So what would be the point of needing what you cannot have? — Arne

And no philosopher worth their salt is going to allow anyone to decide what they mean by the terms they use. It is not going to happen. — Arne

The tragic view of philosophy! Quite possibly the correct one -- we will never get what we need, but, like Sisyphus, we can't stop pushing the philosophical rock up the hill.

If you want to read a first-rate philosopher discuss all these issues, try Reality+, David Chalmers' new book. It sheds light on a lot of what's being debated here.

I was getting at a different question about causality -- not whether the lamp causes the perception (in sense-1) of the lamp, but whether the supervenience relation is also causal. To put it another way, you use the phrase "experience can arise" to describe what happens when we go from a physical brain state to a mental state; my question was whether this arising is a causal relation. I think you can have supervenience without causation.

But now we're definitely off-topic, so I'll just say thanks for the response!

Very clear and helpful. If we can say that Hegel's view was pretty close to the idea that "reality" doesn't mean "whatever's 'out there' apart from phenomena," then I'm content. It may not even be necessary to uphold a modified correspondence theory, which has all the problems you point out (and my attempt to rephrase it was totally clumsy!).

For what it's worth, I've always respected Susan Haack's theory of “foundherentism,” an unfortunate term for very interesting idea that tries to make a bridge between foundationalism (or realism, in this context), and coherentism. I can’t do her justice here, but her inspiration is American pragmatism, and she quotes James approvingly: “When we give up the doctrine of objective certitude, we do not thereby give up the quest or hope of truth itself.”

This exchange has motivated me to reread her Evidence and Inquiry to see if she considers her foundherentism to be a correspondence theory; I no longer remember.

Good, that's what I hoped you would say. The "direction of fit" question is important, and we don't want the two senses of "perception" to escape very far from each other's orbit. But would you agree that "supervenience" is not "causality," and that the story we tell about how sense-1 and sense-2 perceptions connect doesn't have to be a causal one?

Like you, I apologize to others on this thread if I'm veering too far off topic. Just want to give this one point a closer look.

John Searle argues that many of the great modern philosophers use perceptual verbs ambiguously in two different senses.

1. In a constitutive sense. The perception is understood as what is constitutive for having it, such as brain events or a perceptual process that exists only for the one who has the perception.

2. In an intentionalistic sense, The perception is understood as what is perceived, or what the perception is about. For example, the visual perception of the lamp. — jkop

Not to take sides on Searle's contributions to philosophy overall, but this distinction is extremely useful, I think. You mention that this ambiguity allows us to stipulate perception in sense 1 but not sense 2 (hallucinating the lamp, or "seeing a lamp that isn't there"). But does it also support the reverse? That is, can I maintain that my sense-2 perception of the lamp is genuine, and a legitimate use of the word "perception," without committing myself to some story about how it supervenes (or otherwise connects) to a sense-1 perception?

Your translations from Hegelese are excellent, thank you! And the bolded paragraph from the Encyc. Brit. does seem very close to the question at issue in the OP.

The Hegelian position here is that “one can’t step outside belief altogether.” “Every search must end with some belief” about the results of the search. For Hegelians, this situation is an important and somewhat scandalous insight. For various versions of realism, it’s unsurprising and unproblematic.

Why would we expect “stepping outside belief” to be the criterion for knowing something about reality? What about the distinction between belief and justified true belief? A modest realism only asks that there be this difference, and that our epistemological search can end with JTB, rather than mere opinion. (JTB is not certainty, except possibly for analytic propositions, and that’s why I call it a modest realism.) The opposing idea would seem to be that only an unmediated, “unbelieved” Reality with a capital R could be the proper goal of the search. Or perhaps the idea is that, unless we can make contact with such a reality, we’re in no position to judge whether a belief is a JTB.

Would such contact be the same thing as contacting what is “given” to the mind, “direct apprehension,” “unmediated knowledge,” etc., on this view? I suppose so, since it can be plausibly argued that we never do achieve such contact. But I don’t see why the realist needs to concede this equivalence between “direct apprehension” and reality. They can say instead that a phrase like “the experience of reality is always mediated by beliefs” is either incoherent – there is nothing to be experienced – or that it’s perhaps true of “givens” or “raw feels” or some such, but that this is not what we mean by reality. The correspondence we’re looking for is not between propositions and “unmediated” reality, but rather between certain beliefs about states of affairs, and whether those beliefs are warranted.

Having said all this, I think the issue may be a classic instance of a kind of “spade-turning” difference in intuition about metaphysics. I don’t expect a Hegelian to be swayed by what I’m saying, and they probably don’t expect me to be swayed either. Each of us thinks the other is arguing in a circle, in some important sense, or missing a basic insight about the possibilities of experience. Philosophy goes on, precisely because we don’t really know what to say about these bedrock differences . . .

OK, I think I understand you. You're saying that the "assumption" is not about a specific P being true prior to verification, but rather about truth in general being knowable and recognizable as such. Or if not truth in general, then truths of the sort that can (putatively) be verified by simple perceptual experiences such as seeing a cat, coupled with some basic background information. This procedure would reveal "truth-makers," if all goes well.

How is a state of affairs outside of the logical grid of language and logic possible to affirm since any affirmation itself is weighed within that very grid? — Astrophel

I don't understand this question re truth-makers. What does it mean for an affirmation to be "weighed"? Do you mean "judged true or false"? If so, one can only reply that there is a distinction between states of affairs, which would exist without any perceiver, and the statements we make about them, including judgments of truth and falsity. I suppose that is an assumption, if you like. We don't have to use the word "true" (or "false") at all if we really don't believe there are such things as statements that correspond (or don't) to reality in a Tarskian T-truth sort of way. And yes, it's very vexing that no account of how this works seems flawless. But to affirm P, and to have a justification for doing so, doesn't make P disappear into a vicious circle of linguistic/logical assumptions, unless you're a severe sort of Idealist . . . which is maybe what @Count Timothy von Icarus is getting at, above, with his Hegelian analysis.

This has been fun to watch from the sidelines. I more or less share Banno’s point of view on this, but I have a feeling some basic clarification might help. For starters:

And the great flaw in the traditional analysis of knowledge has always been the assumption that P is true, that is, "S knows P iff S believes P, is justified in believing P and P is true" has no business simply assuming "P is true" without itself having justification, and this too would require justification, and it never ends. — Astrophel

Perhaps the problem here is that we’re not understanding what you mean by “simply assuming ‛P is true’”. As I read JTB, no such assumption is made. The truth of P needs to be independently verified, yes, but by using the term “justification” for this (presumably perceptual or scientific) process, we get unnecessary confusion, as if the whole thing were somehow circular. But, as has been pointed out, truth-makers aren’t usually the same things as justifications. Truth-makers are states of affairs, not propositions. JTB states a hypothesis: If P is true, and S has justification for this belief that P, then S knows P. So, could you clarify where the “assumption” comes in?

I don't read Rawls as saying that definitions of the good have to be unanalyzable preferences. This seems to set up a false binary: Either the good for individuals can be known and agreed upon by some rational, objective process (and presumably form the basis for a civil society), or else all we're left with is "unanalyzable preferences." Rather, what we're left with is what we see in more-or-less democratic, more-or-less civil societies -- vigorous dispute over what is good! Dispute and lack of resolution do not necessarily indicate that a problem is "unanalyzable," only that it's difficult and perhaps evolves historically. In addition, we can allow that progress is possible, as indeed has happened in Western democracies, I believe.

If a society based on Rawls principles is set up, and over time it evolves into ABNW, where is the objection supposed to come from? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You! That's the whole idea -- a pluralism of viewpoint is encouraged. See something wrong? Speak up, make your argument. Unless the suggestion is that ABNW would somehow rob people of their ability to notice what's dangerous within their society? It's been years since I read the novel, and perhaps Huxley does suggest this, in order to make his world truly dystopian, but I think that's unrealistic. Remember, the ideal liberal democracy thrives on disagreement, not conformity.

This is a scary vision, all right. I don’t think it has much to do with Rawls or political liberalism, though. It’s a huge subject, obviously, so let me just raise two points.

1) Yes, Rawls is offering a theory of political virtue, not individual morality. He’s not agnostic or skeptical about morality, as one person or another may conceive it; he himself was surely a hard-core Kantian. What he argues for is a hands-off approach by liberal governments when it comes to what is sometimes called “legislating morality.” He assumes both pluralism and tolerance. “Messing with the system that makes most other people happy,” to use your phrase, would presumably involve active restraints or disincentives on certain behaviors, as government policy. And Rawlsian liberals believe this is not the right approach, that tolerance of stupidity and wickedness is, in the end, the lesser of two evils. I emphasize again that this whole theory applies to social structures, not individuals. Personally I despise all forms of bigoted rhetoric, for instance, and do everything I can to oppose it; I’m not the least bit personally tolerant in this area. But I don’t want my government to censor or ban it. I’m also against a life of selfish pleasure, but liberalism asks me to tolerate in my role as citizen your choice of lifestyle even though I disapprove.

2) I think Rawls had much higher hopes for a society that implemented his theory of justice – higher, that is, than a sort of pleasure-based accommodation of desires. It isn’t only personal desires that thrive in a liberal democracy. So too do ideas, values, commitments, imagination, and deeply experienced “projects” of all kinds. And so does impassioned disagreement. Rawls believed we would become better people in a just society, not all at once, but as a result of participating in a fair political process. And his vision of “better” is surely not a matter of binges and entertainment. I guess another way of saying it is: Rawlsian liberal democracy is our best shot at creating a society that allows you or me the unfettered opportunity to argue for our personal morality, and perhaps see those arguments prevail.

That's a resounding note to end on, but I'm impelled to add: Rawls did not pay nearly enough attention to systemic economic inequality and its effect on fairness.

the dialogue between then Cardinal Ratzinger and Jürgen Habermas — Wayfarer

Habermas is exactly who I was thinking of as an exponent of this ongoing, rational, consensus-driven approach to knowledge and values!

Intersubjective agreement is essential when it comes to scientific hypotheses, but it's not realistic when it comes to one's own existence, unless you're part of a collective. — Wayfarer

This is complicated, but I understand what you mean. We don't want our values determined for us by consensus. But the alternative of stubbornly asserting one's own right to decide what matters based on nothing other than personal choice is surely a version of the inimical individualism you've been writing about. As usual, we're looking for reasonable middle grounds for compromise . . .

What I'm referring to is the centrality of individualism to liberalism and modernity, and the individual as the sole arbiter of value in Enlightenment philosophy. I would have thought that an uncontroversial claim. The underlying point is that with the rejection of the transcendent, we are inhabitants of Max Weber's 'disenchanted world'. — Wayfarer

OK, the world may be "disenchanted" in Weber's sense, but surely "the individual as the sole arbiter of value" isn't the only remaining alternative. Isn't there an vigorous, important strain of thought in the West that tries to find meaning and value in various forms of community, intersubjectivity, etc.? I'd argue that, in fact, this is the basis of scientific method and of Deweyan pragmatism; no single individual can assert what is valuable or not; reasoned, fallible consensus is required.

Yes, what you say about Simpson's criticism is similar to the points that Nussbaum and others have made. There is a claim to a sort of obviousness in Rawls' initial intuitions about what needs to be "veiled" in order for justice as fairness to emerge. Why these intuitions and not others? As for cultural relativism, I don't know what Rawls may have said about it to Hare or anyone else, but to me it's plain from reading A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism that Rawls was trying to craft a conception of justice that was in some important ways transcultural for democracies. I'm not sure if Rawls ever gave an argument as to why an autocracy, for instance, could in principle not be just. He was concerned with finding a firm basis for liberal democratic values as he understood them, and also (to quote his opening statements in Political Liberalism), "to develop an alternative systematic account of justice that is superior to utilitarianism." This shows his basic Kantian commitments, I think.

BTW, the only thing I thought was unfair about Count T's reference to Rawls was this: "We might try to imagine ourselves 'behind the veil of ignorance,' but we can't actually place ourselves there." I took this to mean that the thought experiment couldn't succeed, because we can't actually become ignorant in the right ways, and that Rawls was somehow overlooking this. But this may not have been Count T's meaning.

why does the abstract rational agent want the society they want? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We should probably start a different thread to pursue this. But I think you're right that the liberal/Kantian ethical position begins by refusing to specify morality ("what should I want?") and instead assumes that a just society will make maximal allowance for many ethical points of view and prudential goals. This, then, at a higher level, is "what I should want" -- a contractarian respect for something that looks like the categorical imperative with a dash of tolerance added. And the (perhaps interminable!) debate is about what that maximal allowance should be. Free speech? Sure. Free speech that directly threatens me with death? Surely not. Free speech that promulgates morally obnoxious points of view, according to me? Not so clear . . . European liberal democracy often says no, US Constitution usually says yes. And the conversation goes on.

Rawls might be another example. In grounding social morality in the desired of the abstract "rational agent," debates become interminable. We might try to imagine ourselves "behind the viel of ignorance," but we can't actually place ourselves there. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not a Rawlsian all down the line, but I do think you're being unfair here. The veil of ignorance, or the "original position," is a technical contrivance Rawls uses to set a basis for his very complicated discussion. He's well aware that no one actually starts from there, any more than we formally adopt "the social contract." If you want to read some good objections to the original position from a sympathetic philosopher, read Martha Nussbaum's Frontiers of Justice. Her basic criticism is that the conditions Rawls asks us to be ignorant of -- race, class, sex, a particular conception of the good -- may not include some other equally important ones, such as disability or even species.

That was a bit off topic, but my next comment is relevant, I think. You say "debates become interminable" if social morality is based on the prudential desires of abstract rational agents. But one person's "interminable debate" may be another's "ongoing process of communication and refinement of values." It raises the question, Why do we expect rational debate to terminate? Are there in fact instances of this, in philosophy? Might not one of the virtues of rationality be its (perhaps) endless willingness to continue the conversation? When I deny misology and put my trust in reason, I'm also declaring my faith in certain human characteristics and values -- patience, fairness, inclusion, intellectual honesty. Is this model of reason in fact Eurocentric, or patriarchal, or similarly flawed by historicity? That may well be -- but the only way find out is to keep talking about it.

In liberal political theory, the individual conscience is the sole arbiter of value. — Wayfarer

Hmm, I'm wondering who you have in mind here. If we take John Rawls as a paradigm liberal political philosopher, we certainly don't find him making such claims for conscience, as far as I can tell. Also, we shouldn't oppose duties of conscience to Catholic teaching. Looking at my old adult catechism, I find, from the Second Vatican Council, "Every one of us is bound to obey his conscience." Aquinas evidently agreed, writing that a person is obliged to follow their conscience even when, unknown to them, it is quite mistaken -- "to deny one's conscience is to turn one's back, if not consciously on God Himself, at least on moral authenticity," according to the catechism.

The question is then, How is one's conscience formed? And of course the catechetical Catholic answer will be very different from, say, the existentialists. "The sole arbiter of value," even for Sartre, doesn't come from conscience, but rather from a series of choices which then inform conscience. These choices may be arbitrary or absurd, but if so, it isn't conscience which will tell us so. We need reasoned discussion for that. Or perhaps a Catholic would add -- "and appeal to authority."

:lol:

If the activity is no longer "philosophy", what is it? — Paine

Right, that would be the question. PI 194 turns out to be a good test case, because the description
LW gives of philosophers -- "we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the way in which civilized people talk, put a false interpretation on it, and then draw the oddest conclusions from this" -- surely can't be self-referential; that is, refer to the very statement LW is making. (Presumably he doesn't think he has drawn any odd conclusions from misunderstanding "civilized" people.) Rather, it's a critique of what some philosophy leads to -- but critique in the name of what?

Maybe you could say more about the implication that philosophy has been abandoned. — Paine

Here I'm just referencing the usual idea that LW's program was "therapy," an attempt to get us to stop engaging in certain fruitless lines of thought and speech. Maybe "murder-suicide" would be more accurate! Can you end philosophy, using philosophy? For my part, I prefer to take LW's brilliant speculations at face value, for what they add to our understanding of rationality and language, and not worry too much about whether he was right that 1) philosophy ought to be/can be abandoned and 2) LW himself has stopped doing it, as of . . . right now . . . . or no, wait, he means at the end of this sentence . . . no, wait . . . . OK, now he's stopped . . .

Do you know of an instance of Habermas bringing the charge of performative contradiction against Wittgenstein? — Paine

I don’t. If anything, Habermas seems sympathetic to the later Wittgenstein (less so to the Tractatus). But there’s a lot I don’t know about Habermas.

“Performative contradiction”: I suppose it depends on how seriously you take the idea that LW was not doing philosophy in, e.g., the PI. The passage you quote begins “When we do philosophy . . .” and the meaning of the sentence implies that LW himself, in this “performance,” isn’t doing philosophy, but rather commenting on it or criticizing it. Is this really tenable?

. . . and a general reply to this conversation: In his excellent book The Logic of Reflection, Julian Roberts reads LW as asserting in the Tractatus that “the structures of truth and certainty are only very inadequately rendered in natural language,” quoting 4.0002: “Language disguises the thought.” But by the time of the Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, “Wittgenstein questioned whether there was any such thing as a ‛fact’ independent of the system we used to describe it. Arithmetic, for example, taught us to see particular sorts of ‛fact’.” So language, and the various language-games, would trump logic or structure.

I think LW is open to the charge of what Habermas calls “performative contradiction,” in that he seems to be privileging a particular language-game in his later writing to discuss, criticize, and relativize language-games. It doesn’t matter whether we call this game “philosophy” or not. The question rather is whether such a critical perspective carries its own warrant, so to speak, or whether it is merely another way (among many) of seeing “particular sorts of ‛facts’.”

↪Jamal That makes sense to me -- The purposes of philosophy differ between them. — Moliere

Makes sense to me as well, though I think there is indeed a parallel, which you've pointed out.

Very interesting. Do you think the later Wittgenstein was in sympathy with the idea that reason can be self-reflective, or at any rate can reflect critically upon the forms of understanding? I’m not sure how to read Wittgenstein on this. In the Tractatus, I think LW is saying that such a critical project would be just "metaphysics". But can a “form of life” include a more generous scope for philosophical language that abstracts from experience (or "my world") to question itself?

So, this version of the P-Region has the same sort of multiple realizability that B-Minimal properties do, but at the cost of becoming virtually the same thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, this is helpful. I agree.

The way I understand it, we are talking about the actual spatio-temporal region involved in producing M given any one actual instance of M. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This seems to be key. Is an "actual" S-T region one that can only change in certain ways? What I mean is, adding to and subtracting from the mass of P-Reg(P) is doable, in our world. It's a manipulation we can perform on the same region, or at least that's how it seems sensible to think about it. But can we change the physical composition of the substance, without replacing the "actual" example with a different one -- one of the "physical ensembles"? In short, are changes in composition allowed in theory, or does the idea of an "actual" S-T region automatically shut down any such theoretical manipulations?

I think this question makes sense, but we may be losing sight of why multiple realizability matters in the first place. What we want is an explanation of supervenience that preserves a kind of rough-and-ready causality (no M without P) but doesn't commit us to a S-T causality that is unique, that can only happen once. Any sphere will have the property of roundness. The roundness of SphereA isn't caused in space and time -- you don't start with the sphere at T1 and then get the roundness at T2 -- yet it is a property that supervenes on a specified physical (or mathematical, if you prefer) arrangement. So it ought to be multiply realizable. And then the question gets interesting if we go on to ask, "Are minds and brains like this? Is consciousness a property of the brain? Does that mean that a given thought is multiply realizable? How about an entire mind?" etc.

I figured. Just wanted to make sure I understood you, thanks!

Agreed. The skeptical position is almost always about the limits of knowledge, not a declaration about what does or doesn't exist. And it tends to equate knowledge with certainty, as you say -- a much easier target for doubt.

One thing I'd add: You say we might agree with the skeptic that

(b) proof and absolute certainty are chimeras in epistemology — Jamal

but aren't they only chimeras in reference to the external/empirical world? I think you can be a Humean skeptic while reserving a place for genuine analytic knowledge. For Hume, relations of ideas, which would include math and its proofs, are not problematic, because they can be known by reason alone, requiring no reliance on experience.

Love it! Can we see his picture? Well, not "his" picture, if by that you mean Noumenal Former Fred . . .

Of course the Kantian analysis can be played for laughs. The question, if we want to be serious, remains whether some kind of intersubjective agreement is a sensible way of describing human "objective" knowledge.

OK, I thought you were referring to brain states (P) giving rise to mental states (M). The P ("exterior" object) to M (perception of it) is different, I think. For the latter case, it's trivially true that all the Ps have to be unique, if there is more than one perception. (This is assuming that P must include a temporal dimension.). And we could generously allow that the M states are identical across perceptions, though this is by no means certain. But how does this bear on the multiple-realizability question? Is there even such a question with regard to this kind of example? We could talk about "multiple realizability" of perceptions of an apple, but this won't tell us what we want to know about the relationship between physical brain states and the mental events.

Perhaps, to make the two kinds of examples clearer, we could eliminate the "exterior" perception entirely and instead ask, "Is your thought of 7 + 5 = 12 realizable in my mind as well? If so, is this because our respective neuronal arrangements are/must be identical?"

I don't want to lose sight of this exchange between Jamal and Hanover. Hanover is uneasy with the idea of an “intersubjective” way-station between individual subjectivity and some kind of “divine” objectivity which presumably would include knowledge of the noumena. I think the distinction Jamal is making is quite innocent, and conforms well with our experience and practice. I see a dog but for some reason have doubts. So I invite my neighbors to have a look. Together, we agree that I’m not deceived. Further doubts could resolved by a zoologist, post mortem, I suppose. But the point is that my increasing confidence in my subjective judgment never approaches statements about “reality” of the sort that concerns Hanover. We could all be deceived about the “reality” of the dog if you want to limit the use of “reality” to “what the noumena reveal”. But this isn’t how humans (other than philosophers!) operate, and Kant surely wasn’t doubting this intersubjective version of reality. On the contrary, his entire project is to make sense of it, to understand what would have to be the case in order for it to exist.

As for the question about mistaken or invalid reasoning, this seems to me an argument in favor of intersubjectivity. It’s precisely by engaging in rational discussion with others that we’re able to correct our mistakes. Could we all be simultaneously mistaken? Sure, but only more rational investigation will tell. And same point as above: None of this back-and-forth around possible mistakes has any bearing on a “reality” that would put us in direct contact with Kant’s noumena.

No, I think your OP is right. I suppose it depends on whether we can really imagine that "identical B-minimal properties do not entail identical P-regions". This degree of abstraction requires that B-minimal properties could be successfully identified without specifying P-regions, which seems doubtful. What is one of these "properties" supposed to be, anyway, if it isn't defined by its location in space-time? But I guess I'm just calling into question the intelligibility of the whole multiple-realization model. It may not depend on which way we go on B-minimal properties, but rather on whether functionalism, broadly interpreted, can make sense of the physical/mental world at all. Time will tell . . .

superveniance famously fails to ground such ontological dependence — Count Timothy von Icarus

Could you refer us to a paper or discussion about this?

It seems like the two are mutually dependent such that changes in M entail changes in P AND neither current states of M nor P determine future states of M or P. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is an important implication, and I'm glad you brought it out. If one is looking for a different, non-supervenience-based model of how the physical and the mental are related, some kind of mutual dependence is a natural substitute. But of course this is very hard to describe or understand with our current (pathetically limited) knowledge about what consciousness is, and whether downward causation (mental to physical) is even possible.

B-Minimal properties remove the possibility of multiple realizability, perhaps they also obviate the need for it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. If you're not a friend of multiple realizability, this is probably the way to go.

That seems to be the way I'm reading Kant, taking him in the direction of Husserl (even at the risk of reading too much back into Kant). — Jamal

I also find this a promising direction. Has anyone ever written a piece called "Kant: The First Phenomenologist"? :smile: At any rate, it's proved impossible to do phenomenology without more or less constant reference back to Kant.

The question about the status of noumena is hard to resolve. Kant tells us, "Doubtless, indeed, there are intelligible entities [these would be the noumena] corresponding to the sensible entities; there may also be intelligible entities to which our sensible faculty of intuition has no relation whatsoever; but our concepts of understanding, being mere forms of thought for our sensible intuition, could not in the least apply to them" [B308-9]

In a way, you could argue that the whole history of Kantian interpretation turns on what he means by "corresponding." (I don't know German, so I don't know whether understanding the German word would help.) Does he mean "corresponding" in the way that a map corresponds to the territory -- a kind of picture? Does he mean "corresponding" in the sense of cause and effect -- the cause (noumenon) might not resemble the effect in the slightest, but still correspond one-to-one as cause and effect? Or is it the correspondence between "concept of understanding" and "Husserlian intentional object"? This latter type of correspondence is itself difficult to articulate, even if we imagine Husserl admitting noumena to his philosophy. But I mean something like the way a theorem creates reasons for assent to its truth, rather than "causing" us, ineluctably, to believe it.

Sorry, this may be shedding more shade than light. But the questions are endlessly interesting, and important. And your original point about not denigrating scientific or phenomenal knowledge on supposedly Kantian grounds is surely right.

In the Critique of Judgment Kant uses the term 'objective' to mean 'disinterested'. A valid judgment of taste is subjective, universal, and not based on concepts. To put it somewhat paradoxically, objectivity is universal subjectivity. — Fooloso4

Another way to think about this, using terminology I don't believe was available to Kant: Objectivity would be universal intersubjectivity. We can theoretically have universal agreement on phenomenal facts, like the cat's whiskers. This avoids the charge that my belief in my cat's whiskers is "merely subjective," while not going so far as to claim that I've achieved the "view from nowhere."

Okay, I can at least start with this . . .

Concerning Finn & Bueno: as I said, a wonderful paper, full of insight. I’m particularly grateful for the four-part counterclaim to quantifier variance around which they structure the paper, because you can then use those four issues as a kind of checklist for any defense of QV. That will be part of another post I’ll write, but for now I want to consider a different question.

Finn & Bueno write that Ǝ “invariably has the function of ranging over the domain and signaling that some, rather than none, of its members satisfy the relevant formula. Yet the quantifier-variance theorist requires Ǝ to have multiple meanings. . . . This raises the issue of how the meaning of a quantifier can differ, and what the other meanings could be. And it is this issue that we tackle, arguing that one cannot make sense of variation in quantificational apparatus in the way the the quantifier-variance theorist demands.”

I think there’s a subtle but crucial equivocation going on here, around the term “meaning”. Consider this from the Sider paper referenced above: Sider also wants to know what these “candidate meanings” could be, but he lays out the question differently. “Understand a ‛candidate meaning’ henceforth as an assignment of meaning to each sentence of the quantificational language in question, where the assigned meanings are assumed to determine, at the least, truth conditions. ‛Candidate meanings’ here are located in the first instance at the level of the sentence; subsentential expressions (like quantifiers)[my itals] can be thought of as having meaning insofar as they contribute to the meanings of the sentences that contain them.”

If Sider means “can be thought of as having meaning only insofar as they contribute to the meanings of the sentences” (which I believe he does), then we have an important distinction. It would be possible, on this view, for the meanings of sentences containing quantifiers to vary according to one’s chosen L, while the quantifiers themselves do not vary. They still get used only one way, the way Finn & Bueno think they must. We would thus fulfill the requirement that Ǝ always has to mean what it ought to mean in well-formed logical expressions. But there’s still room for “quantifier variance” if the meaning resides not at the level of the quantifier but, as Sider suggests, at the level of the sentence.

An example might be helpful. I say “numbers exist”; you say “numbers do not exist”. Each of us would have to use Ǝ to formulate our position in Logicalese. What I’m arguing is that we’re each going to use Ǝ the same way, as we state our respective contradictory positions. The difference in our statements is not at the subsentential, quantifier level. We have no quarrel about "variation in quantificational apparatus." We differ on what exists, not on the use of the quantifier.

Is this still quantifier variance? I say yes, in spirit if not in name. It sharpens the question of multiple ontologies rather than dismissing it. Granted, I’m also suggesting that the term “quantifier variance” is perhaps poorly chosen, since it does seem to imply that it’s the meaning of the quantifier per se, rather than any sentence formed using it, that can change. But the reason why someone would want to posit QV is unaffected. The question never was “Can we find multiple meanings for Ǝ (or ‛&’ or ‛→’ or any of the other operators)?” Rather, what Hirsch is interested in is the question, “Can sentences about existence (which logicians express using Ǝ) change their meanings based on what criteria the speaker is using for existence? Can people talk past each other because their sentences, as a result, mean different things? If so, is there one privileged or distinguished way we ought to write these sentences in order to capture something true about the structure of the world?” If we accept ontological pluralism, then the last question (usually) gets a “no,” but all those many ontologies will still be expressed with well-behaved, consistent operators, satisfying Finn & Bueno. (And yes, I agree with them and with Sider that logical pluralism is untenable as an argument for QV.)

This analysis overlaps with another problem I want to raise about the entire debate, concerning whether ‛Ǝ’ is uniquely troublesome in that it’s used to refer to both a quantifier and a predicate. But I’ll save it and invite comment on this question of equivocation on “meaning”. To summarize: Is it the quantifier whose meaning changes, or the sentences in which the (unchanged) quantifier occurs? And if the latter, is it still QV?

Funny, I was just sitting down to start a reply. I thought the article was brilliant, in about a dozen ways. Enormously helpful in clarifying the issues, especially when read side by side with the Sider paper. I also think there are a couple of points they missed which I want to try to articulate. I'm a slow (re)reader and even slower writer. I'll be back with something in a day or two, hopefully.

Agree about the profound implications. It's all part of the same discussion we visited back with Davidson et al.

Thanks for appreciating the thread!

Thanks, Banno. The paper looks right on target. Sider also has a lot of arguments against quantifier variance. I'll read it carefully and reply. But just looking at objections i - iv, I agree that (iv) raises issues but perhaps should be phrased, "QV appears not to be compatible with charitable translation, and thus requires a defense of its internal consistency." Soften it, in other words. And I think (i) is largely where the debate between Hirschians and Siderians takes place. Sider says the quantifiers have to be unrestricted. But let me read and cogitate . . .

Alisdair MacIntyre, Elizabeth Anscombe, and others would say that the words "moral", "virtue", "obligation", and similar ethical terms no longer describe what Plato and Aristotle meant, nor would they understand what we mean. The entire project of contemporary ethics would be as if "the notion 'criminal' were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten," in Anscombe's words. This idea of modern ethics as a degenerate, vestigial grasping at what the Greeks meant is even stronger in MacIntyre, and characterizes a lot of the resurgence of virtue ethics. An interesting question is whether it's possible to return to a previous paradigm.

:smirk: Happens to the best of us!

I'm not familiar with the term "scientific miracle." Probably I should be, but could you explain it for me? Thanks.