Have you ever noticed that when someone sets out a state of affairs, they do it by setting out a statement? — Banno

Agreed, but just about no one mistakes the statement for the state of affairs. But you know this, so I realize there's something I'm not understanding here. Expand?

Ok. The statement from @frank that I was questioning is "States of affairs have the same form as thoughts." We can be more generous and change it to " . . . a similar form as thoughts." But you say that the isomorphism is a matter of the atomic proposition having a similar construction as the state of affairs. Is that really all there is to it, that allows this pictorial similarity? Does the similarity go beyond putting two things together? Animal and mat in the one case, the words "cat" and "mat" in the other? I don't even think you can get "sitting on" to be isomorphic, since the words don't do anything like that; one merely precedes the other.

I guess what I'm asking is, How is this a powerful or important theory? Thus far it seems to have very little explanatory power.

Well gosh, I opened my copy and it all looks like a bunch of words to me. Where's the cat-on-the-mat-looking part?

I know that's not what you meant.

But seriously, how do you understand Witt's explanation of "similar form" in this context? Are you referring to picture theory?

Agree. I've noticed a tendency for many people to get exercised about the so-called problem of "treating subjectivity as an object." Like you, I can't see this as a genuine problem. We're not trying to replicate it or inhabit it or experience it, we just want to think about it, much as we would any other non-objective property. In doing so, we will of course keep its unique character in mind.

This may not have any bearing on the OP. — frank

No worries, this is sort of the after-party!

States of affairs have the same form as thoughts. — frank

Well, but this is what I'm contesting. Even on the most generous interpretation of "form," a cat sitting on a mat doesn't look remotely similar to any thought or linguistic expression. So if not in appearance, where are to we to find the similar form?

If you're worried about metaphysics, you're trying to do something with language that it's not capable of. — frank

Possible but unlikely. Do you believe that Witt himself succeeded in demonstrating this?

Glancing at SEP, what I see is "States of affairs are similar to thoughts. Thoughts are true or false; states of affairs obtain or not." That's a little different. So yes, similar, but by bringing in a verb like "obtain" we are trying to move away from talk about language (such as truth values), and into the world independent of thought. It's not supposed to matter how we "think of the world." I don't think Witt meant "all that is the case phenomenologically" or "for humans" or some such, do you? Being "the case" doesn't depend on us.

Troll summary in a nutshell: Is the like like the like that likens the unlike with the like in the like and the unlike alike? — fdrake

I guess I should "like" your post. :wink:

Concretising the schematism into expression rather than making it transcendentally prior? — fdrake

That may be close to it, if by "expression" we include the act of thinking. The new part is Kimhi's confident assertion (sorry!) that what he calls the syllogisms of thinking and being cannot be connected in predicate logic. Frege might reply, But that's a good thing! whereas Kimhi sees it as a bug, not a feature.

Oversimplified, of course, but I'm trying not to dive back in!

Really appreciate your thoughts here. What you say about unity vs. duality is, I think, the best shot yet at trying to explicate Kimhi on that topic. And it reveals the head-scratching problems as well.

If someone thinks that P, the assertoric force associated with thinking that P is conceived of as part of thinking that P - and the force is not truth functional — fdrake

This is also very illuminating, and I think correct about Kimhi. Is it true? I'm still not sure.

I too wonder if T&B is going to turn out to be a kind of unicorn, grazing in its own field, inviting awe and derision but perhaps not contributing much to philosophical discussion. And yet . . . look at us here, going on for pages and pages about it! Maybe a path for further engagement would be to take a step back from the specifically logical issues that Kimhi raises, and see what the book helps us to understand about the perennial problem of mind's special place in the world, or what Kimhi calls "the uniqueness of thinking." We shouldn't neglect that a good bit of Kimhi's project is highly "Continental," in that he's convinced that analytic dualities about thinking and being are just wrong, and misunderstand subjectivity completely.

Strange indeed. I have a friend who refers to this as "the impossible problem," for the reasons we've just laid out. The good news is that such absolute immersion in another's experience may not be necessary in order to get a wonderful sense of "what it's like" to be some other consciousness. We already have vehicles for accomplishing this in part -- fiction, films, virtual worlds, anything that invites empathy and identification. Time will tell whether we can create a technology that transfers this from an imagined to a real experience of an other.

An interesting dilemma follows from the idea of "experiencing what X [someone else] experiences." Am I having that experience, or is X? If it's me, then it would appear that I'm not experiencing what X experiences, since she surely experiences it as herself and not me. But the other horn of the dilemma is equally unappealing: If I have somehow become X when I experience what it's like to be X, then it what sense have I had this experience? Have I suddenly birthed a second identity?

The hard problem is, "Will we ever know what it is like to BE a conscious individual that isn't ourselves". — Philosophim

Just for the record, that isn't the standard way of stating the problem, and it isn't David Chalmers' way (he coined the phrase). You can listen to Chalmers describe it here: He defines the problem as "how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experiences in the mind." When we solve this problem (I do believe it's when, not if) we may or may not know "what it's like" to be someone else. That's a separate, though perhaps related, issue.

Well, anyway. All this was in aid of investigating whether clarity really is a hallmark of (let's call it) Anglophone philosophy, or whether the "unclarity" of some Continental philosophers is only a matter of degree of difficulty. It's hard to generalize, of course, but my own experience has taught me to be wary of dismissing a philosopher because I find them unclear or difficult to understand. After multiple rereadings and consultation with related literature, if it's still unclear . . . OK, maybe they're driveling. But more often than not, patience is rewarded. And never underestimate the obstacles that translation poses.

So is there any alternative data? A similar survey of the supposed vast ranks of continental philosophers? — Banno

Good question. Anyone know?

Yes, forgot McDowell.

OK, I spent a little time with the PhilPapers survey. You did notice that those surveyed were, by a huge majority, English-speaking (mostly US) and identified as Analytic philosophers? The lack of interest in phenomenology is hardly surprising, then.

But it's also fair to say that you might not a get a big tagging of "phenomenology" even among contemporary Continental philosophers. It's my impression that phenomenology as such -- as an actual method of inquiry -- has by now been subsumed into larger contexts, both Analytic and Continental. Not to oversimplify ridiculously, but if you're doing work that emphasizes hermeneutics and the exploration of the objective / subjective boundary, then in some important sense you are standing on the shoulders of phenomenology. Possible comparison: You might identify yourself as working within Kantianism or critical philosophy without thinking to call yourself a practitioner of a "transcendental method." The term has both dissolved and broadened, I think, which isn't necessarily a comment on its usefulness or fecundity.

Full disclosure: History of phil is not my specialty, as may be obvious. I've got no stake in being right here, so feel free to correct.

Cool, thank you.

can you think of any philosophers generally thought of as Analytic who mentioned Hegel positively, or at all, in their work? — Joshs

Arthur C. Danto is the only name that comes to mind. His early works were certainly Analytic but as he became focused more on aesthetics, his interests broadened. He remained committed to what I would call Analytic rigor, in the best sense. He openly acknowledges his debt to Hegel in his theories about "the end of art" in works like The Transfiguration of the Commonplace and The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art.

Politically, re Hegel, I think you (and Rorty) are right.

Do you happen to know what group was surveyed?

OK, thanks. It's an interesting take on Rorty's part but I'm not sure it's held by too many others. It makes for some strange groupings -- Husserl is meant to have more in common with Quine, on this view, than e.g. Heidegger or Sartre, which seems wrong. But in fairness, I don't think Rorty cared too much about the history of philosophy, and its divisions. His division, as you quote, was between philosophers who wanted to maintain a transcendental method for philosophy, and those who believed there was no boundary named "Objectivity" or "Truth" of this sort.

Well, I did say "arguably". :smile: Perhaps it would have better to say something like "In the early 20th century a split in methods and interests occurred within philosophy, and Husserl was a bellwether." I was trying to pinpoint the "two-camps" division, before which Hegel et al. were simply philosophy, common property of all philosophers. Only in retrospect were they seen as prefiguring Continental phil. Or that's my version of the history, anyway.

Clarity seems to be the biggest difference between the two 'camps'. — AmadeusD

OK, I'll stand up for the Continentals here! Is it possible that what you're calling "unclarity" could better be called "difficulty"? Case in point, perhaps, is Husserl, arguably the father of Continental thought. At first reading, he's as clear as mud. But you have to persist. In part this is because he's not a gifted writer, at least not in translation. (And if that's what you mean by unclarity, then you're correct.) But something can become clear, given time. His ideas are unusual and difficult, and require slow, patient reflection and discussion. The thing is, it pays off richly in philosophical insight.

This is not to take sides in any alleged Analytic/Continental debate. The same could be said for many Anglophone philosophers too.

To the first point: you'd said "the quality of our lives" so I took you to be referring to something intersubjectivity or semi-universal. But now I see that you mean: "A useful philosophy for me should improve the quality of my life," and yes, that's different.

To the second point: Indeed, I didn't see where morality came into it in the first place; I was only quoting you that it was a "moralizing" question.

I'm not sure we've completely eliminated the normative, though, by putting it in these terms. Presumably you'd say that someone who disagreed with the "philosophy should improve the quality of my life" position was wrong, wouldn't you? Or is that too only meant in the sense of "For me, philosophy is about improving the quality of my life. You may have a completely different conception of what the use of philosophy is, and there's no right or wrong here"?

Signing off for the night . . .

Good. All too often, a philosopher's conception of personhood is asked to do too much, especially in the ethical area.

Philosophy if it is to be of any use should improve the quality of our lives. — Janus

I can't help asking: Isn't the above a definitive answer to the question of how to do "proper" philosophy? So when you discovered the answer, were you engaging with a "tedious moralizing" question? I'm confused.

Have you read Nagel's essay Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament? — Wayfarer

Yes, an excellent piece. That's one of the reasons I appreciate Nagel so much -- he refuses to be doctrinaire about the type of philosophy he was trained in.

In any case, I am not worried about outliers. — Kurt Keefner

I understand that the outliers are not the subject of your OP, but I do want to point out that this view of personhood, based as it is on a capacity for conceptual rationality, may result in some unpleasant ethical implications. My query about animals was aiming in that direction. And infants, of course . . . But you may not mean that personhood is a requirement for being included in the ethical community.

OK, I'll posit that there is no non-philosophical way of raising the question of what philosophy is, or should be. Both Analytic and Continental philosophers are surely aware of this, but I would say that on the whole the (best) Continentals are slightly more skilled at performing the necessary self-reflection involved. Analytic philosophers can get very hung up on being right about things -- which (see above) reveals a certain conception of what philosophy ought to be doing.

That said, I agree that there are a lot of interesting "bridge" figures between the two schools, and we shouldn't make a huge deal about some supposedly irremediable divide.

An interesting topic. To be sure I'm understanding you, let me pose this question: Are you saying that the question of "philosophy proper" or "a proper way of doing philosophy" can receive an answer that is non-philosophical or outside philosophy? Or would any answer assume, or reveal, a particular conception of what philosophy is?

So I assume, from your OP (welcome, by the way!) and from the responses of others, that non-human animals are persons too? Or have I missed something that would rule them out?

OK, fair enough.

Just out of curiosity -- why would we want to talk about subjectivity in the first place, on your view? Is the talking meant to provoke in the listener a deeper experience of their own subjectivity, somehow?

The question I see being raised here is, "Are property rights always just?" Most of us would want to reply, No, not always. What counts as property, and as a right to hold property, varies from society to society. Justice, arguably, does not, or should not. That something is a right does not make it just. Murphy & Nagel's The Myth of Ownership is good on this:

Any convention that is sufficiently pervasive can come to seem like a law of nature -- a baseline for evaluation rather than something to be evaluated. Property rights have always had this delusive effect. Slaveowners in the American South before the Civil War were indignant over the violation of their property rights [by actions such as] helping runaway slaves escape to Canada. But property in slaves was a legal creation, protected by the U.S. Constitution, and the justice of such forms of interference with it could not be assessed apart from the justice of the institution itself. — The Myth of Ownership

In other words, you can't usefully ask "Was Harriet Tubman wrong to break the property-rights law?" without also asking "Was the law itself wrong?"

Philosophy is for closers!

I like how you characterize Kimhi's viewpoint in T&B. It's the offbeat, alternate-history quality that, for me, is part of its striking originality. As we've remarked before, Kimhi seems uninterested in Wittgenstein after the Tractatus. And he treats Frege as if the guy was still publishing! I think it's a way of drawing the connections he wants to draw to the source of his problems -- Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle. He's not interested in the history of philosophy as such, but rather in the history of a problem, one that he's inviting others to look at and realize it is a problem.

I hope you say more about your thoughts on T&B as you progress through it.

Wow, great find. I had marked a few of these too, but most are new. Thank you!

Welcome to my world! :lol: I tried so hard to leave him out of the assertion challenge ("inspired by Kimhi"), for just that reason. But we're trudging along as best we can . . .

Sorry, I should have provided references but, as I said, I wasn’t sure I was even on track with your OP.

For Kierkegaard, I had in mind the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Part Two, Chapters I, II, and III. I won’t even pretend to give a summary! But his stance, briefly, is that Hegel’s philosophy (which was very much in vogue at the time, and which SK calls “the System”) can give an account of absolutely everything except SK himself. He is left understanding all that can be known (he’s being a little sarcastic here) but the one thing he wants to understand best, his own being, is left out of “the System.” And this must necessarily be so, since there is no room for anyone’s subjectivity in an objective account of what is. The “uniqueness” angle might be that “the System” treat only things which are not unique, because they must be shareable and rationalized. Whereas any given self is, arguably, a one-off, a hapax – so how can it be made an object of knowledge?

The Nagel reference is more specific. In The View from Nowhere, p. 54, Nagel writes of what he calls the “centerless” objective world:

Yet each of us, reflecting on this centerless world, must admit that one very large fact seems to have been omitted from its description: the fact that a particular person in it is himself. What kind of fact is that? What kind of fact is it – if it is a fact – that I am Thomas Nagel? — Nagel

So again, subjectivity is posed as a problem for the objective viewpoint. (The puzzle is only a puzzle when expressed in the 1st person.) I think the “uniqueness” question here is more or less the same as in Kierkegaard – Nagel is uniquely Thomas Nagel, and this is of extraordinary importance to him, not in some egotistical way, but simply as a plain matter of getting around in his life. How do we fit such a vital fact into our “System” of non-unique things?

Hope this helps.

I'm using two contexts to try to understand you: First, the Kierkegaardian questions about how a self can escape from rational objectification. Second, a puzzle voiced by Thomas Nagel as to whether the statement "I am Thomas Nagel" is a fact about the world. They both consider "uniqueness" as possibly irremediably subjective.

I'm not at all sure I've understood you, though. If this is off track, please ignore.

Good post. And it helps me see another possible application of the force/content distinction. Compare "symbol" and "sign." This used to be the standard way of separating what humans do with language from what non-human animals do with . . . well, whatever philosophers used to think they had. This has all been rejected, I believe, but the symbol/sign disjunction still comes up for us humans. A mere sign is supposed be a kind of command, pure illocution if you will. It needn't have any semantic content at all, and is certainly not a proposition. A symbol such as a word or sentence, in contrast, has sense -- we can contemplate it for its meaning alone, think about it, play with it. It's not telling us to do any one thing in particular. So you might say that the possibility of separating force from content is essential to having a true language of symbols.

Just speculatin'.

I think my OP explanation was barely "pretty good," but 20 pages later, your summary captures one important point. I could go back and count at least a half-dozen excellent questions that the Kimhi-inspired challenge to Frege on assertion has sparked, some quite technical, as we've seen. But we shouldn't lose sight of this very simple one that you highlight: Propositions are not "in the wild"; they are bits of language, as Kimhi puts it. That may indeed be obvious, but many of the consequences are not. And Kimhi himself is working toward a highly unusual, even mystical, understanding of how the bridge between thought and world should be construed. Well, not unusual to Classical phil, but unusual now.