on some sociological language learning theory studies that are ambiguous at best. My cat Gumbo greets Ginger, her lifelong dog friend, but hisses at Fred Barkowitz, the new puppy invading her home. How is it that Gumbo can distinguish Ginger from Fred without language but Hanover the toddler couldn't even tell red from the midnight sky?

Is that just "knowing that..." against "knowing how..."? If so, my point is that this does not go far enough. "Knowing that..." is a form of "knowing how..."; knowing that the cup is red is just knowing how to distinguish that cup from other cups. Knowing that something is the case is just knowing how to use words correctly. — Banno

I did already take your position as you have clarified here, which is that you're not just claiming that I might know how to fix broken pipe without language, but that I can't even tell a pipe from a wrench without language.

Would you be conformable with saying that this synthetic (bottom-up obtained) and analytic (in cog.sci . terms: top-down attained, i.e. (genotypically) predetermined toward learned) conflux of meaning can be inherited in all things that can perceive?

For my part, I’m accustomed to using other terms to express such behavioral inheritance of meaning. But I’m curious to know how one would address this same form of inheritance of meaning(s) in lesser animals via formal epistemological philosophy—this such as via the synthetic / analytic distinction. — javra

I'm told monkeys are born with a fear of heights and snakes, and I can say that my sheepdog has a herding instinct that I certainly never taught him. This goes along with your goose example.

My use of the synthetic/analytic language comes from my recent re-reading of Quine, who argued the non-existence of the distinction. It dawned on me that there is a distinction between observing the world and performing logic on the world, but the two are always intertwined. I cannot just look at an object without imposing my sense of reason on it. That's what knowledge is. I think animals do that as well, and I don't think it's really significant whether the reasoning ability has developed over time and was learned or whether it comes hard wired. In either event we see the world and we impose the reasoning of our mind onto it, and sometimes that includes using language and sometimes it doesn't.

He said that one could distinguish between two colors but not know that one was red. I still don't know what that means. He's saying I can know that I have two distinct colors, but I don't know that one is different than the other. Had he said one could distinguish between two colors and not know that one was "red," then I'd understand it to mean the person just didn't know how to correlate his sensation to language.

You changed the example to be that I could know that two people were standing side by side but not know they were husband and wife. Obviously I can know some things about an object but not others. I could know that my computer has a USB port but not a CD drive. I could also know that two objects are husband and wife but not know they were people. I could also know they were husband and wife and not know they were standing side by side. I could also see something and not know that there were two of them. My question still being why are there some things I can know without language (like that there are two people standing there), but there are others that require language (like they're husband and wife).

If the words in a given sequence of words are intelligible - understandable – how do you get past that to something else and preserve the qualification?" — tim wood

Those who hold the bible is the word of God believe every word is impregnated with divine meaning and would therefore demand scholarly interpretation of every passage, with recognition their interpretation may be flawed. Such traditions often rely upon sages or particularly learned people for biblical interpretation.

My turn. No song memories, but you made me reminisce, and so here it is. I suppose this explains me as good as anything...

I remember the long hot Georgia summers where you never wore shoes and you wandered off into the woods to the creek and looked for elusive crawdads, coming home for supper ("dinner" was the big meal mid day on Sunday) only when the street lights came on. Lightening bugs never lost their entertainment value. You wore Tough Skins from Sears Roebuck all with orange knees from the red Georgia clay.

The best spot at Grandmama's house (which was even farther south) was next to the blowing AC window unit. If the heat didn't keep you awake at night, the clatter of the crickets would.

Every man was a sir and every woman a m'am, no matter their standing. You stood for the national anthem, you bowed your head for the prayer, and closed your eyes as tight as you could. You never told on anyone, and you hit back hard. Dads told you to be honest and work hard and moms always reminded you to "be sweet," because you often weren't.

As I get older I convince myself my memories are all real. I think some really are. I suppose every generation laments the loss of their world.

It seems fitting these posts are found in the Last Word thread.

If you mean it is not the word of God, then either that is your opinion (that I share), or you can prove it. If the latter, please do so. — tim wood

See, https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Documentary_hypothesis.

The OT is a combination of a number of writings that were written over many years.

By way of example, there are two entirely seperate Noah stories strewn contradictorily together in Genesis, providing proof these were two works pieced together by an editor. http://www.awitness.org/contrabib/torah/flood.html

I assume he meant it in the sense that I can distinguish one person from another but not know that one of them was your wife. — Michael

I don't follow this distinction. If you can distinguish one person from the other, you must have an unspoken definition of person. The only distinction between the definition of person and wife is that the latter is more complex. Are you committing to some arbitrary delineation between simple and complex definitions? What is it?

It strikes me as possible for a dog to recognize a wife, especially one that has interacted with enough human couples to where the dog might fully expect a swat from a particular man if he nips at a particular woman. In fact, adult cats don't interact with other's kittens because they understand what a mother is (and how she acts).

I'd go further and suggest that all objects of perception contain indistiguishable elements of the synthetic and analytic. A bird flying overhead synthetically is some amount of raw data, but reason imposes so much upon it, one can never know what that raw data is. Analytically, we add our defintions to it, so that it is expected to act a certain way, from flapping its wings to being a predator.

How we analyze is in part instinctual, and, as we are a higher organism, in part deliberate. Our perhaps best tool for analysis is language, but that's all it is - a tool. This leads to an indirect realist metaphysic, simply saying we know our world only through interpretation, some being the way the eye works, some the brain, and some language.

I don't see that as supportive of the idea that language is the primary determinant of knowledge, but only that culture, environment, language, and I'm sure a multitude of other factors play a role in shaping one's understanding of the world. It's not as if animals, devoid of all language, are unable to form a conception of reality. I'd expect that monkeys from Asia have differing perspectives of similar events than do monkeys from Africa, simply due to the environmental differences. I also think it's obvious that any sort of formalized thought about ordinary events will result in a deeper understanding of those events, meaning that if I study colors (which includes reducing my thoughts to language), I will be more knowledgeable about the different types of colors than someone who doesn't.

I'd say you could distinguish one colour from another, but still did not know that one of them was red." — Banno

I note that "red" isn't in quotes. What does this comment even mean? I could distinguish red from green, but not know they were different?

Here I suspect we meet an impasse. I'd say you could distinguish one colour from another, but still did not know that one of them was red. Witness the Greek's "bronze sky", and the Himba seeing different colours to you or I. Language crystallises perception. — Banno

This really makes no sense. Are you suggesting that the Himba fail to see the full array of colors that you do because they live in a language deficient environment? That seems hopelessly backwards. The reason the Himba fail to see the full array of colors you do is because they live in a color deficient environment, and since they can't see those colors, they never created words for them. It's not like the Himba are just particularly bad wordsmiths when it comes to labeling colors, and now the Himba can't see colors everyone else can.

I'll certainly admit that pointing things out, discussing them, analyzing them, and thinking about them clarifies them and brings forth knowledge you would have never otherwise known. So if that's what you mean by "language crystalizes perception," I agree. Thought increases our knowledge, thought occurs with language; therefore language increases knowledge. So sometimes language precedes knowledge, sometimes not.

To the real question here, are you actually asserting that your language theory is an empirical one, and this isn't a matter of philosophy as much as it is a scientific one?

So in order to know what "red" means, you must already know what sort of things are red. Yet to know which things are red, you must know what "red" means.

What do you make of this puzzle? — Banno

The second sentence doesn't follow. I knew red prior to knowing the word "red."

What does that mean? That you learned that the cup is red in a different way to how you learn that I learned that the cup is red? — Banno

That (1) the cup is red and (2) you have an experience the cup is red. I learned #1 by seeing the cup. I learned #2 by your telling me. I have no way to verify #2.

Did you learn about the cup and I, or did you learn about how we use the word "red"? — Banno

I learned about the cup by seeing it. I learned about how we use the word "red" by hearing it.

Part of your learning that the cup is red is your learning how to use the word "red". — Banno

Obviously for me to label it red, I must know what "red" means. But if it had a peculiar odor for which I had no name, I'd just as much know that smell name or no name.

That supposed distinction between internal and external, subjective and objective, breaks down on close inspection. — Banno

I don't follow this at all.

Indeed, a cat/dog dualist might insist on their being incommensurate. A cat/dog monist might insist that cats and dogs are both mammals.

These are not distinct epistemologies, so much as distinct ways of talking about cats and dogs. — Banno

And do you not concede though that when speaking of mental states versus external states that they are epistemologically distinct?

I know the cup is red by sensing it. I don't know your phenomenal state of the cup is red by sensing it.

Disagree. Definitely on topic. The OP references "mechanism," which is his word for physicalism, which he then argues negates free will, all of which is metaphysics.

Doesn't the atheistic monist have to deal with the same question of when consciousness (i.e. that something extra) begins and ends during a life cycle?

Why? Rather, a monist would reject that very distinction. The "must" is what a dualist might think the monist must do. Monists might well disagree. — Banno

A monist can no more reject a distinction between a mental state and a physical state than he can a cat and a dog. They are different things. The problem for the monist though when distinguishing between mental phenomena and objects is that, unlike cats and dogs, they are different in class, not just different in degree. Mental phenomena of rocks are subjective, rocks are objects.

Doesn't the fact that you can't show me your phenomenal state of the rock but you can show me the the actual rock offer a meaningful distinction between the two? So the monist tells me that one is composed of Element A and the other of Element B, but those are both subtypes of Substance A. The dualist says the same thing, he just doesn't acknowledge the two types are of the same substance. I say there's no real difference between the two positions.

That's not even close to what metaphysics is. This is not the place to go into that. — T Clark

If one is a physicalist, then metaphysics would in fact be that which physics has yet to explain.

no legal precedent for anyone under such circumstances being convicted of murder. — Sapientia

Alright fair enough. Suppose I duct taped someone's mouth shut just to keep him quiet, and then I started watching South Park for a couple of hours and didn't remember about the guy until I smelled the pizza burning, and I was like "oh shit," and I couldn't get him to respond, so I started to bury him, and he started fighting like a mother fucker, but I finally got him down. Is that murder? I sorta need to know.

Well, it all strikes me as a rationalization to support your personal moral imperative to have as many kids with your wife as possible. It is just as likely (in fact more so) that there will be more children if we abandoned traditional marital norms and normalized sexual free for alls, making certain no fertile female is unimpregnated.

I realize that there is insufficient wealth to care for all these children as we would wish, but the same holds true for your situation unless you are incredibly wealthy. I expect your community can provide for you if you lack the resources, but I don't believe it could if all your neighbors did as you are.

None of this is to be taken as a criticism of your desire to have a large family, but only as a response to your criticism that others don't.

It'd seem then under such logic that abstention would be murder because you're withholding the creation of life. You possess in your hands (so to speak) an awesome person creator, at attention, ready to erupt and make little ones. Holding your warrior back is to murder a whole army of potentials.

So I say to my brothers, go out, conquer, and bring me back a mighty litter. All else is murder!

So there's a 50/50 chance you'll roll any particular number on a 6 sided die? My guess is you scored less than 50% on your statistic tests 100% of the time.

Mechanism, its very simple, what you decide to do is beyond your controll, its dictated by physics, just as any other action or reaction is. — XanderTheGrey

Do you not see the paradox within this sentence? You've arrived at the conclusion that conclusions can't be arrived at. Of what value are any of your philosophical conclusions if you admit they aren't based upon intentional deliberation, but just based on coercive forces?

A monist must accept a critical distinction between the phenomenal states of experience and the objects of the objective world. How does the cup image form in my mind, what is it's composition, and how does it correlate with reality?

That is to say, the monist has to admit to dualism and offers no better explanation as to the interaction problem as the dualist. The God explanation is the "it just does" explanation. Isn't that what you ultimately say?

Then why all the talk about the mind body interaction problem?

Hanover likes sarcasm which is good, because a fair amount is aimed at him. — Bitter Crank

It's rarely so potent. Usually I just get an eye roll, so imagine my joy at an almost philosophical suicide. It is good to know I have such a poisonous arrow in my quiver though.

Staying on point with this thread, I note this is simple metaphor. There are no actual arrows and quivers. Should we be speaking in more complex double entendre metaphor, I would insist upon having my poisonous arrow in someone else's quiver of course. Poetry is all around us.

Yeah, no one holds the mind and body aren't interrelated. The question is how they are related. Even parallelism posits the mind and body correlate, even while denying a causal connection.

So here's how you started off this thread:

On the other hand, it seems like in all of these cases, there was something to gain from performing such actions. If somebody didn't donate to a charity then they would be guilt-ridden by not doing anything. — Alec

Your argument was that since there's always an underlying fulfillment of personal desire by carrying out a seemingly selfless act, all acts must be inherently selfish. I disagreed, arguing that fulfillment of desire (i.e. doing what you want) does not make an act selfish. In order to determine whether something is selfless, you simply look to the specific act and see if it primarily is directed at helping others.

But here you say:

If you want an example of an selfless intentional act that has a reason, then it is very simple to provide one. Compare "I want to save someone from a burning house in order to protect myself from the guilt of not doing so" to "I want to save someone from a burning house because it is the right thing to do". If you still think that the latter is somehow impossible then please tell me what is wrong here. — Alec

This appears to ignore your initial concern, namely that the fulfillment of personal desire negates the selfless quality of the act. The first example and the second example you give above are indistinct in that regard. Your wanting to do the right thing (and therefore doing the right thing) obviously results in some sort of benefit to you else you wouldn't do it. If you didn't do it, what would be the repercussion? You'd wish you had?

Or here's another way of putting it: You're saying that I want to do x because it would satisfy my wanting to do x. That sounds circular. — Alec

My initial objection to your inquiry was that you were searching for a tautology, and here you're just recognizing my objection.

The question is: When is an act not selfish?

My response is not to look at this analytically, but simply to ask in which instances do we call something selfless. Saving kids from fires, rescuing the drowning, etc. are all such instances. It's not significant to me whether the rescuer were a passerby who would have had a strong sense of guilt had he ignored the victim or whether it was a paid emergency worker for hire. In either case, they saved another, and in both cases they had underlying motives, in both cases they were heroes, and in both cases they were not selfish..

Your inquiry has, however, been to try to derive that which is selfless from analyzing terms as opposed to simply looking for instances of term use. I first pointed out that all acts occurred for a reason except for those that were accidental, which meant that you'd be left with the absurd conclusion that the only selfless acts would be those like tripping over a wire to save people. You then wished to correct me by asking when were conscious acts selfless, and by conscious, you meant intentional.

You distinguished between two sentences:

#1: I simply want to save someone from a burning house vs.
#2: I want to save someone from a burning house in order to protect myself from the guilt of not doing so.

The problem is that #1 is an incomplete sentence. There is some reason you want to save someone because, tautologically, every intentional act has a corresponding intent. In order to find an act without an underlying intent, you must look for accidental or random events, not the sort we're at all interested in here.

So, to your question, when does #1 occur, asking very specifically as you have when do you intentionally save someone from a burning house for no reason, I'd say never, but that's based upon a logical problem in trying to explain how one can act intentionally for no reason. That just doesn't make sense. If you acted intentionally, you had a reason, and that reason formed the basis of your intent.

There will always be a reason. I want to save someone from a burning house because it will satisfy some desire in me.

Doing what you want to do is compatible with the latter, but my question is if there are any true cases of such behaviour. — Alec

As I've accused you of a tautology, the disproof would be for you to hypothesize the very example you seek. That is, if you can't imagine a hypothetical case of conscious, non-accidental selflessness, then what you are looking for exists in no possible world and is thus a contradiction. To assert its absence would be a tautology. So you tell me, using your definition of "selfless," when does it occur?

Come on. Are all conscious decisions that we make done out of concern for oneself? — Alec

You're creating a tautology here. If I do what I want to, then I'm selfishly doing what I want, even if what I want is to save your life from a burning house. If I didn't want to save you, I wouldn't have.

My point is that you're misdefining the word.

But my question has to do with whether or not there are actual examples of people doing something solely for the benefit of others and not their own interest. In other words, are all actions done out of concern for oneself? — Alec

Sure, but they're not what we would consider selfless. If I trip over a wire and save you from electrocution, I did something for you and nothing for me.

On a personally level, its a disgusting word to me, and I feel nothing but anger and suspicion the moment someone says it to me. — XanderTheGrey

But of course, as this is thematic with your ongoing agenda to advocate some sort of sociopathic ideology/religion you've come upon. How much longer must we wait before your big reveal where you set out the bases of your brand of Satanism?