But my argument was precisely against your assertion that beliefs and propositions, "are not falsified the same way," so it doesn't help to point back to the assertion I was arguing against — Leontiskos
Clearly, but my responses remain the same. That you think the are
the same thing as far as this goes, is bizarre and unsupportable to me
prima facie. It is non-intelligible.
But the case from my argument cannot be "falsified" without knowledge of the state of affairs, namely without knowledge that the video is a deepfake. — Leontiskos
Knowledge held by a third party. So, the subject isn't involved in that knowledge-having. I, personally, could give you evidence that such and such a belief is false (i.e you do not have anything which supports it in hand) and not comment on the state of affairs.
I could also provide evidence of hte kind you note (source of hte deepfake, lets say) without getting anywhere near the grounds for your belief.
I have not shied from this being quite weird, but I bite this bullet. Maybe you don't, and that's the issue. If something crucial has been missed by me, I would assume it was something around this. That the subject has had this evidence given to falsify the state of affairs. And that's fine, it's not likely they would continue to believe the falsified state of affairs. This does not entail that they had a false belief (to me). They had a true belief, in a false state of affairs (reiterating the bold above)
If the actuality is undetermined then the truth or falsity of the belief will also be undetermined — Janus
This feels as if it is the reverse of what's being asked. If you falsify the state of affairs, but hte person remains steadfast in a belief due to
reasonable standards of evidence then the belief is 'true' and the state of affairs false. That said, this could be only possible in the other direction (i.e falsifying a belief does not entail that the content of the belief is false (this one is clearly true)).
Is that the confusion? If it isn't, I have to just walk away from a conversation which confuses a state of affairs with a belief in it (or, amalgamates them). It isn't something i buy at all. Nothing personal in that. It's just coming across completely stupid to me to claim that reasoning for falsifying a belief
in a state of affairs is the
same as reasoning falsifying the state
itself.
If either of you believe you could run an argument that would bring those two together (rather than premising the argument with that assumption) then we can maybe get further.