But philosophy did not stop at Aristotle, or even Aquinas. They are interesting, even fun, but not necessary. — Banno

Do you think there are philosophers who are more necessary than Plato and Aristotle?

It's interesting to me that you often complain (with Midgley) about the sorry state of philosophy, but I'm not sure you have a remedy to hand. Now, I've no doubt that folks like Hare and Wittgenstein are better at resisting the problems than their contemporaries, but they are at the same time enmeshed in the same sorts of problems that tend to plague 20th century English-speaking philosophy.

But teaching this stuff formally, as part of the curriculum, is unnecessary and probably counterproductive. Only some folk will have the stomach for it. The rest will reject it. — Banno

As an analogy, a society without cabinetmakers will tend to be comparatively lacking in all that relates to quality cabinets. Sure - others can fill in the gaps. General carpenters and those who specialize in other disciplines can manage to throw together a cabinet in a pinch, and these cabinets will be more or less passable. But without the specialization and its outflow into the society a lacuna will form.

Actually in our age of hyper-specialization overarching disciplines like philosophy become especially important. I think you are over-associating philosophy with logic, but even in the case of logic the analogy holds. For example, Scientism is full of scientists who "throw together logic in a pinch," and it's not so much that their logic is incorrect, but rather that it's incomplete, and they end up mistaking logic for scientific logic. When those disciplines which anchor all disciplines—such as logic—become unmoored and conflated with sub-disciplines, then all of the sub-disciplines that rely on the anchor suffer.

For the sake of argument: Why couldn’t the dictator genuinely believe that it’s rational to advocate dominance over others? In that case, he’d be offering what he perceives to be genuine arguments in his favor. The other case is the one you’re imagining: The dictator tries to get the better of others by using rhetoric, specious arguments, etc.

In fact, the more I think about it, the more I think Habermas wants us to imagine the first, “genuine” type of dictator. Remember, the key point is the rationality of the position. Anyone can try to dominate others by false rhetorical tactics, and those tactics needn’t be rational in the least. What we want to know is, if the dictator is willing to argue for his actual ethical stance, and claim that his use of shabby, irrational pseudo-arguments is a completely rational means to his ends, could he do it without contradiction? — J

You place on the one hand the dictator who "tries to get the better of others by using rhetoric, specious arguments," and on the other hand the dictator who uses, "shabby, irrational pseudo-arguments [as] a completely rational means to his ends." They seem like the same thing, not two different things.

More precisely, I would say that the one who is willing to argue for his position in good faith is not a dictator or a sophist. But then there is Thrasymachus:

This would be the dissimulating type, above. But consider Thrasymachus again – is he dissimulating? (He’s not a sophist, of course.) I read his arguments as entirely sincere. Indeed, if he’d thought about them more carefully, and taken a better measure of Socrates, he’d have either kept silent or come up with another plan to get his own way (or show off his rhetorical chops!); being sincere didn't work. I’m not too comfortable saying that Socrates reveals a performative contradiction in Thrasymachus’ position, but he certainly reveals that position as undefendable, at least by Thrasymachus, and even causes him to blush with shame. — J

Thrasymachus begins by dissimulating, but he gets called out. He is the sophist who proves unsuccessful in the face of Socrates' strength, and what occurs is a partial reformation (with the blushing and whatnot). Also, at 344d the group self-polices Thrasymachus' sophistry, and this is one of the things that injures the sophistic tactics. By pushing Thrasymachus into the defense of sophistry (a kind of meta-sophistry) Socrates ends up achieving a small victory. But sophists don't usually meet such skillful or generous interlocutors.

The end of self-flattery and the end of manipulation are both injurious to the end of the love of wisdom, and are therefore contrary to ethical discourse. For Thrasymachus the manipulation gets opposed and cut short, but I think it is clear that it would normally be in play.

Very interesting. For me, this raises a characteristically modern ethical problem: To what extent is this kind of judgment possible? The analogy with a basketball game places the referee above the intersubjective system (the game), but is this really the case? In one sense, he’s the judge, and his call on a particular play is authoritative; he doesn’t require everyone to agree with him. But in another sense, the referee is completely at the mercy of the rules, to the extent that he’s an accurate and fair judge. — J

Well that's just it: the sophist is not an accurate or fair judge. He permits himself to do what is impermissible, and unless others are able to shift into the role of the referee the game will dissolve. When sophistry reigns unchecked entire nations can be swallowed up in corruption and strife. The rules need to be enforced, else they may as well not exist.

Habermas wants the rules of his “game” to arise from “transcendental/pragmatic” intersubjective agreement. The transcendental part is important. This isn’t just a matter of consensus. We’re supposed to understand communicative rationality as invoking certain background conditions that are necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) for rationality to exist. It then becomes pragmatic, because we agree on ways to apply such rationality in our time, in our circumstances. — J

I would welcome the idea that Habermas is open to transcending intersubjectivity and/or consensus, but it remains true that if Habermas is not able to definitively judge someone like the first-person dictator then I don't see how the transcendental part will help him. The transcendental part must be brought to bear, and Kant does bring it to bear in his prohibition on lying. Kant gives a valid argument for why the sophist cannot lie (whether or not it is sound). That sort of thing is what is required. And so the question recurs, "In virtue of what does Habermas' obligation apply to the dictator?"

What is the difference between the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" and Kant's Kingdom of Ends? — javra

As I have pointed out numerous times, Kant has no "Kingdom of Ends" in the way that you use that term. Kant is not a utopian who thinks that we need to resort to violence to bring about his utopia. This is, again, the opposite of what Kant thinks. Therefore your question makes no sense to me. You are taking a consequentialist maxim and trying to make it Kantian.

And how do you view this stipulated end as differing from Kant's Kingdom of Ends? — javra

It is the end that you stipulated. To minimize harm and maximize harmony is obviously not the same as treating everyone as an end in themselves.

Again, your "Kingdom of Ends" seems to be internally contradictory. You want to have a kingdom of ends in which not everyone is treated as an end. If you really think this is Kantian you will have to provide the quote from Kant, for it is prima facie implausible to think that Kant would hold that a "Kingdom of Ends" can justify the means of, say, violence. Kant's whole system is based on the idea that the end does not justify the means. Your whole system is based on the idea that the end justifies the means.

- Means toward the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony."

(I added an edit to my last post to try to more directly address your question about contradictions.)

Perplexity does not equate to the occurrence of contradictions — javra

Sure it does. "An agent is perplexed if she is unable to avoid acting immorally" (). It is to find oneself in the situation where what is right and what is wrong converge into one thing, and given that "right" and "wrong" are mutually exclusive this produces a contradiction. The very fact that your system results in perplexity shows that it involves contradictory principles.

Yet an affirmation of X does not of itself justify X being true. — javra

On the contrary, to affirm X is to say that X is true.

And I so far find no contradictions in what I’ve previously stated: Again, given the exact same distal intent of, say, minimizing harm and maximizing harmony, the use of violence as means of obtaining this very same distal intent can be simultaneously right in proximal application (wherein far greater harm/disharmony is thereby avoided) and yet remain wrong in distal terms (for an absolute harmony cannot be of itself produced via violence); therefore being simultaneously right and wrong but in different respects. — javra

You have two ends: to survive, and to not-use violence. To use violence as a means to survival is to contradict your second end.

Now if you rewrite your system and say that you're only trying to "minimize harm and maximize harmony," then these two things which were formally ends now become means. You are of course free to retract your earlier system and do this, but on your earlier system you claimed that do-not-use-others-as-a-means was an ultimate end. Given that you transgressed this ultimate end (with violence), you were contradicting yourself. Note too that the rewriting dissolves the perplexity along with the contradictions.

Am I mistaken in understanding the quote to conclude that my arguments make use of contradictions? And does not a contradiction require that incongruent givens simultaneously occur in the same respect? — javra

To never-use-violence and to use-violence-as-a-means contradict one another in the same respect. If they don't then I would suggest that on your view such contradiction is logically impossible, and could not occur in any circumstance. Similarly, the perplexity-contradiction is a contradiction of non-hypothetical ought-judgments, and two contradictory non-hypothetical ought-judgments contradict one another "in the same respect."

If we agree that indeed, wanting to buy a phone for non-financial reasons may lead to the financial decision of buying a phone, then we can apply that to "moral judgements" defined in the OP. "Moral judgements" are non-hypothetical ought-judgements, and would parallel with the financial decision of buying a phone. If we non-financial motivations can lead to a financial decision, can't non-moral motivations lead to us making a "moral judgement"? — Judaka

The question at hand is whether your analogy is apt. Perhaps you should attempt to give an example of a non-moral decision.

I more or less agree with this, though as I say, I don't know if I'm agreeing on Habermas's behalf or not. — J

Right, and I have more familiarity with your own thinking than Habermas, although I recognize that it was formed by Habermas.

But only some, unless we take a very cynical view of "reaching an understanding." — J

Right.

Also, the term "first-person dictator" can be a little misleading. The dictator is not imagined as doing what real-life dictators mostly do, which is, as you say, commanding and threatening. The first-person dictator position is an ethical stance, which claims that it's perfectly rational for me to try to get other people to do what I want, as far as possible. This desire needn't be fulfilled only by standard dictatorial tactics. In part this is why I think it's plausible that Habermas might be picturing the first-person dictator as being willing to stay engaged in communicative action. — J

Good. Yes, I understand this, and I think my points apply to this more specific kind of dictator, but I wanted you to enunciate the more specific kind. I take it that this more specific kind of dictator is a sophist or propagandist, engaged in duplicity or dissimulation, which are often included as a form of lying.

Staying with Plato, Thrasymachus could be said to espouse the first-person dictator position. It's often been asked, Why does Thrasymachus, given his views, bother talking in the agora at all? (Pride in his rhetorical skills, perhaps.). For Habermas, I think Thrasymachus is an example of a first-person dictator who wants to convince others that his views are correct, but is in performative contradiction by doing so. — J

Yes, but I think the motive you gave is more substantial: "To get other people to do what I want." Of course in Plato's time the two came together: the sophist got what they wanted (money) by way of teaching "philosophy" (rhetoric).

The difficulty with the sophist is that they are slippery, namely because they wish to appear to be engaging in "communicative action," when in fact they are not, and thus their modus operandi is dissimulation. Their very words are a kind of Trojan Horse capable of undermining ethical discourse.

On my view the democratic man holds intersubjectivity as the democratic virtue par excellence, and Habermas is a democratic man (and there are important ways that Kant is not a democratic man). The democratic man is thus concerned with fair, cooperative play. But what the democratic man has difficulty accessing is The Judge, and this relates to "the paradox in ethics" I gestured towards above. Now, if ethical discourse is a game of basketball, then while the democratic man will be zealous that everyone should follow the rules, his worldview gives him no power to enforce the rules. Enforcement requires a judge who is above the intersubjective system (a referee) and whose judgments are not accountable to the canons of intersubjectivity.*

Without a judge the sophist can play to the crowd, generate an intersubjective "understanding" (in the cynical sense), and have The Philosopher executed. Obviously Aristotle, and especially Plato, are good at pointing to the shortcomings of democracy. Note too that the judge need not be externalized. The participants can self-police, but it remains true that the act of policing or judgment is categorically different from an act of communicative action. In effect, communicative action depends for its existence on the non-communicative action of judging (in both the sense of policing and in the broader sense of judging truth-claims; judging intent and judging assertions). The integrity of the intersubjective project will paradoxically depend on the ability of participants to make definitive—and to that extent non-communicative—judgments. This is basically Kierkegaard's distinction between the crowd and the church in his Attack upon Christendom.


* Adverting to our private conversation, the judge's assertion is the assertion of an individual apart from an intersubjective consensus, and thus requires an internalist epistemology. The intersubjective participants are accountable to The Judge, and the judge is accountable to internal criteria of truth, such as justification. This is also the case whenever an individual engages in everyday judgments, even though they use a common language to form those judgments.

Facts are not skills. Which is why I support philosophy as a fundamental pillar of education. And yet many nations or education systems do not offer philosophy as a primary or secondary level module. If it were up to me it would be mandatory and fostered from an early age.

I think the issue is that many assessments are based on an objective points based system. If "Fact X,Y or Z" is mentioned then assign 1, 2 or 3 points to said exam response.

This is not learning, it's a memory test. — Benj96

I do think the U.S. is too opposed to philosophy, but the problem with your proposal is that "philosophy" is an incredibly elusive term. I would follow Lloyd Gerson in defining it in terms of Plato's wake, but many would disagree with me. So perhaps philosophy is a prophylaxis against propaganda; it's just that we will never be able to agree on what "philosophy" should mean.

At the risk of being deemed Godless thus evil (or, far worse, a socialist), I strongly feel that the wellbeing and health of all children needs to be of genuine importance to us all. — FrankGSterleJr

I don't know that anyone would disagree with you. It is always a question of how to achieve such a goal.

Yes, this is similar to the first point that White raises when he pushes back on Habermas's communicative action schema: "Is the obligation to provide justification really a necessary one (does it have to follow from the idea of communicative action itself)?" I think you're pointing to an ambiguity in Habermas (or Habermas as I've been presenting him; I may be the one who doesn't read him clearly). It's this: Are we being asked to imagine the dictator, say, simply stating their position and then refusing further discussion? Or are we supposed to imagine this person arguing for the position? This would seem to make a big difference along the lines you're wondering about. At what point does the schema begin? If I say, "I am not making a claim within the context of communicative action," have I already performatively contradicted myself, according to Habermas? — J

I am thinking of something even more basic:

• Communicative action is "speech-action oriented to reaching an understanding among participants in a dialogue..."
• The dictator is not engaged in any speech-action oriented to reaching an understanding among participants...
• Therefore, the dictator is not engaged in communicative action, and does not bear the obligations that communicative action incurs.

To advert to Plato, the tyrant or the sophist does not "play by the same rules" as the others. The very word, "dictator," belies something foreign to Habermas' presuppositions. To dictate is not to dialogue or argue, and so if communicative action has to do with dialogue then it seems that the dictator is not interested. In virtue of what does Habermas' obligation apply to the dictator? Does Habermas believe that the dictator's use of language to command or threaten, rather than to dialogue, is a legitimate use of language?

(What's curious to me in the phrasing of the OP is not so much that Habermas' ethical principle seems to lack teeth, but rather that it doesn't even seem to self-consistently apply to the dictator. In order to apply to the dictator it would need to apply to speech-acts which are not self-consciously communicative/dialogical acts, and this is precisely what it cannot do. Kant's ethical principle against lying is relevant precisely because it manages to logically apply to the dictator, and this is because the genus to which Kant applies his principle is 'statements', which in no way depend on the speaker intending a "communicative action." Crucially, Kant is willing to appeal to a higher order than intersubjectivity, and he is willing to invoke a higher moral theory than intentionalism. Because the dictator is only required to state or assert, and a lie is a statement, therefore it follows (on Kant's logic) that the dictator's lies are impermissible regardless of intention. Habermas seems to be coming up short against the paradox in ethics whereby prohibitions would seem to be unethical insofar as they tend to go beyond their own seemingly-absolute rules. Namely, to enforce or even assert the obligation that Habermas wishes to assert is, in some sense, to already have gone beyond communicative action (and intersubjectivity/intentionalism). I would suggest that this is a significant problem, and one which leads to an undue "softness." Note that this also represents a practical problem on TPF insofar as moderators must decide what is beyond the pale, and who should be banned.)

If someone had constant thoughts and fantasies about raping, torturing, killing etc people that they may or may not enjoy but were perfectly moral in the real world (either for its own sake or from fear of consequences of acting on said fantasies) is it reasonable to describe such thoughts as evil? — Captain Homicide

Classically one becomes culpable for an evil thought to the extent that one wills it. So a thought of rape that is in no way willed or assented to is not an evil act, but to assent or intend such thoughts is an evil act. Even on materialism, although the evil act does not harm another, it does harm oneself and inclines oneself towards acts of rape.

Interesting thread, . I am not overly familiar with Habermas, although I understand some of this broad themes.

This is because, as Habermas writes, there is a “speech-act-immanent obligation to provide justification” for any claim raised within the context of communicative action. — J

I am wondering what reason we have to think that the first-person dictator and the free rider are engaged in what Habermas calls "communicative action."* It seems to me that such persons are explicitly intending to not participate in "communicative action." They wish to be uncooperative, not cooperative. Therefore they don't seem to have the obligation you speak of. They would say, "I am not raising a claim within the context of communicative action, and therefore I have no such obligation."

Coming at this from a different angle, I am curious to see an argument you would give in favor of the Habermasian position, and I am specifically interested to see how (if at all) it deviates from Kantianism. For example, Kant's justification for the impermissibility of lies seems to be nothing more than an appeal to "communicative action."

* You define communicative action as, "speech-action oriented to reaching an understanding among participants in a dialogue concerning practical or prudential ends."

Say I've got the option to buy a new phone to replace my old one, but don't wish to, and claim "It's not due to financial reasons". Though the act of buying a phone is clearly related to my finances and would be a financial decision, I'd have meant that my decision was motivated instead by other factors. — Judaka

The question is then whether one can say that, "My decision was instead motivated by non-moral factors," which according to the OP would entail that it involves no non-hypothetical ought-judgment.

To keep things short, I don't find that my account of ethics would make any sense whatsoever were it to in fact incorporate "contradictions", which I do not find my account to incorporate: At no juncture in my account can there ever be something that is both right and wrong at the same time and in the same respect. — javra

Here is what I said:

The problem is that your system contains internal contradictions, and framing Kantianism in terms of consequence-ends is already a contradiction that Kant would not have accepted. These contradictions are producing further contradictions, such as the idea that violence is compatible with a "Kingdom of Ends." — Leontiskos

So, for example, on your scheme violence is simultaneously right and wrong. It is right qua survival and it is wrong qua using-another-as-a-means. The problem is that your principles are not necessarily in sync, and in certain cases they oppose one another (and lead to perplexity). So you could do what most perplexity-views do and weight your principles, but before that you would need to admit that you have two principles in the first place (i.e. that "survival" is distinct from a prohibition on violence).

It doesn't matter that something is not right and wrong in the same respect; such is not needed to produce perplexity. It only matters that something be simultaneously right and wrong.

I see that I was addressing many presumptions which are not shared. This for instance. By "obstacle" I naturally assumed that that which stands in the way and thereby impedes is/was unforeseen. Otherwise I'd simply view it as part of the terrain to be traveled. If I see a house between me and the house's backyard to which I want to get to, I don't then discern the house to be an obstacle in my path. But if I expect the backyard gate to be unlocked when in fact it is, this I might then consider something that impedes my intended progress. — javra

On the contrary, in charting a path to a destination one will be apt to identify obstacles. So if I chart a path that must cross a river, and I look for a bridge, I am already considering the river as an obstacle which must be overcome. Obstacles are not necessarily unforeseen. Often we consider obstacles before deciding whether to "travel."

Every voyage toward a destination is, consciously or unconsciously, idealized to go as expected or planed, i.e. for the circumstances to be as one best foresees, and thereby idealizes, them. If I take a flight from A to Z, unexpected weather conditions might have it that I get detoured and delayed. Or that I never arrive. Nevertheless, I will take the flight expecting to arrive on time as per the ideal circumstances of so arriving as scheduled. — javra

It is only idealized within certain parameters, and your "idealization" was straight-line travel. Straight-line travel is never expected, except in the case of air travel, and most forms of transportation are not air travel. If you had stipulated that you were talking about air travel then this would make more sense, but you did not do so and there was nothing in your analogy that would cause one to conclude that you were in an airplane or helicopter. Thus the obstacles to straight-line travel should have been, at least in a certain vague sense, foreseeable (partially foreseen and partially unforeseen). Whenever I go somewhere I try to go in a straight line (the ideal), and I know with certainty that it will not be possible unless I am flying (or perhaps traveling by water).

"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. So I again find the presented dichotomy of ends to be inappropriate. — javra

On this reading you must think that the pacifist could not agree to the rule, "Do not commit violence," which is of course strange to say the least. "Do not commit violence" simply does not mean, "Do not commit violence unless your survival is threatened." People do not generally say, "In order to not-commit violence we must be alive, so therefore in order to obey the rule 'Do not commit violence' we must use violence against this aggressor who is trying to kill us." I don't think this is plausible at all. It strikes me as common sense that use of violence will be contrary to a rule against violence.

Aside from which, as stated (1) gives the impression of an absolute commandment. — javra

It was not absolute. The rationale was provided: "because violence requires treating the object as a means." The idea was <We are not to treat others as a means; violence treats others as a means; therefore we are not to use violence>.

Moreover, the "strict pacifism" mentioned would leave all peace aspiring people to die at the hands of violent people... — javra

Pacifists are vulnerable, yes. That's part of what it means to be a pacifist. You seem to think that pacifism is logically impossible...? Part of my difficulty with your examples is that they erect false dilemmas. The pacifist has an option other than fight or die: it is to run. The German has an option other than tell the truth or give up the Jews: it is to mislead, or to fight, or to equivocate; etc.

How might this bring about or else be in the service of a "Kingdom of Ends"? — javra

It won't, but neither will your approach, as I already noted, 'I'm not sure if it is possible to arrive at a "Kingdom of Ends" so long as (2) is given precedence over (1). When would you ever "get there"?' The problem is that your system contains internal contradictions, and framing Kantianism in terms of consequence-ends is already a contradiction that Kant would not have accepted. These contradictions are producing further contradictions, such as the idea that violence is compatible with a "Kingdom of Ends." Again, the ends with which one begins will determine whether contradictions (and perplexity) are possible.

The problem of using violence to achieve a violence-free society is the Marxist problem of having to "Break a few eggs to make an omelette." It is paradoxical, and for those who adhere to the classical doctrine wherein the end does not justify the means, it doesn't work.

Aside from certain parts of the second counterexample I've provided, where have i done so? — javra

It happened in both counterexamples, the evil genius and the tyrant king. In the case of the evil genius (which example I initially raised) you said that the attribution-footstep was not a moral/human act.

I am now getting the sense that you might uphold a moral code of duties via systems of deontology that traditionally have made little sense to me. Namely, those which uphold a strict duty or obligation to absolute oughts and ought nots irrespective of consequence. — javra

Rather, I think duty/obligation is built in to your attribution of "immorality," which you refuse to forfeit even in cases of necessity. Given that you hold that there are immoral actions which are necessary (and therefore permissible), I conclude that you are working with a form of moral perplexity. You explain this in terms of "departing from the ideal," but it seems clear that there are conflicting duties at play when, say, a quasi-pacifist must resort to violence. I thought this was the very point of your analogy; that it was meant to highlight the tensions that must be worked out.

So if we wanted to tailor-fit the definition of perplexity to your own verbiage we could say that "An agent is perplexed if she is unable to avoid acting immorally."

If so, I would rather not continue this conversation, being fairly confident that it will result in disagreements without resolution. — javra

That's fair enough. Thanks for the interesting conversation. :up:

I hope I didn't give the impression that perplexity-views such as your own are beyond the pale. I think they make a certain amount of sense given the complexity of the moral landscape. Beyond that, following Aristotle and Aquinas, my style is much more terse than your own, but that doesn't indicate a lack of effort. I just think that many of the relevant arguments can be said in few words.

I’ll for now address the following last portion of your first reply since I see this as pivotal to most all of the other replies I might myself give. I know there is a lot left for me to address, but, before I do, please let me know if the following is something that you find fault with. If this leads to an insurmountable difference of perspectives, then I doubt you’d find any of my other further replies cogent. — javra

Okay, thanks.

I want to say that there are two ends or a twofold end rather than just one. First let's take your analogy:

Via one analogy (which as analogy can only go so far), say that one strives to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible so as to win a prize. Were it at all possible to do so, one would then rationally follow a straight path from point A to point Z, this being the shortest path to travel. But there is an intractable obstacle in the way at point K. — javra

What are the two ends?

1. Strive to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible.
2. Strive to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible, in ideal circumstances.

Obstacles only present a problem if I am doing (2) instead of (1). This is in many ways related to hypothetical and non-hypothetical ought-judgments. "If there were not a rock in my path, then I would not need to use precious time circumventing it" (hypothetical judgment). "There is a rock in my path, therefore I will need to go around it to achieve my goal" (non-hypothetical judgment). More precisely, "as short a time as possible" increases each time you encounter an obstacle, and therefore the obstacle does not impede (1). But "as short a time as possible, in ideal circumstances," does not change when you encounter an obstacle, because an obstacle is a non-ideal circumstance. So the question is: Are you trying to do (1) or are you trying to do (2)? Or perhaps you are trying to do both? Or perhaps the more pertinent question is, "What happens when we encounter unforeseen obstacles or dilemmas?"

To then ask whether violence is moral or immoral will depend on the vantage taken: relative to the very actualization and thereby eventual actuality of Z, it will always be immoral. Yet relative to what is on occasion pragmatically needed to best approach the actualization of Z, it will in certain circumstances be moral. As was illustrated, this strictly contingent on—not its application per se—but the intention with which it becomes applied. — javra

Again, I see two ends, and in this case I think both are simultaneously aimed at:

1. Do not commit violence (because violence requires treating the object as a means)
2. Survive as a community

These are both involved in the goal to, "Arrive at a Kingdom of Ends."

But in this case it seems that (2) is given precedence over (1), and I'm not sure if it is possible to arrive at a "Kingdom of Ends" so long as (2) is given precedence over (1). When would you ever "get there"? Obviously the alternative would be strict pacifism: giving (1) precedence over (2).

Secondly, in light of (2) does (1) need to be revised to (1a): "Do not commit violence except in extremis"? It seems like this is the rule that is actually in play, although there is simultaneously a desire or telos towards (1).

For what its worth, it might be cumbersome to explain, but I all the same so far find it conformant to the living of a virtuous life (this as best one can, with the occasional mistake granted). — javra

Yes, and I want to try to be respectful of the fact that you are giving analogies, which will of course limp. Hearkening back to the OP, my difficulty is the way that you are apt to class exceptions as non-human acts. I want to stress that the exceptional act of violence is still a human act, and by recognizing it as a human act we are able to recognize its rationale, namely (2). Moral systems almost always come up against this problem of exceptions, and the case is sometimes termed "in extremis" (at the point of death).

Still, to class exceptions as "amoral" does make sense in a certain way, but I think I would stick with my analysis in terms of what is "understandable" as opposed to what is amoral ().

More generally, I think moral systems that do not take account of obstacles or dilemmas are to that extent poor moral systems. For example, in sanctioning certain legal forms of violence I think your community should have already considered the relation between (1) and (2). In speaking to J about a similar topic in private, I sent him a book review, "Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought from Gratian to Aquinas." Our difference seems to be over whether moral "perplexity" (simpliciter) is possible.* For older thinkers like Aquinas perplexity is not possible, whereas for thinkers in the modern period perplexity seems to be unavoidable.

If you wish to continue, it seems to me that we would need to discuss this issue of moral perplexity. It seems that on theories such as your own, which admit of perplexity, one must either transgress duties or else redefine those duties as being in some way non-obligatory. Still, I think the question of ends is intrinsically bound up in these taxonomies, for the possibility of perplexity seems to depend on the ends in play.

I hope this reply makes sense. I was a bit tired when I wrote it, so hopefully I didn't run roughshod over the analogous nature of the analogy. It's possible that to parse the ends separately is to lose their essential cohesion.

* "An agent is perplexed if she is unable to avoid acting against an obligation" (404).

P.S. The other elephant in the room is something that the modern tradition often overlooks: akrasia. But I will leave it be for now.

Harm, or suffering, is not merely subjective (as I've sketched previously ↪180 Proof) whereas "happiness" is whollly subjective (e.g. hedonic set-points are not the same for everyone or constant through time for each individual); the latter, therefore, is not as foreseeable, or reliably known, as the former such that reducing harm / injustice is a more realizable and effective moral strategy than trying to "maximize happiness" (whatever "happiness" means).

However, it's my position that on avarage – all things being equal – we optimize well-being, or "happiness", in any situation where harm / injustice has been prevented and/or reduced as much as possible such that it's not a binary choice but rather is a matter of priority whereby the "secondary" consideration (positive utility/consequence (e.g. more sex)) is a function, or opportuned by, the "primary" (negative utility/consequence (e.g. less illness)) and yet not the other way around (e.g. health-wealth-fame-power-pleasure "maximizing" itself cannot prevent or reduce suffering, misery or (self)harm).

Some primary influences on my moral thinking are Epicurus, Spinoza, K. Popper, D. Parfit & P. Foot. — 180 Proof

Okay, thanks. That makes good sense, and I think I agree with you that happiness is more subjective than harm. I certainly agree that safety from harm provides a strong condition for the seeking of happiness.

Regarding your idea that happiness is "wholly subjective," there seems to be an interesting counterargument at hand:

Have you had such an experience? If not, then isn't it more reasonable than not to conclude that everyone is vulnerable to and can recognize the kinds of harm you've experience because they are objective phenomena? :chin: — 180 Proof

@Lionino has posited that both harm and benefit are somewhat subjective, and in response you challenged him to provide a kind of harm that is not recognizable by others. Could the same be said of happiness? Could we say that the kinds of happiness that I experience are also recognized by others as kinds of happiness? (For example, food, sex, comfort, knowledge, etc.)

- Good post. I am pressed for time so I will just offer a short response.

I can think of one reason to preference the reduction of the negative over the maximization of some positive principle (e.g., pleasure for J.S. Mill). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, and as I told @Lionino a few times: I accept that harm is more potent than benefit.

Minimizing harm seems to be less likely to fall into the "min/max" trap. We are inclined to think of disease, dysfunction, etc. as a variation from some stability point or harmony. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think much of what you say makes good sense. Still, I think one of your implicit premises is that harm correlates to a disruption of harmony or a deviation from homeostasis, and I am not convinced that this premise is sufficiently developed. It seems to involve a specialized meaning of harm. In my opinion, in these debates the crux is to somehow introduce objective normativity, and this is where things always get difficult. Your post focused on this idea quite a bit.

However, when it comes to the acquisition of positive things, we often tend to look to maximize the good. For example, Mill wants to maximize pleasure (and we might consider here Plato's distinction of which pleasures are better than others in the Philibus or Aristotle's in Book X of the Ethics as counter examples). This makes a certain sense to me, because when it comes to the acquisition of external goods, food stores, money, etc., it is always nice to have more as a sort of "backup." More won't hurt, we can always just not use a resource we have "extra," of, or share it in exchange for some other good. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Actually I think the maximization of pleasure will be detrimental to organisms, and this seems like an important problem in Mill's view. More really can hurt, and the classical virtue of temperance will to some extent simply curb an excessive desire for pleasure simpliciter. The Philebus enters into the "objective normativity" question, attempting to refine the manner in which we ought to desire pleasure (and Mill tries to do this too, in his own way). So at first glance your argument does seem to hold, given that negative utilitarianism seems to favor homeostasis more than classic utilitarianism does.

I don't understand the question. :confused:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_utilitarianism (I interpret this reducing harm-caused-by-personal-conduct / judgment as normative morality ↪180 Proof) — 180 Proof

When I heard about negative utilitarianism I thought of that clause in the Hippocratic Oath, "First, do no harm..." But this implies that there is a "second," and I am wondering about that "second." I am wondering why only harm considerations are moral considerations. From your Wikipedia article:

Negative utilitarianism is a form of negative consequentialism that can be described as the view that people should minimize the total amount of aggregate suffering, or that they should minimize suffering and then, secondarily, maximize the total amount of happiness. — Wikipedia | Negative Utilitarianism

So apparently some negative utilitarians think there is a "second," namely, to "maximize the total amount of happiness." The question could then be rephrased: why choose the first form of negative utilitarianism over the second form?

From a 2023 thread Convince Me of Moral Realism, by 'harm' (in some of its various forms) I mean this...

And by 'injustice' I mean harm to individuals as a direct or indirect consequence of a social structure, or lack thereof, reproduced by customs, public policies, legistlation, jurisprudence or arbitrary violence. Thus, utilitarianism is a kind (or subset) of consequentialism.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_consequentialism (I interpret this reducing injustice (i.e. reducing harm-caused-by-social-structure / violence) as applied morality ↪180 Proof) — 180 Proof

Okay, this is helpful. :up:

Leontiskos – Assuming you intend to reply, I've just edited my previous post so that (hopefully) my statements are clearer. — 180 Proof

Sounds good.

---

Because the word "quality" here is often up to personal preference, as I note: If I am shooting someone, I am making them lose qualities (health) that we hold universally as desirable. However, if I offer someone drugs, there will be wide disagreement about whether I am harming or helping them because what the drug is supposed to counteract may or may not be held positively, or may or may not be held more negatively than the other effects of the drug. — Lionino

Okay, sure.

Well, being fat would not be a quality — so would everybody say prior to 2013.

In most cases no, because being addicted is something that (almost) all would agree is not a quality but the inverse of it. — Lionino

When you were using the word "quality" earlier I assumed you were using a value-neutral term, because that is how that term is often used. In that sense to possess something, such as weight or alcohol, would be a quality. But it now seems that by "quality" you mean "good quality," such that an alcoholic cannot have the quality of "possessing a bottle of alcohol," because the alcohol is not good for him. Yes?

I skimmed through the paper. The principal example given - that of killing one person to save five - has always been irksome to me due to its ambiguity/non-specificity: ought one kill a Mother Teresa to save five Hitlers or, else, ought one not kill one Hitler and allow five Mother Teresas to die instead? — javra

I'd say the idea is that it doesn't matter who's who, as long as they are innocent. It will always be wrong to kill "one innocent person to save two or five innocent persons from being killed by someone else" (1).

I think the basic idea here is fairly straightforward. It is the question, "Does duress excuse?" Or, "Is one still culpable when they act under duress?" — Leontiskos

But the issue to this hypothetical, within its own context of argument, is as follows: must the person in this case then be answerable for the goodness/badness of the deed they brought about?

In other words, are they in any way morally responsible for their choice (a choice which they now are attributively responsible for)? Specifically, this for having insulted a stranger rather than having done a far worse bad/evil/wrong against this same stranger. — javra

For me the important question is whether they are responsible for (a). I can agree with everything else you say as being fairly straightforward (e.g. it is good that they chose a.i rather than a.ii ; it is at least understandable that they chose (a) rather than (b)).

As an aside, was the bolded here a typo?

(unlike the choice between (a) and (b) - which, due to being made under extreme duress, the person can be argued to not be attributively responsible for) — javra

By "attributively" did you mean to write "morally"?

It's not about the choice or deed being excusable due to the duress - there was no duress in the two alternatives of the second choice that was taken (there was only a necessary choice between a fixed set of alternatives, with complete liberty to choose either). It's about the individual not being answerable for the goodness or badness (depending on perspective) of the choice of insulting a stranger rather than beating them unconscious. (In contrast, were the person to choose not to insult but to instead beat the stranger unconscious, then they would be morally responsible for their choice - for, in this case, they would now be answerable for the goodness/badness of their choice.) — javra

This strikes me as the same issue I tried to address earlier in my paragraph that began, "I think you are right that the comparison will itself be an act of deliberation..." (). What is happening in both cases, I believe, is that you are conflating two acts with a single act.

Here are the two acts as I see them:

1. Choose between (a) and (b)
2. If (a), then choose between a.i and a.ii

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you are saying that you are "attributively responsible" for both (1) and (2), and morally responsible for (2) but not for (1) (because of the duress involved in (1)). Similarly, you think (2) is a human act but (1) is not (because of the duress involved in (1)).

If this understanding is correct, then the response that I already gave should be on point. If this understanding is incorrect, then the response that I already gave may be missing something. Again, it seems to me that the central question is whether the duress involved in act (1) makes it non-moral and non-human, and this is the question I tried to address in my last response.

I should add that, in the same way that you think lying to the Nazi is praiseworthy, presumably choosing (a) is deemed praiseworthy. If it is praiseworthy, then it must be moral in the OP's sense.

(It is possible to parse the acts differently than I did, but I think that in any case there will be multiple acts.)

I'm myself finding it a good means of honing my reasoning skills (or lack thereof :smile: ) — javra

Yes, it is a good exercise! - haha.

Myself, I so far find the idealizations of what should be which are presented in this reply contrary to "deliberate reason ... directed to the due end" which Aquinas also makes mention of. Were this due end, for example, to be that of completely obeying or else holding duty to a set of rules set up by some supreme rule-maker, this might then make sense to me. But consider this hypothetical: either one tells oneself a white lie (say, that today the appearance of one's clothes is decent when, in reality, one does not feel this to be so) or, else, all of humanity perishes (one can affix whatever daemon scenario on pleases to this). If the end pursued is absolute obedience/duty to the rule-maker's rule that one does not ever lie, then it might be correct, or right, to destroy all of humanity by not lying. Yet - not only does this intuitively seem very wrong - but, in changing the end one directs one's actions toward to that of, say, maximal eudemonia, it would then necessarily be rationally incorrect, or worng, to do so as well. — javra

But now you're saying that not-lying is immoral, and this seems to prove my point. If I think lying is immoral and you think not-lying is immoral, then we are in agreement that lying is not amoral.

That said, any system of consequentialism that does not look upon such literally ultimate long-term goal but, instead, focuses one merely intermediate goals will, to me, necessarily be less than moral. One here deems eating candy a good due to the intermediate goal of satisfying one's sweet-tooth despite so doing leading to tooth decay and the loss of one's teeth ... sort of mindset. And I don't find that typical utilitarianism holds any such ultimate long-term goal in mind - just a generalized heuristic that might or might not eventually lead to such goal (depending on its interpretation and administration). — javra

But doesn't classical utilitarianism hold to the long-term goal of maximizing pleasure? In this case pleasure is the goal or telos, and it is appraised in terms of consequences (i.e. "Will this act lead to maximal pleasure?"). On first blush it would seem that you simply have more goals than this utilitarian, but that all of your goals are similarly appraised in terms of consequences. I wouldn't call your system deontological because none of your goals are immune to being overridden on account of consequences. Kant does have such immunities, and for this reason he seems to be interested in rules, not goals. He has rules which must be universally applied, not goals which must be worked toward. So Kant's rules preclude him from lying, and they preclude him regardless of any alluring consequences that could be foreseen. Unlike consequentialism, Kantianism is therefore not quantitative or calculative. It seems to me that his system is intended to be a priori in the sense that it does not advert to consequences and inclinations (but I am not a Kantian).

Yes, language is important, and I was clumsy in how I applied it. To try to better explain, an important synonym for good is "beneficial", which can be interpreted as being of proper fit. One then can further interpret good as that which is of proper fit to one's goal, or telos. There are always different teloi we actively hold at the same time: some proximate, some distal, some intermediate (and, in my own musing, as per what I mentioned above, one's ultimate telos, which I shall here address as "the Good"). That which fits the Good is always good/right in an ultimate sense. That which is antithetical to the Good is then always bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. Then, if one's actively held ultimate goal "X" is antithetical to the Good, one's intentions will always be bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. This even if, to further approach or actualize goal X, one needs to engage in acts that are of themselves a proper fit to the Good. Example: one wants to sadistically destroy humanity at large but finds that in order to do so one needs to rescue an innocent baby from drowning; one than is compelled to save the baby from drowning (something one would not have otherwise done) in order to destroy humanity and then so proceeds to do. The deed of saving the baby is good, for it of itself as deed is fit to the Good, but the intentions with which this deed is done are bad, for as intentions they are of proper fit to goal X. Otherwise expressed, the saving of the baby does not hold intrinsic value to the saver or the baby - as it would for anyone whose ultimate telos is the Good - but, instead, is strictly of instrumental value in allowing for goal X. In brief, the deed of a saved baby is of itself moral but the intention with which it was saved is immoral. — javra

Okay thanks for explaining that. It makes sense to me and I can agree to much of it. The question I would have—and this may be somewhat tangential—is: What is the difference between intrinsic value and instrumental value? If both baby-savers are saving the baby for the sake of their goal, then why is only one of them acting instrumentally? I think this question may also help get at the consequentialism inquiry.

My beating some complete stranger to a pulp strictly out of the pleasure to do so directly estranges my from the Good. However, where I to be aiming to remain optimally aligned to the Good, and were a horrendous attack on an innocent to occur right in front of me, my then beating to a pulp the assailant so as to prevent the innocent's death (were I to be so capable of doing and were this to somehow be the only viable alternative to take) would be vitiated as an intentionally performed bad/evil/wrong. Here, (were I to be so capable) I would be proud of risking my own life to save the innocent despite the violence I willfully engaged in - and would feel very deep shame and guilt, i.e. profound culpability, where I to do nothing while the innocent died right before me with me doing nothing about it (though, in the latter case, I would not have engaged in any violence myself).

I know things can get more complex, but maybe this serves as good enough explanation? — javra

Hmm. We are considering my thesis that on your system "a bad deed does not vitiate a good end/goal." The qualm I have with your explanation is that the "bad deed" is arguably not a bad deed at all (i.e. defending the innocent by fighting an aggressor). I would rather take something that we commonly accept to be a bad deed, such as raping a woman. If my thesis is correct, then on your view it would be reasonable to say that, in some cases, raping a woman is not only not immoral, but is morally necessary and praiseworthy, if it achieves some proportionately good end (such as avoiding "the perishing of all humanity"). The idea here is that any deed, no matter how evil, is always justifiable in principle. There is apparently no deed of which we can say that it is impermissible in all circumstances (except for "deeds" which are abstractions, such as "causing maximal suffering").

You are right, it's not easy to phrase these disparate notions of wrongness in common speech. But to try to clarify my position: X is not a wrong (an incorrect or else unfit) course of action to take as a necessary means of achieving Y which is itself optimally fitting to an eventual achieving of the ultimate good goal Z - this even though, in direct respect to ultimate good Z, X can only be ascertained as ultimately being a wrong (this because it does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z). More concretely, let Z = Kant's Kingdom of Ends; Ukraine's engaging in war against an unjustly invading Russia is then something that cannot of itself directly achieve a Kingdom of Ends and, so, is a wrong in this ultimate sense (I do have trouble calling Ukraine's war of self-deference an evil, though, even when termed a "lesser evil"); nevertheless, Ukraine's engaging in war is necessary to achieve Ukraine's maintaining of autonomy, which is itself optimally aligned to an eventual Kingdom of Ends. As regards common speech: although we all know that war is ultimately bad, it is good for Ukraine to engage in war against an unjust invader rather then allowing itself to be decimated by not engaging in such war. — javra

As above, I have a hard time with this attempted reframing of Kantianism in terms of consequences—even the consequence of a Kingdom of Ends. Let me therefore leave Kantianism to the side for the moment.

Regarding your X, Y, Z analysis, I would want to say that if X is necessary to achieve Y and Y is necessary to achieve Z, then X is necessary to achieve Z. In fact this would seem to prove that it is false to claim that, "[X] does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z." Or am I underestimating the work that your term "optimally fitting" is doing? (Note that if, as you seem to say, Z precludes X, then it cannot simultaneously be true that X is necessary to achieve Z)

In my post there was a paragraph that began, "I think you are right that the comparison will itself be an act of deliberation..." (). Given that this had to do with your counterexample to the OP, I am curious if you agree with it.

Best,
Leontiskos

- Sounds good, Bob. Thanks and take care.

I would say both are contrary to the object's desire, but not free will in the sense of freedom of choice. When we impart harm on someone, we are taking something away from them, which by the definition of "harm" is against their will; by withholding welfare, we are not attacking their free will, as we are basically not interacting with them at all — not giving them something appears to me as very different from taking something away. — Lionino

First I should again note that harm is more contrary to the will than withholding welfare. With that said, by the definition of "welfare," imparting welfare to someone is in accord with their will, and thus it would seem that withholding welfare is contrary to their will.

I think you are right to note that there is a difference of expectation. In the case of interpersonal harm one expects that it should not happen to them, whereas in the case of interpersonal welfare one does not expect that it should not be withheld (or more simply: one does not expect that it should occur). Yet this matter of expectation is, I think, related to rights rather than will. They are different because we have a right to not-be-harmed, whereas we have no right to receive welfare. Thus such a version of negative utilitarianism seems to be a form of classical justice (because it is rights-based). The analysis seems to be presupposing rights.

I am behind these definitions. The interesting thing about "harm" is that indeed it means to make something lose its qualities. So then we see that the word "harm" itself already carries some sort of aesthetic/moral judgement by evoking the word "quality". In many cases it seems uncontroversial. If I am shooting someone, I am making them lose qualities (health) that we hold universally as desirable.
However, if I offer someone alcohol, there will be wide disagreement about whether I am harming or helping them.

So perhaps it is the case that negative utilitarianism simply pushes the issue back and leaves the conclusion up to subjectivity, instead of grounding it objectively (on something like freedom or serotonin or reproductive success). — Lionino

Yes, and I think this gets at why the definition of 'harm' becomes important. Is it merely physical harm? Does it include psychological harm? I want to say that "to harm something is to make something lose its qualities," is too broad, because not all qualities are self-consciously believed to be valuable. For example, on your definition if I cause someone to lose weight I have harmed them. Yet we are apt to say that, prima facie, the exact opposite is the case. Or to use your example, if I take alcohol away from an alcoholic, does it necessarily follow that I have harmed him?

And in many countries that is indeed the case. Shooting someone brandishing a knife is allowable if done so to incapacitate, but going behind him and shooting him in the head may be seen as undue use of force and execution. — Lionino

Right.

You hold that some ‘evil’ is amorally bad, and is thusly outside of the scope of morality; whereas I think that all ‘evil’ is intrinsically bad, and is thusly within the scope of morality. — Bob Ross

I would say that all evil is intrinsically bad (and evil), but that not all evil is moral evil. Again, I don't have a strong position on whether natural evil exists, but for the foreseeable remainder of our discussion I will just pretend it does exist.

You hold that ‘moral’ refers to only meanings directly related to ‘acts’, whereas I use it in a much broader scope.

Morality, at its core, is about acts for you; intrinsic goodness, for me. — Bob Ross

For me morality relates directly or indirectly to intention. SEP states this well by talking about "intentions or negligence" (for negligence captures indirect intention).

I think you think health, for example, is an amoral good... — Bob Ross

I would suggest following the SEP definition that I have given very many times now. Rain is non-moral because it is not caused by intention or negligence. Health is not a non-moral good, for health can obviously be influenced by intention and negligence.

Everything in reality can be attributed the property; and I can make a parody argument for redness: everything in reality is red, but we can say things that makes sense like “a block that doesn’t exist is not red”. — Bob Ross

To restrict the predication of "being" to what exists "in reality" is tautologous and artificial. We don't limit our use of the predication in that way. We really do talk about grandma no longer existing. Your so-called "moral" is altogether different.

I think the argument from vacuity is a defeater for your idiosyncratic use of the term "moral." We talk about things that do not exist because things do not exist. In a world where everything is red there would be no possibility of talking about non-red things. We would have no concept of red or non-red.

It means discourse related to (1) intrinsic goodness and (2) what is intrinsically good. — Bob Ross

So you think that every time we use the word "good" we are engaged in moral discourse? This would explain some of your recent threads.

For you, and commonly to people, morality is about behavior; but this is a major mistake: it is really about intrinsic goodness and what is intrinsically good. — Bob Ross

If that were the case then the word "moral" would not exist, just as the word "red" does not exist in the possible world you were considering. As I said, the reason humans distinguish the moral from the non-moral is because it turns out to be an enormously important distinction in human life. On your view it is a minor distinction that requires lots of words to tease out.

It depends: when we discuss those things, are we supposing we are talking about actually good trees, actually good birds, etc.? If so, then we are definitely talking about ethics. — Bob Ross

Claims like this are self-evidently false to those of us who are familiar with the English language. Rocks, trees, and birds are not moral entities.

Either morality is only about what is related to behavior and there is no morality in a world incapable of agents (i.e., things which have behaviors, can act, in the manner you describe) OR morality is not fundamentally about behavior (although it can include that in itself, even as a primary sub-subject). — Bob Ross

For the third or fourth time, I choose the former. If you think there is something problematic with the former you will need to give an actual argument.

Morality is not itself the study of behavior. — Bob Ross

It is in the sense that if you are talking about something 100% unrelated to behavior, then you are not talking about morality.

Maybe I've missed it but could you briefly describe "classical justice" or link to a post upthread where you discuss it. Thanks. — 180 Proof

I don't know that I've really discussed it on this forum, but I began to broach the topic in my earlier post to you. You said:

Not if "incapacitating" the gunman is the only or least harmful way to prevent the gunman from doing greater, perhaps lethal, harm (e.g. like surgically removing a malignant tumor...) — 180 Proof

Roughly speaking, for classical justice everyone has a right to not be harmed by others, but when the gunman trespasses while brandishing his weapon he forfeits that right. For classical justice due harm and undue harm are not commensurable, and so it is not merely a matter of weighing harms. It sounds like on negative utilitarianism the harm done to the gunman is commensurable with the potential harm he will cause, and knocking him unconscious is permissible only because the former harm outweighs the latter harm. On classical justice one can still act unjustly against the gunman even though he has forfeited some of his rights (by, say, using excessive force), but the harm needed to incapacitate him is not only not unjust, but is also within the special moral genus of "self-defense" (and it thereby trumps a first-order harm analysis). As a caveat I should admit that I don't know the ins and outs of negative utilitarianism, so much of this is guesswork.

(Aquinas is not opposed to the principle of removing malignant tumors, but in the case of criminals he would see this as the prerogative of the state rather than of the individual.)

---

There is also an issue a bit closer to the OP. Negative utilitarianism passes muster insofar as it does not fall prey to the problems that I have commonly seen on TPF, namely those that plague Objections 2 and 5. Nevertheless, in line with my response to (link):

I think there are possible sets of moral rules that do not touch on all human acts, such as ↪180 Proof's negative utilitarianism. But after recognizing those sets of rules the next step is to ask ourselves whether there is a good reason to call the acts which fall under those rules "moral" while calling acts that do not fall under those rules "non-moral." More specifically, we want to probe the question of whether someone's distinction between the moral and the non-moral is a firm, defensible distinction. — Leontiskos

So I would want to ask, first, why "positive utilitarianism" is not partially correct (i.e. why consideration of the harm-complement is non-moral). Second, I would want to inquire into the relevant definition of harm.

(CC: @Lionino)

Here is a hypothetical wherein the choice made is concluded to be amoral (this strictly in the sense of being neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy) despite a) the available alternatives not being of equal moral import, b) being an act of consciously made volition and, thereby, a human act, c) being a non-hypothetical ought-judgement and, hence, per the OP, a moral act, and, to top things of, d) the choice taken being a known wrong a priori. — javra

Okay, great. As an aside, Peter Simpson has a paper related to a similar issue, "Justice, Scheffler and Cicero."

I think the basic idea here is fairly straightforward. It is the question, "Does duress excuse?" Or, "Is one still culpable when they act under duress?" (Or coercion, or compulsion, etc. Cf. ST I-II.6.4&5, ST Sup.47.1, as well as Nicomachean Ethics, Bk III)

Aquinas would basically say that culpability is mitigated but not destroyed.

I am the summoned subject of a tyrannical and mad king who, simply for his own amusement, informs me upon my arrival to his citadel that... — www.anenquiry.info / Chapter 11: Validating Our Free Will / Section 11.3.2.

I think your analysis is reasonable in general. Also, your book looks interesting!

If this example holds, as I believe it does, it then illustrates how one could have a human act of conscious choice making which, as per the OP, can be defined as a moral act (for it involved non-hypothetical ought-judgements) that is nevertheless amoral in so far as being neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy. And, furthermore, this amoral quality of the act is upheld despite the committed wrong of insulting a perfect stranger. — javra

First, let me try to short-circuit the counterargument. What we are apt to say on such occasions is that the person's action is understandable (rather than "praiseworthy" or "blameworthy"). What I believe this means is that, given the extreme circumstances, the person's action was morally acceptable or morally mediocre. If this is correct then what is at stake is not an amoral act. Second, extreme circumstances are a sufficient condition for heroic virtue. If—even in the circumstances of extreme threats and duress—a person nonetheless stays true to what is right, we are apt to account them a hero. If the heroic act is not amoral, then is it possible that the non-heroic act in the same circumstance could be amoral? (This seems to relate to Objection 2)

More technically, I want to say that coercion of this kind can only ever be partial coercion. The person is still responsible for their action, but their culpability is mitigated due to the duress. In fact it seems to me that in these situations their responsibility is an important factor in the tyrant's motive. The tyrant is acting immorally, and to aid or abet him is to participate in his immoral actions. The tyrant wants others to participate and aid him in this way, because it tends to justify his cause (and/or destroy the morale of dissenters). It seems to me that to say that such acts are amoral would be to say that the tyrant is wrong about all of these calculations, and I don't believe he is wrong about all of these calculations. I think this deeper level of tyranny is bound up with causing other people to freely* participate.

* The act is partially free and partially coerced, but without the partial freedom the tyrant's motive and special malice would disappear. If, over time, he could decrease the coercion and increase the freedom while achieving the same effect, he would deem this all the better.

First off, thanks for the thoughtful reply. Your views are much appreciated. — javra

You're welcome, and I thank you in the same way. I was not expecting to receive this level of engagement in the thread! In keeping with your own approach I will address your two posts separately.

As one example, were a WWII Nazi to knock at the door to inquire as to whether there is a Jew in your house... — javra

For Aquinas (as for Kant) it is not permissible to lie even in this case. Here is what he says in an article entitled, "Whether every lie is a sin?":

Objection 4. Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another from being killed.

Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x). — Aquinas, ST II-II.110.3.ad4

Due to life's complexities, in these and like examples we in my view then act morally by engaging in lesser wrongs for the sake of preventing greater wrongs (given caveats such as that no other viable alternative in preventing the greater wrong is available to us). — javra

I suspect that the disagreement here is over the principle of whether it is permissible to "do evil that good may come" (or whether a good end can justify an evil means). Would you object to my characterizing your view as (a robust form of) consequentialism?

I realize that this response is a bit abrupt, but hopefully the rest of the reply (and the second post) will elaborate on some of the related issues.

Because of this, I do deem that on occasion being moral or else immoral is separate from the committing of wrongs. One can likewise appraise someone who does something good and thereby moral due to intentions that are ultimately evil - in so far as having been committed so as to result in the realization of an evil long-term goal. Here, given the overall situation, doing a right/good act can well be nevertheless appraised as immoral (as one possible example, such as when a liar reinforces their nefarious lies via the telling of truths in what is often enough termed "spin"). — javra

Perhaps one of the most fruitful entry points is linguistic. First, to nitpick a bit, is the bolded an accurate depiction of your view? "Good and thereby moral"? Later in the same paragraph you give what seems to me the more consistent position, that, "doing a right/good act can well be nevertheless appraised as immoral"? In that case what is good is not thereby moral, and thus it would seem that someone who does a good deed as a means to an evil end is acting immorally when they do their good deed (I say "deed" instead of "act" only because for Aquinas the act is not separable from the remote intention). What's philosophically interesting here is that, according to your position, it would seem that a bad end/goal vitiates a good deed, but a bad deed does not vitiate a good end/goal. Or in other words, the former kind of act is impermissible (immoral) whereas the latter kind of act is permissible (moral or perhaps amoral). This also gets into the idea of coercion, which I will leave for the second post.

Second, it seems to me that in common language, to say that an act is wrong is to imply that it should not be done. Presumably, then, someone who believes the Nazi should be lied to would say, "One can sometimes use evil as a means to a good end," but they would not say, "One can do wrong as a means to doing right." In other words to advise X such that X non-hypothetically ought to be done is incompatible with X being wrong. Hence the commonly accepted idea that the end will "color" the means (e.g. If Y is necessary, and X is necessary in order to achieve Y, then X becomes necessary). What do you think of this?

I'm hoping my reasoning here is explained well enough. — javra

It certainly is. This gets tricky and it relates to the article I gestured to in my last response, ST I-II.20.6... Let me know if my reply to this ends up being too terse and requires additional explanation.

In having thought about this, it yet seems to me that, in order for a human to consciously discern that there are no moral differences in the two alternatives available, the human must necessarily to some extent deliberate between the two alternatives - thereby consciously judge and weigh their differences and differing consequences via their reasoning faculties. So doing will itself be a consciously rational act. So, I presently believe that the very act of consciously discerning that the two alternatives have equal moral import can only be a human act - for it requires conscious rationality. — javra

I think you are right that the comparison will itself be an act of deliberation. For Aquinas there would be two distinct acts of deliberation. The first act of deliberation is, "What should I do?" The second act of deliberation is, "How do my options compare?" This comparison performed in the second act is meant to provide an answer to the inquiry of the first act. Everything you say here is correct, and everything you say here seems to me to pertain to the second act. We might say that the comparison-act is complete and renders the conclusion that there is no difference at all between the two options (right foot vs. left foot). But in this case the first act will be incomplete due to the fact that the second act did not succeed in identifying an actionable difference between the two options, and this is precisely why the first act is not a human act. Or alternatively, perhaps it would be better to say that the decision that results from the first (and second) act is not a human act; or else that no decision in the proper sense can result from the first act given its incompleteness.

Once this active deliberation between the alternatives arrives at the conclusion that the available alternatives are of equal moral import, then ... I'm thinking one could still make a reason-based conscious choice as to which alternative to act on (for example, choosing to start with the right foot with the aim of maintaining consistency were this scenario to ever befall again - thereby keeping the harm to a minimum (I know this is iffy, but its the best I've got at the moment)) or, else, one might at this juncture simply allow one's strongest unconscious impulse to precipitate a first step with whichever leg it might be - or else abide by the flipping of a coin. If the first, it would then still be a reason based conscious act. If the latter, then not. — javra

Yes, I think the first is "iffy," as it assumes a consistency between events of this type. I would say that even if the decision of which foot to put first turns out to be a human act, it cannot involve a moral act of choosing who will live and who will die. It can (and I think it does) involve a moral act of accepting that someone will die, but no moral act exists which is based essentially on the comparison.

All the same, in terms of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness, the individual's act would be beyond either. Given no other available alternative to choose from, in this sense alone the person's act of walking would then be amoral... — javra

Let me save this question of coercion vs. duress for my reply to your second post.

Yet the discernment of the act so being (both on the part of the individual or any onlooker) would then be fully rational - for the individual here was not negligent; he/she took to time to deliberate the situation so as to arrive at the rational discernment of being forced to commit an equal wrong regardless of what is chosen. — javra

I agree that the individual was not negligent in choosing between their right foot and left foot. I think it is an interesting question to ask whether negligence in this was even possible.

Precisely! :up: :smile: Nice to see your evaluation of it.

I'll post the initially mentioned hypothetical I have in mind separately... — javra

Sounds good. :smile:

Not to float my own boat, but back when I wrote my midterm essay for some 100-level ethics course, my choice of normative principle was along the lines of "avoid the greatest amount of harm, even if it means also avoiding a greater amount of welfare (to another party)". That seems to be the same as some version of negative utilitarianism, particularly threshold NU and weak NU. — Lionino

Interesting! This thread is the first I have ever heard of the term "negative utilitarianism," although I was aware of harm-based ethics that are not based on classical justice.

One of my justifications for the principle is that harm violates the object's free will, (not giving) welfare does not. — Lionino

In general I am apt to prefer classical justice to negative utilitarianism, but that debate is somewhat tangential to this thread (at least at this early stage). For example, I would suggest that harm and the withholding of welfare are both contrary to the object's will, if in slightly different ways—harm is certainly more contrary. But I don't know if you are using "free will" in a special sense.

I will check the theses and the objections when I am in an ethics mood and when I have time. — Lionino

Sounds good. No rush.

Tricky counterexample. My current best thoughts: — javra

I want to first say that I think your thoughts are wonderfully cogent, but let me pick at them a little bit.

All the same, in this scenario, unlike the first, irrespective of which choice we make we know that we will be committing a wrong beforehand.

[...]

If, however, no other conceivable choice were to be available, then we’d literally have no choice but to knowingly commit the wrong of killing some unfortunate stranger via our actions. In which case, because a) we hold no choice in the matter of so doing despite the two alternatives available to us and b) the two alternatives are morally identical in impact to the best of our knowledge—were we to not then so step with the explicit intent and pleasure of killing a stranger—I’d then conclude that our walking either via a first left step or a first right step would be amoral. We would be attributively responsible for (i.e., we’d be a/the primary cause for) the killing of a stranger but we’d not be morally responsible for it (EDIT: here meaning in any way either blameworthy of praiseworthy for the action taken and its consequence). — javra

So according to your earlier statement which I quoted* (and assuming we have no other choice), the act would be amoral. Here it seems like you want to say that it is simultaneously amoral and wrong. Or perhaps more accurately, the act would be amoral and yet in so acting we would be "committing a wrong." There is thus an interesting way in which immorality and wrongness are separating.

All the same, in this scenario, unlike the first, irrespective of which choice we make we know that we will be committing a wrong beforehand. This will then be a crucial difference. — javra

I think Aquinas would somewhat agree with you, but would instead say that the primary difference between the hairbrush scenario and the evil genius scenario is that in the former we are choosing between two goods and in the latter we are choosing between two evils (or that it is two good options as opposed to two bad options). Then he might note that, in most cases, instead of choosing between two evils one could also abstain from choosing (by abstaining from acting). I think all of these ideas are found within your reply.

For Aquinas the moral decision of which foot to begin walking with is, I think, not a human act. This is because there are no rational criteria upon which to deliberate. Because the reason has nothing to act on, therefore it cannot be an act that flows from reason. The act could only become rational (and moral) if perchance the agent fastened upon some aspect that could support rational deliberation. (Nevertheless, the natural act of walking and the moral act in question are not identical, and therefore to choose to begin walking with the right foot on account of a limp would be a human act distinct from the moral decision under consideration. Cf. ST I-II.20.6)

The hairbrush scenario is similar. For many people the choice of which order in which to brush hair and teeth is not a rational act and therefore not a moral act (because they give it no consideration). Yet for some it may well be a rational act. Suppose, for example, that a superstitious person believes that if they brush their hair within 5 minutes after brushing their teeth, plaque will begin to grow in their hair. This is a rational act (an act flowing from the deliberate reason), and for Aquinas it is an immoral act (because it is an irrational act, falsely ordered to the end of health). Another person, knowing they have lice, may avoid brushing their hair first for fear of getting lice in their mouth. This seems to be a moral act, for it both flows from rational deliberation and is rational in the secondary sense, being rightly ordered to the (legitimate) end of health. On the other hand, excessive caution in this regard could be an irrational form of OCD.

Here is a related quote from Aquinas:

And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.

If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions. — Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Question 18, Article 9

Apropos, as to the evil genius being not so genius: It is interesting to me that in Romanian there are two adjectives for the English word “bad” (with no adjective for “evil”); one is rău, which can just as well mean either “sick” or “mean spirited”; the second is prost, which can just as well mean “stupid” or “idiotic”. (The only relatively close proximity to the term “evil” is the noun form of rău, but, again, it doesn't occur as an adjective). Which when literally translated into English to me at least presents the connotative understanding that the property of badness could be interpreted as “the stupidity of being mean spirited and, thereby, psychologically sick”. Your expression somehow reminded me of this. :grin: Though, of course, so understood the concept can only apply to agents. — javra

Ha - very interesting! Aquinas follows Augustine, and for Augustine evil is a privation of what ought to be, which dovetails nicely with some of this. Further, as you may have noticed from the above, for Aquinas irrationality and immorality are closely related.

* "because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral" ().

Let me put it more precisely, then: “the events which transpire directly due to a tornado are intrinsically bad”. Do you disagree with that statement, or find it likewise idiosyncratic? If not, then I think we are just disagreeing on semantics: I identify intrinsic goodness with moral goodness — Bob Ross

I don't disagree with that statement, and I admit that the critique is a matter of language. Too-many-scare-quotes is a linguistic critique.

I added a bit to my last post in an edit and I'm not sure if you saw it:

The predication of generic “being” (i.e., generic ‘to exist’) is univocal predication, just like “Brk”. — Bob Ross

You are right that generic being is univocal. I suppose the problem is that it doesn't apply to everything like Brk does. For example, "Grandma does not exist anymore." We talk about things losing and lacking being.

Either way, I don’t see how univocally predicating a property to everything, would make it vacuous. If it is clearly outlined what “Brk” actually is, then it is not vacuous. For example, imagine that everything happens to be red: does that make ‘redness’ vacuous? — Bob Ross

Yes, because if everything happened to be red then we wouldn't be capable of identifying or distinguishing red. In that case we wouldn't have a name for the color. The only reason we are tempted to think that "red" would make sense in that world is because we live in a world of colors.

I am no longer claiming that a tornado is a moral agent; I was referring to the adjective, which I guess in a sense is a property, of ‘moral’ (perhaps ‘moralness’). — Bob Ross

Correct, it is still a property.

I highly doubt this. Would you not agree, that “moral” also signifies “that which is within the sphere of moral discourse”? You left that out in your analysis here. — Bob Ross

What does the word "moral" in your term, "moral discourse," mean? Does it mean something other than the two senses I already gave? I think not. Moral discourse is precisely discourse about things that are moral or immoral, or else things that are capable of moral or immoral acts. (As in the OP, "acts" is shorthand, and is not meant to exclude other moral or immoral things, such as habits.)

If you deny this, then I must admit your theory of ethics is entirely too act-centric for me. The study is fundamentally about what is “good”, and this in a “moral” sense, and only as a biproduct does one discuss moral or immoral acts. — Bob Ross

I don't think so. We can talk all day about good trees, or good birds, or good sunsets, and no one will suppose that we are engaged in moral discourse.

If you think there is a morally ideal possible world EVEN WHEN there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that morality is not dependent on, nor gets its core substance from, analyzing acts. — Bob Ross

Earlier in our conversation I already told you that I don't think this.

By #2, are also referring to moral and immoral acts, or what is morally bad or good simpliciter? I read it as acts, but if it is about just moral badness and goodness (in general); then I would say that my use of "moral agent" falls within this category, because #2 makes no reference to any sort of capacity for responsibility (of anything). 'moral' in #2's sense, assuming you aren't referring to only acts, would include uses like "this agent is doing moral things, even though they cannot be held responsible for their actions, because their actions align with what is morally good". — Bob Ross

(1) and (2) are both using "moral" in the dictionary sense that SEP also highlights, where it pertains to intention and responsibility. So yes, you can read (2) as speaking about acts. I didn't specify that because of what footnote 1 in the OP says.

The aesthetic might parallel wind here: there are gradients within the aesthetic. The beautiful and the sublime come to mind; and here these gradients need not have opposites but rather can be more or less relative to itself. And if you establish some kind of standard to judge more and less then you'd establish a gradient. — Moliere

Yes, but I suppose I am not convinced that the aesthetic gradient and the moral gradient are distinct. When Plato applies the form of the beautiful to human life he seems to arrive at the noble, and I think nobility of life or action would be moral in Aquinas' sense. Actually I think Plato's approach is especially compelling morally.

Concretely we might say that certain settings (such as nature) are more ennobling and life-giving than others, and that this aesthetic consideration coincides with morality whenever it touches on volition or choice. For example, when a city must decide whether to carve out spaces of natural beauty for its current and future citizens, it seems to me that it is considering a moral question (or at least a question that is intrinsically bound up with morality).

I can think of more plausible examples that mimic the arbitrary nature of your example. The choice between regular M&M's and M&M's with peanuts seems morally arbitrary or amoral (not sure which phrase I prefer). — Moliere

Blasphemy! :angry:

We can have arbitrary rules that we follow and even though they mimic or can be interpreted within a moral dimension I'd say they're amoral actions -- outside the scope of moral thinking. — Moliere

Can we have arbitrary rules that we follow? :chin: This may turn out to be an important question in the thread, and I'm not sure we can. I suspect that as soon as we recognize a rule as arbitrary then we will tend to stop following it, or that its force will become nothing more than the inertia of the habit.

The choice between M&M's does seem morally arbitrary. Between this and the hairbrush example I think we are coming upon the case of the choice between two morally insignificant options, a la Objection 2.

Presumably the 'end' of eating M&M's is pleasure, and it seems to me that seeking or giving pleasure is a moral act. It's just that in this case the pleasure differential is so miniscule that the decision is unimportant, a la Objection 5. If morality were alcohol, then an M&M is like diluting a bottle of whiskey in 5 gallons of water and then asking whether taking a drink counts as drinking alcohol. It goes back to that question of the OP of qualitative differences vs. quantitative differences, and whether it is philosophically rigorous to base morality on the latter.

Nice thread and OP! — javra

Thanks, Javra. Allow me to begin with your second post before moving to your first, for I think others may find the second post especially enticing:

Here's a concrete example that might help out: In one's morning routine, ought one brush one's teeth before brushing one's hair or, otherwise, brush one's hair before brushing one's teeth? Whichever alternative one chooses, the action one will engage in will in this example be a fully conscious volitional act (in contrast, for example, to haphazardly touching one's beard in unthinking manners). Yet, because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral. — javra

Good thoughts! Suppose an evil genius (or maybe an evil non-genius :sweat:) rigs up a scenario where he will murder one of two people given a decision you make. As you are standing still, he tells you, "If you begin walking with your left foot I will kill person A, and if you begin walking with your right foot I will kill person B." You know nothing about either person beyond these simple facts. According to your argument, "because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral."

What are your thoughts about this? I don't think this alternative scenario necessarily undermines your reasoning, but I am curious what you would say.

---

I first want to mention that, as with all others, the English language has its own idiosyncrasies via which possible conceptualizations find themselves limited to certain linguistic expressions. There is no one word in the English language with addresses this generalized state of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness in impartial manners. I think the closest English comes to it is in the word “responsibility”—this in the strict sense of being the primary cause for an effect/consequence (rather than, for example, in the sense of being accountable, or answerable, for an effect/consequence). As is also the case with at least the Romanian language (which I also speak fluently), existent words also overwhelmingly tend to emphasize the wrongness of effects/consequences: e.g., what or who is at fault for, what or who is to blame for, or culpable for, etc. — javra

Yes, very true.

That said, when considering the goodness or badness of an effect or else consequence—via what I will here specify as “responsibility for” in the strict sense just mentioned of being the primary cause—the responsible cause can either be in any way accountable, or answerable, for the given effect or not. If the primary cause is deemed answerable for its responsibility in having brought about the effect, then we likewise deem the same given cause’s future effects to be alterable (or else reinforceable) via rewards or punishments. This first broad category of cause-types then subsumes that category the thread addresses as moral evils. — javra

Good, I agree.

Other primary causes which we deem incapable of being in any way answerable for their responsibility in having brought about a certain effect, we then deem fully unalterable via the (yet possible) administration of rewards or punishments—with tornadoes being one example of such latter types of causes. In this second generalized category of cause-types we then place all natural evils. Here, though the wind is responsible for the tree’s leaves movements, we neither blame nor praise the wind in an attempt to either alter or reinforce its doings (this because the wind as primary cause is incapable of in any way answering, or taking responsibility, for what it does). — javra

I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with @Bob Ross.

This outlook I then find can be itself reduced to a dichotomy between (a) agent-caused effects (with individual agents being, as I believe you’ve previously mentioned, in at least some ways causa sui originators of the effects they willfully produce) and b) effects caused by non-agential causes (which are then basically deemed fully deterministic in their nature). [edit: just as I take your own arguments to generally be] — javra

Yes, I fully agree.

For one example, while people will blame and praise their dog’s doings with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) their dog’s behaviors, tmk most will not blame or praise an AI’s doings in their interactions with the AI program with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) the AI program’s behaviors. The first is deemed an agent whereas the second is not. (If dogs are too controversial in terms of moral doings, then one can just as well replace their example with the example of fellow humans.)

Not sure if this is of significant benefit to the discussion, but to me at least it does serve to further illustrate the divide between moral evils and natural evils. — javra

Thanks - I think it is very relevant to the discussion I am having with @Bob Ross, and this distinction between agent-causes and non-agent-causes is central to the OP, because for the OP morality is bound up with agency.

I thought about it even more and came up with another argument. I hope you and Bob haven't hashed this one out yet, because I'm not going to read your guys' entire conversation right now. — ToothyMaw

Sounds good. I think the OP is still live, in that my conversations with other posters have not become necessary reading. The objections and agreements have been quite varied.

I start by defining an amoral act as: an act that results from deliberation that is not intended towards a moral end. Note that this is a statement about intent. I also define an amoral judgement as: a non-hypothetical ought judgement resulting from consideration of non-moral hypothetical oughts (a non-moral all things considered judgement). — ToothyMaw

Okay, this is very clear.

You might argue that the new category of "amoral" act I am talking about above could still be good or bad based on whether it violates some arbitrary set of rules. I admit that it could be. What if it doesn't break any rules? What if there is an amoral act that flows from an amoral judgment that neither breaks nor acts in furtherance of any rules that could be made? — ToothyMaw

It's an excellent question, especially because you speak about "any rules" instead of "any moral rules." First I would want to say that if it doesn't break or adhere to any rules, then the hypothetical 'oughts' upon which it is based must be arbitrary. But I don't think hypothetical 'oughts' are ever arbitrary when they constitute a legitimate consideration for action, and so I don't think these hypothetical 'oughts' will be arbitrary. Because of this I think the hypothetical 'oughts' and the non-hypothetical ought-judgments that depend on them will be associated with rules and ends.

Not only would it be neither good nor bad, but it would be amoral in the sense of being informed purely by non-moral hypothetical oughts and considerations, and thus would not be subject to moral scrutiny; given no intended moral consequences, there is no calculation that could be considered moral if you accept my definitions. — ToothyMaw

Sure, but the definitions are at this point stipulative. You have defined amoral acts in an admirable way, but do these acts really exist? That seems to be the question. What would be an example of an amoral act?

Great OP. — Moliere

Thanks, Moliere.

I would have said your example of the person with the rule to not cross their fingers while urinating is a good example of a non-moral act in the wider sense you're talking about. It's not morally evaluable because it's not morally significant. So that leads me to objection 5. — Moliere

Okay.

Along with objection 2 -- I'd say there are moral acts as you use the term, and non-moral acts -- or, rather, I think I'd prefer "activity" so as to encompass more than a singular act, but rather the patterns within a world.

But rather than saying "this one falls in the middle and so is neither good nor bad", I'm thinking that some acts simply don't fall on the spectrum. To use the light/dark spectrum as analogy, "wind" is real but has no brightness because it's a pressure gradient, rather than a light gradient.

But then when it comes to "What makes activity moral?", in the wider sense, I haven't an answer there. All I have is an example that seems troublesome, but you seem to bite the bullet with your example of the rule to not cross your fingers while urinating as morally evaluable. — Moliere

Well, what is the example you have in mind? Presumably you have an example that parallels the "wind"?

Part of me wonders here, though: Surely we can evaluate any action on a subjective basis of an arbitrary rule -- but that ability doesn't indicate something about moral life, just as your finger-crossing example doesn't really seem to, though it can be evaluated along a subjective rule. — Moliere

Yes, and the finger-crossing example was risky in that it is easily misunderstood. I was only trying to illustrate the role of susceptibility and negligence. It is (intentionally) artificial because no one holds that rule. Of course, there is a sense in which it is important to consider subjective moral evaluations (in part because conscience is always a moral factor), but I think we can leave that to the side for the moment.

Firstly, you are absolutely right to point out that a tornado is not an agent, as an agent is self-caused, and that it isn’t acting (in the strict sense of the word that relates to agents) either; and I apologize if I suggested otherwise. However, this doesn’t takeaway from my main point, which is is that what the tornado is “doing” is immoral. — Bob Ross

Okay, good. I see you used scare quotes around "doing." To illustrate just how idiosyncratic your language is, consider the sentence: <The tornado is a "moral" "agent" "acting" "immorally">. This level of idiosyncratic language and scare quotes is simply unwieldy. This applies to everything. Suppose I sit on an old chair, it breaks, and I get seriously injured. <The chair is a "moral" "agent" "acting" "immorally">. One could multiply bizarre claims to emphasize the reductio ad absurdum.

The reason we don't call natural evils immoral is because they are appreciably different from moral evils. Both natural evils and moral evils are evil or bad (and this is their common genus: evil or badness). So what makes them different? The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect. We have a special word to denote this difference because the distinction is enormously important in human life, and that word is "morality." The difference determines whether blame can apply, and whether we should punish the thing that caused the evil.

The same could be said for "good" (as opposed to "evil"). There are moral goods and non-moral goods. A moral good is the meal cooked by your mother. A non-moral good is the rain that waters your crops. What they have in common is goodness; what differentiates them is whether they are caused by an intentional agent. The word <moral> and its antecedents have always been used to describe the behavior of intentional agents, and they have never been used to describe the behavior of non-intentional agents.

I would also point out, to my favor, that ‘evil’ is traditionally a morally-loaded term; and so, technically, it doesn’t make sense to say “moral evil”: it’s redundant. — Bob Ross

Perhaps in English this is somewhat true, but it is not historically or philosophically true. And I already gave an English counterexample, "When the farmer in the drought says that a great evil has befallen him, he is not saying anything about immorality."

It’s just because I have my own ethical theory, which we haven’t discussed in depth. — Bob Ross

I concede and acknowledge this.

This does not mean that I am wrong; and surely doesn’t entail that I should stick to all the traditional terms IF there are better ones (for formative purposes). — Bob Ross

At a certain point of idiosyncrasy I think one ought to revert to traditional usage. More, in philosophy one should stick to philosophical usage (which differs slightly from colloquial usage).

I say all agents are “moral agents” insofar as they are capable of moral analysis, but some are not held capably blameworthy for their actions; and if one wants to use “moral agent” in the sense of an agent which can be held responsible for their actions, then I have no problem using it that way if it helps them wrap their head around things. Anyone can understand this easily. — Bob Ross

Relative to the general perspicacity of language, this is not easy to understand. And you require additional scare quotes around "moral analysis."

I’ve never had a problem with the SEP article, as, like I said, I have interpreted it as making a distinction between two types of evil; and that ‘evil’ still was completely in the sphere of moral discourse. — Bob Ross

I'm sorry but the SEP article directly contradicts your "interpretation." When the SEP distinguishes natural evil from moral evil it is obvious that natural evil is not "completely in the sphere of moral discourse." I have noted this multiple times.

It makes absolutely no sense to claim that some amoral bad is evil. Something that is amorally bad is just pragmatically bad. — Bob Ross

I explained non-moral evils above, with the tornado causing suffering and the death of 100 people.

Fair enough! As always, great conversation Leontiskos! Feel free to stop the conversation whenever you wish...I will let you have the last word. — Bob Ross

Okay, sounds good. Thank you as well. The one thing I think could be further meted out is my "argument from vacuity." Feel free to reply. Let me explain...

That everything is capable of moral analysis does not in any way entail that nothing is capable of moral analysis; and just because a property can be applied to everything, it does not follow it is vacuous (e.g., beingness). — Bob Ross

It does entail this. "Being" involves analogical predication and degrees. For example, propositions exist in a different way than giraffes or colors. "Brk" is a univocal predication, as is your predication of "moral (agent)."

I would also like to note that by saying everything is capable of moral analysis, I am not claiming there is a property of "moralness" that can be predicated to everything. "moral" was being used as an adjective, not a property. — Bob Ross

Oh, but you are saying it is a property. You think the tornado has the property of "moral agent," and this property applies to all things without exception.

I feel like you keep forgetting that, by your own lights, ‘moral’ has multiple meanings; and you then proceed to conflate them. — Bob Ross

Nah, I don't think I have conflated this once in the entire thread. For traditional language-users "moral" has only two basic meanings, and both are closely related: 1) capable of moral or immoral acts, and 2) moral or immoral (and in both of these cases the term "moral" is meant in the sense of praiseworthy or morally good). This is standard language, where a cause can be named according to its effect (see, for example, my "corollary" above).

To be clear, your "brk" is not "morally praiseworthy," but rather "moral (agent)."

- I would recommend Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas. For more modern treatments, see my post <here>. Beyond that, Edward Feser is someone who tries to offer introductions to this paradigm, and he also has a blog.

I would also like to ask, how would you go about determining what is the "human good" which grounds our morality? — Max2

To give more references, this is what Aristotle focuses on at the beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics and what Aquinas focuses on in the beginning of the "First part of the second part" (Prima Secundae) of his Summa Theologiae. For Plato I would reach for The Republic but the idea is strewn liberally throughout his corpus.

Finally, in terms of metaethics, is this a subjectivist or an objectivist position on the reality of moral claims? — Max2

Neither, really. It tends to predate and transcend those divisions.

would different types of creatures have different "ethics" due to plausibly having their own good that is distinct from the human good? — Max2

It's possible, yes. But for this Platonic school all creatures participate in the same Good, and so the differences are not jarring or contradictory.

I see what you mean, and now recognize that I need to be more clear with my terminology.

To answer your question outright: I accept the corollary as valid, but this leaves me no choice but to deny the existence of amoral agents and acts (in the sense of ‘moral’ qua what is within its sphere [of discourse]) because I do think we can analyze acts and agents which are not responsible for their actions within [the study of] morality.

However, it is important (for me) to note that there are amoral agents and acts in the sense of ‘moral’ qua what is morally wrong/right.

In other words, all agents/acts are within the sphere of moral talk, but not all agents/acts are necessarily being immoral/moral or doing immoral/moral things.

Moreover, there are two subtypes of immoral agents (in both senses of the term I expounded above): those capable of culpability and those that are not.

A tornado is a moral agent in the sense of being an agent subject to moral analysis; and it is, in fact, doing things and that are morally wrong and is being something that is inherently immoral—it is not just being or doing things that are amorally bad.

Evil, then, is always moral. There is no such thing as ‘natural evil’ in the sense that you outlined; instead, what I mean by ‘natural evil’ is evil which is does indeliberately (viz., in a way of which no one can be held responsible for it)—that’s it. — Bob Ross

Okay, well now you are being consistent, and that's a good thing. But you are redefining words independently of their common and philosophical usage, and that's a bad thing. You need to talk about moral-agents-that-are-not-capable-of-culpability and moral-agents-that-are-capable-of-culpability. Everyone else simply talks about non-moral ("natural") realities and moral agents.

There are also deeper linguistic problems with your views, relating to the etymology and history of words like 'moral' and 'agent'. For example, an agent is "one who acts," which derives from the Latin agere, "to set in motion, drive forward; to do, perform..." This is the basis of Aquinas' distinction between both human acts and acts "of a man," as well as between moral realities and non-moral realities. An agent is something which is a self-cause, such that it itself is a cause of motion via its own intention and freedom. We do not call tornadoes moral, but we also do not call tornadoes agents, because they do not have the causal capacities that agents have.

The problem with this, is that under my theory moral goodness is identical to intrinsic goodness; so the obvious antithesis to this is intrinsic badness. Thusly, if what the tornado is doing is intrinsically bad, then it is morally bad. See what I mean? — Bob Ross

Not really. You are now using words in such thoroughly idiosyncratic ways that I have a hard time following what you are saying at all. The fact that you have a hard time communicating your thoughts with idiosyncratic language is no coincidence, for idiosyncratic language undermines the purpose of language itself.

(1) I don’t think it is idiosyncratic (but that’s a mute point) — Bob Ross

It is not as moot as you might think. It is moot insofar as it does not impact the formal soundness of your arguments. It is not moot insofar as it will prevent you from easily talking with other people and engaging in dialogical philosophy.

To your point, if I were to say to the common man “that tornado is immoral”, they will find it nonsense because they would interpret it the way you are. — Bob Ross

True.

To my point, if you said “evil is not always immoral”, they would also find this to be nonsense. — Bob Ross

Only because "evil" in that sentence will be interpreted as, "evil (human) acts." If you ask the same person whether a devastating tornado is evil, and whether it is immoral, they will probably say yes/no.

Likewise, to my point, if I clarified my statement about the tornado, such as “the tornado is immoral insofar as its acts (or the events it brings about) are immoral”, the common man would find no problem with it. — Bob Ross

Perhaps, but perhaps not. Either way, the common man will not call tornadoes immoral of his own accord.

The only reason they would find it initially nonsensical, is because within the context of the use of ‘immoral’ in that particular sentence makes it sound like I am saying the tornado is culpable for its evil actions. — Bob Ross

And they are right, for immorality implies culpability. I showed you that SEP affirms this. We could also go to IEP and Wikipedia, but if you distrust SEP then I doubt these other sources will avail.

Cancer is immoral, because I think it is intrinsically bad; and intrinsic badness is the antithesis to intrinsic goodness; and intrinsic goodness is moral goodness. — Bob Ross

Okay. I'm not going to engage this syllogism, but you can imagine what I would say.

No, so what I was pointing out is that the ‘natural’ vs. ‘moral’ evil distinction makes sense if (1) ‘evil’ is interpreted as immoral AND (2) ‘moral’, in ‘moral evil’, is interpreted as signifier the capability of being responsible (as opposed to being an assertion about it being within the sphere of moral discourse). Again, you have to admit (at least) that the adjective ‘moral’ is used in many senses. — Bob Ross

You believe that something which is not responsible for its acts can act immorally. I would suggest investigating this further, for it is commonly accepted to be false (and I too believe it is false). Perhaps you should also look at the usage, history, and etymology of terms like 'moral'.

For example, imagine agents could not exist in reality: it is, let’s say, metaphysically or logically impossible. Does that mean that there isn’t a state of supreme and ultimate (moral) good that would be applicable to that reality? I don’t think so. Do you? — Bob Ross

Of course I do, yes. But this would lead us into an investigation of your understanding of what it means to be an agent, and I don't think that is something I want to investigate. :wink:

Are we perhaps at the end of our conversation? SEP says that we call something morally evil, morally bad, or immoral insofar as it "results from the intentions or negligence of moral agents." I agree with SEP; you disagree. You think entities incapable of intention can truly be called immoral, such as tornadoes. For me, this is the key takeaway.

---

Edit: I suppose I should raise the customary toast to the argument from vacuity. That if everything is "moral" then nothing at all is "moral."

• Jake: That tree is brk.
• Sue: What does 'brk' mean?
• Jake: Brk is a property of everything whatsoever.
• Sue: So nothing is non-brk?
• Jake: Nope, nothing.
• Sue: Well if there is nothing which is non-brk then it would seem that 'brk' means nothing at all.

If everything whatsoever is "moral" (in the sense that it is capable of producing good and evil effects), then "moral" turns out to be a vacuous word. The true word 'moral' has meaning because there are realities which are truly non-moral (or amoral). Yet on your view, to posit non-moral realities would be to transgress the corollary set out in my last post.

By ‘amoral agent’, I was referring to an agent that is not capable of moral decision making (viz., not capable of being culpable for their actions); and by ‘amoral act’, I would be referring to an action which is not itself immoral or moral. — Bob Ross

Excellent, and it is the corollary that you seem to transgress at various points throughout the thread, "Amoral agents can only produce amoral acts." Or similarly, "Amoral agents cannot produce acts which are moral or immoral." Do you accede to this corollary?

Is this “bad” state, morally bad? — Bob Ross

It can't be morally evil. If it were morally evil then natural evil and moral evil would not be distinct, and SEP would be utterly failing to distinguish them.

Again, what do you mean by ‘bad’? — Bob Ross

Just bad (or evil). Call it a "primitive concept" if you like. Again, it doesn't matter to me whether non-moral evils exist. I have no dog in the fight. But someone who holds that the suffering and death of 100 people are bad would just say that death and suffering are intrinsically bad (or evil). This suffering and death is not morally evil because it "does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents."

I do not think it is controversial that suffering and death caused by a tornado is not morally evil. Whether it can be called evil at all (i.e. "naturally evil") is debated.

I would say that the suffering and death of 100 people is morally bad, because it is a morally bad state of affairs. — Bob Ross

You think it is immoral because you have idiosyncratically defined "immoral" to include natural evil, as I noted above (). You agree with SEP that it is a "bad state of affairs which did not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents," but instead of using the common philosophical parlance of "natural evil" you call it "immoral." According to moral philosophy that which does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents is in no way moral or immoral.

Would you agree that, although the tornado is not a moral agent, the tornado is doing something “bad” when in the event of destroying those 100 people’s lives? — Bob Ross

Eh, to say that, "The tornado did something bad," is to use moral language metaphorically. You will never hear newscasters or other people speak about the immorality or wickedness of tornadoes. Only moral agents engage in moral actions. With tornadoes we say things like, "The tornado left destruction in its wake." Any value imputed to the effects of non-moral realities is agent-relative. "The tornado destroyed my house, and this is bad insofar as it harms me."

If so, then what kind of “bad”? — Bob Ross

It is something like misfortune. Arthritis is bad, but it's not immoral. Those who suffer from arthritis suffer misfortune; they do not suffer from an immoral act. Misfortune is bad, and if a tornado causes misfortune then we say that the tornado is bad (or evil).

Yes, but the only way this distinction makes sense (to me) is if this natural evil is still morally bad (being evil); — Bob Ross

If SEP is making a distinction between natural evil and moral evil, then it makes no sense for you to say, "Okay that distinction makes sense to me so long as natural evil is moral evil." To say such a thing is to fail to understand that any distinction is being made at all!

then morality is restricted to essentially the sphere of deliberate acts and what relates thereto — Bob Ross

Morality is restricted to the realm of deliberate acts. As SEP demonstrates, this is not controversial.

The way I see it, either 'natural evil' is a matter of amoral consideration and is, thusly, not evil (viz., it is really 'natural badness'); or 'natural evil' is a matter of moral consideration and is, thusly, evil. — Bob Ross

The reason SEP is just accurately reflecting philosophical and historical usage is because, contrary to your beliefs, 'evil' and 'immoral' do not mean what you think they mean. To use the word 'immoral' to denote things unrelated to intention or negligence is to misuse the word. Once this is understood it becomes more clear why 'evil' is not reducible to 'immoral.' When the farmer in the drought says that a great evil has befallen him, he is not saying anything about immorality.

I thought about it some more and came up with a somewhat convoluted counterexample that, under certain constraints, might show that your first thesis is wrong. — ToothyMaw

Okay, great.

Accordingly, if we bring “that which benefits humanity” into line with “that which advances knowledge”, by redefining that which benefits humanity to be the effects of advancements in knowledge, we end up with a one-to-one relationship between the two that does indeed maximize benefit to humanity through advancements in knowledge. — ToothyMaw

As an aside, I want to point out that while we could redefine, we could also simply predicate. For example, if I say, "X is green," I could either be defining X or else predicating green of X. If I am defining then X means the same thing as green. If I am predicating then I am saying that green can be said of X even though it does not exhaust the meaning of X. An example of this latter case would be, "[The bicycle] is green." Usually someone who wishes to advance knowledge in order to benefit humanity is working in the realm of predication, not definition. They are saying, "That which advances knowledge benefits humanity," rather than something like, "Only that which advances knowledge benefits humanity," or, "Benefitting humanity just means advancing knowledge."

But this admits of some acts that must be neutral - not subject to moral scrutiny - because not every act furthers or hinders advancements in knowledge. This is different from the spectrum you describe in objection 2 because there are plainly acts that have no relation to what is good or bad now, even if there is still a sort of bifurcated spectrum. — ToothyMaw

Yes, this is a good and insightful objection. :up:

I want to say that if we begin from discrete rules or norms then thesis 1 will only hold when these rules rule the whole of human life and human acts. Your objection pertains most directly to my Addendum. I would suggest having a look at the Addendum in its entirety, but here is an especially relevant excerpt:

...The scope of one’s non-hypothetical ought-judgments will extend as far as one’s normative end(s) extend(s). The breadth of one’s moral sphere will depend on what they conceive of as the end of their life and perhaps of all human life. Still, it seems to me that Aristotle conceived of this end and its scope rightly. — Leontiskos

(Or perhaps more relevantly, "The breadth of one’s moral sphere will depend on what they conceive of as the purpose of moral acts.")

Now we can approach your objection in a number of different ways, and I will not exhaust them here. First, for Aquinas if someone has only two rules or norms then all of the actions they choose to undertake should be traceable back to those two rules. If they engage in actions unrelated to those rules, then there must be other, implicit rules (or norms) at play.

Second and relatedly, it could be argued that someone who is spending time doing things that do not directly or indirectly benefit humanity is wasting their time and, in failing to use their time to benefit humanity, is acting immorally. Similarly, by failing to advance knowledge we might say that they are indirectly hindering advancements in knowledge. If this is correct then every act does further or hinder advancements in knowledge.

Third and also related to the first point, Aquinas often tends to work from acts to rules instead of working from rules to acts. For instance, instead of asking someone about their rules and then predicting how they should act based on those rules, he might observe how someone acts and spends their time and then infer which rules or norms they are implicitly following. So if he caught the objector feeding their child he would probably say, "Hey, you clearly think it is worthwhile to feed your child even though this act has no obvious relation to the advancement of knowledge. I therefore conclude that either there must be some rule or norm that you have not recognized, or else you should stop feeding your child."

What do you think of those responses? It is possible that I am missing part of the nuance of your objection.

(I think there are possible sets of moral rules that do not touch on all human acts, such as 's negative utilitarianism. But after recognizing those sets of rules the next step is to ask ourselves whether there is a good reason to call the acts which fall under those rules "moral" while calling acts that do not fall under those rules "non-moral." More specifically, we want to probe the question of whether someone's distinction between the moral and the non-moral is a firm, defensible distinction.)