- :up:

The entirety of a syllogism is a mere series of assertions — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. "Bears are furry; water is wet; and Bob's last name is Ross." On your reckoning that would be a syllogism, given that it is a series of assertions.

An immoral act is evaluated relative to... — Bob Ross

Okay, this is an interesting and thoughtful theory. :up:
I am not going to enter into prolonged interaction with the theory given that it feels a bit like a new OP.

For the former, no object of the act can have infinite dignity because it is a contingent being and none of them have been of infinite repetition (historically); — Bob Ross

The first question to ask is whether there are, using your definitions, immoral acts which are not sins. You seem to be presupposing that there are immoral acts which are not sins, and that these immoral acts are (likely) not proportionate to infinite punishment. Are you claiming that there are immoral acts which are not sins?

If there’s nothing infinite about the act or its consequences, then it cannot be proportionate to punish the person responsible for the act with something infinite because something infinite is disproportionate to something finite. — Bob Ross

I agree with that. What we are asking is whether you have the burden of proof to show that there is nothing infinite about human acts (or at least immoral acts that are not sins); or whether I have the burden of proof to show that there is something infinite about human acts. The reason I think you have the burden of proof is because you are the one who started the thread. But let's consider Aquinas' argument:

however, to your point, it is in principle possible that the universe continues for infinite time and that some sins which are not rectified would “spill out” infinitely — Bob Ross

And if this is right then the act which causes the infinite "spillage" would itself be infinite insofar as it is the true cause of an infinite effect. The question seems to ask whether humans are capable of acts which incur eternal consequences:

<Only a very substantial act is able to incur an eternal consequence; humans are not capable of such substantial acts; therefore humans cannot incur eternal consequences> — Leontiskos

I don't think 2.4 billion people are believing things without evidence. And we'd need to include other religions like 1.9 billion Muslims and 1.2 billion Hindus too. — Tom Storm

This is another example of your unseriousness. On the pejorative definition of faith_ath, anyone who believes something without evidence must be engaged in faith. This is silly, lexically speaking. On this view, for example, someone who has been hypnotized to believe something is engaged in faith; someone who appeals to their instincts is engaged in faith; and the victims of "inception" are also engaged in faith. This is all linguistic nonsense, of course. More generally, "faith" becomes a synonym for "stupidity," and the word loses all unique lexical value. It's a fancy form of name-calling which also bastardizes natural language.

---

My ethics professor had his doctorate in linguistics, not philosophy. At the time I found that odd, but I no longer do. Those who are careful with language are good philosophers, and those who are careless with language are bad philosophers. This is why those who study linguistics or philology are so often better philosophers than those who study philosophy. Those who do not respect language, and bend it to their whims, also tend towards sophistry and a kind of intellectual unseriousness and/or dishonesty.

Anti-religious bigots are a dime a dozen. I am happy to oppose them on occasion. Your whole approach here is, "Religious faith is irrational. Prove me wrong." I almost never agree to those sorts of terms, given the question-begging nature of the challenge. That's why I pointed out the unseriousness of your a priori stance. So I guess you can just get back to me when you find a more objective source than Bertrand Russell, or when you at least have the intellectual seriousness to look for some objective sources.

Imagine if we treated anti-religious bigotry the same way we treat anti-homosexual bigotry? Banno would have been banned years ago.

But you're not being very philosophical, are you? It's just insults and ad hominems, presumably because you hate atheism and see everyone in the image of Dawkins or Hitchens. — Tom Storm

Well, no. For example, pointing out that your bigotry flies in the face of human psychology is both an insult and an argument. It shows that you are not taking this topic seriously and it is an argument for why faith_ath is a facile concept.

You haven’t attempted to respond to this — Tom Storm

It's nothing more than another fallacious appeal to faith_ath. In a technical sense bigotry is basically just a whole lot of question-begging assertions.

Well, you're the only one doing the insulting. I wonder why you feel this is necessary? — Tom Storm

I just told you why: because your whole approach to this topic is absurd and bigoted. That's why you're being insulted.

Good that's better - I got this off the Revised Standard Version. But no doubt there are arguments about which translations are correct, ect. — Tom Storm

I gave you a link to a Greek lexicon. We don't have to limit ourselves to Biblical translations.

(I have Banno on ignore, but he is apparently still engaged in his habit of appealing to ChatGPT. Not sure why that sub-par approach is necessary when we have dictionaries and lexical studies to hand.)

That’s the problem with an appeal to faith – there is nothing that can't be justified using an appeal to faith, since it is not about evidence. As per Hebrews 11: 'Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.' — Tom Storm

This is ironic, Tom. "Conviction" is here translating elenchos, which in many translations is rendered as 'evidence.'

For example, the King James Version, "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." This is a standard text for Christian treatments of faith.

But why stop at your precious 2.4 billion folks? — Tom Storm

To do you a favor. :lol:

I think faith_ath is a bad pathway to truth. — Tom Storm

Faith_ath is a bad pathway to truth. The point is that if you can't stop appealing faith_ath then you're just begging the question. You are committing fallacies, over and over. Pointing to the 2.4 billion was an attempt to help someone who isn't great at spotting their own logical fallacies. If you want to rise up to intellectual seriousness you will have to consider the idea that religious faith isn't faith_ath.

I think the dogmatism -- though that may be too strong -- lies in your insistence that only "providing a definition" will further the discussion, which in turn implies that the entire subject is capable of such definitions. — J

The fact of the matter is that when you pretend to use a word, but you have no idea what you mean by that word, you are engaged in a form of sophistry. When you say something and someone asks, "What do you mean by that?," and you answer, "I don't know what I mean," then the onus is on you to backpedal and rework your argument. You can't just pretend to say things; you can't just use words that have no meaning, even to you. That's the point about (nominal) definitions.

Beyond that and as I've noted before:

When people on TPF and elsewhere contradict others for pages on end without giving any alternative account of their own, they are engaged in a dubious practice. — Leontiskos

If you really want to further the conversation you should set out your own account of morality, or your so-called "moral realism." Merely contradicting and opposing things that Count says isn't yet philosophy in any meaningful way. It's the Monty Python argument skit.

- I am just appalled at your bigotry; at your unwillingness to openly consider the idea that 2.4 billion people might not be foundationally irrational. That sort of nonsense is appalling, after all. Maybe consider the idea that your whole approach to this topic is absurd, and that this is why you are being insulted.

Thank you! — boundless

Sure.

But one should have the sufficient awareness that is making is wrong, right? Maybe not an explicit 'oath to evil' but still a deliberate decision to be 'faithful' to a lesser good. — boundless

Yes, that's basically right. But the key is that what is chosen is in fact a good, albeit a lesser good. It is not evil simpliciter.

The problem that I see with how the notion of 'mortal sin' is formulated is that it is legalistic. The view you presented here isn't. — boundless

There are various reasons why Roman Catholic praxis tends towards legalism, but the theological undergirding is not really legalistic.

Anyway, I still am not convinced that 'universalism' proper is rejected if the necessity of repentance is affirmed. — boundless

I said that Hart's position is not secured, not that it is rejected. Indeed, if Balthasar's position is secured then Hart's conclusion can't be rejected. The securing of Balthasar's position entails that Hart's conclusion is possible, for we cannot hope for the impossible.

BTW, I do find weird that among Christians the 'hopeful' position is quite rare. — boundless

I don't find it odd. I don't think hopeful universalism is compatible with Christian revelation. Let me quote the crucial line, with the originally emphasized 'if':

Specifically, if we say that no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then Balthasar's position is secured, but Hart's is not. So what you say is right: if no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then hopeful universalism is rationally permissible. — Leontiskos

I don't think Christians can uphold that 'if'. I said why here:

Rational grounds for hope are always different than rational grounds for assent. What you are effectively doing is switching from Hart's position to Balthasar's, where Balthasar is merely recommending hope. My answer is basically the same: philosophically speaking, sure; theologically speaking, no. By my lights verses like Matthew 26:24 exclude universalism, whether hopeful or firm. If no verses like that existed, then universalism would be theologically possible. — Leontiskos

-

Ok! The more one is addicted, the more is difficult to heal from the addiction. I also believe that addiction is a very good analogy for evil/sin. — boundless

Right, but it is broader than addiction. It is 'habit' or even 'phronema'. Humans mold themselves into definite shapes, and as far as we can tell, those shapes are not reversible (after a point). Minor moldings can be reversed, but even that can be quite hard. I think these discussions tend to overlook the empirical data that molded patterns or phronemata have a telos of stability or fixedness. Once this is seen universalism looks more and more like a deus ex machina.

But what traditionalists do not seem to allow is the possibility that experiencing the painful consequence of having remained in sin might not lead to repentance. — boundless

I think you probably included more negatives in this phrase than you intended.

Empirically, reversals do happen, and they often happen in the way that you illustrate. Also empirically, reversals do not always happen.

Well, here you seem to assume that the 'ultimate reason' is necessary for evangelize. But as I said before, a universalist has many other reason to share his or her views. — boundless

As I've said, the universalist has non-necessary reasons to evangelize, but no necessary reasons. That's a big difference from the traditionalist. It also contradicts the urgency with which the Gospel is presented in revelation.

Also, your example of the travel to Brazil is misleading IMHO. A better analogy would be that if I don't buy the ticket, I can't take the plane and I have to go there without a plane. — boundless

Well your idea that "I have to go there" contradicts the premise that "you and your spouse will be taken to Brazil." You are presumably thinking of universalists who believe in purgatory, but this broader issue is another problem with universalism: how exactly are the unbelievers to be forced "to go there"?

I would suggest facing the analogy more squarely. If I will inevitably end up in Brazil no matter what I do, then why do I have to do anything? Your contention that I have to do something is part and parcel of the logical error I have been trying to point out. If I will end up in Brazil no matter what I do, then I don't have to do anything at all (in order to arrive in Brazil). If arriving in Brazil is the ultimate and most important goal, then that's all that needs to be said.

Now maybe someone wants to go to Brazil early. Or maybe someone wants to sit in first-class rather than coach. For these lesser goals, one might have to do something. But in the end it won't matter at all, especially given the way the universalists in this thread have been talking about things that "could be seen as a punishment" (e.g. "A sub-equal condo in Brazil could be seen as a punishment").

A better analogy is one of an illness where you are presented two choices. If you take a painless drug now, you are healed without much suffering. But if you wait, you have to undergo a very painful treatment, where both the pain from the illness and the treatment is hard to bear. So, even if the final result is the same (being healed), the process might be very, very different. In this case, the doctors would have a very good reason to try to convince the patients to take the first medication. — boundless

So on your analogy the most significant universalist motivation is avoidance of pain, whereas the most significant traditionalist motivation is avoidance of death. What's worse? Pain or death? I don't think there is a real comparison here. And the urgency with which revelation presents the Gospel is apparently not compatible with a mere lessening of pain. The analogy is apt given the way that revelation speaks about the ultimate stakes as death, not pain.

Again, the difference is between expedience of means and arrival at the end. Arriving at the end is by definition enormously more important than doing so via an expedient means. Universalism dissolves any possibility of not arriving at the end, and is left only with admonitions about the expedience of the means to that end.

When you define religious faith as belief without evidence, you are saying that it is a form of irrationality. When you say that religious faith is a form of irrationality, you are committing yourself to the claim that the billions of religious believers are foundationally irrational in a central part of their life. And now combine this with a remarkable ignorance of religious traditions and theology.

That's a mind-boggling level of bigotry. Off the charts. I recognize that there are some unfortunate areas of the world where this level of anti-religious bigotry is not only socially acceptable, but is actively fostered. In those locales anti-religious bigots can pass themselves off as polite, respectable, reasonable, etc. Nevertheless, the level of bigotry which glibly states that billions of people are foundationally irrational is not polite, respectable, or reasonable. It is problematic; it is insulting to religious people; and it is insulting to all rational human beings who are opposed to bigotry. I am not impressed.

I don’t recall saying religious people aren’t human beings. I thought you disliked rhetorical stunts like this. — Tom Storm

When your first move is to just to assume that 2.4 billion people are irrational, you've obviously implied that 2.4 billion people are not rational human beings.

Religious faith is considered irrational because god can't be demonstrated and there is no good reason to believe in a god.

Faith in airplanes is not irrational because we can demonstrate that they exist and that people fly safely every second of the day.
Therefore, faith in airplanes is not unwarranted. — Tom Storm

"I think religion is irrational therefore everyone who is religious is irrational; and I think faith in airplanes is rational therefore everyone who is afraid of flying is irrational."

Talk about thinking the world revolves around you! What about the billions of people who disagree with you on both scores? Just because you think something is irrational doesn't make it irrational. Heck, you couldn't even make it through a popular level treatise on the lexical nature of the word 'faith'. Maybe you need to dial down the faith you have in yourself?

I was simply asking that we consider evidence in regard to the difference between faith and belief. — Tom Storm

Again, to think that the billions of people who disagree with you on both scores are uninterested in evidence is wildly naive and bigoted. I'm not sure how else to put it.

I was saying that atheists find 'faith' used to justify a belief in god as irrational — the concept we are discussing. I did not make the argument that, beyond this, all Christians are emotional and irrational. — Tom Storm

Why are you giving the atheist view if you don't agree with it? It's pretty clear that you yourself agree with that view. Your earlier definition of faith was similarly pejorative and irrational. (And in any case, I have no idea what atheism has to do with flying.)

If you are going to define faith as believing things without reason/evidence, then you've implicitly called all those who engage in faith irrational.

This may be true, but we weren’t talking about human psychology, nor have I argued what you’ve written here, so it’s a bit of a red herring. — Tom Storm

So you want to imply that 2.4 billion people are foundationally irrational while prescinding from the facts of human psychology, because "we weren't talking about human psychology"? :roll: :zip:

I wanted to have the conversation and not be shut down with "I know better". — Tom Storm

But that's all you've been doing the whole time, saying, "I know better." I've asked you to be serious, objective, look at dictionaries, philosophy of religion, history, and I even provided an essay that delves into all of these aspects.

I'd be interested to know what a good secular philosopher would say about this discussion.

Are there any atheists you respect, or do you think the position is irredeemably unjustifiable? — Tom Storm

Faith in atheists is a rather odd approach. What sources do you trust? Are there encyclopedias that you trust? Publishing houses? Dictionaries? That's how you should proceed. For example, if you trust SEP then you should consult it. If you trust Oxford University Press then you should consult it.

As far as self-proclaimed atheists qua atheists, Austin Dacey is the only one I have read in this vein. Dacey is not irrational enough to believe that 2.4 billion people are just believing things without evidence, but the same is true of any atheist with half a brain.

But consulting atheists about religious faith is like telling your wife that she believes X and X is irrational, and then when she objects, instead of consulting her about her beliefs you go consult someone who fundamentally dislikes her. There are probably people who fundamentally dislike her and yet remain objective, but that would still be a weird-ass approach to assessing your wife's beliefs. She would probably slap you, and you would probably deserve it.

Yeah, but I think it’s a fine line between censorship and self-defense. To me, I don’t think it’s censorship qua censorship to fight back against a censorial mob who only wish to stop you from speaking. I think that counts as opposing violence rather than censoring them. — NOS4A2

I don't think that engaging in self-defense or opposing violence is incompatible with censorship. I mean, if there is a violent group and you impede their activities by squelching their speech, it seems that you are opposing violence via censorship, no? I just don't know of a reasonable definition of censorship where this sort of thing would not be censorship. At the very least, if we want to say that speech-restriction only counts as censorship when it is done for certain reasons, then we would be required to outline those reasons.

And again, 's petitio principii is not a correct interpretation of Popper. For Popper "intolerant philosophies" are forms of anti-Rationalism, not forms of violence. Popper would no doubt counsel violence or legal coercion to oppose intolerant philosophies, at least where those intolerant philosophies cannot be adequately met with rational argument. Presumably a form of anti-Rationalism which is not overtly violent and nevertheless cannot be adequately met with rational argument (e.g. many forms of cancel culture) would not be tolerated by Popper, such that the community ought to take legal action against that kind of anti-Rationalism.

That you think "ought" must imply "obligation" is perhaps indictive of the problem I mentioned about an ethical tradition that ultimately grows out of voluntarism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. From earlier:

"Ought to be chosen" != "Obligatory" — Leontiskos

-

I am pointing out that the objections in this thread are based on no definitions at all. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It happens too often on TPF.

And then to the question: "what is this x that real tiger possess?" the answer is: "I don't know, it probably doesn't exist" or "x exists but it is inaccessible to reason." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This road has been traveled in the past and @J doesn't seem to have an answer.

It's perhaps indictive of the voluntarism underpinning the ethics (and metaphysics) of command (law) and obedience (duty). I think this is why anti-realists so often claim that divine command theory is a good theory of ethics, and what any "real ethics" would look like, if only God existed. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Michael certainly resonates with this Anscombian genealogy, but I think J may be better characterized by Simpson's genealogy. I think Kant is really the antecedent to J's skepticism. The ice of Kantian morality is not thick enough to support those living in the 21st century. But it's certainly possible that J's views are more theologically informed.

Duty and natural law aren't situated in anything broader here — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep.

In general the moral anti-realists of TPF don't know what to do with the modern subjective/objective distinction, but I think you are also right that there is something one-dimensional and brittle about the way they conceive of the possibility of morality. Morality in the modern period is like a tree which lost all its antifragility as its roots dried up. Morality became this autonomous being, sequestered from everyday life and incompatible with mundane decisions. It atrophied and died in quarantine.

With that said, there are more productive ways to approach such difficulties. First we define morality as that which pertains to rational action, at which point we can try to relate various subdivisions: categorical/exceptionless moral norms, non-hypothetical ought-judgments, weighted moral values or "ceteris paribus rules," and hypothetical imperatives. The tendency among our moral anti-realists is to reduce moral norms to the first subdivision: categorical/exceptionless norms, probably because this is the most potent kind of moral norm. Its potency also makes it the hardest to justify, and therefore it is understandable that someone who reduces all of morality to the most potent variety of morality also comes to the conclusion that morality itself is impossible to justify, and that morality is therefore little more than a pipe dream.

But there may be a second reason we tend to focus on that first subdivision. Presumably liberalism and individualism make us very sensitive to impositions, and this is why we have become even more sensitive to categorical/exceptionless norms. Modern man is like the prey whose only predator is the categorical/exceptionless norm, and therefore he has a tendency to be overattentive to it, over-scrutinizing it (and then, unsurprisingly, depriving it of existence). Morality thus becomes a defensive game rather than a comprehensive approach "permeating all aspects of life." The question J is always ultimately asking is, "What right have you to impose your rationality/morality on others?" If he were to yield to realism and real definitions he would have to forfeit that schtick, and of course if tigers are real then they might eat you.

Perhaps the pedagogical approach in these dialogues is to abandon the categorical/exceptionless subdivision for a time and develop the natural roots of morality. (I think this is the direction you are taking things.) Absent divine commands, that subdivision cannot be sustained without deeper roots of the more natural and pragmatic forms of morality.

(This is to say that the definition which eludes J and AmadeusD is bound up with categorical/exceptionless moral norms. The idea is that morality is really about rules which admit of no exceptions (and this flows simultaneously from both Kant and divine command theory). The exceptionless character of the rules makes them autonomous, sovereign, untethered to any ulterior considerations, particularly prudential ones. To give a reason for an exceptionless rule is almost inevitably to undermine the exceptionlessness of the rule itself. It's not an unworthy puzzle, and I think it comes down to the same issue of ratiocination vs intellection. ...And nevermind the fact that J's pluralism will balk at the idea of intellection, even though his mystical "metanoia" is quite similar to it.)

You might be right - although I don't recall appealing to an echo chamber. — Tom Storm

I think of Bertrand Russell as an anti-Christian polemicist who would not be considered an objective source in these discussions.

What seems missing from your summary of this discussion is exploration of evidence. Doesn't that leave out the key element? — Tom Storm

Only the key element of your definition of faith. See:

All of the work I did in <this post> is based on Pieper's definition, which is empirically derived via actual usage. Pejorative definitions preclude true philosophical work like that. — Leontiskos

If we have no common point of departure, then we will just talk past each other by using different definitions of 'faith'. That's why I proposed Pieper as a common point of departure which is rigorous and academic (and perhaps too academic for your palette).

So we could try to oversimplify a complex word with appeal to a dictionary. The definition that Bob Ross gave can be related to an entry in the Cambridge Dictionary, "a high degree of trust or confidence in something or someone."

Religious faith is considered irrational because god can't be demonstrated and there is no good reason to believe in a god. — Tom Storm

But this is little more than prejudice. I have read Aquinas on faith, Avery Dulles' historical survey of faith, Pieper's essay on faith, Martin Laird's dissertation-derived book on faith, Ratzinger's treatment, and various academic encyclopedias on the topic. It's a very well-developed topic. Bertrand Russell strikes the informed like a drunk 3rd grader stumbling into a post-graduate seminar. It's a remarkable combination of ignorance, arrogance, and irrationality.

Why irrationality? Because suppose you ask the question, "There are 2.4 billion people in the world who are Christians. Why are they Christians?" The answer, "Because they are emotional and irrational," is just plain stupid. It's not an intellectually serious answer. Psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists would get a good laugh out of that sort of intellectual unseriousness. It is evidence of ignorance of human psychology, basic sociological dynamics, and even the principle of sufficient reason as applied to beliefs. People who think 2.4 billion humans basically form beliefs in the absence of evidence or contrary to evidence simply don't understand the first thing about human psychology. They are so biased against religion that they adopt psychologically absurd theories. They are conspiracy theorists.

There are a few different ways to approach the topic of faith. Here are some:

1. Try to objectively understand what the word means
2. Try to understand what people are actually doing when they engage in acts of faith
3. Assume that faith is irrational and proceed to subtly or not-so-subtly call religious people stupid, arguments be damned

If your starting point for comparing religious faith to airplane faith is to blandly assert that "there is no good reason to believe in god," then it's pretty clear that your protestations against being grouped with the New Atheists are entirely without merit, and you're engaged in nothing more than (3). If that is your starting point then you're not taking the topic seriously. What you need to do is recognize that religious people are human beings, that human beings are not merely irrational, and then you need to generate a sincere interest in understanding why they believe the things they do. Until that happens dialogue is a non-starter.

- Sure, but the point is that "intolerant philosophies" = anti-Rationalism. I should have included more context to the quote, but I am trying to illustrate precisely what Popper sees as the potential object of legitimate intolerance.

I see you edited your post, but part of the point is that Popper is not primarily concerned about ideological positions or disinformation.

My point was that when Popper says that, "we should [not] always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies," by "intolerant philosophies" what he means is anti-Rationalistic philosophies. The point is that both Popper and his opponents are proposing intolerance, and therefore there must be a distinction between proper and improper intolerance. Popper's solution to that problem seems to be favoring "Rationalism," which I read as free speech and inquiry. If someone is not opposing "Rationalism" then for Popper they are not being intolerant.

The question boggles me, too. Thoughts and verbal or written expressions are perhaps the least consequential and harmless actions a person can make in his life time. So it is a conundrum why people get so worked up about beliefs and words and often respond with some very consequential and harmful actions, like censorship, ostracization, or even violence.

Can such an inconsequential act, like the imperceptible movements of the brain and making articulated sounds from the mouth, be evil? I don’t think so. I believe the reactions to acts of speech, though, undoubtedly are, and represent some sort of superstition of language, though I no argument for it yet. — NOS4A2

Sorry, I forgot about this reply.

For my part, I am not convinced that speech is an inconsequential act. This is why free speech always becomes a difficult issue. If speech were inconsequential then no one would worry about free speech and we would need no civil right to free speech.

To give a very blasé example, suppose the captain orders his troops to kill the women and children. That is a consequential speech act, albeit a command. Its causal power is manifest. Other acts of speech, such as persuasive speech, can also be consequential. If someone traveled back in time to kill Hitler, they may very well aim to off him before he starts giving his big speeches, given what a powerful orator he was.

As a theist, you would of course see it as pejorative. — Tom Storm

It is, factually, a pejorative. It is the usage of the word in a negative or disapproving way.

But you and other theists also use polemics and pejorative language when talking about atheists, so as far as that goes, it seems to be open season. Both camps often convinced that the other is obtuse, irrational and wrongheaded. — Tom Storm

Pejoratives are useful in echo chambers, but to use them in arguments against the opposition is the logical fallacy of begging the question.

I started it but struggled with it. It's prolix, and I would need some hours to step out the argument with notes, which I don’t have time for. But I appreciate the piece being included and may get around to it. — Tom Storm

Fair enough. Thanks for giving it a shot.

We've ended up in a debate about whose usage is correct, and, unsurprisingly, we've landed where the theist thinks their usage is correct, and the freethinker thinks theirs is. — Tom Storm

No, not really. I've pointed to dictionaries, philosophy of religion, historical usage, etc. You've appealed to members of your echo chamber. That's a rather big difference.

I think it is quite clear that those who suggest censorship, de-platforming, the heckler’s veto, cancel culture, etc. are of the intolerant variety, and the tolerant ought not to tolerate their behaviors. — NOS4A2

Yeah, I think that's in alignment with what Popper is saying.

The paradox sometimes rears its head in discussions of free speech as a justification for censorship, “de-platforming”, and “cancel culture”. This shocked me when I first heard it used this way because I always understood Popper as suggesting that the censors fall into the class of “those who are intolerant”, that the censors needed to be suppressed and met with violence if necessary. But on another reading, I can understand how Popper’s solution might be confusing, especially for the bigot. — NOS4A2

Involved in the paradox is the idea that we should use censorship to censor censors, so to speak. Thus any act of intolerance, such as cancel culture, could be opposed or defended on the basis of Popper's reasoning.

The way out is to find a value, something which distinguishes proper intolerance from improper intolerance. Popper provides that value in the second quote you give, and it is something like free speech and inquiry. That is why things like cancel culture would be abhorrent to Popper: because they are opposed to his "Rationalism."

It may be that Popper's goal was to embolden those who felt that all forms of intolerance were impermissible, and who were therefore unable to properly defend the Western, "Rationalist" way of life. Things like cancel culture obviously threaten that way of life.

Popper seems to have violent, anti-tolerant (not merely intolerant) rhetoric and behavior in mind, not refusing to screen Woody Allen movies. — J

Not at all. Cancel culture fits Popper's description of, "incitement to intolerance and persecution." What he is saying is that we should claim the right not to tolerate the intolerant, but that where the intolerant can be adequately met with rational argument they can be tolerated.

Can cancel culture be met with rational argument? No, not really, and therefore it is well within what Popper sees as beyond the pale. It is a form of mob violence, where reputational harm or vocational harm is intended alongside the physical harm. An attempt to force someone to lose their livelihood is obviously persecution.

but it really lowers the bar on what it means to be intolerant — J

"If you try to give your speech you will suffer the consequences," is not intolerance? You need to invest in a dictionary, J.

So I have always held that faith is the excuse people give for believing something when they don't have a good reason. — Tom Storm

Do you see that this is also pejorative?

I think this definition of faith has been used by freethinkers for many decades. It was certainly the one Russell used, long before Hitchens and company were being polemicists. I was using it back in the 1980's. — Tom Storm

Russell strikes me as an anti-Christian polemicist, not in the sense that that was his sole gig, but in the sense that he regularly engaged in anti-Christian polemicism.

I'm trying to rethink mine based on feedback from theists. — Tom Storm

Have you looked at Pieper's essay? If you want to know what a group means by faith, you have to look at sources from that group. In this case the way that group (Christians) use the word is entirely consonant with historical and lexical usage.

The closest thing you will find in an actual dictionary to, "Belief without evidence," is, "Belief without proof," but it should go without saying that proof and evidence are rather different beasts. The first question you need to ask yourself is, "How do I figure out what a word means?"

...whereas my argument establishes that all three forms of infinitude (relevant to judging sins) are absent in practical sins which entails that infinite punishment would be disproportionate. — Bob Ross

I don't see that you have. P2 is merely an assertion. There has been no argument to "establish" it. In fact we've already seen Aquinas rebut the idea that the duration of the punishment must be proportionate to the duration of the offense.

I suppose it is possible that most or all human sins, thus far, are “open cases” like a continuous water spillage; but I would find that implausible. How is someone who steals and does their time in jail akin to this continuous water spillage? Likewise, wouldn’t this argument require that the universe is eternal (for the sin would have to causally affect for eternity)? — Bob Ross

Well remember how the analogy began:

I missed this. To use an analogy, imagine that a pipe breaks and the water that was flowing through it is now flowing out onto the ground. This is an order being disturbed, and as long as the pipe remains broken, the water will continue flowing out onto the ground. It will flow out onto the ground for all eternity if the cause/pipe is never repaired. Put crudely, Aquinas is saying that we are able to break our own pipes in ways that we cannot repair, and that Hell flows out of this. — Leontiskos

The "order" is charity, or friendship with God, and Hell is basically the absence of that friendship. To destroy a friendship is like breaking a pipe, on my analogy.

But yes, humans are eternal beings on Christianity.

Duly noted: perhaps I am thinking of the wrong person. I will re-read Aquinas on that part. — Bob Ross

Sounds good. :up:

- Yep. :up:

I think I was careful to rule out absurd definitions. — J

But you are doubtless unable to answer the question, "What is an absurd definition?" You keep making claims that you are unable to explain, and using words that you are unable to define.

Of course they aren't. That's why I said, "There could then be a discussion about each person's reasons for selecting their preferred definition." It might well turn out that one set of reasons is the more convincing. — J

That one person has stronger metaphysical superglue? :wink:

I think I arrived at this view through Bertrand Russell, who said: "...We only speak of faith when we wish to substitute emotion for evidence." — Tom Storm

That's a pretty standard pejorative (and unserious) usage. You won't find anything about emotion over evidence in dictionaries.

In one sense, this quite true. Evil doesn't have an essence; it is a privation. I think this understanding is pretty mainstream in the West (e.g. St. Augustine), and it certainly is in the East. It is absolutely true that evil ought not exist, and thus Hell ought not exist either. The Fall is the result of irrational rebellion. Both man and the demons' rebellion is something blameworthy, something that ought not have occured.

Evil exists in the world though, and in the hearts of men. We need not deny this. Evil exists as privation and imperfection, the tendency of creatures towards multiplicity and non-being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, agreed.

Hence, I don't think considerations I mentioned erase moral blame. Freedom, self-determination, self-governance, knowledge, etc. have contrary opposites (e.g. unity/plurality, true/false). We can be more or less free, more or less aware of what is truly best, and so more or less culpable for "missing the mark" in our thoughts and deeds. Spiritual sickness is not blameless, since people enable their own sickness and freely partake in their own degradation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well then let me explain why I think your contention undermines moral culpability and the possibility of moral evil. You give a threefold dichotomy, ignorance, weakness of will, and external constraint:

Here would be my contention: no one chooses the worse over the better but for ignorance about what is truly best, weakness of will, or external constraint. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is one evil or morally culpable on the basis of ignorance? It seems not. Is one evil or morally culpable on the basis of weakness of will? It seems not. Is one evil or morally culpable on the basis of external constraint? It seems not. If moral culpability and moral evil are not possible on any of the three exhaustive options you have provided, then they are not possible at all.

Indeed, your whole argument here is that universalism is inevitable because humans could not but choose otherwise. Given your understanding of human choice, humans could never choose evil, and therefore they could never fail to choose God. You apparently view humans as something like Roomba vacuum cleaners, which may make a few wrong turns but will never ultimately fail. This is why Flannery's analysis is so relevant. Evil itself would not exist if this theory of choice were correct, and the Problem of Evil goes hand in hand with the problem of Hell.

Spiritual sickness is not blameless, since people enable their own sickness and freely partake in their own degradation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If they do it continually throughout life, why cannot they do it continually throughout eternity? Can one take a mulligan on their entire life?

This is the maximum extent of the curvatus in se, and I suppose that one argument for a Hell of infinite temporal duration might be that this curving inwards approaches something like a black hole at the limit, a point at which no light can escape. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right.

People know evil as such and still embrace it; they have a right to be punished. The reduction of justice solely to remediation (rather than the restoration of right) degrades justice into something like breaking a horse. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, agreed.

The question is not whether punishment is deserved, but whether punishment of infinite temporal duration is deserved. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This "maximum extent of the cuvatus in se" is already its own punishment, and need have no temporal limit if humans and angels/demons are indeed eternal beings who do not cease to exist.

At any rate, I don't think voluntarism actually helps here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't seen anyone propose it, so no biggie.

I'm not even sure what position this is supposed to be responding to. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Precisely the position that you've set out, namely the one that logically entails the impossibility of moral evil. Else, you are basically trying to justify a position where moral evil is possible for x amount of time but not x+y amount of time, which is a rather difficult task.

The latter could be considered an intrinsic punishment that one does to oneself, but would also imply a capacity to deface (and lose) the Imago Dei absolutely, beyond any capacity to repent, which is at odds with a lot of theology (closer to Plato than Aristotle in some ways too). — Count Timothy von Icarus

The idea that one can deface the imago dei is written up and down throughout Scripture. In that there is some similarity with Aristotle, but universalism is basically just a form of Platonism, of the ineluctable Good. I don't think you get to universalism from Scripture or from empirical data (Aristotle). You basically need to be ultimately committed to Platonism, and thus allow Platonic theories to override these other considerations. It's no coincidence that your theory where evil is basically derived from ignorance is so closely bound up with Socrates' approach.

Thanks for the response and the link, I'll read. — boundless

You're welcome. If you are referring to the thread on a different forum, beware that it may be a bit hard to follow. I was tailoring it to individuals rather than to a general audience. In any case I think a thread like that would shed more light on justice than a discussion of Hell. Hell is a hard case, and it is better to begin with easy cases ("Hard cases make bad law").

As a short premise, I didn't change my mind. I just see more subtlety in the 'free will' defence of semi-traditional hell view. Although I don't consider them convincing, you did make good points. — boundless

That's fair, and I appreciate that you are taking care with this conversation.

Anyway, let's say that the sinner does, indeed, have the ability to make a 'oath to evil' (or 'mortal sin') and the ability to commit to it perpetually. — boundless

Sticking with Aquinas, to fix one's end in sin is not to form an intention towards evil (or in an extreme case, an oath towards evil). For example, adultery is a sin, but when a man commits adultery he is not doing it for the sake of evil. He is doing is because he desires the romance and sex, and chooses to pursue it. He values the romance and sex more than he cares about not-committing adultery.

As I see it this question of understanding how an evil act could ever be performed is much closer to the heart of the issue, and it bears on my last post to Count Timothy.

So, here at least from a logical standpoint, it seems to me that if some are beyond any hope for salvation,... — boundless

Let me repeat and elaborate:

Rational grounds for hope are always different than rational grounds for assent. What you are effectively doing is switching from Hart's position to Balthasar's, where Balthasar is merely recommending hope. — Leontiskos

Universalism is the belief that all will be saved, and this is largely what you and I have been discussing in this thread. But now you are switching to a different topic, namely the topic of "Hopeful universalism": the belief that one can or should hope that all will be saved. These are two different things.

Hope positions are always easier to defend than assent positions, and the same holds here. Hans Urs von Balthasar wrote a book in 1979, Was dürfen wir hoffen? ("What may we hope?"). As you know, David Bentley Hart wrote a book in 2019, That All Shall Be Saved. Hart was one-upping Balthasar by switching from the topic of hope to the topic of assent or assertion.* What you are now doing in the thread is shifting back into Balthasar's more modest position.

Specifically, if we say that no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then Balthasar's position is secured, but Hart's is not. So what you say is right: if no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then hopeful universalism is rationally permissible.

So my contention here is that the hopeless state of (some of?) the damned cannot be explained solely on terms of their ability to make oaths. — boundless

Sure - I think you are technically correct. But I don't find the psychology and anthropology convincing. To make the point quickly, we could say that a man who has been addicted to opium for 70 years is logically permitted to stop using opium, but this is undue "logicalism." Although it is logically possible, that's just not how reality works. Human acts form the habits and the soul towards an end. There may be creatures who do not move towards fixity in an end, but they are certainly not humans. I take it that these claims are much more empirically sound than the idea that reversal of one's fundamental orientation is always possible, no matter what has come before.

(We might even begin to ask what it means to say that the opium addict is "logically capable" of abandoning opium.)

BTW, I didn't know that Balthasar allowed the possibility of post-mortem salvation. Interesting. — boundless

You may have misunderstood me, because I don't think he did. He tended toward what I said here:

(It may be worth pointing out that universalists don't need to deny the fixity of the will at death. The fixity of the will at death has much to be said for it, and many universalists don't find it reasonable to question. Instead they claim that we don't have inside knowledge on what happens in someone's soul before they die. I.e. Everyone may secretly repent before they die.) — Leontiskos

-

Regarding your points about evangelization, I think we are talking past each other at this point. I am not really sure why you think that believing in the traditional view of hell is so fundamental for evangelization, if you also agree that universalists would still have their valid reason to evangelize. But it is a tangential discussion. — boundless

I think it is a central point of the discussion. Let me elaborate on the logical error that I see:

If an end is inevitable then it need not be pursued. A necessary means to an inevitable end is already a contradiction, if the means is supposed to be contingent. — Leontiskos

This is basically your position:

Suppose that next week you and your spouse will be taken to Brazil, and there is nothing you can do about it. You know with perfect certainty that you will end up in Brazil. Your spouse says to you, "Let's buy plane tickets and fly to Brazil next week." You respond, "There is no need. We will be in Brazil next week no matter what we do. It would be a waste of money to buy plane tickets." Your spouse will only desire to buy tickets insofar as they don't realize that there is no need to buy tickets (and this explains the secretive universalists you referred to).

The universalist has no more ultimate reason to evangelize than the man has a reason to buy a ticket to Brazil. Buying the ticket is irrational. I think this argument actually destroys the notion of universalism in the Christian context, hook, line, and sinker. Folks who accede to universalism literally act this way, and that's perfectly logical. They become uninterested in pursuing the inevitable end. The Unitarian Universalists are a great historical example of this.


* He was even playing on the English title of Balthasar's book, "Dare We Hope That All Men Be Saved?"

I tend to avoid people whose views or behaviours limit conversation and commonality and I avoid people with views I find ugly or unpleasant. Betrayers, trolls and liars would seem to be fairly good to avoid as there's a good chance we (or others close to us) would become victim of their behaviours. I've generally avoided people who are into sport, fashion and pop music. Things I don't like I avoid. — Tom Storm

Okay, but it looks like you have two different categories. The first category has to do with commonalities and excludes people who are into sport, fashion and pop music. The second category has to do with behaviors that you do not want to fall victim to.

What would you say is the rational justification for excluding, dismissing, or avoiding victimizers? What precisely is it about the victimizer that makes you oppose them? A specific example may be helpful here, and it could even be one of the three you mentioned (betrayers, trolls, or liars).

Doesn't it seem problematic that your conception of "ought" makes it impossible to develop a single example of it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Someone like @J or Michael will distinguish the moral ought from the non-moral ought, and when you press them on what is meant by "the moral ought" they will be reduced to the exact same problems that plagued them in the first place.

This goes back to your ethical/deliberative definition of good as "choice-worthy," or the definition of good as that which all things seek (i.e. a kind of desirability). "Ought" is no less conceptually complex and multivalent, and if we do not recognize the analogical nature of such terms we fall into univocal fallacies. For example, the univocal move where one distinguishes the moral ought from the non-moral ought and yet has no idea what they claim to mean by "the moral ought."

This all goes back to my reference to Simpson's paper.

Acknowledged. I had associated the word with general discussion of the problem of evil not realising that it was usually intended as a apologetic in the religious context. So it is misleading, and I have changed the thread title to reflect that. — Wayfarer

Thanks. I think that's helpful, even though I realize there isn't a great rhetorical substitute for the word "theodicy." Nevertheless, "Indictment" is a good one.

That is not the argument at all. The argument is, if the existence of suffering is supposed to be an indictment against God, then where do you draw the line between what you would deem a reasonable and an unnacceptabe degree of suffering? That colds and influenza would be 'allowed' by a merciful God, but not cancer? That earthquakes would be reasonable, but mass casualties would not be? — Wayfarer

That's basically the argument I gave. I'm not sure if you're familiar with reductio ad absurdum arguments? The implication is that either (4) or (5) must be false.

That colds and influenza would be 'allowed' by a merciful God, but not cancer? — Wayfarer

Again:

So there is a possible danger of over-emphasizing the critique contained in the OP, namely by overemphasizing the question, "Where exactly should the line be drawn?" — Leontiskos

So for example, does your "Where exactly should the line be drawn" argument imply that not only colds, and not only cancer, but also genocide is permissible? The danger here is the idea that there is no line and nothing is off limits. Even if (7) is absurd, there still seems to be a line somewhere.

The more general argument is that a world without suffering is inconceivable, (although I might add that this is actually what Heaven is supposed to mean.) — Wayfarer

Right, but if heaven exists then it's not clear that, "facing and rising above evil is an essential aspect of existence." Specifically, I think Buddhism takes evil/suffering as a brute fact in a way that Christianity does not. For Christianity evil possesses a contingency at a level which is not true for Buddhism. The difference is that Christians believe in a God who allows evil that he was at least somehow capable of preventing—even in the extreme case where he decides not to create at all. That's presumably why Dawkins does not levy the Problem of Evil against Buddhism.

Again, the essay 'is not an attempt to justify suffering, nor to offer spiritual guidance. It aims only to point out the mistake of that common assumption in modern discourse — the idea that if God exists, He must operate like a benevolent manager of human well-being. It’s a superficial way of seeing it. Recovering some understanding of the metaphysical and theological contexts against which the problem of evil has traditionally been resolved, allows us to reframe the question in a larger context — one in which suffering still has to be reckoned with, but not on account of a malicious God.'

And I stand by that argument. — Wayfarer

Yes, and I think it is a salient point. :up:
Contemporary atheists definitely take the argument too far and make God into a Hotel Manager.

If further context is needed, I can find some Gospel passages, I suppose, but I doubt whether you really need them. — J

I think you definitely need them, given that people use "love" to justify anything and everything. For example, I know Christian consequentialists who say that in the Trolley scenario, or in a scenario where a tyrant applies consequentialist pressure so that you might murder someone, the loving thing to do is to go ahead and murder for the greater good. You might even be one of these consequentialists who would say that if you can murder someone so that ten other people do not die, the loving thing to do is to murder them.

Without some context, "Love" is an incredibly ambiguous and increasingly meaningless term.

Which beliefs are matters of faith and which are not, cannot be rendered in black and white terms. — Janus

To his great credit, @Bob Ross attempted exactly that, and he is right that a substantial rebuttal of his explanation is lacking. In fact I don't know that I have seen anyone else on TPF attempt to give a precise definition of what they mean by "faith." Usually it goes <more like this>.

God as omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent — J

@J is not altogether wrong here, @Wayfarer. First, it's very confusing that the word "theodicy" is being used in this thread to mean "anti-theodicy" or "anti-theism." For that reason I will avoid the word altogether.

Here is a standard argument against theism which utilizes the problem of evil:

1. If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent, then there would be no evil
2. But there is evil
3. Therefore, there is no existing God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent {modus tollens}

Part of your argument is something like this:

4. If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent, then there would be no head colds
5. But there are head colds
6. Therefore, there is no existing God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent {modus tollens}
7. Therefore, head colds disprove the existence of God {reductio ad absurdum}

(Note how similar this is to <my argument against anti-natalism>.)

(7) represents Hotel Manager Anti-theism, and the response is to say that (4) is rather dubious.

For me, the point is that there is a real and live problem with Hotel Manager Anti-theism, and yet at the same time it is true that at some point Hotel Manager Anti-theism ends and more legitimate reasons for Anti-theism begin. So there is a possible danger of over-emphasizing the critique contained in the OP, namely by overemphasizing the question, "Where exactly should the line be drawn?"

(See also my response to Tom Storm. The trick here is that not all anti-theistic arguments are created equal.)

Sure, we can use other reasons to try to convince the non-believer. We could even appeal to his moral system, assuming he has one. — BitconnectCarlos

The word "even" makes me think that such an appeal is not necessary, which makes me think that there are suitable reasons which do not specifically leverage the non-believer's moral system. If that is so, then the issue must be amenable to reason and not merely to divine commands. If it is not amenable to reason then we couldn't use other reasons, and there could be no .

If that's not right, then I think you need to replace, "We could even," with, "We could only."

Sorry for the belated response! — Bob Ross

No worries.

My answer was that there are three kinds of things that can be quantified over for the sake of this discussion as it relates to infinitude: (1) dignity, (2) duration, and (3) repetition. My point was that you can pick any of them or all of them for our discussion and my argument will apply. — Bob Ross

And my point is that if you don't pick one of them then you simply don't have an argument at all.

It's like if I said, "If one wanted to argue against factory farming they could do so on the basis of animal welfare, environmental issues, or sustainability." The natural response would be, "Are you going to produce an argument against factory farming? If so, you'll need to pick one of the three and put together an actual argument. Until you do that there is no argument being proposed."

I agree with your assessment here; and I would point out that no matter how many gallons of spillage happen due to this person it would not warrant infinite demerit unless the water that spilled was infinite in volume, was spilling for infinite duration, or was itself or a casually derived offended party was of infinite dignity. None of these three are the case in every human example of sin. — Bob Ross

Aquinas' point is precisely that the water spills out for a potentially infinite duration. "So long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also."

This was my complaint with Acquinas, because he attempts to tie the infinite demerit of a sin to God’s infinite dignity since God is an offended party; — Bob Ross

You've already been told by multiple people that Aquinas doesn't do that at all, and that you have Anselm in mind. If you want to characterize Aquinas, I would suggest quoting him, or at the very least quoting a secondary source.

And even on its own terms, the logic quickly becomes untenable. If suffering were to be eliminated, where exactly should the line be drawn? Is it enough that we only suffer head colds, not cancer? That no child is ever harmed, but adults might still endure misfortune? That natural disasters occur, but without casualties? — Wayfarer

The "hotel manager framing" speaks as if God's only purpose is to prevent suffering, and as you say, this sole-purpose-god can be invoked to remove any level of suffering, no matter how small. That's the oddity: the Copernican Revolution led to a cramped, anthropocentric worldview, where the removal of human suffering is the most important thing. The "god" of this worldview has but one job: remove suffering. The whole picture is self-directed rather than transcendent of self—curved in on oneself. Like going to the doctor day after day and demanding more painkillers. A diminished anthropology.

'The Hotel Manager Theodicy' is a misnomer. — Janus

True enough.

This seems like a central argument to your post:

Here would be my contention: no one chooses the worse over the better but for ignorance about what is truly best, weakness of will, or external constraint. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But isn't this tantamount to the denial of (moral) evil? Flannery rightly points out that arguments against Hell are very similar to arguments against evil, or for the claim that evil ought not exist.

If what you say is true then sin and (moral) evil do not exist at all, and of course Hell cannot then exist either. You could actually read my thread, "Beyond the Pale," as an inquiry into the rational grounds for moral blame, which is in turn related to the question of whether moral evil is possible. It's a difficult question that our culture struggles with in a special way, but nevertheless I don't see how such a thesis is compatible with Christianity. For Christianity moral evil does exist.

Let me quote Flannery given that this is such a ubiquitous issue:

Before dealing with this issue directly, we need to establish one preliminary point: that there is no intrinsic reason to regard the sayings of Jesus found at Matthew 25 as mere threats or warnings. The only reason we might have for so regarding them would be if Balthasar (and others) were right: that it is incompatible with God’s nature to allow to happen what Christ says will happen to those who are not merciful. But there is no reason to make this assumption. Is such evil incompatible with the notion of a loving and all-merciful God? We already have such evil in the world: sinners who separate themselves from God and live—even humanly-speaking—frustrated, resentful lives. If such suffering is incompatible with the notion of the Christian God, he is either not as powerful as Christians claim (and therefore not the Christian God) or he does not exist. Given that the Christian God does exist, if such suffering is in itself not incompatible with his nature, why must its duration be incompatible with that same nature? As Newman remarked ‘the great mystery is, not that evil has no end, but that it had a beginning.’ Ultimately, the problem of hell can be reduced to the problem of evil—and no one thinks of solving the problem of evil by denying its existence. If we have no reason to regard Christ’s remarks at Matthew 25 as mere threats or warnings, it is legitimate to represent them as conditional statements of the form ‘if p then q’: if we are not merciful we will find ourselves in hell. The question facing us is how to understand such statements. — Kevin Flannery, How to Think About Hell, 476

(To look at the mysterium iniquitatis and conclude that evil does not exist, or to look at the mystery of goodness and conclude that goodness does not exist, strike me as concrete instances of the low anthropology referenced earlier. The idea—so tied up with our own culture—is that responsibility does not exist, whether deserving praise or blame. The dual potency goes hand in hand with that responsibility. This is also related to a transgression of Przywara's Analogia Entis, where one consideration is allowed to trump all others.)

It's common knowledge that it is. — Janus

Argumentum ad populum?

Here we go:

4. "There are many parallel, non-interacting worlds."

1. would be falsified if sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another were found. Do you disagree with that? If so, on what grounds?

2. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that one race is inferior to another could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?

3. would be falsified if you could imagine what sound evidence could look like. Do you disagree? If so, on what grounds. — Janus

"4. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that there are not many parallel, non-interacting words could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?"

So on your approach the many-worlds interpretation is falsifiable. As I said, on such a facile approach every proposition must be falsifiable. This approach says nothing more than, "It would be falsified if it were falsified, therefore it is falsifiable." The fact that you've been running with this facile approach for so many posts is rather crazy, and it's very hard to believe that you are being intellectually serious here.