Wild. We're in exactly hte same place, philosophically on this one. Nice.

There's some daylight between how we see the trans community being treated. But that's by hte by for the thread. Thanks for your input :)

That's roughly my understanding, yes. Its a petrostate which has collapsed under it's reliance, as best I can tell, on oil. They've nationalized and essentially mismanaged the worlds biggest oil reserve.

The socialist aspects limiting pricing and profits can't have helped. The autocracies can't have helped either - i imagine people are collapsing as a population under the tension between humanity and their leaders for the last 30 years aside from over 90% of the country living in poverty.

I imagine hte US is there because of the strange alliances between Venezuela and Russia, China and Iran over the years. Not to mention drug trafficking, likely a result of intense corruption. I can see why the US is there, or trying to, at least, enforce democratic practices.

Fair enough - my knowledge is roughly the same, except extended over two decades as I've had a family who is a set of friends of my family, 'escape' and return.

Yep, that's fair. Thank you - very reasonable position.

I also don't think it really makes any sense to morally judge someone who violates a country's immigration laws if they are only trying to improve their situation peacefully. There are ways to immigrate to the united states legally, but clearly a lot of illegal immigrants are not able to complete those procedures, or don't know how. — ProtagoranSocratist

That's fair. I just don't think that's the USA's problem. They should come in legally. I don't think its at all fair, or reasonable to post-hoc ignore your laws to be 'nice'.

DACA was good. But its been weaponized. If you're in the US illegally, get your shit together. I can't see any argument that would deny the US the right to remove a criminal who's been there for 40 years and never got their papers together, despite DACA.

Now comes comments about enforcement tactics. I presume we're closerr there than anywhere else in this. But I also assume we have different 'facts' due to informational bottlenecks, echo chambers etc.. (i'm joking - it may not be worth wading into that, lol).

Going in reverse, because its easier: Yeah, I agree. Have said so. Our best info is the best way to reason. When we don't have good info, I entertain all comers.

I agree, something 'between us and reality' is fraught, unless one takes simulation seriously and defines reality in a super-restrictive and awkward way. But my view is that in any case we might end up finding out is 'true', that is natural. There can't really be non-natural reality which I assume is hte contradiction you note. I didn't mean to put that forward. I agree with essentially all you say.

The comment was to illustrate that one can accept naturalism, and still reject strict materialism i guess. Doesn't seem like we disagree.

But the notion that all we know is found by perception if fraught with issues, peripheral to the question of what is real. It is a mistake to equate what we perceive with what is real. — Banno

Mate, I followed it. I didn't agree with you (or Austin, as it has since turned out).
I agree, it's a mistake to equate what we perceive with what is real. I can't see the disagreement anymore.

Fitch shows that the antirealist cannot consistently maintain both that all truths are knowable and that there are any unknown truths; the antirealist must either accept omniscience, accept unknowable truths, or abandon the unrestricted knowability thesis. — Banno

Are you able to explain in non-formal terms how this works?

There doesn't seem to be any tension whatsoever between saying "there are things we can't know" and reality.
I also don't understand how an antirealist is committed to saying all truths are knowable. That said, my understanding (or, probably more properly my ill-labeled position) is that an antirealist has to assume there are truths we don't know. So am more than happy to have it explained to me like I'm not following - cause this time i'm not lol. I don't know Fitch.

It seems to me that "direct" and "indirect" do not have a determinate application in the context of perception. — Ludwig V

I suppose this, somewhat, rests on something Banno's type would say v something I would say:

"When you look at a tree you see a tree".

So much seems true. But I would say...

"You factually do not see something "out there"". You see a tree, because that's what you see, we call a tree. Not because that's the same thing as what you cast your eyes upon. Something something ding en sich.

You see something in your mind (or rather, generated by it). This is what I mean when I say indirect. It may be that there is no appreciable difference between the two - looking through a dark glass doesn't necessarily have you seeing something 'untrue'. But To suggest that we see the world undistorted seems to me something which can be set aside without much trouble. I've definitely had to drop aspects of these thoughts over the last year or so though, for the reason set out in the last two comments we made to each other: I don't think the world exists in the mind. I just don't see a problem with accepting there is a real world, and a world of perception - whatever their closeness in terms of identity.

Do they distort reality? In one sense yes, in another sense no. — Ludwig V

I don't think 'distort' anything on the basic premises here. Closing ones eyes simply has us seeing the inside of our eyelids. Putting on noise-cancelling headphones simply has us hearing a restricted selection of the sounds we might otherwise hear. The same as going into one's car, to some degree. Its not the same as, for instance, an inability to see the frequency we call red. That's where the interesting stuff comes in, and where I've truly loved Banno's comments over the couple of years i've been here.

Trans is a 'true' identity, and has existed historically everywhere. — Jeremy Murray

Not quite. 'trans' hasn't existed many places at all. Most instances quoted are, in fact, torturous attempts to relitigate instances of historical homophobia. What's happening now isn't too far off, as you've noted elsewhere. Most trans youth resile into being gay at puberty.

What I meant by true is 'verifiable'. Claiming to be trans is nonsense, on it's face. Not that it can't mean anything at all socially, but on it's face, its like claiming to be a rock. Your second point is taken, and the sudden drop in identification in the last 18 months seems to suggest something along those lines.

Patently untrue. The definition of a woman as an 'adult human female' is not false in any sense of the word false. This entire post just prevaricates and ignores the problem.

It may be uncomfortable, and that's fine. It's not exactly the one I would use, simply because I'm happy to call polite, non-imposing people what they want to be called. That would require me to violate that definition.

So, let's actually get to some meat, and point out where what you're saying is entirely bogus:

So, are transwomen women? Well, if a transwoman is someone who identifies as a woman but would not be considered one by a biologist in the grips of the definist fallacy....then some of them might be, and some of them might not be. It depends on whether they answer to the concept of a woman - a concept that is not amenable to definition and that biologists are not authorities about. — Clarendon

"if" does so much lifting, that you've done nothing more than anyone else in this thread to even broach the topic. You're saying in the bolded that you simply take self-identity as rote, or alternately that there is no answer. So be it. But that's bollocks and I'm sure you know it.

The concept of a woman is either defined, or meaningless. I don't care which. Female does the job I need it to do.

Ok Ucarr.

Wherever we encounter indigenous peoples they all say the same thing, They revere their environment and seek to live in harmony with it. They respect their environment and natural balance and inherent wisdom of the animals and plants they live alongside. — Punshhh

They also tend to engage in murderous cultural norms, sexual assault, xenophobia and plenty of other pretty ridiculous things. The Noble Savage concept should have died a century ago. Rousseau is perhaps the single worst thing for thinking about indigenous cultures of the 20th century. Its a weird European nonsense.

alright, put that way, i think i can explain what i mean: the immigration policies by Obama and Biden are also xenophobic, but the official campaign rhetoric with liberal presidents tends to be less so. I also found that Biden acting against tiktok was also xenophobic and i personally thought it was just stupid and divisive...my understanding of the word is that it either means fear of outside influence or foreigners, this is the etymn online deconstruction: — ProtagoranSocratist

Hmm, ok, cool thank you. That's hugely clarifying.

Is your issue that there are secure borders? I 'm not trying to corner you there; I take 'secure' to mean enforced as per immigration laws. I guess I'm wondering where in that there xenophobia comes from - and I'm having to take it back to the fact that entrants must be legal? I assume that's wrong, so would appreciate correction.

borders themselves are also xenophobic — ProtagoranSocratist

This is key, so thank you. We do not have any common ground here. This now says all we need in terms of disagreement, but the discussion is fun anyway to me.

Overall, i find such notions to be unfounded because clearly more predatory and criminal activity is committed by people who are already living in the country. — ProtagoranSocratist

That's fair. But if there is a policy which would prevent X type of offence being committed (or offences by X group), I want that policy (generally). And if that policy is simply enforcing existing laws, I can't complain about it. We do not have males in female spaces largely because that group commits certain crimes. Not all, not even most. A sliver, at best. But we stil have that policy and enforce it heartily. Most people just do it. Not illegally entering a country should be the same.

For me, the issue was that a huge swathe of hte public decided to rally to prevent the enforcement of existing laws and that was for decades. Despite the policies of Obama and Biden. I absolutely agree the rhetoric and political delivery is softer in those administrations - Im unsure that's good. As noted though, if this goes back to borders being 'xenophobic', I cannot understand that and we're good :) lol

You've been evaluated. If they are non sequiturs or spurious, there's nothing to 'analyze'. I suggest that is the case. It is an incoherent request for something which - apparently, you don't actually want. That is because I have quite clearly given you my position, and you just walk away.

But it is what the anti-realist (idealist) makes of this mundane fact that bothers me. — Ludwig V

Definitely. It's taken me a while to realise that its required to claim antirealism. It makes me very uncomfortable as I need to push back hard on the likes on Banno claiming that perception is direct.

It looks like I've had a comment or two removed. Unsure - but I can't make sense of this exchange as it sits lol.

I think laughing is still good.

I see no good reason to think anything unnatural exists. This is not an expression of certainty - I'm open to having this theory challenged and defeated. But the mere possibility it is false is not a defeater. — Relativist

I'm not really seeing how this runs against anything else said though - anything discovered would ne 'natural'. If there is some 'non-physical' reality of some kind, or some sort of film between us and reality that necessarily negates the objectivity of what we see, that is also natural.
So, your point is taken, but I think claiming its on 'naturalistic' grounds is a bit sus.

Our knowledge of the world is in our heads, and that is (in a sense) made up - even though it corresponds to reality. — Relativist

These sorts of thoughts are why I've given the above response. Curious...

You'll need to explain why those policies (which are standard US immigration polices, enforced most harshly by Obama) are 'xenophobic'.

It seems to me that would be an unavailable argument. But I would be fine hearing why I'm wrong. I suggest that copping out in the way you have is essentially ignoring the question. Which isn't about Trump. It's about how you get to 'xenophobic' with any given data (i.e speech, acts, policies etc..).

You're more than welcome to the cop out. I am not trying to goad you, but letting this slide on the grounds of 'we're talking past each other' is not tenable.

All three statements here are essentially non sequiturs to one another.

The fourth, addended, seems to make less sense than the others.

True, but I think you need something more than but-for reasoning to establish such a thesis. — Leontiskos

I don't think so myself.

I feel as if you're trying to hold back the tide with a sand castle. The water creeps in at every point, and therefore so many different questions pop up: — Leontiskos

There are no questions popping up for one who understands the position. The answer to all of them:
It makes me morally comfortable. However, your first bullet point is, I think, absurd. I said I would use explicitly rationality to try to get people to act in certain ways, rather htan moral reasoning. I am quite sure I fail constantly, lol.

Part of the crux is that every reflective person cares about the way that other people act, given that we are social beings who live in social arrangements. So I don't think a move like, "I just don't care what other people do" holds water (whether or not you have been claiming that per se). Now take a second premise: coercion is generally inappropriate (or immoral, if you like). With those two premises in hand, obviously we would like to be able to use rational persuasion in the moral sphere, because it would allow us to influence the actions of others without coercing them.

I don't know if you disagree with much of that? — Leontiskos

Yeah pretty much all of it. Inappropriate doesn't say 'wrong' to me.

So do you mean that Donald Trump is just saying/doing that anti-immigrant stuff to placate voters and grasp at power? He's certainly after both of those things, but he has been complaining about Chinese people and Latin Americans for years, i just don't buy into the perception that he doesn't believe his own xenophobia and/or racism. — ProtagoranSocratist

I would need to see something you think its 'xenophobic' rather than enforcing reasonable immigration laws (no comments (yet) on enforcement tactics). You say 'hes been complaining about'. I don't quite know what you're talking about yet, so I'll wait for examples.

Been in the lounge lately? I am not being all that serious, because I'm not bothered by the lean, but there are several heavy posters who are obviously and somewhat aggressively left:

Yourself
Mikie
180
Punnsh
Jamal
ssu
jorndoe
Relativist
Wayfarer

among many others. Again, no particular issue with it. Most 'clubs' as such have a lean. Philosophy is quite left-leaning in general.
I'm on the left myself, as a box-ticking claim. Quite firmly, actually. But we do not get, for instance, the type of robust, detail-laden responses to some of the left-wing wittering about Trump (and I'm not the one to give it, so don't come at me lol. All i could do it post links). Just commenting that there's clearly a left lean to this club too :)

And even so, conservatives can make their points and arguments in here anyway, there's nothing removed because of that. But if people think hate speech or similar is just a matter of politics, then that's maybe the fault of that person and not a forum that aims to reach for a higher level of discourse than the usual online climate. — Christoffer

This is an unfortunate example that I am glad Jamal seems to have pushed back on.

Hate Speech is amorphous, and largely spurious. We can talk about what speech you find offensive, but using a label "hate speech" is a cudgel and nothing more. But on the Left, its a darling to shut down conversation. As we've seen with Kirk.

Not really. Again, my comments seem to run on from yours in a way that doesn't quite alter them.

I think the biggest argument for antirealism is the actual facts of eyes, ears, noses and mouths (and skin, I guess). I do, however, think its possible I've not come across a name for the position I actually think its reasonable, because its not idealism as antirealism might suggest.
I suggest antirealism about perception is roughly, unavoidable, but that antirealism as a metaphysical comment seems... tenuous as best, and seemingly ridiculous at worst. Maybe that clears up where I'm not understanding the issues in the previous comments.

I beg to differ. The position that "conscious activity cannot be reduced to neural correlates" is a strong claim- it implies impossibility. My position is that there's no basis to claim it's impossible ("not impossible" is a modest claim) — Relativist

That's definitely fair, and fwiw, where I sit.

But I feel exactly the same level of passion as Wayf does about avoiding people who claim its either sorted, or all-but-sorted. We actually simply have no clue yet, and may never.

I have my doubts.

We all know, at some level, what existence is. — ucarr

We don't. — AmadeusD

What narrative are you after?

I don't think Trump gives a flying fuck about stopping the drug trade.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Everyone knows that, why he is doing it though is another question. — Sir2u

Jesus Christ.

The level of omniscience people in the Lounge have, specifically about Trump makes me laugh a little less haughtily at TDS.

I don't think this forum is very left leaning — Christoffer

Oh, its definitely left leaning.

Interestingly, this is how I've been taught consciousness operates:

Conscious
Preconscious (might become conscious
Subconscious (cannot become conscious).

That would be a neat trick for a God to play on themselves.

This seems like a lot (and, I do not mean this disparagingly. I'd not have seen this until this ninth page) of back-and-forward to simply say

"Wayf doesn't accept that conscious activity can be reduced to neural correlates"

Nothing profound or wrong going on there. Maybe the gripe is with people who seem to think materialism is provable. That seems to me, demonstrably not the case (and perhaps, demonstrably not possible). But that doesn't actually make it untrue. Its awkward.

But I don't see anyone being unnecessarily defensive about it. Seems a run-of-the mill Phil of Mind disagreement.

We don't. And all responses have tried to make this clear to you - it seems you are entirely resistant to critique.

Blind obedience to authoritarian others who will vilify you strictly due to your lack of obedient conformity to their authoritarian ego’s whims and mindsets is always unethical — javra

Hmm interesting characterisation. I'm unsure I would go as far as unethical, but there definitely seems to be something "wrong" with, for example, the political dichotomy in the US. Something truly aberrant in the thinking that leads to adherence to either party on "party lines" rather than on issues.
I guess one problem with this (although, I imagine you're answer is simply "yeah, that's right" lol) is that there's also non-authorities that lead to this same thing. I'm always, in these contexts, taken back to Mill:

"Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression; for though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.

Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own"

On Liberty

Fear of rejection seems a more motivating issue than fear of imprisonment.

But unknown unknowns do. The catch is that we don't, and can't, know what they are. We only know that there are such things because we have encountered some of them before. — Ludwig V

Yes, I understand that obstacle. I suppose my problem with thinking this has any effect, whatsoever, on these conceptual analyses is that it is wholly fact-specific and empirical. We may never, ever, in our entire existence come across some substance which exists 60,000 light years away and further. That is, on it's face, and unknowable unknown. If the idea is that for antirealism to hold, everything knowable must be in concept, in hand, then I see only two realistic responses:

1. That's nonsense, and obviously so; or
2. Is what's actually being said is something more like "you can't claim something is unknowable conceptually" which seems wrong in it's own way but I can see the argument.

My big problem with any issue with "unknowns" is that they are simply unknown. We can't comment on them, no matter what system we ascribe to. I'm happy to presume there are plenty of things humans will never (and, physically/practically/empirically) can never know. I'm not seeing hte issue. If i've missed it (i presume I have) please help lol.

This didn't help. LOL

This is because but-for causation casts a wide net. We would not want to conclude that knives are evil from the claim, "But for the knife, he would not have murdered." Nevertheless, what I think your argument does demonstrate is that thoughts constitute an important causal aspect of acts. — Leontiskos

The seem to constitute the origin of acts. As I laid out, plenty of horrid acts are not motivated by something bad. But some decent acts are. We can't quite make that work unless the thought it was made the act wrong by virtue of its intention. I don't know how strongly I want to argue this, but that seems the case to me.

1) why is it good when you convince someone to agree with you — Leontiskos

It makes me feel good (emotivism). Again, hard to explain that - but I think this answers the question you're asking. The 'why' is kind of a private, for-me thing to figure out and that's the semantic system I alluded to earlier.

2) why would you try to get other people to assent to your reasoning if moral issues are not susceptible to rational assent? — Leontiskos

To feel better.

If you don't think moral positions are susceptible to rational inquiry, then I don't understand why you would try to rationally persuade another person to adopt your own moral position. — Leontiskos

This is what I was getting at earlier - I don't. I try to get them to understand my reasoning. They might still morally disagree, but accept that, perhaps their act is likely to land them in prison, and so resile. That would be a result for me. Sometimes its fun to try to put the moral argument ot people, but its make me personally uncomfortable as I don't feel I have the right. These discussions are where I get most of my 'talk' out in the moral realm. It should also be clear that I only ever try to get people to either act or not act. I don't care much what their moral position is. I just either want A to happen, or A to not happen. I want them to do that. Not accept why I'm uncomfortable as their reason to do so (well, sometimes that's the case - my wife often does or doesn't do things for my comfort and vice verse but we share morality in that way so sort of moot).

That's a weird one - I don't see a tension between accepting that metaphysical discussion and lets call it 'moral' discussion can come to 'truths' and science giving us truth 'about' such and such.

I would simply say these non-empirical 'truths' are not concrete, empirical truths (as would be suggested by the two categories diverging at 'science'). Its not possibly to scientifically determine that I am thinking X. But you can be fairly certain of it in the right circumstances by conceptual analysis.

In the strictest sense of the term, "knowledge" is true, adequately justified belief ("adequate" = sufficient to not be merely accidentally true). — Relativist

This is very much problematic and has been up in the air for a while now. partially because there is no 'strictest sense' of the word knowledge which could be applied consistently.

I agree with essentially everything here, but I would put a wedge somewhere to put some distance between reliability and the scientific method - not because its rwong, but because its carried out, interpreted and put out by humans. Humans aren't very good at doing things properly.

Fair response all round, thank you.

I'm not sure what you meant by "output" systems. — Janus

How we convey scientific information. This could be how technical writing works, how semantics work in relation to experiments and their results, or it could mean how we teach different levels of student (tropey: in your last year of high school it is common to be told "we've taught you wrong for years for practical reasons. Now you're going to learn the real stuff". All have pitfalls, obstacles to accuracy etc.. etc.. etc..

I don't think the fallibility of science is as great as the fallibility (in the sense of being subject to illusion) of scriptural authority, mystical experience and the rest.. — Janus

I agree here, but I think plenty of philosophical thinking about non-scientific matters can produce robust beliefs. "X is good" can be extremely well justified philosophically. The break-down is going to be roughly in the same place as with science: human perception. On observational matters, I can't even get my abstract argument off the ground :sweat:

that science is not a better foundation from which to speculate metaphysically than imagination and the other things I mentioned — Janus

This is a bit of a goal-post move imo. I'm unsure that science is the best way to formulate beliefs about non-empirical matters. I'm unsure how it would have a leg up. It tends not to wade into those waters.

LOL.

From what I've seen the main argument in the last two pages has been that Banno thinks if there are things we don't currently know, then Antirealism can't hold.

Well... *sigh*. That is.. not reasonable.

There are plenty of things we may never come into contact with. That doesn't make them unknowable. Unknown and unknowable are simply not the same.

Now, I presume I've missed something major. But I don't see it anywhere. Someone want to help me out there?

What? I have literally no clue what you're talking about. I'll try to just clarify what I was saying in hopes that's made-sense-of.

What I am pointing out is that the bolded in that quote relies explicitly on the metaphysical/philosophical theories underlying the scientific method, reportage standards (like peer-review and all the problems that go with it including replication issues) and empirical observation-as-infallible thinking. Again, prima facie, its patently correct that measuring the rainfall and explaining clouds on that basis is a better-justified method for forming beliefs about the clouds than inferring that there's an angry man pissing from the sky.

I am simply saying this is not without shaky foundations. We do not start with observation. We start with ourselves and can only carry out observations we're going to later take as gospel (excuse the religious language) on the basis that we believe our perceptual, recall and output systems are, at least practically speaking, not fallible in any major ways. These are things science cannot give us an answer to. Wayf seems to be much more intently, and explicitly exploring that problem.

This doesn't seem to even be outside the realm of scientific: our perceptual system is not direct observation, and neither are our experiments because we are not the data. We interpret it. Our science tells us this. Oh, but that's recursive... so... yeah. We're kind of stuck conceptually and "do our best". Hence, prima facie, correct.

An interesting thing to note is that when I argue for Indirect Realism, i am given arguments about how science can't prove our perception is indirect if we are IRists(this comes in response to the next claim i am about to make..).
But that is exactly what science tells us about our perceptual system - so either my above notions are correct and IR can hold despite this failure of science to answer a fundamental issue, or we can trust the science anyway and accept Indirect realism on that basis.
Not the only options, but in criticisms laid on me for the IR position, this comes up. Bit of a stalemate.

close, but what i'm trying to say is not quite as dogmatic. There very well may be evil -- there are certainly things that are horrible or very bad. It doesn't take much effort to find these things, especially in human activity and behavior. Ideas themselves hardly fit the bill for being the absolute worst, because clearly people say and think a lot of things just as an emotional reaction, and emotional reactions are too pure for such heavy-handed blame and moralization implied when calling something "evil" in my opinion. — ProtagoranSocratist

Right, okay, that makes more sense, thanks.

I personally find the "if but for" type of reasoning helpful here. "If but for the belief that negroes are inferior to whites, the defendant would not have carried out X, resulting in the wrongful death of a"

I think this applies to almost all actions that could be considered evil. The problem, as I see it, is that some wont fit

Action 1 = ostensibly evil (appearance of a hate crime, for instance)
Motivation 1 = ostensibly non-evil: true self defence, in an awkward circumstance
NOT EVIL
Action 2 = ostensibly evil (appearance of a hate crime, for instance)
Motivation 1 = ostensibly evil (actual hate crime, by admission)
EVIL
Action 3 = ostensibly evil (illegally refusing service to a Black person)
Motivation 3 = ostensibly non-evil (the Black person in question was ornery, unruly, couth and threatening but in some nuanced way not obvious on the face of it)
NOT EVIL
Action 4 = ostensibly non-evil (refusing service to an apparently obtuse/unruly/threatening Black person)
Motivation 4 = ostensibly evil (by admission: hates Blacks and so refused service at hte first possible chance of justifying it).
EVIL

The wrong-maker appears to be the thoughts. However:

I personally choose not to describe things as evil, because it's very emotive, and it's a common concept used by very dishonest (or maybe just stupid/delusional) people. — ProtagoranSocratist

Absolutely. I think its essentially empty, because it can only mean whatever the person using it describes when asked. We have difference descriptions, i'd say (all of us, not you and I). Not because I thikn people are dumb for using it. I do think dumb people use it wrongly, as you say, though.

i prefer "extremely dishonest" and "xenophobic" because these are more descriptive. Some people call Caligula (one of the early Roman emperors) and John Wane Gacy evil, but I prefer "sadistic" and "psychopathic" because those are also more descriptive of these individuals. — ProtagoranSocratist

Hmmm. I appreciate that this may be the best we can do as people - but those descriptions certainly wont hit home for many. I, for one, while agreeing with dishonest, can't see it in the "extreme" category. Neither do I see him as xenophobic - so, there's the descriptive thing I mentioned above.

Okay, and is there a particular ethical system you hold to in this? Am I correct in recalling that you are an Emotivist? — Leontiskos

More-or-less correct, yes. I imagine there's edges to it, as there are with almost all claims to a moral system, that don't quite fit into a description of same, but yeah overall. Hence this being a system of figuring out what I (or what to, depending on whether action is required) feel about X, Y or Z.

So you will try to enforce your moral positions, as long as you are not violating civil rights? Wouldn't enforcing your moral positions involve applying your moral positions to other people? — Leontiskos

No, not at all. If people resist my attempts to 'enforce' my moral take *on that specific thing that I have deemed action is required in response to* then that's fine, and I can't say they're 'wrong'. Just that they are counter to what I think is best. I don't think my wanting to take the action I feel is 'right' goes against accepting that it is subjective and i can't justify getting anyone else to agree with me (although, when they do, it's good. That might be harder to explain). My reasoning is what I am trying to get other people to assent to in those situations. If they do not, my moral position becomes irrelevant. UNless there's a "The Sky is yellow" type of thing going on, my reasoning is unlikely to move anyone expressing a moral belief. Which is fine. But I suggest those "sky is yellow" cases are covered by rights violations.

It's been awhile since I read it, but C. S. Lewis' argument against moral relativism in Mere Christianity is quite good. He points up the way that people who claim not to impose any morality on others are very often doing just that. — Leontiskos

I cannot imagine this mattering to our discussion. Imposition is quite, explicitly different to carrying on ones life as they see morally fit. Charlie Kirk would be an example of someone imposing their moral beliefs on others (and I still see no problem with that, personally.. Which is part and parcel of my not imposing my beliefs on others). That i personally would want to see X happen or not happen, and carry on my life under those beliefs doesn't seem to me to run into any obstacles insofar as claiming I don't impose on others.

Maybe there just needs to be a concession/caveat that carrying on ones life will implicitly, "accidentally" impose ones morals on those around them. I can accept that. But i active attempt not to do this, where ever there is no clear legal rights violation. Even some situations where there is, I don't feel that simply believing A or B is a better response gives me any truck in trying to get other people to do so.

huh, that's really quite interesting and i bookmarked the website...who knew that "bad" was derived exclusively from a work used to insult homosexuals and less-masculine men?! It's not surprising, but to me the word is more abstract and less loaded than that... — ProtagoranSocratist

There are several possibly origins of the term. Thiis is one of three that seem to ahve serious thought behind them. The other two make far, far more sense:

Old English baedan = "to defile" roughly
Proto-Germanic bada = "difficulty, trouble/damage" roughly.

The first seems to be the original of the suggestion Leon's given. I would probably hold off on concluding one or the other.

I'm discussing the justified beliefs we can derive about the actual world. Beliefs derived from science have a good justification, whereas beliefs derived from metaphysical speculation seem (to me) unjustified, or only weakly justified. We see lots of philosophical theories tossed around, but I'm not seeing much of a defense of them- other than it being possibly true. — Relativist

The bolded appears to rely on the italicised. That appears quite problematic to me, and likely what Wayfarer is getting at, i think. But you are patently correct, prima facie.

because the alternative (philosophical speculation untethered to empirical data) cannot produce justified beliefs. — Relativist

Is this also true of mathematics?

You generalize and find fault with groups of people but defend the actions of the German Gestapo and that is worrisome. — Athena

I don't think this is anything but disingenuous and inflammatory.

I note you do not engage any criticism of your position, consistently.

I genuinely cannot quite understand what you're trying to say here. I don't mean that to be disparaging - it's probably me.

It seems you're saying there is nothing that can be called evil. Given that actions are guided by motivations, it seems wrong in law and in concept to call an act evil which does not carry a malicious intention. I can't really see how we could reject that the ideas/thoughts/motivations are evil but maintain that the acts are. Partially because of some of hte other stuff i said, that it looks like I'll be going on for Leon just now..

So would you say that some things are not merely misguided but truly evil — Leontiskos

For me, personally, I find "evil" pretty empty. In terms of how personally arrange my moral judgments, yes. But I don't think this means much at all. It's just hte convenient semantic way I work out how I feel about things (or more properly, whether I should feel that/some way or not). An action which is aesthetically/prima facie disgustingly malicious and inhumane, let's say, whicih accurate reflects the actor's intention and ..i don't know.. world view? Could be considered evil to me. That's a practical notion, though, so I think I may not be saying what you're asking for unfortunately lol.

On that view true philosophical arguments for moral positions are impossible, and when the philosophical intelligentsia hold to such a view unthinking prejudice and taboo is inevitable, especially among the common people. — Leontiskos

To some degree, i think this. I don't see any possible coherent basis for moral thinking which isn't entirely relative. The best call I've heard from anyone is mass agreement. But we know that mass agreement is essentially culture-bound. Carlo Alvaro wrote an absolutely horrible paper outlining the basic premises of current moral realism and its.... as if a first year student was tasked with defending an illogical position. But that's just my take. I think the Law does well-enough when it comes to moral regulation. Its often wrong, and it can't please everyone, but its better than everyone doing what they think is right, imo.

many people nevertheless wish for their moral position to "win out," and this leads to all sorts of behavior that is different from rational argument. It leads to the question, "How do I get what I want without relying upon rational argumentation?" — Leontiskos

Yes, definitely. I think this is one of the unsolvable problems of modern, pluralistic society. I, at least, remain humble in my moral positions and don't pretend that they need apply to anyone else. I will try to enforce mine where i am not obviously violating rights (which are a legal institution) but otherwise I don't feel 'right' trying to convince people to my point of view (although, there is the obvious caveat that if it has to do with others violating rights, I'm likely to say something. Boot licking? Not imo).

You may be right about the disconnect between those arguments.