And this is the kind of attitude that gets trumpism elected. Ser. — baker

It is EXACTLY 180proof's attitude that resulted in the first T election.

I see, clearly, from outside the US, this happening again. Biden has been such an absolute disaster in so many ways that It's really, REALLY hard to believe that he, or another Dem, could be re-elected. It's obviously in the realm of genuinely possibility, and almost rises to likelihood - but given that:

Biden:
Approve: 37.9%
Disapprove: 55.4%
78% of D approve.

vs

Trump:
Approve: 42.2%
Disapprove: 53.1%
85% of R approve.

https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/favorability/donald-trump/

It's hard to understand an attitude that writes off a reelection, given the absolute paucity of candidates with anything coming close to acumen or persuasive media presence. Seems like wishful thinking on the part of someone who can't understand T's election at all.

We were able to see just how many people (the vast overwhelming majority of people) are willing to throw away their basic rights simply because they are told to. We also saw how they will defend their choice to abandon their basic rights with the weakest, flimsiest bullshit, and then go on to indiscriminately impose the same upon everyone else.

It is pathetic that these sheep continue to double down on it all, despite the fact Coronavirus-2020-hindsight has proven lockdown and vaccine policy to be an absolute disaster. It is a case of too much pride and zero dignity. — Merkwurdichliebe

I can't help but laugh at the lack of self-awareness here. The exact same attitude present in those who went gung-ho and demonized those resistant to public health protocol is present in this dismissive, inhumane reading of the other side. You also can't (No, you can't) be sure that those public health protocols didn't ensure a far-less intense negative outcome from the pandemic than without.

That said, I think your screed DOES apply to those who are, since let's say last August, still making the claims made two years ago, and still expecting people to behave in what are (regardless of the previous ssituation) definitely absurd and pointless ways now.

wreak of coordinated corruption more and more as time passes. — Merkwurdichliebe

maybe this is true if you've been predisposed from the jump to leap to this conclusion. In actual fact, all it reeks of in hindsight is more-than-initially-assumed incompetence. Which is, let's face it, the norm. There is no such thing as a competent government, and least of all when it comes to public health. We don't need to invoke any intent to get the results we got.

Do you understand that "materialist" is not a distinct category from "philosopher"? — wonderer1

I dont understand the problem.

A plumber can have opinions about other plumbers that don't comport with those plumber's attitudes.

A materialist philosopher can have opinions/views on philosophers in general. Am i missing something here? I mean, analytic/continental philosophers are at loggerheads often in this way..

I am not saying that you should be convinced that you shouldn’t be doing X because I think you shouldn’t be doing X: I am saying that I am going to try and stop you. First, I will try to intellectually and rationally convince you otherwise. — Bob Ross

Such a good way of setting this out - and I think what i would reference here is the ethical considerations around vegetarianism.
You get quotes from folk like Parfit and Singer to the effect that it is inarguable that we, objectively, should all be vegetarian.

That's merely a strong preference - but these people spent/spend decades trying to convince people of their point of view. They believe it's 'true'. Yet, fail entirely to actually establish that that is the case. Many take that further and become violent because of this conviction. I've been physically attacked (not in any way that put me in real danger) for refusing a (really bad) argument for vegetarianism in public. So, this taste can absolutely be imposed on others - its just that those imposing it don't consider it a taste. They are wrong.

it is clear that the belief is what is enveloped in the proposition, which, in turn, envelopes the moral judgment — Bob Ross

:ok:

. Attempts to bypass that with talk of the T-sentence rule or directions of fit only obscure the issue because the T-sentence rule accommodates both realists and anti realists. — frank

:cheer:

that was me for a long time. Sometime in 2021 I got into her then-new album Chemtrails Over The Country Club. Represented something wholly different from what I’d heard from her before and the subsequent two albums matched that, have really enjoyed all three. The track above is the opener from her most recent album

's that "some sense" that needs to be explained. In my own thesis, I use abstract "Information" instead of personal "Psyche", partly in order to avoid the absurdity of atomic awareness. :smile: — Gnomon

I believe i have seen Chalmers reference (perhaps in that 2022 Yale talk?) IIT as a framework for how you could have different 'levels' of consciousness essentially mirroring the functionality of the 'being'. Vague, but a hint at a direction.

... is not my statement. — 180 Proof

Ok, so your statement amounted to claiming that the issue of how consciousness arises is a hard problem is semantic nonsense. Your use of parentheses makes a direct quote both unwieldy, and open to the type of sidestep above by explaining the parenthesized element.

So, that's what it amounts to - on paper. If you meant something else, so be it. But given what was actually put across in your post - that absolutely entails philosophers of mind who treat that as a serious metaphysical problem as either misguided or confused. Can you, perhaps, not be obtuse, but address that question?

So many gems in this thread. I'll be coming back rather often I think!



I'm not crying; you are.

Yes. I had this going with a friend from a Facebook group but it fizzled out... on their end. LOL. I'm very interested in this type of thing

Is there any reason — TiredThinker

World war perhap

Of course I grant that if the book sets out plans for a coup d'état then it would be illicit. I wasn't reading anything that extreme into your comments — Leontiskos

AH, i f'd up on this one. I did fully misread your direction.

You are correct.

I don't think so. Not after Holmes' dissent in Abrams won the day. — Leontiskos

My legal training is in the British/New Zealand system - but that case doesn’t deal with definitions of imminent lawless action in the context of a peace time society, as best my memory and cursory skim of it's text tells me. Noting i may be over my head, This is genuinely fun for me as a legal professional.

What i think I would consider operative here, is Holmes treatment of 'intent' and 'imminent'.

It is plain that 1A doesn't protect incitement to violence, as to imminent lawless action.

I don't think Holmes dissent outlines any kind of carte blanche - It merely outlines the limits of the charges (well, the third charge (relevantly, anyhow)). There is a huge amount of daylight between the facts of this case, and the charges laid that I can't see it as relevant, really, to cases of actual incitement. I don't think Holmes did either. Indeed, it seems to me, passages such as this:

"Of course, I am speaking only of expressions of opinion and exhortations, which were all that were uttered here.." - Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Abrams v US at 631

make it known that his Honour understands that there are limits, that those limits rest upon interpretations of the above (imminence and intent) and that in this case the limits weren't reached. I would agree. But i can't see this making any issues for the example - Let's say the book was understood to convincingly address itself to less-intelligent yard-workers who have a chip on their shoulder and a history of mobilizing for untoward causes - and the intent is to incite, essentially, a slow-drip but country-wide attack on ballerinas, physically. Particularly in light of Jan 6, I cannot see the judiciary having anything but contempt for similar speech. My opinions withheld there :P

The book is protected by the first amendment. It is not legally tricky. — Leontiskos

That may be legally tricky actually depending on the modes of enforcement your book called for.

That, my friend, is corroboration

Those who hold the type of emotivism you are describing do not generally also hold that moral statements are binding. Taste does not bind, and is not the stuff of argument. To say that the moralist is expressing a taste is to make an excuse to ignore them. — Leontiskos

Thank you for this. That is, happily, not what I was saying. I, in fact, whether wrong or right, indicated my understanding was exactly that what you say is true, abs therefore statements of the kind “one ought not kick puppies” is a statement of taste only and so is emotiovism I’m action.

I am not seeing either you or Banno making statements that aren’t emotivist. They are just statements that express your opinion as a command. I assumed I was wrong at every turn and sought anything at all which would traverse the taste-truth gap but I saw nought to that effect. That is why I cannot even conceive of the positions you two have taken. They are just fingers in ears

Edit; I am typing on a phone on a bus. Forgive the inevitable typing errors

I think I’ve found the “cool kids”

Israel's special and exclusive history of grievance gives it special and exclusive license to behave as it likes. — hypericin

....whatt????

↪AmadeusD - Sorry, I've read enough of your exchange with Banno. I don't think your position makes a lick of sense, and I think you are only engaging in hand-waving when met with the contradictions in your thought. It looks to be an exercise in evasion. If that's how you treat contradictions, then there's really no reason for me to try to lead you to another one. So yeah, "Keep working on it," I suppose. — Leontiskos

Given that i take both of you to have avoided the problem you face entirely (including in this comment - which is condescending and bizarre in many ways), suffice to say this is no skin off my nose.

I hope to remain in good faith going forward :) Take care mate.

But I am not the one saying anything; you are. That's the whole point. You are the one enforcing a prohibition on the torture of babies. — Leontiskos

Hmmm. this comes across entirely a non sequitur in the face of what Bob Ross has outlined.

He is, from what i can make out, making an emotionalist argument against moral realism. So far, it's not been addressed very well. Moral statements are instances of a subject expressing their taste as a universal rule. What makes this not true? In the case of the babies vs the ice cream, the only move that needs to be made is moving from your taste, that babies ought not be tortured, to a statement that no one should do it. Nothing of substance changes there, just a delivery method apt for a wider audience than merely one's self.

If you've got the inverse of this as an overview of hte exchange, I think you may be misreading.

The T-sentence is exactly about truth. It does not address belief. — Banno

It is a statement of belief. If you don't have something of more substance than to just repeat the statement, in the face of this objection, we have no further ground to cover. As i've noted multiple times.

It wouldn’t. — Bob Ross

:ok:

Now we have been through this discussion, set out where this goes astray. — Banno

If this is for me, I have. Multiple times, and have now decided to refrain from repeating myself.

It's an opinion, and nothing more. I reject that it's a fact, or state of affairs and you've not adequately defending either stance. So, again, I think we're done. I'm trying my absolute best to end this exchange respectfully. But I am getting the distinct feeling you're under the impression you have an empirically verifiable position - something to which this claim is not amenable, in my mind.

So there we go. Tip my hat once more.

↪hypericin Good article. You should consider starting a thread specifically on it. It might be fun. — Banno

@hypericin Agree with the above..
Not the whole way through it; but very interesting and I imagine a fairly colourful area to be discussed at -large.

Maybe your answer is not as clear as you think.

But keep working on it. — Banno

Or... so strange, i know... maybe... You're not supporting your point in such a great way? That's my conclusion. So, as i say. I think we're probably done :)

It's been a very interesting and entertaining exchange. I don't require you to change your mind, and i've not seen anything that would push me in that direction either so... I simply tip my hat to another on the path.

Same I think could be claimed for most everything. — javra

We;re getting somewhere... :P

That is, you act on the basis that "Folk ought not keep slaves" is true. — Banno

No, I don't. And i have explicitly covered why not multiple times, so i'm refrain from repeating my very much coherent answer to this charge again.

it doesn't matter which propositional attitude you frame it with; the T-sentence sits on its own. — Banno

It sits on it's own, while completely failing to rise to the status of truth. Because its self-referential and tautological. So, yeah. I reject your position and your reasoning on the basis that is not good lol. It's just a way of sophistically remaining convinced your opinions represent truths.

So your reply doesn't help you avoid ascribing truth values to moral statements. — Banno

yes it does. A repeat of the first response in this comment.

I think we may be done. But i pointed that out a long time ago.

objective reality of what is good by being most proximate to it, — javra

No. I did cover this. It is explicitly not entailed by acting on what is thought to be the best option. My own fallibility precludes me from concluding that my best intuitions correlate with 'truth'. I don't even think my deductive reasoning could be truth-apt in that sense. If you reduce the claim to it being true, that it is the best option among those in front of me, that's the case. But that doesn't touch the truth of the statement itself.

And if you think folk ought not be allowed to keep slaves, then can you explain how it does not follow that you think "folk ought not be allowed to keep slaves" is true? — Banno

I just did. I don't mean this to be rude - but it appears you might just plum not have read my response to this same question in the post you're quoting:

"It think its the best option given te information I have, when input to the values i hold."

That doesn't require me to believe it's true. It requires me to believe it's the best option.

So you ar enot confident in your conviction that folk ought not keep slaves. Ok. — Banno

Bit underhanded. I'm confident that its the best option, and so my conviction to it is sound. I just don't claim it's true, in any sense that isn't entirely predicated on my disposition in light of the data available to me personally (i.e that which i'm aware of, rather than could (lets say easily) become aware of).

But moreover, if you think folk ought not keep slaves, how could you not be committed to concluding that "One ought not keep slaves" is true? — Banno

I'll take this one: You can act without believing your act to comport with truth. Im unsure why that's difficult. I outline to Banno that a direct answer is that to act in accordance with what i think is the best judgement of the information/data available to me doesnt entail that judgement's truth, or that i must necessarily take it to be true. It only need be the best among the options I see ahead of me, for any given decision to act.

Additionally, I could believe a course of action is 'right', despite not relying on a truth to inform the action.

I personally think Israel is probably wrong in it's current actions. But that's amenable to immediate update if new data is available to me. If i believed they were wrong, i would necesasrily have to also believe, with certainty, some data which informed that belief. I don't. I don't even think that's available to me. So, I hold belief (such as a belief is a strongly-held, lively impression of a judgement) that Israel is likely wrong (disproportionate, at least) in it's current actions.
That doesn't require me to think it's true. It is just the best explanation I can rely on to inform any kind of moral decision. Luckily, i'm not involved lol.

Parenting has thousands of these situations - you have to believe what you're doing is 'right', without ever having to believe the data is true on which you've based the decision to do that thing.

In fact, animals also exhibit moral behavior. Isn't the most natural explanation that it is instinctive? — hypericin

Can you give an example that comports with what humans envisage morality to be viz. contemplated outcomes resulting in a judgement informing the decision to act with regard to other sentient beings?

I necessarily see instinct as separate to this. Though, determinism might trump me, if true.

But moreover, if you think folk ought not keep slaves, how could you not be committed to concluding that "One ought not keep slaves" is true? — Banno

No. It think its the best option given te information I have, when input to the values i hold.

I would need to be confident in my own ideas to such a degree (one i can't fathom) that my beliefs entail teh truth of them. I just don't make that move. And i can't really see how anyone could, and be entirely comfortable with it (that is, without some supervening source of ethics like revelation. Then you just believe what you're told and it's air tight).

My suspicion, from what you have written, is that you are only now becoming aware of the implications of this.

You're welcome. — Banno

No. It was my entire point. One which i took extreme pains to try to very carefully map out over your responses. Apparently, i failed. But i thank you not :snicker: This appears to some thing necessarily ignored by your responses to mine. So, I don't think either of us could have done a great job here :lol:

Also we can't really say that these ideas are necessarily unique to Christianity. — Echarmion

Don't most aspects of Western civilization predate Christianity in some near-Eastern traditions anyway?

Yes. In order to know that there is a difference between two things, one must have access to both in order to compare them — creativesoul

That's up... out of the bottle. Not down. — creativesoul

Gotcha; thank you :pray:

So, where does my deduction, given above, go astray? — Banno

That it doesn't establish it's truth. It establishes any given S's belief in it's truth. I note a very subtle, but incredibly important difference between "..therefore X is true" and "..Therefore S believes X is true".

Seems to me that such positions are inherently flawed in that they are untenable and/or self-defeating. — creativesoul

Sorry, just to be clear, you're indicating a Kantian "We know we don't see things as they are" position is untenable (I suppose this entails the inverse also is lol)?

And yet, one ought not keep slaves. It is therefore true that "One ought not keep slaves". — Banno

I reject your position. You haven't defended it adequately, and so i remain unconvinced. Im not asking you to make any psychological moves - But i am pointing out that your descriptions and expositions are very much wanting to my mind. If you're to reject my 'theorizing', so be it. That doesn't actual say anything about the truth of your position. I may agree with that position, but that doesn't make it true.

And hence, if truth is corresponding to states of affairs, then that one ought not keep slaves is a state of affairs. — Banno

Trying my best to remain credulous, no. But that is given my above position, i suppose. It just plum has nothing to support it as a conclusion running from your opinion about slavery.

I can't make sense of how you are distinguishing morals and ethics here. Ethics is the field of study that has as its subject, morals. What you have said is analogous to "thjis seems to suppose that botany is the correct basis for considering plants". Well, yes. — Banno

Ethics is the study and discussion of the benchmarks that inform morals( to my understanding, and from what i can tell, the general population including philosophers). They seem adequately different to be potentially decoupled, or conjoined by context.

Further, no, it isn't anything like that. Ethics is how to get your framework in place. Morals is how to apply that framework to your behaviour (in answering what i take to be your query here viz. what do i actually mean by these terms).

They must work it out for themselves. Their believe does not determine the truth of the proposal. — Banno

Apply this to what you've proposed, at any point in these collected exchanges. I smell a lot of fish.
Your belief that moral truths exist doesn't entail that they actually do. It entails that you believe them. Which is the totality of my point, highlighted in a specific instance. And as best i can tell, your beliefs rest upon your beliefs. And at this stage, I am getting the distinct impression your position jhust boils down to "Well, I believe these moral statements are true. You can reject that, and that's fine, but they're still true". I just don't buy that line.

Notice that you do understand that ethical truths "ground" moral truths, something you seem to deny, above. — Banno

If this has been the impression, I have misspoken. I am acutely aware that ethical positions inform moral decisions. I am just under the impression that barely anyway has a clue what their ethical positions are and operate from (what i read to be) similar brute statements are you're employing to support teh abstract position that moral truth exists. So, as mentioned many, many times, i accept that for you some ethical statements may be true because you cannot conceive otherwise. I'm just not in that position. Seems a fairly simple divergence that we should be able to just recognized and see for what it is.

In addition, there is a confusion here about "subjective" statements, such that you seem to suppose that hey cannot be true. That would be very odd. But then, the subjective/objective distinction is fraught with conceptual puzzles. — Banno

This I'm certainly picking up. Subjective statements can be 'true'. Like Jones is in Barcelona :snicker:

I'm just pointing out that there are moral truths. — Banno

*claiming. You've yet to say anything that indicates to me that statement is anything but a over-wrought subjective claim. But i have no issue with this, because that's my ground position anyway LOL

Because if one is going to hold others to a standard then they either have to admit that a standard exists or else accept the fact that they are performatively self-contradicting themselves. This is quite bas — Leontiskos

Where did i indicate my standard applied to others?

Strictly speaking, everything ever thought, believed, and/or uttered comes through a subject, so in that sense, nothing is strictly objective — creativesoul

It has always appeared to me that 'objective' refers to the 'best of the lot' type of thinking rather than a strict entailment of necessity. That said, I am yet to find a convincing passage/chapter/paper that convinces me the gap between 'ding en sich' and my impression of it is such that It can't be a 1:1 match. That we can't know this seems inherent in sensibility - but I can't quite grasp that the gap is wide enough to matter (until imagination comes in, anyway - which may be the place in which the problem actually lies).