Irrespective of what your anticipated answer will be, I again deem the choosing of the least bad to be a good in an of itself, rather than a bad in and of itself. — javra

Then you are directly denying #3.

Is it a bad to choose - or else to intend the manifestation of - the lease bad from all alternatives that are available to oneself at the juncture of the given choice? — javra

It is impermissible to choose harm on such a basis given the three stipulations. (1) and (2) form an exhaustive division: ends and means. According to (3) harm is bad, according to (1) what is bad cannot be done for its own sake, and according to (2) what is bad cannot be done for the sake of something else. The three stipulations logically entail pacifism. There is no way around this given that every act is either a means or an end. It is contradictory to accept the three stipulations without being committed to pacifism, and therefore you are contradicting yourself.

Edit: Here is a more formal version, which may help you see your contradiction:

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is X.
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something that is X—even for the sake of something good.
3. Harming someone is X.
4. Therefore, pacifism is true.

(2 is strictly speaking superfluous, but I think Bob was going for the exhaustive division noted above.)

It’s true that this doesn’t moot the ontological question, but it’s a special and severe restriction on what we can say about existence. It’s also a precise description of the order in which Fregeans have to proceed: quantification first. — J

I don't think this is correct at all. Here is Frege:

Here I would retort: If “Sachse exists” should mean “The term ‘Sachse’ is not an empty sound but it stands for something”, then it is correct to say that the condition that “Sachse exists” must be satisfied. This, however, is no new premise, but a self-evident presupposition of all our words. The rules of logic always presuppose that the words used are not empty, that the sentences express judgements, that we are not playing with mere words. Given that “Sachse is a man” is an actual judgement, the word “Sachse” has to stand for something; in which case I do not need any further premise to infer “There are men” from that. The premise “Sachse exists” is superfluous, as long as it means nothing over and above that self-evident presupposition of all our thought. Or can you produce an example where a sentence of the form “A is B” is meaningful and true, A being a name of an individual, and yet “There are B’s” is false?[4]

[4] [...] Gottlob Frege, “Dialog mit Pünjer über Existenz” (between 1879 and 1884), in Schriften zur Logik und Sprachphilosophie: Aus dem Nachlass (Meiner Verlag 2001), 99, p. 11–12. [...] — Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 157-8

If we attribute any content to the verb “to be”, to the effect that the sentence “A is” is neither superfluous nor self-evident, we shall have to concede that the negation of “A is” is, under certain circumstances, possible, viz. that there are subjects to which being must be denied. Then, however, the notion of “being” generally won’t be suited to be used as an interpretation of the meaning of “there is” any more, according to which “there are B’s” would be equivalent to “some being falls under the concept of B”. For if we applied this interpretation to the sentence “There are subjects to which being must be denied”, we would obtain the sentence “Some being falls under the concept of non-being”, or “Some being is not”. This is unavoidable, as soon as one ascribes any content whatsoever to the concept of being. If the interpretation that “there are B’s” means the same as “some being is B” is to be correct, then it is simply necessary that “being” be understood as conveying something completely self-evident.[5]

[5] [...] ibid., 20-21 — Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 159

Given this evidence it would seem that it is incorrect to claim that for Frege quantification is wider than existence. I think the sources from your thread on QV attest to this same fact.

I have been snipping the second sentence of that title, "Can we speak about that which is not? Actualism and Possibilism in Analytic Philosophy and Scholasticism." The general critique of Frege seems closely related to the Actualism and Possibilism debates.

-

Newtonian physics is still a powerful tool, despite getting the big picture all wrong. — J

As I said in the first sentence of that post, "I think it is a useful tool." By "tool" Srap is apparently implying a strong sort of ontological pluralism, as he favored in your earlier thread. You are welcome to press him on it, or on the question of better and worse logical tools.

If Frege’s system is insufficient in its basic understanding of how propositions work, how they must be understood within logic, then while it may remain a powerful tool, it’s defective in explanatory power at the metalogical level. — J

Yes, well put.

I’m suggesting we think of force as something that can be displayed without assertion. And having said that, the question is whether this is just playing with words – whether the nuance I’m proposing really clarifies anything, or would change how we think about logic. To that question I would say, “Kimhi thinks it does, but I’m not clear on it yet.” — J

This is what I suspected, and said, "...But is there any formal logic that will really be able to dodge this bullet and provide the same cornucopia of locutionary flavors that natural language possesses?" ().

There are systems of logic that set about mapping other forms of force, such as belief, but it doesn't strike me as a great approach to lay the charge at Frege's feet that he hasn't sufficiently accounted for non-assertoric forms of locution. This is where I think Srap's critiques are helpful, for they demand more precision as to the actual conclusion being argued for.

Both@Leontiskos and Fdrake have concerns about the “I” of assertion. This is very important, in my opinion. — J

It strikes me as a simple question of intent. One asserts something if and only if they intend to, and I don't think any material sign contains within itself any variety of illocutionary intent. For example, "The grass is green" can be placed in that modus ponens premise, and thus stripped of its assertoric force. Now it does have a kind of prima facie assertoric force, which must be stripped or prescinded from if we want to avoid it. Is that the same as being intrinsic?

I think the answer is no. — J

I don't think you understand what I am saying. "I" refers to the person speaking the sentence, and this person is not fdrake. The oddity is that @fdrake seems to think that there was no asserter prior to the one who was "conjured" by the "I", but I recognize that he is not trying to give an answer to the paradox.

I have seen analytics fall into this trap of thinking that sentences can float in the ether without any speaker, even a logically remote one. In that sense I would agree with the OP that all sentences have a kind of force, but I would call it an intentional force rather than an assertoric force. — Leontiskos

Does, "It is raining," have assertoric force, and if so, who is the asserter? There is a sense in which it has a kind of meta-assertoric force insofar as we are forced to imagine at least an implicit speaker. But my use of the quotation marks indicates that I am holding it aloof rather than asserting it myself. I don't suppose this is all Kimhi is saying?

For starters, I don't see how you can claim to accept all three stipulations and then argue for harm consequentialism. The stipulations logically entail the conclusion that harm cannot be done. You say you accept all three stipulations but then go on to say that harm can be done. It seems that if you want to hold to harm consequentialism then you will at least need to reject #2, no?

I'm not sure how damning it is to describe something as merely useful, but you've got a hobby horse to ride and I'll not stop you. — Srap Tasmaner

No one said it was damning. Is mine the hobby horse, here? If you are averse to the topic of a thread, why post in it? After all, if you are ultimately just going to say, "None of this matters at all, and 'logic' is nothing more than a word," then it would seem that you are averse to the topic.

- I think it is a useful tool, but Frege thought it was more than that and it seems he was wrong. When one sees that Frege's system is insufficient it at the very least must be demoted to the level of a "tool." Whether @J is arguing for more than this, I do not know.

I don't think "logic in its entirety" is a thing. — Srap Tasmaner

Do you think logic is a thing?

In short, when the only available alternatives to one are all of differing degrees of wrongness, or of badness, then it is virtuous (and hence good) to choose that alternative which is the least wrong, or bad, among the available alternatives. This in contrast to choosing an alternative which is more or else most wrong, hence bad.

Choosing not to choose between the alternatives in this situation would also be, by my reckoning, a non-virtuous act - for, in so choosing not to choose, one then of one's own accord allows for the possibility of the more or else worst wrong to be actualized. — javra

This is pretty stark consequentialism, is it not? Especially your final sentence?

It looked to me like the argument form here was something like this:

A: Fs are not Gs.
B: But in a way they are.

That's a disagreement, I guess, but I wouldn't call it an argument. And yes maybe it's a disagreement over presuppositions, but what's the argument for dropping the presupposition? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that's fair. :up:

If we find that there are multiple frameworks for analyzing the symbol systems of humans and their utterances, and each is useful for particular purposes, we might consider the possibility that the speakers of a language also have at their disposal multiple frameworks for thinking about the utterances of their fellows. The distinction between between force and logical form might not be a fact, so much as a strategy, something people do because for some purposes it's very useful to do so. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think it is a question of whether there are non-logical forms of discourse. That can be granted. The question is whether Frege's system is a flawed logical form of discourse.

Kimhi defines philosophical logic as, "the idea of a study that achieves a mutual illumination of thinking and what is: an illumination through a clarification of human discursive activity in which truth (reality, aletheia) is at stake" (1).

So logic is not indirect discourse, and indirect discourse would not function as a counterexample to Frege's system. It may be otherwise for Quine, but for Frege the ontological question is not moot, and Frege did not consider his system to be a strategic, pragmatic deployment. Specifically, the system was meant to capture logic in its entirety. You are saying that it does not capture all of human symbolic activity. Would you also say that it does not capture all of logic?

The odd part of it seems to be "I" conjures an asserter. Which isn't the person who writes the sentence (me), it's the person in the sentence. — fdrake

"I" always refers to the person speaking the sentence, does it not? These are two different claims:

• It is raining and I don't believe it is raining.
• It is raining outside, and he says, "I don't believe it is raining."

I have seen analytics fall into this trap of thinking that sentences can float in the ether without any speaker, even a logically remote one. In that sense I would agree with the OP that all sentences have a kind of force, but I would call it an intentional force rather than an assertoric force.

The Fregean picture is more like “p would or could be an assertion under the right illocutionary circumstances (thanks, Banno), but unless it’s actually being asserted, p has nothing in the way of force.” That’s what I’m challenging. — J

The simple argument from Geach in Kimhi's book is that p has assertoric force in (2) but not in (1):

1. p → q
2. p
3. ∴ q

What you seem to be saying is that if we let p = "The grass is green", then it will have assertoric force in (1). Is that really true?

The force of a locution is context-dependent, but doesn't formal logic always need to nail down and simplify this context-dependency? If the argument of the OP is that natural language is a more powerful or complete logical tool than formal logic, then I would agree. But is there any formal logic that will really be able to dodge this bullet and provide the same cornucopia of locutionary flavors that natural language possesses?

Curious to know if K's interpretation [of Aristotle] is mainstream or outlier/revisionist. — J

The difficulty, which also strikes me as a red flag, is that Kimhi provides no bibliography. Therefore it probably goes without saying that he has no clear sources to corroborate his interpretations of Aristotle. I don't see much Aristotelian scholarship being appealed to.

And a weakness is that Kimhi completely ignores the Medieval period. One cannot oppose Frege without an alternative, and the most basic Aristotelian alternative to Frege is the Medieval development of Aristotle. Kimhi may be committing the faux pas of providing a critique without any alternative.

‛The grass is green’ is not neutral as to force — J

The closest Frege's system can get to modeling something like this is to say, "There exists something which is both grass and green." Fregian logic has an especially hard time with individuals since it is built for concepts or classes. Given that the statement is not Fregian in the first place, it raises a whole host of issues.

But for now, what do you all think? Have I succeeded in raising a genuine challenge to Frege, or does the Fregean have an obvious counter-argument? — J

All the objections to Frege's logic that I have seen are metalogical objections, and yours is no exception. says that there is no (counter)-argument being offered, and this is true at least insofar as there is no counter-argument which adopts Fregian presuppositions. What is being questioned is the presupposition.

So how does one offer an argument against logical presuppositions? The most obvious way is to argue that the presupposition fails to capture some real aspect of natural logic or natural language, and by claiming that natural propositions possess a variety of assertoric force that Frege's logic lacks, this is what you are doing. Yet this is where a point like Novák's becomes so important, for logicians like Russell, Frege, Quine, et al., presuppose that natural language is flawed and must be corrected by logic. This moots your point. Further, Quine will set the stage for a "pragmaticizing" of logic, which destroys the idea of ontologically superior logics at its root:

In Quine’s hands, however, the principle takes on a purely descriptive meaning, stating merely what kind of entities a given theory presupposes to exist – namely those that can figure as values of bound variables in that theory. In other words, the Principle features in Quine as his famous criterion of “ontological commitment”, which, since language has been purged of all directly referring expressions, lacks any a priori connexion to reality and becomes rather a matter of pragmatic choice. — Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 166-7

It is a question of what you're up against.

And that’s what Kimhi’s book is about. — J

Kimhi's approach strikes me as a attempt to kill Frege by a kind of "death by a thousand cuts." Whether or not this works, it will not be convincing to entrenched Fregians, as it requires a willingness to abandon Fregian presuppositions for the sake of argument. Beyond that, with each small cut Fregians will presumably respond, "It's such a minor issue - who really cares?" It seems to me that your Sider paper—which never in fact received a hearing within your earlier thread—was much more "punchy" and effective as directed against Fregians. Kimhi's book seems to be directed towards those who are predisposed to question the sovereignty of Fregianism, rather than committed Fregians themselves.

And finally, this argument about assertoric force is an argument where I can see both sides, and I don't know that the clarity and merits of the OP are sufficient to overcome the weight and presuppositions of the opposing side. For example, on the one hand we have some obscure gesturing towards real problems or at least wrinkles with the Fregian presupposition. What do we have in favor of the Fregian presupposition? Something like this, which is both clear and strong: <The first and second premises of a modus ponens both display p, but with entirely different assertoric force. Therefore assertoric force is not intrinsic to p>. That's a strong argument, and from my skim of Kimhi and the ND review I did not understand Kimhi to be questioning this distinction between sense and assertoric force tout court.* To question the distinction tout court would require a very clear and very strong argument. The ultimate nub here is always going to be, "Well if you aren't questioning the distinction tout court, then in precisely what way are you questioning it?" Does Kimhi have a clear answer?


* In fact all logic seems to require a distinction between sense and assertoric force, and therefore if the conclusion of your argument is that these cannot in any way be separated then logic itself would appear to be doomed. The subtlety of Kimhi's argumentation results in a subtle conclusion. There is the danger here of throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

These are not statements that apply to angles or even Zeus. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up:

Paul literally has the Son creating the spiritual powers here in Colossians 1, namely the other "divinities" that some in this thread are identifying with Jesus.

Can you provide some examples of that? — Paine

The basis is referred to as the Hellenization Thesis, often traced to Adolf von Harnack, but it also has earlier antecedents in many anti-philosophical approaches to Christianity. You could think of three camps: Christianity was strongly Hellenized, and it was bad; Christianity was strongly Hellenized, and it was good; Christianity was not strongly Hellenized.

I’m looking for some source help. I know that the parallel between ‛X exists/doesn’t exist’ and ‛p is true/false’ is a familiar one, but I can’t find a focused discussion of it in the literature — J

I originally skimmed the works of Gyula Klima when I saw your thread, but I did not see anything related in a precise way. Yesterday I picked through some of the volumes of a journal he co-edits, "Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics." I found an article that is remarkably on-topic in volume 12. It is Lukáš Novák's piece, "Can We Speak About That Which Is Not? Actualism and Possibilism in Analytic Philosophy and Scholasticism." Unfortunately after volume 10 they stopped making the pdfs available online, but it looks like you may be able to get a copy of volume 12 here.

Instead of asking about predications of truth and being, which is a bit general, the article looks at the question of whether we can speak about that which is not. Novák looks at Frege, Russell, Meinong, Quine, Strawson, and then a number of scholastics, particularly Henry of Ghent, Francis of Meyronnes, and John Duns Scotus.

One of the interesting points that Novák makes is that there is a characteristic divide between the scholastics and the analytics with respect to natural language:

In scholasticism the matters are rather more complicated. Generally speaking, the scholastics lacked the Russellian revisionist attitude towards natural language, and therefore they rarely explicitly challenged the obvious capacity of the natural language to refer to non-existents. Their approach was, generally, to explain and analyse, not to correct language – and so the standard scholastic theory of supposition (the mediæval counterpart of reference) naturally allows (via devices like ampliation etc.) for reference to non-existents.[18] — Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 168-9

Kimhi's reliance on Wittgenstein is curious insofar as Wittgenstein has one leg in both camps, although both legs seem to be underdeveloped.

-

Volume 5 is also on topic, although less so. It deals with the question of direct and indirect realism as applied to Aristotelian Medievals such as Avicenna, Averroes, and Aquinas. Aquinas ends up with a doctrine where Kimhi's both-and holds, namely reality is present to the intellect in itself and yet representational/propositional moves are not thereby excluded. This volume is available from Klima's faculty page: "Universal representation, and the Ontology of Individuation."

So much for ignoring me. — Fooloso4

I'm sure the referee will award you a point for eliciting a reply to your trolling.

- That was a devious splicing of many different contexts and conversations, which still didn't get you very far. At this point you've lowered yourself to the level of a dishonest troll. Those who thought you were otherwise should take note.

You are not following what I've said. My point is only that perception is a mental construct. — Hanover

I would say that you are not following what you are doing, for your <post> in question is obviously not primarily about the thesis that perception is a mental construct. Instead of standing by your interpretation of Banno's claim and answering for it you've retreated back into your motte. I don't intend to keep chasing you back and forth.

What Kimhi adds to this, in a manner I'm still grappling with, is the unity part: the claim that "the assertion 'p is true' is the same as 'I truly think p'." — J

I think Kimhi has some good insights, but in things like this I wonder if he is pushing his point too far.

The problem is that Frag. B2 of Parmenides' poem presupposes that truth and falsity are asymmetrical, and I think this is correct. In the early pages of his book Kimhi takes for granted that they are symmetrical, and this creates problems. He assumes that in speaking of truth one can equally well speak of falsehood. For example, we can say that there is no gap between a reality and an assertion of that reality, but it does not follow that there is no gap involved in an assertion of falsehood. The proper object of an assertion of falsehood is always a proposition or representation, whereas the proper object of an assertion of truth can be reality itself.

Later in the book Kimhi seems to get a lot clearer on this asymmetricity, but at least at the beginning it looks a bit confused to me.

I have always found it interesting to read Genesis 3 in light of that aspect of Parmenides' poem, because the serpent introduces (partial) falsehood into creation for the first time, and this places Eve on a "path entirely unable to be [traveled]" (2). In Augustinian language we would say that falsehood is a privation of truth, and presupposes it in a way that truth does not presuppose falsehood. There was truth in creation before the serpent spoke, and falsehood (and doubt!) only emerged by and through his speaking.

In Judaism the messiah is not God. — BitconnectCarlos

That's right, and therefore claiming to be the messiah is not blasphemy.

- Good points. :up:

To break the Law is not limited to infractions. — Fooloso4

Absolutely not! — Fooloso4

I doesn't need to be. When you claim that breaking the Law is blasphemy, that means that all breakings of the Law are blasphemy. If one can break the Law without blaspheming then your claim that breaking the Law is blasphemy is false. The fact that you still can't admit this basic logic just shows what a hot mess you are. Speaking with such an unserious person is an utter waste of my time, and this is also on par with the intellectually dishonest way you discuss other topics. You are now on my ignore list.

Point being, from what are likely the very earliest Christian sources Christ is seen as divine. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, but Fooloso will argue against all of these sources and Tim Wood has literally claimed that the Christians of the Council of Nicea did not even affirm that God exists. I don't see that any amount of evidence is going to overcome this level of post hoc rationalization.

I thought that that 'issue' had been long since resolved. — creativesoul

I think the reason Michael's threads never get fully resolved is because Michael refuses the transparency that is a prerequisite for such resolution. In this thread the refusal was in place from the start: instead of making arguments for his position he would only ultimately make arguments from authority from "the science." He was never willing to try to explain how his conclusions followed from "the science." If you don't set out your argument you cannot be critiqued, and if you cannot be critiqued then you can never be wrong.

Fair interpretation — Hanover

Okay, well I have no idea how (2) is supposed to follow from (1).

Why would I demand that language not be a factor in how we interpret the world? — Hanover

No one has said you would. The question is why you think (2) follows from (1).

As to Banno's statement, you fully ignored the heart of it, "Things in the world [...] also have a say in what colours we see."

At this point it seems like you are trying to continue agreeing with Michael despite not agreeing with him on much of anything.

- Is this your argument?

1. The people around us have a say in what colors we see.
2. Therefore, language is necessary for perception.
3. Therefore, babies do not see, color or otherwise.

If that is not the reasoning that takes you from Banno's statement to your inference, then what is the reasoning that takes you from Banno's statement to your inference?

This past 30 minutes of conversation arose from this comment of Banno's:

'Things in the word, and the people around us, also have a say in what colours we see." — Hanover

Yes, and I gave my interpretation of Banno's statement here, which included a critique of your interpretation:

This seems like the same equivocation between determination and influence that Banno pointed out to begin the exchange.

The claim seems to be that things in the world influence what we see, and our linguistic community influences the names of what we see and the aspects we pay attention to. It does not follow from this that babies do not see. — Leontiskos

You responded with a question. Would it help if I added that it neither follows from this that babies do not see color?

How do you get from Banno's statement to your inference that, "babies can't see, color or otherwise"? What is your reasoning?

You indicated language was a necessary element in the formulation of a perception — Hanover

Where did I indicate that? This thread has been running on poor reasoning for dozens of pages, so I think it's time to address the reasoning itself. Where did I say or imply that language is a necessary element for perception? Where is your reasoning coming from?

so I asked why my example was inapplicable — Hanover

Where do you believe you did that?

The question here is how you interpreted Banno's claim in order to impute to Banno the conclusion that, "babies can't see, color or otherwise." What sort of strawman is intervening to produce such an incredible conclusion? If it doesn't follow from what Banno said, then what is happening, here?

- And should I answer your question with a different question?

You made an argument, I pointed out why it was a bad argument, and then instead of responding you asked a question. Was your argument a good argument or a bad argument? Does your conclusion follow?

- Ok. Whatever you say, Hanover.

I assume babies can't see color because "Things in the word, and the people around us, also have a say in what colours we see." Since babies don't know words and words determine what we see, babies can't see, color or otherwise. — Hanover

This seems like the same equivocation between determination and influence that Banno pointed out to begin the exchange.

The claim seems to be that things in the world influence what we see, and our linguistic community influences the names of what we see and the aspects we pay attention to. It does not follow from this that babies do not see.

Would it help if we noticed that Wittgenstein is acknowledging uses of "know" that he subsequently argues are illegitimate? — Banno

Sure I can see that, but I am wondering if he would be able to provide a legitimate use of "know."

No. It is a prompt towards seeking justification - "Can't you see it?. Look closer". — Banno

But as I understand it looking closer could never provide Wittgenstein with justification for knowledge, and thus it is odd to say that "looking closer" will somehow yield justification.

Wittgenstein takes it as read that knowing requires justification, and hence were there is no proposition to supply the justification, one cannot be properly said to know. — Banno

The oddity is that the ultimate justification for empirical knowledge is usually thought to be sense data, and so for Wittgenstein to say that sense data does not count as a justification seems to commit him to the view that knowledge of this kind does not exist at all. If nothing is self-justifying then how can anything be justified?

The question of foundationalism is here the elephant in the room, is it not? With Sam, I don't see how it can be avoided. Does Wittgenstein believe that knowledge exists at all? And if so, what would be an example of knowledge and its attendant justification?

I have given textual evidence that speaking against the Law is regarded by the accusers as blasphemy. — Fooloso4

You said this:

To break the Law is blasphemy. — Fooloso4

I asked you to defend it and you gave a non sequitur argument. Now you are finally admitting, albeit quietly, that you were wrong:

It is not simply a matter of breaking the Law, as it every offense however minor would be a blasphemous offense. What is at issue destroying or abolishing the Law. — Fooloso4

So we agree: your earlier claim that breaking the Law is blasphemy is false.

Again, you make my point. A son of man is a human being. — Fooloso4

What is your conclusion here supposed to be? That Jesus is claiming that anyone who is human can forgive sins? Do you even believe yourself when you make these sorts of points, like Aristotle's boxer who swings without knowing what he is doing? Can you see anything at all through the foggy polemicism of your glasses?

It requires no discernment to understand that what is being spoken of is not a mere human being:

and behold, with the clouds of heaven
there came one like a son of man,
and he came to the Ancient of Days
and was presented before him.
And to him was given dominion
and glory and kingdom,
that all peoples, nations, and languages
should serve him;
his dominion is an everlasting dominion,
which shall not pass away,
and his kingdom one
that shall not be destroyed. — Daniel 7, RSV

If you like:

'One like a human being' receives the kingdom from the 'Ancient One'. Is this second figure a symbol of the nation that will exercise the dominion (the Jewish people), depicted as a human rather than an animal? Or is he a divine figure (such figures represented as in human form, Dan 8:15; 10:5)? If so, is he Michael, who 'stands' for the Jews in 12:1? — The Oxford Bible Commentary, Daniel

Acts, as quoted and referenced, says that Stephen spoke blasphemous words against Moses and against God. To speak blasphemous words against Moses means to speak against the Laws of Moses. — Fooloso4

Here is your argument:

• Speaking against the Law is blasphemy.
• Therefore, To break the Law is blasphemy.

I can explain why this is a non sequitur if you need me to.

Breaking the Law is not blasphemy, but the one who claims to have power over the Law blasphemes if they are not above the Law (as God is above the Law):

I tell you, something greater than the temple is here. And if you had known what this means, ‘I desire mercy, and not sacrifice,’ you would not have condemned the guiltless. For the Son of man is lord of the sabbath.” — Matthew 12:6-8

Jesus gets accused of blasphemy for doing things like placing himself above the temple, or calling himself lord of the sabbath, or teaching and reinterpreting the Law "with authority," or forgiving sins. These are all the unique prerogatives of God, and not of lesser divine beings. Jesus and his accusers both know this.

The accusation of blasphemy, according to this story was false. — Fooloso4

You are missing the subtlety of the writings entirely. The subtlety of the Gospels and the Jewish mind is characterized by a verse like John 11:51. The charge of blasphemy is both correct and incorrect. It is correct in that it is not a conspiracy theory spun up out of nowhere; it is incorrect in that God's Son has God's prerogatives. What is blasphemous for others is not blasphemous for him.

For example, Luke 5:24 does not say, as you seem to think it does, "Oh, I'm not God but I can forgive sins anyway." Instead he says, "I, in my uniqueness as the Son of man,* can forgive sins, and to prove it I will cure this paralytic." The premise that only God can forgive sins is left untouched, significantly. The center of that text is the forgiveness of sins, and the healing is meant to support Jesus' authority to forgive sins.

* Cf. Daniel 7

Most of the time this neural activity is a response to sensory stimulation of biological sense organs, but sometimes it is a response to other things, whether those be artificial sensory aids, drugs, sleep, or mental illness. — Michael

Does the same hold of color?

--

The reason color is not a percept is because humans know that there are things which alter our percepts without altering the external objects of our percepts, and because of this the most common use of the word 'color' has a super-perceptual referent. For example:

This would be a neat argument for why colors and percepts are not the same thing. The percept of the ball changed, but its color stayed the same. — Leontiskos

When a shadow falls over a ball we do not say that the color of the ball has changed, because we differentiate our visual perception of the ball from the ball's color. We know that things like paint change the ball's color whereas shadows do not. This is just like the indirect realism argument regarding perspective (i.e. the way that distant objects appear smaller).

"Color is a percept" is a false statement, just as, "Objects are percepts" is a false statement. Nevertheless, there is a manner in which color is more "perceptual"/subjective than shape. Color is more one-dimensional than shape given that it cannot be perceived by any other sense, and it is interpreted by the brain in a more idiosyncratic manner than shape is (i.e. it is more dependent on the particularly human cognitive apparatus than something like shape). But it is incorrect to take these subtle differences and turn them into crass statements like, "Science has proved that color does not exist!"

They are seeing in the sense of having a visual experience but not seeing in the sense of responding to and being made aware of some appropriate external stimulus — Michael

Okay good, and this is true even if their percepts are identical, yes? Therefore to see an external object is not merely a matter of percepts, yes? — Leontiskos

Note that just as one can have a visual experience of an object without seeing an external object, so too one can have a visual experience of a colored object without seeing an external colored object. I can hallucinate a horse and I can hallucinate the horse's brownness, and this is different from seeing a real horse and seeing its real brownness. The distinction you are making applies equally well to color.

But other mechanisms such as a cortical visual prosthesis can help. Much like a cochlear implant helps where an ear trumpet can't. — Michael

There are cases where nothing will help. Again:

Of everyone with a brain, there are some blind and deaf people who can be helped by aids to sight or hearing, and others who cannot. To understand the difference between the two is to understand why sight and hearing are not reducible to [the subject]. — Leontiskos

They are seeing in the sense of having a visual experience but not seeing in the sense of responding to and being made aware of some appropriate external stimulus, much like the schizophrenic is hearing in the sense of having an auditory experience but not hearing in the sense of responding to and being made aware of some appropriate external stimulus. — Michael

Okay good, and this is true even if their percepts are identical, yes? Therefore to see an external object is not merely a matter of percepts, yes?

@Michael

So when the blind dream are they seeing? They are obviously interacting with percepts, and you think percepts are seeing, so apparently the blind are seeing when they sleep.

Sleeping pills are not a cure for blindness. — Leontiskos

I'm not confusing myself because I haven't claim that "hearing voices" isn't a euphemism for "hallucinate". — Michael

You've claimed that the "hears" in "hears voices" is just like the "hears" in ordinary predications about hearing, which is false, because "hears voices" is a euphemism for hallucination.