That's pretty much the point. Institutions brought them fortune, power and fame and they're busily attacking and tearing down those institutions, in order to deprive other people of the protection they offer. — Vera Mont

It's hard to see how a focus on three non-philosophers who the author dislikes amounts to anything more than ad hominem. A philosophy essay needs to avoid such strong reliance on ad hominem. The piece is more than that, but it is bogged down by it.

I tend to think what matters most is that the enterprise is self-correcting — Srap Tasmaner

So is that what you see as the core of science?

you seem to be saying that the natural sciences check more of our "science" boxes than the social sciences — Leontiskos

I was trying not to say that, in fact, — Srap Tasmaner

But do you think it is true? It seems a basic fact that cannot be brushed aside in favor of a theory that would prefer it otherwise, hence my question to you:

Why do you suppose the modern holds that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences? — Leontiskos

I think we have to actually grapple with the now-common belief that that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences. Indeed, I don't see how it is possible to construe what you said about box-checking without admitting the interpretation I gave. Our colloquial understanding of "science" does seem to prefer the natural sciences to the social sciences.

Roughly, I'm trying to say that I think it's a mistake to identify science with the methods that worked for the low-hanging fruit. — Srap Tasmaner

And I'm wondering if there is an argument for that sort of claim. What makes it a mistake? Because the contrary position is pretty easy to represent: <Science pertains to knowledge of the natural world, and where our knowledge of the natural world is more certain and reliable, there science is more present>. That actually strikes me as the default position, and it accounts for the current consensus that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences.

Consider the fact that a very common objection to science-pluralism is that it would be unable to distinguish true science from pseudoscience (and the proponents of science-pluralism really do struggle with this objection). A pseudoscience is basically just a "science" which produces uncertain and unreliable "knowledge."

That's quite interesting. Mathematics is particularly troublesome, but I want to defend the view that there are approaches to the study of atoms and mountains and lungs and whale pods and nation states that are all recognizably scientific and scientific because of some genuine commonality, despite the differences which are unavoidable given the differences among these phenomena. That commonality might be more "family resemblance" than "necessary and sufficient conditions," but I lean strongly toward the mechanism of communal self-correction being required. I guess we could talk a lot more about all this. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay. Yes, I think this would be worth talking more about, namely the essence of science.

Note that I am not saying that the things we call "sciences" have nothing in common. That would be a strange thesis. I am basically saying that science is a genus; the various sciences are species within that genus; and that there are differences between the various species which bear on their "scientificity." The claim that some sciences are paradigmatic is more conservative, whereas the claim that some sciences are more scientific than others is more daring. But if I wanted to defend the second thesis I would begin by noting that sciences are more scientific than pseudosciences, despite the fact that we never quite know where to draw the line. The deeper point here is that if the science-pluralist cannot consider the idea that there might be a hierarchy of sciences (or multiple hierarchies depending on our criteria), then it's not clear to me that their thesis has risen to the level of philosophy.

I'm going to hold off talking about pedagogy, but I'm glad you brought it up, because I think "learning" (as a concept at least) should be far more central to philosophy. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay good, and I agree. I think that if we considered pedagogy, development, and parenting more often we would have more serious discussions.

This is my 30,000-foot view of science, and why I mentioned the importance of specifiable plans for further investigation above: science is a strategy for learning. That's the core of it, in my view, and everything else serves that, and anything that contributes to or refines or improves the process is welcome. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, wonderful. I like that better than your notion of self-correction. For Aquinas science is, "an organized body of knowledge following in a demonstrative manner from certain premises which are either immediately known to be true or which are proved in another science" (paraphrase).

Do you think there are non-scientific strategies for learning? For an Aristotelian science has to do with discursive/inferential knowledge, and so it would encompass any true strategy for learning, despite the fact that different sciences have different objects and methods. But obviously our colloquial understanding of science is much narrower than that.

Aren't there two kinds of knowledge? There's factual knowledge of the objective world, which Mary in her black and white world can learn, and then there's experiential knowledge of the inner world (of what it's like to see red), which Mary, in her black and white world can't learn. — RogueAI

Can you give an example of "factual knowledge" that is independent of "experiential knowledge"?

I'm having trouble imagining a reason to ask. — Srap Tasmaner

I ask in order to try to erect a second erroneous extreme within which to situate the question. So that rather than saying, "Monism bad; pluralism good," we can begin to identify two errors and then try to find a mean between them. I think this is helpful in understanding things, such as science. It also gives different perspectives or considerations their due in a way that a one-dimensional approach cannot. And even where we fail to find common ground, that too is helpful. Maybe you will disagree with my answers to the questions I asked.

What if we left out "paradigmatically" in your question: are some disciplines "more scientific" than others? — Srap Tasmaner

Sure, that's workable, although I will revisit the difference below.

If you take "discipline" reasonably broadly, the obvious answer is "yes": writing poetry, for instance, is a discipline that, for the most part, does not even aspire to be scientific. Are you asking if some sciences are "more scientific" than others? Is physics more scientific than biology? Is biology more scientific than sociology? — Srap Tasmaner

I think it is helpful to consider all disciplines, but I did add an elliptical comment in an edit, in which I tried to emphasize those disciplines that are generally seen as scientific. So yes: both questions are on the table.

I'm having trouble imagining a reason to ask. It's clearly possible to make up an answer, to make a long list of characteristics of "science" and then count how many boxes each discipline checks. I think most of the natural sciences check whatever boxes you might come up with, and it wouldn't be surprising if the social sciences checked fewer, but it doesn't seem like a helpful exercise. It suggests that there is a difference due to the domain, when it's the approach that matters. — Srap Tasmaner

So you seem to be saying that the natural sciences check more of our "science" boxes than the social sciences, but that's not because natural sciences differ from social sciences, but rather because, "it's the approach that matters."

Is that what you are saying? And when you say it's the approach that matters, are you saying that we approach the natural sciences differently than we approach the social sciences (and that this is not due to a difference between the two sciences)?

I think not in principle ― not on account of something "especially scientific" about any given field ― but for pedagogical reasons, probably so. What would the students already have some familiarity with? What would most engage their attention? What would give them opportunities to participate and see for themselves ― to, in a fundamental sense, do science themselves? — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, and therefore it seems like you would say that if the students are equally familiar or unfamiliar with all of the "scientific" disciplines, then neither one discipline nor another would be a more appropriate starting point for the pedagogue?

For Aristotle (and myself) it is not right to disentangle the domain from the approach. Put differently, the reason we approach different things differently is because they are different things. The reason we approach physics differently than mathematics is because of the difference between physics and mathematics. Similarly, if humans were equally familiar with the various objects and methods of each of the sciences, then the pedagogue could start wherever he likes, but the crucial point is that humans are not equally familiar with all domains of study. Note that this is not an idiosyncrasy depending on the student, for there will be commonalities between all students and all humans. For example, Aristotle thinks mathematics or physics is a much better starting point for humans than political philosophy, and that this has to do with the objects of study as they relate to the human mode of being and development.

Maybe this is a variation on your question: isn't it the case that some domains are simply less suited to scientific study than others? Suppose you wanted to teach science and chose to begin with "the science of beauty", for instance ― how far would you get? I expect most of us would agree, not very far, but I don't think we have to dismiss the idea out-of-hand: why not explore and see if the process itself reveals the limits of what we can do here? ― Maybe this is the right point to mention that Goodman, in particular, insists that literature and the arts are not competing with the sciences and are not failing to meet a standard that is set by the natural sciences, but offer alternative frameworks for knowledge. (The word "knowledge" looks slightly odd there, but he would probably be fine with it.) — Srap Tasmaner

Right. Classically science pertains to natural realities and artifice pertains to man-made realities. In that way science pertains to knowledge (scientia) and artifice pertains to know-how (praxis). And then each would also include the specific ordered body of knowledge/know-how as well as the learning involved. So classically aesthetics is the science of beauty.

Maybe this is a variation on your question: isn't it the case that some domains are simply less suited to scientific study than others? — Srap Tasmaner

At this point it depends a great deal on what we mean by "science." In what way might an Aristotelian say that mathematics (or physics) is more scientific than political philosophy? Probably in the way that mathematical reasoning is more certain than political reasoning, and that our mathematical knowledge possesses more certitude than our political knowledge. At least on that criterion mathematics will be more scientific, but on other criteria it need not be. Similarly, Aristotle will chastise the political philosopher or the metaphysician for desiring the same degree of exactitude and certitude that is available in mathematics; and yet given that mathematics possesses this greater degree of exactitude and certitude, it forms a better introduction to the very notions of inference and knowledge. It's a bit like starting a student reading with big letters rather than small letters.

This hearkens back to my original point about paradigmatic sciences, and what is paradigmatically scientific is a bit different than what is most scientific. Presumably Aristotle would say that something like geometry is paradigmatically scientific, but not most scientific.

Why do you suppose the modern holds that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences?

I don't know ― is any of this in the ballpark of what your were looking for? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, thanks. :up:

I don't really understand the question. "Appropriate" in what sense? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm just asking if you think some disciplines are more paradigmatically scientific than other disciplines (including especially those disciplines that tend to be dubbed 'sciences').

I don't understand this question either. "Justified" in what sense? — Srap Tasmaner

You're a teacher. You have a student. You want to teach them about scientific reasoning. Will one discipline provide a better starting point than another discipline, or not?

These are actually fair points. Note though that they can be made private again after @hypericin finishes his meeting. If someone submitted under the expectation that they would be private and therefore publishable, that strikes me as a better reason than anything to the contrary.

There is, on the contrary, no real reason for treating other sciences as "second class citizens" that might someday qualify as the real deal if you can show how they are consequences of physics. — Srap Tasmaner

Do you think it is appropriate to treat certain disciplines as paradigmatic sciences, such as physics or geometry? Along the same lines, would the pedagogue be equally justified in starting with any discipline they like, if they wish to teach their pupil about scientific reasoning?

- I would suggest allowing his entry but exempting him from consideration for the $10,000 grand prize. :grin:
And then delete these three posts to make the submission semi-anonymous.

If you want an example of a true proposition, that's not too hard. That is to say, the proposition is true. Now separate the true from the proposition as something separate from and not a part of the proposition. You cannot do it. And that which you might try to separate is usually called truth. So what is it? What is truth - beyond being just a general idea? All day long people may argue that truth is a something. They don't have to argue, all they have to do is demonstrate it - show it. But that never has and never will happen. — tim wood

If we continue in your Analytic route we would simply say that a truth is a true proposition. Truth itself, apart from individual truths, could just be a general idea, sure. None of this seems problematic. We regularly appeal to general ideas, such as justice, mathematics, politics, sports, etc.

To systematically exclude sound and smell is to abandon a motive of "common sensibles." — Leontiskos

Seems to me they were excluded for a practical reason - sounds and smells don't generate easily measurable properties. — T Clark

That's right, and the motive for "easily measurable properties" is different from the motive for "common sensibles." Hence my point.

I don’t mean to interrupt — Fire Ologist

On the contrary, your input seems like it might be helpful in making progress.

Amadeus seems to be saying no more judgment is needed to carry out the course of action.
Leon is saying there are more pivotal moments requiring more judgments. — Fire Ologist

I think that's right. I tried to get at the difference by talking about a "subordinated judgment" <here>.

I happen to agree with Leon, and don’t see how you can follow directions blindly, and skip adjudicating between when a step is completed and when the next step begins. When I am following directions, I know that I could misunderstand the direction and go astray and end up lost and not at my destination. I also know that Google maps is wrong and has led me to the wrong destination. So at each step, I have to decide “Is the last step completed yet? Can I move on to the next step? Is where I am driving what is meant by this next step? Is Google still correct of should I switch to Apple Maps?

Often these interim judgments are easy and immediately made, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t judgments. — Fire Ologist

Yes, these are good points. :up:
Pointing out the fact that error can occur both in our own judgments and with navigation applications is quite helpful.

I am happy to distinguish between, say, hard judgments and easy judgments, but I think both are judgments.

Btw, truth I dismiss. True I do not dismiss. — tim wood

I distinguish between the adjective, "true," and the noun, "truth," the one an accident, a quality, the other a substance, or should be. — tim wood

Suppose you said, "There are true [somethings], but there are no truths." I would just respond, "What are these [somethings] that are true?" The ontological problem attaches to propositions as much as it attaches to truths, or to whatever [something] the "adjective" modifies.

Here is a good, concise account of faith:

Acceptance of truth on authority is something we do all the time, as in medicine, where we trust the authority of doctors, or in schools, where we trust the authority of teachers. In these cases the truth that we do not know ourselves but accept from others is a truth we could come to know ourselves if we went through the right training. In the case of divinely revealed truth, we can, ex hypothesi, never know it directly for ourselves (at least not in this life), but only on authority. The name we give to acceptance of truth on authority is “faith.” Faith is of truth; it is knowledge; it is knowledge derived from authority; it is rational. These features are present in the case of putting faith in what a doctor tells us about our health. What we know in this way is truth (it is truth about our health); it is knowledge (it is a coming to have what the doctor has, though not as the doctor has it); it is based on authority (it is based on the authority of the doctor); it is rational (it is rational to accept the authority of one’s doctor, ceteris paribus). Such knowledge is indirect. It goes to the truth through another. But it is knowledge. The difference is between knowing, say, that water is H₂O because a chemist has told us and knowing that water is H₂O because we have ourselves performed the experiments that prove it. The first is knowledge by faith, and the second is knowledge direct.

Knowledge by faith, while it exists in the mind, is attained by an act of will. We must choose to trust our doctor or the chemist, and only because we do so do we have knowledge about our health or about the chemical composition of water. The choice must be rational, in that it must be based on adequate evidence. The evidence will not be about the fact known (we would not then need to trust anyone to know it); it will be about the trustworthiness of the authority. We are rational in trusting our doctor, because we have evidence that, say, he went through the right training, that he is licensed by a known medical authority, that he is acknowledged as an expert by other doctors who went through the right training and are licensed by the same authority, that what he told us about our health before turned out correct (we or people we know were cured of this or that ailment by following his instructions), that he is not a liar or corrupted by bribery, that he has an upstanding character, and the like.

Such faith is rational, but it is also an act of choice. The evidence, because it is about the trustworthiness of the authority and not about the things the authority says, does not convince the mind of the truth of these things, but only of their trustworthiness. To believe their truth, the mind must be moved to do so by an act of trust. But an act of trust is an act of will. We can, if we like, refuse to believe the doctor or the chemist, however convincing the evidence of their trustworthiness may be. We cannot, by contrast, refuse to believe that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles once we have seen the proof, though we can contradict it in words if we like, for speech is an act of will. Where acts of belief dependent on acts of will are involved, coercion can be legitimate—not to force the act of will (an act of will cannot be forced), but instead to facilitate it by the suppression of opposed irrational desires and opposed irrational contradiction. The force is used to facilitate the act of trust, not to prove its rationality (which is done instead by the evidence). That there is such force with respect to belief, and that it is legitimate, is ignored by liberalist doctrines of tolerance (even though, if truth be told, they have to rely on something like it to justify their own coercive acts of rule and self-protection). — Peter L. P. Simpson, Political Illiberalism, 108-9

So many things fell into place, so much begins to make sense where previously there was a patchwork of ancient philosophies and myths. — Wayfarer

Yet in fact Galileo's theory was empirically inferior to the geocentric model, which is why it was not adopted by the scientific community. It was Kepler's elliptical orbits that made heliocentrism plausible. Galileo wanted circular orbits due to their perfection and elegance, and this error was in fact based in Galileo's more ancient approach to the Heavens.

So the story is more complicated. The geocentric model was in many ways much more mathematically sophisticated than the heliocentric model. The desideratum initially had more to do with elegance than predictive power. Before the findings of Tycho Brahe's superior telescopes were compiled, the predictive power question was moot. The myths that have grown up around Galileo are legion.

This absolutely ignores what I've said. You haven't addressed it. I can wait, but its also not entirely needed - your definitions are your definitions. They don't matter much to the discussion. I made a point about your definition which has been glossed over. That's fine. But not my problem. — AmadeusD

What point have you made? Spell it out. Here is what I see:

I said:

L1. To judge is to affirm something as true or false {Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy}
L2. To believe that I have arrived at the end of my trip I must affirm as true that I have arrived
L3. Therefore, to believe that I have arrived involves a judgment

You responded:

A1. Suppose every mental act counts as a judgment
A2. If so, then L3 would be true
A3. But not every mental act counts as a judgment
A4. Therefore, L3 does not follow

And my response was that I have never claimed A1. A1 is a strawman. Thus your counterargument failed, and now you must decide whether to accept argument L1-L3 or else offer a different counterargument.

By recognizing it and making no judgement. If all that happened was a green light lit up on a HUD, all i've done is seen something and exited the car. You'll not get me to say this is a judgement. This is what I wanted to avoid - I thikn your definition sucks, you probably think so about mine. — AmadeusD

You haven't given a definition at all. You want to say that you see a green light lit up on a HUD and determine that you have arrived at your destination, but that you in no way judge that you have arrived at your destination. That doesn't make any sense, and you have provided no definition of 'judgment' to make sense of it.

I gave you several. I also gave my own. — AmadeusD

Where is it? It would have been much easier to simply quote yourself giving the definition rather than write a long post of nothing-burgers.

And it's odd - peculiar - how difficult it is. — tim wood

I would say that it has something to do with the idea that truth is the water we swim in, and it is hard to identify that sort of thing. Probably only in the presence of two apparent and conflicting truths does the notion of 'truth' emerge more clearly.

At a much more general level, I would be very wary to discount a word/concept that is so ubiquitous throughout human civilization. Those sorts of words/concepts tend to have a meaning, even if the meaning is difficult to pin down.

I'd say the study of mystical experience as one aspect of human experience is as much a part of phenomenology as the study of any other aspect of human experience. — Janus

Okay, but doesn't that mean that the study of mystical experience broadly possesses the same sort of "quasi-empirical" nature that you ascribe to phenomenology? To deny this would seem to require that some parts of phenomenology are not quasi-empirical.

- I think religious claims are truth apt. That may be the elephant in the room here.

- I think I opened the page in a new tab early, before looking at it.

You will certainly find a lot of "emptiness" in theistic traditions, and also some (but less) "unification/fulfillment" in non-theistic traditions.

In any case my view is that experience and interpretation/framework are mutually influencing, such that anyone who draws a one-way arrow is mistaken.

f(a, (b,c)) is of course malformed — Banno

According to what authority? The gods of Analytic Philosophy, who do not allow a 2-tuple within a 2-tuple? :wink:

Your whole presupposition is that one of the two relata is complex, and is therefore subject to substitution, for you are substituting a subject/part of a proposition, not one of the two relata that frank outlined. If the proposition-relata cannot be complex then your objection has no force.

- Bananas indeed. :up:

I think this is a good answer to Leontiskos question about whether an emphasis on properties and one on mathematics contradict each other. — T Clark

Let me highlight a few things from that quote:

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp35-36

This is much to my point. To systematically exclude sound and smell is to abandon a motive of "common sensibles." If one were motivated by common sensibles there would be no reason to systematically exclude two of the senses. For Galileo and Descartes the point is not epistemic; it instead pertains to quantitative description and the fact that quantitative analysis is eminently rationally manipulable and transparent. It is that some qualities are deemed objective and others subjective, and the senses that pertain to the "subjective" pertain to secondary qualities.

We can see this in Galileo, Locke, etc. with the demotion of color to a "less real" (merely mental) "secondary quality," while shape and motion, etc. remain fully real "primary quantities." — Count Timothy von Icarus

...so it is more than just color that is less real. It is also sound and smell, which are directly correlated to two of the senses.

Just to note a basic division in testimony, theistic religions tend to report experiences of emptiness and such, while no-theistic religions tend to report experiences like the unification with God or whatever. Perhaps a general conclusion is not possible. — praxis

Did you mean to reverse the two?

I don't see how the knowledge that Tully wrote X is something about the body. It seems to be about thought. — frank

The problem is that a name is arguably an extrinsic quality. To know some object is not the same as knowing what name certain other people use to refer to that object.

Maybe you have a nickname, and only two of your friends use that nickname. To fail to know your nickname is not necessarily to fail to know you. Banno's, "Tully = Cicero," actually means something like, "What some name as 'Tully' others name as 'Cicero'." This isn't a particularly substantial point. It pertains to names, not to things. It pertains to predication, not to relationship. Banno says:

if it were a relation, then substitution should be allowed - if f(a,b) and c=b then f(a,c) — Banno

What he requires is something more like f(a, (b,c)), such as Knowledge(Frank, (Tully, De Officiis)). The quibble is actually over the propositional predication (b,c), not the relation between knower and known. After all, Knowledge(Frank, (Tully, De Officiis)) is arguably different than Knowledge(Frank, (Cicero, De Officiis)), if names are to be constitutive parts of knowledge.

I'll go out on a limb here based on my limited reading of the history of science in the 1600s. Looking at reality as made of of things with physical properties was a new idea in that period. Physical properties are only observable by our senses. Mathematics depends on measurable properties. Otherwise it wouldn't have anything to operate on. — T Clark

But is mathematics observable by our senses?

Count Timothy pointed to those who think that mathematics is what is ultimately real, and where the senses and mathematics conflict, we should trust mathematics. At that point there is certainly an opposition between sense knowledge and mathematics, but perhaps that extreme point is merely an aberration?

By true I mean a property, call it T of P, such that for proposition P, P is T, if in fact it is. — tim wood

What does "it is" mean? Does it mean "it is T"? Or "it is true"? Either way your definition is circular:

• Former: "By true I mean a property, call it T of P, such that for proposition P, P is T, if in fact it is T."
• Latter: "By true I mean a property, call it T of P, such that for proposition P, P is T, if in fact it is true."

This is an indication that defining truth is more difficult than one might first expect. Truth is something which is characteristically resistant to univocal sequestering within the object language or meta language (which is why philosophers like Buridan explicitly rejected the notion that the two "languages" are separable).

- I would say that "relationship" simply does not have that baggage except in the context of Analytic Philosophy.

The reason I would not want to use "relationship" is because it reifies propositions. It is something a Platonist might like.

If we don't check every member of a set it's always possible to find a black swan. — Moliere

When you talk about "Aristotle's view of induction," what texts are you referring to? Or are you just thinking of Hume and conflating him with Aristotle?

Aristotle was not wrong in his time.

But neither he nor we can make induction a valid move that secures knowledge.

I say he wasn't wrong because I can see how his inferences are good given his circumstances, influences, and concerns not just from the rest of his writing but also from others' writings at the time, as well as writings about those writings.

But I don't think we can travel by induction up to knowledge of God, for instance. I'd say there is a limit of some kind on our ability to judge on some questions we might want to answer or try to answer, but don't seem like we can reliably answer. — Moliere

Well either he was not wrong or he was wrong. You seem to switch back and forth at least four times in these few sentences. Do you think Aristotle thought "induction" could secure knowledge? If so, and if it cannot, then you should hold that he was wrong.

I'm not sure that the process is sound. — Moliere

The process I outlined or some other one you are substituting? Here it is again:

Let's suppose that Aristotle thinks one should have wide experience before drawing a conclusion, and one should consult popular theories (or even all theories) to the best of their ability. Okay. I think that's right. Do you have some objection to it?

Because the idea that such a process is defeated... — Leontiskos

Because your argument looks to be invalid again. "There might be a black swan, therefore one should not have wide experience before drawing a conclusion, and one should not consult popular theories to the best of their ability." Non sequitur.

But if someone had something in mind other than Aristotle -- some modification which dealt with the notion that a single mind dealing with eternal categories does not bring one closer to being, but rather collective effort and distributing tasks and building trust such that we can work together, which tends to function better in an atmosphere where doubt is encouraged does. — Moliere

I am fairly certain that your familiarity with Aristotle is slim to none, but what you say here does not help your Humean notion of induction. Collective effort does not overcome the problems of Humean induction.

Are you able to say what each is? — Leontiskos

Not exactly, but by way of example I've hoped to show a difference -- Aristotle is the philosopher-scientist, Lavoisier is the scientist, and Kripke is the philosopher.

Not that I've been explicit or clear on this, really, but this is what the examples are meant to furnish -- as good examples of how to use the terms differently. The interpretation of each I'm meaning to use as why I might want to distinguish between the terms: look at what they mean and how they make inferences in these details and you'll hopefully catch onto the difference.

There won't be necessary and sufficient conditions -- I don't think we can solve the problem of the criterion, though I think falsification is still an important subject unto itself -- but there will be stark differences between two family resemblances when we compare them. — Moliere

This looks like another non-answer. If you want to say that science and philosophy are different, then you must be able to say what each is, and why the two are different. If you can't say what the two are and why they are different, then I have no idea why you would assert that the two are different.

Aristotle, Lavoisier, and Kripke? How many pages have you read of any of them? If they are to serve as exemplars of the putative categories you attach to them, then apparently both of us must have strong exposure to all three. That seems doubtful. I have read lots of Aristotle, a small bit of Kripke (less than 70 pages), and nothing from Lavoisier. Have you read enough of each to take them as exemplars of categories such as "philosopher-scientist"? If not, they are not going to function as exemplars of anything substantial. In that case they will just end up being empty vessels for post hoc rationalization.

This is why learning to make real arguments is important. "Philosophy and science are different, I can't say why, but I can point to Aristotle, Lavoisier, and Kripke as prime examples of the relevant differences, despite the fact that I have read very little Aristotle or Lavoisier." That's not a good argument, and what this means is that you have not provided any good reason for your conclusion. A good argument provides a good reason to believe the conclusion.

- :up:

- :up:

- :up:

Not that the future couldn't be different, but now there are just that many options that this method is not feasible to do metaphysics with. — Moliere

Okay, but do you have an argument for your conclusion? Are we no longer capable of induction in the 21st century? Was Aristotle wrong that we should have wide experience before drawing conclusions?

So, for instance, I wouldn't say induction requires, but I'd say that the manner in which Aristotle's induction does. The way I see him move is securing his claim by an exhaustive survey of the extent arguments, a review of their merits and demerits followed by the conclusion of Aristotle's.

So, yeah, you'd have to figure out some other way to be an Aristotelian, at least, if you wanted to progress to metaphysical truth in the manner of induction as Aristotle practiced it. — Moliere

Let's suppose that Aristotle thinks one should have wide experience before drawing a conclusion, and one should consult popular theories (or even all theories) to the best of their ability. Okay. I think that's right. Do you have some objection to it?

Because the idea that such a process is defeated if we do not consider every single scientific claim that exists or is available in our linguistic context looks like a strawman. Even if we don't look at every single scientific claim, the process is still perfectly sound. And the person who looks at more evidence will be more suited to draw conclusions. There is no magic number or percentage of evidence that one must consult, nor does moving from 99% to 100% make the induction somehow qualitatively different. It's not like Aristotle made sure his pupils never made any "inductive" or "metaphysical" claims before considering "all" evidence. :grin: Have you ever engaged in teaching or tutoring?

Basically I think philosophy and science are separate activities. — Moliere

Are you able to say what each is?

- I think J asked a good question. Here it is again:

Would it follow, then, that if most people had mystical experiences, we'd consider them also to be "quasi-empirical" and possible evidence for general conclusions? How many would we need? What would be the threshold beyond which the experiences gained evidentiary status? — J

If phenomenology is "quasi-empirical" and the study of mystical experiences is not, would this change if most people had mystical experiences?

My thoughts were that they are ultimately connected. Mathematics is, at least initially, based on abstracting the common sensibles from any underlying matter and other qualities, including from time. So you get a timeless, changeless "platonic," intelligible subject that is nonetheless based on what is common to the senses (i.e. the experience of magnitude and multitude through shape, number, extension, etc.).

So, I'd argue that mathematization is sort of a blending of the two. It is materialism pulled back up into the intelligible realm, or the intelligible truncated down to just what is abstracted from the common sensibles.

It's obviously also intuitive in much the same way, which is why it is almost as old (e.g., Pythaogreanism). — Count Timothy von Icarus

That seems right to me. I am just trying to think of the wider picture within which to situate the OP. Mathematization could derive from an emphasis on the common sensibles, sure, but what else could it derive from? Mechanistic philosophy and the Baconian desire for control over nature, for one. Quantifiability and univocal, tidy reasoning schemes, for another. Along with this quantifiability is the neatness with which mathematics represents reasoning, which is apparently why many philosophers—from Plato to Descartes—were so fond of mathematics.

Also, your other point could be extrapolated out. It is the idea that where overdetermination exists, "testimony" is subject to confirmability. This happens with common senses, and it also happens with intersubjective consensus, repeated scientific testability, large sample sizes for the sake of induction, and probably many others. That desire for confirmability is surely present in many ways in our own age.

But, aside from the objection that this cuts out far too much, I think there is also a good argument to be made that a recognition of both magnitude and multitude is reliant on a measure (e.g. "one duck" must be known as such to know three ducks, or half a duck, etc.) and measure itself requires going beyond mathematics, to a recognition of unity and wholes (virtual, as opposed to dimension/bulk quantity, i.e. intensity of participation in form). That puts some recognition of whole, and so intelligible form, prior to dimensive quantity. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes and this relates to the transcendental of "unum." Cf. <This post> and others within that thread.

Second , mathematization struggles with existence. Even if one accepts that "what everything is" can be described by mathematics, this does not seem to explain "that it is." Hence, mathematization still tends to either tend back towards materialism (e.g. "these particular mathematical objects really exist just because, for no reason—which essentially puts potency before act or potency as actualizing itself) or towards extremely crowded and inflated multiverse ontologies. For instance, Tegmark cannot fathom how mathematics can explain existence (fair enough) so he had to suppose that every mathematical object exists (and that some just happen to have experiences). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, good points.

I suppose empiricism leans towards the materialist side, rationalism towards the platonist side. Either way though, they have to somehow reduce the fullness of experience to a part of experience (quantity). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and Lloyd Gerson would also juxtapose nominalism, mechanism, relativism, and skepticism with materialism. I am wondering if that constellation of materialist notions is bound up with the primacy of the pragmatic over the speculative. To prefer the pragmatic to the speculative is perhaps to inevitably reduce the fulness of experience to a part of experience. It may be that speculative reason is the only thing that can truly resist that reductionism. In his book on Illiberalism Peter Simpson seems to think that a society which honors truth will resist such problems.

Well, atheists I know would not say, as you write, “there isn’t any personal god.” They would say instead that there are no compelling grounds for belief in a personal god, though they remain open in principle to revising that view should persuasive evidence arise. — Tom Storm

Regarding the meaning of the word 'atheism', see <this post>.

Wittgenstein's Hinges and Gödel's Unprovable Statements — Moliere

This is a very relevant topic on TPF, so I think the submission is appropriate.

If one’s notion of epistemic justification is dependent on other epistemically justified beliefs, then the infinite regress looms. Or as I've said , it "is a bit like a novice bricklayer’s idea that every brick needs to rest on two other bricks. But this leads to an infinite regress, for there must be a foundation which itself supports the lowest bricks."

The basic way to avoid this infinite regress is by positing more than one kind of justification. For example, the justification that attaches to foundational beliefs versus the justification that attaches to non-foundational beliefs, where the justification that attaches to foundational beliefs is not dependent on other epistemically justified beliefs.

Wittgenstein’s solution is apparently to make a distinction between different kinds of beliefs (or “propositions”) but to dismiss the idea that foundational beliefs require justification. So there are different kinds of beliefs but not different kinds of justification.

In other words, given the following argument, Wittgenstein would apparently accept 1, 2, and 3, but reject 4 and 5.

1. Either every belief is justified in virtue of other beliefs, or else some beliefs are not justified in virtue of other beliefs.
2. If every belief is justified in virtue of other beliefs, then an infinite regress results.
3. Therefore, some beliefs are not justified in virtue of other beliefs.
4. Every belief requires justification.
5. Therefore, even beliefs that are not justified in virtue of other beliefs still require justification.

The rejection of 4 is a significant problem for Wittgenstein, but there is another problem. The justification/warrant of an argument's conclusion flows from the justification/warrant of the argument's premises, in much the same way that electricity travels from one end of a conductive surface to another. Yet Wittgenstein believes that he can begin with premises which possess no justification/warrant, and from them infer conclusions that possess justification/warrant. This is not coherent, and the same issue rears its head in reverse when we consider the fact that a modus tollens critique moves from conclusion to premises (or more precisely, from consequent to antecedent). It is irrational to try to divorce premises from conclusion qua justification.

As Wittgenstein observes, "There is no why. I simply do not. This is how I act" (OC 148). — Moliere

How should we respond to Wittgenstein here? Apparently by pointing out to him that there is a why, and that other people act differently than he does. As soon as two people who act in foundationally different ways come into contact with one another the "why" will become a question of interest.

But what about Gödel?

Just as Gödel showed that mathematical systems rely on axioms that cannot be proven within those systems, Wittgenstein's hinges reveal that epistemic systems rest on certainties that cannot be justified internally. — Moliere

This is simply a misunderstanding of Gödel. Mathematicians since Euclid knew that axioms could not be proved. This is nothing new. Gödel's contribution has to do with the completeness of formal systems, not the self-justification of formal systems. In fact most thinkers already believed that formal systems lacked completeness, but Gödel proved it and in the process destroyed the hopes of Wittgenstein's friends in the Vienna Circle.

I don't suspect that Gödel shared Wittgenstein's confusion in this matter, but perhaps someone who is familiar with Gödel's wider work could comment. I don't suspect that Gödel confused formal reasoning with natural reasoning. Formal logic has a very strong dichotomy between axioms and consequences, to the extent that there is a schizophrenic gulf between the two with regard to justification. Natural reasoning does not work that way.

(Note that Wittgenstein tends to shift haphazardly back and forth between psychological description and logical normativity, and this complicates but does not invalidate the picture I have drawn. Gödel does not do this. He is not arguing for the idea of unjustifiable premises.)

- Okay, well I agree that falsifiability pertains to modus tollens. I don't think our notions of falsification differ on that score.

I infer that because of his method of induction -- in order for him to be able to consider being, as such, he would have to start with the lower categories and move his way up. As I read the move from the physics to the metaphysics that's pretty much how we gets to his claims to have philosophical, metaphysical knowledge. — Moliere

So your argument is that <Induction requires exhaustive knowledge; in order to have exhaustive knowledge we would have to survey every scientific claim; therefore induction is no longer possible in an age with such a large multitude of scientific claims>?

Because it's small and could die and remains uncertain from its inception. It only grows in certitude with growth, or gets thrown out -- but its beginning is not its end, unlike a building -- an architectonic -- which builds from a solid beginning. — Moliere

Okay.

They don't have to unless they're following in the footsteps of Aristotle. — Moliere

Where does Aristotle say that one needs to consider every scientific claim?

Do you have an argument that connects your premise to your conclusion, or am I right that your inference was invalid?

Possibly, though there's a difference in kind here where "X" is some measurement and "Y" is some theory.

So the theory that follows is just another guess that sounds good, but doesn't have any observable measurements which falsify it. — Moliere

Again, I don't see any substantial claims being made here. "Possibly" is not saying anything. "Another guess that sounds good" doesn't tell us much of anything.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Scientific_Discovery — Moliere

Your article says nothing at all about modus ponens, and so fails to answer my question.

Yes, I think a lot of the questions we're running across are somewhat siderails -- but I don't think it's some fundamental error as much as a difference in approach to philosophy. — Moliere

In order to do philosophy I would say that one has to make claims and support those claims with arguments.

"What is real? How do we know what is real?"

This is one of those questions that can’t be answered in the way most people expect. It’s not that there’s no answer, but rather that the question itself rests on a misunderstanding; it assumes we need a justification or proof for what we already take for granted in our actions.

We don’t know reality in the same way we know facts; instead, we act with a certain conviction that things are real. This acting isn’t based on reasoning or evidence; it’s the foundation upon which reasoning and evidence even make sense. Doubt and knowledge only function because we already move through the world with an unquestioned trust in its reality. In this sense, the question "How do we know what is real?" is like asking, "How do we know that the ground holds us up?"—it’s not something we know in the usual sense; it’s the condition that allows knowing to exist at all.

So, the question isn’t meaningful, it’s misguided. It treats certainty as something that needs to be justified, when in truth, certainty is what makes justification possible in the first place. — Sam26

It seems to me that the problem with the Wittgenstenian approach is that it casts one half as certain and another half as justifiable, and never the twain shall meet. Except that's not really how certainty and knowledge work. The "reality" and the "facts" influence one another. There is no strict separation.

In this sense, the question "How do we know what is real?" is like asking, "How do we know that the ground holds us up?"—it’s not something we know in the usual sense; it’s the condition that allows knowing to exist at all. — Sam26

Continuing, there are not "conditions" in one part of reality and "knowing" in another part of reality. It would be more accurate to see "conditions" and "knowing" as the trough and crest of a wave, where everything is in continual motion, and "trough" and "crest" do not point to determinations that are primary (since the trough/crest is a secondary form of continuously moving matter).

(This presumably has also to do with @Moliere's misunderstandings of Aristotle. For Aristotle the movement from the more certain to the less certain is primarily individual, not "objective.")

There's a great deal in these posts that is helpful and to the point.

But I don't think they can get round the fundamental problem, which is nicely exemplified by Husserl. Somebody earlier posted a quotation from him about his intent to start his project from scratch, in poverty, etc. It's a classic idea. Such a project might have a special status, above the fray of all the competing schools. But it's not possible, as the history of phenomenology demonstrates. — Ludwig V

Okay, so what is the fundamental problem that you see, in your own words?

Interesting and thoughtful OP. :up:

Hence, the common sensibles of size, shape, quantity, etc. get considered "most real." We can see this in Galileo, Locke, etc. with the demotion of color to a "less real" (merely mental) "secondary quality," while shape and motion, etc. remain fully real "primary quantities." — Count Timothy von Icarus

We can also see how some people strive to remove the echo of the senses from this way of thinking, to make mathematics more abstract and thus, presumably, "more objective." For instance, LeGrange's 18th century mechanics textbook proudly announces that it uses no diagrams or drawings, only formulae. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Apparently there are two modern emphases you are bringing out. One is an emphasis on common sensibles, and the other is an emphasis on mathematics and mathematicization. What's curious is that they seem opposed. The first tends towards materialism and the second tends towards Platonism, and yet both flow in a special way out of the modern period.

I am not sure how to reconcile those two strands. If they are left unreconciled then the modern period appears schizophrenic, torn between an emphasis on common sensibles and an incompatible emphasis on mathematicization. Is there a ready way to reconcile the two? To reconcile thesis 1 and thesis 2? Or am I incorrect in thinking that they are opposed?

- Crap, I was hoping you would be preoccupied with your essay contest. :razz:

Further, we don't begin with a solid foundation and build outwards. Rather I'd use the plant metaphor that we begin with a seed which, when nurtured in the proper environment, slowly takes roots to the soil and becomes something solid. — Moliere

But how is a seed not a solid foundation? That seems to be precisely what a seed is. From an edit:

It's as if Aristotle gives a theory of seed germination and growth, and in response you say, "I think you just have to throw seeds and see what happens." — Leontiskos

So rather than beginning with the certain I'd say we make random guesses and hope to be able to make it cohere in the long run. — Moliere

Aristotle is well aware that most people have no method, and just throw seeds randomly, hoping to stumble upon something or another. He just doesn't think such a person will produce reliable fruit.

I'd say it's on par with "From the more certain to the less certain" — Moliere

It's just a part of Aristotle's account in the Posterior Analytics. I use it because it is so uncontroversial.

I don't think that follows at all. I think that what this says is that Leontiskos can't understand how someone could think that sensibility and intelligibility are important unless they are not skeptics, rather than that one doesn't begin with skepticism. — Moliere

It follows as long as you understand what skepticism is. If one holds and presupposes that reality is intelligible, then they are not skeptical of that proposition. If they say, "Oh, well I am skeptical of X even though I believe and presuppose it entirely," then they are equivocating on the word 'skepticism'. This is but one example of moving from the more certain to the less certain. The "more certain" is that reality is intelligible. You are again captive to Aristotle's knowledge even without realizing it.

At the time one could reasonably, though falsely, believe they had reviewed "all the sciences" such that they could reasonably make inferences about "all of reality at its most fundamental". — Moliere

Not sure why you think someone has to review every scientific paper, for example. Seems an odd idea.

Aristotle, though he did not have access to all science, could feel confident that he'd responded to all the worthwhile arguments so that he could link science to metaphysics.

The sheer volume of knowledge today makes it so that Aristotle's procedure can't be carried out. So one's metaphysical realism can't be on the basis of science insofar that we are taking on a neo-Aristotelian framework -- it's simply impossible to do what Aristotle did today with how much there is to know. — Moliere

Okay, so this is the new argument, <If we do not read and survey every scientific claim, then we cannot be metaphysical realists (or else we can't connect science to metaphysics)>. Again, pretty clearly invalid. Or else, I am still in no way sure how you are getting from the premise to the conclusion. Why must a metaphysical realist read and review every scientific claim?

I'd start with Popper, at least, so falsification follows the form of a modus ponens. — Moliere

I'm not sure what it means to say that falsification follows the form of a modus ponens. Does Popper say this somewhere?

But then I'd say that in order to falsify something you have to demonstrate that it is false to such a degree that someone else will agree with you. — Moliere

Anyone at all?

Furthermore I don't think that for falsification to take place that the next theory which takes its place will be true or even needs to be demonstrated as true. — Moliere

So X can falsify Y even when X is not true?

I would say that there is truth and falsity, and then there are also beliefs about propositions, namely that they are true or false. Falsification can be viewed from either angle, but both are interconnected.

I think TPF probably needs a thread addressing the deep problems with an intersubjective approach to truth, given how many people here are captive to it. We can falsify an individual's belief, but only if the content of that belief itself has a truth value (apart from any particular individual).