Do you see the difference? — hypericin

Is it this idea?

There is a common confusion and category error between theories about "morality", and moral theories. Only the latter involves true normativity. There is moral subjectivism as a theory about "morality," and then there is moral subjectivism as a moral theory. I have argued against the latter; you are proposing the former. I don't think it is incoherent to say that every moral claim is about societal expectations (but I do think it is wrong). Similarly, I wouldn't think it incoherent to say that every moral claim is really about the lengths of different giraffes' necks. Neither one is incoherent in the sense of self-defeating. But I do think it is incoherent to appeal to these sort of claims while at the same time espousing a moral theory (i.e. a normative theory). — Leontiskos

[Between <theories about "morality"> and <moral theories>]

Human psychology isn't a slave to some supposed duty. — Michael

It was a discussion from several years ago that I mentioned in passing. I didn't mean to bring it into this discussion. — Michael

<This thread> :smile:

This thread has been largely polemical, but some recent developments in a different direction have led me to draw up this post. I am thinking of and 's consideration of a central thesis of Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy," and to a lesser extent, 's more serious posts on ethical dilemmas. Taking Anscombe as my point of departure, everything in this post will tend toward the "analytic" spectrum.

When someone coming from an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework (A-T) encounters the characteristic categories and problematics of modern moral philosophy, they seem strange and far-removed, almost like Zeno's Paradox. It is very hard to know how to begin to bridge the gap, and in large part these two traditions have simply ignored one another. When Anscombe speaks about modern moral philosophy needing to develop a robust "psychology" or "theory of action," I think she has this gulf in mind, at least in part.

(My entry point is usually the idea that all acts are moral, or that the moral/practical and moral/psychological distinctions do not hold (which I have alluded to a few times in this thread). Interestingly, Anscombe takes an almost identical tack in her, "Medalist's Address," albeit only in passing.)

Introducing someone coming from the modern tradition to Aristotelian-Thomistic moral philosophy would be a bit like setting someone on a motorcycle who has never driven a manual transmission or even ridden a bicycle. "'Clutch', 'front brake', 'accelerator', 'shift', 'rear brake'. Good luck, and remember to balance!" Thus, not too many have tried to bridge that gap, and many of these have done a poor job of it. Still I wanted to draw up a list of articles that would be helpful to anyone who is interested. Almost all of these essays only attempt to bite off a small chunk of the task, for obvious reasons.

As far as I know, the best philosopher who attempts to respond to questions of modern moral philosophy with an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework is Peter L. P. Simpson (website; academia.edu). He is a very strong Aristotelian and he knows the modern tradition well. For a longer treatment, see his book, Goodness and Nature and its supplement. Here are three related essays, each also available in his book, Vices, Virtues, and Consequences: Essays in Moral and Political Philosophy:

1. "A Century of Anglo-American Moral Theory," by Peter L. P. Simpson
   
   • (A historical look at the genealogy of Anglo-American moral theory along with some of its biases)
   • Related: Alasdair MacIntyre's informal piece, "On Having Survived the Academic Moral Philosophy of the 20th Century."
2. "Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble," by Peter L. P. Simpson
   
   • (A historical framing of the widespread Kantian idea that morality is a sphere all of its own)
3. "On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas," by Peter L. P. Simpson
   
   • (Answering the naturalistic fallacy with Aquinas)

The next three essays are a step removed, topically, from the first three, but they are still related. Kevin Flannery wrote the first, and he is also very good.

• "Anscombe and Aristotle on Corrupt Minds," by Kevin Flannery, S.J.
  
  • (Explaining what Anscombe meant by a "corrupt mind" and why that corruption is culpable)
  • Jennifer Frey's work on practical truth, following Anscombe, may also be of interest to some.
• "Justice, Scheffler and Cicero," by Peter L. P. Simpson
  
  • (Defending Cicero's absolute moral prohibition on murder against consequentialists)
• "On Practical Thinking and St. Thomas," by Peter L. P. Simpson
  
  • (With respect to Aquinas on theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge, and ethical truth)

Another step removed:

• "On Virtue Ethics and Aristotle," by Peter L. P. Simpson
  
  • (That contemporary virtue ethics is non-Aristotelian in significant ways)
  • This paper also helps underscore the fact that the A-T tradition, following Aristotle, sees only a thin line between morality and politics. Simpson also has a large body of work that is more "political" than "moral," addressing these same questions in the political sphere. See also: "The Revolt Against Prudential Truth," by Charles de Koninck. Jacques Maritain is also worth mentioning in this regard.

Finally, three essays by William Matthew Diem. I appreciate his work greatly, but it is more specialized and less accessible to folks coming from the modern philosophy tradition. Diem is speaking to Thomists and using Thomistic language, although I think he will still be understandable to those coming from a secular perspective:

• "Obligation, Justice, and Law: A Thomistic Reply to Anscombe," by William M. Diem
• "On Value and Obligation in Practical Reason: Toward a Resolution of the Is–Ought Problem in the Thomistic Moral Tradition," by William M. Diem
• "Reasons for Acting and the End of Man as Naturally Known: Reconceiving Thomistic Axiology," by William M. Diem

Other relevant essays that I have not yet vetted include, "The Two Kinds of Error in Action," by G.E.M. Anscombe and Sidney Morgenbesser; "Moral Obligation," by Thomas Pink; "Normativity and Reason," by Thomas Pink; "Promising and Obligation," by Thomas Pink; "Reason and Agency," by Thomas Pink; "Law and the Normativity of Obligation", by Thomas Pink; "Natural Law and the Theory of Moral Obligation," by Thomas Pink; and "St. Thomas on Prudence and the Moral Virtues," by Alfred Freddoso.


(CC: @J, @Bob Ross, @AmadeusD, @Apustimelogist, @hypericin)

I will purchase a complete works of Aristotle this week - mark my words! — AmadeusD

Well that's ambitious! Don't let me deter you, but if you want to start slow I would recommend his Nicomachean Ethics, which has become the go-to ethical text in Aristotle's corpus.

With each other as well as the Papists. — Banno

Contrarian folk. Sort of like philosophers.

I did find a link to the archived article on the SEP site itself if you wanted to use it for that thread: https://plato.stanford.edu/Archives/win2021/entries/anscombe/

(I assume this is the same one)

- Yes, good luck. Aquinas draws heavily on Aristotle, and Aristotle is also a good source even though he wasn't a religious thinker in the same way as these others. I also think Plato is great, and he strikes me as being more "religious" than Aristotle.

1. Some "one ought not X" is true
2. "one ought not X" doesn't mean "according to some rule-giver Y, one ought not X"
3. There are no obligations without a rule-giver

These cannot all be true. — Michael

Sure. Note that your (2) here is a bit different from (1) up above.

So yeah, you've got a logical tension there. I personally reject (3) outright (), but I also think morality has a transcendent aspect or ...augmentation, so maybe I could leave (2) as well.

The thread on Anscombe that started four years ago is about (3), and might make for a fruitful discussion.

non-cognitivists and error theorists must reject (1) — Michael

Agreed.

subjectivists must reject (2) — Michael

As I noted above, I don't think this is right. Presumably self-legislation would be rule-giving, even though I agree with Anscombe that this approach doesn't work. And apparently some subjectivists think law, such as a king's decree, would be legitimate.

and realists must reject (3) — Michael

I don't really understand why this would be true, but I don't want to get off onto too many tangents...

Are the determinations compatible across each sector of assessment? — AmadeusD

Yes, but the "range" is not entirely overlapping. Specifically, there are some religious moral truths that are not accessible to natural reason.

I would be interested to hear a moral theory that comports with a religion, and an atheist, naturalistic world-view. — AmadeusD

Thomas Aquinas and the Thomistic tradition enunciate such a theory. I don't think I will raise it in these forums any time soon, but you could read around that tradition. (Or Augustine, or Maimonides' Jewish version, or Averroes' and Avicenna's Islamic version)

I was simply using an example that better fits my breakdown here. — Michael

My consistent point throughout has been that "moral subjectivism" doesn't hold up under scrutiny. Some versions are incoherent, others are plainly false. Even in the literature and SEP I don't see much representation for this position. I think you have made a bit of progress showing that there are versions which are false, but not incoherent. Fair enough?

---

Well that’s the issue. I think that (1) is false, I think that some moral sentences are true, and I think that obligations without a rule-giver are nonsensical. Yet these three positions are incompatible. — Michael

They're not incompatible. Convert! Make straight the way! :grin:

That's interesting, though. Is there an implicit atheistic premise, here? Or is that baked in as a rejection of divine command theory or something like it?

(To clarify any confusion, my position is that morality is overdetermined, being derivable in both a religious and non-religious manner.)

Your edit:

Subjectivism claims that (1) is true, and if (1) is true then the conclusion follows. Subjectivism allows for obligations. — Michael

If (1) is true then subjectivism allows for obligations. Everyone here seems to be in agreement that (1) is false, including you. This seems about right to me. This is the case that I would call obviously false but not incoherent.

That’s where realists and subjectivists disagree. — Michael

Well, not quite. You said something similar and I already agreed. You said:

Moral realists (and error theorists) believe that (1) is false, whereas (some) moral subjectivists believe that (1) is true. — Michael

Note, "some." Two self-proclaimed subjectivists in this thread have already disagreed with (1), and none have agreed with it.

If the argument is valid and if the premises are true then the conclusion that one ought not harm another iff society says one ought not ham another is true. — Michael

Yes, but (1) is false.

What exactly do you mean by “intrinsic”? Isn’t this the very thing that realists and subjectivists disagree over? Realists say that moral rules and obligations are “intrinsic” (i.e objective) and subjectivists say that they aren’t. — Michael

I am speaking about sufficiency. "Society said so, therefore I ought to obey," is a false statement.
knows why. A further premise is required to get to the consequent. For example, "The societal rulers are ordained by God, . . . therefore I must obey." An extrinsic normativity or authority must be applied to society, for it does not possess it in itself.

You appear to just be saying that subjectivism fails because it isn’t realism. — Michael

The funny thing about your defenses of moral subjectivism is that the self-proclaimed subjectivists in this thread have consistently disagreed with them, and along the same lines that I have. I find it curious, although certainly not definitive. In any case, this claim of yours falls flat in light of that fact.

Huh...the buggers have updated the SEP page since then. — Banno

I thought they might have.

Then you would go along with the modus tollens reading...? — Banno

No, I tend to think Anscombe was wrong about (1). Aquinas didn't read Aristotle the way Anscombe reads him in that article, and her thesis cuts against the grain of Catholic thought. But it's not altogether easy to circumvent her argument. Kant's attempt is perhaps the most famous, but it is also convoluted and probably wrong. Her article probably bothers me as much as it does you.

These are difficult debates and I would have to review the literature. Also, I have come to these questions from the perspective of Catholic philosophy and you have come to them from the perspective of more secular philosophy, so translation is required. In any case, Catholics tend to hold that a substantial version of morality can be attained without believing in God. Protestants would be likely to disagree.

Not exactly. I'm saying that society says "you ought not kill babies" and then we either obey or we don't, and if we don't then we're doing what society says we ought not do. Moral subjectivists claim that there is nothing more to morality than this. According to them, when we say "you ought not kill babies" we are implicitly (or explicitly) saying "according to society you ought not kill babies." — Michael

Sure, then we're back to a theory of "morality," and you're safe again! Of course your claim here does seem to run up against your earlier claim, "We ought to obey the law, and not just for practical reasons." ().

Moral subjectivists think this nonsensical as they believe one cannot have a rule without a rule-giver. — Michael

Okay, I'm not sure I agree with this but I'm going to leave it to the side.

1. "one ought not harm another" means "society says one ought not harm another"
2. "society says one ought not harm another" is true iff society says one ought not harm another.
3. Therefore, "one ought not harm another" is true iff society says one ought not ham another.

The argument is valid. — Michael

Valid and coherent, but it erroneously divorces morality from oughtness, as noted above. Society saying something does not intrinsically obligate anyone to obey. This seems like Unenlightened's claim, where the moral premise is tacit and yet denied. I think a theory is either normative or else it is not, and there's no use trying to straddle the line and be both. But if you are here propounding a non-normative theory then I accede.

But moral realists (and error theorists) believe that (1) is false, whereas (some) moral subjectivists believe that (1) is true. — Michael

Okay, agreed.

I'll join Philippa Foot in changing my mind every couple of years. — Banno

Hah. What is the "modus tollens" reading, or the logical implication that you have in mind? I couldn't find that reference in the SEP article you link to in your thread.

This remains for me the central and most troubling article in Ethics. — Banno

Yep. It's a tough nut to crack. I sometimes think I've overcome it but of course doubts always remain when it comes to Anscombe. Granted, I have less at stake than you do. :wink:

Well, I know lawmakers like to think themselves above the law, but they're not. — Michael

Those who make laws for themselves don't need to break laws when they can simply change them, or grant themselves a dispensation, or something like that. This problem becomes painfully obvious when, say, a U.S. president is impeached.

Whether or not these are the rules that we refer to when we talk about morality is the very issue that (robust) moral realists and moral subjectivists disagree on. — Michael

I think the circularity objection stands (). Again, go back to my distinction between a theory about "morality," and a moral theory (). You are now moving back into "moral theory" territory for subjectivism. You're not just saying, "Morality is just the laws we pass;" you are saying, "Morality is the laws we pass and we ought to obey those laws." You're moving back into the normative territory, and that is precisely what my circularity objection addresses.

- Fair enough, I appreciate that. Sorry for being dismissive. :victory: (A peace sign, not a victory sign :razz:)

Yes, sometimes some other rule demands us to break the law. And perhaps this other rule is yet another manufactured rule. I can understand the moral subjectivist taking issue with the claim that there are rules that are simply "built in" to the world or whatever it is (robust) moral realists believe. — Michael

I think Anscombe sums up the problem. We can never manufacture binding rules for ourselves. Self-legislation does not bind:

Kant introduces the idea of "legislating for oneself," which is as absurd as if in these days, when majority votes command great respect, one were to call each reflective decision a man made a vote resulting in a majority, which as a matter of proportion is over-whelming, for it is always 1-0. The concept of legislation requires superior power in the legislator. — Elizabeth Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 2

But rather than chess, perhaps laws a good example. We ought to obey the law, and not just for practical reasons. — Michael

Right, but I touched on this earlier when I mentioned positive law and its relation to morality. The common opinion is that a law can be immoral. Further, and more importantly, the law example runs head-on into the circularity objection (). I admit that law is part of morality, but not that it is the whole of morality. I don't think consensus can describe morality in its entirety. See:

I don't have a problem with the idea that consensus carries moral weight, but I believe the circularity argument proves that morality cannot be simply reduced to consensus. — Leontiskos

This is where I think things get tricky. I think moral language comes in two varieties:

1. X is wrong
2. One ought not X

Do these mean the same thing? If not, does the one entail the other? — Michael

I think they are both normative; they are both "ought"-claims. By "descriptive" I am thinking of the "is" in the is-ought distinction. It is the complement of normative.

I don't think that this is necessarily the case. There is a normative component to the rules of chess and to laws even though these are manufactured. I don't see a problem with claiming that society has manufactured a set of rules that each member must abide by, and that these are the rules we talk about when we talk about morality. — Michael

Right, understood. But morality is not conceived of as a voluntary activity, whereas chess is. "Pawns cannot move backwards," and, "Babies cannot be eaten," are not the same, because the former only holds given a prior decision to play chess. The latter is not like that.

Kindly "piss off". — hypericin

hypericin, you're just out of line. No one here is being as escalating or trollish as you are. You continually misread posts in order to take offense, and then sound off like a loose canon. See:

Oops, I somehow misread that as "all moral claims are true". — hypericin

See also:

Great. You think it's "chimerical". Wow. Everyone take note, Leontiskos thinks moral subjectivism is chimerical. — hypericin

That was in response to a post where I agreed with your position with respect to Michael's consensus-based subjectivism, and then noted that Michael's attempt is not altogether bad, along with AmadeusD's. You seem to have taken umbrage as if I were calling you out, but I don't even consider your theory moral subjectivism. I consider it non-cognitivism. You think system-based moral claims are truth-apt and supra-systematic claims (or axiom claims) are not truth-apt. Given that the foundations of the system are the most important issue, this is non-cognitivism in my eyes.

(The "chimerical" comment was a reference to the arguments in my previous post to Michael)

What I am saying is that there are certain behaviours that society has deemed acceptable and certain behaviours that society has deemed unacceptable. According to some moral subjectivists when we talk about morality we are talking about these socially acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. The sentence "murder is immoral" is true iff society deems murder unacceptable because "murder is immoral" just means "murder is deemed socially unacceptable."

This may be factually incorrect (e.g. if Moore's open argument is sound), but that doesn't make it incoherent. It's an internally consistent theory even if it mistakes the meaning of moral sentences.

And on a similar vein, the same is true for the subjectivists who claim that "murder is immoral" is true (for me) if I disapprove of murder because "murder is immoral" just means "I disapprove of murder". It's internally consistent even if factually incorrect. — Michael

Okay, thanks. My problem with this is that morality is a normative affair. If someone is making purely descriptive claims, then they are not engaged in, or committing themselves to, any kind of morality. If someone claims that morality is reducible to descriptive facts, then they are explaining away morality.* Either way, there is a significant equivocation on the term 'morality.' If someone mistakes the meaning of a moral sentence by failing to understand that, for example, "murder is immoral" involves a claim about whether one ought murder, then they are substituting an equivocal sense of "immoral."

There is a common confusion and category error between theories about "morality", and moral theories. Only the latter involves true normativity. There is moral subjectivism as a theory about "morality," and then there is moral subjectivism as a moral theory. I have argued against the latter; you are proposing the former. I don't think it is incoherent to say that every moral claim is about societal expectations (but I do think it is wrong). Similarly, I wouldn't think it incoherent to say that every moral claim is really about the lengths of different giraffes' necks. Neither one is incoherent in the sense of self-defeating. But I do think it is incoherent to appeal to these sort of claims while at the same time espousing a moral theory (i.e. a normative theory).

The relevance here is that folks in this thread either are, or else are flirting with, espousing normative theories. That sort of "subjectivism" is incoherent. The other sort just fails to understand that morality pertains to oughtness.

* Ethical naturalism aside

I don't think you have presented any incoherencies. — Michael

See:

The notion that the consensus has moral weight and the votes have none is incoherent. — Leontiskos

Are you committed to the proposition that, on the version of moral subjectivism you are examining, the consensus has moral weight and the votes have none?

Are you expecting honesty? — unenlightened

From someone who thinks dishonesty will lead to the collapse of society? Yes, in fact. :grin:

(I agree, by the way.)

Of course. Are you expecting mere philosophical considerations will decide what you ought to do? They might help you phrase the issues, but they will no more solve all your moral quandaries than they will tell you the value of the gravitational constant. — Banno

There is a great quote to this effect in the Magna Moralia by Aristotle (or whoever wrote it). I couldn't find it. :nerd:

---

In any case, meta-ethics has an effect on ethics. In fact we often argue about ethics via meta-ethics nowadays.

When others argue against moral realism they are arguing against their (3b), not your (3). Your (3) also allows for their (3a).

So you're just talking past each other. — Michael

You are assuming that (3a) is coherent, but when presented with the incoherencies of (3a) you only said, "Well it's like chess." Instead of addressing the morality question you sought to address a chess question, and I don't think it was persuasive. ()

I suspected this would finally provide a divergence in our opinions... — Banno

I am glad the positions have now scrambled a bit. The thread was becoming dull before that.

But a common interpretation of Akedah (The Binding) is that Abraham was morally problematic, inclined to child sacrifice as was common at the time, and that God was acting as pedagogue, pulling out the weed by exposing the deepest rot. So I don't mind your claim that Abraham is no moral exemplar. :razz:

There is no moral indignation. Just the end of communication. — unenlightened

And I suppose "fuck off" is not a normative utterance? :roll:

Cool! Fuck off and die, then. — unenlightened

I'll take your moral indignation as a sign that there is an implicit 'ought' in your account. :wink:

Again, if a moral theory were to advocate some horror, it is open for us to reject that moral theory on that basis. — Banno

I agree. This is a point that I have <pounded> before, and I think it's actually one of the most widespread problems on this forum.

So, to take on a biblical example, the Binding of Isaac can be seen as child abuse, sufficient to rule out Abraham as a moral authority. — Banno

So even if I were to disagree with Banno on this, he would not be begging the question or committing any logical faux pas. Reductio's can act on systems, including moral systems.

I think you're being overly pedantic here. In the case of chess there was a majority consensus amongst the group authorized to decide the laws. In the case of laws there is a majority consensus amongst the legislature. In the case of morality it may be that there is a majority consensus amongst the general population. — Michael

Right, I edited to say "general consensus." The consensus of a non-elected or non-representative body is an authority in a way that excludes the sort of general consensus we are considering.

They are if the ontology of chess is such that the rules are dictated by some relevant authority, which they are. Cavemen didn't just discover the rules of chess one day. — Michael

If the nature of chess is dictated by an authority, then it is not the result of a general consensus. A vote and an appeal to an authority are two different things. Thus your chess case, as presented, is not a matter of consensus.

I did. Moral subjectivists say it's the former. — Michael

Then the votes that constitute the consensus are themselves non-moral, and this is absurd. If a consensus of votes have moral weight, then the individual votes also have moral weight. The notion that the consensus has moral weight and the votes have none is incoherent. Your contractualism article actually admits this and tries to wrestle with it.

Are you saying that the rules didn't change? Because they did. — Michael

I mean, you're making an argument from authority. "The chess foundation said so, so it must be true." I think this chess tangent is a dead end. This is about the ontology of chess, and ontological questions are not settled by authorities.

I don't understand what's circular about it? — Michael

How can it be simultaneously true that, "It is morally wrong because we agreed on it," and, "We agreed on it because it is morally wrong"? You have to pick one or the other. How could the votes that constitutes the consensus themselves be non-moral?

The reality is that communication happens, and is advantageous, and can only happen in a largely truth-telling community. The summary of these facts is that one ought to be honest, because otherwise communication ceases, language is useless, and society collapses. This a physical reality. — unenlightened

I agree with @Michael. "Society ought not collapse" is not a physical reality.

Well this isn't true. The (official) rules of chess last changed in 2014 (I think) to replace the fifty-move rule with a seventy-five move rule. — Michael

Only if the rules of a game do not constitute the game would this argument succeed. That seems highly implausible.

Some moral subjectivists disagree. They argue that that is exactly what morality is. — Michael

But you haven't answered my central contention about circularity. If morality is nothing more than consensus, then the origins of the consensus (the votes) are non-moral (or pre-moral). I don't have a problem with the idea that consensus carries moral weight, but I believe the circularity argument proves that morality cannot be simply reduced to consensus. If a consensus of 10 votes carries moral weight, then so does a single vote. The moral weight can't just materialize out of nowhere upon the reaching of a consensus.

The incoherence is going to be especially problematic in a democratic age, where majoritarianism and morality are more clearly distinguished.

We are arguing over whether moral subjectivism is a coherent position, or whether subjective truth is a coherent concept. If we change the rules of chess then we are playing a different game. Calling it "chess" is misleading. If we speak about consensus, then we are not speaking about morality. Else, if "morality" is nothing more than consensus, then how could one cast a vote in the first place, before the consensus? Consensus-"morality" is something like positive law, and I think everyone recognizes that positive law is not the same thing as morality.

Again, "Either it is morally wrong because we agreed on it, or else we agreed on it because it is morally wrong." Is the pre-consensus vote pre-moral?

Moral subjectivists might. They might argue that moral rules are the collectively decided rules of social behaviour. — Michael

Okay, I see. I think this goes back to my voting example. If we all agree that X is morally wrong, does that agreement make X morally wrong? Either it is morally wrong because we agreed on it, or else we agreed on it because it is morally wrong. Such equivocations seem to always be present, in this case on the term "morally wrong." It begins as one thing in the voting phase, and it transforms into a different thing in the consensus phase.

Or more concisely: positive laws can be immoral.

If you don't think the worth of a diamond is a good example then consider the rules of chess. We can change them by collective decision. Can we change moral rules by collective decision? — Michael

I don't think we can change moral rules by collective decision. I don't know if anyone believes that...? I am not following you here.

- I'm here for philosophy. Good luck with your temper tantrums. You're on my ignore list.