Within an ingroup (Singer's circle of moral concern), all are morally equal. Some are more rational and better informed at knowing how to solve cooperation problems - how to act morally.

But being rational and well-informed about how to act morally does not imply such individuals will actually act morally because there are no generally accepted imperative moral oughts.

An irrational and poorly informed individual can choose to act more morally than a rational and well-informed one.

Really? Perhaps you could comment on my reply to Banno.

What does your claim that "well-informed and rational are normative” mean to you? I can make no sense of it.

That may be partly due to my background in science and engineering. I am using well-informed and rational in the conventional sense I would in science and engineering. I look at data and the hypotheses that explain it. I cannot make sense of being well-informed and rational about this data and the hypotheses explaining it as “normative”.

Perhaps “well-informed and rational” are used differently in philosophy?

But my usage seems consistent with Gert’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defining morality, so that seems unlikely. If you think well-informed and rational are used differently in philosophy than in science and engineering, please explain how they are used differently.

The naturalistic fallacy is a warning about imperative oughts. I claim no imperative oughts. That the function (the principal reason they exist) of cultural moral norms and our moral sense is solving cooperation problems has no innate moral bindingness even if it is objective truth. The naturalistic fallacy is irrelevant.

And of course, people cooperate for immoral goals. How is that relevant to moral ‘means’? Judging only by your comment, you appear unable to distinguish between the morality of means and ends.

‘Means’ and ‘ends’ are different categories of thing. Perhaps your embedded prior moral judgements and definition of morality are rendering you unable to think coherently about morality – unable to understand that moral means (unselfish cooperation) and immoral ends are distinct categories of things.

Empirically, past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense’s judgments and motivations are parts of cooperation strategies. Whatever your embedded concept of morality is, it seems to be causing a bizarre rejection of consideration of the possible relevance of this remarkable claimed result.

When you say, “You have embedded prior moral judgements in your definition of ‘moral’”, I am puzzled how you imagine my prior moral judgments affect 1) empirical data about cultural moral norms and our moral sense and 2) the game theory of cooperation developed in the last 50 years or so that explain it.

Every criticism you mentioned is irrelevant.

That is OK with me because of your gift. The gift is the explanation of the reason for your thought processes - “You have embedded prior moral judgements in your definition of ‘moral’.” Thanks. I have thought along these same lines for years, but never expressed it so well. I love the word embedded – it’s just the thing.

What I am getting at is how conditional oughts can be helpful in defining moral systems.

"Moral behaviour is defined as performing bad actions only if they cannot be avoided,"
How do you define bad? The claim just passes the explanatory burden.

An objective moral judgment itself, I would argue, is involuntary and is an imperative in the sense that we do it regardless of whether we want to or not. — Bob Ross

Bob,

Why would you argue that? I can't think of any rational or instrumental (goal-related) reasons for doing so.

That may be your intuition, but what is your intuition’s philosophical merit if it is an illusion foisted on you by your genes?

Building moral philosophy on an illusionary understanding of “an objective moral judgment” is a recipe for endless speculations.

Why not ground moral philosophy in the origins and objective function (the principal reason it exists) of cultural moral norms and our moral sense? With that, you can build a solid, culturally useful structure and, for the most part, leave the endless speculations behind.

Bob,

Getting back to the moral realism question in your OP:

Is Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) a kind of moral realism? Does it determine mind-independent moral truth values?

Yes, a necessary moral component (a definition of right and wrong) exists for all highly cooperative societies of independent agents. Regardless of anyone’s opinion, that moral component is strategies that solve cooperation problems.

MACS describes that necessary moral component. MACS, therefore, is an expression of moral realism that determines mind-independent moral truth about that necessary component.

Does MACS tell us what we imperatively ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences?

No. It is silent on imperative oughts.

Does MACS answer all our questions about morality and ethics?

No. It only describes the cooperation strategies that are a necessary moral component for all highly cooperative societies. MACS is silent about the goals of this cooperation and the broader aspects of the traditional ethical questions, “What is good?”, “How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?”.

P1: One ought to consider what causes cultural moral norms and our moral sense objective moral judgments.

P2: Solving cooperative problems is the cause of cultural moral norms and our moral sense.

C: Therefore, one ought to solve cooperative problems.

Is that syllogism accurate? — Bob Ross

Bob,

No, it is not accurate.

How about this version instead as explanation?

P1: Virtually all cultural moral norms and our moral sense’s judgments and motivations are heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for parts of strategies for solving cooperation problems. Game theory shows that a necessary part of cooperation strategies is the punishment of people who create cooperation problems by violating cultural norms that are the heuristics for solving cooperation problems.

P2: Solving cooperation problems is necessary for maintaining or increasing the benefits of cooperation in a society – the principal reason societies exist.

C: Therefore, if you wish to maintain or increase the benefits of living in your society, you ought (instrumentally) to advocate cultural norms that are heuristics for parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems and whose violation deserves punishment. By doing so, you will advocate for an objective morality with no imperative moral oughts.

Would all rational, well-informed people wish to maintain or increase the cooperation benefits of living in their society? Perhaps. If they did, then the proposed objective morality without imperative moral obligations would be normative by Gert's SEP definition.

Again, I am operating under the semantic use of an ‘objective moral judgement’ being more than just a description of proclamations which are contingent on wills (in a voluntary sense): would you disagree with that usage of the term? — Bob Ross

I agree that 'objective moral judgements’ are more than “a description of proclamations which are contingent on wills”. Objective moral judgments are proclamations dependent on the same objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense. The existence of objective moral judgments is not contingent on our wills. Their acceptance as moral obligations IS dependent on our wills since imperative obligation is not a necessary part of what is objectively moral.

Perhaps you are still thinking something like “what is objectively moral is necessarily an imperative obligation”. This idea is “an illusion foisted on us by our genes" (as the philosopher of biology Michael Ruse likes to point out).

This illusion is the origin of the moral realism problem you describe in your OP.

An example of an objective moral judgment is "It is moral to solve cooperation problems; it is immoral to create cooperation problems" which summarizes Morality as Cooperation Strategies. It is objective (mind independent) in that it is the product of the objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense – cooperation problems and the strategies that solve them.

You seem to be essentially noting that we can derive objective facts pertaining to what norms societies are setup with (and sustain) and that these judgments (which are guided by the need for cooperation) are an objective standard for morals. Am I understanding you correctly? — Bob Ross

Not quite. You are missing a critical element: the subject of the objective facts. The subject is the function of cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment).

Assume it is objectively (mind independently) true that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems and cultural moral norms are fallible heuristics for parts of strategies, such as reciprocity strategies, which solve those problems. Knowing the function of cultural moral norms enables us to resolve many disputes about if and when cultural moral norms will fail this function or will fulfil it in a way that is contrary to our values and goals. Therefore, this function provides an objective standard for moral behavior we can use to understand cultural moral norms better and thereby resolve disputes about them.

For example, consider “Do to others as you would have them do to you” as a fallible heuristic for initiating reciprocity. When tastes differ and following it would create rather than solve cooperation problems, the proposed moral standard (solving cooperation problems) provides an understanding that it would be objectively immoral to follow the Golden Rule in this case.

Again, the function of cultural moral norms provides AN objective standard for morality. This objective truth is silent regarding the existence of other moral standards that are either “objective features of the world” (as it is) or “involuntary obligations” (which it is not).

The key to many miscommunications in moral realism discussions may be that one side is assuming the subject is "imperative obligations" and the other side is assuming the subject is "objective features of the world".

"A key miscommunication between us is what the “function of cultural moral norms” refers to. “Function” refers to the primary reason cultural moral norms exist. Clarifying what this feature of our universe ‘is’ should shed light on how to best define “objective moral judgments”.

Assume for a moment that there is a mind-independent feature of our universe that determines the primary reason that culture moral norms exist (what their function empirically is). Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides an objective standard of what is good and bad."

Thank you for elaborating on this, but, to me, I don’t see why a “primary reason” for norms existing would be thereby an objective norm: why is that the case? — Bob Ross

I repeat, "Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides AN objective standard of what is good and bad." How could you argue that was false?

Past and present cultural moral norms are cultural standards for right and wrong. If virtually all past and present cultural moral norms have the function of solving cooperation problems, then solving cooperation problems provides AN objective standard of what is good and bad that is an objective (mind independent) feature of our world.

Note that my claim is silent regarding this standard of good and bad’s imperative obligation. It is also silent if there are other objective (mind independent) standards of good and bad of either the objective feature of the world or imperative obligation varieties.

And my claim is silent regarding the normativity of this objective standard of good and bad. I do argue that this particular definition of good and bad will be normative by Gert’s definition (what all well-informed rational people would advocate). But note that Gert’s definition is silent on imperative obligation. Gert’s definition describes as normative what all rational people would advocate, not what they would be imperatively obligated to do.

You seem to be focused on moral claims that somehow have the objective property of mind-independent imperative obligation. To me this is odd. Perhaps because I have come to the study of morality from the science of morality side. From the science of morality side, the existence of behaviors we are imperatively obligated to do regardless of our needs and preferences is highly unlikely.

The biologist/philosopher Michael Ruse seems to delight in saying, "Morality is an illusion foisted on us by our genes”. Perhaps this makes sense to him because he also is focused on morality as imperative obligations while ignoring morality as an objective feature of the world (as strategies that solve cooperation problems). Morality as an objective feature of the world is definitely not an illusion. It explains, among other things, why such an illusion of imperative obligation is encoded in our genes.

“… the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will)”— Bob Ross

I understand you to be saying (here and elsewhere) that fixating on a cultural moral norm (encoding it as a moral norm in your moral sense in my terms) makes it an objective moral judgment – an involuntary obligation.

Also,

"Understanding the function of cultural moral norms provides an objective, mind independent basis for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms." - Mark S

Maybe I am just misunderstanding you, but I don’t see how this provides a “mind-independent” basis: it seems as though you are making laws and cultural norms the standard of what is good. — Bob Ross

A key miscommunication between us is what the “function of cultural moral norms” refers to. “Function” refers to the primary reason cultural moral norms exist. Clarifying what this feature of our universe ‘is’ should shed light on how to best define “objective moral judgments”.

Assume for a moment that there is a mind-independent feature of our universe that determines the primary reason that culture moral norms exist (what their function empirically is). Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides an objective standard of what is good and bad.

(The superficially diverse, contradictory, and strange norms of cultural moralities without this insight into their ultimate source and function is relatively useless.)

But what is the source of this function’s bindingness? Are we logically free to “fixate” (and advocate as a matter of will) for a different standard of what is good and bad? Of course. The empirical observation of the ultimate source of cultural moral norms carries no innate bindingness. This function’s bindingness may be subjective and the choice to fixate on it to trigger the feeling of bindingness a matter of preference. But the ultimate source of human morality is an objective truth not a subjective one.

So what is the mind-independent function of cultural moral norms? To solve cooperation problems that are innate to our universe.

In highly cooperative societies, all intelligent, independent agents must solve these same cooperation problems and therefore their morality will also have the function of solving these cooperation problems. (We can expect them all to know why the Golden Rule is a useful moral guide and, if they are sufficiently advanced, when and why it goes wrong and should be abandoned.)

Based on what I argue the function of human morality is (solving cooperation problems), the most useful definition of "objective moral judgments" is based of the “objective features of the world” rather than “an involuntary obligation (of a will)”.

Morality as Cooperation Strategies is wonderfully compatible with
Wikipedia’s definition - "Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."

But could it be normative? By the SEP, normativity sounds likely:
"The term “morality” can be used ... normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people."

I expect rational people would prefer to live in cooperative societies and therefore would be interested in basing their moral system on solutions to problems that block cooperation.

Thanks for your careful reply. I am keenly interested in better understanding reasons for preferring your or Wikipedia’s definitions of moral realism.

Wikipedia’s definition - "Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."

I understand your definition to be

the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will) — Bob Ross

Rewriting Wikipedia’s claim in a parallel structure:

“A valid definition of objective moral judgments is that they refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the “involuntary obligations” definition of "objective moral judgments"?

Advantages:

• Harmonious with our innate perception of moral obligations as involuntary.

Disadvantages:

• No such involuntary obligations appear to exist.
• Resulting moral antirealism claims based on this definition are confusing if moral judgments refer to objective features of the world.
• Offers no objective (mind independent) basis for resolving moral disputes.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the “objective features of the world” definition of "objective moral judgments"?

Advantages:

• Objective features of the world exist that are the basis of moral judgments as summarized by cultural moral norms. Those features are strategies that solve cooperation problems.
• Understanding the function of cultural moral norms provides an objective, mind independent basis for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms.
• Understanding the function of cultural moral norms explains the origin and function of our innate perception of moral obligations as involuntary.

Disadvantages:
?

Additions or corrections to advantages and disadvantages?

Also, I don’t understand “this definition fundamentally accepts that everything is ultimately subjective” when the subject is objective features of the world. Science is good at being objective concerning features of the world.

Then you say “Again, I have a hard time understanding how this is actually a moral realist position: can you please elaborate?”

It is not a moral realist position by your definition. My response's point is that your definition of moral realism is less useful than the “objective features of the world” definition based on the above advantages and disadvantages. These are just definitions. We are free to choose, assume, or advocate the most useful.

Postscript:
Do you have a reference for a formal definition of “objective moral judgments” consistent with

the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will)? — Bob Ross

Is the moral realism vs. anti-realism just a good approximate line to draw? Is it clear and cut? Do you think one can hold there are objective moral judgments and that none of them are obligatory to fixate upon? — Bob Ross

Whether moral realism or anti-realism is correct is a function of how we define the terms.

Assume we use your definition of moral realism as the reality of “categorical imperatives”, which I take to be imperatives about what we somehow ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences. Then I would argue that moral realism is unlikely to be true.

But, as Hanover mentioned, people have also defined moral realism as:

"Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

By wikipedia’s definition, I support moral realism. My realism claim is based on the empirical observation that past and present cultural moral norms (ethical sentences) refer to parts of cooperation strategies (reciprocity strategies for the most part) which are objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.

One criterion for the most useful definition of moral realism (and other terms in moral philosophy) is which will make understanding morality less confusing. It would be confusing to simultaneously 1) define moral realism as the reality of “categorical imperatives” (which results in the conclusion that moral realism is likely false) and 2) accept the empirical data that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems (which implies a kind of moral realism).

Thus, the most useful definitions of moral realism and other terms in moral philosophy could be based on what we empirically observe about morality.

Perhaps the difficulties you refer to in your opening post are due to a mismatch between your chosen definition of moral realism and the reality of what human morality is?

"How is moral conscience even possible?" — Heiko

That is an easy question to answer. We have an innate moral conscience (and an innate moral sense) because it enabled our ancestors to solve cooperation problems in ways that increased their reproductive fitness.

However, I have no reason to believe that knowing the function of our moral sense - to solve cooperation problems - can answer questions about moral ends and moral values independent of cooperation strategies.

Heiko
519
No, I don’t see the problem. Maximizing durable happiness by maximizing satisfaction and minimizing suffering defines an end. It does not define a means.
— Mark S

An "end" would be something of unquestionable value. Happiness is good and hence worthwhile. "Maximizing" it.... seems formal. This seems to give it priority over other goods. Minimizing suffering is not necessarily the same and can be made to conflict with it in thought experiments. How would we judge what to do? To me it seems there has to be another end behind those. — Heiko

Heiko, I know of no reasons we should believe that a moral theory’s, even an objectively true moral theory’s,

"end" would be something of unquestionable value. — Heiko

That sounds merely like your preference.

We might also prefer that mind-independent moral theories be able to answer any ethical question. Again, there are no reasons I know of to believe that.

For example, the Morality As Cooperation Strategies moral theory is essentially silent about moral ends and values other than values that are parts of cooperation strategies; hence this thread about judging moral ends separately from moral means.

Perhaps I misunderstand you. I hear you objecting to all cultural moralities as, on balance, bad.

This sounds like the definition would be a means to achieve the end...
Sorry - you see the problem with this I hope. — Heiko

No, I don’t see the problem. Maximizing durable happiness by maximizing satisfaction and minimizing suffering defines an end. It does not define a means.

It’s not rare that people will be forced to do X even if it’s supposedly to be in their interest. Who decides when and what and who and all that. They may not like that. — schopenhauer1

Societies decide when “people will be forced to do X” when they advocate and enforce moral norms. For example, people will be coerced into not stealing and murdering. Will some people not like that? Sure. Will anyone else care? No.

nor the means justify the end
— Mark S
I have never heard of or considered this possibility.
It would be better of course if you supported that with some argumentation and/or examples ... (Referring to Kant cannot substitute that.)

Actions (means) in general are based on will and are done in order to accomplish something.
.... it makes no sense to talk about "the means justifying the end". Which makes this statement void of meaning and of no use.

I will be glad to "hear" about any arguments or examples that disagree with the above. : — Alkis Piskas

My comment that the “means do not justify the end” was about moral means and ends, so let’s restrict the discussion to morality.

If you are convinced that moral actions necessarily have an end, you might ask people who are acting morally at a considerable cost what their end is. They might say the end was “acting morally” but that is not a meaningful definition of “end” as I am using it. As Hume pointed out, people act according to their motivations which they may not understand rather than a logical consequence of their chosen ends.

So, no, moral actions do not necessarily have any end (beyond “acting morally”) that are understood by the actor. Behaviors motivated by our moral sense and advocated by cultural moral norms may have a function and ultimate cause but no conscious end. People act morally most commonly because they feel a motivation to do so, not to accomplish some goal.

Are you claiming that Kantianism does not hold that “moral means justify ends” (as per it being ‘immoral’ to lie to the murderer about where their next victim is)? My understanding of Kantianism is superficial and I would be happy to learn that is not the case.

So, actions (means) should be judged for themselves, independently of the purpose (end) they are supposed to achieve.
Actions have end results, consequences and possible outcomes. They can --and sometimes even must-- be judged for themselves.

As a general rule, the end does not justify the means. — Alkis Piskas

And neither the ends justify the means (as per utilitarianism's possible over-demanding ‘means’), nor the means justify the end (as I have read Kant advocated).

What is the difference between moral and non-moral "ends"? moral and non-moral "means"? Can "ends" be moral with non-moral "means" and/or vice versa? Are the relations of "means to ends" different when both are moral from when both are non-moral? Lastly, is tge distinction 'moral and non-moral' between independent, parallel concepts or is one concept dependent on – contingent to, or subset of – the other concept? — 180 Proof

!80 Proof,
“What is the difference between moral and non-moral "ends"? moral and non-moral "means"?”
Gert proposes that what is morally normative (what I was referring to here as “moral”) is what all rational people (with specified conditions) would advocate as moral for their society. If we accept that, then the difference is what “all rational people” would advocate as moral and non-moral “ends” and “means”.

"Can "ends" be moral with non-moral "means" and/or vice versa?"
Yes. Utilitarianism might be a moral end that could be achieved by an immoral means such as forcing a large penalty on one person in order to create a tiny benefit for many people. Or moral means such as defined by Morality as Cooperation Strategies could be applied to achieve immoral ends such as the extermination of outgroups. (Negative utilitarianism offers the interesting possibility that the "ends", lessening suffering, is the same as the "means", but I have not thought much about it yet.)

"Are the relations of "means to ends" different when both are moral from when both are non-moral?"
“Means” and “ends” can be non-moral, both moral, both immoral, or some mix of moral, immoral, and non-moral. I don’t see why the "means to ends" relationship would change.

"Lastly, is the distinction 'moral and non-moral' between independent, parallel concepts or is one concept dependent on – contingent to, or subset of – the other concept?"
Moral and immoral “means” and “ends” are subsets of possible behaviors and “ends”. Then non-moral “means” and “ends” would be subsets of all other possible behaviors and “ends”. I am not confident I am addressing your intent here.

To be meaningful don't we have to define what is good as a state-of-affairs?
— Mark S

Define? I don't think so. Mediate? May be. We could also point to examples what is bad and leave the conclusion open.

"The good" is that what can be wanted reasonably. Is that a state of affairs? — Heiko

If we are going to effectively work toward achieving something, here a moral ‘end’, then we have to agree on what we are working to achieve – we have to define it. Sure, if you don’t care about achieving an end then you can leave it undefined.

Morality as Cooperation Strategies is a non-zero-sum game. This produces many opportunities to increase the benefits of cooperation without harming others.
— Mark S

That's not true. The mere act of "trying" to cooperate may cause issues relating to autonomy or lack thereof. — schopenhauer1

Perhaps helping others and otherwise being kind could cause issues relative to autonomy or lack thereof, but wouldn’t that be rare? Why focus on possible rare bad effects instead of the normal, plentiful benefits?

From a deontic point of view the moral end is "the good" which deserves unconditional preference over "the bad" or "the evil". This is not a state of affairs but a value-in-itself which may appear to be represented by a state-of-affairs or some action. But as is always the case with mere appearances one can be oh so wrong about their true nature. — Heiko

To be meaningful don't we have to define what is good as a state-of-affairs?

The greater point is that all moral decisions except the one I mentioned have an element of harm, so that’s inescapable in this universe. — schopenhauer1

Morality as Cooperation Strategies is a non-zero-sum game. This produces many opportunities to increase the benefits of cooperation without harming others.

Can you please describe a moral end? Why not simply describe it as a state of affairs rather than “moral state of affair” (or moral ends as you put it) — invicta

Increased well-being (or flourishing) for all, and lessened suffering are common moral 'ends' in moral philosophy.

So I think if you keep clear that ends are ideas, and means are behaviour, your separation will work. But you need I think to give priority to behaviour, as the law does – eggs are broken, someone has died. — unenlightened

Thanks for the supportive comment.

Interesting that you suggest giving priority to behavior.

Past and present cultural moral norms are all about behavior. Aside from philosophers, few people worry about ultimate moral ends. Cultural moral disputes are almost always about moral ‘means’, not moral ‘ends’.

As I have described elsewhere here, it is mind-independent truth that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies. That is, what moral behaviors ‘are’ appears to have an objective basis which is not much affected by what we argue moral ‘ends’ (goals) somehow ought to be.

↪schopenhauer1
What if you were doing the deed for recreational purposes and the new born was unintended…what then ? Abortion ? — invicta

All,
The antinatalism and abortion topics you have brought up deserve their own threads. I'd appreciate it if discussions here were kept more relevant to the OP.

The moral mean to prevent a murder would be to murder the would be murderer*

In the context above judging them separately would be incoherent as murder is universally wrong/immoral but taken together the moral ends and means are both justified. — invicta

Moral ‘ends’ (goals) are a state of affairs, or perhaps an idea about a state of affairs as unenlightened suggests. Moral ‘means’ are actions. Murder is an action, not an idea about a goal.

The point is that rules of thumbs and heuristics are meant to spare us cognitive load in our decision making. When a problem is too complicated for us to process an optimal solution, then we rely on rules of thumbs and heuristics to approximate that solution. So we have to be able to define the decision problem before talking about heuristics and rules of thumbs. Gert’s rules (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm) may be seen as an answer to the question: what is default behavior that would more likely lessen the harms of all those who commit to them? In this case those rules would be more rule of thumbs. Gert's assumption that "morality is for fallible biased people" could support that reading. My impression however is that Gert's argument is stronger because he wants to talk in terms of rationality and not just make an empirical general claim approximately true. — neomac

I agree with your reading of Gert described here and why heuristics are so useful. And the ten rules are Gert’s answer to “what is default behavior that would more likely lessen the harms of all those who commit to them?”

My arguments have been to illuminate Gert’s moral insights rather than contradict them. That illumination starts with understanding the ten rules as advocacy for initiating or maintaining reciprocity strategies which are powerful means for solving cooperation problems. Solving cooperation problems is the default behavior most likely both to lessen harms (Gert’s and negative utilitarianism’s goal) and, as I argue, positive utilitarianism as well. The same 10 moral rules support both positive and negative utilitarianism equally well because the same cooperation problems must be solved.

Imagine you have 2 parents with 10 kids, they can afford to provide each of them with minimal means of subsistence or kill five of them to let the other five have more than just minimal means of subsistence. Now consider 3 scenarios:
(A) Both parents agree on providing each kid with just minimal means of subsistence
(B) Both parents agree on killing 5 kids to let the other five have more than just minimal means of subsistence
(C) Parents disagree
In case A and B we do not have a cooperation problem between parents while in C we do, right? — neomac

As you describe it, the cooperation problem is just between the parents. But alternatives A), B), and C) could each be ‘rational’ (depending on the parents' values) ONLY if the kids have no independent moral worth. If the kids have independent moral worth, then any of the options would be a cooperation problem for the kids plus the parents.

You may want to say that they are instrumental to solve or support the solution of cooperation problems. If that’s the case, there are 4 issues with that:
1 - maybe you explained that in your past posts and I missed it, but so far you didn’t offer to me a concrete example where a cooperation problem would likely have no (suboptimal if not optimal) solutionunless we adopted Gert’s moral rules. — neomac

It is not Gert's moral rules that are key. They are just heuristics for solving cooperation problems. Examples of cooperation problems that cannot be solved without those strategies could be useful for presenting my case. A response would take at least 500 words. That might be better presented as a separate thread.

2 - most importantly, cooperation is itself instrumental to some goals, which goals? If the answer is: reducing death, pain, disabilities, etc. of some people by some people engaged in the cooperation then we are back to Gert’s rules. The payoff of the cooperative strategies will be defined as a function of death, pain, disabilities, liberties, etc. reducing the evils and/or increase the goods — neomac

Cooperation is instrumental to obtaining whatever benefits of cooperation that people agree to pursue. I am not sure what you are asking here.

3 - Gerts’ “descriptive” definition of morality suggests that also the “normative” definition of morality is focused on reducing evils (“lessening of harms”) and not increasing the goods (indeed “do cause pleasure” is missing among the rules). While the notion of “cooperation” is not focused on lessening the evils. — neomac

Cooperation is the best means we have for both reducing harms and increasing positive benefits (for both positive and negative utilitarianism).

4 - I’m not sure that Gert’s 10 moral rules are necessary and sufficient conditions for a “normative” definition of morality. Indeed, Gert concedes that there are reasons for disagreement even if we accepted the 10 rules (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/010.htm). So Gert’s 10 rules may not suffice to support the solution of cooperation problems. — neomac

I agree. The normativity of moral 'means' can be based on the normativity of morality as cooperation strategies, not Gert's ten rules. The normativity of moral 'ends' (such as positive or negative utilitarianism) may have no mind-independent answer (contrary to Gert's position). I have not seen the idea of separately judging the normativity for moral 'means" and moral 'ends'. I've been working on a thread on that topic and will post when it seems ready.

P.S. I'm giving answers based on a charitable understanding of Gert's position. I don't assume that my understanding is accurate nor I'm committed to Gert's position as I understand it. — neomac

A charitable understanding of moral claims (how can a moral claim be interpreted as rational) is the more intellectually challenging approach and the one I also try to take. It is much easier to interpret moral claims in the dumbest way possible. The “dumbest interpretation” approach may be more likely to ‘win’ arguments by the advocates for new ideas giving up in exhaustion and frustration. But in the end, the charitable approach is more likely to produce genuine progress in understanding morality. I hope you can take the charitable approach with me as well as with Gert.

Here Gert is even more explicit about this “it is important to use these (ten) rules as moral guides, it would be disastrous to regard them as absolute, that is, to hold that it is always immoral to break any of these rules no matter what the circumstances were. ” (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm)
Yet I wouldn’t call them “heuristics” or “fallible rules of thumb” because these are more epistemic than moral notions. I prefer to talk about them in terms of “default” social norms, that may be exceptionally reconsidered depending on some compelling circumstances. — neomac

Humm… I don’t get what you mean by “more epistemic than moral notions”.

I do know, empirically and independently of any of Gert’s claims, that the ten moral norms are fallible heuristics for reciprocity strategies. So at least we agree they are not moral absolutes.

But if they are not moral absolutes, in what circumstances would following them be immoral? The heuristics for solving cooperation problems perspective provides a simple answer. It would be immoral to follow them when doing so is more likely to create rather than solve cooperation problems.

When would you say it would be immoral to follow Gert's ten moral norms?

Even though I don’t think we can take Gert’s 10 rules as a case of “utilitarianism”, yet I think they are more about “collective” ends than means to achieve them. — neomac

I agree that Gert’s 10 rules have no necessary connection to moral goals such as utilitarianism. But that is because they are moral norms about behaviors (moral means), not moral ends (goals). They are collective in the sense of rules advocated in the group that solve cooperation problems.

I have a question regarding moral codes: Aren't or shouldn't they be based on some theory or ethics system and/or fundamental principles regarding the nature of ethics ? (I prefer this term in general over "morality", but I use both words "moral" and "ethical" according to language requirements.) — Alkis Piskas

I hope we can agree that:

Cultural moral codes have existed quite comfortably for all of history without a unified theory or fundamental principles.

The theories or principles you refer to are moral philosophy’s answers to the big ethical questions “What is good?”, “How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?” Proposed answers include positive and negative utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and Kantianism.

Then, Gert’s approach and my Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) differ in that, rather than answering the above broad ethical questions, we both take on the simpler task of understanding the function of past and present cultural moral norms.

I understand Gert to be proposing that the function (the principle reason they exist) of cultural moral norms is lessening suffering. He sees lessening suffering as the goal of moral norms - the defining principle for what is moral based on the goal of moral behavior.

MACS proposes that the function (the principle reason they exist) of all cultural moral norms is solving cooperation problems. I see solving cooperation problems as the ‘means’ by which moral norms enable people to accomplish whatever goals they agree on, one of which could be “lessening suffering”. Solving cooperation problems is the defining principle for what ‘means’ are moral. In contrast to Gert’s proposal, MACS is silent about what ‘ends’ (goals) are moral.

Then Gert proposes a useful definition of what is normative which I interpret as what all well-informed, mentally normal (not delusional), rational people would advocate.

Gert and MACS provide two perspectives on the function of moral norms. Both have something to contribute to understanding what is morally normative.

Gert's "descriptive" notion of morality tries to capture what would characterize normative systems as "moral" cross-culturally, independently from the geographic or historical latitude, in short rules/ideals protecting a group from harm is what counts as moral [1]. — neomac

Right, but referring to “normative systems” rather than something like “cultural moralities” could lead to confusion about when a system is normative – “when it would be advocated by all rational people”.

Also, being cross-culturally “moral” does not necessarily imply something is normative. Being cross-culturally moral only suggests that something is a good candidate for what is normative.

I interpret Gert to be saying as a descriptive claim about all cultural morality:

What morality is: “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.”

This only becomes normative if it is what all rational people would advocate as I understand Gert’s arguments.

Gert's “normative” notion of morality requires that these rules/ideals be acceptable by all rational agents. He identified 10 rules (and 4 ideals, if I remember correctly) that satisfy this normative constraint (they do not seem to include e.g. rules against cannibalism or prostitution but they seem to exclude rules about human sacrifice or slavery). — neomac

But Gert is not advocating these 10 rules as moral absolutes. Rather, they are heuristics (usually reliable, but fallible rules of thumb) for the goal of “lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system”. And “human sacrifice or slavery” would violate that moral behavior goal.

Conclusion, even if I see why you might be interested in integrating Gert’s definition with a reference to cooperative strategies, I don’t think it would be an improvement, because Gert’s definition belongs to a greater level of abstraction (once again compare “rational animal” and “rational animal with genital organs“) and results from a philosophical investigation about the notion of human morality (independently from its continuity wrt animal behaviour). — neomac

Am I correct in taking your understanding of

“An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.”

to be the claimed negative-utilitarianism goal of moral behavior?

In this case, I agree that adding the phrase “increasing the benefits of cooperation and” does not make sense.

I have been thinking of Gert’s above claim as a claim about moral ‘’means’ (lessening of harms) not moral ‘ends’ (the negative-utilitarianism goal of moral behavior). Your interpretation seems more likely.

Thanks for persisting in your objection.

Tom, you did not address your question to me, but briefly:
1) Gert provides a useful criterion for what is normative - what we ought or ought not do. If you have a better alternative, don't keep it to yourself.
2) Understanding the underlying universal function of cultural moral norms as parts of cooperation strategies provides a well-grounded candidate for normativity by Gert's definition.

Sorry for the delay in responding. I had immediately composed my reply but then did not hit the post comment button.
You are misreading Gert.
He says:
"There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions.One reason for this is that “morality” seems to be used in two distinct broad senses: a descriptive sense and a normative sense. More particularly, the term “morality” can be used either
1) descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or
2) normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people."

In the article, he goes on to describe the rarity of definitions of moral normativity and why he thinks defining it is important.

But perhaps our miscommunication is due to different understandings of what descriptively moral and normatively moral refer to. What do you think they refer to?

I’d like to keep this thread focused on the cultural usefulness of Gert’s approach to normativity and what ‘is’ moral.

But perhaps some contrast with Hegel can usefully illuminate Gert’s approach. I’ll respond specifically to what you have said about Hegel.

For Hegel, morality is the abstract understanding of "the good," held by rational subjects. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The question “What is good?” has no definitive answers, rational or otherwise, so far as I know. Of course, you could simply prefer Hegel’s definition of good and advocate it on that basis. Your preference may not make it culturally useful however because it has no objective basis. Having no objective basis means it is unlikely to be universally shared and therefore less useful than moralities that have a objective basis. Your preference alone is not necessarily a culturally useful basis for a morality.

In contrast, Gert focuses on what he sees morality ‘is’. And then, as I understand him, Gert claims, based on what morality 'is', that lessening harm is objectively moral based on it being what all rational persons would advocate. Gert’s approach (with its stated limits) has the advantage over Hegels in that it is claimed to meet (again as I understand him) his criterion for normativity – what all rational persons would advocate.

The modern science of morality (which studies the origin and function of our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms) has moved beyond Gert’s understanding of what morality ‘is’. As I argue elsewhere, we can still follow Gert’s general approach using the science-enhanced understanding of what morality ‘is’ to define a morality that all rational people will even more strongly advocate.

Besides the more I think of your definition and the less I find it clear. I think cooperative behavior can be found also in animals. The partnership, dominance and marker proto-rules (or patterns of behavior) can be found also in the animal world. Am I wrong? If so and animals showing cooperative behavior are not moral agents, then cooperative behavior must be conceptually decoupled from morality. Now, if morality increases the benefits of cooperation, there must be something in "morality" that can not be reduced to those patterns of behavior constituting cooperation the increases the benefits from such patterns. — neomac

I hear you complain that my definition of what is descriptively moral is not normatively moral. Perhaps you are confusing what is descriptively moral with what is normatively moral?

What do you understand descriptively moral and normatively moral to refer to?

The added “increasing the benefits of cooperation” defines the ‘means’ by which harm is to be lessened - cooperation. That knowledge is needed to accurately encompass what morality descriptively ‘is’. Morality descriptively is NOT simply lessening harm as Gert’s version implies. Morality descriptively is lessening harm by increasing the benefits of cooperation.

Consider:
(A) “slaves must obey their masters”
(B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
(C) “homosexuality is evil”
....
If A, B, C can be explained by both BGD and MSD then how is MSD more accurate than BGD and not just more redundant wrt BGD? — neomac

Humm…

How does Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral based on “lessening of harms” explain, as you claim:
(A) “slaves must obey their masters”
(B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
(C) “homosexuality is evil”.

I don’t see that it can. My "Morality As Cooperation Strategies" (MACS) definition of what is descriptively moral does explain them because it includes cooperation strategies. It explains them as marker and domination strategies, strategies for increasing the benefits of cooperation in ingroups at the expense (always for domination norms and sometimes for marker norms) of outgroups.

BTW can you clarify better what "marker norms" means and why it is to be distinguished from dominance and partnership norms? — neomac

I have described marker strategies as:

“Marker moral norms – Markers of membership in and commitment to a more cooperative ingroup. Preferentially cooperating with members of an ingroup can reduce the chances of being exploited and thereby increase the benefits of cooperation. These markers include “eating shrimp is an abomination”, “masturbation is immoral”, and other food and sex taboos.”

I can add that these markers of membership and commitment to an ingroup are parts of indirect reciprocity. By limiting the number of people deemed worthy of cooperating with, the chances of being exploited are reduced and the potential benefits of cooperation increased for members of the ingroup.

As to how marker strategies differ from partnership and domination moral norms, see
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13929/what-if-cultural-moral-norms-track-cooperation-strategies/p1

Briefly, partnership moral norms such as the ten rules proposed by Gert, are ingroup norms where all people are assumed worthy of full moral regard.

Domination moral norms such as "slaves must obey their masters" and "women must be submissive to men" are examples of ingroups (men or slave owners) cooperatively enforcing the exploitation of outgroups (slaves and women).