As I understand it, both Plato and Descartes are against error, and I support both in that respect. Both are in favour of rationality and I support them in that.

I don't think that solipsism has anything to do with that.

Though I admit, I don't think that what is usually called rationality is anything like the whole story. But I don't think solipsism has anything to do with that either.

Freedom plays a part in all this, of course. But freedom is not the same as solipsism.

It's not how they are viewed but many battles have likely been fought over solipsism. — introbert

I'm afraid I don't know anything like enough to debate why various battles have been fought. I would be very surprised to learn that any battles have ever been fought over solipsism. It seems rather unlikely. But as I say, I'm not a historian.

You say: -

individual freedom is going to involve independent thought, which involves only having certainty of one's own mind and being critical of the validity, soundness or even existence of anyone else. — introbert

I'm getting the idea that your idea of solipsism is essentially radical individual freedom. That's somewhat unusual.

the ideal guerilla is a freedom fighter, a partisan, a resistance member. The ideal conventional soldier unquestioningly follows orders from the command chain of a regime. The ideal guerilla is not an ideal conventional soldier and vice versa. Neither are inherently good or evil. The ideal guerilla is the solipsist and the ideal conventional soldier is the confederate. — introbert

You are giving me a very simplified sketch of a very conventional view of what is required of a soldier in these different kinds of warfare. From the little that I know about it, I would say that the simplifications amount to distortions. I don't think we're going to reach agreement about this. I'll just repeat that so far as I understand it, fighting a war involves team work on one's own side - whether it is guerrilla warfare or conventional - and an enemy group or team. I don't see how solipsism could function at all in that kind of situation, even if it amounts to no more than a belief in the primary importance of individual freedom.

Why would I accept solipsism as a litmus test of anything? Neither Platonic realism nor Cartesianism say anything at all about individual freedom, so far as I know.

Oh, I thought it was obvious. A battle is between two groups of people. A solipsist cannot recognize that there are any other people. So a solipsist is unable to take part in a battle and moreover is unlikely to want to take part in a battle for recognition and inclusion, both of which involve relationships with other peop.

I don't think I'm competent to debate military strategy. Sorry. But I have the impression that sometimes guerrillas win and sometimes conventional soldiers win.

So a conventional soldier can't be an idealist? Why on earth not?

Guerrillas don't have command structures? How do they co-operate?

I don't see how or why solipsists could be or would be guerrillas or conventional soldiers without compromising their solipsism.

Well no, if solipsism were true there would be no reason to connect with people because there would be no other people. — Darkneos

So you are concerned that solipsism might be unprovable but nonetheless true. Historical speculations fall into that class. There could be evidence, but we'll never get it. For example, so we'll never know what Julius Caesar said to Brutus, as he and his friends stabbed him to death. The claim that he said "Even you, my child" is unprovable but might be true.

I was treating solipsism as a hinge proposition or an axiom. It is not like a historical speculation. No evidence will ever be relevant to its status. That's why hinge propositions and axioms are not proved or disproved, but chosen or adopted. One can choose a different hinge, a different axiom. So if solipsism causes you suffering, it is open to you to adopt a different hinge/axiom.

Solipsism could be something as hard to change as a bad habit, and I'm well aware that pressing suggestions on someone who wants to change a habit is not only useless, but offensive. So I wouldn't dream of pressing any suggestion about what to do about solipsism on you.

I can't see how this can be discussed. Do we agree on that?

. . . so I look at critical thought such as postmodernism as being part of a struggle to redesign solipsism. Such things as turning one against social construction, disciplinary institutions (panopticon) and fascism etc and even an openness to schizophrenia as gently nudging the reader towards solipsism. — introbert

The struggles that you are referring to were, in my opinion, entirely justified. Understandably, there was little thought given to what would happen when the struggles succeeded, and they did succeed, at least in some measure. (I don't think they are yet over, but that's another issue) I don't think anyone in those movements thought of solipsism as the goal. On the contrary, faced with their opposition, solipsism was a non-starter. The mistake was to cast the argument in terms of freedom. They would have been more accurate if they had thought of their movements as struggles for recognition and inclusion. That might have prevented, or mitigated, what happened next.

What happened when the revolutionaries joined the mainstream is that the erstwhile oppressors felt like victims. So they hi-jacked the rhetoric of freedom as yet another way of fighting back. It's too late to prevent that now, and so we find ourselves in great difficulty.

But what all this shows, I would suggest, is that society is not a monolith. It is a battle-ground - not even one battle-ground, but many. As a philosopher, it is more convenient to think of the struggle as a dialectic, though it won't help to think, with Hegel, that progress is guaranteed, or that there is any kind of end to it.

We have to recognize that there is no vantage point above the battle that allows issues to be settled without a struggle. Or if there is one, we haven't found it yet.

I would also like to suggest that you might think about recognizing that in a battle, solipsism is not helpful.

Well, I can't understand solipsism from a solipsist's point of view, because I have a different hinge (axiom?). Even if I didn't, I still couldn't understand solipsism from any point of view but my own.

Nonetheless, in my reading, both those arguments (I'm not sure if that's the right word for Anonymous' piece, but it certainly is for Barmadosa's) turn on: -

I am the subject of my experiences, make my various judgements, have various desires and values and perform various actions. No-one else can do those things. — Ludwig V

. Or so it seems to me.

You started this discussion because, as you say: -

I'm asking because years ago I thought I saw a post on Quora that proved solipsism to be true and I suffered since then. But I don't remember what it said or even if it was right (I'm pretty bad at philosophy) and I can't find the post. So I've lived thinking it's true this whole time and there isn't a reason to connect with people because they aren't real. But if solipsism is unproveable then he's wrong and I can move on. — Darkneos

So we are agreed that solipsism is unproveable.

It might help, though, to think that there doesn't need to be a reason to connect with people. Like all the best things in life, it is something worth doing for it's own sake, and it might reduce your suffering. Elimination of suffering is too much to ask, I'm afraid. That's my experience, at least.

You might be less pleased if I point out that the fact that solipsism is unproveable means that it's undisprovable, as well. But that only means that each solipsist and non-solipsist has to decide for themselves where they stand. I guess solipsists can live with that. (Anonymous, at least, seems to have taken that on board.)

general understanding of conflictual process for truth relies in some catalyst for argument, and these two realities are definitely a source of conflict. — introbert

Can I understand that quotation as meaning that you are trying to express a real conflict or something like that.

I can understand that. I've never been keen on those traditional metaphors of the state - the ship of state, the body politic. Society is as much a battle-ground or, better, a riot as anything else.

Is that right?

That is a possibility. I'll think about that.

Could you please clarify what you mean by "true"?

nationalism, is a product of solidarity, integration, unity, those kinds of things, and are not necessarily true. The solipsist is not necessarily true either, but a general understanding of conflictual process for truth — introbert

I thought that nationalism was about values, while solipsism was about truth.

Whereas conflict is always based on values, or at least desires.

Are you confusing solipsism with the value of individual freedom?

I don't understand. Do you mean that solipsism consists of just that statement "I alone exist", in two versions, "I exist and nothing else exists" and "I exist and no other person exists".

No reasons, no explanation of what "exists" means or "I" means?

No response to the question what that assertion means if there is no-one to hear it?

Or is it just that each solipsist has their own meaning and reasons?

I have to look again at the links you gave in the beginning.

That seems to be a box with a label but no content.

Are we essentially just brainwashed by society and nothing more than puppets in our lives or is there more than that? — Darkneos

We are not brainwashed by society. Our brain is trained (programmed, if you like the computer analogy) by its environment, physical and social. Without that training, there is no person. Hence, we are created by society.

The fact that we can object to, rebel against or withdraw from, our society shows that social control is imperfect, partial. That's a good thing, for the same reason that variations in DNA are a good thing.

I'm replying to you because you started this discussion. I hope I'm not being too disruptive by intervening at this late stage. I have read the discussion so far. I hope I can bring something new to it.

The core of the solipsism seems to be “I alone exist” (call this P). From my point of view, this is clearly empirically false. I can recognize other people and interact with them; my training for this began within minutes of being born, before I could speak or think.

But a solipsist is clearly a person, living in the same world as me. But I an equivalent belief - that other people exist. Certainly refutation or proof of the normal kinds are not available. So this must be a proposition of a different kind – hinge, conceptual, grammatical. That does not mean it is trivial. However, I can only decide how serious or trivial it is when I understand it.

It may be that solipsism is based on the observation that I am the subject of my experienes, make my various judgements, have various desires and values and perform various actions. No-one else can do those things. Indeed, some people think that this is what constitutes my self, and similar observations underpin various other ideas in philosophy.

For me, “I” designates the same thing as my name, namely me. That does not mean a special part of me, but rather the whole of me (although that whole, like other things with parts, can undergo various changes as time goes by.)

So the difference is a difference in the idea of the self, person, human being.

How to understand and evaluate this? Assuming that everything that can be said in one language can also be said in the other, it will come down to different attitudes and ways of interacting with other people. And it will likely be a pragmatic decision.

Thank you for that. :smile:

I think how we come to be aware of a particular body is a fundamental question and I think the self issue is more about inhabiting a particular body and consciousness than a selection of traits and preferences. — Andrew4Handel

I think there's a lot to be said for that view - although we can select traits and preferences at least up to a point.

We are aware of our particular body by means of proprioception. This is quite different from what philosophers call introspection because there is a specific physiological system that does it. "Proprioception , also referred to as kinaesthesia (or kinesthesia), is the sense of self-movement, force, and body position. It is sometimes described as the "sixth sense". In other words, we become aware of a particular body as ours through a sensory system specifically devoted to the job.

One wants to ask why we don't experience our own body as distinct from ourselves in the way that we experience everything else that is not me. Tables and chairs, etc are experienced through senses. So are our own bodies. I guess the answer is that we learn what is under our direct control and what is not. That's how.

There's a Wikipedia entry on proprioception if you want a quick initial briefing on it. Google will turn up lots of other material. I haven't seen a philosophical piece on this yet.

This might be true from a third person perspective. Not from a first person perspective. — neomac

Yes. First person use of "know" is different from the others, because there is no difference between justification and truth. In the case of second or third person uses, they are. That was the point of the last sentence of my last post.

But it seems to me that the paradigm use has to be second or third person uses, because there is no real difference between "I know that p" and "I believe that p", except emphasis.

Concerns for knowledge is not separate from concerns for the knower. — Fooloso4

Ah! I was hoping you didn't mean Dr. Pangloss's belief that all is for the best in the best possible world. I think you may be right in suggesting that knowing p is good for the knower. Believing that p may or may not be beneficial. Thinking that p is usually harmful - because "he thinks that p" suggests that he is wrong.

I substantially agree but what I find more interesting to notice is the following: while the falsity of p implies that "I know that p" is false, the epistemic "withdrawal" from a belief that "turns out" to be false (as opposed to "unjustified") might correspond to different epistemic conditions: e.g. "I don't know that p", "I know that non-p", "I believe that non-p", "I don't believe that p", or "I doubt that p". Yet only "I know that non-p" would make sense to say to me in that case. In other words, knowledge claims defeated out of falsify are not just "withdrawn" but "replaced" by other knowledge claims. — neomac

I think you are on to something here. I hadn't thought of it. The difference between "I don't know that p" and "I know that not-p" is particularly relevant here. And you are right, of course, that only "I know that not-p" is the contradictory of "I know that p". The relationship of those two to the other three is clearly complicated. In this example, it seems plausible to say that Al doesn't know that p and that he doesn't know that not-p. I'm inclined to say that he believes that p. I would also say that "I doubt that p" implies "I don't believe that p" and "I don't know that p".

But all of that gets more complicated if you consider "s/he knows that p" etc.

I'm afraid I don't know what to make of these two messages.

Some of it I understand and agree with, though I'm not sure I'm interpreting it in the same way as you are.
Some of it I don't understand.

It seems as if you are a platonist. Is that fair?

I feel I want to ask you where you are going with this?

It is in light of the good that the difference between opinion and knowledge can be seen. — Fooloso4

Yes, that is persuasive. Opinion is like knowledge, but deceptive and turn out not to be knowledge. Something pleasurable can be deceptive and turn out not to be good.

I say it is only persuasive because someone who wants to resist the conclusion will simply question the comparisons, and I'm not sure there are compelling reasons to say they are valid.

Something reliable can fail once or twice and still be classed as reliable. But if something certain turns out wrong, it is no longer certain.

I prefer "defeasible" because "fallible knowledge" can be taken to mean that If I claim to know something on good grounds but it still turns out false, it is nonetheless knowledge. So I'm anxious to insist that knowledge doesn't fail - people do. So a claim to knowledge that p must be withdrawn if p turns out to be false.

Well, it was a good thing I checked. What the Gorgias says is rather different from my account of it. You will find that at 463 he characterizes rhetoric as "flattery" and then as "experience and a knack". He contrasts those things with skill or art (techne (and not episteme as I thought. Many examples of techne are discussed. The skill of kubernetike ("navigation" in my translation - which calls the navigator "pilot") apparently includes knowing its limits, in which respect it is contrasted with rhetoric. But then, Socrates calls swimming an episteme at the beginning of the same speech.

See what you make of it.

1. "knowledge" claim is a principled based or procedural form of certainty. And principles/procedures can validate our "knowledge" claim to the extant they are reliable. — neomac

I think I accept that. A lot depends on what you mean by "certain". On some interpretations, that might conflict with reliability, or least, the standard of reliability needs to be compatbile with the standard of certainty.

My feeling is that the question of reliability is indeed important, and that's what justifies the J clause and indeed the infuriating (so some) vagueness about what it means.

Given a choice between the two, I would prefer truth to reliability, but that conflicts with the idea of a definition. But then, I don't think that definition is as all-important as many people seem to think. We seem to manage quite well without water-tight definitions for many of the words we use.

Condition one makes "knowledge" claims legitimate. Condition two makes knowledge" claims fallible. — neomac

It depends a bit on what you mean by "fallible". I prefer to call knowledge claims "defeasible" because I think that if a knowledge claim fails, in the sense if the proposition that is (claimed) to be known is false, the claim to knowledge loses any legitimacy and must be withdrawn. The same applies to any assertion we make, so it isn't as radical as one might think.

I think he is expressing a genuine type of skepticism. We do know what knowledge is but in trying to say exactly what it is and is not, it alludes us. — Fooloso4

Well, that is the classic conclusion of the early dialogues. So you are probably right about that.

I'll look up the Gorgias and give you a reference. It gives you the opportunity to see for yourself. You would probably want that even if I wrote my account of it.

Where is your car?" is a question that doesn't do justice to the scenario as described. How is Al or Betty supposed to answer it? — Agent Smith

Yes. Exactly.

_I don't really understand what your point is and how this is relevant to our Scientific Epistemology of the brain...Care to elaborate? — Nickolasgaspar

I'm afraid I can't provide much elaboration. I assumed that if something is done by the my unconscious self, it followed that I was doing it. Actions done by me are normally done consciously. But there are occasions when we say that something is done unconsciously, so that is not a cast-iron rule. Some habitual actions, some reflex actions and maybe others fall into that category. Still, unconscious actions are, I think, exceptions to the norm. Normally, I am held responsible for what I do, but this is not so clear in the case of unconscious actions.

On the other hand many automatic processes are not classified as actions performed by the self. Heartbeat, digestion are examples. Breathing and swallowing are sometimes performed by the self and sometimes not. On the face of it, brain activity seems more like heartbeat and digestion, but it could be more like breathing and swallowing.

Scientists will do whatever they want to do and work out their own justifications. I have no problem with that. But philosophy has its own agenda and may need to work by different concepts. I doubt, for example, whether questions of moral responsibility figure prominently in the discussions of the unconscious self. Those questions need to be addressed in their own way.

The paradox is best visible when we ask a question other than "do you know where your car is, monsieur/mademoiselle?" — Agent Smith

That puzzles me. I was suggesting that the paradox is best understood when we move away from that question and begin to ask others, like "Where did you park your car?". Simply asking "Do you know where your car is?" presents a limited choice of answers and masks the complexities of the situation. These are revealed when you start to ask other questions.

Is that what you meant?

If we let go of the false belief that knowledge is JTB the dilemma is dissolved. In both the Theaetetus and Meno mathematics plays a key role. Socrates KNOWS how to solve the geometric problem in the Meno, he does not just have an opinion, true or false, about how to solve it. — Fooloso4

I'm very confused by what you say about the dialogues. I would have to look up the dialogues to comment intelligently.

But what I collect from the passage I quote is that you think that the difference between knowledge and true belief is that one has the skill to establish the truth that is at stake. (I'm not sure that's an adequate formilation, so I hope that's reasonably close.) That's a theory and it fits well with what Plato says in the Gorgias about episteme. It's a very demanding criterion, but that also fits well with Plato's ideas about philosophy and common life.

That is a description of an observable phenomenon. The quality of helpfulness follows. — Nickolasgaspar

The observable phenomenon is the brain activity and its apparent connection to what we consciously do at the conscious level. The description "unconscious self" is a decision about how it is appropriate to consider the phenomenon. "Unconscious" applied to "Self" seems contradictory to the normal idea of the self, so it needs more justification than it is getting here. Other descriptions may be more appropriate. I would prefer to say that the various calculations take place, without committing to the idea that anybody is doing them.

I think the application of "material" or "immaterial" in an imagined absolute sense to computations is a category error. It's like saying, for example, "the tree is or isn't spiritual". — Janus

Yes. That's a better response than mine.

My contention is that it is the misuse of Plato, based on a misunderstanding of the dialogue. — Fooloso4

I'm glad we agree about that.

I have read it. It is actually Gettier himself who drags Plato in. He says in a footnote: — Fooloso4

Yes. "Drag Plato in" is exactly right. And his footnote, though it shows a certain respect for him, doesn't help matters.

Actually, given that he actually cites three different versions - all modern - and explicitly claims that his argument will refute all of them, we might guess that citing Plato recognizes that to cite just one version of the definition may mean that he (Gettier) only refutes one version. But then, he should perhaps have included Plato's version in his collection and added it to the list to be refuted. Perhaps he didn't believe that his argument does refute Plato's version. I think he may be right. But then, Plato refutes it anyway. So it's all a bit of a mystery.

It reminds me of the way some people like to cite Epicurus' atomic theory as in some sense a predecessor of modern atomic theory. Which it isn't. Why would it be? I think it is an attempt to give modern theories respectability. But they would do better to let their own theory stand on its own feet. Indeed, I haven't seen that trope for quite a while, so perhaps it isn't done any more.

But the questions of knowledge that Plato raises far exceed the narrower cases that Gettier addresses. In addition, for Plato the issue is not "are you justified for believing" in the sense of having some reason, however insufficient for believing, but "can you defend the belief" in such a way so as to demonstrate its truth. — Fooloso4

Quite so. For me, that's a dilemma. My problem is I haven't been able to develop a third alternative. But I haven't given up hope.

What you say reminds me of what Hume says about radical scepticism - he calls it Pyrrhonic. Everybody will continue on their merry way, despite not being able to disprove it. Indeed, he recommends everyday life as a good cure for it.

Is lived experience not itself a process of continual construction or construal, even prior to the creation of narratives? — Joshs

Yes, certainly. I just wanted to clarify that giving the narrative is an additional process of construction on top of the processes involved in living what the narrative reports.

If recognizing others as selves is an integral part of learning to be a self, then isn’t it going too far to say that individuals do not recognize themselves? — Jamal

I may have been a bit hasty here. "Recognize" can mean "acknowledge" as in "recognizing (or not recognizing) the court". That's quite different from "recognize" as "knowing again". I took what you said in the latter sense.

But crucially, I wouldn’t say that this irreducibility entails immateriality. — Jamal

I agree with that. Indeed you put the point very well, better than I did.

In Cognitive science, there are two types of "Self". — Nickolasgaspar

Well, if that is helpful to cognitive science, it would be churlish to quibble. I wouldn't say, however, that I carry out the processes of the Unconscious Self. I would say that they occur. For one thing, I don't think that I can be held responsible for those processes when they go awry. But if it wasn't my conscious self that carried them out, I suppose it'll work if it is convenient.

Everything responsible for this mental concept is a product of brain function interacting with the environment....hence its Material. — Nickolasgaspar

I wouldn't say that the calculation performed by a computer was material, even though it is the result of a physical process. Indeed, it seems to me to be rather misleading.

The reason, I think, he introduces it is not to provide a model of an account but to address "certain persons". — Fooloso4

Good point. That seems very likely. Thanks.

it is helpful to the extent that it says what knowledge is not, that is, JTB. — Fooloso4

It doesn't disprove JTB. It disproves that the model he proposes isn't appropriate for JTB (or anything else very much).

That's helpful if anyone has proposed such a model, as you point about "certain persons" shows. But I don't think anyone since Plato has.

Are you referring to anyone specific? — Fooloso4

I wasn't. But I can cite Gettier as an example.

You didn't drag Plato into the discussion. Banno did. He was bemoaning the fact that philosophy was still discussing JTB without any results. As I said at the time, my post wasn't directed directly at him, but was an excuse to vent about the use so often made of Plato in discussing JTB.

But I've benefited from the opportunity to discuss it with you. If you can check out Gettier's original article, you can decide for yourself about my complaint.

Why would he use this as the model of an account if it is not helpful? — Fooloso4

That is the puzzle.

More specifically, extracting things from the dialogue, as if they were stand alone arguments. — Fooloso4

It seems to me that what the citations I'm complaining about are doing. They ignore the conclusion that Plato draws, without refuting his refutation.

Socrates human wisdom, his knowledge of ignorance, is in a limited sense knowledge of knowledge. — Fooloso4

True, knowing what one doesn't know may be wisdom or at least the beginning of wisdom. I can see that the dialogue could then be an object lesson. But I don't see that justifies citing the dialogue and then ignoring it.

"I" is a kind of name. What it refers to is defined in the context in which it is used. So it identifies exactly what my name identifies, which is not a part of me, material or immaterial. It is the whole of me.

I recognize the importance of everything that you've packed in to

The self is the overarching temporally extended narrative construct of a necessarily embodied and social consciousness which turns the animal acting in an environment into a subject. — Jamal

But I have to take issue, or perhaps quibble, with

It is that through which the individual recognizes that it is one of many, i.e., an individual in a society of individuals, which are also selves. The self is that which recognizes itself as a self in a world of selves.* — Jamal

Individuals do not recognize themselves. They learn to be themselves in interaction with other selves. There is no process of recognizing others as selves, or rather that skill is an integral part of learning to be a self.

The traditional answers, such as

The experiencer or perceiver. In one sense it seems to be immaterial but it could be something associated with the brain. — Andrew4Handel

are based on the mistake of thinking that because I undergo or initiate various changes, there must be a changeless essence. Theseus' ship is in the same boat. I am different from the boat because change is of the essence, as your emphasis on story shows.

But, a further quibble, my narrative is not constructed. It is lived. Afterwards, narratives may be constructed.

It is immaterial in the sense it is not correlated with anything physical — Andrew4Handel

It might be misleading to deny that my body is part of me. If you mean "immaterial" in the sense that Parliament is immaterial, even though it consists of people organized in a certain way and usually meeting in a certain place, I could buy that. But then, a car or a house is also immaterial because its' constituent part are organized and the organization (design) is immaterial.

What seem important is to have a unified locus of perception/awareness that keeps us aware of a continuity between all these internal things and unifies our incoming data from the external world. — Andrew4Handel

That's not a problem. I am the unified locus. Nothing distinct from me is needed to keep me aware of what I need to be aware of.

Socrates pursuit of knowledge of knowledge is part of his desire to be wise. Abstracted puzzles fail to catch what is at issue in the question of knowledge. — Fooloso4

That is certainly an interesting question. But Plato seems to veer away from it when Socrates says

Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is.

I'm not sure what you mean by "abstracted puzzles". Perhaps you mean the thumbnail sketches that are used as examples? I'm not very fond of them myself, I admit. But they seem to focus attention and discussion better than abstract statements.

And, what is at issue in the question of knowledge. Do you mean wisdom? Then by all means, let's discuss the relationship between knowledge and wisdom.

That certainly seem to be true.

Years ago when I was still somewhat active in the research community I published a paper on an unexplored topic. — jgill

Yes, that would be a good example.

Gödel's results are reflected in only a very small number of research themes. — jgill

I'm not surprised. Those results, in my uneducated view, are pretty devastating for mathematics as we know it. Philosophers are probably more inclined to take his theorem seriously. But most of them are inhibited because they don't want to grapple with and are not qualified to grapple with mathematics (or should that be metamathematics?)

The point that I've not forgotten is that the orthodox philosophical claim that logic provides arguments that everyone will agree to is false. Yes, there is a penalty, supposedly. If one withholds assent from a sound argument one is guilty of inconsistency or something. Which is true. But that professor did not seem to be suffering any serious ill consequences.

I'm not really clear what ChatGP is. But if you think it has some special access to what's going in Al's head, there's no harm in hearing what it says. There's a good chance it would be amusing and an outside chance it might be helpful.

It's the measurement problem. Looking at it changes it. — frank

That's very good. :smile:

If it was me, I'd say that I'm VERY aware of it and glare at you knowingly. I don't know what Al would do. — frank

Quite so. But this is philosophy, which Has great difficulty recognizing irony except in Socratic dialogues and Kierkegaard, where it is officially allowed. Al would undoubtedly do whatever the author of the story makes him do; he doesn't have free will, or any will.

What counts as justification depends on what the justification is of. ....... How does one justify that one possesses self-knowledge? What would count as justification of ethical knowledge? — Fooloso4

There are ways of justification available in both those cases. Not that I can write down a rule book, but I'm sure you are familiar with both practices. The question how to justify one's knowledge of knowledge is one thing, but not the same as what Plato has been discussing, which is knowledge of everything else.