- :up:

If someone went to a prestigious health conference and said their definition of good health was being in pain and vomiting until you die the other guests would laugh at them at best and ask them to leave at worst and they wouldn’t get invited back. — Captain Homicide

Harris' point here is salutary. It is that just because there is disagreement does not mean there is no truth to the matter. If there were no truth to the matter of health then the claim that health is "being in pain and vomiting until you die," would be no more true or false than any other claim about health. But this is clearly wrong. Therefore health is truth-apt. I make this sort of argument a lot to the many skeptics and pluralists of TPF, .

In Aristotelian language we would say that certain first principles are readily known even if there is disagreement about some entailments of those first principles. We do not disagree on the foundation, even though we can disagree on the more speculative matters which are not as easy to see as the foundation.

Aristotle even grounds disagreement itself in the agreement on the . In Metaphysics IV he shows that anyone who rejects the PNC will reduce their utterances to nonsense.

If they were using observation and calculation and I did not understand how that was possible I would probably have believed that they must have direct non-empirically derived knowledge. — Janus

But you're begging the question of your own paradigm again. The question is whether you would think they have knowledge you don't understand if they could make accurate predictions, but you had no idea how. That means you do not understand them to be using "observation and calculation," which are the tools of your own scientific paradigm. Again, see my references to the FBI psychics above.

From above:

What kind if argument could possibly show that such knowledge is possible, in fact not merely possible, but real for some? — Janus

The effects of the knowledge show that it is possessed, in the way of a sign. If someone can make an accurate prediction then this is a sign that they had knowledge of the future. This holds even if you have no idea how they obtained such knowledge. Your idea that it is impossible to provide evidence for non-standard forms of knowledge is simply not true.

- I am saying that if you were living in the ancient world you would be the guy claiming that no one has special knowledge and eclipses cannot be predicted, because the science does not allow for it.

The kind oif direct knowledge I have in mind is the supposed knowledge of the sage into the true nature of reality, not foreknowledge of temporal events. — Janus

My point is that the sage who has insight into the true nature of reality will be able to do verifiable things that most people cannot do. This is exactly what happened with ancient philosophers and eclipses. If you don't think that same thing can happen today, then it seems you do think we have reached the end of science. ...that if our scientific rules preclude some form of knowledge, then that form of knowledge is simply impossible because our scientific rules are final. Every scientific age ends when it is learned that the science was not as final as was believed.

Yes, but that is empirical knowledge. We were discussing the confirmability so-called "direct knowledge" or intellectual intuition I thought. — Janus

Who's to say that he doesn't know it directly? I could have direct knowledge that some future event will occur, and this would in no way preclude the future occurrence from being verified. Direct knowledge and empirical confirmation are not mutually exclusive.

I'm not sure if you saw my edit above:

There is no intrinsic barrier to the FBI using a psychic to help in an investigation, even though the FBI agents are not themselves psychics and are not able to reproduce the psychic's method. — Leontiskos

If those "theses" cannot be confirmed by logical or emprical evidence, then how will they be confirmed? — Janus

If someone claims to have special knowledge, and that knowledge is in no way confirmable by any other person, then their knowledge cannot be confirmed. But that case seems like it would be quite rare.

For example, if an ancient philosopher claimed to have knowledge of an eclipse, and the eclipse occurred when they said it would, then their knowledge was confirmable. All we have to do is check and see if the eclipse occurs at the predicted time. It's pretty straightforward, and if the current science holds that predicting eclipses is impossible, then the successful prediction counts as evidence against that scientific paradigm.

What kind if argument could possibly show that such knowledge is possible, in fact not merely possible, but real for some? — Janus

The person who claims to have that sort of knowledge propounds theses that are not accessible to the current paradigm, and if those theses are verified then you have evidence for their knowledge. This is the same way any new paradigm establishes itself.

More simply: special abilities signify special knowledge or special faculties. All they have to do is demonstrate the abilities.

For example, think about the way that the FBI will leverage psychics in difficult cases, and the way in which they have certain psychics who have a good track record, and whom they trust to provide aid in their investigations. There is no intrinsic barrier to the FBI using a psychic to help in an investigation, even though the FBI agents are not themselves psychics and are not able to reproduce the psychic's method.

Someone who thinks the FBI couldn't possibly use psychics may well reflect J's theory:

There's a natural tendency to regard "science" as meaning "everything we know now, which is all there is to know." — J

-

I don't know what led you to think I was suggesting that we have reached the "end of Science". We know what science consists in as it is practiced. — Janus

To say that we know what is and isn't science with some sort of perfect certainty implies that one thinks there can be no further scientific paradigm shifts. That mindset occurs in every age ...at least until the next scientific paradigm shift.

- I agree with most of that. :up:

My point would be that what appears as supererogation from the frame of history/man, and thus monstrous to compel, need not appear so from a corrected perspective.

To "take up one's cross," and "be crucified with Christ," are beyond the duties fallen man recognizes for man, for instance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's fair, but I am not convinced that arduous acts like "taking up one's cross" are compelled, unless we are talking about Christians:

That's not to say that what is obligatory for a Christian is the same as what is obligatory for a non-Christian, but I don't think Christians should impose specifically Christian obligations on non-Christians. — Leontiskos

So I want to say that "to take up one's cross" is also beyond the duties that Christians recognize for non-Christians.

In general, to coerce or compel a non-duty is to require someone to do what they are not required to do, and this is unjust. Compelled supererogation is but one instance of this.

Hence, supererogation is neither monstrous (sub-natural) nor angelic (supernatural), but the original, natural state intended for God's image bearer. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you mean "deification," not "supererogation." They seem quite different.

Twice now in this thread I've wondered if I simply don't understand the word "supererogation" and reached for the dictionary:

the act of performing more than is required by duty, obligation, or need — Supererogation | Merriam-Webster Dictionary

doing more than necessary:

-An act of supererogation is an act that is "beyond the call of duty" - it is an act that is over and above what a person is required to do.
-A man may do more than the law requires of him, and perform works of supererogation. — Supererogation | Cambridge Dictionary

I have never heard the nature/grace debate couched in terms of supererogation or duty/obligation. You could fanagle the term into that debate via the route of "necessity," but that whole paradigm seems largely foreign to the issue. It is foreign in large part because, "When you have done all that is commanded you, say, ‘We are unworthy servants; we have only done what was our duty’" (Luke 17:10).

Science was born out of the quest for Truth, capital T, — Wayfarer

What does "capital T truth" mean? I hear that phrase a lot but I never know what it means.

...Meister Eckhart. A medieval monastic and mystic — Wayfarer

FYI, Eckhart was a Dominican, not a monastic. The monastics mostly hated the new mendicant Orders. In fact he was a scholastic who served two terms at the University of Paris as a magister—the first to do so since Aquinas. He is one example of the confluence of mysticism and scholasticism.

I used to live with a Fransiscan nun who did lots of outreach work. I'm thus quite fond of Fransiscans. — fdrake

Very cool. Individual Franciscans are hit or miss for me, but I do appreciate their overall ethos and I have met some remarkable individuals.

...though we ended up having a lot of heated discussions regarding whether brutal tragedies, like miscarriages, should be seen as other parts of God's artwork. I was of the impression that all of creation meant all of it, the nun agreed. Neither of us could quite stomach loving the majesty of suffering and indifference. The damnedest thing we spoke about was that it was ultimately our senses of compassion and espirit de corps with humanity that stopped both of us from also loving pain. — fdrake

I'm an orthodox Christian, and the orthodox answer is that the state which brings about tragedy flows out of the Fall. Christians have not traditionally accepted tragedy as part of God's (primary) plan, and that's why. It doesn't surprise me that Christians who throw out those doctrines run into these problems. The doctrines are there for a reason. You get the same thing in Catholic theology with limbo. Limbo is thrown out and then you end up with all sorts of intractable problems with the stark heaven/hell dichotomy. We forget that the doctrines were there for a reason, and cannot be thrown out indiscriminately.

When I've been referring to supererogatory acts, I've been wondering if I should've come up with another construct like "acts that would be considered supererogatory if they were not coerced or compelled in any sense". — fdrake

Yes, that would quell many of my critiques. "That would have been a heroic act if he had chosen it himself!"

I kept referring to them as supererogatory to play with the question I just asked you regarding that distinguishes an act which one feels compelled to do and an act which one is really compelled to do. It is a hard question, as it seems you agree? — fdrake

Well the simple answer is that self-compulsion is not possible, and that one cannot be compelled by something which is not an agent. Or more precisely, that the "mixed nature" of an act like jettisoning cargo does not count as involuntary. But at that point we're picking at your attempt to blur the line between being compelled by an agent and being compelled by a circumstance.

To be blunt, I don't see how injustice (or monstrosity) can arise via compulsion unless there is an actual agent doing the compelling. One might feel—or be—compelled to jettison cargo, and they can feel frustrated about that, but I don't see anything unjust or monstrous about this. If you bring in the idea of gods or demons and say that Poseidon is a monster for compelling you to jettison cargo, then all of the logic is restored (and I wonder if this sense of "monstrosity" is a hangover from that view of gods). I'm not really opposed to that view of gods or angels/demons, so this isn't a full-scale criticism of that sense of monstrosity, but it is a criticism of the idea that one can be unjustly or monstrously compelled when no other agent is involved.

The more mundane question here is whether it is rational to get angry at a circumstance which is no one's fault. It's not an uninteresting question given that we do get angry in that manner quite often.

I should then perhaps conclude {on the same basis as the previous paragraph} that I was obliged to use two antibacterial wipes to clean my kitchen counter. Which means using three would've been a dereliction of duty. Which is absurd. — fdrake

I would say that:

1. If
1a. You are obliged to clean your flat, and
1b. Cleaning your flat entails cleaning the kitchen counter, and
1c. You decide to clean the counter with antibacterial wipes, and if 1c...
1d. ...Then two antibacterial wipes are required to clean the counter
-then-
2. You are obliged to use at least two antibacterial wipes when cleaning your kitchen counter

<(1a ∧ 1b ∧ 1c ∧ (1c → 1d)) → 2>

If we omitted the words "at least" from (2) then the conditional would be false, as there is no obligation to use exactly two wipes (unless we want to bring in another premise, say, about wasting wipes). That is, your claim that using three would be a dereliction of duty is false.

This is relevant because Y could be a supererogation, and you could not derive a contradiction from X entails Y and one-ought-X due to the failure of the syllogism.

Which is the situation I am construing us as being in. We have obligations, those obligations entail supererogatory acts, but nevertheless we are not obliged to do them. — fdrake

I don't see that this is correct. If we let Y = 3 antibacterial wipes (which is supererogatory), then the entailment fails. It fails because at that point X no longer entails Y. Being obliged to do X does not oblige us to do Y.

Even though we are required to do them to fulfil our obligations in some sense. — fdrake

In what sense is one required to use three antibacterial wipes in order to clean the kitchen counter?

So if one believes one ought to do something about climate change, "your bit" is recycling, but everyone knows it's not enough. — fdrake

As I said previously, if recycling is not enough then one who has recycled has not yet done their bit, at least if the joint "bits" are supposed to be sufficient.

Nevertheless I want to insist that you really have succeeded in your duties if you do your bit. It's just that succeeding in your duties doesn't correspond to your duties fulfilling their intended function or purpose. Like addressing the existential threat climate change poses to human civilisation on the basis of putting the sardine tin in the green bin. — fdrake

Again, I would describe this as naïveté about what is required, or sufficient, or obligatory. If someone believes that putting the sardine tin in the green bin is sufficient to address climate change, then they believe a false proposition.

Earlier I said:

Unless you're just saying that the many are lazy and therefore the few have to pick up the slack, but that seems like a different argument. — Leontiskos

Even though that's not a very poetic or interesting way to phrase it, it's basically how I see the issue. If we view humans as social and hierarchical creatures rather than as atomic individuals, then the human community will require disproportionate sacrifice from the few in order that the whole community may thrive. This disproportionate sacrifice is arguably supererogatory (on a democratic-individualistic paradigm), and it is also a hypothetical imperative unto the end of communal flourishing (or in some cases, communal survival). But on an ancient paradigm the disproportionate work is not a burden, for the model of excellence was the heavenly spheres, which are constantly "working," and on which everything else depends to the utmost, but yet which have the most excellent and beautiful job of all.

Historically that is also how the saint or prophet would tend to view themselves (excepting the many saints who are too humble to think too long on themselves). It's not that they have a monstrous, burdensome, supererogatory job.* Rather, it's that they have been blessed to sit at the head of the table, near the Host, and that "the greatest is the servant of all." They imitate the Host who is kenotically pouring Himself out ceaselessly—who moves "the sun and the other stars." Besides, your point still finds a home in the idea that, "To whom much has been given, much will be demanded" (Luke 12:48).

This is why lots of Christians find the liberal-democratic paradigm rotten at its core, for it cannot but help view disproportionate service as tyrannical or monstrous.

* With certain exceptions such as Jeremiah or Jonah

Under what conditions would you say someone is really compelled to do something vs if they merely feel compelled to do so something? — fdrake

Allow me to reframe it. Your monstrosity depends on the relation between volition and compulsion. Here is Aristotle:

Throwing a cargo overboard in a storm is a somewhat analogous case. No one voluntarily throws away his property if nothing is to come of it, but any sensible person would do so to save the life of himself and the crew.

Acts of this kind, then, are of a mixed nature, but they more nearly resemble voluntary acts. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III.1

No monstrosity is occurring in an act with this sort of "mixed nature." Thus even certain forms of true compulsion are not involuntary. You haven't given a clear definition of what you mean by "monstrosity," but presumably it has to do with the kind of compulsion and constraint that makes an act involuntary.

Or put it this way: if you are the only man on Earth and you ran into Aron Lee Ralston's conundrum, you might be tempted to say that cutting off your arm is supererogatory (and therefore not obligatory), but I would be hard pressed to understand why it has anything at all to do with obligation. I would be hard pressed to tell you in what this obligation consists. (Let's also suppose you're an atheist.)

Edit: I think a big part of the issue is this question: How is a properly supererogatory act motivated? Can someone self-consciously engage in a supererogatory act, or will every heroic act be self-consciously viewed as obligatory?

Nah I'm going back to the Society of St. Francis. — fdrake

A friar, a gyrovague! That takes me back. Dominic and Francis were only ten years apart.

There are things which will not improve without some acts of supererogation. If someone believes that those things must improve, then they believe some acts of supererogation are required. The model I have of this is giving up your life as an activist for a noble cause - really a necessary cause, like making sure people don't starve to death. — fdrake

Okay, but what are these "things" that cannot improve without some acts of supererogation? I think most religious people would agree that there are such things, but I don't see how something like feeding the hungry could be one of those things. Is it really true that starvation is something that cannot improve without acts of supererogation? Ironically, it may be that starvation is one of those issues that will never improve if it depends on supererogation.

The mirror of your argument is this: supererogation is difficult and rare, and therefore if things are to improve they should not depend on supererogation. Again granting your premise that some things do require supererogation, nevertheless I do not see how the basic goals of require supererogation. For example, it seems to me that the problem of hunger would certainly improve if everyone simply did their obligatory part. The notion that simple acts get us "no closer" to the goal is simply not true. Indeed, an important question is whether humans require unattainable goals in order to entertain hope, and whether they will cook up new unattainable goals when they become restless and stagnant.

I've spoken with several Christians who saw bringing about the kingdom of god as their greatest moral imperative — fdrake

But note the word "their." There is no reason why supererogation cannot be imperative, but your OP is about compelled supererogation. I think what you probably mean to say is that one feels compelled to do something heroic. To say that they are compelled is stretching language too far. I can feel constrained or compelled to propose to the woman I love, but I am not in fact compelled to do so. There is no compulsion, strictly speaking.

Which is all well and good, it's just that if someone were to believe that one was obliged to do what one must to bring about that better state, one would then be committed to the supererogatory. — fdrake

If this isn't a contradiction, then I would invite you to go ahead and define "supererogatory" and "obligatory" and work out how you haven't just uttered a contradiction. Presumably you are just using poetic and inaccurate language to say that our obligations are more than we assumed. What is your definition of "supererogatory"? Is a supererogatory act something that goes beyond obligation, or is it merely an act that is uncommonly arduous?

An example, this is very much the logic behind "doing your bit". Someone {usually incorrectly} sorts their recycling and doesn't go join a group to help with the supply side of climate crisis issues, 30 years of zealous recycling ever and we're no closer. "Doing your bit" was never enough. People will absolutely get irritated at those who recycle incorrectly, or don't recycle at all, even though they are also putting the wrong things in the wrong bins due to design failures, and much plastic that ends up in the right bins can't be recycled anyway. You can do your bit forever and it's fine, but "just fine" forever means the quality of forever degrades. — fdrake

1. We are obliged to solve the recycling problem
2. If everyone "does their bit" then the recycling problem will be solved
3. "Doing your bit" was never enough {Contradiction}

Your response is, "Supererogation is necessary to solve the recycling problem." The better response is that we underestimated what "doing your bit" entails. If (1) is true then (2) entails that we are obliged to "do our bit," and that if X bit is insufficient to make (2) true then we are obliged to do more than X. As far as I'm concerned, (3) is an equivocation which assumes that "doing your bit" is some contribution less than "your bit."

Unless you're just saying that the many are lazy and therefore the few have to pick up the slack, but that seems like a different argument.

water is composed of H20 — J

water = H20 — Banno

It is interesting that 39% of the references to the molecular structure of water on TPF are given as 'H20' (H-twenty) rather than as 'H2O'. It makes those discussions elusive to a search.

In that case I should go to all the “God” threads, ignore the specific topic, and just bring the conversation back to how God doesn’t exist. — Mikie

It happens constantly, and it's not against the ethos of the forum.

What you could do is, instead of asking for a special stricture in your thread, propose a new forum approach that would apply to all threads.

I'm not trying to say that only acts of supererogation improve things, I'm saying that some acts of supererogation are required to improve things and trying to draw out a consequence. — fdrake

I read you as saying that things cannot improve without (compelled) supererogation, and that is what I was responding to. Do you say that things cannot improve without (compelled) supererogation?

What I have in mind with a moral imagination is, roughly, a psychological and social concept. — fdrake

Okay, understood. I certainly agree that if we cannot think about how things might be better, then we will never effectively improve things. But I don't agree that thinking about how things might be better is necessarily supererogatory. Some parts of the moral imagination are supererogatory (both for the individual thinking and for the goals he is thinking), and some parts are not.

I'm sure you can see the Christian theological undertones there, they are quite intentional. I trial ran this discussion with a priest. — fdrake

Okay, interesting. I certainly see it, but I also disagree with Christians who would make the supererogatory obligatory. I'm a traditional Catholic in that sense. And I think things can improve without saints, just as bread can be edible without yeast. That's not to say that what is obligatory for a Christian is the same as what is obligatory for a non-Christian, but I don't think Christians should impose specifically Christian obligations on non-Christians. I don't know whether you would disagree with this.

So are you leaving TPF to become a monk after Eärendil? :smile:

What is monstrous is any state of affairs that requires some people to act in a supererogatory fashion at some times in order to improve the world. — fdrake

Okay, and I don't really agree with that, but I would distinguish "improvement." I would only agree with the claim <What is monstrous is any state of affairs that requires some people to act in a supererogatory fashion at some time in order to meet a mere obligation of improvement> (where the meeting of a mere obligation is not supererogatory). Some morally imagined improvements involve supererogation, some require mere obligation, and some require neither.

I'm making an argument that "the moral floor" is sinking, or too low, if you are only required to act in accordance with it. The minimum effort is not enough to attain what the minimum effort aims for, a kind world. If people act as they do in accordance with their moral imagination to be kind, for a kinder world, then the bar of duty isn't high enough. And because it's not high enough, existence compels us to a largely unachievable higher nature. This is monstrous, but not necessarily wrong. — fdrake

Okay. Aristotle's way of phrasing that is to say that society cannot survive on justice alone. That if we do not bail out more water than we believe to be flowing into the boat then we will sink.

In any case, I agree with most of your claims in this final paragraph, so maybe I agree with your conclusion but disagree with some of the argumentation. ...Or else I am not reading it in a sufficiently poetic register.

existence compels us to a largely unachievable higher nature — fdrake

Is it something like Eliot's, "In order to arrive at what you are not / You must go through the way in which you are not"? Or, "When you stop growing you start dying"? Or that to give up the stretching and tension of transcendent aspirations is to have become subhuman?

Ultimately it is the Pelagian themes that worry me. The monstrosity takes a different form if God is tangential to the picture, for then there is no surgeon other than ourselves:

The wounded surgeon plies the steel
That questions the distempered part;
Beneath the bleeding hands we feel
The sharp compassion of the healer's art
Resolving the enigma of the fever chart.

Our only health is the disease
If we obey the dying nurse
Whose constant care is not to please
But to remind of our, and Adam's curse,
And that, to be restored, our sickness must grow worse.

The whole earth is our hospital
Endowed by the ruined millionaire,
Wherein, if we do well, we shall
Die of the absolute paternal care
That will not leave us, but prevents us everywhere.

The chill ascends from feet to knees,
The fever sings in mental wires.
If to be warmed, then I must freeze
And quake in frigid purgatorial fires
Of which the flame is roses, and the smoke is briars.

The dripping blood our only drink,
The bloody flesh our only food:
In spite of which we like to think
That we are sound, substantial flesh and blood—
Again, in spite of that, we call this Friday good. — T. S. Eliot's East Coker

The "supererogation" takes on a very different form when one is a patient.

Can it count as a doer of evil if it isn’t a human? — fdrake

It can count as (natural) evil, but it can't count as a doer. So when you go on to say that an ideology isn't an agent, you are simultaneously saying that it isn't a doer, and hence is not a doer of evil.

We could say that rocks are evil insofar as rocks can kill people, either via moral agents or apart from them. But a law or an ideology really isn't like a rock. In that case we can prescind from the agency of the people who fashioned or uphold the law or ideology, but we can't pretend that the agency doesn't exist at all.

Something which "requires acts of supererogation" must be an agent (or a "doer"). This is because in order to require an act of supererogation one must understand what is obligatory and then require an act that is not obligatory. So a law could require supererogation via the agents who create it, but a rock cannot require supererogation.** Or consider something that requires one to give all their earthly possessions away, namely death. Death is not requiring a supererogatory act, even though it does require us to give all our possessions away, and the reason it does not require a supererogatory act is because it possesses no agency. Someone can meet their death in a supererogatory way, but death does not require supererogation in requiring one to yield up all their possessions. At best the natural reality of death predisposes us to supererogatory acts, but does not require them.

A pure passion is never supererogatory, because "in order for an act to count as supererogatory, it must be classified as a choice," and (pure) passions are merely things that we suffer, things that happen to us. So when you claim that some reality without agency requires acts of supererogation, you seem to err twice, both in thinking that something without knowledge can require supererogatory acts, and in thinking that because someone undergoes a passion—say, of losing all their possessions—they have therefore performed an act, and even a supererogatory act, namely the act of giving up all their possessions. One can lose without giving up.

Nevertheless, I agree that it is a "monstrosity" when someone requires as due what is in fact supererogatory. But it is not an inevitability. In the case you reference we should simply remind them that we are not obliged to "improve things," and certainly not according to their criteria. The same can be said to ourselves. When the day is done and it is time for sleep, even the atheist can say, "I am not God. It does not all depend on me."

** And in a more precise sense, coerced supererogation is not supererogatory, as noted above. So in the end even things which can implore acts of supererogation cannot require or demand them.

Not much rescuing of the subject there, insofar as the subject still has the functional necessity for understanding the content the study of looking implicates. — Mww

Bernstein goes on to make an interesting point. He says that Husserl "fails to stress the dialectical similarity" between objectivism and transcendentalism — J

Yep.

But what does part 2 achieve in relation to part 1? It achieves a form of philosophy which more fully incorporates the subject. There are lots of targets involved in part 1, and phenomenology hits some and misses others. At the same time, I am not sure if Wayfarer targets certitude in the way that J does. That Husserl wants a foundation that will withstand historical vicissitudes may not be a problem at all, even for Wayfarer.

Then it’s truly remarkable how wanting to avoid those discussions by narrowing the conversation down in a separate thread is considered problematic. — Mikie

Making a separate thread is no help. You could make a million threads on geophysics and flat-earthers could post in all of them.

According to you, there’s basically no way to do so. Fine—point made. I don’t agree. — Mikie

And yet you're faced with the contradiction that even according to the topic of your new thread climate change skepticism is on-topic given that climate change skepticism has to do with the effects of climate change. Your Holocaust counterpoint was . But we will agree to disagree.

Granted, I don't think the way TPF is set up is inevitable. Other approaches are possible. But TPF's approach is not particularly bad.

Yeah, and geophysics includes flat-earthers, and evolution includes creationists, etc. Got it. Whatever you say. — Mikie

Yep. If you make a thread on geophysics or evolution, then posts from flat-earthers and creationists would be on topic. I'm glad you're figuring this out. :up:

It's instructive that it is not only your opponents who believe you are attempting to prevent free expression, but .

I don’t see any issue whatsoever with keeping things on topic — Mikie

My was that the topic as you defined it includes the folks you are attempting to exclude. This is no coincidence.

Logic 101: those that deny the Holocaust ARE discussing the Holocaust — Namely, that its effects were nil (i.e., didn’t happen). Gotta allow that in a thread on the Holocaust, because otherwise it’s against the ethos of the forum. — Mikie

Denying the Holocaust in a Holocaust thread is not against the philosophical ethos of the forum. It is against a rule of the forum. Just because it is not against the ethos of the forum does not mean that it is permissible.

So this is another logical error, namely the idea the that if one is not allowed to contravene the general ethos of the forum, then anything which does not contravene the general ethos of the forum is permissible.

- It is a pre-judging of the issue at the time of the dispute, and unless the basis for that pre-judging is understood the discussion is futile. Note: I never read ChatGPT sources.

- Klima's article seems more up your alley, but I think it's more important to figure out why folks are prejudiced against essences. Did they read an argument from Quine that convinced them that essences are not coherent? Because in that case we need to talk about Quine's arguments, which Oderberg and Spade address. If someone were coming to the issue without preconceptions then there would be no need to understand the basis of their preconceptions as a starting point. Regardless, I don't know that there is much general interest in this topic on the forum. I don't know if anyone other than yourself would want to pursue it. I chose the Anselm paper because I thought it would attract more interest than a paper on essences, and there was very little interest even there.

Pages 40-41 are available to me.

Thanks, that is helpful in clarifying the OP.

The broader tension, which I tried to gesture toward with the latter half of the post, is that we seem to be that the state of things requires acts of supererogation to improve. — fdrake

Okay, understood, but does it? Couldn't we also improve by better understanding our obligations, or by better realizing a capacity to fulfill them? Those forms of improvement seem to have little to do with supererogation. I think we have to bring in your idea of moral imagination:

We aspire to the heights of our moral imagination, even when achieving those heights is practically impossible. — fdrake

Is moral imagination bound up with supererogation? Or with obligation? Or perhaps neither? What is the end that moral imagination conceives?

The supererogatory is a gateway to the horrifying state of things. We live in a world where no one can be a saint, but everyone needs to be. — fdrake

Aren't you aiming at the paradox wherein the supererogatory is obligatory? That we are obliged to improve and supererogation is necessary in order to improve; therefore the supererogatory is obligatory?

What I was trying to say above is that I see a contradiction, not a paradox. If I were able to see a very clear case for why each side of the contradiction must be upheld, then perhaps I would be made to consider it a paradox.

I don't believe I was shifting agents, I was describing an act as supererogatory. Treating supererogation as a modality on par with obligation and permissibility. In a similar manner I considered acts as saintly or exemplary, and not moral agents. The state of things which is monstrous, in that instance, is compelling an action that would otherwise be considered above and beyond the call of duty. Notably I am not intending to construe a specific agent as monstrous or supererogatory, or even just acts as monstrous or supererogatory, I'm trying to say that a broader state of things, which is largely placeholder term, can be considered monstrous when it forces supererogation on people for things to get better at all. — fdrake

When I said that you were shifting agents, I was not imagining that you were not talking about acts. Acts are the acts of an agent, after all.

So what is the object of supererogation? And what is the object of monstrosity? An agent? An act? A broader state of things? Namely, do they have the same genus of object?

And what is a monstrosity after all? Is it anything more than a matter of constraining or compelling?

If it's some kind of intuition pump for you, the background I'm drawing on to delimit the scope of ethical judgements is a heritage of philosophical pessimism, which tends to treat arbitrary things, paradigmatically existence itself, as the kind of thing which can fail or be wanting. I think this is relatively comprehensible, though I wouldn't want to stake my metaphysical career on it. "Things are shit", "Life sucks", perfectly cromulent everyday valuations. I'll trust the type of them is alright. — fdrake

And I would surely disagree with the attribution of moral properties to non-moral realities, but you don't press this angle very hard in the OP, and it is but one piece of a sprawling OP.

At a more general level, while I recognize that modern conceptions of morality produce highly paradoxical tensions, I think this is due to flaws in the moral conceptions themselves. I grant that morality involves tension, but not contradictions.

I apologize if this is a crude strawman, but suppose someone said <We are obliged to be better as a species; we can only become better by compelling supererogation; therefore we are obliged to compel supererogation (and thus we are abandoned to monstrosity)>. I'd say that holes can be picked in either premise quite easily. I'm the ethics teacher who would say, "Oh? Your argument concludes that compelled supererogation is obligatory? You've probably made a mistake somewhere in the argument. Can you show me the steps that got you to the conclusion?"

which you might not like if you're a divine command flavour of Aristotle fan. — fdrake

On the contrary, I find modern morality excessively moral; excessively scrupulous. I don't think you find that extreme in traditional moral approaches, whether religious or philosophical. The organic approaches do not have such sharp edges. For example: you sin, you recognize that you sinned, you go to confession, you make reparation, and you simply move on with your life. I think there is plenty of meta-ethics in the OP, such as the presupposition that "improvement" justifies compelled supererogation. I don't find that extreme presupposition in traditional approaches.

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Edit:

We face the choice between allowing devilry or requiring the angelic, and humanity falls off this tightrope of right action either way. — fdrake

Is that a real dilemma or a faux dilemma? Is every moral philosopher ultimately either proposing that we allow devilry or else that we require the super-human?

- :up:

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I would have thought that "a bachelor is an unmarried male" has a truth-value in L — J

Because you are thinking of it as a proposition, not as the definition of a term. If you make it a definition like so then it has no truth value: "A bachelor is_df an unmarried male."

The difficulty here is that "definition" is equivocal. Lexicographers can err, and in that sense the definitions provided by a dictionary can be true or false. And in the Aristotelian sense a nominal definition can be a better or lesser approximation of the real definition, i.e. the accurate abstraction of the essence. But "definition" in analytic philosophy tends to mean stipulative definition, and stipulative definitions are not true or false. More generally, in a linguistic sense the meaning of a term is not true or false; what is true or false is a proposition that involves multiple terms with a copula.

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Okay, thanks. :up:

Isn't that part of the tension in the OP? — Moliere

As I understand it the OP wants to critique (compelled) supererogation without critiquing obligation. My point there was that I don't see how obligation doesn't fall under the same shadow as supererogation with respect to compulsion, given the argumentation.

This is a thoughtful and stimulating OP, @fdrake. :up:

Other categories may be suggested. A common one concerns going above and beyond, so called “supererogation”. — fdrake

I often find myself saying on TPF, "I'm not convinced that there is any room for supererogation in your moral system."

And that coercion, rightly, monstrous. Giving up all of one’s material wealth to a charity is another example, laudable if someone does it willingly, monstrous if they are compelled to do so at gunpoint. — fdrake

The wrinkle here is that you are shifting agents. Magnanimous giving is supererogatory for the person giving, whereas coerced giving is monstrous for the person coercing.

Regardless of how laudable the soldier or the saint’s actions are, the state of things which compels them to behave in that way consigns such sainthood to the dustbin of the tragic. — fdrake

...And when you phrase it in this way it presents as a single state of affairs with two different possible circumstances. The state of affairs is that he gives a large sum of money, and the two possible circumstances are 1) that he gives money freely and 2) that he gives money under duress. But on a classical view such as Aristotle's these are two starkly different actions, not one action with two possible accidental circumstances. More simply: what makes (1) supererogatory also makes (2) non-supererogatory.

In that regard, an ideology which compels people toward acts of supererogation, to each person’s detriment, would also be monstrous. — fdrake

I agree that "supererogation" should not be coerced or compelled, but I also don't think the scare quotes can be omitted, because I don't think coerced or compelled acts are supererogatory.

A strong constraint on actions will be present... — fdrake

Note that you have here shifted from supererogation to constraint, which are in fact two different concepts. I think this shift is important to canvass and assess, as it matters whether you are arguing against compelled supererogation or just compulsion per se. This relates to the point below about obligation vs. supererogation.

Someone can then be compelled to act in accordance with an ideology by its inherent normative force, rather than the threat of violating it. — fdrake

I.e. One can act without consequentialist motivations.

While this is correct, appealing to the inherent mismatch of ideals with reality is a cop out, and serves as an explanation for any impermissible act consistent with the operative principles of a society that allows it. Which is to say, it exculpates any moral evil imaginable. — fdrake

Sure, but aren't we ignoring the other side of the coin? Namely that appealing to the inherent mismatch of ideals with reality is a cop out, and serves as an explanation for any act inconsistent with the operative principles of a society that disallows it? As in, there was a downside to the French Revolution, and I'm not convinced your construal is able to come to terms with that downside. The promotion of an ideal is not unobjectionably good, given both that there is moral worth to the stability of the status quo, and that false ideals are very often promoted.

Therein lies the rub, if one sacrifices one’s moral imagination against systemic injustice on the altar of practicality, one exculpates all evils. But if one believes that we are required not to forsake it, one believes in an ideology that requires the supererogatory of humans, and is thus monstrous. — fdrake

But your critique of the supererogatory was grounded in coercion and compulsion. I realize you tried to argue that compulsion can be subtle, but if subtle compulsion is monstrous, and every moral belief involves subtle compulsion, then morality is itself monstrous. Ergo: those who think humans should try to be better are monstrous, which strikes me as absurd. Indeed, I believe insufficient attention has been paid to the difference between the obligatory and the supererogatory, given that your critique would apparently make the obligatory equally monstrous.

The crux here may be the question of whether every form of pressure is a form of illicit compulsion, including argument and persuasion, and even expressed normative beliefs. Obviously this is a central concern for individualistic societies.


What I would suggest is missing here is Solzhenitsyn's point:

The line separating good and evil passes not through states, nor between classes, nor between political parties either -- but right through every human heart -- and through all human hearts. This line shifts. Inside us, it oscillates with the years. — The Gulag Archipelago

When the problem is construed as "My moral imagination vs. systemic injustice," one quickly forgets that the line between good and evil is more complicated than that. But feel free to redirect my focus if I am not honing in on the nub you are interested in.

This is a good topic which I was looking into awhile back. See:

But much more is needed—and on a coordinated, national scale—not only to counter traditional disinformation, but also to confront a new and growing concern from abroad. In recent years, hostile foreign state actors have accelerated their efforts to attack all branches of our government, including the judiciary. In some instances, these outside agents feed false information into the marketplace of ideas. For example, bots distort judicial decisions, using fake or exaggerated narratives to foment discord within our democracy. — Chief Justice John Roberts | 2024 Year End Report on the Federal Judiciary

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Would it violate our free speech laws and norms to try to begin to address this problem by making this illegal? Let's put aside the practical difficulties of enforcing a ban. I am mostly concerned here with the question of whether this should be considered the kind of speech that should be protected. Should we protect Russia's right to flood our information spaces with propaganda and disinformation? — petrichor

Foreign actors who are not citizens do not have a right to free speech in the United States. As I understand it, what is more pertinent is the right of U.S. citizens to receive speech, namely the idea that censoring foreign speech could impede a right to receive speech. See:

• The Right to Receive Foreign Speech | Oklahoma Law Review
• Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech At - And Beyond - Our Borders | College of William & Mary Law School

(Granted, we could also talk about internal propaganda as opposed to foreign propaganda, which would generally be protected speech.)

It seems to me that our commitment to freedom of speech has become something of an Achilles' heel for the West — petrichor

I agree.

I don't know where the Supreme Court TikTok case now stands, but that is a case in point.

This is a thread to discuss the current effects of climate change, predictions about its effects, and mitigation efforts.

Anyone interested in debating whether climate change is “real,” or wishes to post things from less than credible sources— there’s a separate thread for that purpose. — Mikie

Logic 101: Someone who denies that climate change is real is discussing the effects of climate change. Their position is that the effect is nil.

Think of this part as the introduction. It is the statement of the issue. The ensuing sections will look at various ways to address it. — Wayfarer

Sounds good. :up:

Maybe petition for a thread called, "New Thread Skepticism," and ask the mods to enforce a rule where everyone who disagrees with Mikie must post there instead of here. Or better yet, ask the mods to create a new forum, "The Other Philosophy Forum," and have them enforce a rule where everyone who disagrees with Mikie must post on that forum instead of this forum. Then you won't have to deal with these pesky disagreements. Because that obviously won't create extra work for moderators! It will "actually save moderators time." :lol:

“let’s stay on topic” — Mikie

TPF doesn't moderate sub-topic premises, such that an OP could set out an ideological premise which is not allowed to be disputed within the thread. The OP's presuppositions are always open to debate as long as they are within the broad topic. Ergo:

Climate change denial is definitely on topic in a generic thread about climate change related issues. — fdrake

In my opinion what you are asking for is a form of evangelization, and contravenes that rule. But even if it isn't evangelization it would still be a request to moderate a sub-topic premise. In other words, what you are proposing is a special stricture on a thread, not a topic.

- At this point I would usually take the trouble of demonstrating that you're an idiot, except for the fact that it is already well-known and this thread is more "proof in the pudding." Go find a climate change safe space and stop pretending at philosophy.

Having a thread which allows for a single stance is directly against the ethos of the forum. — AmadeusD

:up:

If there is, in fact, a state of affairs prior to any mind apprehending it, then that would be 'natural'. For that reason 'objectivity' seems to be a concept which could only apply to consensus. — AmadeusD

Good post Amadeus. I hope I don't derail the thread, but I don't follow the reasoning of your last sentence. Cannot one have objective knowledge apart from a consensus? That even if only one person existed they could still know things objectively? It seems to me that placing objectivity in consensus puts the cart before the horse, and that the most important advances in knowledge tend to ignore the prevailing consensus.

So I would want to say that objectivity implies confirmability, and confirmability implies the plausibility of a consensus; but that to know objectively is something that we are capable of irrespective of any given consensus.

The validity of the prosecutions or the deficiencies of the trial processes for particular defendants has no bearing on the "quasi-coup narrative." — Paine

Sure it does. If 1600 are charged with crimes then the insurrection narrative is plausible. If 95% of those charges are bogus then the insurrection narrative is laughable. It makes an enormous difference.

The liberals never seem to ask themselves why the shenanigans are taking place. "Purely accidental," they tell themselves.

Well, it's only part 1! — Wayfarer

Understood!

I would hope that the reach of the argument is more than simply 'scientism', although that is certainly as aspect of it. — Wayfarer

Yes, and I didn't mean to imply that nothing more than Scientism is at stake. Hopefully the remainder of my post corrected that possible reading. My point about, "Scientism says X," is that I think your project needs more concreteness. Often enough you give your genealogical speech beginning with Descartes, but it feels as if there is no punch line or climactic turn. There needs to be a concrete conclusion, even if it is provisional, e.g., "It all began with Descartes... ...And that is why apple pie is now at risk of going extinct." Apple pie is a big deal, and anyone who slept through the first part will sit up straight and pay close attention once they realize what is at stake. :smile:

My time on TPF is making me wary of "Pontifications from 30,000 feet":

The trouble with the 30,000 foot view is that everyone is right in their own book at 30,000 feet, as it's just a matter of so-called ↪common sense (see my bio quote from Hadot on this point). — Leontiskos

The trick is to say something on the ground level, where people can engage and argue with it. It should be something that moves the needle but does not win the day. Small steps and concrete arguments that are able to carry others along or at least generate meaningful disagreements.

The danger is to simply reiterate over and over a 30,000 foot claim about 400 years of history, instead of breaking it down and moving step by step in a rigorous and transparent way.

And although I probably shouldn't be so frank after our recent political standoff, the reason everyone is wondering about part 2 is because we have all heard part 1 many times, albeit not marshalled so eloquently. In fact it is fairly common to rehearse one's starting point when one has not quite worked out where their ending point is. But I will await the continuation with everyone else (which I am assuming will occur within this thread).