a fact about the world, say, electrolysis, — ucarr
Unfortunately, this
seems to have ignored the vast majority of what I've said, and run right into the same confusion i teased apart earlier (agreement/disagreement notwithstanding).
Electrolysis is a method for achieving the aim of (usually) electroplating metals. The resulting object would be a fact about the world (or, just to give related examples " X is currently electrolysing Y". A description of the process would be "science about science" where the
fact that the process does what it does would be a "science fact". So, you can tease this into:
Electrolysis can destroy follicles achieving an aesthetic hairlessness - A fact
about science. In this case, the science of aesthetic electrolysis. It can be gleaned from the basic observation of watching hte process happen.
However, "electrolysis(in this context) is the process of destroying hair follicles by running a charge through a tiny wire under the skin (and all the rest)... " is science fact. It's a description of a scientific process not apprehendable by bare observation. It requires the
scientific method to deduce. THe former does not(though, you can argue that both are simply the same thing at different levels - I think we know what we're talking about. If not, Okay - we have more work to do between us
:P )
We are allowed to segregate facts about the world into different categories, are we not? — ucarr
Sure. My point is to say that some facts in science are 'theoretical' not instantiated anywhere in-and-of themselves. The speed of light would be one. Whereas, "light takes x time from Sun to Earth" is fact, borne from the scientific method, that stands alone, instantiated "perfectly" in an aspect of the world.
the discovery, when made, lies outside of science? — ucarr
I think this is a
slight misstatement, but overall, yes, I'd agree. The hair curler is not an object of science, as eg. But how it works, is (well, assuming that's a relatively settled description lol... I don't know it).
How can this be a non sequitur to a discussion when it responds to a topic you introduced into the discussion? — ucarr
Not so. What you brought up was the "meaningless"ness of the Tony Awards, without the performances they are given. This seems both incoherent (they are interdependent - teh awards are not given for no performance) and a non sequitur, because I made no comment at all abouthe
meaningfulness of something. "The Tony Awards" still means "The Tony Awards" if no performances have been considered. They just will not be awarded to anyone. And so you can (hopefully) now see, that you brought in something I did not intend to be spoken about. My intention was to point out that The Tony Awards
do not consist in the performances in any respect. They simple are not given sans performances. "meaningful"ness isn't relevant, as best I can tell. It's confusing meaning with meaningful.
How is it you're not confusing relevance with identity? Give me an argument that shows how an award for an acting performance doesn't relate to the acting performance.How can one thing be an award, i.e., recognition, for another thing it doesn't relate to? — ucarr
You are not responding to what I've said. Obviously the award
relates to the performance for which it is given. My saying "I am a legal executive"
relates to my legal training. They are not, in any way, overlapping elements of the world. A baseball cap is
related to the manufacture process, but they are not at all the same thing. I think its possible you are confusing identity and relevance - yet reversing the onus of clarity. It certainly feels that way in your posts. For hte bolded above, I think I'll need to you pedantically explain how you got to that question. I dont assent to it, because it doesn't relate to what I've said, on my terms. I cannot answer, because it appears irrelevant and asks me to defend something I did not say.
Art has no right/wrong value. Art has no moral content — ucarr
No. This is not correct(not quite relevant here), nor the right extrapolation of what i've said. What I've said relates to the fact that you cannot, as an artist or otherwise, call a piece of art "right or wrong". You can
only indicate whether, by your subjective lights, its "good or bad". This distinction does not remove moral content. It removes
the ability to judge art morally. They are very separate things.
You can, as a scientist or otherwise, call a scientific proposition "right or wrong" (i suppose this is getting to t vs T, so maybe if so we should shut it down there for another time to avoid getting weedy). You cannot call it "good or bad". Where that happens, people are using art criticism to impugn scientific validity (think Charles Murray. His actual robustness isn't relevant. the Bell Curve was judged like an exegesis). And then where people proclaim art is "bad art" they are trying to use scientific judgment schemes such as "correct" or "accurate" which is not apt.
So, with this clarity, I see that what i wrote means precisely what I had intended it to
:)
Things are ⇒
⇒
facts, or truth. — ucarr
I'm unsure I agree to this. Some things are feelings. Some things are ranges. Some things are variations. Some things are multiply realized. There are pieces of art which contain scientific facts as a basis for their aesthetic quality. But only on
analysis would this become obvious, and you'd assess that basis with scientific rigour, but hte piece of art overall with a critic's scheme. Truth isn't relevant to the overall picture, but it may be that the truth of the included science fact is relevant to the aesthetic of the wider piece. This changes nought here, just quite an interesting little conceptual russian doll.
How sentient beings respond to truth introduces morals. — ucarr
I outright reject this, unless what you're getting at is that somehow we can inherently tell shit from shinola. I don't think that's the case, and I think morals mainly come from reacting to events and feelings that follow them. Sometimes they are assented to on a social basis, rather than an analysis of any kind - but mostly, truth isn't relevant to morality Imo unless you're after an objective morality, which I reject.
I'm unsure of the meaning of "cross-culturalism" in this context. — ucarr
Science, the method, transcends culture. No, it is not a 'Western' idea, it is not 'chauvanistic' to think careful observation and measurement is how we come to robust conclusions about hte world. It works wherever it is carried out, and in whatever context.
The social sciences do not respond this way to the world. Carrying out an analysis of, let's say, gender divisions, will require different methodologies among the Objibwe, in Mali, in Dublin, in Tehran etc.. etc... You can't carry the same assumptions around with you to get accurate data. But you can with 'science'. Publishing though - ooof. The same compartmentalisation and disagreements occur there.
It's not the case simplicity of theory is a strategy for achieving the best outcomes? — ucarr
Of course. You're, again, conflating two quite different inferences. The
outcomes don't matter. The method for getting there does. But carrying out hte method correctly means "so be it" as regards the outcome. You seem to be confusing relevance and identity *wink wink*.
I don't think the outcomes of cancer research are matters of indifference to the researchers. — ucarr
as researchers they, at least, should be. You cannot aim at an outcome. You do the work. THe outcome is as it is. Researchers are human though, so obviously they're going to care. This is conflation, again.
Are the plays of Shakespeare culture bound? — ucarr
100% they are culture bound - but I'm unsure I get what you're asking, because this seems silly and you're not. They are based in 16th century Europe. Written in Middle English and refer to humour, politics (geo as well as local), social interactions and institutions of the time. They are completely culture-bound. That other cultures
enjoy Shakespeare is a different fact with different interpretations. It could simply be the force of colonialism has hoodwinked other cultures into giving a toss. Who knows. A different conversation. (I suppose what one might want to say here, is that those plays are culture-bound but the
themes are not. But then, they will exist in some cultures and not others, so still culture-bound but if a different way).
The culture-bound, policy-driving forces of Mein Kampf aren't a problem? — ucarr
You're confusing a political (practical) problem with an accounting problem. My descriptions of those two modes of (lets just say) are not problematic. Mein Kampf, ironically, instantiates perfectly what I mean by the distinction - the Bell Curve vs Mein Kampf.
Pseudo-intellectualism is looking like the most probably explanation of this person's writing. — I like sushi
That seems a bit much to me. I think confusing similar concepts is enough to explain. ucarr appears very thoughtful to me, and wanting to engage - I tend to see a lack of wanting to engage with pseudo-intellectualism (couple of other threads active rn are dead-on examples). I tend favour incompetence instead of maliciousness or deceptiveness to explain these things
:P Perhaps I'm a bit sanguine as to this.