Or here's another way of putting it: You're saying that I want to do x because it would satisfy my wanting to do x. That sounds circular. — Alec
My initial objection to your inquiry was that you were searching for a tautology, and here you're just recognizing my objection.
The question is: When is an act not selfish?
My response is not to look at this analytically, but simply to ask in which instances do we call something selfless. Saving kids from fires, rescuing the drowning, etc. are all such instances. It's not significant to me whether the rescuer were a passerby who would have had a strong sense of guilt had he ignored the victim or whether it was a paid emergency worker for hire. In either case, they saved another, and in both cases they had underlying motives, in both cases they were heroes, and in both cases they were not selfish..
Your inquiry has, however, been to try to derive that which is selfless from analyzing terms as opposed to simply looking for instances of term use. I first pointed out that
all acts occurred for a reason except for those that were accidental, which meant that you'd be left with the absurd conclusion that the only selfless acts would be those like tripping over a wire to save people. You then wished to correct me by asking when were
conscious acts selfless, and by conscious, you meant intentional.
You distinguished between two sentences:
#1: I simply want to save someone from a burning house vs.
#2: I want to save someone from a burning house in order to protect myself from the guilt of not doing so.
The problem is that #1 is an incomplete sentence. There is some reason you want to save someone because, tautologically, every intentional act has a corresponding intent. In order to find an act without an underlying intent, you must look for accidental or random events, not the sort we're at all interested in here.
So, to your question, when does #1 occur, asking very specifically as you have when do you intentionally save someone from a burning house for no reason, I'd say never, but that's based upon a logical problem in trying to explain how one can act intentionally for no reason. That just doesn't make sense. If you acted intentionally, you had a reason, and that reason formed the basis of your intent.