Definitely. It's taken me a while to realise that its required to claim antirealism. It makes me very uncomfortable as I need to push back hard on the likes on Banno claiming that perception is direct. — AmadeusD

It seems to me that "direct" and "indirect" do not have a determinate application in the context of perception. So it's like "glass half full" and "glass half-empty". Which means one should not draw dramatic conclusions from either.
But do we think that noise-cancelling headphones prevent us from hearing what's going on, or do we think that they enable us to hear what is going on?
Do they distort reality? In one sense yes, in another sense no.

This thread provides good evidence that you need to put your money down on specific definitions or you’ll never\\ be able to discuss beyond just the surface of metaphysics. If we come back in a month and have the same discussion, the same arguments will just get recycled over and over without ever having a resolution. If you want to go deeper, you have to commit. — T Clark

I agree that one has to pay attention to the ways that words are used - the concepts that define the discussion. But I do not agree that laying down a definition at the start avoids the issues - though I do not deny that it may sometimes be helpful.
But no definition (rule) can cater for all future possibilities - there can always be cases where interpretations of the rule differ. There's no reason why these can't be sorted out, but they can only be sorted out when they appear; they cannot be sorted out in advance.
This is all particularly tricky in philosophy, because disagreements so often turn on different uses of words - different presuppositions.

We can write "Kp" for "we know p", and "◇Kp" for "we might know p", and "~Kp" for "we don't know p" and "~◇Kp" for "we can't know p", none of which are tensed. — Banno

W can write "Kp" for whatever we like. Once we have interpreted it, however, (I think that's the right word), there are consequences.

"we know p", is compatible (awkwardly) with "we might know p". But it is incompatible with "we don't know p" and "we can't know p".
"we might know p" compatible with "we know p" and "we don't know p"; it is incompatible with "we can't know p",

In other words, we can interpret "Kp" however we like, but that does not mean we can substitute any interpretation for any other. "We know that p" and "We might know that p" are not inter-substitutable.

In addition, we have the issue of tensed or tenseless. This is complicated and doubly complicated in this context, because we have two verbs involved. But I'm stuck on "it is raining" does not follow from "It might be raining".

I might well be confused about what tensed and untensed truths.

I think the biggest argument for antirealism is the actual facts of eyes, ears, noses and mouths (and skin, I guess). I do, however, think its possible I've not come across a name for the position I actually think its reasonable, because its not idealism as antirealism might suggest.
I suggest antirealism about perception is roughly, unavoidable, but that antirealism as a metaphysical comment seems... tenuous as best, and seemingly ridiculous at worst. Maybe that clears up where I'm not understanding the issues in the previous comments. — AmadeusD

I agree with you that we're not all that far apart. There is a truth in anti-realism; where I disagree with it is the inflation of that truth into a Grand Doctrine. In the case of perception, it is inescapable true that what we know about the world around us comes to us from our senses.
But it is what the anti-realist (idealist) makes of this mundane fact that bothers me.
The point of the discussion in that post is the idea that our perceptions (or language) are not self-contained but point beyond themselves to a mind-independent reality, which can be known by us. Which does not mean that we will ever know everything about everything, so that there are always some things that are not known.

You propose a type of purposiveness which is not set toward any goal or aim. It's just a "functional mechanism", a "control mechanism", which does what it does, without any further goal, or aim. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a misunderstanding here. Our digestion has the function of extracting nutrients from food and disposing of the waste. That is the goal or aim of the system, isn't it? Our balance organ controls our actions so that we don't fall over. That is it's goal or aim.

How is that reasonable in any sense, to drive such a wedge and produce a dualism of purposiveness within an individual being? This is why I say that this proposed division of purposiveness would leave one type as unintelligible. Unless one is understood as an extension, or subtype of the other, then the one is left as aimless and unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes I am suggesting exactly that. Evolutionary purposes are an extension of the paradigm of conscious purpose. I hate to complicate things even more, but I am also suggesting that the purposes of our physiology are not evolutionary, but are about establishing and maintain our bodies. That's also an extension of conscious purposes. This in the context of unconscious purposes, which was raised earlier.

But in philosophy when we want to understand the true nature of something, what is conventional for other purposes might mislead the philosopher. That is what I think is happening here. This idea, which is useful for some other purposes, is misleading you in your philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

"conventions...might mislead the philosopher" tells me that sometimes it doesn't. So it makes a good starting-point.
I don't see that I'm being misled by the idea of language games.

What is learned is "ordinary language", what is taught is principled speaking (philosophy). — Metaphysician Undercover

So what is learned is not what is taught? I think, however, that you are forgetting that many people, perhaps most people, do not learn language by being taught. They learn it from interacting with their environment. Actually teaching language is a different kind of exercise.

Therefore ordinary language is based in a foundation of philosophy as the guiding principles, what you call rules, even though the learner may refuse the rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

H'm. How on earth did people get on before philosophy was invented? Not that I deny that philosophy of language is useful. I just don't see that it is useful in the way you suppose.

I explained to you the principles of separation. You are claiming that the principles of separation also serve as unification. That is what I insisted, is unjustified. Obviously, "300 miles" refers to a spatial separation between two distinct and separate places. Please explain how you conceive of "300 miles" as a union between these two. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not quite. "300 miles" is a distance which can be regarded as a measure of the space that separates them, or a measure of the space that unites them - they are both in the same state, though not in the same country. Separation and unity are two sides of the same coin.

Sex is a cross-species or meta-species classification. It is something that subdivides species of animals, and therefore requires a level of abstraction and generality beyond zoological studies considered according to species. In a philosophical and theological sense sex has always been somewhat elusive in that way. — Leontiskos

I'm a bit surprised that you don't mention the distinction between sex and gender in this connection. It is, perhaps, only a beginning to addressing the complications you refer to. But it is at least a start.

This is incidentally why ↪Ludwig V is mistaken when he views metaphysics as merely a matter of "height," as if it were a hermetically sealed compartment at a certain "altitude" of thought. That is a very common misunderstanding.) — Leontiskos

I did recognize that I was pushing a metaphor. But I did so in order to bring it into question.

Metaphysics is not some hermetically sealed compartment that is distinct from all other compartments of thinking. It is more a kind of valence or mode or abstraction that occurs in thinking. — Leontiskos

I'm not sure I would put it in just that way, but I don't disagree with you. It seems to me that the difficulty of characterising it shows that metaphysics is not a discipline or subject like any other. That's why, in my book, presenting actual metaphysical discussions is the best way of introducing it to people.

Absolute presuppositions are not verifiable. This does not mean that we should like to verify them but are not able to; it means that the idea of verification is an idea which does not apply to them.... — R.G. Collingwood - An Essay on Metaphysics

This is an interesting idea. I have so many questions. But it seems better to read the book and then ask questions. It's 200 pages, so that will take time. It's a pity, but perhaps there will be an opportunity on another occasion. I have downloaded the book.

As I noted, this is a first take. I don't like it much. Definitely needs work. Beyond what's on the list, just general good writing rules also apply. — T Clark

I don't disagree with you, though I would vastly prefer - "explained" instead of "defined" in the first point. If one offers definitions, there is a serious risk one will never get any further. "Definitions first" is a recipe for stalling. "Definitions last" would be a lot more realistic. If that approach was good enough for Socrates, it is good enough for me.
But the biggest issue is about clarity. The analytic tradition sets a lot of store by it. I'm never quite sure what they mean. The standard of clarify in that tradition is logical analysis. But that is a poor model for many topics and requires a good deal of input on the part of most readers - in that they have to learn logic first, which presumably can only be clearly introduced and explained in ordinary language. I don't know what other traditions say about this, but one would think that they would be inclined to sign up, with a different idea of what clarify is.

It would help to bear in mind the question for which an answer is sought. — Mww

Oh yes, certainly. That's why I said that the question defines its answer (normally). What counts as an answer depends on the question. Different kinds of answer for different kinds of question.

no contradiction in treating metaphysics scientifically, that is, in accordance with basic principles as grounds for its speculative maneuvers. — Mww

OK. I understand why one might include logic and mathematics as sciences; they do have some basic principles. They are different from the principles of physics &c. That is the result of the kind of questions that they ask, so it is not a problem.
But what are the basic principles of metaphysics? Maybe one could venture that they are the principles of logic applied to certain concepts that are used in almost every context. One might get assent to the proposition, but then comes the question why no progress is made.
Perhaps we should not be asking that, but asking what counts as progress. That might reveal a good deal about the nature of the enquiry.
Here's what really puzzles me. Metaphysics is said to be about the world - de re. Why, then, is it not an empirical science like physics, etc.

Mathematics is sufficient proof, in that for what reason proposes from itself metaphysically, experience proves with apodeictic certainty naturally. — Mww

What's the phrase - "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics"? It's a good point. Someone is sure to ask whether there are questions for which a mathematical answer is not appropriate and if so, why?

i was just demonstrating that Metaphysics influenced taxonomy without asking anyone to read the book, i honstly don't even know what the paper is about...but it mentions aristotle's metaphysics in regards to zoology, i regret using that as an example... — ProtagoranSocratist

I would suggest that the point is that the Aristotelian approach was developed to apply universally, but it seems reasonable to suppose that Aristotle got the model from his biological work. Certainly, it has turned out to be a lot more useful in biology than in physics. Against that idea is the fact that Plato developed the idea of "forms" or "ideas" in the context of mathematics, and Aristotle must have been influenced by that.

Or, as I suggested to Metaphysician Undercover, if you continue to say such things you may well be institutionalized. — J

Yes, of course that's true. I intended to high-light the point that "penalties" might or might not overlap with consequences and that although they might be different in some respects, they are also the same, or likely to have the same effect on the relevant behaviour - to discourage it.

The evolutionary thesis isn't usually applied to the stuff that's biologically obligatory, like breathing or digesting. — J

Yes. Actually, it occurs to me that the biologically obligatory activities are in a somewhat different category from the evolutionary purposes. The former serve the interests of the individual. Evolution serves the interest of the species.

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were making what I regard as polemical points, in opposition to the rationalizing tendency of the philosophy that was current. I find it difficult to think they really believed it, about themselves. — J

I've always thought there is a big rhetorical element in much of what they say. But I've never heard anyone else suggest it. It makes sense to me.

whereas growing is a type of intentional activity which is far more general. — Metaphysician Undercover

"intentional" in some sense, I suppose. I would prefer "purposive". It's a process of developing a functional mechanism and the process is set up by DNA (roughly) and includes control mechanisms. But it's very different from purposive activities at a conscious, everyday level. Our growth processes are not controlled by the conscious being that is being created. That would be impossible.

the idea that we can't help doing what our biology (or unconscious, if you prefer) insists on. — J

Yes and no. We can't help eating and drinking in a sense, but there is a huge super-structure of activity at the conscious level. The basic biology is realized - catered for - in many very different ways, depending on the environment, cultural and physical. (It's very hard, to impossible to separate the biology from it's superstructure.)

I believe that philosophy forms the bedrock usage, and ordinary language sails off, losing contact with the philosophical roots. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how that's possible. We don't learn philosophy on its own. We have to learn ordinary language first. The same applies to very many, if not all, specialized languages. To put it another way, we expect everybody to speak ordinary language, because that's what we all use all day. Could a child learn physics first and ordinary language afterwards? I think not.
I think there's a specialized use of "foundation" here, which is part of the way that we think theoretically. So there are questions about the foundations of mathematics or logic that are quite different wha similar question mean in the context of house-building or institution-founding.
My point here is that "foundation" sometimes means "beginnings" and sometimes means something that one can only really understand when one has already understood what is "built" on the foundation.

However, we do have very good reason to accept the minds of others, as well as the medium between us, which separates my mind from your mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there is a medium that separates us, it also, at the same time, unites us. It's just a change in perspective. London and Edinburgh are separated by a bit more than 300 miles. At the same time, they are joined by those miles.

We couldn't call these signs "the rules", because "the rules" implies principles which people are obliged to follow. — Metaphysician Undercover

I guess you mean by "obliged" that there are penalties if inflicted on you if you do not follow them. If you kick the ball when you are off-side, the referee will impose a penalty. But sometimes, there are just consequences when you do not follow them. If you break the rules of chess in a formal game, there will be a penalty. If you break the rules in an informal game, there are no penalties, except the consequence that you are not playing chess. Your opponent may or may not be pleased by your action, and that reaction could be regarded as a penalty.
But you have a point. There are no formal rules in ordinary language. The so-called rules of language are, perhaps more like habits. I do agree that they are certainly not particularly like conventions, in the sense that there is no agreement to use words in particular ways and we follow them without being able to articulate them.
But it is useful to think of language as a set of rules - grammar. This is a process of articulation and codification after the event. One use is to teach the language to new users who already speak a language. It is a hard road, and is usually supplemented by the informal learning that children rely on. Another is that it allows us to develop the idea of logic and so to improve our thinking and calculating ability.

Or, if it's merely a matter of "Either follow them or face the consequences," then this applies equally well to ordinary language, which exacts stern consequences for the non-followers. — J

Yes. If I say "Julius Caesar is a prime number", the penalty is that I haven't said anything. But sometimes, when people break the rules, we find an interpretation that makes sense. "Trieste is no Vienna" is, strictly speaking, meaningless, but in fact we can make sense of it. Sometimes, a look can speak volumes, though normally you can't say anything by looking.

Or at the very least, presupposes the possibility of it. From there, it’s legitimate to propose a theory under which it may be described. — Mww

The trouble is that, when we come to looking for an answer, we find it very difficult to articulate one that acquires the consensus that needs to coalesce around a truth. That's why it is different from science.

The trick is to get involved in the discussions and let the definition take care of itself. -- Ludwig V
That would probably be true if metaphysics was just something interesting to talk about as opposed to something really important and useful that has important consequences. — T Clark

Yes. Perhaps we would do well to spend more time articulating why the questions are so important and what important consequences answers have.

if everyone would just agree with me. — T Clark

World peace! Yay! But the end of all the fun and excitement of doing philosophy. It'll be hard to wean people off that.

What sort of things tie all particular disciplines together? Things like 'being', 'truth', 'God', etc. So metaphysics can reasonably be understood as the "height" of generalization and abstraction, where we are considering concepts that are applicable to literally everything — Leontiskos

I'll buy the scope of the concepts that fall under metaphysics and consequently that very high levels of abstraction are in play. That's the problem. We think our ordinary ways of talking about concepts are going to work for us. But they don't. I'll push your metaphor further and claim that the height of abstraction is such that it has no oxygen - that is, it's a problem, not a feature.

Yea. It's about ultimate truth, which is why I brought up gothic cathedrals. Metaphysics is tinged with the idea that we're finding a hidden, but grand truth about what's right under our feet. — frank

I know what truth is (except when I'm doing metaphysics). But what's ultimate truth?

I don’t get it. If it’s so simple why have people been arguing about it for thousands of years with no resolution in sight—just going around and around and around. — T Clark

Long ago I remember reading a piece by Isaiah Berlin about philosophy (reference forgotten) that claimed that philosophy is about all the questions that nobody knows how to answer. That caught my attention and eventually sucked me into philosophy. It would explain the phenomena.

Materialism, realism, idealism, anti-realism, existentialism, stoicism, nihilism, empiricism, rationalism, utilitarianism, and all the other isms—do you really think one of those is right and all the rest are wrong? — T Clark

You've got a point there. So it may be that truth or falsity isn't the issue. I've got time for the idea that metaphysics is about how to interpret - think about - the world and life and Grand Questions. Truth is beside the point or perhaps not the whole point.

The claim that metaphysics is empty (‘otiose’ was Ayer’s term) is itself a metaphysical claim. That’s basically what sunk the positivists. — Wayfarer

Perhaps we need to consider positivism in its context - which is the development in physics of some really mad theories. Many philosophers dismissed them out of hand - and they were not wrong. Positivism set up a framework - instrumentalism - that provided a justification for pursuing them even though they were clearly impossible. That focus is what led to the sharp distinction between descriptive, factual, true-or-false statements and the rest. Physics was true to its mission and defined a boundary that enabled the project to proceed. Perhaps that's an example of what @T Clark meant when he talked about metaphysics as "something really important and useful that has important consequences". I'm not sure that physics has yet abandoned it, so perhaps talking of it as sunk is a bit premature.

This expands the "sense of [unconscious] purpose, of intent" into the moral sphere as well, as so many contemporary exponents of evolutionary explanations do. — J

Yes. Dual intent/purpose is certainly at work. So is manipulation of our desires. Life's quite bleak from the evolutionary point of view.

Yes, quite so.

That is a fundamental point of enactivism, 'a theory of cognition that emphasizes the dynamic interaction between an organism and its environment, positing that cognition arises from the organism's actions, not just from internal brain processes. — Wayfarer

Yes. That's why I'm very keen on enactivism.. The dominance of "internal brain processes" is the result of the "theoretical stance". Enactivism needs to locate that as a derivative or specialized way of thinking that depends on ordinary, active, life.

Although I will grant that 'create' carries connotations that are perhaps a bit too strong. 'Mind constructed world' would be nearer the real intent, but it doesn't have the same ring to it. — Wayfarer

It's not just that. It's that it doesn't address the fundamental point that we are "thrown", as they say, into a world. It is what we are lumbered with, what we have to learn about before we can act coherently. There are no fresh starts.

So when you say that you can see and hear things without intending to, this is a self-deceptive illusion you create for yourself, by restricting "intention" to a conscious act of willing, and not allowing that there is intention, purpose, behind all your subconscious acts as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

The strange magic of evolutionary theory is that it creates a sense of purpose, of intent, that does not depend on any conscious activity. Whether, and how far, that coincides with un- or sub-conscious activity, I couldn't say. But I don't think that it makes philosophical sense to say that an unconscious purpose is just like a conscious purpose, but unconscious. It needs a bit more explaining than that.

But I think when we claim each of us create or construct the world, and cats and bunnies do so as well, the world tends to multiply. — Ciceronianus

I think that "Lebenswelt" does have some sense to it. But it is odd to say that each living thing creates its own. It would be better to say that each living thing has an associated lebenswelt which arises as a result of its existence. What is more difficult to understand is "the world" etc.

To properly study philosophy, it is of the utmost importance that we do not adhere to "ordinary use" for our definitions. Ordinary use is so full of ambiguity that attempts to apply logic would be fruitless. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think it is necessarily wrong to develop variant uses of ordinary concepts for philosophical purposes. But it would be a mistake to think that philosophy can just sail off on its own, losing contact with the ordinary world and ordinary language. Ordinary language, because it is the first language we learn, is the inescapable bedrock of everything else.

It's just more evidence that your world is not the same as my world. Therefore it's more proof that "the world" is actually a false conception. No matter how much the belief that there is just one world, is a shared belief, it's contrary to reality, as demonstrated by what you wrote here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why can't our individual worlds all share in the public world?

I don't see how ordinary language could be misused, because the nature of "ordinary language" is that there are no regulations to distinguish between use and misuse. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't mean there are no rules. It just means that the rules can be misused and misinterpreted. Some of these misinterpretations become new, or extended, uses. Others are ignored or suppressed because they are not accepted (taken up) by the ultimate arbiters of correct and incorrect - the community of users.

Philosophers strive to exclude such misuse, and that's what separates philosophical use of language from ordinary use of language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. We can't take the whole of ordinary language for what it is and do philosophy. We have to use it somewhat differently. But we need to link back to ordinary language (or experience) or world, or philosophy becomes a pointless exercise.

These are secrets Whitman would say, but not kept secret. — Antony Nickles

That's a new concept for me, but it makes sense. I could give examples, but that would violate the taboo.

The odd thing is that in asking the question, one also answers it. (emoticon of scratching head in bewilderment - the classical philosophical position.)

The claim that metaphysics is empty (‘otiose’ was Ayer’s term) is itself a metaphysical claim. — Wayfarer

I'm trying to give up arguments of that form. I used to love them, but I've come to appreciate how important it is to understand that arguments fully before dismissing them. I can't resist pointing out that, by their definition of "empty", they were correct. Which possibly means they missed the point.

For myself, I am stuck in that I cannot see that it matters greatly whether you say that the concept of matter is meaningless or that matter doesn't exist. In other words, de re and de dicto are, in a sense, images of each other. For all my criticism of idealism, in the end, I think that there is nothing that idealists cannot say in the language they allow themselves that realists cannot say in the language they claim for themselves. So perhaps it comes to a question of what hangs on the issue, if anything.

I think some of the bad rap metaphysics gets is because of its repetition by those who repeat it in slogan form without really grasping it. — Wayfarer

It's difficult, though. Either one has to refute a generic form of idealism, which will likely consist of mostly slogans, or one has to refute a specific idealism, which leaves the rest unrefuted. It is perfectly clear that metaphysics has not finished, and that fact sends its own message. The anti-metaphysics of the early 20th century is not the first of its kind and I'm sure it will not be the last. A slogan - "The most fundamental problem in metaphysics is whether metaphysics exists". :smile:

Other than that, I guess I'll keep intercepting information about metaphysics until I no longer do. — ProtagoranSocratist

The most important thing I was trying to say was that you are unlikely to find a good definition of metaphysics and then go on to study it. The trick is to get involved in the discussions and let the definition take care of itself. The discussions are much more interesting anyway.

In today's culture, because these insights are categorised along with religion then they're generally disregarded or deprecated. — Wayfarer

The problem is that it is very hard to sort out the false from the true, the helpful from the unhelpful. In the end one has to look at their effect on the lives of those who take them seriously. That means their lives beyond the experiences themselves.

Thanks for this. Do I have to let anyone know if I want to attend?

That's an excellent quotation.

I must have looked up this word at least 10 times. Here's what comes up:
the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space. — ProtagoranSocratist

Dictionaries are a good starting-point, but are also often not particularly helpful. The list of topics suggests that metaphysics is defined by its subject-matter. The quotation from Wilfrid Sellars in @180 Proof's post above expands on this by giving the questions, not just the topics. But what really distinguishes metaphysics is how you set about answering the questions - methodology. But don't look for an explanation of the methodology - watch how people conduct their discussions. You'll get some idea from that and then you can build on that by joining in.
A good idea is to look at what people discussing metaphysics are talking about and how they are talking about it. You could even ask a question or two.
You'll have gathered that it is a contentious question, and that there are people who think metaphysics doesn't exist or is an illusion. (I admit I am among them.) I think you'll find it most helpful to look around for books and articles that discuss the topics listed and try to make sense of those. (Google will help, but choose carefully. There's good stuff out there, but also lots of rubbish.)
The most important thing is to see what the questions are. There's a famous hint from St. Augustine. He said that he knew fine what time is until he asked himself what it is and found he could not explain it. That puzzlement about something that is entirely familiar and everyday is what motivates philosophy - in my opinion, of course.
I wish you good hunting!

As I have followed along in this thread, it struck me that solipsism, the simulation argument, and belief in God are equivalent metaphysically. — T Clark

Is that because they all assert that the world is very different from what it seems to be. I've always though that the simulation argument and Descartes' demon are equivalent. Does that count?

In that case, quantum physics would go on the list as well.

you can "know" that the world is not just a product of your imagination through intuition and experience. You can't prove that your life is nothing but a dream, you can't prove your waking world is the waking world and the dream world is the dream world, you can't prove that you are not the only living person (solipsism), but your intuition will tell you that those theories are all rubbish. Kant's assertion that consistent objects in your environment disprove idealism and extreme solipsism are perhaps evidence, but you can actually dream consistent objects in your environment...even though dream matter tends to be more random and fleeting. — ProtagoranSocratist

A lot depends here on what you call proof and when proof is the appropriate way to go and when alternatives need to be found. I'm not sure I'm happy with intuition - it's a bit like waving a magic wand. I don't say intuition is always wrong, but it's a bit like waving a magic wand. One needs a bit more. The question is what? I'm thinking of looking at things differently. It's a question of attitude and interpretation, rather than proofs and facts.

Searle's tongue was in his cheek: whoever "disproves everybody else's solipsism" presupposes that s/he is not a solipsist. — 180 Proof

You are right. That remark is more complicated than it seems. It is true that to seek to disprove everybody else's solipsism is something that only a non-solipsist would want to do. That's why the addition that you can't disprove it to your self is such a surprise.
I can't tell whether he is trying to say that proof or disproof are not relevant to the argument. Everything that others might say can be interpreted in a way compatible with solipsism and vice versa for the non-solipsist. It's not helpful to see solipsism as a thesis or doctrine about the world. It is more like an interpretation (for lack of a better word) of it.

We should start by accepting that the solipsist has a point. That needs to be recognized, and understood. Then it may be possible to show how that point is being misinterpreted, But it is difficult to express the point clearly.
We need to recognize, alongside the recognition of other selves, the unique place in our worlds of our own selves. Put simply, I cannot experience other people's experience or perform other people's actions. There is a sense in which we cannot eat another person's food, or suffer another person's illness or live another person's life. The self - the meaning of "I" - has a uniquely complicated logic. Self-control, self-deception, unselfish action are all difficult issues. I have a unique place in my world, which is curiously close to having no place in it at all. We put too much emphasis on the truth that we are no different from anyone else and too little on the equally true point that we are also unique and not in virtue of the emprical differences (and similarities) between us.

There really is no way of knowing whether or not you are just a product of my imagination.. — ProtagoranSocratist

It depends on what you are paying attention to. As long as you are immersed in your dream, there is no way to understand that it is a dream. It is only after you wake up that you can appreciate a wider context, extract yourself from your immersion, and realize the wider world that shows that it was a dream.

For Kant, in his time, the statement that awareness of self required the existence of "exterior" things was his argument against solipsism. — Paine

That's one nail that he hits right on the head. I take it as pointing out that one can only grasp one's self by also grasping the not-self all around. The same applies to many (I nearly said "all") concepts. One can only understand what a table is if one understands what is not a table. However, the second half of that process is to understand the distinction between one table and the next. Similarly, awareness of self requires an understanding of what other selves are. (Here comes the specialness of "I" - there is no possibility of my mistaking someone else for myself. What I mean is the understanding that other people are also "I".) The tricky bit is understanding that the differences and similarities are not at all like understanding the difference between one table and the next. Neither table is me.

You seem to be confusing objectivity and truth. Objectivity is not necessarily truth. Subjectivity is not necessarily false. — Corvus

I didn't think I was, although we may have different definitions. For me, objectivity is true or false. Subjectivity is neither.

Nope. Not making sense at all. No two minds can see a bus exactly same. Even if you and your pal see a bus passing in front of you, your perception and his perception will be different in some way. You cannot stand on the exact position where he stands, and your eye sight wouldn't be same as his ...etc. — Corvus

I didn't mean to say that your perception and my perception of the bus are exactly the same. For a start, one of them is yours and the other is mine. But that is merely numerical difference. I will stipulate that there will always be qualitative differences as well. But then, there will also be qualitative similarities too. Telling whether we are seeing the same bus is a matter of weighing those up. One example is that the one bus may well be at different points in our visual fields, which in any case can't be located in relation to each other. But we can use that information to identify where the bus is in public space. It we both locate our visual bus at the same point in our shared space, it is very likely to be the same bus. If we locate it in different points at the same time, it is almost certain to be two buses.

I am not sure if perception can be objective in any sense. — Corvus

Nothing makes perception and sensation subjective. — Corvus

For most people, I think, if something can be true or can be false, it is objective. There's no truth or falsity to something subjective.

In what sense what I am seeing X is same as you are? — Corvus

Do you mean if I am seeing a bus and you are seeing a bus, in what sense are we seeing the same object? In one sense, if we are seeing different buses, we are seeing two objects of the same kind. If we are both seeing the same bus, we are seeing the same object. Does that help?

Even if I had a very intimate discussions on many topics or shared some daily life experience with someone, I would not claim I know their deep true inside feelings, thoughts and wills. — Corvus

But if you know that they have some deep true inside feelings etc. then it must be possible, even if it is difficult, to know what they are.

I'm not seeing hte issue. If i've missed it (i presume I have) please help lol. — AmadeusD

That's most likely because you are not wearing the right spectacles. Here's my take on it:-

In analytic philosophy, anti-realism is the position that the truth of a statement rests on its demonstrability through internal logic mechanisms, such as the context principle or intuitionistic logic, in direct opposition to the realist notion that the truth of a statement rests on its correspondence to an external, independent reality. In anti-realism, this external reality is hypothetical and is not assumed. — Wikipedia - Antirealism

This account rests on the the application of a metaphor to language - "external" and "internal". Realism asserts what antirealism denies - that there are things "outside" language and most language is "made true" by that reality. Antirealism asserts that truth and falsity are just a matter of internal coherence among the descriptions of language.

Sometimes that seems to me to make perfect sense; sometimes I cannot get my head round it.
That's one thing that makes the debate difficult. The strongest argument in favour of anti-realism is that there is no way to identify the non-linguistic, language-independent world without using language. The business about unknowns rests on the idea that if language is not complete, in the sense that there are facts that cannot be expressed in it, then there must be a distinction between language and the world it describes.

So the hope is that by identifying "gaps" in language, we'll open a door into that world. The biggest problem in that project is that you can't identify something unless you know it.

Does that help?

There is no objectivity in there. Even my own perception and sensation can sometimes mislead me. — Corvus

It is true that our perception and sensation can sometimes mislead us. But "sometimes" means that sometimes they do not mislead us. That looks like objectivity to me.

There is no 100% guarantee that my perception and sensations are infallibly true. — Corvus

No, there's no guarantee. But that doesn't make them subjective.

If this isn’t the case, then there must be other things that are not seen, even by an anti-realist. Because there might be more than one anti-realist. — Punshhh

Well, yes. But can an anti-realist know that there is more than one anti-realist? I think not, and that's why I think that the only consistent form of idealism is solipsism.

...... antirealism, which is the epistemic position that if something is true, then it is knowable. — Banno

That seems entirely reasonable. I guess the problems must be in the fine print.

There cannot be any unknown truths if every truth is knowable. — Banno

But what is the force of "cannot"? Does it mean that we don't have the technology? Or does it mean that we have to develop a new approach (elliptical orbits instead of circular ones?

If we are to hold that we do not know everything, then there are things we cannot know. — Banno

Well, I can see that perhaps we cannot know all truths. But it does not follow that there are any truths that we cannot know.

If we do not know everything, then antirealism is not an option. — Banno

I think the distinctions between known unknowns and unkowns is relevant here. lt seems to me that the former are not incompatible with anti-realism (or some forms of it). I may not know the tenth place in the expansion of pi (5), but I know that there's a method for finding it. But it also seems to me that the latter are. However, I don't see that anything prevents us from discovering at least some of them and developing new concepts in the process.

That doesn't seem to me to be addressing Fitch, ..... — Banno

Perhaps not. I don't really think I'm capable of demonstrating that it is wrong. On the contrary, I think it is right, provided the context is right. IEP - Dynamic Epistemic Logic has a helpful summary of the argument:-

From ∃p (p ∧ ¬Kp) follows the truth of its instance (p ∧ ¬Kp) → ◊ K(p ∧ ¬Kp), and from that and p ∧ ¬Kp follows ◊ K(p ∧ ¬Kp). Whatever the interpretation of ◊, it results in having to evaluate K(p ∧ ¬Kp). But this is inconsistent for knowledge and belief.

It is clearly true that I cannot know that p (is true) and that I do not know that p. In general, if the person who knows (K) is the same as the person who asserts the starting-point, it is self-contradictory (Moore's paradox). But it is not contradictory if the person asserting the starting-point is different from the person who knows. There's no problem about me asserting (knowing) that p is true and someone else does not know it. I'm not sure what impact, if any, this has on realism/anti-realism.

From what I've seen the main argument in the last two pages has been that Banno thinks if there are things we don't currently know, then Antirealism can't hold. — AmadeusD

I agree with you that it is not obvious that known unknowns threaten antirealism. But unknown unknowns do. The catch is that we don't, and can't, know what they are. We only know that there are such things because we have encountered some of them before.

I'm not sure if it is relevant but @Banno doesn't assert merely that there are things that we don't currently know.

It (sc. Fitch's paradox) begins with Up(p⊃◇Kp), which is not temporally dependent. — Banno

. l agree, though, that a move from "knowable" to "known" does seem to require tenses.

There's another term I would like to avoid.
— Ludwig V
Which one? "Proposition"? — J

Yes. "Sentence" and "statement" are just about acceptable. "Thought" and "judgement" are also very dubious.

"The argument is not tensed. It is not based on "Not known now, but could be known later." — Banno

That wasn't my summary of the argument. I think it may be based on the point that the manifestation of a disposition or capacity is an event, therefore not tenseless.

It begins with Up(p⊃◇Kp), which is not temporally dependent. It is modal.[/quote]
You won't be surprised that I don't know modal logic. But I had the impression that if it is possible to know that p, it is also possible to not know that p. So (forgive me that I can't do the formula properly,) the formula should read "For all p (if p is true then it is possible to know that p and possible not to know that p). I doubt that the conclusion would follow from that.

The direct conclusion is that there is no p such that p is true and not known. ... There cannot be any unknown truths if every truth is knowable. — Banno

That sounds like "If it is possible that it is raining, it is raining." More generally "possible" does not imply "actual".

If we are to hold that we do not know everything, then there are things we cannot know. If we do not know everything, then antirealism is not an option. — Banno

I don't see any problem about holding that we do not know everything.
Probability. A toss of a coin. It may land heads or tails and must land one or the other and we know that. We know the probabilities of each outcome, but we do not know which it will be.
Most questions identify things that are not known to the questioner. Many of them have answers in the sense that somebody knows the answer. But sometimes research is necessary. It's not really a problem.
I have more difficulty with the idea that there are things that we cannot know. In some cases, it is just a question of technology. Discovering the speed of light may be an example. Seeing what's on the far side of the moon is another.
But I do have a problem with the idea that there are things that we cannot know in some way that is not just a technological issue. Ex hypothesi, if we knew of some such thing, it would be something we knew.

Reality is what there is, hence to posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is, and "beyond reality" is a grammatical error. And what I experience is not the very same as what is real, what we know is not the very same as what I experience. — Banno

In a way, I'm fine with the first sentence. My problem is that we seem to hunger for a way of metaphorically pulling everything together under one heading. I just did exactly that with "everything". and that itself reveals the fundamental issue. In normal contexts, the scope of everything is set by the context (and sometimes we talk about "domains" in this context. But here, I'm attempting to use "everything" without a limiting context. We do the same with "reality", "existence", "being", "world", "universe" and "cosmos". The catch is that we can't let go of the expectation that the scope will be limited, and so we undermine our own attempt by positing something that is outside the scope of how we are using the term - a possibility that we set out to exclude.

Your second sentence is very tempting. It turns on the fact that these terms are not synonymous, but are conceptually linked and inter-related. But we don't have a clear grasp of those links and inter-relationship, so that we get lost in them. This second sentence is tempting, but if one asks what "the very same" means (and particularly wonder what the difference is between "same" and "very same"), the meaning suddenly becomes elusive. (I'm skating over the issue how "experience" and "knowledge" relate to the terms in the first sentence, because our idealist tendencies seem to me to explain that.)

But the additional point is that what is denoted by the symbol is an intellectual act, not a phenomenal existent. And I say that is a real, vital, and largely neglected distinction. — Wayfarer

Does the following explain why you think the distinction is so important?

Thus intellectual abstractions, the grasp of abstract relations and qualities, are quite literally the ligatures of reason — they are what binds rational conceptions together to form coherent ideas. — Wayfarer

I don't want to elide the distinction you are trying to make - though I confess I don't fully understand it. I can attribute meaning to the idea of "phenomenal objects" and to the idea of "intelligible objects". But it does seem to me very important not to let go of the idea that we often understand the things that we perceive and often perceive the things we understand. I think I may be arguing for a third class of objects, which can both be perceived and understood. I hope that makes some sense.

As you say, very few philosophical terms could undergo such an evolution. It's for that reason, as I've said so often on TPF, that I'd like to see philosophers avoid terms like "reality" whenever possible. Or else put it in Peirce-marks or Kant-marks or Carnap-marks etc. if that's what you mean. — J

I sympathize and try not to use those terms unnecessarily. But they are so deeply embedded in philosophy, that it seems impossible to not use them - and I can't resist joining in the discussion.

This is right, and perhaps not so neglected if we see the connection with the many discussions we've had about the status of propositions. The whole point of trying to separate out something called a proposition is to preserve that very distinction. Sentences denote propositions (when they have the appropriate form), not objects or even individual thoughts. Nor are propositions objects in the world, though they may be about objects in the world. — J

There's another term I would like to avoid.

Well I think it's implicit that we're talking about known reality. — Mijin

The trouble is that by referring to "known reality" you open up the possibility of unknown reality. Any limit that you try to set, immediately creates the idea that there is something beyond or in addition to that limit. Wittgenstein tries valiantly to get round that problem in the Tractatus, but ends up with a compromise - "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." - which sits oddly beside "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world."

Interesting how this connects to the previous considerations about "reality." Like "reality," the term "the world" is capable of being used in many ways. Wittgenstein's insight is valuable whether or not we want to use "the world" the way he uses it. His point is that, apart from objects, there are states of affairs, facts, construals, propositions, ways of thinking and speaking -- and when we ask "What is the case?" it is those items we're asking about, not the objects. — J

Oh, surely, what he says is stronger than that. "The world is all that is the case." and "The world is the totality of facts, not things." Of course, this is related to the Fregean insistence that words only have meaning in the context of sentences and Wittgenstein's belief that sentences work in virtue of the similarity (identity?) of their structure with the structure of the world.

The game seems to be, let’s insist there isn’t anything else (other than our reality), because we don’t have the vocabulary to do it’s ising justice. Meanwhile smuggling in the acknowledgement that there probably is something else (as a nod to the idea that you can’t prove a negative). — Punshhh

Yes, we give with one hand and take back with the other. Berkeley is a spectacular example. He says nothing can exist unperceived and that he does not deny the existence of "any one thing" that common sense believes in. (He reconciles the two by pointing out that God always perceives everything.)

He’s doing a neat trick whereby the phenomenal has to become intelligible (therefore an intelligible object) before it can be acknowledged. — Punshhh

Yes, that's the price you pay for positing phenomenal and intelligible objects as distinct kinds of objects. The obvious solution is to insist that perception and intelligence deal with the same objects at least sometimes.

Anti-realism says: every truth must be knowable.
But you also say: there are truths we don’t and maybe can’t know.
Fitch shows you can’t have both.
If there are unknown truths, then not every truth is knowable, which just is the denial of anti-realism. — Banno

On a quick look-up, SEP explains the paradox thus:-

The ally of the view that all truths are knowable (by somebody at some time) is forced absurdly to admit that every truth is known (by somebody at some time).

I'm not impressed. It seems to follow that at any given time, there can be unknown truths. That these truths may be known at some other time is not particularly interesting.

We can be more specific. We can't assess physical theories without doing the maths.
And there is no maths here. — Banno

Quite so. That gives us some ground to treat the speculative physics that we hear so much about as somewhat different from this game. The speculations are at least candidates for the status of a hypothesis.
But it's not a free-standing game like noughts and crosses or tic-tac-toe. It's an extension of the language-game that's played in everyday language, and it is a puzzle game, not a competition between the players. Solving the puzzle is what it is all about. The solution is to understand the extension and see not only that it can't be played but why it can't be played. (Or, just possibly, to see whether there is a way that it might be playable.)

The system, begun by Linnaeus, of identifying creatures by genus and species, e.g., Homo sapiens. I offered it as an example of a single, useful definition that can save everyone a lot of trouble. It has to be agreed to, of course. — J

Of course. I should have understood. However, definitions like that are contextualized in a specialized field where the definition is a stipulation rather than a codification of an existing practice. Another advantage in the context of zoology is that it is possible to nominate a specimen as a reference, to supplement the words and help make decisions about borderline cases. So they are not like the philosophical attempts to define words that already have a use.

And not a valid one. The mark is a symbol. What it represents is a mathematical value, not an object. — Wayfarer

Yes. You are right. My main point, though, was the structure of type and token that enables to say that it is the same symbol in many places and many occasions. Or at least, I thought that was what you meant.

The token is a symbol, not the referent, which is a numerical value. — Wayfarer

Just a small point. What I "actually" point to is a mark on wall or paper. That mark is a token of the type "7". It is a sign or symbol for the number, which is an abstract object. We often refer to tokens as numbers, but I agree that they are not.

This is why I say that numbers, logical principles, and laws of nature are intelligible rather than phenomenal. They are not given in sensation the way tables, colours, or sounds are. You don’t encounter the number 7 in space and time; you grasp it by a capacity of the intellect. That makes them real, but not existent in the empirical sense. — Wayfarer

I'm surprised you are bothered about the empirical sense of "existent". I'm not, at least if you think that sense is "to be is to be perceived". The issue is whether inferences from what we perceive to things that are not (directly) perceived are allowed.

I’m distinguishing two modes of existence. Phenomenal things exist as objects of sense. Intelligible things are real insofar as they can be grasped by a rational intellect, but they are not phenomena, in the way that sense objects are. — Wayfarer

Well, that's true. But it doesn't follow from the fact that intelligible objects are not phenomena that they do not exist.

From Plato and Aristotle through the medievals and into early modern rationalism, the difference between what is apprehended by the senses and what is apprehended by the intellect was taken to be fundamental. — Wayfarer

Perhaps so. But even Berkeley, for all his rhetoric, had to concede exceptions. The existence of his own self, other people, and God were all inferred from his perceptions (ideas). Physics and other sciences have no trouble with that - so far as I know. Microscopes, telescopes, dials and meters of all sorts.
I think that our language here leads us in to unnecessary difficulties. At first sight, it seems that "what we perceive" and "what is apprehended by the intellect" are two distinct sets of objects. But perception and intellect do not work separately, in distinct silos. They are both involved in everything. Perception involves understanding and understanding involves perception. It's not an accident that "I see" or "I hear you" can mean "I understand".

I’m distinguishing two modes of existence. Phenomenal things exist as objects of sense. Intelligible things are real insofar as they can be grasped by a rational intellect, but they are not phenomena, in the way that sense objects are. — Wayfarer

The awkward thing here is that there is a gap between phenomenal things like sights and sounds, smells and tastes, etc. on one hand and intelligible things like circles and squares and numbers and functions. Ordinary life relies mostly on objects that involve both perception and understanding.
But there are lots of different kinds of object. Do we really need a "mode of existence" for each kind? I don't see that as necessary, though I'm not dogmatic about it.

I guess I'd agree that we know how to use "real" in the context of "Simone de Beauvoir was real" vs. "Santa Claus is not real". — J

Santa Claus and Pegasus &c. are a bit atypical. Standard cases are quite clear. Forged money is not real money, but exists; it is real in that it is a copy of real money. A model car is not a real car, but it exists because it is a real model of a car. A fisherman's fly is not a real fly, but it is exists because it is real bait. An actor is not a real policeman, but exists because they are a real person.
The last of these illustrates the peculiarities of fictional characters. Santa Clause is not just not a real person; he exists as a fictional or mythical character, which is to say that he does not exist.

Have there been other philosophical definitions which had to compete for survival against competitors using the same term? — J

I had the impression that philosophy was a war of all against all all of the time - in a collegial way, of course.

Binomial nomenclature, in contrast, seems a noble and successful task. — J

What is binomial nomenclature?

the fact that we cannot observe them directly doesn’t preclude their existence. — Punshhh

Of course not. We can observe them indirectly.

how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality? — an-salad

We know that there are things we don't know about, because we have questions we cannot answer. We also know that there are things we don't know about because we know that we know things that people in the past didn't know.
Of course none of those things are beyond our reality. Or at least, if they are, they will become part of our reality as soon as we know about them.
Does that help?

Just keeping things philosophical. — javra

Perhaps you are right. Quantum physics always seem to shroud everything in a fog, anyway.

That's not what I said, is it? — javra

I may well have misunderstood you.

You and I are selves, and selves do stand out ... this to the consciousness embedded in each which, as consciousness, does not. One does not see "consciousness" in the mirror but only one's own physiological self. — javra

I find myself floundering here. There is a regrettable tendency to think of anyone's self - including one's own - as if it were an object of some sort. If it is, it is remarkably elusive for something that is omni-present in one's life and experience. What's worse, is that one tends to find oneself positing more than one - a physiological self, as opposed to various others; none of these can possibly be one's true self - whatever that means. In addition, while I can supply some sort of (metaphorical) meaning to "stand out" as a description of what existent objects do, I can't grasp a meaning clear enough to be sure that I'm making the right sense of what you are saying. I am confused by the fact that if something "stands out" in my experience, I find that it does so against a background, which also exists.

I might question whether the word was ever "perfectly useful," but other than that, you've said it well. — J

Perhaps. "perfectly" was really a rhetorical flourish, meant to underline that there are uses of "real" and of "reality" that are not problematic in the way that this peculiar, specifically philosophical, use, is.

We could, for instance, create "Peirce-marks" to indicate when the word is being used as Peirce defined it. — J

Well, yes, "P-real" could become a (real) word. There would be a swarm of other, similar, words. It would be interesting to see which of them would survive for, say, ten years. Definitions can only work if there is a consensus about how the term is to be used. But there is no such consensus in philosophy about "exists", so there is no sound basis for evaluating any definition. I'm also deeply suspicious of any definition that sets out to define a single word. (Dictionaries nowadays recognize the relationships of a given word to others.)

Curious if you disagree with this: In commonsense language, then, Superman, the comic-book character, exists (in our culture) but is not real. — javra

I think that's right. But it's perhaps worth adding that he is a real comic-book character, just not a real person. As a cautious generalization, I would say that the problem with "real" is that things are often real under one description and unreal under another. "Exists" seems to be binary (unless you are Meinong).

This sort of speculative physics makes for poor threads. — Banno

I agree with you. But see below.

Speculative physicists don't seem to think so (sc. that speculation is a waste of time).. — frank

That may be because they are working in a context that gives some traction to discussion and argument. On the other hand, it may be that that kind of response is not really appropriate. The speculation may be fun or exciting or something. Truth is, perhaps, only relevant when the speculation gets tied down into a
critical framework. It may or may not be true that Kekule came up with the carbon ring after he had a dream, which then gave him the idea of the benzene ring, which sent him into the laboratory. But it illustrates the point. No-one is concluding that dreams are a reliable source of scientific hypotheses.
The transition may involve a high casualty rate and a good deal of fruitless discussion. Is it worth it? I don't know.

There's no hypothetical future where humans have mastered time travel (and beyond?) that any matter currently in existence can be somehow "placed" or otherwise "end up" at such a point? Why is that? (It's honestly fascinating to ponder, is all) — Outlander

I can see your point. But I think it is important to recognize that the fascination is not the same thing as truth. If you don't, you'll find yourself believing in dragons and world conspiracies. "What if.." can be great fun. But it doesn't always play into truth and falsity. (Who cares that Superman is impossible? We all understand the context and can enjoy the stories, but let's not get carried away into political philosophy.)

That is the sense in which I hold they (sc. abstract objects) are real (in the noumenal or intelligible sense) but not existent (in the phenomenal, spatiotemporal sense. — Wayfarer

Well, they are not phenomenal or spatiotemporal objects. But why does that mean they don't exist? Or, why do you restrict existence to such objects?

This capacity (sc. to grasp abstract objects) is anticipated by a discussion in Plato’s Phaedo called ‘The Argument from Equality’. In it, Socrates argues that in order to judge the equal length of two like objects — two sticks, say, or two rocks — we must already have ‘the idea of equals’ present in our minds, otherwise we wouldn’t know how to go about comparing them; we must already have ‘the idea of equals’. And this idea must be innate, he says. It can’t be acquired by mere experience, but must have been present at birth. — Wayfarer

Yes, but Plato is wrong to think that the idea of equality must be innate. We learn how to measure things and so when things are the same length or weight - and even when there are two sticks or rocks. True, we are born with the capacity to learn, but that's not the same thing.

The simplest answer to the OP is we don’t know what else there is. There might be all sorts of weird and wonderful stuff, that we can’t see. We just can’t see it.
This can then be elaborated by saying we know that there is a lot we don’t know about the world we find ourselves in. So we know that we don’t know things about things that we can see. Therefore we are not in a position to say, or know anything about what we can’t see. So we can’t say what else isn’t there, just like we can’t give a full account of what we know is there. — Punshhh

Yes. That seems straightforward and right to me. It also seems to me that the difficulties arise only when we insist on trying to drag "reality" and "existence" and a metaphorical use of "beyond" into it.

Yes, I think we're all in accord that the culprit here is the word "reality," no surprise. — J

Yes. But the challenge is to explain exactly what the word "reality" is guilty of - or, better, what we are guilty of when we misuse the word "reality", if it is possible to misuse something that we have created. (I mean the word. not the reality.)
"Reality" is an example of the common philosophical mistake of over-generalizing, or perhaps better, of decontextualizing a perfectly useful word, which then becomes virtually useless. What counts as "real" and "unreal" depends on the context, which is specified when you complete a sentence and specify what the context is. The idea that you can lump everything real into one group and everything unreal into another group is just wrong. Things are often unreal under one description and perfectly real under another. Similarly, what existence depends on what kind of thing you are thinking of. Superman exists - as a character in comic books, but not as someone you might meet at a bus stop.

we can write down the set of all the integers in a finite set of words - I just did; but by stepping outside the rules for writing down the integers and using sets instead. — Banno

Yes. It is often possible to do something impossible by changing the rules. I'm not sure that proves anything - except that we wrote the rules in the first place. So we can change the rules or invent new ones any time we want to. Even mathematicians have been known to indulge in that - especially where infinity is concerned. But I don't think that really undermines the point you originally made.

For Peirce, something can be real without existing (e.g., a universal law or a potential quality), but anything that exists is also real. The existing things are just the particular instances where the real generalities (laws and habits) are manifested in brute, immediate interaction. — Wayfarer

That's all very neat and tidy. But I don't think it reflects the complexity of the relationship between reality and existence. On the contrary, it looks like reading in a real distinction - between laws and generalities on one hand and the particular and individual on the other - into the difference between real things and things that exist. I think it is perfectly reasonable to say that there is a natural law about conservation of energy. If that's true, the law exists. Superman is a well-known comic-book character, but everyone knows that he is a fictional character and so not a real person.

This since no one individual umwelt can of itself be omniscient as regards all aspects of reality in general. — javra

Perhaps so. But each umwelt is a part of the same reality in general, isn't it?

These thoughts we, at the very least at present, have no access to and cannot express in words that we ourselves have at our disposal. — javra

Fair enough. Our languages, natural and artificial, are not closed. There is plenty of room for new concepts. I don't see a problem.
BTW - isn't the existing theory of quantum physics an example of what you are talking about? Something that is both a wave and a particle?

We as conscious observes, though an aspect of reality at large (for we as conscious observers are indeed actual, hence real), however do not exist, not in this formal means of understanding the term, for we don’t stand out to ourselves, not even conceptually via the concepts that do exist for us. — javra

Well, you are welcome to define a new use for "exists", but if it means that we, - you and I - do not exist, I think you might find it rather difficult to sell.

I find them useful precisely because he maintains a distinction between the real and the existent—a distinction I think is crucial, but which has largely dropped out of contemporary philosophical discourse. — Wayfarer

I agree that there is a neglected distinction between "real" and "existent". But I don't think Peirce remotely captures it.

In addition to 'res potentia', we also have to consider the reality of abstractions, such as the natural numbers. Here my sympathies lie with Platonism, although much of the debate around 'platonism in philosophy of math' is abstruse. — Wayfarer

I agree with that. The problem with platonism is not so much about the reality of abstract numbers and shapes but the denial of the reality of physical objects. Both exist and are real; but they are different knds of object, that's all.
`

I tried to post all my notes together and it was 42,000 characters too long, so I’ll leave this as a reading group and post a separate discussion with all my notes so I can have them together. I think a I’ll add a post summarizing my comments on method. — Antony Nickles

OK. I canunderstand wanting something to keep and refer to. There was much more meat than I expected. I'm thinking that many people would get more out of his discussion of language games than they do elsewhere.

After I give Ludwig V’ a chance to comment on my response to his latest, — Antony Nickles

Thank you. I'm afraid I'll need to be brief.

So what are we doing with “appropriate”? — Antony Nickles

Yes. It was a lazy choice. I had in mind a certain uncertainty I have about the borderline between logic and psychology when it comes to philosophy. I freely admit that I am not clear about the issues here. though I hope I'm getting the measure of them.

Now I will grant that part of what he is saying is that the skeptic is just doing it wrong; that they are thinking poorly in imposing their standards and creating a picture to have those make sense. — Antony Nickles

It is one thing to decide that the sceptic is doing it wrong and then try to understand why they are making their mistakes. It is, perhaps, a different thing to wonder whether the sceptic may be right and then to try to work out whether that is so.

How to think better, deeper, closer, more detail, based on the facts, having a case or example, letting things be what they are, etc. — Antony Nickles

That is certainly what W is pursuing - and he has much to teach us.

Part of the problem is that folk think in terms of objective and subjective objects, a nonsense that might be partially replaced by thinking in terms of objects and processes. — Banno

Yes. It's almost as if objective and subjective have become nouns. I always thought that the ellipsis in "objective" and "subjective" was "propositions". i.e, it was primarily about truth-conditions, where subjective propositions had, essentially, just one truth-condition - the assertion of the subject.

.... the process of the logic of a practice to judge (afterwards): what qualifies as understanding something; how we have a conversation about what is meaningful about what I said; or the difference between what we determine to be thought compared to just the voice inside your head, slogans, being polite, etc. — Antony Nickles

Quite so.

I resist the idea that thoughts about "the object" come down merely to a psychological motivation. — Paine

I'm not sure, but I think the object here is the meaning of a word. Given the understanding of meaning as intention that makes some sense, I think. The other interpretation is the the object, the meaning of a word, is a "mental object".

I resist the idea that thoughts about "the object" come down merely to a psychological motivation.
— Paine
Is this to say you think I’ve made a mistake in reading? or that you disagree with him? — Antony Nickles

I have to say, I think that W did not, for some reason, feel the need to draw a clear distinction. It may be that he had in mind the earlier (before Frege) idea that the laws of logic are the laws of thought.

I mean, does pointing out that they are logical errors as well (generalization, forced analogy, abstracting criteria, etc.) make it seem less… personal, individual… ethical? — Antony Nickles

Put it this way, Seeing these errors as logical makes them seem more appropriate for philosophy.

I take him to be investigating why we take a particular framework of how we think about objects and impose it on how to think about thought, meaning, and understanding. — Antony Nickles

Yes, But, from memory, what he offers us is things like an irresistible temptation. But this is not a temptation like the temptation offered by the bakery counter. That is, the temptation is not the temptation of pleasure. It's more like the temptation of taking the first offer for you car because you have better things to do than hang about selling it or putting on yesterday's clothes because that's what you have at hand.

One starting place is to ask why W wants to separate psychology from thinking. The separation is a stumbling block to explanation. — Paine

There is an issue here. I'll venture that what W is interested in is not how we actually think, but how we should think - logic justifies its conclusions, psychology merely reports them.

That does not explain why W does not reduce one set of signs into another. — Paine

Sorry, I'm not sure what you are getting at here.

I take the method here is to show how (and why) the skeptic pictures thinking this way by contrasting it with (and perhaps in this way “separating” it from) the logic and reasons of our ordinary ways of judging what is a thought and what is considered thinking (as I mention above). — Antony Nickles

the skeptic pictures thinking this way by contrasting it with (and perhaps in this way “separating” it from) the logic and reasons of our ordinary ways of judging what is a thought and what is considered thinking (as I mention above). — Antony Nickles

There is a similarity to be found there in at least some versions of scepticism. I mean that a sceptic might say - and I have heard sceptics saying - that the sceptical argument is applying more rigourous standards because he is doing philosophy and philosophy demands something better than the sloppy ways of ordinary thinking. W, on the other hand, wants to show that ordinary thought has, or can have, more depth and complexity to it than the sceptic recognizes.

But I’m interested to hear what you take thinking to consist of, and why psychology would be a part of it (or thought to be), one that needed to be separated, and for what reason. — Antony Nickles

Since, as you know, I'm a bit obsessed with this question, I'll also offer an answer. If I make a mistake fixing one of those old-fashioned petrol engines by fitting the wrong kind of spark plug or failing to adjust the timing (of the valves) properly, there are certain kinds of explanation within the scope of engineering, that could be offered - failure to realize what kind of spark plug the engine needs or failure to understand why the correct timing is important. That kind of explanation is quite different from the explanation that I made those mistakes because I had not slept properly or was arguing with the boss or seeking revenge on the owner for over-charging me for accountancy services.

under our biases, presuppositions, indoctrination, attachments, etc. — Millard J Melnyk

All of that is what we start with - the inheritance we are lumbered with. We do well to examine it closely. There are good things in it, however. The habit of asking questions, for example.

This fable of once-for-all understanding, the Holy Grail of philosophy, is actually a hatred of wisdom, and it's a big reason why I've rejected the entire philosophical proposition as it's been pursued throughout history. — Millard J Melnyk

Do you mean that the suspicion of "once for all" is wisdom. I wouldn't argue with that.

I wouldn't say over the top. I'd say f*cking stupid -- which is something I don't do if I can help it -- and I have not done and do not do that in the discussions here. — Millard J Melnyk

That's all right, then.

Yes, that's a common approach, but it presumes (without warrant) that valid beliefs must exist. What if they don't? — Millard J Melnyk

I'm not sure it's a presumption. If one understands when a belief is invalid, then it follows that one understands when a belief is valid, don't you think? That's true even if one has never encountered a valid belief. I would say that that approach hopes, even expects, that there will be some true beliefs to be found. Proving that there are none is very hard, since you would have to examine every possible belief and discard them all. That's an endless task. As for your "what if", it is not a great worry - you'll never know for sure.

That's the question I raised here, so I'm sure you can see that responses based on the presumption that beliefs/believing itself must be rational in some form completely miss the point (unresponsive). — Millard J Melnyk

Presumptions may be found to be true or false. Good arguments are a different matter.

That's "my" method and it's best method I know. — Millard J Melnyk

That sounds very reasonable. However, the proof of any method is, in the end, the results it produces.

The compartmentalization has led to a bizarre situation where sensemaking in philosophy is a completely different proposition than sensemaking in science, which is a completely different proposition than sensemaking in real life. Different goals, different standards, different expectations. — Millard J Melnyk

I don't think that's bizarre at all. It's horses for courses. Philosophy, Science and everyday life are different environments and our different ways of making sense in each environment are, on the whole, pragmatically successful - mostly.

That's cool, gotta start somewhere. His mistake was in thinking that once he found what seemed like rock, that was the end of the project. — Millard J Melnyk

You mean that Descartes was looking for, and thought he had found something permanent on which he could build a whole system of knowledge - permanent and final. It's a common enough mistake. I should have said that I didn't think you would like the house that he builds.

That last includes a continual feedback/self-assessment loop that was exactly what Descartes wanted to escape. — Millard J Melnyk

Yes, indeed. It wasn't enough for him that he was able to recognize and correct his errors. He wanted to be able to avoid making them in the first place. But that's not how our lives work.

Jesus likened it to housebuilding, which is what I did for a while as a general contractor. — Millard J Melnyk

So are you saying that we shouldn't be looking for rock-like foundations, but only for foundations that are good enough for whatever purposes we have at hand?

Beliefs (like thought, idea, ideology, knowledge, on and on) are concepts of human construction that, at best, refer to something in reality. At worst, they contribute to bullshit and gaslighting. — Millard J Melnyk

It seems a bit over the top to dismiss all beliefs just because some of them are wrong. I would have thought that the challenge is to distinguish between those beliefs that refer to something in reality and the garbage. It seems a bit over the top to dismiss all beliefs just because some of them are wrong. (It's also a mistake that Descartes made, when he recognized that his senses sometimes deceived him and so decided he could not trust his senses at all. Sometimes our senses deceive us, sometimes they don't. The trick is, to know which is which.)

I start with embodied experience -- actions from communication to experiment -- take the findings, then analyze them. — Millard J Melnyk

So is that your rock? Fair enough. Can you tell me more about the process of analysis?

Feelings are a completely different kind of thing, far more immanent and psychologically deep than any concept or, for that matter, cognition itself. — Millard J Melnyk

So I'm thinking that feelings are the findings from embodied experience and action.

I think this is important because, to the extant that our most respected and most predominate thinking are responsible for the FUBARs in the world that look like they're increasingly threatening our very existence, I think it behooves us to assess and fix their psycho-social and ideological causes. — Millard J Melnyk

You remind me of Descartes and his project of universal doubt. But I think taking on everything at the same time, is unlikely to be fruitful. It would be like trying to map the earth from a satellite with the naked eye. It's not the word/concept "know" and "knowledge" that you should focus on but the different areas and kinds of knowledge.
Science and Mathematics are the (not unchallenged) gold standard in our culture. Philosophy of science and mathematics would give you a much more interesting take on that kind of knowledge. Other areas, Art, Ethics, Psychology, Sociology are more contested, but, again, you would learn more about what is and is not knowledge from looking directly at those, rather than a single, broad-brush concept.

I assumed belief/believing had a modicum of legitimacy and value. Since then I've had the suspicion that isn't true, so I've been digging into it. — Millard J Melnyk

Again, you remind me of Descartes. Like him, you have some sort of idea what a belief needs to have if it is to be legitimate and worth something. Like him, you are disappointed when you ask around. I would suggest, tentatively, that you think about the standards you have by which you assess beliefs. Where did they come from? What could make one belief more legitimate and valuable than another?

Consider the question: “Why should what we do here be called ‘philosophy’? Why should it be regarded as the only legitimate heir of the different activities which had this name in former times?”) — BB, lpage 94

I've been wondering whether to go on and read the Brown Book. This is astonishing, because he is putting in to question what elsewhere - especially in the Blue Book - he is in no doubt at all. He does not doubt that knows what philosophy is and seems in no self-doubt about what he is trying to do in his consideration of orthodox philosophy questions.
I'm afraid I'm a bit blase about the idea of philosophy. The tradition seems to perpetually be calling itself into question, remaking itself (but not unmaking its own tradition). That's all standard fare. Wittgenstein is, I think, unusual in asking whether his approach to philosophy should be counted as philosophy at all. For my money, since he engages with the tradition, after a fashion, I have no hesitation in shelving him alongside Russell and Moore, though perhaps at the other end of the shelf.

The kernel of our proposition, that that which has pains or sees or thinks is of a mental nature, is only, that the word “I” in “I have pains” does not denote a particular body, for we can’t substitute for it a description of a body. — ibid. page 110

Yes. With some writers, I would take that as trailing his coat, keeping us on edge for the next episode. Or, more likely, he doesn't know what will happen next himself and so is unable to make an end. In a way, I like the conclusion even though I don't understand it. After all, if I am not this body (you know which one, don't you?) what am I? On the other hand, that's a different question from "Who am I?" Is W trying to persuade us to drop the former question, perhaps in favour of the latter?

I haven't ignored it since you first brought it up, and I've said so. After working it through, tho, I realized it doesn't matter. — Millard J Melnyk

I'm sorry I didn't notice. But disappointed that you think it doesn't matter. It depends what your project is, so I won't argue with you.

But here's the surprise (for me): Why interject the self-reference at all? — Millard J Melnyk

In a sense the "I know" in "I know that it's raining" doesn't add anything to someone asserting "It's raining". The reason is simple. If you assert "It's raining" and I trust you, I can safely conclude that you know that it's raining. Equally, of course, if you assert "it's raining" and it's not raining, or I don't know whether it's raining, I can conclude that you believe it is raining.
It does not follow from the fact that it's raining that you know or believe that it's raining. So these implications are a bit odd. They follow from you asserting "it's raining".

But that's the strictly logical situation. Informally, when someone says "I know that p", they are borrowing the authority of knowing something, which, strictly speaking can only be given to by someone else. Why, because marking your own homework is meaningless. That's why, if you want to understand "know" and "believe" you need to think in the third person. The first person is a limiting case, not typical. Standard cases assume that speaker and subject are different people.

think/believe/know have no logical bearing on the assertion being made. — Millard J Melnyk

They have no logical bearing in the sense that they are not grounds for, or evidence for, the assertion being made. But since "I know that p" is only true if "p" is true, they do have a bearing on "know". It's not quite the same with "believe", but anyone who says either "I know that p" or "I believe that p" is asserting that p, and that is part of the meaning of those two words.

So, think/believe/know has nothing to do with P (whether it's raining). They indicate how sure/committed I am to the assertion. I'm implying but not saying how tall my ladder is. — Millard J Melnyk

I don't really get the business about the ladder. It is true that if I have good, but not sufficient evidence for p, there is what one might call and evidentiary gap. People probably do sometimes leap over that gap and assert more than they really have evidence for. So what?

Yes to all of that. So the idea that "think" and "believe" are synonymous is a non-starter. The OP would need to be much more specific about which uses of "think" are equivalent to "believe." — J

I struggle to articulate the difference. It is tempting to say that they express different propositional attitudes. But I don't like propositional attitudes for reasons that don't matter for the moment. The "I know that p" is special, because speaker and subject are the same person. So that comes out as an emphatic assertion of "p" - pleonastic but expressing something nonetheless. "I believe" and "I think" come out as less emphatic assertions - normally.
But "S believes that p" is expresses S's evaluation of "p", of course, but is not contradicted if "p" is false. So it expresses the speaker's evaluation. Is that an illocutionary effect, possibly? Then there's the rest of the family - "think", "suppose", "imagine", "assume" etc.