- If you're only concerned with the attack on the police line, then yes.

Did you find nothing at all disconcerting about Gold's testimony?

The cashout of what Gold (and Hochschild) had to say seems to be this: the common conception is that a large number of people were tried, or convicted, or accepted a plea bargain, and therefore a large number of people were involved in criminal activity on January 6, which in turn strengthens the quasi-coup narrative. But it turns out that many of the trials, convictions, and plea bargains were shenanigans, so the common conception begins to break down. And this obviously impacts how one views the pardons.

Do you not find it at all strange that Gold was charged with a 20-year felony for witness tampering and evidence shredding? Or does her past involvement with the anti-vaccine crowd invalidate any questions that might be raised here?

- No, the article does not give a geographical timetable of events in that manner.

Yes. I want to show you my bumper sticker collection. — frank

As a member of TPF I am already familiar with it. :wink:

Those supposed peaceful visitors are not why they got access to the building. — Paine

According to Hochschild police voluntarily let in a number of people on the east side. Are you contradicting him? I was not there, so I don't know for sure. Maybe you were there and you know that the police did no such thing.

- Would you like to say that to me again in the parking lot?

- I refuse, and whoever created it is a liar, for vancho cakes are unmakeable.

It supports the thesis of Hochschild's article that my post referenced:

On the east side, there was no rioting, but plenty of people gathered on the two sets of steps, some conversing with police. Police eventually let them in. Some of those people, a combination of tourists and peaceful protestors, were later arrested, charged, and jailed for trespassing. All to send a message: How dare they threaten Democracy? — Joshua Hochschild, Begging your Pardon

(I.e. there was a lot of political maneuvering involved in the portrayals, events, and sentencing of January 6.)

Even science can only be objective in regard to what is actually observed. Theoretical explanation of what is observed are another matter. — Janus

So are you claiming that theoretical explanation is not within the purview of science?

It seems I'm talking about science, and you are talking about philosophy. — Janus

I think there is all manner of bleed between the two spheres.

I watched it to the end. — Paine

Okay, well thanks for that.

The claims amount to something like "I was shoplifting for a couple of hours in the store but saw nobody getting hurt." — Paine

Not sure what you're talking about. Are you claiming that her prepared speech was inciting?

Then what is the value of her testimony measured against all the violence that was filmed and reported upon by others? — Paine

Your video was completely non sequitur and this comment is a non-starter. Gold is not claiming that no violence occurred on January 6. Hochschild obviously does not claim that either. They are contextualizing a common narrative. Two things can be true at the same time, after all.

- I would suggest you ask yourself the question, "Is she lying? Or is my interpretation missing something? Is there a more plausible conclusion to draw?"

I googled her and found the Guardian article — Wayfarer

I offered you a direct interview of eyewitness testimony so you would have an opportunity to cease your post hoc rationalization with your favorite ideological sources. I guess you prefer that ideology to such an extent that you can't even listen to eyewitness testimony. Such is prejudice in the extreme.

- You have to listen to someone and correctly interpret them if you are to call them a liar with any degree of seriousness. Your inability to fairly interpret Gold's statements is quite remarkable. Probably there is no desire for a fair interpretation in the first place.

- I think you have to listen to someone before you call them a liar, just as you have to read philosophy before you draw conclusions about it.

And, answer the question! — Wayfarer

Watch the video if you want to have a discussion of the video. I think this is a good opportunity for you to do some critical thinking rather than just jumping to the conclusion that folks are outright lying.

- Did you watch the video I posted? I don't know how to discuss the testimony found in a video with folks who haven't watched the video. I don't find anywhere in that video where Gold claims that no violence or rioting occurred on January 6. I think that was a convenient interpretation for Wayfarer's preconceptions. It allowed him to dismiss the video without watching it, and now he wants to discuss a video he didn't watch.

Doing a bit more digging on this Simone Gold: she was arrested for participating. — Wayfarer

So you didn't finish watching the video. It seems like watching it might have threatened your preconceived notions, so you decided not to.

I've asked the question many times as to what 'including the subject' could look like in the sciences that investigate the non-human. — Janus

And I gave you two examples: the novelty of parasitic reference in modern logic and the yielding of Schopenhauer's dynamism to Wittgenstein's mirror. Russell, Quine, and (early) Wittgenstein are examples of the neglect of subjectivity, and the two papers in question underline that point.

Yes. — Wayfarer

Well that must be it. She had an experience of violent rioting but said she had a peaceful experience because she's just a big old liar. That was easy. Convenient, too.

Leaving aside the riot, are you a fellow traveler of the anti-vaccine crowd Gold hung out with back in the day? — Paine

This sort of ad hominem is something I don't often see from you, but I suppose we're in a political thread.

I listened to that interview right up to where the speaker said 'it was completely peaceful'. She says, as a witness, no violence, kumbaya. — Wayfarer

I would suggest listening further. Do you think she was lying? Why do you think she said it was peaceful?

It seems perfectly obvious that our ideas and beliefs are both neural processes, and that they are held for reasons both valid and invalid, sound and unsound, and that they are all defeasible. — Janus

The way that the modern period in its progression has encountered the perennial problem of universals seems to be as follows:

1. If knowledge is objective, then it isn't subjective.
2. If knowledge is subjective, then it isn't objective.

(KO → ~KS)
(And the bijection also tends to hold)

What happens is that on this view in order to secure the objectivity of knowledge one must never talk about the subjectivity of the knower, and the subjectivity of the knower thus becomes a black hole. This neglect of subjective realities such as belief, intention, and conscience leads to the erosion and opacity of those realities in these philosophical paradigms. For example, Klima's paper on Anselm is more about this than what was actually discussed in the thread, for the inability of modern logic to conceptualize parasitic reference is a direct consequence of its abandoning subjectivity and intention. See also Simpson's critique of Wittgenstein.

Note too via Klima's paper how parasitic reference (and an explicit recognition of subjective intentionality via ampliation) secures rational commensurability between interlocutors, whereas the opacity of subjective intentionality and theories of reference that can't account for it lead very quickly to incommensurable gulfs between interlocutors. That is but one of the problems with the lack of subjectivity in the modern period: an inability to reckon with disagreements between subjects; for disagreement brings out the crucial fact that subjects are involved, and it does this in an especially quick and potent way.

Hard to parse that, but you're apparently claiming that the meaningfulness of arguments is what makes a definition meaningful. — noAxioms

So in the first place it's a straightforward biconditional, and should be parsed as such:

"The term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful."

And how does one oppose a biconditional? The same basic way they oppose a conditional: by providing a counterexample of one side obtaining without the other.

Not sure if I can agree — noAxioms

And so if you want to disagree you have to provide that counterexample. You can either show how the term could be meaningful even if arguments over the meaning of existence are not meaningful, or you could show how arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful even if the term is not meaningful.

This is also what @J is required to do if he wishes to answer objections to his claims.

It’s exactly consistent with the ethos of the forum — Mikie

I find 's point more persuasive than your assertion.

and actually saves moderators time. — Mikie

I find 's post more persuasive than your assertion.

-

More evidence continues to emerge from eyewitnesses about the actual events and procedures surrounding January 6. More and more it looks like Hochschild's direct contacts were more reliable than mainstream outlets.

...to be continued — Wayfarer

I think this is a helpful and concise outline of your project, Wayfarer. :up:

In general, though, I am always left with the question of what exactly your thesis is. I would like something clear, like, "Scientism says X, but I say ~X," or, "I say X and Scientism would altogether disagree with me."

Because very often it seems that we are left with a wide-ranging modus tollens. For example:

1. If X is true, then "we ourselves are not part of [the truth we know]."
2. But that can't be right.
3. Therefore, X must be false.

X could be Scientism, or Realism, or some variety of Objectivism; but whatever it is, this overarching argument rebukes it. Now this isn't actually such a bad argument, but most all of your opponents are going to reject (1). I think the key is therefore to find an X such that a proponent of X would not reject (1). On my view this would be a thinker who says that humans are capable of objective knowledge despite the fact that humans possess no special capacity to know truth (e.g. some varieties of eliminative materialism). More simply: that humans are capable of objective knowledge and are no qualitatively different than the lower animals. More generally: that humans are capable of objective knowledge and yet are themselves opaque to investigation. This niche is where I agree with your project, but I disagree when you go farther and make X = Realism.

Let me add that the reason it is not a bad argument is because (2) is persuasive, namely because self-knowledge should be epistemically accessible. But it is worth adding at the same time that self-knowledge is also difficult and elusive, and therefore the fact that X abandons the difficult task is in some ways understandable.

I like the idea of a to this issue, but one-off requests that lack overall consistency with the ethos of the forum, and which create lots of extra work for moderators do not seem like a great option. At some point you're looking for a think tank rather than a philosophy forum.

Do you guys think the thread suggested demands an acceptance that one's ideology is the only one worth having, or do you distinguish it from this rule? — Hanover

This is the right question. :up:

Positions on climate change are ideological. The TPF taboos are also ideological, but whereas a taboo against Holocaust denial is ideological, there are significant differences in the international Overton window with respect to these two issues. I don't see how an international website should impose local taboos on an international user base.

(Note that words like 'ideology' and 'taboo' are here being used in a technical, non-pejorative sense.)

I had to look that one up — noAxioms

The Possibilism-Actualism Debate | SEP

Could you provide links to the resources you consulted before writing your OP? I'm trying to understand where you are coming from.

So what are the arguments against? Without begging the principle being questioned, what contradiction results from its rejection? — noAxioms

I'm not convinced that self-contradiction is a great way to look at it, given that Meinong and his opponents are not usually accused of self-contradiction. A better approach to disputed questions would probably be to present rationale and arguments pro and con, Medieval style.

- Okay. I shouldn't have assumed.

The thesis <There is a living NWR presence on our Earth at some implied moment in time>, which leverages a specific definition of 'exists', and there plenty of alternative definitions, as you seem to point out. So I left the word out of my version of the thesis statement. — noAxioms

So do you agree with my claim that the term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful? I assume we agree that by removing the word “exists” you did not remove the concept of existence from the proposition.

I picked a position where predication does not require existence (with 'exists' not clearly defined). I am looking for a contradiction arising from that premise, a contradiction that does not beg the principle that such cannot be the case. — noAxioms

I agree with you. I don’t think Quinian Actualism is defensible. I haven’t seen anyone who promotes that view other than @J, and I haven't seen him offer real arguments for his position.

The obvious answer being 'yes', so I instinctively look for some definition that allows them to exist in the same way. Both are arguably mental assessments. That's a similarity, but the former is arguably not just that, so I still fail. — noAxioms

Sure, but I would want to remember that we can always think of a definition of "exists" in which that proposition is made either true or false. But if our definitions are arbitrary then it makes no difference, and this seems to prove that not all definitions are on a par. For an example of an arbitrary definition, we could say that "exists" means "able to be conceived," on which definition it is false that <Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist> (given that both are able to be conceived). But again, arbitrary definitions are of no help in resolving real questions.

The thing I'd want most is for people to be able to state a reason why posts are reported. — fdrake

That’s a fairly modest request. :sweat:

In general I think part of the essence of a moderator is the possession of coercive force. Because the average Plush moderator can only delete a post or a thread, their ability to wield coercive force is highly limited, and hence their authority is also quite limited.

As much as this would help remove perceived trolls from discussions, it would also act as a vehicle for trolling. — fdrake

I definitely think the forming of cliques could become a problem, and perhaps also a kind of indirect trolling. I think you would need rules such as, “No quoting or referencing users who are not permitted to post in the thread.” But enforcing that would of course introduce new moderation costs.

For me a philosophy forum is in essence a place where I can go to create or enter a thread on a philosophical topic and earnestly engage with other users on that topic. The feature I proposed would allow one to do such a thing. Bad actors could not derail threads, even if they could still troll from afar. This is but another modest goal, and the feature requires no immediate moderation. To give one prominent example, currently on TPF there is so much anti-religious trolling that a user who wants to create a religious thread is effectively prevented from doing so. The effort would be futile.

On my view if someone wants to have an earnest philosophical discussion, and they have the power to invite others who are interested in the same goal and exclude those who undermine that goal, then earnest philosophical discussions will occur. This is exactly why many of us prefer private message groups or real life groups over conversations in the trollspaces.

I think it's better to ignore sub-discussions that aren't to your interest. — fdrake

In the real-world parallel this would be like saying that one should just ignore the protesters who are yelling during the meeting. It’s possible in theory but not in practice. Granted, the ignore extension is great, and almost every user responds appropriately to being ignored, namely by slowly ceasing to engage with the person who is not responding to them. (Although I agree with you that a native Plush ignore feature would be better.)

The problem of limited moderation is a general problem that the internet needs to think harder about. There are all sorts of societal precedents. A simple one is the very concept of “disturbing the peace,” which is basically, “Conduct and self-moderate your behavior appropriately or else you receive a vague, general, and low-moderation-cost infraction.” A more complex one from older legal systems is, “If you bring a facetious suit against someone, you pay the price you intended to inflict.” Or in forum language, “If you don’t have a damn good reason to report a post, you will be punished for creating an undue burden on the moderators.”* In my proto-forum I drew up a rule where users who make petty reports would simply lose their ability to report posts. Those sorts of rules are intended to protect the moderators’ time, and they are intended to sustain systems with limited legal/moderation resources.

If TPF moves onto a newer forum system I would be happy to help write open source plugins that aim to achieve a lighter moderator load. Indeed, if I host my own forum the software will be chosen primarily according to its ability to leverage user plugins and foster healthy internet environments that are more effective for users and especially moderators. Large forum softwares like Discourse or NodeBB have a large number of contributing developers who can collaboratively spit out features like this at the drop of a dime. Anyway, the point here is that moderator burnout should not be inevitable.

Do you have any thoughts on ways to lighten moderator load to avoid burnout or disillusionment?

* Incidentally, anonymous post-flagging strikes me as an insanely bad feature.

mispost

I think it works well when the teachers are properly trained and prepared, but the danger comes when success is seen in the ideal circumstances, and then those who unprepared jump on the bandwagon. Ideally what needs to happen is that classical teaching approaches need to be integrated into more colleges and universities that offer degrees in K-12 education. An interesting development.

That I can answer with 'no'. Yes, there might be a truth (maybe), but if there is one, is there a way to determine it? I think not since multiple valid interpretations will always be avaliable. The best appeal one can make is to logical consistency and simplicity. — noAxioms

<Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist>

Does that proposition have no truth value? @noAxioms? @J?

In philosophy it is common to confuse oneself by conflating something that is not obvious with something that is impossible. When two philosophers offer two different accounts of existence, it is hard to discern who is correct (if anyone). But if you take from that the idea that no existence claims are truth-apt, then I think you have fallen into all sorts of absurdities.

• "The Northern White Rhino exists."
• "Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist."
• "Jimmy Carter no longer exists."

Moving from what is not obvious to a generalization of the impossible would commit us to the absurd claims that these propositions are not truth-apt. It's a bit like saying, "The Riemann Hypothesis has no obvious truth value, therefore mathematical claims are not truth-apt, therefore 2+2=4 is not truth-apt."

(What is likely happening is a form of Empiricism which only permits a narrow form of justification. But those forms of Empiricism are reliably self-defeating. Just because two people are arguing doesn't mean neither one is right.)

- I gave two in the post above with this quote. Click to the thread and links will be included:

If that is right, you may be interested in Gyula Klima's "Contemporary 'Essentialism' vs. Aristotelian Essentialism," where he compares a Kripkean formulation of essentialism to an Aristotelian formulation of essentialism, and includes formal semantics for signification and supposition, which involves the notion of inherence. Paul Vincent Spade also has an informal piece digging into the metaphysical differences between the two conceptions, "The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics: How to Get Started on Some Big Themes." — Leontiskos

David Oderberg also writes a fair bit on this topic, e.g. "How to Win Essence Back from Essentialists." Banno also has an old thread on a paper of Kit Fine's, which I believe to be too conservative.

Edit: Banno's claim that the Medievals lacked a "modal first order language" betrays a very curious form of ignorance. At bottom is the fact that Medievals were explicitly uncomfortable separating natural language from logic in the way that someone like Frege, Russell, or Quine was wont to do, and therefore they did not arrive at artificial constructs like possible worlds semantics. Such artificial constructs (and their weaknesses) flow from the idea that logic and natural language can be separated. To take one example, modal logic was highly developed by the late Medieval period, but it was not reified into rigidly formal constructs. Cf. "Natural Logic, Medieval Logic and Formal Semantics."

- This thread is obviously an extension of your anti-Medieval tack from my thread on St. Anselm's Proof. An anti-Medieval tack is not problematic in itself, but it needs to be more than posturing. Here is what you said in your penultimate post from that thread:

Again, possible world semantics shows us were we have been led astray. — Banno

If you think that possible world semantics solves some problem that the Medievals could not solve without it, then you have to set out the problem, their solution, and the alternative possible worlds solution. Or as Bongo said in response:

but we can be much clearer here using modal first order language than was possible in medieval times. — Banno

How does possible world semantics restore coherence in the face of referential opacity?

Asking for a friend. — bongo fury

Now it is fairly well established that Quine's understanding of Aristotelian essentialism was highly superficial. But you are welcome to try to do the work that Quine failed to do: set out a robust and well-referenced account of the solution that you find lackluster, and then show how your own possible worlds solution is supposed to be an improvement. As Bongo alludes to, I don't recall Quine seeing possible worlds semantics as being especially promising or advancing. Ironically, much of the recent neo-Aristotelianism flows from a growing dissatisfaction with the artificiality of possible worlds semantics. We are slowly correcting modern errors, first with Kripke's modal form of essentialism, and then moving with Fine and Klima towards more traditional and robust forms of essentialism, that do not rely on the overrated device of possible worlds. You seem to be stuck in positivistic decades that have been largely superseded by a hearkening back to richer philosophical traditions.

-

Quine occupies a curious position in the history of philosophy, with antecedents in Pragmatism but with sympathies very similar to the linguistic philosophy of Russell and Wittgenstein, and an attitude not so far from that of the Vienna Circle. — Banno

No, not the history of philosophy, but rather the history of 20th century Anglo philosophy. Again, one must read books written before 1900 if they are to make claims about the history of philosophy, and this very recent tradition you are immersed in is virtually unknown outside of the English-speaking world. If you have no knowledge of Medieval philosophy it's hard to understand why you make so many claims about it. It's a bit like the cat-lover who has never seen a dog and yet goes around telling everyone how much bigger and better cats are than dogs.

- Yes, that seems fairly accurate to me. :up:

The takeaway is that parasitic reference is possible, that it is based on an intentional theory of reference, that it is different from modern conceptions such as Kripke's, that it helps resolve some of the disputes about possibilism, etc.

- I should point out that your OP is very much related to my recent reading group on parasitic reference, which offers one kind of alternative to Meinong's theory, namely a medieval alternative (i.e. "ampliation"). See also Lukáš Novák's, "Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?"

That is, apart from usefulness in laying out a metaphysics, is there a truth of the matter? — J

Suppose two scientists are arguing over whether the Northern White Rhino still exists (which is at least an endangered species). The thesis in question is <The Northern White Rhino exists>.

Now is the term "exists" meaningful within that thesis-proposition? Because I would contend that such a term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful. Specifically, if you want to say that an argument over the meaning of existence is not meaningful or substantial or truth-apt, then I would contend that you must also say that the term "exists" as found within the scientific thesis is unmeaningful.

But perhaps the deeper issue here is your hangup with "metaphysical superglue," as if truth could apply to a term and not a proposition. Term-tokens do not have inherent meaning or truth, and the term-token e-x-i-s-t-e-n-c-e is no exception.

And, clearly, I'm doubtful if my wish can be granted. — J

The difficulty is that you don't seem to be asking a meaningful question at all. Even your claim that some recommendation can be "sensible" and yet "nothing can be said in its favor" looks to lack coherence. I grant your claim that "X exists" is different from "X is a table," but I'm not sure what that claim is supposed to prove.

- Yes, "derailment for thee but not for me." But it's good to know that no one takes your historical claims seriously. Try reading a book written before the 20th century. It will help you understand your very limited and naive perspective.

Can we please have mod attention to this persistent failure on Leon's part to address the topic at hand, and to indulge in personal insults directed at me? — Banno

They should also go back and address all the crap that Banno littered my thread with.