I heard that Australia is in the process of implementing a law that prohibits anyone under 16 from using social media.

Meanwhile, drones fly over NJ and no one is entitled to an explanation. — Hanover

Shoot them down and wait to see who sues you. Problem solved.

I don't care too much about which account is true, they both seem like cromulent ways of doing business. It's just two ways of answering "If a tree falls in the forest and no one hears it does it make a sound...", Michael says no or "mu" or "cannot compute", Banno says yes, in ye olde page 2-10 @Leontiskos sort of says "yes, because God hears it" and @Wayfarer sort of says "no, because what it means to be a sound is to be heard". — fdrake

What do you say? There is a problem on TPF of criticizing views without giving one's own view. You pointed it up in Michael quite well, but to be complete you should also be willing to give your own view.

- :up:

I mean, I know such arguments are unfavored here, but you don't actually know anything about what does or does not happen after death minus what a 2 year old can observe and comment on. — Outlander

Yes, we do not know that at all, despite the fact that seculars today pretend to.

Harming oneself is bad. ...That's a sound principle that does not require pretending to know that there is nothing after death. Things are not at bleak as they seem. Reality has a way of surprising our simplistic and short-sighted fears and expectations.

I see what you are saying, but if Aquinas is just noting that no man can punish another who is not in their jurisdiction (to do so) but that they can restrain or stop a person from doing wrong; then this does not, per se, negate my point since invading a nation like North Korea is done primarily for stopping them—not punishing them. — Bob Ross

Well, to occupy a country militarily seems quite different from, "to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then." I think you're really talking about an act of war, and I don't think just war theory would permit initiating a war or a war-like act simply for the sake of preventing some country from engaging in immorality. Some immoralities may justify wars, but certainly not all.

I thought you were saying, by way of Aquinas, that a nation cannot invade another nation to stop them from doing immoral things to their own people because that nation has no jurisdiction over the other one (and thusly no duty to do it). That’s inherently about the legal system: the jurisdiction that they don’t have is purely legal—no?

Likewise, the polis is about legal jurisdiction: it is the city-state. — Bob Ross

My point is that, just as there is legal jurisdiction, so too is there moral jurisdiction. One is not morally justified in preventing every act of immorality, just as one is not legally justified in preventing every act of illegality. It is an analogy. I am not saying the moral and the legal are identical.

And no, the polis is not about legal jurisdiction. It is about mutual interdependence.

It arises out of the roles an agent has within that teleological structure—e.g., a good dad, a good son, a good mother, a good police officer, a good firefighter, a good judge, etc. — Bob Ross

Okay.

...I should care about the cleanliness of the water on the whole planet for the sake of the entire moral project (which is to properly respect life in a nutshell).

I don’t just have a duty to clean the water for my own ‘community’ (as you mean it) but, rather, to preserve the human good and the good of all life—don’t you agree? If you see a polluted stream that you knew with 100% certainty wouldn’t pose any threat to your community but would to another, then you think you have no moral obligation, ceteris paribus, to do something about it? The human good (in terms of as a whole) doesn’t bind you at all—just the communal good? — Bob Ross

I think we have a Christian duty to help humans qua human, but not a natural duty. Kant is attempting to rationalize Christian morality, and I don't think he succeeds. For example, what is your rationale? What does it mean that we have a duty "for the sake of the entire moral project?"

Presumably you would say we also have a duty to rational aliens on other planets, if they exist?

If I am traveling in China and I notice a source of water pollution, I do not think I am bound in natural justice to address it.

The reason the average Western citizen thinks he has duties to random strangers on the other side of the world is because he was reared in a Christian culture.

Not quite, this is, again, the straw man that I am arguing that every human is obligated to do the impossible; but I am saying that human’s have duties to the human race—not just their own nation. — Bob Ross

I know, and again, "The bee would have no reason to believe you." Do you offer any reason for why we are responsible to people on the other side of the world?

A nation wouldn’t be a community then: they aren’t self-sufficient. They have to trade with other nations. — Bob Ross

For wealth, but usually not for necessity. But a nation would generally be seen as a kind of para-community.

I don’t think so. For you, would you say that if you didn’t require the resources of anyone else in your nation (and thereby were living completely self-sufficiently), then you have no obligations to help other people? What if you are filthy rich and completely self-sufficient and there are people that are starving? It seems like under your view there would be no duty or obligation to help them because there is no interdependence. — Bob Ross

Humans are pretty much always dependent, but if there were a non-social species then yes, it would not have communal obligations. One does not have communal obligations if one does not belong to a community.

I don’t remember how I initially presented the principle, but it might have been. What I am saying is that there are duties which arise out of the roles one has in a teleological structure, some of which can be morally relevant, and that those duties do extend to the entirety of the moral project [of respecting life—Justice and Fairness]. — Bob Ross

Supposing I have duties to random strangers on the other side of the world, in virtue of what teleological reality do I have those duties?

I used that example of purpose in anticipation (;

If I am right that duties arise out of the roles derived from the teleological structure and duty is living in proper agreement with those roles and being dutiful is fulfilling one’s duties, then a lion is dutiful if the lion is fulfilling its roles within the teleological structure of being a lion—e.g., a good father lion, etc.

Voluntariness and choice are not the same thing—given that I take the Aristotelian approach here—and duty is just acting in alignment with one’s obligations; which can be done voluntarily without choice. — Bob Ross

A lion is bound by nature to care for its young, but not by reason. I don't see that Aristotle would attribute volition to lions. He says, "a voluntary act is one which is originated by the doer with knowledge of the particular circumstances of the act" (Nicomachean Ethics, III.i).

If they are a chess player, then they are bound to follow the rules. Sure, they can decide to become a chess player or not, but that doesn’t make the goodness, badness, and dutifulness which is relative to that teleological structure a hypothetical imperative for a chess player. — Bob Ross

Your point looks tautological, "If he wants to play the game of chess, then he must follow the rules of chess, because in order to play the game one must follow the rules." But you are trying to say that chess duties are not moral duties. I would say that if one breaks their promise to play chess then they are acting immorally, which can be done by cheating. I don't recognize non-moral duties.

If I take your argument seriously, then it sounds like all forms of moral relativism must express merely hypothetical imperatives. — Bob Ross

Sure, that sounds right to me.

Who says it has to be unconditional? — Vera Mont

:up:

1. One cannot reprimand a person which one has no jurisdiction over.
2. One can reprimand a person which is doing something unlawful. — Bob Ross

The word "reprimand" does not appear at all in the passages you quote, which hinders your argument for equivocation.

Then we are not restricting ‘duty’ to its strict meaning as it relates to law — Bob Ross

What do you think it would mean to restrict duty to that which relates to law? Are you thinking of positive law or something?

The question, then, becomes: “what kinds of teleological structures can support duties?” — Bob Ross

How do you suppose a teleological structure would support a duty?

If I were to grant that one such set of moral duties relates to the teleological structure of ‘community’, then it seems to plainly follow that the entire human species, as a whole, is the highest of this type of structure as it relates to humans — Bob Ross

Suppose I see a source of mercury polluting the water supply. I should remove it, because as a member of the community I should value the health of the community and the cleanliness of its water. My good is bound up in the community's good, just as its good is bound up in my good. But the human race is not a community in any obvious sense. For the ancients the largest community would have been the polis, the city-state. Telling a human that they are responsible for every human would be like telling a bee that it is responsible for every bee, as opposed to the bees of its hive and especially its queen. The bee would have no reason to believe you.

Perhaps the argument is not that because they are so distant to each other that they are not proper communities but, rather,... — Bob Ross

What is a community? It is something like a group of mutually self-sufficient people. Communal obligations arise in virtue of that interdependence. The parties to a war would be an example of separate communities.

I wouldn’t say that one must oppose all the immorality that they can per se: one should oppose all immorality that they can as it relates to their duties. — Bob Ross

But that's circular, for you are appealing to your principle in order to establish duties.

The difference between us, is that I think of duties as relating to many teleological structures, whereas yours seems to be limited to legal structures. — Bob Ross

I don't know where you are getting these ideas, but I don't think you will find them in my posts.

So, what teleological structures can support duties? I would argue: all of them! Just as all teleological structures can and do support objective, internal goods to and for the given structure; so, too, does it house duties which relate to the preservation and realization of the purposes in those structures. E.g., just as there is such a thing as a good lion, there is such a thing as a dutiful lion. — Bob Ross

I was about to make a joke about the animal kingdom, and then you went on to talk about dutiful lions. So you think that teleology entails duties and lions have duties?

Surely, e.g., a dutiful lion is not morally relevant, for the lion cannot rationally deliberate (in any meaningful sense). — Bob Ross

If lions cannot deliberate then I'm not sure what a dutiful lion is.

Doesn’t, e.g., a chess player have certain chess duties (such as not cheating to win) even though they are not directly morally relevant duties? — Bob Ross

The chess player has a hypothetical imperative to follow the rules of chess, but unless he has a duty to play chess he has no duty to follow the rules of chess. Yet if he promises someone to play chess with them, then he has a duty to follow the rules in virtue of his promise. In any case, hypothetical imperatives are not duties.

I didn't say it. — Michael

Heaven forbid that you would say something. :wink:

Yes, I saw you nudging in that direction. I don't know. I think things get tricky once we realize how important the predispositions of philosophical inquiry are, and then try to manage them. It is there, in the heart of the jungle, where you encounter the most danger and require the most care, and yet after the long and taxing journey care and attention is often lacking when it is most needed. A text like Przywara's Analogia Entis is an attempt to plumb those depths, and the success is always only partial.

Traditionally the difficult question and the cleft/alienation doesn't appear with truth, but rather with falsity and error (and the threads on Kimhi danced around this). We can debate the relation between truth and falsity, but it looks to me that in the long history of epistemology the conundrum is, "What is falsity?" "What is error?" And if the false cannot be known then how can the ship be righted?

(Michael was poking around in this when he earlier said that realism inevitably courts skepticism. The problem is that his idiosyncratically defined "anti-realism" doesn't seem to offer a substantive alternative. The problems posed by skepticism aren't so easily evaded, at least at the theoretical level.)

Yes, that is an interesting idea. It also seems to me that there's a kind of pre-reflexive movement—something like faith or trust—that determines the outcome in a curious way. If you trust him then he turns out to be trustworthy, and if you don't trust him then he turns out to be untrustworthy, and there is no middle ground.

I see this a lot in the analytical stance of trying to achieve that neutral middle ground, a stance which carries within itself commitments that are unseen.

:up:

This is the classical problem of "realism," namely the debate between those espousing some account of universals and those espousing nominalism. Usually on TPF we read about a philosophical issue on SEP like someone who reads about the wetness of water. The benefit of real argument, such as this thread represents, is the same as the benefit of familiarity with water itself, as opposed to encyclopedia descriptions.

Dare We Say, ‘Thanks for Nothing’? — FrankGSterleJr

Sure, if you have nothing. But it's mostly not the people with nothing saying such things.

- Good posts. :up:

Sure, I just think the extreme cases are useful to demonstrate how it is implausible, from the perspective of almost any ethics, that we always benefit most from extending our own lives. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's fair.

The drive of beings to maintain their own form is absolute nowhere in nature. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think self-preservation is a drive of nature.

Nor is the case of dying in this way really sui generis. We often take on all sorts of risk and suffering to accomplish goals. The duties that come with being a parent, learning to ride a bike, learning to read, starting an exercise regime or diet, etc. can all be unpleasant and risky, and yet it seems hard to claim that this entails that they cannot be to our benefit. The daily self-reported "happiness" of parents of young children is significantly lower on average, for years out, but I don't think this makes having children necessarily not to one's benefit. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Isn't is sui generis in the sense that it forces us to conceive of "our benefit" in a non-egoistic manner? After all, egoists don't balk at dieting to lose weight in the way they balk at martyrdom.

I agree that we are mistaken in thinking that egoism is the default or natural position, but it does have a basis in human experience.

It's the demand for a univocal measure of the good that leads towards such rigid pronouncements as "it is never to our benefit to do something that kills us." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but the univocity is determined by egoism and the attendant interpretation of "our benefit." For Peter L. P. Simpson this is perhaps the characteristic moral marker of modernity. It is certainly the prima facie position for 21st century folk.

Kant is an inheritor of that modern way of thinking. He does not challenge it in any significant way. And his fideistic solution is characteristically Protestant.

Well, again, I think the question has to do with cases of heroic virtue. If a 110 year-old sacrifices their life there will almost certainly be less heroic virtue involved than if a 30 year-old sacrifices their life. It is one thing to be willing to accept a mortal cost for the sake of a virtuous act, and another to be circumstantially indifferent to death. So I would want to keep our eyes on cases where the person stands to lose something. You are giving cases where, for one reason or another, the person does not stand to lose much in dying.

- So you won't give an honest answer to the question. Noted.

I wonder however you arrived at this? Name calling too. That's called strange. — Tom Storm

No, it's called true. Saying things you don't believe is lying, whether you like it or not.

You're engaged in a lot of sophistry in this thread. Here's the question:

For example, why do we prohibit cocaine as a society? — Leontiskos

Do you have an honest answer?

- So you're just saying things you don't believe to be true. That's called lying.

- Do you really think cocaine should be legal and prostitution leads to happiness? Or are you just saying things you don't believe to be true?

Because it's generally bad to have one's grandchildren die. The one act, saving the kids, might entail dying. Which is to be preferred? The claim that it is simply impossible to rightly prize any goals more than temporarily extending one's (necessarily finite) mortal life seems like one that it will be very hard to justify. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, that is a good argument. :up:
The virtuous person does not value their own life above every other thing.

- The text has a cultural context. It does no good to read "just the text" while ignoring that context.

People ask not to receive medical treatment all the time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, but this isn't really relevant to an argument regarding courage or virtue. The question here is, "Should we be virtuous, even if means dying?" When death is preferable to a burdensome life we are talking about something quite different.

If a grandmother attempts to save her grandchildren, and will die in the process of successfully rescuing them, it hardly seems clear that this cannot be to her benefit either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, but why? How is it to her benefit? J is obviously going to respond by pointing out that one who ceases to exist can no longer positively benefit.

And this might well be true, but it shows that life is not ultimately sought for its own sake, but rather as a prerequisite for other goods. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that life is intrinsically good. It's just not unconditionally good. It does not trump every other consideration. And this is where I would go with Socrates. Indeed, it is where Socrates goes himself.

"They conquered him by the blood of the Lamb and by the word of their testimony; love for life did not deter them from death" (Revelation 12:11).

If J told his followers to go out among the gentiles/the nations and eat what they serve you then I cannot view that as anything other than permission to break Torah law regarding diet. — BitconnectCarlos

Scholars see other possibilities, some of which I already gave:

It could be that, but there are alternative interpretations, namely the avoidance of being fussy when receiving hospitality, and ignoring the additional food laws imposed by the "traditions of the elders." — Leontiskos

But as Count Timothy von Icarus notes by gJohn we have J instructing his followers to dine on his blood and flesh -- clearly prohibited by the Torah. — BitconnectCarlos

Sure, but this goes back to my point about an elevation of the core of the Law. It is also tied up with his divinity. If he isn't divine, then when he says this he is breaking the Law tout court.

Sure, the distinction between pleasure and happiness is alive and relatively well presently, insofar as pleasure is the primary conception of the singular positive feeling, happiness being one of many subsumed under it. Right? Is that what you’re getting at? — Mww

No, I don't think happiness is one species of pleasure. Think of an exchange like this:

• Son: Having sex with prostitutes whenever I please gives me great pleasure.
• Father: But what about happiness? Will it make you happy?

That exchange is as meaningful now as it was 2500 years ago. This constant claim that our word "happiness" primarily means something superficial looks to be simply wrong.

This is a very interesting take, that I would like to explore more. — Bob Ross

:up:

I think you are right here: the firefighter’s duty would be to help put out fires and help people vacant the premises—not necessarily to save everyone. — Bob Ross

Yes, and that seems in line with what I found when looking at firefighter's oaths, i.e. "Protecting people."

So what about the man that watched that woman get kidnapped? It seems like your view leaves no room for moral obligation to help people outside of the strict, institutionalized sense of duty. — Bob Ross

• We must oppose all the immorality that we can.
• We must oppose all the immorality that we should.

On your "can" formulation we must help the woman being raped. What about on my "should" formulation? Is there a reason why we should help her aside from the simple fact that we can? I think so.

Aquinas addresses some of this in the complicated Question 79 of the Secunda Secundae, particularly in Article 1 (on the quasi-integral parts of justice) and Article 3 (on omission).

First:

In fact, wouldn’t it follow that—not only was the man permitted to just stand there and watch but—he was not permitted to stop it since, according to your Thomistic take, he has no jurisdiction to reprimand a fellow unwilling citizen? — Bob Ross

See, in the same Question:

Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking another. — Aquinas, ST II-II.65.3.ad3

How does this pertain to justice, given that Aquinas is speaking in the context of a section of the Secunda Secundae devoted to justice?

I would point to this:

If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the sense of "all virtue" [Cf. II-II:58:5]. And yet even if justice be taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good; namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.

On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good as due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's neighbor; while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil. — Aquinas, ST II-II.79.1 - Whether to decline from evil and to do good are parts of justice?

Given that an omission, strictly speaking, is a matter of justice and due (cf. ST II-II.79.3), and omitting aid to the rape victim is an omission of justice in this strict sense, then how is it that the victim is due aid? (If they are not due aid then helping them might be a nice thing to do, but it is not due to them as a kind of duty.)

For Aquinas there are two options. The aid could be due qua the specific virtue of justice, or it could be due according to justice taken in the general sense. If we want to go the route of the specific virtue of justice, then the good of aid must be due to them qua individual (e.g. commutatively). I wouldn't take that route. If we want to go the route of justice taken in a general sense, then the good of aid must be due to them in virtue of their relation to the community or God. I think we could go the route of the community and say that one is acting as a kind of unofficial police officer who has care of the common good. Similar to the way we might pick up litter for the sake of the community, we should also prevent overt injustices such as rape for the sake of the community. This is to assess the person's private good qua common good.

So the rape victim has a right which we must honor in view of their inclusion within our community. Is a person on the other side of the world a member of our community? Classically the answer is 'no', and to say 'yes' is to stretch the meaning of "community" unduly. But if one wants to say that they are a member of the human community and we have a duty to all members of the human community, then it could be said that a duty is owed to them, albeit the thinnest kind of duty.

And then there is the question of their relation to God, especially if we take a revealed aspect of God. This is where it gets tricky, because the Christian has a duty to the victim via God, and our society is by and large a Christian society (and therefore many of the cultural intuitions are Christian intuitions). Thus Aquinas speaks of mercy and beneficence in the context of supernatural charity (ST II-II.30 and II-II.31). For example:

Objection 1. It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are unable to do good to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to the impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.

Reply to Objection 1. Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to all in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as for the faithful. — Aquinas ST II-II.31.2.ad1 - Whether we ought to do good to all?

(Note that for Aristotle this is more straightforward, as we should be beneficent but beneficence is not due in justice.)

And:

I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.

Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, and so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various ways according to these various connections, because we ought in preference to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with us. And yet this may vary according to the various requirements of time, place, or matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one's own father, if he is not in such urgent need. — Aquinas II-II.31.3 - Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us?

And on this principle it should be seen that, in effect, we have no real duties to random strangers on the other side of the world.

True enough. ↪Bob Ross and I understand the symbiosis on the one hand and the conceptual evolution on the other. — Mww

Or devolution? Either way, I think the distinction between pleasure and happiness is still alive in our contemporary lexicon, and it avoids these arguments about happiness vs. happiness.

Two is a false premise — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, but how so? What is a counterexample?

(And note that in following @J's argumentation I perhaps should have italicized "your". He is emphasizing personal gain or benefit.)

In general, it is better to be courageous than reckless or cowardly. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and I agree that our way of doing ethics now puts too much emphasis on exceptional cases, but Socrates' hemlock is still an interesting example. Socrates dies willingly. Fortune does not intervene in an unanticipated way. On the contrary, Socrates probably foresaw his end a long way off.

Plus, I feel like courage is the easiest one to make this sort of example for because it involves our response to danger. It's harder to think of common examples where it would be better to be profligate or avaricious, as opposed to generous, or either gluttonous/lustful or anhedonic/sterile as opposed to temperate. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can think of some, but my argument is unique insofar as it involves death. If you could find another virtue that is capable of causing death you could run a similar argument.

My point is that it's the action we judge, not the pleasure derived from it. — Tom Storm

My point is that the prohibition of cocaine (or methamphetamine or whatever you like) has everything to do with the drug use, and that the pleasure is an integral part of that drug use. Your idea that the prohibition of cocaine has nothing to do with the pleasure cocaine provides is what is implausible. If cocaine didn't provide pleasure we wouldn't ban it, because no one would use it.

Whenever I hear this argument, I find it underwhelming. Parsing happiness into "the right kind" and "the wrong kind" seems both futile and subjective. — Tom Storm

Actually the idea that some pleasures are intense but empty strikes me as a unanimous idea in both ethics and psychology. I think it would be hard to find an author on ethics or psychology who does not admit this. In fact, if one denies this idea, then ethics as a science looks to be unnecessary.

For example, why do we prohibit cocaine as a society? Because it is a base pleasure that deprives individuals and groups of deeper fulfillment.

So I’m driving along, in this cool-as-hell ‘67 Cobra, hair flyin’, head-bangin’ to some classic Foghat turned up to 11….happy as a pig in an overturned hotel restaurant dumpster. — Mww

Aristotle would call this pleasure.

To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some reason) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life-that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some reason for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.v, tr. W. D. Ross

(This is quite similar to the discussion @Count Timothy von Icarus and @J are having elsewhere.)

E.g., a firefighter must save all people from burning buildings irregardless of if they feel like it, but they are not violating that duty meaningfully by saving as many as they can if they cannot save everyone. — Bob Ross

We could rephrase my argument for the firefighter:

If one were bound to save every person from fire then they would be bound to do the impossible; but no one is bound to do the impossible; therefore no one is bound to save every person from fire.

You say that a firefighter is bound to save every person from burning buildings. I don't think that is right, and I don't think you will find that idea in a firefighting oath.

Yes, I am not arguing that we must oppose immorality that is out of our power to oppose: I am arguing that, all else being equal, a moral agent opposes all immorality that they can. — Bob Ross

Is a firefighter bound to save every person from fire that he can? No, and although this may sound pedantic, firefighters work on teams, and that means that they are supposed to share the load. This means that a firefighter might be rebuked by his captain for trying to save someone (because it is not always appropriate for him to try to save someone, even when he can).

With regard to common citizens, I don't think a moral agent should "oppose all the immorality that they can." I think they should oppose all the immorality that they should. "Can" is obviously a very loaded word. Let's return to Aquinas' quote:

Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction. — Aquinas, ST II-II.65.2

And especially objection 3 and its response:

Objection 3. Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (II-II:32:2). If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows. It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows. — Aquinas, ST II-II.65.2

The question here is whether there are reserved forms of correction. Aquinas thinks there are, and that "chastisement by blows" is one of them.

My claim is that the same distinction regarding jurisdiction applies to nations and cultures. "It is lawful for any nation to impart correction to a willing nation, but to impart it to an unwilling nation belongs to those only who have charge over it."

And then there is the deeper question of open coercion, which applies to things like war. Given the United States' military prowess, it can oppose a great deal of immorality. But I don't think it should, because I don't think it has a duty to do whatever it can.

You often raise this strawman. I don't see anyone thinking that Hitler self-consciously believed himself to be evil. The example of Hitler is often raised for the opposite reason: the self-righteous are not always righteous.

The shooter should spend the rest of his life in jail, but anyone losing sleep over this CEO being gunned down? — RogueAI

That is prima facie contradictory. "This crime deserves a maximum sentence, and also we shouldn't lose any sleep over crimes like this."

I am always amazed at how much attention a suggestion gets. Reading Groups is only slightly different from Primary Sources, and it has the great benefit of already existing, so I think my request has already been met.

There is one consideration for any future forum that affects both Reading Groups and Primary Sources. It is the exclusive nature of a thread, where it must belong to only one category. In systems where categories run on a tagging mechanism, a thread on Plato's Republic could belong to both the Reading Group category and the Political Philosophy category. This could be helpful for combining different categorization schemas. It could also be confusing if posters perusing the Political Philosophy category do not recognize that this Political Philosophy thread is also a Reading Group.

- So do you see it as a mistake to make Reading Groups a category? Would it have instead been better for individuals to simply post individual reading-group threads?

However, it means: "it is to your benefit to be courageous, temperate, prudent, generous, patient, honest, friendly, modest, loving, witty, etc." and "it is better for you to live with people who have these virtues," and "it is better to live in societies that embody and instill these virtues." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here is the counterargument:

1. It is always to your benefit to be courageous. (Supposition)
2. It is never to your benefit to die.
3. Some courageous acts get you killed.
4. Therefore, (1) is false. (Via reductio)

And @J has the same puzzle:

• Socrates was right to drink the hemlock. (Supposition)
• But it is never right to die.
• Therefore, Socrates was not right to drink the hemlock.

I don't see how such a position doesn't require the presupposition that "benefit" means something like "egoistic pursuit of one's own pleasure," or something similar. Good luck building an ethics on that assumption, and good luck justifying it, given how many examples there are of people being ruined by such egoistic pursuits. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is part and parcel of the incoherence of Kantian ethics: right action absent motivation (because all motivation is selfish). @J keeps dancing around that without actually defending it. If he would actually defend his own Kantian position this could be a productive exchange.

Kantian ethics in a nutshell:

1. If something is done for a reason then it isn't moral.
2. Therefore all moral acts are done for no reason.

(The modern egoist uses the same premises, only denying the existence of moral acts.)

And J's argument:

• Suppose (1) is false.
• What reason does Socrates have to drink the hemlock?
• Socrates' act is "right" without being "good." It is an act without a reason, without a motivation, without an intended good/benefit. Reasonable acts are always susceptible to selfishness, and moral acts are not susceptible to selfishness.

---

If we follow J's version of Kant, then it would seem that Kant agrees that Socrates made the correct decision, but he can't figure out how that would be true given the ethical options available to him, so he tries to draw up something new. Kant's ethics makes most sense when considering these acts of extreme virtue or sacrifice.

For example:

I would greatly like to know if there is a Greek word that discriminates here, allowing "beneficial" to break off into these two senses -- roughly, the benefit of personal goods and the benefit of acting well. — J

• Socrates did what was right even though it was not desirable.
• Therefore not everything we should do is desirable.
• Therefore there must be some category of choiceworthy-but-not-desirable.

For the Greeks the kalos is desirable but not base, and it retains its value even in cases of martyrdom. @Count Timothy von Icarus is right when he says that reducing all desirable objects to the base or selfish is the error. Kant seeks a guarantee on the moral character of an act, and that is the problem. It is a bit like trying to guarantee that you avoid gluttony by only eating food that tastes bad. Or more specifically, specifying sensuous taste as a non-moral category.

There is no deeper metaphysics. We say things, we write things, we sign things. There's no need to overthink this. — Michael

That's the avoidance of an answer and the avoidance of philosophy.

• Let's talk about what truth-bearers are.
• Michael: Impossible!

Again, philosophers have been talking about the status of truth-bearers for thousands of years. This is a pretty standard topic, and most everyone responding to you is critical along similar lines, including myself, frank, fdrake, Apustimelogist, and Srap.

- Yep. :up:

- And half of it about that one. :smile: