This is a little risky on TPF, but I'll go ahead and say that my main reason for standing a bit aloof from the historical-analysis perspective is that I associate it with various pessimistic (and moralistic) accounts of the decline of Western civilization, which I disagree with. ("We gave up the Greeks and we gave up Catholicism and now we're fucked!"). — J

Why is it risky? You're going on about it all the time.

But note that it is fallacious to draw intellectual conclusions from a state of desire. "I associate P with pessimism; I oppose pessimism, therefore I assert ~P." That's emotional reasoning 101.

More precisely, someone draws a distinction between the pre-modern and the modern, and you anticipate an argument about decline. Opposing the presumed thesis of decline, you assert that there is no real distinction between the pre-modern and the modern (because if there is no distinction then there can be no decline). "I don't think there is a decline, therefore there is no real difference between the pre-modern and the modern," is an invalid argument. It is also a form of sophistry, given the fact that you are asserting a truth ("There is no significant distinction") only to achieve an end you desire, without having rational grounds for that assertion. It is wishful thinking. We have to try to get that horse in front of the cart if we want to do philosophy.

One response that I am aware of is the Thomistic response, which essentially claims that the sin is in part evaluated relative to the dignity of the being offended; and since sinning is against God and God is infinitely good, it follows that any sin carries with it infinite demerit. — Bob Ross

That sounds like Anselm, as Count pointed out.

On the issue of Hell and punishment there has been a tectonic shift since the 19th century. See for example, "Universalism: A Historical Survey," by Richard Bauckham. What this means is that the propulsion in an anti-Hell direction is more cultural than rational, and the recent works on the subject produce more heat than light.

Here is a basic Thomistic approach:

Article 3. Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?

Objection 1. It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice is equality: wherefore it is written (Isaiah 27:8): "In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is temporal. Therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal punishment.

Objection 2. Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an end, and "what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be infinite.

Objection 3. Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction of men" [Vulgate: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal punishment on man.

Objection 4. Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. Therefore it cannot be of infinite duration.

On the contrary, It is written (Matthew 25:46): "These shall go into everlasting punishment"; and (Mark 3:29): "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the principle be saved, defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment.

Reply to Objection 1. Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for life—sometimes even by death; wherein account is not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the living, so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now according to Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity. A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever."

Reply to Objection 2. Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to Proverbs 19:25: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser." Accordingly the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments, according to Psalm 59:6: "Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered."

Reply to Objection 3. God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them.

Reply to Objection 4. Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order, and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punishment endures. — Aquinas, ST I-II.87.3

Political Illiberalism: A Defense of Freedom, by Peter L. P. Simpson.
(See also: Response)

Er, no. Did you even read Hart's article? Reading it would remedy much of the confusion in your post, as well as the confusion on TPF. The very fact that Frege has to "demonstrate a mysterious third realm," or that we "ask how object/subject are not separate," is itself evidence that reality is not being seen as akin to intellect.

's quote is crucially important to understanding an older, more robust idea of God, and it is also important in understanding a general modern shift into nominalism et al. I can't imagine that anyone familiar with both sides would attempt to blur the pre-modern/modern distinction that Hart is highlighting.

It was an unreasonable claim in teh discussion. That is simply not how food is characterized. It is necessary to survive. — AmadeusD

So you are claiming that food isn't good, it is necessary to survive. But I would point out that people call food good in part because it is necessary to survive. Both are true at the same time. And food is a sound counterexample to your claim that good is arbitrary and that what is good for a Christian is different from what is good for a Muslim. If Christians and Muslims both deem food good then that claim is false.

Bit of a non sequitur going on here. — AmadeusD

You are avoiding answering the question. If you answer the question in the affirmative then your claim about arbitrariness is consistent with your answer. If you answer the question in the negative then your claim about arbitrariness is inconsistent with your answer. And I think we both know that the correct answer to (3) is, "No." If the rhymes and reasons are not altogether different, then their products will not be arbitrary across individuals.

But, intellectually it's pretty simple to me - there is no arbiter of good and bad. — AmadeusD

Is there an arbiter of true and false? Do we need an arbiter before we can see that 2+2=4? If no arbiter is needed elsewhere, then why would it be needed in ethics?

-

That doesn't say anything about its rightness. — AmadeusD

I would suggest, "Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble," by Peter L. P. Simpson. A link can be found <here>.

- :up:

Where I think this becomes particularly interesting is that questions like the problem of evil take on a different character. — Tom Storm

As a point of reference, Philip Goff moved from atheism to theistic personalism rather than classical theism because he thinks the problem of evil excludes classical theism (link). I think he's fairly ignorant of both theological traditions, but that sort of move is not uncommon nowadays. In fact a good portion of theistic personalism seems to be a response to critiques of (classical) theism. While theistic personalism is more readily given to caricature, there is an open debate as to whether it is inferior with respect to, say, the problem of evil.

Equating the two just muddies the waters. — Tom Storm

Saying, “That seems like faulty reasoning to me,” is not a substantial argument. If you want to demonstrate an equivocation, then you must identify the two different term-concepts being used and show that they are relevantly different. If you want to contest a claim about airplanes, then you ultimately have to give your definition of faith, show how that definition does not apply to airplanes, and then be prepared to defend your own definition.

The airplane analogy does not strike me as ideal, but consider this story. I have a friend who is very non-religious. When she gets on an airplane, she closes her eyes and says, “I believe it can fly, I believe it can fly, I believe it can fly!” She tells the person seated next to her that if you don’t believe, then it won’t work. She is joking, of course, but she is not making an anti-religious dig. She is just having a bit of fun, and it would not be funny if there were nothing true about it. She has no idea how airplanes fly. She has no first-hand knowledge of, “Engineering protocols, air traffic control systems, and black boxes.” And you probably don’t, either. Scientists themselves continue to dispute the explanation for lift. In fact there are a surprising number of people who avoid flying. If you ask them why, they might literally tell you something about a lack of trust/faith in airplanes. For all these reasons, the word “faith” is naturally suited to airplanes, and it seems like your dispute may be with the English dictionary and English language use rather than with the word ‘faith’. The prima facie evidence is certainly against your view that the word ‘faith’ is not applicable to air travel, given the way in which it is spontaneously used in that context. If space travel becomes popularly accessible the word ‘faith’ will be naturally applied in that context even more than it is applied to air travel. Using ‘faith’ in such contexts is surely not an equivocal use, as the difference between the money bank and the river bank is.

That fits with my experience, for I have found that polemical atheists always beg the question with regard to the concept of faith. I usually let them define the word, show them that they themselves are committed to such a concept, and then wait for them to renege on their definition, which they always do. It’s not surprising that their belief that the word or concept of “faith” only ever operates in religious contexts is impossible to sustain. This is because the polemical atheist uses “faith” as a purely pejorative term, when in fact in common use it is not a purely pejorative term. . If the atheist abandons pejoration and tries to define it in a serious way then he will inevitably lose his debate. In reality the distinction between the religious and the non-religious is not nearly as simplistic as such an atheist wants to believe.

Note that the pejorative argument looks like this:

1. Religious faith is irrational
2. Faith in airplanes is not irrational
3. Therefore, faith in airplanes is not religious faith – there is an equivocation occurring

That’s all these atheists are doing in their head to draw the conclusion about an equivocation, and this argument is the foundation of any argument that is built atop it.

-

We can actually parallel the two propositions quite easily:

1. Lack of faith, lack of assent
   
   • 1a. “I do not have faith that the airplane will fly, and I do not assent to the proposition that the airplane will fly.”
   • 1b. “I do not have faith that God exists, and I do not assent to the proposition that God exists.”
2. Lack of faith, presence of assent
   
   • 2a. “I do not have faith that the airplane will fly, but I assent to the proposition that the airplane will fly.”
   • 2b. “I do not have faith that God exists, but I assent to the proposition that God exists.”
3. Presence of faith, presence of assent (where assent flows solely from faith)
   
   • 3a. “I have faith that the airplane will fly, and I assent to the proposition that the airplane will fly (and my assent is based solely on my faith).”
   • 3b. “I have faith that God exists, and I assent to the proposition that God exists (and my assent is based solely on my faith).”
4. Presence of faith which is not necessary for assent (overdetermination)
   
   • 4a. “I have faith that the airplane will fly, but I would assent even if I did not have faith.”
   • 4b. “I have faith that God exists, but I would assent even if I did not have faith.”

A fear of flying attaches to 1a. Atheism attaches to 1b. Tom Storm’s approach to flying is represented by 2a. My approach to God's existence is represented by 2b. And as said, 3b is a more recent phenomenon. 3a can characterize flying, but it would also tend to characterize the non-professional who is traveling in space or is traveling in a deep sea submarine.

This helps show why it is wrong to assume that faith necessarily attaches or necessarily does not attach to a material proposition. In fact the same proposition can be held with different modes of assent. 2a is not the only possibility for airplanes, and 1b/3b are not the only possibilities for God.

(As I recall, Josef Pieper's treatise on faith is rather good on this question. The beginning can be found <here>.)

Given that one of the essential goals of the program is a lack of transparency, it's not clear to me how one would determine whether it is being used. That's much of the problem in the first place. It's a secretive program with anonymous accusations where the accused are assumed guilty, are not notified of accusations against them, and can be silently punished without ever knowing that the reason they were, say, not considered for a job is because of one of these accusations. The people using such a program are the sort of people who would not admit that they are aware of the program/law at all. That feigned ignorance would simply be an extension of the anonymity and lack of transparency inherent in the program itself.

The phenomenon of turning neighbor against neighbor with incentives to provide secret reports in favor of some ideological goal (in this case, "hate" suppression), is as I understand it a hallmark precursor of totalitarian power shifts. It undermines the organic trust structure at the most local levels of society, and that trust structure is the core source of resilience to societal manipulation. I see Peterson's warnings as salutary.

But we had a similar bill recently in the UK which I disliked. It's an anti hate speech bill which you can report someone based on hearsay, no witnesses required. Your name goes on a registry. No one uses it though. — fdrake

Peterson has covered this. See, for example, 57:50 of the Doyle/Linehan interview. Do you have any evidence for the claim that no one is using it? That no one is reporting or recording non-crime hate incidents?

no one's been punished under it right?

[...]

No one uses it though. — fdrake

These are strange defenses. You have highly problematic laws and practices on the books, which are newly minted, and the response is, "I don't think anyone has been punished under the law (yet)." Note too that an unjust law is causing harm even by the very threat it represents, and uneven application of a law is another problem all its own. One should oppose an unjust law even before its application begins.

I don't disbelieve Peterson when he says that he has spent a good deal of time studying the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and neither do I doubt that these sorts of laws parallel the seedbed for those sorts of movements. That's of course why he is so vehemently opposed to these things - he sees in them the same sort of limitations on civil liberties that precede totalitarian drift. At this point in time the thesis is alive and well.

-

He got famous for resisting compelled speech, a completely different thing. — Jeremy Murray

Yes. Construing that as opposing trans rights is dubious. But be aware that the moderators of TPF tend to lean strongly in this direction.

“Supervenience” has often functioned in philosophy of mind as a kind of magic word that promises metaphysical rigour but without any really explaining anything. — Wayfarer

Yes, and this was borne out in threads such as, "Philosophical jargon: Supervenience."

Yes, I agree. The connection only breaks down as we move out of the human ethical sphere. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I agree. :up:

But I think this highlights something helpful, which is that, without something that is chosen for itself, goodness (and choice-worthyness) dissolves into an endless multiplicity. In this case, anything is only ever good as respects some end, and that end is only ever good as respects some other end, etc., in an infinite regress. IMHO, this is why appeals to "pragmatism" to paper over epistemic and moral relativism/nihilism are ultimately flawed. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and I think a big part of this conversation is to repel, "Morality as a set of hypothetical imperatives." That is an important ingredient, and I can see that you were speaking to it earlier.

To me, this capacity for intellectual desire seems obviously essential to meaningful freedom and self-determination. We need something like Harry Frankfurt's second-order volitions, the ability to desire to have (or not have) other desires. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and attendantly, when we make a choice we are deeming our election choice-worthy, but we could also come to regret (or confirm) it a minute, hour, or year later. Choice-worthiness is an important and non-vacuous concept. (As is goodness!)

Moreover, if many disparate goods are sought for their own sake we still face a multiplicity problem. Yet if we are ordered to an infinite (or highest) good (actual or merely ens rationis), there is no such difficulty. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and precisely insofar as the infinite or highest good places the goods which are sought for their own sake into a hierarchy, or at least subordinates them to the highest good.

David Bentley Hart... — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is a good quote. It reminds me of Gaudium et Spes:

The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the first man, was a figure of Him Who was to come, namely Christ the Lord. Christ, the final Adam, by the revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear. It is not surprising, then, that in Him all the aforementioned truths find their root and attain their crown. — Gaudium et Spes, #22

-

...and its role in making goodness a coherent unity. — Count Timothy von Icarus

An interesting idea.

Also, "if something is chosen it is choice-worthy" would imply that people are infallible as to what is best for them and can never make "bad choices." This gets back to the example of smokers who give "rational reasons" for why they do not want to quit smoking. I am not saying that we can say that the recalcitrant smoker is necessarily wrong about the relative benefits of smoking of course, just that their "reasoned choice" in no way implies that they are always correct either. In general, I think we have good reason to believe they are normally wrong. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and we can even say this, particularly the bolded proposition:

So the better way to put your argument is, "If I choose to read a book then that book is choice-worthy." What an Aristotelian would say is, "Anyone who chooses X deems X to be good at the time they choose it." But what is deemed to be good and what is good are not the same thing, and anyone who has ever regretted anything has experienced this fact. They might apologize as follows, "It seemed like a good idea at the time..." — Leontiskos

So J's vacuity argument could be applied to an assertion like, "At the time I chose X I deemed X to be choice-worthy." But this is a very narrow assertion, and is very far from what is required to sustain J's conclusions.

In general the fact of human regret throws the subjectivist's thesis into confusion. If nothing were good beyond my desires, or beyond what I deem good, then regret as well as second-order volitions would be impossible.

But I agree that something isn't good because it is choice-worthy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

J's premise is that anything that is chosen is choice-worthy (and therefore "good"). Again, this is false, and it results in the fallacy that choice-worthiness (and goodness) cannot be an explanation for choosing (and that worth cannot be an explanation for a valuation).

Your word "because" is too ambiguous for the disagreement. If we restrict ourselves to the sphere of ethical deliberation,* then what is good is what is choice-worthy. They mean the same thing in that context, and choice-worthiness is meant to function as a semantic explanation of goodness (qua ethical deliberation). An Aristotelian could equally agree that an ethical choice isn't good because it is choice-worthy. Rather, the goodness of an ethical choice is its choice-worthiness. Similarly, someone is not an unmarried man because he is a bachelor. Rather, an unmarried man is a bachelor.

Euthyphro subordinates an essence (piety) to an opinion (god-loved). If someone said that whatever is chosen is good then you could parallel the Euthyphro. But no one has said that. "Chosen" and "choice-worthy" are not the same thing. This is a strawman.


* Or simply ethical deliberation simpliciter.

- :up:

Which a Christian would probably attribute to the unreliability of human reason, tainted as it is by sin, would they not? But then, from the Christian point of view, what is good is not really a matter of choice, is it? — Wayfarer

It would only be voluntary in a corporate sense, "in Adam." Original Sin flows from a choice, namely Adam's choice. Christian metaphysics is going to see humanity as a kind of corporate/bodily entity, such that the actions of one bear on another.

You can see this in the English "desirable." When we speak of "desirable" outcomes in medicine, education, etc., we do not tend to mean "whatever people currently happen to desire." If this was true, dropping out of school would be a highly "desirable" outcome because kids clearly desire it. We mean what is truly worthy of desire, as in "choice-worthy," or "good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. For the intellectually honest inquirer, this should be basic.

I only framed it in that way because, as respects ethical decision-making for finite ends, you can use the two almost interchangeably — Count Timothy von Icarus

If the two terms are to be used interchangeably, then what we have is a definition, namely a definition of goodness qua ethical deliberation.

The Euthyphro dilemma seems different to me. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, it is entirely different. The vague appeal to Euthyphro is just more hand-waving:

↪Count Timothy von Icarus defined 'good' as 'choice-worthy.' It does not follow that whatever one chooses is choice-worthy (which is the thesis you are grasping at, and which requires dropping your "arguably"). Everyone themselves knows that not every choice they have made was good/choice-worthy. When you regret something you say, "I thought it was choice-worthy but in fact it wasn't. I chose what was not good."

Your objection is like, "If you think a bachelor is an unmarried man, then is something a bachelor because it is an unmarried man, or is it an unmarried man because it is a bachelor?" — Leontiskos

-

We can't use choice-worthiness itself as an explanatory element ("Well, I chose it because it was choice-worthy.") — J

The sophistical fallacy persists. "Everything that is chosen is eo ipso choice-worthy, therefore choice-worthiness cannot be an explanation for choosing." Any honest interlocutor should be able to recognize that the antecedent is false. It's as if @J hasn't the faintest idea what the word "worth" means. He might also fallaciously claim that there is nothing explanatory about the claim, "I paid 100 dollars for it because it is worth 100 dollars."

...Note how it is also myopic to relegate the whole discussion to retrospect, for ethics also involves suggestions like, "You should pay $100 for it because it is worth $100." The fallacy loses even its prima facie purchase on this sort of future-looking counsel.

(This forum is riddled with Moliere/Poquelin's shoddy logic.)

If I choose to read an interesting book, that book is, arguably, choice-worthy. But why? — J

It's odd that you would include the word "arguably," as it defeats your point. And do you think that the book is choice-worthy because it is interesting, or because it was chosen?

This is your objection:

• Count: This book is good / This book is choice-worthy
• J: If you don't say why it is good, or why it is choice-worthy, then you haven't said anything at all.

And your unargued assertion is simply false. To say that something is good or choice-worthy is more than saying nothing at all. One can say why it is good or choice-worthy, but things are good/choice-worthy for different reasons. In no way does one need to say why something is good in order to say that it is good.

It sounds like Socrates and Euthyphro. Is piety whatever the gods love, or do they love it because it is pious? Is something good because it is choice-worthy, or is it choice-worthy because it is good? — J

defined 'good' as 'choice-worthy.' It does not follow that whatever one chooses is choice-worthy (which is the thesis you are grasping at, and which requires dropping your "arguably"). Everyone themselves knows that not every choice they have made was good/choice-worthy. When you regret something you say, "I thought it was choice-worthy but in fact it wasn't. I chose what was not good."

Your objection is like, "If you think a bachelor is an unmarried man, then is something a bachelor because it is an unmarried man, or is it an unmarried man because it is a bachelor?"

If I choose to read an interesting book, that book is, arguably, choice-worthy. — J

So the better way to put your argument is, "If I choose to read a book then that book is choice-worthy." What an Aristotelian would say is, "Anyone who chooses X deems X to be good at the time they choose it." But what is deemed to be good and what is good are not the same thing, and anyone who has ever regretted anything has experienced this fact. They might apologize as follows, "It seemed like a good idea at the time..."

(Note that the shorthand I prefer is "desirable," but choice-worthy is not too far different. Good qua ethics is rooted in the object of "a non-hypothetical ought-judgment.")

It's not even a pseudo science. It's not at all a science, of any kind. — AmadeusD

Isn't that simply part of what pseudoscience means, namely, "Not a science"?

Given that you didn't address it, I assume you agree that better represents ethics than (1). In that case we have some simple questions to consider:

1. Do you act?
2. If so, do you act for some rhyme or reason?
3. If so, are those rhymes and reasons altogether different than those which guide other people's acts?

This goes back to our discussion in the other thread. You claimed that . I pointed out that , you went on to say that simply have different aims and different 'goods', and then I pointed out that . You did not respond to the claim that food is (deemed) good by all.

Ergo, anyone who acts is already engaged in ethics. The objection that the good is arbitrary and differs with each person is empirically false. If I put a hot coal next to your eyeball I know that you will shrink back, because I understand your (normative) ethics. I know you believe that burning out one's eyes is bad, even if you claim it isn't.

- Yep, good points. I definitely agree with all of that. I was just trying to keep it simple.

What seems to happen in these discussions is that Hume or @AmadeusD or @J makes a claim based on an implicit epistemology, namely the claim that (normative) ethics is unjustifiable. A simplification of the implicit epistemology could be illustrated with Hume's is-ought separation, but the more robust claim is that, "Given my own uncontroversial epistemology, knowledge of ethics is impossible."

One might directly attack the implicit epistemology and try to get them to defend it, but another approach is to simply point out facts such as the following:

If you place food in front of a poor starving person, they will eat it. If you try to argue that 'is' does not imply 'ought' before allowing them to eat it, they will still eat it, but will also think you are crazy. :smile: — Leontiskos

But ask most people "why is it bad for you if I burn out your eyes, or if I burn out your sons eyes," and the responses will be something like:

"If you burn out my eyes it would be incredibly painful and then I would be blind, so of course it wouldn't be good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

...and this is the approach I described <here>. So for example, if "burning out one's eyes" is bad, and everyone knows it is bad, then any epistemology worth its salt must account for this fact. It is no good to engage in the dubious practice of trying to bootstrap an independent epistemology from the ground up and then claim that this homemade epistemology is so well built that anything which lies outside of it must fail the test of knowledge. Or in other words, we are left with the question, "Is Hume's novel epistemology more secure, or is the universal attestation that burning out one's eyes is bad more secure?" It seems clear that the latter is more secure, and that Hume et al. have the burden of proof in showing that we would be more rational to accept their idiosyncratic epistemology rather than accept the claim that burning out one's eyes is bad.

(The underlying claims here are things like <it is good to exist (ceteris paribus)> or <it is good to not be in pain (ceteris paribus)> or <it is good to possess sight (ceteris paribus)>. It's hard to think that one is posing a serious question when they issue the challenge, "But how do you know that it is good to not be in pain?" We can analyze and expose the errors underlying that question and the errors inherent in the implicit epistemology, but the uneducated person who is not capable of exposing those errors is hardly less rationally justified in rejecting the claim that burning out one's eyes is not bad.)

Ethics are to do with how we act, specifically, as regards other people (or organisms, I guess). — AmadeusD

I would want to amend this and say that ethics has to do with how we should act.

1. Ethics are to do with how we act
2. Ethics has to do with how we should act

So consider the descriptive claim, "He carried out X act." All such claims are ethical claims on (1) but not on (2), and because not every such claim is an ethical claim, therefore (1) must be false. Would you agree with that? That ethics has a normative quality?

(Of course you might respond by saying that (1) describes but does not define ethics. Still, I would say that (2) gives us a better description and certainly a better definition.)

Further, if someone (such as yourself) thinks that there are no true or false claims about how we should act, then they would say that the "ethics" represented by (2) is a pseudoscience. Maybe you would say that.

@Wayfarer and @Count Timothy von Icarus may enjoy a recent piece written by James Ungureanu, "The Perfume of an Empty Vase: The Rise and Fall of Evidential Religion."

Which claims do you have in mind? — Janus

The claim that <Such experiences do not yield determinate knowledge> or <Such experience-inferences are unverifiable>.

That's bullshit—I have not said that post hoc claims based on, or interpretations of, religious experiences, are false—I have merely claimed that they cannot be verified to be true. — Janus

So you don't claim that someone engages in a false inference when they claim that one of their religious experiences produces determinate knowledge? It seems to me that that is precisely what you are saying, ergo:

Perhaps he thinks that when someone makes a claim based on a religious experience, that claim is unverifiable? But he himself asserts that such claims are false. Is his assertion verifiable? If it is not, then it probably doesn’t count as a meaningful assertion. If it is, then the claim he is scrutinizing must also be verifiable (given that he is purporting to falsify it). — Leontiskos

Someone claims that their experience-inference (i.e. the inference they are basing on their religious experience) is verifiable. You claim that it is not verifiable, and that the inference is false or invalid. If the inference is verifiably false/invalid, then the basic claim has been falsified, and what is falsifiable is verifiable. Therefore, your own falsification of the claim shows it to be verifiable. We need not say that the conclusion is false. We need only say that the inference to the conclusion is false or invalid. This nevertheless falsifies the argument-claim in question.

(So if your response is to say, "I am claiming that their conclusion is invalid, not false," my response would be that invalidity secures the point just as well. In that case verification has to do with validity, and invalidity entails verifiability. In that case we can redact my sentence to be, "But he himself asserts that such experience-inferences are false or invalid. Is his assertion verifiable?")

Claims are verifiable by observational evidence or logic (self-evidence). I cannot see how Buddhist claims can be definitively verified, just as claims that one artwork is better than another cannot be definitively verified. — Janus

Is that an argument, though? It sounds like you are saying, "I can't see how it could be verifiable, therefore it is unverifiable" (which is invalid). And I think @Count Timothy von Icarus is right when he points out that if your methodology is consistently applied there will be nothing at all that is "definitively verifiable." I find that folks who criticize religion or ethics in this manner tend to overestimate the certainty and apodicticity of science.

So, I ask how can the claimed supreme enlightenment of the Buddha, a claimed lack of enlightenemnet of Osho, be verified to an unbiased subject? — Janus

Didn't I already provide you with a method? Does my method not count because it isn't a "microscope"? The relevance of the microscope is the relevance of arbitrary criteria for verification.

If you think such claims are verifiable, whereas I don't believe they are simply because I cannot see how they could be, then the burden is on you to explain how they could verifiable. — Janus

If you "cannot see how they could be," then you do not have logical grounds for your claim that they are unverifiable. If you want to maintain your claim that they are unverifiable, then you will at least need a valid argument for that claim.

- Sounds good. I was planning to write one more post before declaring myself "out of steam" (or else time), so this works out well. Thanks to you too.

If I construe the spirit of an obligation as "engendering the kind of world that obligation seeks to create" and the obligation's letter as "the acts constitutive of its duty", maybe that makes it clearer. Satisfying the spirit of an obligation has something like a success criterion for fulfilling a purpose or higher cause, and a duty doesn't need such a purpose or a higher cause but often {typically} has them. — fdrake

Okay, but do we have to distinguish between a duty and a hypothetical imperative? Not every goal of betterment implicates duty.

Some duties are relatively transparent in their spirit and letter. The letter of my duty to take out the trashing is... taking out the trash. The spirit is a bunch of things like "letting rubbish pile up in your house is negligent" {a vice}, "letting rubbish pile up in your house degrades the quality of your and your neighbours lives" {disrespect to community}, just general ethical principles. If one took out the trash and left it in the street, you've satisfied the letter of your duty of taking out the trash, but contradicted some of the tenets that act is supposed to embody. You definitely took out the trash, you were nevertheless not considerate to your neighbours. — fdrake

Let me quote the earlier point I referred to:

I don’t see how the parts are going to help you get to the conclusion that supererogation is obligatory (or required). Suppose there is an obligatory end and multiple independently sufficient means [...] to that end. Obligation then applies to the means qua end. One is not obliged to utilize any given means, but one is obliged to utilize some means or combination of means that is sufficient to achieve the obligatory end. — Leontiskos

So on my view an obligatory means always presupposes an obligatory end. When you want to create a strong distinction between the duty-act and the reason for the duty-act, such that the first is obligatory and the second bears on supererogation, I think you have inappropriately sundered the means from the end, and thus sundered the wholeness and rationale of the duty. Granted, your letter/spirit distinction is a little bit different than your act/reason distinction, but I think the wholeness of means-end is very similar to the wholeness of letter-spirit. Sundering this wholeness results in incorrect reasoning.

One may be perversely or minimally compliant, one may also do minor violations of the spirit of ones duties and count as satisfying them. — fdrake

Agreed.

That's a tyrannical and absurd standard, no one can live chasing after every piece of trash like that - metaphorically and literally. — fdrake

You've here identified the reason why we are not obliged to do such a thing - why it does not fall within the duty.

The room opened up by perverse compliance and minor violations of a duty's spirit is also room for the failure of the aims of duty while satisfying its letter. — fdrake

I think this is too loose. Perverse compliance != minor violations != non-violations (such as the gale carrying away a loose piece of trash). This seems to be your argument:

1. Someone can fulfill the letter of a duty without fulfilling the spirit of a duty
2. If the letter is fulfilled then the duty is fulfilled
3. Therefore, the duty can be fulfilled without its spirit being fulfilled
4. Therefore, the fulfilling of the spirit of the duty is supererogatory

I see the error coming in (2), which sunders the wholeness of the letter-spirit unity.

Nevertheless, the world demands you relate to yourself and others as such a tyrant in order to fulfil your duties about the things which matter in spirit and not just in letter. — fdrake

I don't see how requiring someone to fulfill the spirit of their duty is tyrannical.

I understand something as supererogatory if it is laudable but not required for one's duties, like chasing after the trash in a gale. Laudability arises from embodying the spirit of one's duties to a high degree, heights of considerateness and self sacrifice. — fdrake

Okay so:

Edit: I think a big part of the issue is this question: How is a properly supererogatory act motivated? Can someone self-consciously engage in a supererogatory act, or will every heroic act be self-consciously viewed as obligatory? — Leontiskos

...you want to say that a supererogatory act is motivated by, "embodying the spirit of one's duties to a high degree," or basically by interpolating duty.

The food bank example I think is a good one. I want to take it as given that no one is duty bound to work full time for free in a food bank, it isn't a moral requirement for anyone to do that, but some people take up the burden. What would happen if some people did not take up the burden? The poor would starve. Working as a volunteer full time in a food bank is laudable. Thus, working as a volunteer full time in a food bank is supererogatory, as it's laudable and goes above and beyond one's duties of care for humanity.

But let's have a look at what happens if no one takes up the burden - which is, no one does something which is always permissible not to do -, the poor then starve. Some people working at the foodbank in that manner is necessary for the poor not to starve - necessary as a logical requirement, the poor would starve without it. But it was also shown not to be a moral duty to work full time there as a volunteer.

The aporia arises because if some people did not compel themselves to go above and beyond their duties, the poor would starve. The state of things thus requires {logically} that people go above and beyond their duties to ensure that widely held requirements for a just society. That is a much greater imposition than occasionally chasing after trash in a strong wind. That's the monstrosity I'm speaking about. — fdrake

Okay, good. What are some of the conflicting intuitions at play here, regarding X and Y (from above)?

• Y is required for a just society, and therefore we are required to bring it about
• X is not obligatory
• -
• If something is required, then it is obligatory
• An obligatory end entails obligatory means

I am more and more confident in the thesis that the issue is incorrect reasoning rather than a monstrosity (although we can always look at the phenomenology of the "monstrosity").

Engaging with modern views of morality almost always involves engaging modern notions of justice, and my conversation with Bob Ross was no exception. Ross was using "injustice" in a loose, and in my opinion inaccurate, sense. I think the same thing is happening here. Your premise is, "If someone starves, then an injustice has occurred." But what does that really mean? People and animals have been starving for a very long time, and it's hard to see what this has to do with injustice in any precise sense. Much of this thread strikes me as an issue of language being used poetically, and then arguments being drawn from that poetic usage. "Justice" seems to be a case in point. What do you really mean by that word, "justice"? Is it really unjust that someone should starve? Why?

To revisit the question of how a properly supererogatory act is motivated, I don't think it is as closely aligned to duty as you do. On my view the supererogatory has to do with what is better or what is ideal, and this is quite different from what is obligatory. This is why 's point about "the best of all possible worlds" is perhaps more pertinent than it first appears to be. The better and the best are not obligatory. And note how different solving starvation is from solving climate change. The former is an appeal to what is better or best, whereas the latter is more essentially an appeal to what is necessary qua survival.

I'll leave it there for now, even though I am doing little more than touching on further considerations.

- That's true, but one could agree with the OP regarding the objectivity of health without going on to agree with Harris' whole project. In fact Harris' health analogy receives a lot of pushback from ethicists who don't grant the measure of objectivity that Harris puts forward. This is all non-professional, amateur philosophy, to be sure (as is most of TPF).

That is a good angle of approach. As I reflect on your post, the first thing that comes to mind is that the whole neo-religious and systematic framing of Comte's sociology seems mistaken. The sociological lens is unhelpful when it is given primacy over all else. It leads naturally to dehumanization and despair. Here I think of Mother Teresa's quip about loving the poor rather than merely fighting poverty. The "fight against poverty" reifies and depersonalizes the issue.

But beyond that and regarding @fdrake's "monstrosity," I think subsidiarity is the most necessary political doctrine at the moment. People think they should solve worldwide hunger because they confuse themselves for God. The better thing to do is to address hunger in your own neighborhood and let the other neighborhoods address their own problems. The "moral imagination" is often tripping over itself by "making the best the enemy of the good." If it were not so busy fretting over world hunger, it would have already had a real impact on local hunger. And in fighting local hunger one learns grassroots strategies which achieve more than mere symptom-relief. Indeed the whole concept of "solving a problem" via interventionism may be a non-starter.

Earlier I critiqued the "moral imagination" for failing to understand the importance of stability and conservatism—for failing to avoid the French Revolution. More generally, the problem lies in salivating over "the final solution," and this goes back to Mother Teresa's quote. The problem lies in becoming so fixated on solving the problem once and for all, that one fails to see progress short of a solution, and one fails to see contextualizing and countervailing forces. In particular, one fails to see the finitude of means. There is a failure to see, for example, that if all resources are marshaled in favor of Green Energy, then severely detrimental effects will occur as a result of this misappropriation of resources. It is said that the demons characteristically destroy humans by giving them true knowledge at the wrong time.

In some sense, to draw the dilemma between evil and monstrosity is to have already justified monstrosity. Maybe the monstrosity does not exist after all, if the problem of starvation is not up to one man, or is not to be solved in one year. Even heroic acts will not solve such problems quickly, and one could easily destroy themselves with burnout, thus creating a counterfactually inferior contribution to the problem. Many of our problems are much bigger and older than we are, and it is therefore unrealistic to map them on the small scales of decades or of individuals.

This post is rather unfocused, but in general I think we need to be realistic about the proportion between the contributions of finite agents to large problems. Second, I think we need to distinguish between self-created problems and pre-existing problems. Self-created problems such as recycling or vice have more cause for despair than pre-existing problems where progress has occurred over time, such as hunger.

Yes, thanks for pointing that out—the "can" should have been a "cannot". — Janus

Okay. :up:

I haven't addressed anything as silly as verufying Buddhist claims with a microscope. so that seems like a red herring to me. — Janus

Silly examples are helpful. So what is your "microscope"? Why do you say a Buddhist claim is unverifiable?

So, you are saying that if I became supremely enlightened, I would know whether the Buddha was supremely enlightened? — Janus

I am saying that if you achieve the same level of proficiency as Gautama, then you would be in a very good position to judge that level of proficiency.

Can the claim that it is possible to become supremely enlightened be verified in the first place? If I thought I was supremely enlightened, allowing for the sake of argument that I could know such a thing, how could I know the same thing about someone I had never met? And even if I had met him or her, how could I know? And further even if I could know, how could I demonstrate that knowledge to someone else? And all that aside, how could I rule out self-deception in my own case? — Janus

Sorry, but this is gish gallop. You are just throwing as many random objections out onto the table as you can. If you have an argument it will need to be much more focused.

But I cannot demonstrate even that possibility to anyone who has not experience an altered state themselves, and then I don't need to demonstrate anything—my experience is irrelevant to them. It is their own experience that might lead them to belive. — Janus

Okay, so what? Do you think someone is saying that experience-claims must be verifiable by all in order to be verifiable? That they must be verifiable even to those who do not possess microscopes? Because not even science works that way.

That said, I just don't believe that such experiences yield any determinate knowledge, other than that such experiences may happen. The rest is interpretation after the fact, and usually culturally mediated. That is if people interpret such experience religiously, then they will usually do so in terms of the religion they are familiar with. Of course, such experiences may yield a profound sense of knowing, but that is a different thing and although they might serve to determine my own personal beliefs, they cannot serve to justify anyone else's. They would need to have their own experience. — Janus

And do you think your claims here are verifiable?

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Buddhism was often said by its early 20th century exponents to be a 'scientific religion' with the principle of karma being compared to Newton's laws of action and reaction. But I think that was fanciful. — Wayfarer

Okay, but I think Christian claims are also verifiable. I did not mean to speak only about Buddhism. I just know that you and Janus like to talk about it.

They will recognise the possibility of veridical religious experience, but insist that they are subjective and meaningful only to those who have them, and cannot be conveyed, nor form the basis of any real philosophy. Thereby vitiating the whole tradition of Buddhist philosophy, among others. — Wayfarer

Yes, that seems accurate, namely that @Janus has some bone to pick with truth-claims which flow out of religious experience. Perhaps he thinks that when someone makes a claim based on a religious experience, that claim is unverifiable? But he himself asserts that such claims are false. Is his assertion verifiable? If it is not, then it probably doesn’t count as a meaningful assertion. If it is, then the claim he is scrutinizing must also be verifiable (given that he is purporting to falsify it). So I don’t think claims based on religious experience are unverifiable, even though they are more difficult to substantively verify or falsify.

(As a further issue, @Janus might say that an individual can make unverifiable assertions, such as, “There is a teapot orbiting Jupiter.” I would object by saying that if someone does not have grounds for an assertion, then they are not making an assertion. They can form an unverifiable proposition, but they cannot assert it without grounds. The fundamental point of inquiry for any assertion are the (subjective) grounds upon which it stands, and this is why <falsifiability and the principle of sufficient reason> go hand in hand. ...Incidentally, the pluralists on TPF have a tendency to trade in faux assertions, namely by pretending to assert something that they do not in fact assert – an endless “what if?” game.)

Well, first, I just realized this is a different anti-vaccine female doctor who was convicted. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay.

Does the fact that some George Floyd protestors didn't come face to face with any rioting or police brutality mean it didn't happen, or that all rioters should be given pardons? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is that what is being claimed? The question here is, "Why was Gold charged with a 20-year evidence-tampering sentence?"

However, the original discussion here was the charge that all the prosecutions were unjust and thus that the wholesale pardons were just. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That looks like a straightforward strawman.

What's the idea here, that no crimes were committed that day? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe it's somewhere between these crazy extremes? It doesn't do much good to strawman the opposite extreme when Hochschild or Gold demonstrate that the initial extreme does not obtain. That's like saying, "Gold said not everyone (or every time) was violent, therefore she is claiming that no one (and no time) was violent!" This is a way of rhetorically propping up the thesis that is under fire.

I am saying that. Though I imagine it can appear that I am saying something different since I see the flavour of agency that institutions and ideologies have as principally inhuman. And at a push I'd commit to human agency being kind of inhuman at its root. That's by the by though. — fdrake

Hmm, okay...

Yes. I assumed you were using the obligation of X into obligation of parts of X inference in a prior post. I then attacked the inference as if it were yours. I am making no use of the inference in my arguments. The failure of the inference is part of what leaves me the room to say that some obligations require supererogations, with the requirement being a logical one. The issue is part of the OP, but me writing about it like I have is because I believed you were using the inference against the OP, and I was attacking the inference without using the principle it embodies. I care that supererogatory acts aren't obligatory, I don't want to collapse any supererogations into obligations. That our obligations can require us going above and beyond our obligations in some sense is one of my central theses. That particular sense being {achieving the spirit of our duties or bringing about the kind of world living our obligations aims to bring about or the intended outcome of following our duties to begin with}}. — fdrake

I'm still not getting a lot of traction on this stuff. I would say that if someone ignores the spirit of an obligation and clings to the letter of the obligation, then they are failing in their obligations. I don't think the spirit of an obligation can be a supererogation. It still feels like you are conflating obligation and supererogation.

The failure of the inference is part of what leaves me the room to say that some obligations require supererogations, with the requirement being a logical one. — fdrake

Can you say more explicitly what you mean by "the inference"? I tried to speak to the general issue with the paragraph beginning, "..."

The Count Timothy von Icarus leveraged this to form a counterargument of sorts, by inflating our obligations above and beyond my rather quotidian portrayal of them, our collective failures then become true "moral failings" of our duties, rather than some failure inherent in our moral conscience and the satisfaction of our duties to begin with. The latter is what I'm advocating. That we really do fulfil our duties, that they are quotidian in comparison to why we follow them, why we follow them casts a shadow on our conduct that renders our duties insufficient. Nevertheless we "do our bit", and it isn't enough. — fdrake

Creating a strong distinction between the letter and the spirit of an obligation feels much the same as creating a strong distinction between the duty and the reason for the duty. Just as I would say that merely fulfilling the letter is not fulfilling the obligation, so too I would say that performing a duty without understanding and involving the reason behind the duty is a failure in the duty. From what I can see, the "why" is not supererogatory.

The monstrosity that makes running food banks required to feed people despite massive food surpluses is one that those food banks volunteers' face, if they stop going above and beyond people go hungry. They're thus "expected" to in a manner that goes beyond their duties, and life presents them a threat in the form of a modus tollens impact, if you don't do this then that will not happen. Stop going to work for free and the poor starve. — fdrake

The concrete example is very much welcome.

Let's take a concrete example like this and do the following:

"If I do X, then Y occurs. Y cannot occur without X, and Y must occur."

Then we want to ask whether X is obligatory, supererogatory, arduous, heroic, unsustainable, etc. And whether Y is obligatory, supererogatory, necessary, etc.

If we were to take the food bank example then we would say that X = <produce food surplus or food waste> and Y = <people do not go hungry>. I won't hold you to that example, but we can use it if you want. I want to analyze a concrete example and see if the word "supererogatory" is being used accurately, and if not, what better words could be used.

Yes. Telling people that they must do more to do enough, when we already can't do enough, doesn't work. — fdrake

I'm glad we agree on this.

Answers to the problem aren't really about what to do, I think, they're about how to cope with our condition of being unable to do "enough". One way of dealing with that is to try to do enough. Or to try to bring about a state of things were people can do enough. — fdrake

Okay, but it seems like these fold right back into the problem of what to do.

I see an appeal to absurd as a metacognitive trap, it's how you think you think, but you only think that because you're not looking at how you think. It's also metaphysical stopgap, a refusal to inquire or do more. It's a refusal to be troubled by the troubling. — fdrake

Yes, I can definitely see that.

...extreme leftism, which I see as a secular form of faith. — fdrake

I agree, but I also think that more moderate issues have a tendency to become a secular proxy for religion, such as climate concerns, civil rights concerns, etc.

The people I'm aware of who are troubled by these problems are generally socialists or communists, and treat The Revolution in eschatological terms. It will be Kingdom come, but of our own making. The faith they have in a future end-state with no means of imagining how to bring it about. — fdrake

Right: nothing apart from bringing about the Revolution.

CS Lewis has excellent commentary on this in The Screwtape Letters. — fdrake

Yes, that was a highly appropriate quote from Lewis. It is a better way of illustrating my point above about . But I think it also goes back to the issue of . Lewis admires the man who does his work but then, "washes his mind of the whole subject, commits the issue to Heaven, and returns at once to the patience or gratitude demanded by the moment."

Elsewhere Lewis writes on the importance of putting first things first and second things second; and that idolatry occurs when second things are put first. This mixes in well with . An entailment of Przywara's project is that when the transcendent God is removed from the picture, everything falls out of proportion (and this is a bit like the way that the Sun orders the solar system). How, for example, is the secular to apply proportion and moderation to their concern for recycling? Is it at all strange that extreme leftism looks like fundamentalist religion? When we move away from the rural setting and into the ideational setting of the city-dweller, how are proportion and moderation to be brought to the issues that the extreme leftist champions? I'm not sure that the secular can ultimately contextualize issues at all, given the way that the "moral imagination" is so variable and malleable.

Notably Lewis sees our duties tomorrow as "acts of justice and charity", which are duties in the expanded sense... — fdrake

Charity is a duty for the Christian.
("That's not to say that what is obligatory for a Christian is the same as what is obligatory for a non-Christian" - .)

But the bar for good human conduct raises to a level that it becomes practically unattainable. — fdrake

For Lewis? Why?

And I do see us as referring to ourselves as good accurately, so what is good must be more quotidian than the world transforming eternal present of Lewis', or Count Timothy von Icarus's, moral hero. — fdrake

But it seems you are now back to the idea that good = attainable = insufficient = non-transformative. "We are all good even though we will ultimately fail to do what must be done."

I mean, people like to say they're good. They like to say that everyone does their duty. Especially in a democracy. Because then everyone can pat each other on the back and feel good about themselves, despite the fact that the ship is clearly going down. I admit it's all rather bewildering once you catch a glimpse of what is actually going on, but it really does seem to be going on.

The latter moral hero functioning as someone to aspire to, or as the regulative ideal of our moral imagination? I can agree with that. But then we circle the inherency of failure again, and of the impossibility to fulfil that ideal, despite being required to do so by the state of things. — fdrake

It must eventually be brought up that Screwtape is not equally concerned with Christians and non-Christians. If failure were inherent then Wormwood need not apply for the job, for the job is otiose. Failure is not inherent for Lewis. But Lewis would agree that if success is found by "pursuit of the rainbow's end," then failure is inherent. That is Screwtape's goal. Does Screwtape need to tempt the secular at all? Should he be concerned that the secular (social justice warrior) might not pursue the rainbow's end?

(Edit: The eschatological issue is definitely interesting. I had intended to speak to it more directly than I did... Time is not on my side, as I am trying to fit in a number of threads before I have to take off this evening...)

It's like how people within art or literary or musical movements intersubjectively validate their mutual aesthetic judgements. It only works if you're already converted, so to speak. There can be definitive intersubjective validation of the kind that would convince the unbiased. — Janus

Does that bolded sentence contain a typo?

If a Buddhist says that her claims are verifiable, and the skeptic remarks that they are not verifiable with a microscope, the Buddhist would reasonably respond, "I was not claiming that they are verifiable with a microscope. You are talking past me." If we correctly situate the claim then it seems to me that this problem of "objectivity" never arises. If the Buddhist says that her claims are verifiable with a microscope, then it would be appropriate to oppose the idea that her claims are verifiable with a microscope. If she isn't saying that, then it isn't appropriate.

For example, do you think the Buddhist claim that Gautama was supremely enlightened can be verified? — Janus

I think someone could achieve the same level of proficiency as Gautama, and at that point they would be positioned to vet such a claim. A person in that position would be capable of verifying or falsifying such a claim. The same thing could be done to a lesser extent by someone who has not achieved that state, but has learned to recognize proficiency or hierarchy in that realm. These are all forms of verification, are they not?

And the same applies to other domains of discourse, which may exist in various cultural forms, and within which what is nowadays called ‘inter-subjective validation’ might be available, even if not conforming to the standards of modern empirical science. — Wayfarer

Right, which is to say that something can be verifiable even if it is not verifiable according to some particular metric. For example, a Buddhist claim can be verified, but not with a microscope.

Scientism is the idea that the only meaningful forms of verification are those of the (hard) sciences, and it is widely recognized to be not only wrong, but incoherent. I think we agree on this. I'm not sure where @Janus fits into this.

Because she's lying lol. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What is she lying about? Quote her lie.

Yes, people lie about events they are at in person all the time, and they edit video to support their lies. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So the surveillance video that was shown was just edited? That's your solution?

What is missing in this discussion is the basic skill of identifying the assertions of others. You and Wayfarer want to say that someone is lying, but you won't quote that person or put any effort into demonstrating what was asserted. Wayfarer explicitly refuses to even watch the video, despite maintaining his claim of lying. It's pretty important to be able to identify and present the claims of others on a philosophy forum, so the fact that we've resorting to accusations of lying without any effort in identifying claims is a remarkably big problem.

- Short on time, but I would say that if either of you think it makes sense to have special abilities or special knowledge which is unverifiable, then you should try to spell that out and give examples. For the reasons already set out, I think you're wielding a contradiction. There can only be unverifiable abilities or knowledge if the bearer is irretrievably separated from all other subjects.

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Apparently 's knowledge of historical Christianity is as superficial as his knowledge of historical philosophy. This looks like the same trite political ideology pretending to reprimand Christianity.

- The Search Algorithm knowest thee better than thou knowest thyself. It knowest thy needs even before ye asketh. :razz:

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- I have not, but thanks for the reference. :up:

"The situation is hopeless, we must take the next step." — Tom Storm

Yes, that's basically it. And I think you end up with a critique similar to Chesterton's critique of the slogan, "You just have to grin and bear it."

Can you say some more about this? — Tom Storm

It could go in a lot of directions, which is why I left it vague. The two basic options seem to be either hope or desperation, and they lead down very different roads. The darker road justifies the unjustifiable on account of being "in extremis." Making supererogation obligatory seems like a minor case of that.

A Christian writer like Tolkien incorporates "eucatastrophe." For example, in The Hobbit during the battle of the five armies the hopeless situation is spun on its head with the unanticipated arrival of the Eagles (the servants of Manwe). That is an example of a characteristically Christian hope or possibility. You fight with no understanding of how you could win, and yet with the knowledge that the unexpected is possible. And you do not act out of a rationalizing desperation.

Faith in God requires belief without reason-based thought. — DifferentiatingEgg

Rubbish.

If someone could make, not just one or two accurate predictions, but could consistently make accurate predictions that were not based on observation and calculation, then we might assume they had some hidden way of knowing what will happen. I know of no such case, so it is just speculation, unless you can present a well-documented case. — Janus

I've pointed to the psychics that the FBI uses any number of times now.

The claims they make are not testable predictions — Janus

Sure they are. I've already shown that. You just keep asserting the contrary. Again:

If someone claims to have special knowledge, and that knowledge is in no way confirmable by any other person, then their knowledge cannot be confirmed. But that case seems like it would be quite rare. — Leontiskos

Imagine yourself in the ancient world with your thesis, "Okay, so you can reliably predict eclipses, and no one else can do this. But that doesn't mean you have special knowledge of nature." Of course it does! You are drawing up some fiction where someone is supposed to have a special ability which is in no way verifiable. What is an example of that? As far as I can tell, if a putative ability is in no way verifiable, then it isn't an ability at all. It certainly isn't an ability to do anything.

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I think that is the domain that you're referring to, as defining the entire scope of knowledge, and anything beyond that being 'speculative'. But it goes on [to procedural, perspectival, and participatory knowledge]... — Wayfarer

I think this is sort of the mirror error of @Janus'. These other forms of knowledge are not unverifiable or unconfirmable. If someone says that they have a special form of knowledge but there is no way for anyone else to confirm that they have a special form of knowledge, then they are probably flubbing. This applies to all knowledge, including procedural et al.

So perhaps you have consistently proposed forms of knowledge that are unverifiable, and Janus has been led to believe that such a thing makes sense. Or rather, in reaction to this sort of claim Janus goes to the other extreme and claims that anyone who claims to have special knowledge or special abilities can by definition provide no way for others to verify those abilities.

This is entirely wrong, and counterexamples abound. To take a single example, why does God give Moses the ability to turn his hand leprous and turn his walking staff into a snake? Because Moses knows that no one will believe that he has been sent by God if he can provide no evidence for that claim. These abilities are a direct response to Moses' claim:

Then Moses answered, “But behold, they will not believe me or listen to my voice, for they will say, ‘The LORD did not appear to you.’ ” — Exodus 4:1, RSV

Our culture is really, really averse to signs, and there are all sorts of complicated reasons for that. But the basic logic nevertheless holds: abilities produce acts (or as Aristotle says, the power is known through the act). To claim an ability without any accompanying act is to admit that there is no ability. To claim knowledge without being able to demonstrate the proper effect of that knowledge is to admit that there is no knowledge.

They're stuck in my head as Christian hippies. But an attempt to live by a moral code, like they do, makes me respect them more than I would a hippie stereotype. — fdrake

Yes, I agree. :grin:

I see that. I enjoyed her willingness to dive into the questions and sustain her belief despite the pain of aporias. From what I gathered she and hers were quite fond of Kierkegaard. The students that the Fransiscan group drew in had Christian flavoured Wittgenstein epistemology too {make everything difficult a hinge proposition}. Lots of existentialist stuff in there. — fdrake

That’s fine, but I see it as secondary. Either God aligns with the world as it now exists or he doesn’t. If someone thinks that God aligns with the world as it now exists (and the world has not fallen away from God in any real way), then they effectively believe in a different God than the orthodox Christian. To try to solve that discrepancy with existentialism looks to be a band-aid on a mortal wound. In fact the same basic issue underlies different forms of existentialism. By my lights to be reading Kierkegaard is to already be reading someone who presupposes a fallen condition.

Involvement is quite a different concept from direct cause though right? — fdrake

Sure, and many realities represent a confluence of agents, such as law.

I think I've embraced "both" in my prior posts. — fdrake

If you’re only saying that some forms of agency are diffuse and collective, then I have no problem with that. The OP struck me as going farther than that, and claiming that there is monstrosity apart from the acts/creations/effects of agents.

And again, although it’s not something I tend to broach on TPF, I believe in angelic and demonic powers, and therefore there is room in my thought for very broad and diffuse forms of agency. Indeed, the reason an OP like this is somewhat intuitive is because those broad and diffuse forms of agency are intuitive. But I don’t think the claims will make much sense apart from that religious context. Prima facie, there are “monstrosities” that are not due to human agency. But I think it’s a dead end to hold this while eschewing non-human agents. Prometheus has no one to rail against if there is no Zeus, in which case there simply is no catharsis in identifying a supposed “monstrosity.”

I don't think this works. The reason being that there are loads of substitutable acts for the bacterial wipes. — fdrake

I’d say you’re missing 1c, which is an explicit conjunct in the antecedent. All you’re saying is that if 1c is not present then 2 does not follow, and my reasoning explicitly agrees with this.

One is not. My point was broader. I've got in mind something like the following:

1 ) People ought recycle.
2 ) Recycling is done to reduce climate impact.
3 ) Recycling isn't sufficient to reduce climate impact meaningfully.
4 ) Reducing climate impact meaningfully requires supererogatory acts, like high commitment activism. — fdrake

There is an equivocal term between (2) and (3), and once that is removed your (contradictory) supererogatory obligation dissolves. Namely, you added the word “meaningfully” in (3). Remove the equivocation by adding that adverb to (2) or removing it from (3) and the contradiction dissolves.

The thing regarding parts is to block a modification of the above. One could reason as follows. People ought recycle, this derives from the obligation to reduce climate impact, reducing climate impact requires activism, therefore activism is obligate, what is obligate is not supererogatory, therefore activism isn't supererogatory. The parthood thing blocks going from "reducing climate impact requires actvism" to "activism is obligate". — fdrake

I don’t see how the parts are going to help you get to the conclusion that supererogation is obligatory (or required). Suppose there is an obligatory end and multiple independently sufficient means to that end. Obligation then applies to the means qua end. One is not obliged to utilize any given means, but one is obliged to utilize some means or combination of means that is sufficient to achieve the obligatory end.

Your conclusion (4) is simply invalid. If we fixed the equivocation by adding “meaningfully” to (2), then what follows is not (4), but rather the conclusion that recycling is insufficient to fulfill the obligatory end associated with (1). Ergo: we are obliged to do more than recycle (or we ought to do more than recycle).

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My attitude toward us and our duties is that, by and large, we fulfil our duties. And I think to @Count Timothy von Icarus' point, our duties as we tend to circumscribe them are our duties. I think that most people are decent and have a good moral conscience, and follow most of their duties. Most people don't steal, cheat, harm others needlessly. Most people keep their promises and do their best to honour duties of care. I want to insist that by and large those duties are fulfilled. I just also want to insist that the broader purpose of those duties - their spirit, what they're done for, the kind of world following them is supposed to engender - is not fulfilled without going above and beyond them. That here is an inherent failure in the aggregate of just doing one's duties, that kind of conduct alone cannot bring about the world those duties are imagined to play a part in. — fdrake

I think you’re contradicting yourself. If the obligatory end is not fulfilled by the duties we are fulfilling, then we are not fulfilling all our duties. We are not fulfilling our duties. Is the daughter’s duty to remove the stains or merely to wash the clothes? You’re basically saying, “She fulfilled all her duties by washing the clothes, even though the clothes are still stained.” If her duty was to wash the clothes but her duty did not extend to getting the clothes clean, then what you say makes sense. But it doesn’t make sense to construe her duty that way.

But I think that supposed is holding ourselves to our better natures, principally in our imagination. We make ourselves aim for something better, even if we always fail in doing so. And that's good. — fdrake

I agree: “If you don’t do more than you believe to be necessary, then you will not succeed.” This strikes me as a matter of correcting a mistaken level of effort, not a matter of supererogation. In fact if someone exerts a level of effort that is insufficient to achieve their goals or duties, then they are being negligent and are failing to act in such a way to achieve their goals or fulfill their duties.

That to go above and beyond is, indeed, not expected on the basis of duty. And it cannot be, as to insist to go above duty is duty is a contradiction in terms. — fdrake

Indeed, and when we add to this the idea that we are obliged to undertake means which fulfill our obligatory ends, your notion that the truly sufficient means are supererogatory is undone.

That failure, our perpetual inability to act in accordance with our better natures, and our ranging ability to absolve ourselves of responsibility for this, far from being an awfulness which can be excised from humanity is our essential condition. — fdrake

I think the fact that we fail to fulfill our means-obligations proves that either we are fallen or else our notions of morality and duty are fundamentally confused. To my mind this essentially proves our need for salvation.

But let’s suppose that unregenerate man fails to fulfill his means-obligations. What then? Will telling him that he must do the supererogatory fix the situation? I don’t see how it would. If he isn’t fulfilling his means-obligations it’s not clear why he would fulfill his means-supererogations.

I would say that for the non-religious, or for those who believe that this state is our inevitable and perpetual condition, the only option is some form of resignation (to failure). To reuse the recycling analogy, this would be resigning oneself to fail to correct climate impact. You can still recycle, but only with the knowledge that you will not succeed—with the knowledge that you are only delaying the inevitable. And one can play Camus all they like, but that burns out fast enough.

At the end of the day we must ask for help. We know we can’t do it on our own. The crucial question then becomes: where to turn for help? There are many options.