I'm not keen on conflating mathematical descriptions(which are existentially dependent upon language users) with language less knowledge, thought, and/or belief. Dogs are incapable of doing math. Doing math requires naming quantities. Dogs cannot do that. They can catch a ball nonetheless, and we can describe those events(or at least the trajectory of the ball) with calculus. — creativesoul

I wasn't conflating those two descriptions. I was pointing out that the mathematical description of the trajectory of the ball does apply to the ball and that the dog (or indeed, human) is not applying that description. What beliefs and/or experiences can we discern in ourselves to explain how the ball is caught? Can we attribute those same beliefs to the dog or not? I think that skills like these are attributed to "judgement", which means either that the human "just sees" where the ball is coming and the same can be attributed to the dog. Both express their belief about where the ball is coming by positioning themselves to catch it.
We can legitimately expect that there will be some neurological activity which we are not conscious of and which that enables this to happen. This will be similar to the neurological activity that must underlie our ability to discern where a sound is coming from. We can also expect the same or similar activity to be going on in the dog.

What difference is a question of how we interpret the events? The events are already meaningful. Hence, it is possible to misinterpret them. — creativesoul

The difference between the autonomous salivation and the growl which is under the dog's control.

I'm not convinced that growling is under conscious control, as if used intentionally to communicate/convey the growling dogs' thought/belief. I'm more likely to deny that that's what's going on. The growl is meaningful for both the growling dog and the submissive others. I'm not convinced that the growl is a canine speech act so to speak. — creativesoul

I wasn't going so far as claiming that it is a canine speech act. However, my speech acts are meaningful to myself and others (including my dog), so there may well be something to the comparison.
As to conscious control, I cannot train my dog to salivate or not on my command (any more than I can train myself to salivate or not as I wish). But I can train my dog to stop growling on command. That suggests the growl is under the dog's control.

Functioning in a social context does not lend itself to being a social function in the sense that the community members have some awareness of the awareness. — creativesoul

Sorry, I'm confused. If the growl warns others not to be aggressive, I would have thought that they were aware of the dog's belief that they are being regarded as a possible threat. Is that what you meant by awareness of the awareness? I would also have thought that the dog was aware of it's own awareness that the others present a possible threat. Perhaps that's what you mean?

The growl has efficacy, no doubt. It is meaningful to both the growling dogs and the others. I would even agree that it could be rudimentary language use, but it's nothing even close to adequate evidence for concluding that growls function in a social context in the same way that our expressions of thought and belief do. — creativesoul

So we agree at least to some extent. I wasn't making any claim about equivalence of that function to our expressions of thought and belief. Though it does occur to me that when I feel threatened by someone, I will make placatory and/or self-confident signals, whether by body language or in speech in order to warn them off. That seems to me to be performing the same function as the growl. The difference, I would say, is the difference between the simplicity of the growl and the complexity of the messages we can convey through the complexity of language. There is similarity and difference.

Yes. The question of the significance of the difference(s) is likely the trickiest one of all.
— Ludwig V
How would that be judged? — Patterner

Good question. One way is to assess the ethical implications of the differences we find. Another would be to examine and explore why people get so strongly committed. It would be at least helpful to know why people think it matters. But the difficult bit is that how one sees animals is very much a function of the relationships one has with them, so there isn't a purely objective basis for the judgement. There isn't a matter of fact that makes the difference - it's a question of how one chooses to interact with them.

we can(and do, I would argue) know what all meaningful experience consists of - at the basic irreducible core. It consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. That question was asked to Ludwig, for he admits language less thought and belief. I presume he would admit experience as a result. However, his approach is woefully inequipped to answer the question. That was the point of asking it. — creativesoul

OK. I'll bite. I thought you were asking the question because I couldn't answer it; actually I have answered; it's just that you don't like the answer. I haven't worked out exactly how to argue the point, so I'm holding my peace until I've worked that out.
Preliminary problems include what it means to say that any meaningful experience consists of anything never mind what it means to say that meaningful experience consists of correlations.

Their meaningful experience, thought, and/or belief does not consist of language use. — creativesoul

Language users express their beliefs etc. by talking (and in their other behaviour). Clearly, creatures without human language cannot express their beliefs by talking. But they can and do express their beliefs by their behaviour. Both language users and creatures without language have meaningful experiences, which, presumably, "consist of" correlations. (I'm setting aside my doubts about "consist of" and correlations.)

They do not draw correlations between language use and other things. — creativesoul

Insofar as they do not have human language, that seems obvious. But then, when I call out "dinner", my dog appears. Isn't that correlating language with something else? When I call out "sit", she sits and looks at me expectantly. Apparently dogs are capable of responding appropriately to something like 200 words, which is about the language learning level of a two year old human.

The irresistible temptation is not “to use a certain form of expression”. The temptation is for mathematical certainty. That desire forces the expression into a certain form (as forcing the analogy that everything has the framework of an object.) — Antony Nickles

That looks like an idea that would explain why the temptation exists. No doubt there's more to say, but the desire for certainty would explain why the temptation exists. What I don't understand is why a change of notation would cure the desire. (I realize that the text itself doesn't explicitly get in to that question, but it stares us in the face.)

Some questions:-

This is the ability of language to extend into new contexts (discussed in the PI as: continuing a series) because at times how it matters is, as yet, to be determined. — Antony Nickles

I don’t see continuing the series as at all the same thing as extending a word or concept into new contexts. In the former, we say that we are doing the same thing and that is determined by the rule. The latter is a quite different problem, in circumstances when the rule does not determine how it is to be applied. Thus, the rule “+1” means that we do the same thing, but to a different number at each step. You can call each step a new circumstance if you like, but the rule defines it as the same. But when, for example, we define “ω” we create a new circumstance and have to decide how to apply “+1”.

I took the “cause” to show the authority that I take, which can be the trust in the teacher’s authority, or, without reason, based on the authority I have for my own acts (example 4 “‘I don’t know, it just looks like a yard’”), which is to externalize some ‘internal’ cause for speech into taking responsibility for what I say (wanting to be certain beforehand vs. continuing to be resolved to what I say afterwards). — Antony Nickles

Do you mean that citing the fact that I have been taught to identify the depth of the water or to cite the feeling I get is to try to outsource the justification that should rest with me – sticking to my judgement? But what if I’m wrong? Don’t I have to accept responsibility whether I outsource my decision or not?
To put it another way, there’s a big difference between the referee whose decision defines what happened as a goal and the reporter whose story reports what happened as a goal.

I found this rather confusing. It is true that “cause” does not always mean what it means in philosophy, and I can see why W might want to call the teaching process a cause, but if the teaching has authority, it would be clearer to call it a reason, because part of the meaning of reason is justification. But that isn’t altogether satisfactory either.
Compare:-

Now if one thinks that there could be no understanding and obeying the order without a previous teaching, one thinks of the teaching as supplying a reason for doing what one did; as supplying the road one walks. — p.14

no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. — Antony Nickles

I don’t think that’s quite right. Should it not be “No course of action could be determined by any specific rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with it.”
Given any course of action, one can represent it as in accordance with a rule. But surely it does not follow that given a specific rule, one cannot determine the next step. That is what I learn when I learn to apply a rule.

Again, we can follow a rule or we can go “the way one has gone oneself”, even though we were taught by rules, the teaching “drops out of our considerations”. We may or may not explain by rules afterwards (“post hoc”). — Antony Nickles

`

Giving a reason for something one did or said means showing a way which leads to this action. In some cases it means telling the way which one has gone oneself; in others it means describing a way which leads there and is in accordance with certain accepted rules. — p.14

That’s true. Yet there is a difference between saying that the action is justified for the following reasons and saying that those reasons were the reasons why one did it.

Maybe we can't develop all beliefs without language. But, once developed, they can be expressed without language. — Patterner

Yes. You seem to have it about right. The only issue now is what concepts we can attribute when explaining what animals that do not have human languages.

Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me. — Patterner

Yes. The question of the significance of the difference(s) is likely the trickiest one of all.

Descartes' followers may have been expressing their belief in Cartesian dualism in a very strict sense. (I'm not sure "strict" is the right word, but it's the best I can do at the moment.) But they would not have come to that belief without language. Language was necessary for the belief to exist before the belief could be expressed with non-linguistic behavior. — Patterner

I don't contest the point that there are beliefs that we could not develop without language. All I'm suggesting is that linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, in our world, are connected. Yet I don't rule out the possibility that there are some beliefs that cannot be expressed without language. These are not separate domains, but intertwined. This is why Pennings' Corgi is such a puzzle.

And nobody observing their behavior would have known the belief they were expressing if someone had not used language to explain it to them. — Patterner

Yes, of course, But context is always essential to understand behaviour in creatures capable of rational thought.

I can't say if I disagree, or don't really understand. — Patterner

For what it's worth, I'm not clear about this stuff either. It would be tidy if we could draw a clear line between what can be done with and without language. But I just don't see it.

I would be hard pressed to express any of the thoughts in this post, to say nothing of the thoughts expressed in the 39 pages of the thread, as well as the other however many threads at TPF, without language. I would be interested in hearing how all of these thoughts might possibly come to exist without language. But even without an explanation of that, now that they do exist, What language-less behavior can express them? — Patterner

Of course one cannot philosophize without language. One of the big puzzles in Berekeley's writing is that he is very clear that his immatierialism does not imply any change whatever to his everyday behaviour, and there's a good case for saying that the heliocentric view of the solar system does not result in any change to ordinary behaviour.
But one can express philosophical views in actions rather than words. There's a story that some of Descartes' followers in Amsterdam expressed their belief in Cartesian dualism by nailing a dog to a wooden plank. Devout Christians may express their beliefs in many ways other than asserting them - refraining from certain behaviours and pursuing others. One of the arguments against radical scepticism is precisely that the sceptic does not behave as if scepticism were true.
However, I never intended to claim that there are always non-linguistic ways to express any belief expressed in language. Perhaps I should have been clearer.

Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought. — creativesoul

Surely, thought that involves trees and cats is involved in the behaviour that involves trees and cats. I don't see what you are getting at.

Do you not think there are things languages can express that behaviours that do not involve language cannot express? — Patterner

I'm inclined to answer yes. But I would much prefer to work from examples, so that I understand what the distinction amounts to.

When it comes to what counts as thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience(s) of language less creatures, we must be talking about what's meaningful to the creature. I'm hesitant to talk in terms of first or third person though. I see no point in unnecessarily adding complexity where none is warranted. — creativesoul

You may remember that earlier in this thread there was some discussion of Timothy Pennings' claim that his corgi could do calculus. See Excerpts from "Do dogs know calculus"
The path followed by light refracted through two different mediums is calculated in this way, but no-one worries about what meaningful experiences are involved. So if Pennings' Corgi follows the same path, I don't see that the experience of the corgi is relevant. The calculation applies. So Pennings' title forces us to face the issue whether what matters is the dog's experiences or the mathematics. Or, preferably, what the relationship is between the two points of view.
Or consider the theory of kin selection as an explanation of altruism in social creatures. The idea that preserving one's kin is as good a way (perhaps better than preserving oneself) to preserve one's DNA and that is what, in the end, matters. Empirically, that could well explain the phenomena. But no-one thinks that bees can identify the DNA of another bee. So we need to explain how the bees select who to sacrifice themselves for and clarify what the relationship is between the two points of view. For example, it may be that bees with the same DNA as our subject bee produce similar pheromones, which we know bees can identify and respond to. So that would be a candidate.
Catching a thrown ball is a quite complex mathematical problem. We have to learn how to do it and we improve with experience. But I'm quite sure that I am incapable of solving that mathematical problem. How do I do it? Well, I can also accurately identify where a sound is coming from. We know that we do that by calculation from the difference between the time the sound arrives at one ear and the time it arrives at the other, which is why stereo headphones work in the weird way that they do. Even if I could do the calculation, I could not do it in the time it takes me to identify where the sound comes from. (We can also accurately assess how far away the things we see are, at least at close range, by the extend we have to focus the two eyes in order to see one image - just like a range-finder. We don't normally experience that.)

I guess that the "craving for generality" is a condition that we cannot escape. That is a psychological observation along with whatever it is that Wittgenstein sees as going beyond that. — Paine

I'm a bit torn about this. Philosophers often generalize beyond what seems appropriate to me. "Everything exists" would be one example (not that I could cite a case) and "A=A" is another. It does seem appropriate to describe the cases like these as the result of a "craving for generality".
However, generalizing is deeply embedded in our thinking. To call it a craving does not distinguish between generalizations that are very helpful - even essential - to our understanding and those that are that cause confusion and misunderstanding.
W often seems to talk/write as if all generalization was wrong (misleading), or at least that all generalization in philosophy is wrong (misleading). If we took him to mean that all scientific laws were wrong or all legislation is wrong, it would not (I think) stand up. We accept or at least take seriously what he says because we understand him to be talking in the context of the generalizations of the philosophies that he seeks to escape from because they are misleading and unhelpful.

The question I have is to what degree does the Blue Book discussion of solipsism argue with what the Tractatus says. In the latter, the condition is "manifest" but not "said". In the former, it is a problem that is not necessary after considering other means of expression. Is that another way to point to what cannot be said or is it a change of opinion about the grounds of talking about conditions? — Paine

I had not thought about the relationship with TLP. In that context, it is striking that he thinks that solipsism is a matter of "notation" - of how to represent/express the same facts. In neither work is solipsism (or, by extension, any other philosophical doctrine) thought of as a matter of truth vs falsity. There's that much in common.
That said, the TLP doesn't recognize the multifarious uses of language in the way that his later work does. What happened to showing, not saying? I'm not sure.

It's quite a change from the old (Cartesian) scientific opinion. Perhaps there's some hope for the world.

All behaviors, but different kinds, with different possible consequences, and possibly different intentions (although we don't always think/intend before any type of behavior). — Patterner

Quite so. And the behaviours that do not involve language demonstrate/express/manifest my belief just as effectively as the linguistic behaviours. The difference is that expressing beliefs in language is more detailed, more specific, that non-linguistic behaviours.

If we don't know what it could possibly consist of, how do we know it exists? If we know it exists, doesn't whatever is proof of its existence give us clues about what it consists of? — Patterner

Thought etc. in creatures lacking human language is expressed and available to us in their behaviour. The same is true in human beings, but, of course, philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. I can't think why.


That's interesting. Are we talking about the responses of scientists who study animal behaviour? If so, it confirms my expectation that the closer people look at animal behaviour, the more they find in it.

I don't get the sense that the condition is explained away. The "illusion of language" seems like a complete explanation in a work that questions "general explanations." — Paine

But I don't think anyone is trying to explain the human condition away. The only thing that might be in dispute is what is and what is not a part of it. Remember, the role of the human condition (well, human ways of life) is to be the ground of all our justifications - not that that appears in this text.

If completely general explanations work for establishing human conditions, then Wittgenstein is hoisted by his own petard. — Paine

"Hoist with this own petard" is always satisfying when it works. But I'm not sure what you are saying here. Explanations of human ways of life are not part of W's arguments. For W, human ways of life are the ultimate ground for all other justifications and explanations. The tricky bit is whether we can go further - or rather whether philosophy can (or needs to) go further (deeper?). There's a temptation there - but is it an illusion (of language, perhaps)?

But here we are focused on the desire for the ideal, and not justifying it or achieving it. — Antony Nickles

Well, those are indeed different questions, though they are also related.

Cavell will say that in the PI Wittgenstein is showing that there is a truth to skepticism (it is not a confusion or problem) in that knowledge is only part of our relation to the world and there is no fact that ensures it so we fill the gap with/in our actions (to each other and in trusting/questioning the world and our culture). — Antony Nickles

Yes, I've a lot of time for Cavell. But doesn't he also raise the question of why sceptics cling to their view? Something about being acknowledged (and seeking safety).

He is irresistibly tempted to use a certain form of expression; but we must yet find why he is. — Blue Book, 59

That's the question that I don't understand. If the whole thing is a conjuring trick, there is no answer to it, or rather, the only answer is to the question how the trick is pulled off.

But I agree that we are veering outside the text, so I'll leave this there.

By “certain” I just mean the desire for mathematical/scientific answers—that are universal, predictable, generalized, free from context, “objective”, complete, conclusive, etc. I take these as the opposite of the time/place-dependent, partial, categorical, open-ended, etc. ordinary criteria that we uncover in looking at examples of our expressions regarding a practice, which I don’t take as “subjective” or “self-evident” so much as particular to each activity (thinking, pointing, rule-following, apologizing, identifying, etc.) — Antony Nickles

Aren't you are citing the ideals that science tries to achieve? In practice science is always provisional and restricted in its scope, not certain at all.

These are conditions of being human, and thus separate I would argue from psychological motivations. — Antony Nickles

So solipsism is part of the human condition? Then how can philosophy free us from it? But then, if solipsism is part of the human condition, what does it mean to say that it is only an illusion of language?

Is it the presupposition that fear is a directly perceptible thing? If the being full of fear does not count as directly perceiving fear then nothing will. It's part of the internal aspect of all meaningful thought, belief and/or experience. There are internal elements as well as external ones. — creativesoul

Yes, I see. I wasn't clear whether you were talking first-person view or third. I agree that creatures who do not have human language do experience fear (and pain). Obviously there may be complications and disagreements about other emotions and feelings. But what I'm not clear about is whether you regard fear as a stimulus or a response?

They're competing viewpoints about the same thing. They both consist of meaningful correlations being drawn by a creature so capable(the agents' themselves in this scenario). I'm unsure of why these were invoked. — creativesoul

Because I want to suggest that there is more than one pattern of correlation in play, and that mimicry might be described as a correlation, but it is different from either.

A difference between Pavlov and Skinner has no relevance when we're talking about the elemental constituency of that which existed in its entirety prior to language use. — creativesoul

You seem to be positing some kind of atomic or basic elements here, and I'm not sure that such things can be identified in knowledge or behaviour.

that which existed in its entirety prior to being talked about is precisely what needs set out first here, for any notion of thought and belief that is claimed to apply to language less creatures must satisfy that criterion. — creativesoul

OK. So how do we identify that which existed in its entirety prior to be talked about?

My charge has always been that convention has gotten human thought and belief horribly wrong. The fact that language less thought and belief cannot be admitted due to pains of coherency alone shows that there is a problem with convention. There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? I'm aware of your avoidance of talking in terms of elemental constituency, but from where I sit it makes the most sense of the most things. It also flips many an ancient archaic dichotomy on its head. — creativesoul

Oh, we agree there. I think that answer to what the thought, belief and meaningful experience of language-less creatures consists of is fairly straightforward. Behaviour.

I haven’t gotten as far as your quote from the end of the book, but I think I’ve shown sufficient evidence in the text that the vehicle of confusion may be things like: that words can still have meaning imposed on them despite being removed from context, and that analogy can force a conclusion simply because of shared premises, which are both logical errors, but that the cause, more motivation, which “results” in solipsism is the desire for certainty (e.g., wanting everything to have a reference like objects). The common reading that normally we misuse language or get tricked by it is usually followed by the conclusion that philosophy simply needs to impose its own, better, more logical, clearer, more certain, etc., criteria (though distinctions sometimes must be made). I think this argument plays out through the work. — Antony Nickles

Oh, I agree that that argument plays out through the work and beyond!
1. But it seems to me that further clarification is needed about "more logical, clearer, more certain .. criteria". These all have an application as psychological (hence subjective) terms as well as an objective sense - and there's that troublesome concept of self-evidence lurking here. There does seem to be wide agreement, at least amongst analytic philosophers, about their application, but that might be due to acculturation - training.
2. I can agree that the desire for certainty is a plausible motivation for solipsism. But I don't see any reason to suppose that's the motivation in every case. Why could it not be fear of transparent relationships with other people? Or a feeling of isolation from other people? Once one has started looking for psychological motivations, one has to contend with a pandora's box of them. In addition, we might start looking for a motivation for rejecting solipsism as well. At that point, whether we accept or reject, it seems that we are doing psychiatry rather than philosophy. Or could it be classified as phenomenology?

Calling it best practices, or a code of conduct seems fine but it also seems to remove the reflection on how those actions reflect on our character, as Socrates was trying to make his students better, not just more knowledgeable. — Antony Nickles

There is a difference between a character trait being of particular importance in some activities and it being important in life in general. The virtues required to acquire knowledge may not particularly relevant to those required to do good business or create good art.

It does seem like he starts mid-staircase (as with Emerson), and so it is maybe not so much a matter of where the muddle starts but why, and I think he would lay the blame on our desire for philosophy to be like science, to have the same kind of results, or that everything else be judged in that shadow. And this is not so much against common sense, or the results of our ordinary judgments, as removed from all our varied reasons for making judgments at all except scientific certainty. — Antony Nickles

I think I agree with this, and yes, if one remembers the context of logical positivism (with its links to the TLP), it seems very likely.
There is an irony here, isn't there? The desire to be scientific is in direct conflict with the desire for certainty - at least in the context of philosophy.

In fact, he appears to be creating an ethical standard for philosophy, or, ‘thought’, to be, at least, “worked out in detail”, not forced, with an individual/particular framework and workings. — Antony Nickles

I'm not clear why you call it an ethical standard. It looks to me more like a method - no, an approach - designed to clarify the use(s) of the terms at play and to enable us to see things in a less misleading way.

But we have to start from accepting that the solipsist, for example, is seeing things in a misleading way. How do we do that? It looks to me as if his diagnosis of solipsism is itself the reason for finding solipsism misleading. (Not that I disagree with it.)

The only other possibility is that solipsism contradicts common sense. But common sense is probably not a reliable criterion for misleading or not.

There is no common sense answer to a philosophical problem. — Blue Book, 59

That doesn't necessarily mean that common sense is immune from philosophical problems. Indeed, it may be common sense that gives rise to (some) philosophical problems.

What I'm suggesting is that W here is starting from philosophy as he finds it, and not paying enough attention to what gets philosophy started - which must be muddles that arise from common sense - or perhaps from science's search for causes.

Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious, than ordinary language does, — Blue Book, 59

If our disagreement with solipsism is just a question of notation, we seem to have no way of persuading solipsist to change their view. There must be more to it than that. (The same applies to the more persuasive analogy of the puzzle pictures, which I see turn up in the Brown Book (p.162).)

For clarity, I ask these question in the spirit of Augustine puzzlement about the nature of time. I do think that W is identifying important truths about philosophy and its practice. But that's not to say that I am not puzzled about them.

I'm not confident I remember the authors of the three JTB formulations Gettier set out in the beginning of his paper. Maybe... Ayer, Chisholm, and ??? Lol... It bugged me enough to go check... Scratch the third. :wink: It was just Ayer and Chisholm. I wanted to say Collinwood, for some reason. The 'third' formulation was a generic one from Gettier himself. Something tells me you already know this. :wink: — creativesoul

I did and I didn't. That is, I was expecting references to some of the critiques of Gettier's article, rather than Gettier's selection from existing formulations.

It is my next focus here. My apologies for not being prompt yesterday. Late dinner invitation. Nice company. Be nice to have another someplace other than a famous steakhouse chain with far too many people in far too little volume of space. And the noise! Argh... brought out the spectrum in me. — creativesoul

No hurry. I've never been happy in large, noisy, crowded (and drunken) parties and it's only got worse with age. People behave differently in crowds. There's a lot of research about that - largely with a public order agenda. The Greeks regarded it as a madness and explained it by reference to Bacchus and/or Pan.

For my part, "presupposed" is about the thinking creature. "Prior to" is about the order of emergence/existence. The latter is spatiotemporal/existential. The former is psychological. — creativesoul

Yes. I see that.

I'm setting out the basic outline/parameters of an autonomous biological process that amounts to a basic outline of all thought, from the simplest through the most complex. — creativesoul

There's a lot to be said for that. Stimulus/response and association of ideas do seem to be very important to learning. However, there's an important differentiation between Pavlov's model and Skinner's. (It's not necessarily a question of one or the other. Both may well play their part.) Pavlov presupposes a passive organism - one that learns in response to a stimulus. Skinner posits what he calls "operant conditioning" which is a process that starts with the organism acting on or in the environment and noticing the results of those actions - here the organism stimulates the environment which responds in its turn. There's another interesting source of learning - mimicry. I've gathered that very new infants are able to smile back at a smiling face - there's even a section of the brain that produces this mirroring effect. It is still observable in adults. Just food for thought.

Knowing which train is the five o'clock train is existentially dependent upon being talked about. — creativesoul

I think I can see what you mean. But it needs clarification because there are philosophers who will saying that knowing anything is existentially dependent on being talked about - because drawing distinctions in the way that we do depends on language.
Suppose we stipulate that knowing that it is 5 o'clock requires an understanding of a conceptual scheme that is not available without language. My dogs have always tended to get restless and congregate near the kitchen at around the time that they are fed. I think they know that it is time for dinner. If they were people, we would have no hesitation in saying that they know it is 7 o'clock (say). How do I know that people understand the background scheme? I know if they can tell the time at any time, for example - which does not necessarily require human language, but normally that is how it works. If a small child (who has not yet learnt to tell the time) appears in the kitchen at 7 o'clock, we will look for other clues to explain why they show up.

Consider the sheer complexity of thought required in order to understand Gettier's obliteration of the J part of JTB... as held/articulated by three defenders thereof at the time. — creativesoul

This is a side-issue, but who are the three defenders you are thinking of?

Not all things(X's) exist in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some thought and belief existed in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some did not. Some cannot. It could be put a bit differently. Some thought and belief are existentially dependent upon being talked about. Some are not. — creativesoul

I may have misinterpreted "prior". I was treating it as meaning "presupposed" and thinking of the variety of preconditions that have to be satisfied to make thought and belief meaningful. Even new introductions have to be based on existing ideas if they are to be explained at all.
This takes me back to:-

All thought, belief and statements thereof consist of correlations drawn between different things. We and all other capable creatures think solely by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. — creativesoul

Here, you seem to be suggesting a single pattern of thought that explains all thought. But is that consistent with the variety of thoughts you specify? If some thought and beliefs are existentially dependent on being talked about, I don't see how the model of correlations drawn between different things applies.

It is this crucially important aspect that remains sorely neglected by conventional standards/notions of thought/belief, "rational thought" notwithstanding. — creativesoul

I agree with that. That's why I've taken such an interest in this topic. There's very little discussion anywhere, and yet, in my view, it's not only important for understanding animals, but also for understanding humans.

I have yet to have been exposed to a single conventional practice of belief attribution that has, as it's basis, notions of "belief" and "thought" that can properly account for the evolutionary progression of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. — creativesoul

That's because philosophers seem to be totally hypnotized with thought and belief as articulated in language. They seem to assume that model can be applied, without change, to animals and tacit thinking and knowledge.

Berkeley's version of solipsism is precisely what is discussed in the latter portion of the Blue Book. Wittgenstein's effort differs from Kant who worked to counter the arbitrary quality of causality as presented by Hume. Kant put forth that all of our thinking requires the intuitions of space and time. This places the Cogito of Descartes in a particular "set of facts" that is psychological in nature. Wittgenstein, however, argues that solipsism results from misuse of language: — Paine

OK. I think I understand that. Thanks.

I think the key point is that giving to us an 'agent who thinks' is standing on the outside trying to look in: — Paine

This is an important connection than my merely trying to record the aghast commonly felt at what is seen as removing the self (just, as an object), when he is just following through the categorical error of the ‘strong temptation’ of causality. — Antony Nickles

This reminds me of the reaction to Berkeley's "removal" of matter or the entire physical world. A modern case is the outrage caused by "illusionism". I've never been quite sure whether the authors of those ideas deliberately chose a shocking formulation rather than the mundane version. What's that French phrase about upsetting the bourgeoisie?

I am curious about Paine’s thoughts on the relation to Hume/Kant. Obviously there is Hume’s “agent” and Kant removing the object (but not dismantling the framework that held it). — Antony Nickles

I have to confess, that I didn't really understand the connection that he identifies. I'm not saying that there isn't one.

“We are most strongly tempted to think that here are things hidden, something we can see from the outside but which we can't look into. And yet nothing of the sort is the case.” — Blue Book, page 6

There's a very strong echo of Hume's argument against scholastic "powers" here, isn't there? But Hume's argument has been generally taken to apply to scientific explanations, not to distinguish between philosophical and scientific explanations. (Saving the point that, in Hume's day, what we now call science was called "natural philosophy).

Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us. ...... All the facts that concern us lie open before us. — Blue Book p.6

In his immediately preceding argument, W does say that there is further work to do and I can see that. We live in a different intellectual climate now, and the excitement about neurological discoveries is often taken to be philosophically significant. Indeed, if brain studies can indeed supply - not necessarily objects, but physical processes associated with thought - it will make his arguments here considerably less convincing. Or is this another demarcation criterion between philosophy and science.

Coming back to this, I'm finding myself really confused.

The two mistakes are: 1. What the mind does (thought) is strange; so 2. How the mind works must be a mystery. Thus, we create the “problem” that we just need to get to where we can explain how it causes “thought”. But the “muddle” we got ourselves into was because we pictured thought as an object. Thought is not an object, and so is not “caused”; thinking is not a mechanism to be explained. — Antony Nickles

It seems to me that these mistakes are a different argument from the argument against hidden objects. My problem here is that I'm not sure that W can take for granted that the traditional dualistic conception of thought involves strange or queer objects. Traditional philosophers didn't find them strange, but entirely familiar. His tactic of taking seriously the idea that a thought is an object, and then showing that such objects cannot do what thought does is itself that argument that the traditional conception is wrong. Now, my question is whether that interpretation of the traditional idea counts as a new fact or not.

You've overestimated my upsettedness... That was also weeks back. — creativesoul

OK. So it's over. :smile:

Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires something to be thought about. That something existed in its entirety prior to being talked about. We use the terms "thought", "belief", "meaningful experience", "mind", etc. How do we think about our own thoughts, beliefs, dreams, meaningful experiences? With naming and descriptive practices. There's no evidence to the contrary, and there's plenty to support that. I think we agree on that much, so perhaps we can set that aside and attempt to move forward? — creativesoul

There are various points that I would qualify or put differently, but fundamentally this seems to me to apply to all thought. Some elaboration on "How do we think...?" seems to be desirable. There's an implied analogy with "How does one start a car?" or "How do you get to Rome?" or "How do we calculate the orbit of Mars" which could easily becomes misleading. But that is a starting point for a general discussion of thinking and language. However, I hope we don't need to get too far into the general issues.

Assuming that there is such a thing as non human thought or human thought prior to when language acquisition begins in earnest. In seeking to make sense of this, we're isolating/delineating/targeting/defining thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience that existed in its entirety prior to being talked about(prior to naming and descriptive practices). — creativesoul

I realize that you are aiming to define a context for our specific problem. Nothing wrong with that. But I wouldn't set about it in this way. We need to be more specific, because the idea that there is a single general model of our naming and descriptive practices shepherds us into thinking about specific cases in inappropriate ways.

BTW, I'm not clear how far you are committed to the idea of a single general model for all our linguistic practices, because you do talk about them in the plural. However that may be, I see our problem as specifically about certain practices, not all of them.

More specifically, it is about how far we can sensible apply our practice in explaining human action to creatures that are like us but not human, and specifically do not have human languages. It seems inevitable that our practice needs to be modified. The question is what modifications are needed.

I think we agree on that much, so perhaps we can set that aside and attempt to move forward? — creativesoul

It would be annoying to try and thrash out all the issues before proceeding, so can you proceed with your argument on the basis of a provisional agreement? Then we can just sort out the differences that matter to our discussion. That itself would be an achievement.

_________________________

However, looking more closely at your example does give me pause:-

A growl in a familiar life scenario has all the context necessary for creatures to draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible things... fear, say. ..... The creatures learn how to react/respond/behave/survive. Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours? Sure. No metacognition necessary. No thinking about themselves and others as subject matters in their own right necessary. Does this constitute shared meaning in close to the same sense as described above? — creativesoul

I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". But the scenario is undoubtedly a relevant case and one could say that we learn the correlation between the growl and danger and fighting - hence also fear.

But "correlation" does not distinguish between a Pavlovian response and an action - something that the dog does. When the bell rings and the dog salivates, that's an automatic response - salivating is not under conscious control. It is part of an automatic system which governs digestion. Growling is under conscious control - even a form of communication, counting as a warning. I'm not saying that the distinction is crystal clear, but rather the difference is a question of which mode of interpretation we apply to the phenomena. The Pavlovian response is causal; growling functions in a scoial context. (Even that needs further explanation). But the fact that it has a social function suggests that some awareness of the awareness of the difference self and others is necessary.

I look forward to your reply.

Good catch! :wink: — creativesoul

Thanks. However, I'm a bit hesitant about taking this up again. I didn't intend to upset you before, so I'm concerned that I might do so again. I shall try to keep everything that I say impersonal, in the hope that will suffice.

I'm sorry I have taken to so long to reply. I have had some distractions over the last few days. Nothing problematic, but things that needed to be attended to. But I'll put something together tomorrow.

That would be good.

But it is clear here that it is not language which fools us, but our temptation to treat words as objects (like “time”), and it is this desire that mystifies us, as, on page 7, he shows how analogy allows us to mistakenly infer there is a place for thought because there is a place for words. — Antony Nickles

Are those the two mistakes in your headline for this section? I mean the temptation to follow the grammar of language (as opposed to philosophical grammar) and the temptation to be fooled by false analogies - or by over-extended analogies.

I had forgotten that. Sorry.

You are right that our discussioin has become unproductive and annoying. We aren't making progress. That's a shame but it's probably best if we leave it where it is. Thank you for your time and patience.

There is no agent here that is analogous to the hand that writes or mouth that speaks. We might say that in this case it is the mind that imagines, but we do not think with the mind in a way that is analogous to thinking with the hand or mouth. — Fooloso4

Yes. I had read all that when I posted. My problem is quite simple, Normally, we would say, when I calculate using pen and paper, that I am calculating, not that my hand is calculating. Why? Because my hand does not understand mathematics and so is incapable of calculating. So I'm interpreting W as saying that when I imagine calculating there appear to be nothing that fills the blank in "I calculated by..." (except possibly imagining that I was calculating). That's why there's a temptation to talk about mental acts or events. You quote PI 364, which amplifies a bit.
I'm also a bit confused by what he means by calculating by imagining I am calculating. Do you think he means what I would call "calculating in my head"?
It isn't a big thing. It's just that he so rarely says things that are not clear (in my opinion), that this paragraph stood out as unusual. It could be a translation glitch - not a problem at all in German..

We are misled by language, or, more precisely, the grammar of our language, when we regard 'mind' as we do 'hand' or 'mouth'. Grammatically all are substantives. They are nouns. As such we may be led to assume that they all name particular things. — Fooloso4

Yes. But...

But it is clear here that it is not language which fools us, but our temptation to treat words as objects (like “time”), and it is this desire that mystifies us, as, on page 7, he shows how analogy allows us to mistakenly infer there is a place for thought because there is a place for words. — Antony Nickles

I think this puts it better.

Another way to put this is that science isn’t going to tell us what thought or meaning or understanding are. Thus, “it is misleading to talk of thinking as of a ‘mental activity’.” — Antony Nickles

This is an extra ordinary remark. Thinking is a paradigm of a mental activity. Surely, what he needs to argue is that mental activities, in particular thinking, is not the kind of activity it suggests, because of the contrast with physical activities. Is doing a calculation with pencil and paper a mental or a physical activity?

Thus the reason he says trying to find the place of thinking must be rejected “to prevent confusion”. (p.8) — Antony Nickles

But on the previous page he says:-

Now does this mean that it is nonsensical to talk of a locality where thought takes place? Certainly not. This phrase has sense' if we give it sense. — Blue Book p.7

His suggestion is a way of giving "the locality of thinking" a sense that many people would find perfectly satisfactory.

“I can give you no agent who thinks.” (p.6) This seems speculative at this point (and needlessly provocative), and I take it to mean so far that if there is no casual scientific mechanism, then it is the (“external”) judgment of thought that matters, not its agent (though this belies responsibility). — Antony Nickles

His use of "agent" here is unusual. When I think by writing, the agent is my hands. When I think by imagining, there is no agent. I don't know why the obvious agent - me - doesn't count.

But it is clear here that it is not language which fools us, but our temptation to treat words as objects (like “time”), and it is this desire that mystifies us, as, on page 7, he shows how analogy allows us to mistakenly infer there is a place for thought because there is a place for words. — Antony Nickles

Yes. His concluding remarks about one's visual field nicely demonstrate how that is possible.

The 'is' in that sentence should not be read as the 'is' of identity. — Clearbury

If it was the "is" of identity, everything that is true of the person would also be true of the animal and of the machine. Which is not the case.
The only possibilities in philosophy seem to be reductionism or emergentism. I don't think that either are particularly attractive. As far as I know there hasn't been much work on the logic of cross-categorial relationships, beyond observing that descriptions in one category cannot be meaningfully applied in another category. In the case of human beings, we very much need to understand this.

I do blame him for endorsing one particularly horrific practice. — Vera Mont

Where does he say that?

Probably, most of the inquisitors didn't personally heat the pincers, but they understood the use of hot pincers and published theological justification for their use. — Vera Mont

Now I'm confused. Are discussing the wickedness of Descartes or of the Inquisition? Perhaps you just mean that they are a parallel case. In which case, where does Descartes publish a justification for the use of nails and planks on animals?

I've encountered a few intelligent posters who keep insisting that we go back to original research, because there's just not enough evidence to support the theory of evolution. I do think that's wilful ignorance. It's their loss; I don't punish them for it. I probably do the same regarding subjects I don't care about. — Vera Mont

It is indeed wilful ignorance, although they are something of a public nuisance. On the other hand, we all have to pay the price of the anti-vaxers' wilful ignorance.

Without consideration, or further inquiry? — Vera Mont

Sorry, I thought the need for further inquiry and consideration was a given - subject to the priority that you give to the issue.

It depends on why you're doing it: to protect potential victims, or to benefit from the deception - from laudable to trivial to reprehensible. — Vera Mont

Yes. I still think that disapproval is the default position. But that's just a detail.

Sure. But let's try to be accurate in our observations and honest in our assessment.
It's for their God, not me, to absolve them for their motives or toss them into The Pit for their crimes. — Vera Mont

Accurate and honest, certainly. Are we including fair and balanced as well? I hope so.
If it's for God to absolve them, isn't it also for their God to judge them?

There is no value judgment here of the worthiness of the goal or the cause of the problem. Whether it's aimed at a better cancer treatment or a more effective weapon of mass destruction, the thought process is rational. — Vera Mont

That's fair enough. There's a nasty gap, however, in how one assesses the worthiness of the goal or what's a problem, rather than a feature. But let's leave that alone, for now.

It mattered when the prevailing practice was questioned, opposed, justified on philosophical grounds and therefore continued. In this, he was greatly influential. — Vera Mont

It would take an angel to be on the right side of every debate at the same time. But then, you have high standards, it would seem.
He was indeed influential. But that doesn't necessarily mean that he approved of everything his followers did. I don't think anyone knows (unless you've got a source) what he thought of his followers in Amsterdam. For all we know, he would have disowned them.

Can you possibly imagine none of these intelligent men knew what the screaming signified? — Vera Mont

Yes and no. In the '50's, there was (in the UK) a big scandal about a toxicological test that involved dropping chemicals in the eyes of rabbits to find out what dose was required to kill 50% of the subjects. It was known as the L(ethal) D(ose) 50 test. The goal was, no doubt, desirable, but involved a great deal of pain for the rabbits. So they didn't report that the rabbits screamed in pain, but that they "vocalized". The defence, no doubt, was that it was important to preserve scientific objectivity. So they reported only the facts, without any subjective interpretation. Another example of how indoctrination with an ideology is at least as dangerous, and arguably more vicious, as old-fashioned vices like greed and sadism.

I never understood why you introduced the moral component. — Vera Mont

But why is lying a immoral? — Vera Mont

Unfortunately, our language is not neatly divided between facts and values. Some concepts incorporate an evaluative judgement as well as a factual component. Murder is not simply killing, but wrongful killing. Pain is not simply a sensation but a sensation that we seek to avoid and that, if we have any humanity, we will help others to avoid. And so on.
Actually, you are right - not all lying is wrong; we even have an expression (at least in my possibly rather archaic version of English) for lies that are OK - white lies. Nonetheless, deliberately leading someone to believe something that you know to be false is generally disapproved of. Ditto for hypocrisy.
So I thought you introduced the moral element and I was responding to that.

Obviously, stating one's belief is not lying. It only becomes so if one is exposed to the truth and rejects it. Making oneself believe what isn't true is lying to oneself, whether it's said to anyone else or not. Nobody believes falsehoods through simple carelessness, though they may repeat what they've heard because they don't care enough to reflect. That may be trivial or criminal, depending on the falsehood and its effect on the world. — Vera Mont

That sounds rather hard on people. Surely, if I'm exposed to some evidence for an idea, but there's not enough evidence to justify believing it, I am right to reject it, even if it turns out later to be true. In any case, there isn't enough time to live a life and think carefully about everything we need to know.

I don't believe there has ever been a sane adult in the world who is or was morally pure, or entirely truthful or altogether devoid of hypocrisy. None of our heroes and role models are so much more perfect than we are. Why is that a problem? — Vera Mont

I don't think it is. The best we can do is to try to avoid the biggest failures. So forgiveness becomes important, to prevent pursuit of the good turning into the tyranny of perfection.

It troubles me greatly that Aristotle thought some people are born to be slaves and slavery is an important part of family order, — Athena

The conventional defence is that nobody in the world at that time had any doubt about slavery. It's asking a lot of someone to come up with a revolutionary idea like that - indeed, it took centuries for human beings to develop the ideas that we take for granted.
What troubles me more than his ideas about slavery is that there appear to be some people around who are trying to promote his argument as a justification of slavery today.
If you look at the details, though, you'll find that his version of slavery strips out a great deal of what makes it so objectionable. It can be read as a promotion of decent treatment for slaves, including the opportunity to learn how to be free and a ban on enslaving free people.

Who is going to buy the stuff that makes corporations rich, if the people can not afford it? — Athena

Good question. I keep wondering who will buy all the products when production and distribution are completely handed over to robots and AI. I suppose the machines could sell things to each other, but they can only pay if they are paid for their labour.

When Adam Smith wrote of economics he also wrote of morality and explained the importance of good morality to economic success. — Athena

Yes. The problem is that it is in the interest of everyone to work out a free ride on everyone else's virtue, and it is against the interest of everyone to behave well and get ripped off. Race to the bottom.

Thrift Books has a few books written by Adam Smith for very little money. — Athena

I'm sure it would be quite an eye-opener to see what he actually said.

Yes, I agree that every species is unique in some way. For us it just happened to be symbolic language (unless there is at least one other species that unbeknownst to us also possesses it). — Janus

Some people think that there are number of factors working together. That seems a very likely possibility. Our bipedalism allowed our front feet to develop into hands which enabled us to handle objects in a much more precise way. Our large (for our body size) brain allowed us to develop our kind of language. Not to mention the critical importance of our being a social animal, without which our technologies could not have developed.

If we knew enough about the brain, we - the scientists - could stimulate a flower without us - the experimentee - ever having seen one. In this case, the "external object" merely verifies our criteria, the flower itself is not the ground of our judgment (or our asking about it), rather the "red flower" is something which fits our criteria. — Manuel

But there is no external object, so there is nothing to verify. There is no "flower itself" to be the ground of our judgement, so there is no ground for our judgement and nothing that fits our criteria. There is a temptation to fill the gap, but the fillers are mysterious magical objects and we end up with a philosophical labyrinth that we cannot escape from. Best not to start.

I could give you a plastic red flower, indistinguishable from a real red flower, and it would still fit your criteria. — Manuel

If it is a plastic red flower, then it is distinguishable from a real red flower. Of course, I might be deceived and treat it as a real red flower, but it isn't one. So my judgement that I'm holding a red flower is false.

Which is why I said I was a bit surprised to be included in this discussion. I'm well aware I'm quite likely in the minority view. — Manuel

Nothing wrong with being in the minority. What matters is the discussion.

That's just how he did justify the moral position held by a minority of thinkers at the time that it's wrong to torture animals. — Vera Mont

So I've learnt something to-day. Thank you for the link. I have looked through it, but not read it carefully yet.

I'm losing my grip on what our disagreement is about. Perhaps you'll forgive my not following the convention of linking my comments to quotations from what you say. Instead, I'ld like to offer an analysis of where we are at.

We seem to be using "hypocrisy" in slightly different ways. I think I can best explain through a different case. Many people seem to use the word "lying" to mean simply saying what is false. Whether they attach a moral judgement to the word is not clear to me, but my understanding of it is that saying what is false, knowing it to be false and with intent to deceive is morally reprehensible.
So, for me, saying what one sincerely believes to be true, even if it turns out to be false, is not lying. There's an exception, that one might sincerely believe something because of wishful thinking, or carelessness; but saying that it is true is a different moral failing, for which we don't have a name (I think). In the same way, you seem to call behaving in ways that are inconsistent "hypocrisy" but you seem to exempt some hypocrisy from moral criticism, if it has a rational justification.

But then, there is a difficulty about the intersection of rationality with morality. We like to think that they don't conflict. But when you say that Descartes was hypocritical but rational, I conclude that you are saying that the rationality of his hypocrisy justifies it, or at least exempts is from moral censure. I find that very confusing.

I believe it is the case that Descartes never indulged in the vicious torture of nailing animals to planks, but that some students who followed Descartes did. Furthermore, it seem that he also kept a companion dog in his house, which seems incompatible with believing that the animal was just a machine. Here's my opinion. The students were guilty of consistency, illustrating how rigid adherence to a ideology can lead one into really vicious moral errors. Descartes, on the other hand, was technically inconsistent with his theoretical beliefs, but exhibited good sense in not following through from his theory to his practice.

I hope at least some of this makes sense.

The flower is the stimulus, but without judgments ascertaining if what I gave you is correct, then the flower is quite useless. — Manuel

Yes, but without the flower, judgements about it are meaningless.

Well, the most immediate example would be of a blind person asking for a red flower. But then since they can't see, it would be strange for them to ask for a red one, as opposed to just a "flower". — Manuel

Some blind people have visual images - it depends whether they have had vision earlier in their lives. People born blind, I'm not so sure. But Wittgenstein's point is that one can bring you a red flower without a visual image.

So, I don't find the phrase "have in mind" to be particularly problematic in the least. — Manuel

Well, I think you'll find that not everyone interprets that phrase in the same way - especially in philosophy.

And yet... The Economy of the Hive — T Clark

Yes, quite so. I realized after I signed off that I was wide open to that. If economics is about allocation of resources in a system, then an economy will be an aspect of any society.

Tentatively, I wondered whether any animals have an equivalent of money and I'm a bit sceptical about the claim that bees indulge in trade.

If we are human animals, and human animals are persons, we ought to extend personal identity to the limits of the human animal’s life instead of limiting its application to the fleeting moments of psychological awareness or memory. — NOS4A2

I hadn't thought about this. I guess I assumed that a given human is the same machine, the same animal and the same person throughout their life - normally and paradigmatically. But there are questions about psychological identity (self-identity) and social identity that make it more complicated than that.
Worse than that, many animals have capacities that are at least person-like and a certain (complicated\) moral status - though no-one, so far as I know, thinks that they are morally responsible agents.
But I do agree that the identity of persons (and animals and other creatures) ought to be defined in terms of a life-cycle, not as something that is unchanging throughout life. I also think that my identity as a person is, to a great extent, a moral and a social question, not a psychological one.

But by this criteria, personhood is something that has to be fostered and developed. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, that's certainly true. The phenomena around feral children seem to confirm that and, in my understanding, suggest that there is a "window" in our development when those abilities need to be learnt, or are best learnt.

I didn't know people denied this. Certainly not here at TPF. Most here take it further, and say there is no difference between us and the other species. — Patterner

Yes, some people do say there is no difference. But if that were true, the species homo sapiens could not be defined. The issue is what the significance of the differences is. The objection is to the idea of human exceptionalism; I mean the attitude that thinks that animals have no moral claim on us and can be treated in the same way(s) that we treat any other physical resource.

The argument seems to be more of an assertion and seems to employ zero signficant logic in coming to its conclusion, — noAxioms

That may be because the debate is not really about a matter of fact, but a question of attitude and values.

Yes, I agree. For me, the main point is that it is a matter of values and not a matter of fact. In that case, it becomes a question of whether humans should be considered animals rather than whether they are or aren't. — T Clark

Yes, for the purposes of biology, h. sapiens is just another species. But it would be absurd to apply economic theory to a hive of bees or termintes. But it is not a question is once-for-all; it is pragmatic. For example, people need food and shelter, just the same as their animals; they suffer and die from diseases, just the same as their animals. But it would be absurd to grant animals the right to vote; that belongs to people. Again, in the context of athletics, working out how best to throw a discus requires regarding the body as a machine; for many medical purposes the heart is just a pump. And so on.