A healthy body of law and regulation depends on moral realism, and in a culture where moral realism is waning the body of law becomes unhealthy. Like all natural rights, the right to speech requires moral realism. Nevertheless, because the value of speech is more perspicacious than most values, it is easier for the moral non-realist or the morally non-realistic culture to support the right to speech. In the case of speech it is easier for the moral non-realist to have his cake and eat it too.

When you have a culture that tends towards moral non-realism, free speech absolutism becomes more intuitive (i.e. the idea that there are no values which compete with speech becomes more intuitive). Even so, this merely a stage in a destabilizing process, for the moral non-realist can’t actually justify the value of speech in any significant way, and those who wish to oppose speech absolutism also have no sound arguments to hand, deprived as they are of moral realism. So it becomes the culture of Thrasymachus or Nietzsche, where the power of might makes right. You can actually see this same thing in my thread, “Beyond the Pale,” where the majority of participants said that there simply is no rational justification for prohibiting things like racism (or in this case, racist speech).

is not clearly imbedded in the example. I understand your following (in this post) justification for why I should have assumed this - my point is that your example doesn't rise to that level. I'm unsure that's a tractable issue. — AmadeusD

Okay, but it's an important issue. If we don't mean the same thing by 'morality' then we will be talking past each other.

Ok, so in this case we agree. — AmadeusD

Sure.

What the fuck dude????: — AmadeusD

Sorry, my bad.

Morality: The debate between right and wrong. — AmadeusD

"right" and "wrong" are definitely arbitrary in the sense you want to use them to support a moral system... — AmadeusD

I don't find this a helpful definition. This is because instead of one ambiguous term ('morality'), we now have two ('right' and 'wrong'). You yourself immediately put the two key terms of your definition into scare quotes, which is bad news for us if we want a precise definition.

Again, I have been talking about non-hypothetical ought-judgments. An example of this is, "Do not drink that water!"

I think we need a clearly defined subject if we are to discuss it. I think "non-hypothetical ought-judgments" are very clearly defined. I wrote an entire OP on the subject. I don't think, "The debate between right and wrong," is clearly defined, and therefore I don't think we can have a discussion about it until it is further clarified.

Let me give the argument again:

1. We all make moral judgments (in the sense of non-hypothetical ought-judgments)
2. Our moral judgments are able to be evaluated, both by ourselves in retrospect, and by others
3. We respect these evaluations, or at least some of them
4. Therefore, ought-claims have force
5. Therefore, the "rhymes and reasons" are not arbitrary — Leontiskos

Let me clarify the argument a bit and also dispense entirely with the word 'morality':

1c. We all make non-hypothetical ought-judgments (NHs for short - plural)
2c. Our NHs are able to be evaluated, both by ourselves in retrospect, and by others
3c. These evaluations are themselves NHs
4c. We respect these evaluative NHs, or at least some of them
5c. Therefore, at least some evaluative NHs have force
6c. Therefore, the "rhymes and reasons" are not arbitrary

5c is really my primary conclusion. I realize that this argument will be difficult to follow if one does not understand what an NH is, and that understanding will require looking at the thread where I lay it out.

Supposing you want to disagree, you have a few options here:

1. Decide that the conclusions pertain to 'morality' and then dispute the argument
2. Decide that the conclusions do not pertain to 'morality' and then agree with the argument
3. Decide that the conclusions do not pertain to 'morality' but then dispute the argument anyway

Let me give an example using the water case:

A) You decide to drink water, raising it to your lips (1c)
B) A complete stranger tells you not to drink the water (2c, 3c, 5c)
C) You decide not to drink the water, or at the very least you give the stranger's utterance due consideration (4c)

Note that by giving the stranger's utterance due consideration you "respect it." One need not agree with an evaluative NH in order to respect it. Hopefully that example helps illustrate the argument, even if you want to say that you would not give the stranger's utterance due consideration.

The validity of 5c is really the crux, and I don't claim that I have given sufficient argumentation for it, but I also don't want to do too much work in a single post. The sense of 5c crucially requires that we understand what an NH is, and that we do not conflate a non-hypothetical ought-judgment with a hypothetical ought-judgment. Again, this terminology is explained in my thread.

Roughly, yes — AmadeusD

Okay, good. Your thesis is very close to 5c, so that's good. Perhaps I need more reasoning to justify 5c; perhaps I need more reasoning beyond 5c to reach a substantial conclusion; and perhaps the argument is sufficient as it stands.

I am now back to supremely enjoying this exchange, fwiw. — AmadeusD

Glad to hear it.

That is not at all clear, and if that's baked into your examples you're hiding the ball the whole way through. — AmadeusD

How was I hiding the ball? I said it at the very outset:

1. We all make moral judgments (in the sense of non-hypothetical ought-judgments) — Leontiskos

You've misrepresented the argument by interpreting a moral judgment as a hypothetical ought-judgment. I agree: if the argument is misrepresented in that way then it is invalid. But the argument was never about hypothetical imperatives.

I literally did do this when I was in Egypt, so I don't quite know why you would make such a blatantly unsupportable claim? — AmadeusD

So you are telling me that when you were in Egypt someone told you not to drink the water, and you did not give their utterance any (due) consideration? Their utterance had no force on your decision process?

Nope. That's what you think, and are not convincing me of. That's fine. — AmadeusD

I'm not sure what you are supposed to be arguing here. Are you claiming that it is impossible for a complete stranger to tell you not to drink water?

That's fine. I've already told you that "ought" need be unpacked there, and you've not done it... — AmadeusD

But I have done it, namely in the thread that I have referenced multiple times.

I think you are incorrectly describing morality. — AmadeusD

As I've said, I have no use for the word "morality." You can't even say what you mean by it, so I see no point in using it.

can. Again, totally unsupportable by anything but your intuition to this effect. Fine. i don't share it, nor does my experience support my assent. — AmadeusD

The thesis you seem to be proposing is this: <Sometimes the non-hypothetical ought-judgment of a complete stranger has force for me, and sometimes it doesn't>.

Is that accurate or not? If not, please tell me what you are saying when you say, "Can."

Fixed (im jesting that it's 'fixed' - that's just my view and experience). But then, generally only happens to trans women. Because they are male. It is the male doing all the lifting - not the trans. That part is almost irrelevant until you look at the stats and realise that trans women are vastly more likely to commit a sex crime than even non-trans males. I do not think it is "you're in camouflage" and rather "It doesn't matter what you're wearing. You are male. Stay out". I think that's entirely fair and I think point-blank period MALES trying to tell females what they can and cannot allow in their spaces is utterly reprehensible and just another form of misogynistic horseshit we've been battling for millennia. — AmadeusD

Great points. :up:

We have fundamental societal reasons for separating males from females. The reasons hold whether those males have long hair, or have an earring, or identify as a woman. The reasons are based on biology, not mental beliefs.

@fdrake's concern is generalizable: "What if there is something about someone that makes them unpopular in prison?" The answer is that something should be done to protect them, within reasonable limits. It doesn't matter whether it is their long hair, their earring, or their mental identification that makes them unpopular.

(Note that a woman who is an elite powerlifter will receive special attention from a prison, for the exact same reason that men and women are separate.) — Leontiskos

They won't be excluded on the basis of their strength alone. — fdrake

They will receive special attention on the basis of their strength alone, actually.

If you think that placing biological men who are criminals into an all-woman environment will not endanger the women, then you are the one who has to demonstrate that the men pose no special risk. — Leontiskos

Wrong demographic innit.

The relevant comparison is trans women in women's prisons, not men generically in women's prisons. — fdrake

You've simply misrepresented what I've said. I spoke specifically about biological men.

Women who sexually assault women still go to women's prisons for god's sake. — fdrake

Now try to form a valid argument out of that claim.

Legislation that wants to send people to prisons based entirely on their natal sex for the protection of women then sends women {trans men} to serve sentences in buildings full of rapists. It's utter hypocrisy. You send a woman who passes as a man {how you see it} to a building with loads of women with dubious understandings of consent who might be attracted to her, who's way more likely to be the victim of sexual assault because she's a trans man. And she's a woman {according to how you see it}. — fdrake

Again, you don't seem to have any real proposals. I mean, are you proposing that trans men should be sent to men's prisons? As I said:

Logically, the abuse matter is tricky because a trans man or trans woman who has received hormone treatment will possess a strength somewhere between that of the average man and woman, and therefore they introduce a new (and varied) strength differential. For example, the trans man will be stronger than women but weaker than men, and therefore there is a potential for abuse in both women's and men's prisons. — Leontiskos

The rational position is that biological men should not be incarcerated with women (and biological men should not compete in women's sports). That leaves the question about trans men open. You can make an argument that they should be sent to men's prisons if you like. I don't think we need to physically protect men from biological women at the societal level of incarceration. The main problem I see with that is in prison, which seems a bad option no matter where we stand.

What do you mean "us", kemosabe? — Srap Tasmaner

I gave the argument in <this post>, and particularly in the final paragraph. Give that a read and let me know if I am incorrect in claiming that, "you give it due consideration."

So happy to see you, Srap. :up:

My point is that the ought-claims of complete strangers have force for us, and this jibes with your claim about the "reasonableness of assuming." I don't think my universality claim needs to be exceptionless in order for my conclusion to be valid.

It would help me to know where you think we disagree with regard to the more central moral premises, here. I want to make sure that we don't end up quibbling over a minor point.

(Short on time, sorry if that is an inadequate response.)

It would be nice if you would demonstrate how the difference in physical strength between men and women makes trans women more likely to commit acts of sexual assault if they were imprisoned with cis women. You need to show the implication. — fdrake

The burden of proof you are attempting to push is wild, in my opinion. You may as well go to a women's shelter and say, "You need to demonstrate how the difference in physical strength between men and women makes men more likely to create problems in your shelter. You need to show the implication. We just don't have enough data on men in women's shelters to know if there is any danger. If you can't demonstrate the implication, then we're going to start bringing men into this women's shelter. Because my a priori beliefs that men will not cause problems in a women's shelter are stronger than your a priori beliefs that men will cause problems in a women's shelter."

If you think that placing biological men who are criminals into an all-woman environment will not endanger the women, then you are the one who has to demonstrate that the men pose no special risk. Our whole prison system which separates men and women is premised on the obvious fact that there is a special risk. You are the one with the burden of proof, and it isn't even close.

What about women who are elite powerlifters? — fdrake

Great argument, fdrake. "What about women who are elite powerlifters?" This is painful, dude. I already pointed to the problems where you take an exception and try to use it to establish a rule.

(Note that a woman who is an elite powerlifter will receive special attention from a prison, for the exact same reason that men and women are separate.)

I'm being facetious. — fdrake

Then let's separate husbands and wives too. So what? You're not being rational. What you are engaged in is a red herring.

You would need to establish that trans people pose unique risks in prisons. When people look at the data, it doesn't look like that at all. All that's left is the perception that Man Strong Rapist Woman Weak Raped, and it works like a thought terminating cliche. — fdrake

Again, you seem convinced that women are not physically weaker than men, and I can't think of a more unintelligent position for someone to hold. The rhetoric doesn't help your position.

I am reminded of Nellie Bowles' quip:

[Saying we need to demonstrate that men are stronger than women is] like saying we have absolutely no research indicating that a giraffe is bigger than a goldfish—no double-blind peer-reviewed studies have been done to date, so really, how can we say which is bigger? — Nellie Bowles in response to John Oliver

This is why no one takes your position seriously, and why public opinion is now headed in an immensely more rational direction.

I cannot see it beyond a mechanistic if/then. — AmadeusD

But it's not a mechanistic if/then. More precisely, it's not a hypothetical imperative. He didn't say, "Don't drink the water if you don't want to get sick." He said, "Don't drink the water." Or, "Don't drink the water because you don't want to get sick." I am envisioning the stranger who is telling you what to do, which is why I spoke explicitly about non-hypothetical ought-judgments. If we wanted to be pedantic, we could have him tell you, "Even though we are complete strangers, I know what you value, and therefore you ought not drink the water." You could respond, "You have no idea what I value. All values are arbitrary - what the Christian values has nothing to do with what the Muslim values," and go on to ignore him and drink the water. But you don't do that. Think about the fact that you don't do that!

(What he delivers to you is a non-hypothetical ought-judgment, which I explain in detail <here>. Also see my first paragraph <here>, which anticipates what you've now done.)

I take it you think you've beaten this by showing food helps us survive. It sure does. That is not moral — AmadeusD

Saying, "That is not moral" doesn't mean anything if you can't tell us what the word 'moral' in your sentence is supposed to mean. In fact I have said precisely what I mean by 'moral':

1. We all make moral judgments (in the sense of non-hypothetical ought-judgments) — Leontiskos

...and it is clear that the non-hypothetical ought-judgments of complete strangers still have force for us. The word "moral" is completely unnecessary, and given the way people in this thread want to use that word while refusing to say what they mean by it, it perhaps should be left out of the discussion.

No, it doesn't, as far as I am concerned/can tell. Would you be able to tell me how that makes it non-arbitrary?

[...]

This seems a total non sequitur (think I've pointed that out before). Cannot understand how this is the case... What's going on for you there? — AmadeusD

Did you read the rest of the post? Here it is again:

You might say, "I and everyone else on Earth share the value of wanting to avoid poisonous water, but that value is still arbitrary. Everyone on Earth may share the value, but that does not make it non-arbitrary."

I don't see a need to enter into the debate on universal vs. objective. My point is that at least some values are shared by all humans, and this is all that is required for morality to exist. If this were not true then the complete stranger's warning would have no force for you. But it does have force for you, and therefore it is true that there are fundamentally shared values. — Leontiskos

- It seems like you're intent to avoid the central issues, here. I'm not sure what your claim that husbands rape their wives has to do with the central question of whether women are physically weaker than men, and whether physical strength is a central factor when it comes to rape and abuse.

You've, "Swallowed the camel and strained the gnat," to quote a phrase.

I've almost no interest in talking about the letter of the ruling, other than the ways in which it still catastrophically fails the lobbyist's intentions. — fdrake

Hmm, okay.

Why? Surely you need to demonstrate more danger than would be expected from a typical inmate in order to make this case? — fdrake

Well, why do you think we have separate men's and women's prisons in the first place. Is it for the safety of the men? The idea that I need to demonstrate that it is a bad idea to house criminal, biological men with women is a bit strange. Surely you recognize the longstanding rationale for separating men's prisons from women's prisons?

No. I think the moral panic surrounding trans people in gendered spaces is totally nuts and that they don't amplify the risks meaningfully if they're allowed in their preferred gender spaces especially if they've received a GRC. That's mostly what this ruling was about, honestly. What a GRC does.

Scotland passed a bill that let trans people count as their preferred gender if they went through a lengthy and robust assessment process, which was then vetoed. This ruling made that irrelevant. — fdrake

Okay. I'm not up to date on the legal ins and outs of the GRC in Scotland, so I am not competent to comment on such a thing.

They're sexually assaulting each other just fine in there without trans mens' help. And more than men do to each other in men's prisons. If anything we should be afraid that the poor trans man is being put in with such vicious, criminal, creatures. But we won't, because we see women as weak and in need of protection. — fdrake

Women are physically weaker than men, and in need of protection. That's why Western society has been taking progressive steps to protect women for at least the last 500 years. Do you disagree that women are physically weaker than men? I can understand political positions, but when your political position causes you to contradict some of the most well-known biological facts the political position becomes untenable.

- Lots of strawmen being discussed among the atheists.

- It sounds like your objection is, "The lobbyists' motives are bad." Is that the only objection?

On the view of those of us who are far removed, it looks to be good law. Even supposing the motives are bad, that doesn't make it a bad law. Is there a substantial objection to the law, one that goes beyond imputing bad motives?

I think your substantial conclusion is something like, "This will harm trans men or trans women or both." From the perspective of law and politics, "This will cause harm," is not a sufficient justification. The question is whether it will cause more harm than the alternative. My sense is that it won't, at all.

a tiny minority group — fdrake

If you put a criminal, biological man in a women's prison you put all of the women in danger. You presumably want to favor a tiny minority of criminals because you think minorities are good, and need to be protected. But to favor a tiny minority of criminals at the expense of the vast majority of criminals (particularly in women's prisons) is bad law. It is much more harmful to put a tiny minority of biological men in women's prisons than to put that tiny minority of biological men in men's prisons. The commonsensical argument here is pretty straightforward.

The response of someone in your position is something like, "These are real trans women. They aren't just pretending to be trans women." The fact of the matter is that if a male criminal with a history of sexual abuse can get into a women's prison by merely claiming that he identifies as a woman, he will. We are talking about criminals, not ordinary people, after all. I don't see any good reason to endanger all of the natural women in women's prisons. If we have to choose between endangering the 99% or the 1%, we choose the 1%. That's eminently rational.

(And sure, women's prisons can be vicious. Nevertheless, strength differential is still enormously important.)

Interesting thread, . I am relatively new to Adorno. I looked at Wikipedia, Britannica, IEP, SEP, and read the SEP section on Negative Dialectics. His project reminds me a lot of Erich Przywara's Analogia Entis, for Przywara was also of German descent, born fourteen years before Adorno and dying 13 years after him. One can actually see in all sorts of German thinkers of that era the identification of the evils of fascism with excessive and overly programmatic intellectual certitude.

I will go read the first lecture before trying to say anything more substantial.

A short and related article I stumbled upon: "Getting Serious about Seriousness, Aristotle on the meaning of Spoudaios," by Matthew Lu.

The reason old mate in the foreign country's "Don't drink the water" might be worthy of consideration is the factual situation of his familiarity with something I am not familiar. He might also want me to dehydrate. It doesn't matter, because the facts lead me to think "Maybe this guy/gal knows something I don't". Where's the "ought" coming into this? — AmadeusD

So when a complete stranger warns you not to drink the water, you don't see any 'ought' involved in this?

They will, in all cases, rely on personal values. — AmadeusD

I don't believe anyone has claimed that moral judgments do not rely on values. This is a big part of your ignoratio elenchus.

If they aren't shared, why would I have any interest? — AmadeusD

Exactly, but you do have interest, and therefore according to your own reasoning here your interest indicates a shared value. The fact that you think a complete stranger has a shared value with you shows that the values of complete strangers are not arbitrary.

Is the suggestion here that if several people agree on a value, it is no longer arbitrary? — AmadeusD

Yes. I am claiming that <If the ought-claim of a complete stranger has force for you, then values are not arbitrary>.

You might say, "I and everyone else on Earth share the value of wanting to avoid poisonous water, but that value is still arbitrary. Everyone on Earth may share the value, but that does not make it non-arbitrary."

I don't see a need to enter into the debate on universal vs. objective. My point is that at least some values are shared by all humans, and this is all that is required for morality to exist. If this were not true then the complete stranger's warning would have no force for you. But it does have force for you, and therefore it is true that there are fundamentally shared values.

There’s two interesting points here — Bob Ross

I agree, and those points follow from the argument you gave. I am just looking at that argument and seeing where it leads.

Hell doesn’t have to exist for God to punish you after you die; at least not in the strict sense of being a place absent of God for eternity. — Bob Ross

So then instead of, "If humans are not eternal then Hell doesn't exist," you could read, "If humans are not eternal then eternal punishment doesn't exist." It doesn't matter. The point is that if humans are not eternal then there is nothing to object to (and the person who believes in Hell obviously believes humans are eternal).

Likewise, we are talking about the causes in the universe of one’s sins and not in Hell; so I don’t understand how humans being eternal in the sense of living in another place than the universe after dying necessitates their act in the universe may have infinite spillage. A human could be eternal in this sense and the universe is finite in time; which would mean that their sin would not be capable of infinite spillage. — Bob Ross

I said that for Aquinas the infinite spillage flows out of the broken relationship between two eternal beings, namely God and a human. So if you believe that God and humans are eternal then the infinite spillage is possible. The question of whether "the universe" is eternal is not relevant to the argument I gave.

Duh, women can rape women. — DifferentiatingEgg

Let's just pretend that this is a reasonable claim for the sake of argument. What then is the position? That women can rape women, men can rape men, men can rape women, and women can rape men, and therefore as far as rape is concerned, all prisons should be co-ed? That separating the sexes has no effect on the issue of rape?

This is a good example of why the position is so insane.

I recently listened to a very interesting discussion between Sam Harris and Tom Holland. It is about the ties between secularism, liberalism, and Christianity. The discussion towards the end about the way Islam encounters secular/Christian culture was on point for Wayfarer's thesis.

The lobbyists that forced this issue in the UK courts were principally concerned with not allowing rapists in vulnerable women's spaces. — fdrake

Are you concerned that trans men are going to rape women? Do you think someone without a natural penis can rape a woman? Unaided penetrative intercourse doesn't work so well with a phalloplasty, and I'm not sure why erectile prosthetics would be allowed in a women's prison.

Imagine you're in a woman's prison and Buck Angel walks into the showers. A musclebound, steroid using, bodybuilder with a sixpack and thick bodyfur walks into womens' collective showers... — fdrake

You're equivocating between rape and abuse. If we are concerned about rape, then the ruling is quite logical. If we are concerned about abuse (i.e. strength differentials), then the ruling is beneficial but imperfect (as all law is, by the way).

Logically, the abuse matter is tricky because a trans man or trans woman who has received hormone treatment will possess a strength somewhere between that of the average man and woman, and therefore they introduce a new (and varied) strength differential. For example, the trans man will be stronger than women but weaker than men, and therefore there is a potential for abuse in both women's and men's prisons.

On balance, though, the ruling is great. That you've found an exception to the rule in no way proves that the ruling is flawed. All rules and law have exceptions.

(And if we are concerned with neither rape nor abuse, but merely "perceptions," then we have created a world with infinite potential complaints where realism and pragmatism do not even exist.)

- I don't know that you've provided me with many arguments, but I think you are short on time and I am glad to see you offering Count Timothy arguments and reasons in this post. So, fair enough.

To be clear, the reason I wanted you to consider and answer (3) is as follows:

1. We all make moral judgments (in the sense of non-hypothetical ought-judgments)
2. Our moral judgments are able to be evaluated, both by ourselves in retrospect, and by others
3. We respect these evaluations, or at least some of them
4. Therefore, ought-claims have force
5. Therefore, the "rhymes and reasons" are not arbitrary

It's a definition of 'ought' which relies on value. I just do not accept there are any objective values to be found. Therefore, no 'ought' which is not beholden to it's speaker's values specifically can be found either. — AmadeusD

So suppose your wife tells you, "You shouldn't have done that," or, "You should do this," and suppose you respect her evaluation (i.e. 3). What follows is (4): ought-claims have force for you.
(I think what you are more truly opposed to are categorical/exceptionless norms.)

That's a fairly big step. You, Michael, and others claim that you don't think people are being coherent when they make ought-claims. I would point out that something which is incoherent or non-existent cannot have force, and yet ought-claims do have force; therefore they cannot be incoherent or non-existent.

Now you might say, "Sure, my wife's ought-claims have force for me, but that doesn't make them objective or even universal. Either she knows my own values well enough to counsel me, or else we self-consciously share a set of values upon which we reason together. Either way the objectivity needn't extend beyond the two of us." That's a fair answer, but I would contend that you and your wife are also potentially open to the suggestions and advice of every other person on Earth, and that this would be odd if there were not some sort of value-continuity between the two of you and other people. That is, ought-claims of others who do not know you at all and who therefore do not know your idiosyncrasies and "arbitrary" values nevertheless have force for you (even if that force is quite small or is merely potential and defeasible). Hence the point about food: there are all sorts of values that everyone holds in common, and the general "oughts" which flow from these common values will also be common.

To give a concrete example, suppose you travel to a foreign city and begin to drink water from a drinking fountain. Someone warns you not to drink the water. Whether or not you accede to their suggestion, you give it due consideration. Now I don't know why you would give a perfect stranger's ought-claim due consideration if all values are arbitrary. Instead I would say that, like the food example, the stranger knows and shares one of your own values even though he does not know you, and this is why his ought-claim is worthy of consideration.

and, naturally, the layman atheist latches onto this disposition and becomes the counter-disposition, equally flawed and vague, that ‘faith’ is a useless concept which only refers to blind belief that only makes sense within the context of religion. — Bob Ross

But it doesn't even make sense there. For example, Janus implies that <People have faith in authorities who they have no reason to believe are credible>. That whole idea is incoherent, and it underlies these New Atheist-type arguments.

The paradox of these fringe debates is that the atheist who is infallibly certain that religious faith is irrational cannot be engaged rationally (and that level of certitude almost always results in them refusing to give arguments for their thesis in the first place). On the other hand, the 99% of people who can be engaged rationally do not hold that religious faith is foundationally or definitionally irrational. Therefore you can't ever argue about whether religious faith is irrational, because the tiny percentage of militant atheists are dogmatic and unwilling to offer arguments, whereas the rest of humankind doesn't hold to the thesis in question at all. So it's pointless with either group.

Were they able to unfold their reasoning, we would see that the rational error that such atheists or quasi-atheists generally make is to conflate subjective grounds/evidence with objective grounds/evidence. They effectively mean to say, "Well I admit he has reasons to believe, but they aren't good reasons." Thus the argument is little more than <If I don't think his reasons are good reasons, then he is irrational or he is believing without evidence>. But if the atheist were honest he would admit that the believer does have evidence; he would just say that it isn't good evidence. Yet this merely begs the question since the whole issue is about whether the evidence/reasons are good or bad.

I have limited access to internet at the moment, but there is a famous miracle (of Fatima?) where the sun stood still, or moved backwards for a time, or was blotted out for a time, or something like that. The idea is something like this, "The prophet predicted abnormal activity of the sun to occur at such-and-such a time. That activity occurred. Therefore the prophet is truly in contact with a higher power." (This is an example of how we vet someone's abilities, and the logic is much broader than prophecy or foretelling.)

The atheist will say something like, "Yes, they believed they saw the sun behave abnormally, and therefore they had 'evidence' that the prophet was a true prophet, but it was not good evidence, because they should have [reasoned the way I reason about such phenomena]." Or in other words, "Well I admit he has reasons to believe, but they aren't good reasons."

The philosophical and scientific problem with the atheist's approach is that there is nothing principled or rigorous about his method. Legitimate epistemological theories have identifiable criteria. "If I think it's a poor reason then it's a poor reason," is not a legitimate epistemological theory. An atheist can certainly hold the belief that, "All religious beliefs are based on insufficient evidence," but there is nothing philosophical, scientific, or rigorous about this assertion/dogma.

More simply, the militant atheist is too vain to admit that there are rational beliefs which he would nevertheless disagree with, and it is literally impossible to argue with someone who can never admit that something he disbelieves believe might be rational. Incidentally, this is why there is a strong correlation between militant atheists and unintelligence, and this in turn is why their professional colleagues ask them to pipe down lest onlookers begin to perceive the whole field as being possessed of such unintelligence.

You [...] keep repeating the same demands for explanation of something I haven't claimed. — Janus

"Leontiskos has demanded an explanation for X, but I have not claimed X."

What is X? What is this thing you speak about? Please tell me. :roll:

I'm actually getting pretty tired of your dishonesty of late. Why don't you either tell me what X is or else just admit how silly your last page of posts has been.

That’s fair. What I should have said is that the major and minor premise of a syllogism are both assertions. — Bob Ross

Sure, but the key point is that if you give a controversial premise then you must defend it. P2 is part of what we are differing over, and therefore it cannot be assumed (without begging the question).

In principle, a sin is a concept which extends the concept of immorality; such that the former is an offense, at least in part, to God. We could also word this as the immoral act is simultaneously a non-sin and sin act: the offended party which is not God being the non-sin immoral act, and the offended party as God as the sin immoral act. I prefer to just say sin is any immoral act which, at least in part, offends God to keep things simpler. — Bob Ross

But that doesn't answer the question I asked. If there are no immoral acts which are not sins, then your defense doesn't work (because in that case there is no immoral act that does not offend a party with infinite dignity).

True, but I think this burden is sufficed given that humans have finite dignity, a human cannot repeat a sin infinitely since they live for a finite duration, and the consequences of the sins cannot be infinite if the universe is not eternal. I think all three of those statements are widely accepted as true. — Bob Ross

If humans are not eternal then Hell doesn't exist. If humans are eternal then it is possible for an act to cause infinite "spillage."

The "order" is charity, or friendship with God, and Hell is basically the absence of that friendship. To destroy a friendship is like breaking a pipe, on my analogy.

But yes, humans are eternal beings on Christianity. — Leontiskos

I said science is predominately evidence based and religion is purely faith-based. — Janus

No, you said, "This is the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion," and that's what I asked about. The question is and has always been about the difference between faith in science and faith in religion. You keep evading it.

I don't see that we are talking about linguistics, but rather about the logics of different kinds of faith. — Janus

I'm afraid I have to agree with you. ↪Leontiskos has mounted no argument to support the contention that religious beliefs are evidence-based or logic-based, and has, I now believe willfully, distorted the arguments of those who are posing the hard questions, apparently because he has no answer for them. — Janus

Did I start a thread on the defense of faith against New Atheist types? Nope. This is a thread about the meaning of faith, and when folks like Tom or yourself offer definitions without any arguments or reasons, you are not doing philosophy. The fact that the petitio principii includes psychologically incoherent assumptions makes it even worse. "Leontiskos has the burden of proof to show that faith is not irrational," is not a real argument. It is similar to your unfalsifiability sophistry. Arguing against such is pointless. Accepting their question-begging burden of proof would be insane.

Besides, you know full well that what you are engaged in <here> is bullshit. I'm sad to see you engage in that sort of thing, given that you are capable of more.

(I'm sure Banno is doing his standard troll gig. I have him on ignore as I've said.)

The reason the anti-religious folks are struggling so much is this. They want to define faith as some form of irrationality or some form of belief sans evidence, and yet there is no reputable source which corroborates such a pejorative definition of 'faith'. They want to win their anti-religious argument with a mere definition, and yet there is no good reason to accept their definition. In fact if we want to know what some word means, we set about doing things that the anti-religious folks here refuse to do. The reputable lexical sources are abhorrent to them because those sources don't toe the line of their agenda.

- That's fucking shameful, man. :down:

This is the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion. — Janus

What is the basic difference? — Leontiskos

The basic difference is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be. — Janus

So you are saying, "The basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be."

I'm not following that. — Leontiskos

-

• Janus: This is the basic difference between apples and bananas.
• Leontiskos: What is the basic difference?
• Janus: The basic difference is that carrots are orange whereas peas are green.
• Leontiskos: So you are saying, "The basic difference between apples and bananas is that carrots are orange whereas peas are green." I'm not following that.
• Janus: *Implodes into multiple posts of complete nonsense*

(This is a pretty standard conversation with an anti-religious person, or in Janus' case, a person who holds an anti-religious position. Even answering for their own claims becomes far too burdensome.)

I pointed you to this question:

What is the basic difference? — Leontiskos

What was I asking you? What claim of yours elicited that question of mine? Go back and have a look. :roll:

Lol - You're changing the subject again, just like you did <here>. You made a claim about "the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion," and now you're playing dumb, pretending that no such claim was made. You are equivocating, talking about differences between other things than the original topic (i.e. different kinds of faith).

That last sentence does not even make sense. — Janus

No shit. Why don't you remedy that incoherence?

Or it you are deliberately trying to distort what I've been saying then cut out the sophistic bullshit and try doing some cogent reasoning. — Janus

The sophistic bullshit is all yours, darling. My post shows it all. Ante up and do some real philosophy. :roll:

This is the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion. — Janus

What is the basic difference? — Leontiskos

The basic difference is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be. — Janus

So you are saying, "The basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be." — Leontiskos

So you are saying, "The basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be."

I'm not following that. I would encourage you to take your time in setting this out. The reason I brought up Pieper was to encourage people to take more time and effort with this topic.

We all know what the words evidence and faith mean. — Janus

Lol - I take it that you haven't been following this thread very closely.

I made all sorts of unaddressed points in my last two posts to you. Feel free to go back and address some of them. Here is the most pointed:

What is the basic difference? — Leontiskos

I don't see that we are talking about linguistics, but rather about logic. — Janus

The meaning of a word is a matter of linguistics, not logic.

If we have good reason to think that the authority we are trusting is presenting facts which are based on actual observation and evidence, not mere opinion, then our trusting of such an authority is not merely faith-based but is also a matter of rational inference. — Janus

No one believes authorities who they do not believe are credible. Once you recognize this you begin to see why acts of faith are not without evidence (i.e. you begin to consider motives of credibility).

If we have no good reason to think the authority we are trusting is presenting facts which are based on actual observation and evidence then our trusting of that authority would not be merely faith-based. — Janus

Typo?

If we have no good reason to think someone is credible then we do not believe them, and we do not take them to be an authority.

This is the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion. — Janus

What is the basic difference?

See, you're doing it again. If it is mixed up with trust in authority it may be somewhat faith-based., whereas a belief which is entirely following an authority with no evidence to support such following is simply faith-based. — Janus

This is real argument, which is great. This is what this thread needs much more of.

Much of what we call our knowledge consists in beliefs which are culturally accepted as facts so there is an element of faith of course. The assumption is that if had the time we could check the sources of such facts ourselves, that we have good reason to accept the findings and observations of experts, of scientists and scholars, and thus have good reason to believe in their truth. So there is also reasoning to the most plausible conclusion in play and such knowledge is not merely faith-based.

In matters where there is no possibility of seeing for oneself the beliefs are entirely faith-based. — Janus

I don't think this is linguistically correct, though.

You give two separate conditions:

1. The belief that "if we had the time we could [directly verify the claim]."
2. The possibility of seeing for oneself.

You are basically claiming that if (1) or (2) are present then less faith or belief is involved. There is no real problem with any of this, philosophically or logically. But there is also nothing necessary about it, philosophically or logically. Linguistically an act of faith or belief does not exclude (1) or (2), nor does either condition "water down" the faith-component of some assent.

Suppose you stop at a gas station to ask for directions to the beach. The cashier gives you directions, you believe her, and you get back into your car to drive to the beach.

But now consider two possibilities, both premised on the fact that there were local maps available for sale in the gas station:

A. You do not notice the maps for sale
B. You do notice the maps for sale.

According to your thesis, even if you do not buy or consult a map, your assent to the cashier's directions is still less faith-based on (B) than on (A). This is because on (B) conditions (1) and (2) are true.

But I don't think that's actually correct. When you get back into the car and use the cashier's directions to drive to the beach, your act is faith-based whether (A) or (B) is true, and I don't see that (A) would make it more faith-based. Someone could equally argue the opposite, namely that (B) would make it more faith-based (because there is a more explicit decision in favor of trust). So again, philosophically we can argue these fine points, but linguistically the faith-based nature of the act isn't affected or altered by (B).

(The atheist will want to make a lot of hay out of (2), but that focus is extra-linguistic. It is a philosophically investigable issue, but it is not an outcome of the natural language analysis.)

I see what you mean. As I said, however, it's difficult to harmonize what the Bible seems to say in various places. — boundless

I think we have to establish a proper methodology if we are to avoid begging the question in these matters.

The first way to do that is to speak and listen at a single pace. I think Matthew 26:24 is incompatible with universalism, and presumably I don't need to explain why. You seem to, "See what I mean." So then, speaking and listening at a single pace, you might go on to present something in Scripture that you see as supporting universalism:

For instance, 1 Tim 2:3-4 seems to say that God's will is that all people shall be saved. St Augustine... — boundless

I'm not very concerned with what Augustine says (and he may well be stretching the text). I'm more interested in your argument that 1 Tim 2:3-4 supports universalism.

Verse 4 does seem to support universalism in a prima facie way, but I think that if we simply bring in the immediate context of v. 1 that thesis loses a lot of its steam. "God wills all men to be saved, and therefore it is good and acceptable in his sight that we pray and intercede for all men." The rationale here does not seem to imply universalism, given that praying for a man does not guarantee his salvation. The rationale is that God has a goal and that we contribute to that goal with prayers and intercessions. The fact that the prayers and intercessions are fallible is—in this context—actually evidence that the goal is fallible. If Paul had omitted vv. 1-2 then vv. 3-4 would have had a more universalistic ring.

Further, I think the fallibility of God's (antecedent) will was the most plausible exegetical interpretation in the first place. "God wills to save all men," does not mean, "God will save all men," and this is particularly true in the Hebrew context. Finally, I don't see how this cuts against non-universalism, for I don't know of any non-universalists who deny the universal salvific will of God. Note too that in the verses preceding verse 1 Paul is talking about those who have made shipwreck of their faith, which is certainly in tension with the interpretation that all will be saved. Similarly, verse 15 gives an explicit condition for salvation, thus implying that the condition (and the salvation) may not occur. So I think the initial interpretation is incorrect, and that there are also three contextual cues that the interpretation is incorrect.

Now let's look at your objection to my verse:

I also believe that St John Paul II said that despite what that verse you cite about Judas, the Church never made any definite pronouncements on people who are forever in Hell and this includes even Judas. — boundless

I don't find this to be a strong argument at all. A pope's comments are worth very little in comparison with Scripture, especially when he is not teaching formally. I also think that the claim that the Church has never pronounced on anyone who is lost is demonstrably incorrect, and involves a remarkable whitewashing of ecclesial history (but we don't need to get lost in that debate). In fact, if someone thinks the Church has never made such a pronouncement, apparently they haven't read Matthew 26:24, where the Head of the Church seems to do exactly that. Of course, someone could argue that Judas is saved and nevertheless it is better that he had never been born, but that seems like an impossible argument. I think those who try to engage in those sorts of mental gymnastics must be pre-biased (literally pre-judiced) in favor of a particular outcome.

That was our first step. I pointed to Matthew 26:24 and you pointed to 1 Timothy 2:3-4. At this point in the theological discussion, both of us having presented one pericope, I think the universalist interpretation is less plausible. I think the Matthew text has more anti-universalist weight than the Timothy text has pro-universalist weight.

Another example is St John Chrysostom's — boundless

So it is odd to look for someone who you think made a bad argument (e.g. Augustine or Chrysostom), isolate their bad argument, and then infer that the oppose conclusion must be true. This is a form of invalid reasoning. I could also find people who made (putatively) bad arguments for universalism, but this would not disprove universalism. Better to actually try to make an argument for universalism from Scripture.

(I actually pointed out the problems with two scriptural arguments presented in this thread, in <this post > and <this post>.)

Now let's take another step in the theological discussion. A second verse that I find quite convincing is Luke 13:23-28. I don't know how one could read that without bias and come to the conclusion of universalism. Granted, if there were verses that support universalism as strongly as these sorts of verses oppose universalism, then the "harmonization" question would become pertinent.

Ok, but anyway as I see it, if you allow the logical possibility that one can repent, then the logical conclusion is simply that no one will be beyond hope of repentance (assuming that they will exist forever). — boundless

Yep, again:

Specifically, if we say that no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then Balthasar's position is secured, but Hart's is not. So what you say is right: if no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then hopeful universalism is rationally permissible. — Leontiskos

-

So either the damned - or some of them - will lose the ability to repent or even if they do, they will not be given mercy from God. If we assume that they will lose the ability to repent, it seems to me that, based on what we have said so far, the damned will either not given the possibility to do so or they will not be allowed to do so. So, in other words, it is either an active punishment of God or a complete 'abandomnemnt/desertion'.
But it it is so, then, we have to think eternal damnation as an extrinsic punishment again. — boundless

I don't follow much of this, grammatically or logically. You may have to restate it in a different way.

Note that if Matthew 26:24 is true then Judas will not be saved. I'm not too concerned about whether his lack of salvation has a logical cause, or a psychological cause, or some other cause. Either way the outcome is the same. And again, at some point we have to wonder whether your term "logical possibility" has a specific meaning at all. It looks a lot like a tautology, "If everyone can repent forever, then everyone can repent forever."

I doubt that a Christian universalist would say that evangelization or repentance is unnecessary. — boundless

I spoke about evangelization, not repentance, and I think an intellectually rigorous universalist would have to admit that evangelization is not necessary. Even on your own analogy the only reason to evangelize is to lessen pain, and the lessening of pain is in no way necessary.

But anyway, do you think that the main reason that one should have to evangelize, do good etc is to avoid unending torment? — boundless

I think that if our ultimate goal does not require evangelization, then evangelization is not ultimately necessary. The goal is salvation, not avoiding unending torment. Nevertheless, try to make sure that your arguments rise above a mere emotional appeal.

Maybe at a certain point, the patient will be convinced by his painful experience to take the serious medication — boundless

And maybe he won't. We have no empirical or Scriptural reason to believe that every patient eventually takes medicine. Just the opposite.

So, maybe... — boundless

As has so often been the case in this conversation, you keep saying "maybe" when your conclusion requires that you say "necessarily." "Maybe" won't cut it for universalism, and we have already put hopeful universalism to bed (by agreeing that it is philosophically possible on the supposition of the 'maybe').

Or maybe the illness is not fatal but leads 'only' to agonizing pain but the patient refuses to take the medicine. If the pain could go along forever, will the patient simply forever say 'no' to the medication if he or she will suffer agonizing pain? — boundless

God here begins to look like the guy who tortures you until you finally give in. Or who sets up the universe in such a way that you will suffer until you finally give in.

Assuming that the medicines are necessary for the patient's well-being, compassionate doctors will try to convince the patient to accept them as long as is possible for them to do so. — boundless

Sure, and that's why the Church keeps at it.

The 'hard' universalists would say that at a certain point the 'patient' (sinner) will be convinced to take the 'medication' ('salvation') possibly by the painful experience (where the pain might be regret, a painful experience of loneliness and so on). The 'hopeful' universalists would say that there will be always hope that the 'patient' will be convinced. — boundless

Yes, correct.

The traditionalist would say that the 'patient' at a certain point is beyond hope or is actively condemned to not take the 'medication' or even to not desire it. — boundless

If the "hard" universalist says that at a certain point the patient will be convinced to take the medication, then the traditionalist says that some patients will never take the medication.

Unfortunately, I won't be able to respond in the following days. I hope to come back by mid or the end of next week. — boundless

No problem at all!

- That's actually a much more serious appraisal than anything Tom Storm has attempted in this thread, and so it is at least a step in the right direction.

Nevertheless, Wittgenstein is a lousy linguist, usually pulling things out of thin air. Pieper is an example of someone who is much more attentive to natural language.

If someone suffers from weakness of will and cheats on their spouse we normally consider them blameworthy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Likewise for ignorance. Negligence can be blameworthy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, thanks for the correction. Usually when someone speaks about things like ignorance they aren't speaking about things like negligence, but I see that you meant to include the latter in the former.

Nevertheless, the more central reason I interpreted you that way is as follows. First, an edit I added that you may have missed:

Else, you are basically trying to justify a position where moral evil is possible for x amount of time but not x+y amount of time, which is a rather difficult task. — Leontiskos

Your argument:

1. No one chooses the worse over the better but for ignorance about what is truly best, weakness of will, or external constraint.
2. Therefore, no one chooses anything other than God for x+y amount of time.

My counterargument asks why (3) does not follow:

3. Therefore, no one chooses anything other than God for x amount of time.

Or to Flannery's point: why does anyone choose anything other than God at all?

If man's natural desire for Goodness and Truth cannot find rest in evil and falsity, in the absence of what is desired, then the rational soul stays in motion and hungry until it has attained its ends. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I pointed out to boundless, there are basic empirical problems here. If humans rest in things other than God in this life, then why couldn't they rest in things other than God in the afterlife? I don't think you are appreciating the acuity of Flannery's point.

As I said:

I do not find plausible the idea that our earthly lives are too short for moral or spiritual formation, or that we have some good reason to think that our earthly lives are accidental, such that our destiny-orientation will be fundamentally changed by temporal experiences outside our earthly course. — Leontiskos

My view is that this life and our choices in this life really matter. Your view seems to entail that this life and our choices in this life don't really matter. That someone can choose ends other than God for their entire earthly life, and then everything will just be reversed after they die. That the nature and shape of this life is entirely incommensurate and unconnected to our eternal destiny.

"We already have such evil in the world: sinners who separate themselves from God and live—even humanly-speaking—frustrated, resentful lives" (Flannery). If we can do that for 80 years, why can't we do it for eternity? You are required to say that the bigger picture is just entirely different and incommensurable with the earthly picture. On your theory of will unrepentant evil is possible for x amount of time but not x+y amount of time. I'm not sure what basis there is for such a theory. Nevertheless, I grant that if there were no evil then the Platonic theory of will would be a really excellent theory; and that if Socrates were right in claiming that evil merely flows from ignorance then it would also be an excellent theory.

Anyhow, on your view, if man chooses evil as evil, and finds his rest in evil... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you are probably aware that Thomists do not think man chooses evil as evil. The damned have chosen a lesser good.

B. Have lost its rational nature and rational appetites, which is in some sense to have become a different substance and so to have been annihilated. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here's the argument:

1. Humans by definition desire God
2. Therefore something which does not desire God is no longer human (and has therefore been "annihilated")

Note first that I strengthened the argument by avoiding "rational nature." I don't think we just automatically seek God because of our rational nature, as if Pantheism were true or as if salvific faith were the result of a logical syllogism. This goes back to the tension between Hart's position and classical notions of Pelagianism and grace.

In any case, are you right that a substantial change must occur for someone to be damned? We can talk that way metaphorically, but I have no good reason to take such a claim literally. I don't find the underlying Platonic theory of the will overly certain, and I think there are better sources which contradict it, such as the empirical data we have from earthly life and Scripture.

Presumably their identity perdures, and therefore there is no actual annihilation. We could ask various questions here, such as, "Do the damned desire God?" I would say that unfulfilled desire is part of Hell, but that the desire is not accompanied by repentance. So Hell in the afterlife is presumably a lot like the Hell we occasionally see in this life, and that's probably why Jesus connected the two.

But if someone wants to elevate that Platonic theory of the will to an extremely high place, then I can understand why they would hold to universalism. I just wouldn't understand what grounds we could have for that manner of elevation.

Being arbitrary, it is random. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Let's save your trope about libertarian free will until we have finished this topic of the Platonic view of the will.

Deface, yes, but not utterly destroy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right: can the imago dei be destroyed? I think it can. Scripture certainly depicts individuals who are beyond help or return, and I would venture to say that this is because they have destroyed their imago dei. I am convinced that Orthodox scholars like Fr. Stephen De Young are correct in saying that deification (as becoming an icon/idol of God) vs. "demonification" (as becoming an icon/idol of a demon) is a central theme in Scripture. Indeed, Scripture presents a kind of parity between angels/demons and humans, where the same possibilities of eternal life and eternal death are available to both angels/demons and humans. This is why Augustine's anti-universalist argument about the demons is so strong, and it is also strong because the Platonic theory of the will should apply to demons too.

-

I think a basic critique you are making is something like, "Your view of evil is problematic." I would say that every view of the mysterium iniquitatis is problematic, and that trying to explain it perfectly is a fool's errand. What I want to do is stick to the most credible sources in forming a judgment. I don't find much credibility in a Platonic theory of the ineluctable good, at least when compared with the empirical nature of this earthly life and Scripture.

It seems you are perhaps bigoted against atheists, perceiving them all as monstrous amalgamations of the worst traits of Dawkins and Hitchens. — Tom Storm

Have I claimed that the central act of atheism is a form of irrationality? Of course not. You are reaching.

I would say that many religious believers hold irrational beliefs, but so do many political adherents. — Tom Storm

What does that have to do with anything? It has no logical bearing on the point I made.

I’m not seeking authority figures to follow; I leave that to zealots and fundamentalists. — Tom Storm

You have avoided objective arguments for the meaning of "faith" like the plague. That's not intellectually honest.

That would be a bad argument. — Tom Storm

That's how definitions work. If you define faith as belief without evidence then instances of belief without evidence are faith. I'm not sure how to make this any easier for you.