First "I felt like it" seems a perfectly sensible reason to do some things in some cases and it definitely isn't the same as saying "I don't know." — Dan

Perhaps, but the point is that "I felt like it", as the post hoc answer, indicates a lack of understanding of what the choice meant to the person at the time it was made. Therefore the person did not know what it meant to make the choice, and did not understand the choice.

Sorry Dan, I just can't follow what you're writing now. The following passage is just unintelligible to me.

I am certainly capable of imagining a free, rational agent which (at least for a length of time) has no desires. Such an agent could nevertheless understand the choices available to it, even if it doesn't care to make them one way or another. The understanding is, as I have mentioned above, a precondition to the application of one's rationality. It does not require the person to know or understand what they want, only to know and understand what the choice is and what it means to make that choice. — Dan

And the following in no way explains how a praiseworthy action could also be judged as wrong without two distinct valuation systems. I mean, you appear to be saying that the system of valuation which is used to judge the act as praiseworthy could be judged as wrong itself, but that still doesn't mean two distinct systems is not implied.

I am using one system for evaluating actions and their morality. Praising an action is, itself, an action, so it is evaluated based on its consequences (or its likely consequences). Punishing an action is the same. The initial action is evaluated for whether it is right or wrong based on its consequences and praising that action is evaluated separately based on its consequences. Punishing that action would also be evaluated based on its consequences. There's one system of evaluting the morality of actions. It's just that there is more than one action to evaluate here (the initial action, and the action of praising that action). — Dan

You're just asserting that violence is justified under most circumstances. — Clearbury

That's bullshit strawman and you know it. I just demonstrated why your claim that violence is rarely justified, and hardly ever justified is false. I never implied anything close to what you say I said, "that violence is justified under most circumstances".

I can't argue with someone like you. — Clearbury

I've noticed. Anytime anyone uses evidence and logic, to demonstrate how unsound your arguments are, you say "I can't argue with someone like you". That's obvious, you really can't, because you'll lose the battle. Run along now, Clearbury, and don't trip on the tail between your legs.

If you think you're often morally permitted to use violence against others then that's fine - I simply disagree and so, I'd wager, does virtually everyone of moral sensibility. — Clearbury

But you are not paying respect to the reality (truth) of the situation. The truth is that there is significant multitude of individuals in the world who do not have "moral sensibility", by your standards. The truth of this is evidenced by what you say about the numerous people in this thread "whose views seem to me to be indefensible", and so you chose to "ignore" them. Each one of this significant multitude of people lacking in moral sensibility, will interact with a multitude of other individuals (who may or may not have moral sensibility), on a daily basis, and each one may arbitrarily choose to use violence against these other individuals on an ongoing basis.

In these cases, where those lacking in moral sensibility, arbitrarily chose to use violence, the use of violence to protect one's rights is justified. As indicated by the statistics which may be revealed in this thread, a significant percentage of the general population are lacking in moral sensibility by your judgement. And each one of these may interact with a huge number of other people.

Therefore your claim that it is almost always wrong to use violence, and that the use of violence is only justifiable in very rare cases is completely and utterly false.

But to get to anarchy, it is sufficient that we are not allowed to decide to protect someone's rights and then bill that person and extract payment with menaces. — Clearbury

You did not answer my question, so I will ask you again. When a person provides a service to another, does that person not have a right to get paid for that service?

I am getting impatient with this constant strawman you keep setting up. If I, without asking you and without you commissioning me to do so, decide to make it my business to protect your rights, can I send you a bill for doing so and use violence against you if you decide not to pay? The answer to that question is obvious to virtually everyone: no. That's all my case requires. — Clearbury

Ha, ha, your logic (illogic) is laughable Clearbury. Again, you assume that "virtually everyone" will answer this question in the same way, "no", just like you assume "virtually everyone" with "moral sensibility" will not choose not to use violence. However, you neglect the reality and truth that there is significant multitude of individuals who do not agree with you. Are you familiar with John Locke's political philosophy, and the idea of "the social contract"?

Now, we have a large number of people who are not "morally sensible" by your standards, posing a threat of violence to you, and we have another group of people protecting your rights to be not violently treated by those with no moral sensibility. But these people are threatening to punish you if you do not pay for their service. And you believe that it is your right not to pay them because you did not personally commission them.

It looks to me, Clearbury, like you are in a situation where there is no alternative but to use violence to protect your rights. Violence is necessary. Your rights are being violated from the right and from the left, and you have no choice but to use violence to protect your own rights, because you refuse to pay those who have offered this service to you, and you need to protect your rights from their impending punishment, due to you exercising your right not to pay.

And here you are, saying things like ... it is unjust to use violence except in "rare cases", and the other, and it is "almost always wrong" to use violence. It's time for you to show your steel, demonstrate your temper, get out there and use some violence to protect your own rights, so we can all see what a hypocrite you are when you are freely choosing to use violence, while preaching that the use of violence is almost always unjustifiable.

That's a strawman version of my view. — Clearbury

I gave two quotes from you, concerning the conclusion I am talking about.. One, that it is unjust to use violence except in "rare cases", and the other, that it is "almost always wrong" to use violence. This is not a straw man, those are your words. And, I demonstrated that to be an unsound conclusion.

The SECOND claim - that in conjunction with the first gets one to anarchy - is that though a person is entitled to use violence to protect another's rights, they are not entitled to use violence to extract payment for doing so (not from the person whose rights one has decided to protect, anyway). — Clearbury

You don't think that a person has a right to get paid for their work? Is that what this claim is about? If you work for me, and I refuse to pay you, am I not violating your rights by not paying you?

It is clear to reason that it is unjust for individuals to use violence or the threat of violence against others apart from in rare cases where this is needed to protect a person's rights. And it is equally clear to reason that if a person decides to protect another person's rights, they are not entitled then to bill that person for having done so and extract payment with menaces. From those claims - claims that seem intuitively clear to the reason of most and that it would be intuitively highly costly to reject - anarchy follows. — Clearbury

As I pointed out to you, and you have still not replied, no logic allows you to move from the premise that it is only acceptable to use violence to protect rights, to the following conclusion, that it is almost always wrong to use violence, or that these are "rare cases".

This would require another premise, that it is not often that rights need to be protected. However, it is very obvious that such a premise would be false. Therefore the following conclusion of yours is not only invalid, because you have not provided the required premise, but if you did provide the required premise it would be false and the conclusion would be unsound..

It is almost always wrong to use violence or the threat of it against another person. — Clearbury

The fact is, that the world is full of irrational people, who do not respect the principle that violence is only acceptable to protect one's rights. Therefore you need to consider the possibility that using violence is commonly the correct thing to do.

And, you know that the world is full of irrational people, you've met a number of them in this thread. However, you would prefer to ignore those irrational people, and hope that they go away.

No, I am ignoring those whose views seem to me to be indefensible. — Clearbury

It's becoming glaringly obvious that you have a deeply flawed approach. Ignore all the irrational people in the world who commonly use violence irrationally, hoping that they will go away. Then keep on insisting that it is almost always wrong to use violence.

I didn't say and have applied their rationality to it. I said such that they understood it such that they could apply their rationality to it. — Dan

This is where the problem is then. This phrase "such that they could apply their rationality to it" implies that applying rationality to it is done post hoc. This means that "understood" here means absolutely nothing. There is no requirement of an act of applying rationality, or even any sort of thinking whatsoever, prior to the choice, only a requirement that the person can 'rationalize' the choice after the fact. Such rationalizing generally consists of fictional excuses, specious, and fabricated with the intent of creating the illusion that the choice was rational, and understood, when it really was not.

How can you believe that "such that they could apply their rationality to it" implies any sort of understanding? What you are describing is the potential to be understood, the possibility of applying rationality. But the potential to be understood is equally the potential to be misunderstood (as in the case of rationalizing), and so it is not any type of understanding at all.

That being said, I would also say that "I felt like it" is itself a reason, even if it is perhaps not a good one. — Dan

It is very possible to give reasons which demonstrate a lack of understanding. This is often the case with rationalizing, but rationalizing may also give reasons which are intentionally misleading. So, even though "I felt like it" may be classified as the reason for the choice, it is a reason which expresses that the person does not understand the choice. In this way it is similar to "I don't know", which is a more explicit way of saying that the choice is not understood.

The person who does not understand one's own choice, when asked why the choice was made, may answer "I don't know". If pressed further, for a better answer they might say "I felt like it". If pressed even further, one might rationalize, and fabricate fictious reasons. All of these types of "reasons for the choice" indicate that the person did not understand the choice when it was made.

As for the latter, no, understanding one's choices is not about what one wants, it is about knowing the nature of the choice being made and what it means to make that choice. It seems entirely plausible that an entity with no desires could nevertheless understand its choices. — Dan

How can you possibly believe this? The choice of a human being concerns what one wants, therefore understanding a choice necessarily involves considering its relations within that context. This is the context of the person's intentions. Understanding a choice ("knowing the nature of the choice being made and what it means to make that choice") is to properly position the choice within the context of the person's intentions.

Do you even think about what your words mean before writing them? I cannot believe that you could actually believe some of this stuff you are writing now. Are you the same "Dan" as whom I was talking to before you left on break? It seems like you've gone off the rails now. How do you think that something which selects (say a machine or something), without any sort of desires or intentions which guide its selections toward an end, could possibly "understand" its selections? To "understand" a choice is to place it as the means to an end. The words "meaning", and "means", which are used to describe understanding a choice, all imply reference to intention. You Dan, are using "understand" in some random ad hoc way, which varies with each time you use it, rendering the word completely void of meaning in your overall text.

I think I have understood your criticism, it was just misplaced. There aren't "two different systems". What is praiseworthy and what is right are entirely different from a consequentialist perspective because what is praiseworthy is a judgment of what should be praised to achieve good consequences, and what is right is a moral judgement. There is one system, it's just that praiseworthy is not really a moral judgment on a consequentialist account in the same way that it might be on some other account of morality. — Dan

Why do you refuse to acknowledge the fact that you have expressed two very different systems of valuation? You even name those two systems as 1)"praiseworthy" and 2) "moral judgment". The former is a system for producing a judgement as to whether a choice ought to be praised for its likelihood of producing good consequences, and the latter is a system for producing a judgement as to whether a choice is morally correct.

Can you not accept the fact that these are two distinct systems for evaluating the same type of choice? And, since the same choice may be high on one scale, and low on the other scale, the two valuation systems are incompatible. Why is this so difficult for you to acknowledge?

You have indeed been accusing me of employing two incompatible systems from the beginning, but this has been due to misunderstanding on your part. — Dan

Your use of "understanding" doesn't seem to allow for the possibility of misunderstanding. Any sort of rationalizing after the fact demonstrates "understanding", so where could "misunderstanding" enter the picture? Accusing me of misunderstanding is hypocrisy on your part.

And, your continued denial of the fact that you employ two distinct systems for evaluating a choice, when you even name the two, describe them as different, and show that the resulting judgements of the same act are contrary to each other, is just impossible to understand. This is not a misunderstanding on my part, because I profess no understanding at all of such denial. Your actions appear as completely irrational therefore not at all possible to understand, therefore misunderstanding, which is a belief of understanding that is false, is excluded.

Again, just one scale. Being "praiseworthy" isn't a seperate moral scale, it is a judgment of whether we should praise something, which relates to whether praising it would be right, rather than whether the initial action would be right (again, on a consequentialist account of morality). — Dan

You are missing the point. Of course "praiseworthy" is not a separate "moral scale", the other scale is already called "moral" judgement. This would create ambiguity right in the title, you'd have two "moral" scales which are blatantly contradictory. What I am saying is that you have two distinct scales for evaluating the same act, one is the "moral" scale, and the other is the "praiseworthy" scale. According to the principles of these two distinct scales, the same choice which is of high value (favourable) on the one scale is of low value (unfavourable) on the other scale. Do you see how that contradiction, favourable/unfavourable, is implied?

This is the same issue as your moral scale based in consequentialism, and your praiseworthy scale based in the ability to understand and make one's own choices. You use two distinct scales which produce contradictory judgements.

Would you prefer I say "what it is to make that choice"? — Dan

This is nonsense to me, and that's why I avoided it. No one knows what it is to make a choice, in general, that's why there is an ongoing debate between free willies and determinists. And we have even less of an idea of what it is to make a particular choice. So using this phrase would be completely pointless, it would simply mean that no one understands any of one's own choices, or any choices in general.

No, what I am suggesting is that a person understands their choice if they understand the nature of that choice and what it is to make that choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it. This is very much to do with what happens before the choice, not after it. — Dan

OK, so how can a person be said to understand the nature of a choice, and have applied their rationality to it, when the choice is contrary to what they desire, and made for no reason (whim or caprice), like the example of buying the shirt?

What matters is that the understand what choice they are making and what it means to make that choice so that they can respond to reasons regarding that choice. If they then decide to make their choice on a whim then that's fine. — Dan

This would be contradictory though. To make a choice on a whim explicitly means that the person cannot respond to reasons regarding that choice. That's what "whim" means. the choice cannot be accounted for. So if the person understands the choice one is making, prior to making the choice, so as to be able to respond with reasons regarding the choice, it is impossible, by reason of contradiction, that the person could then make the choice on a whim.

What matters is that they know the choice that is being made and what it means to make that choice. — Dan

It's very clear to me, that the person in the shirt example does not know "what it means to make that choice". Why is this not clear to you? The person wants to only buy a shirt if it's 100% cotton, yet chooses to buy a shirt of unknown fabric. Obviously the person does not understand that buying a shirt of unknown fabric means that there is a very significant probability that it will not be the desired 100% cotton.

Again, this is analogous to my lottery example. If a person has the policy of not buying lottery tickets because they know that the odds of winning are terrible, yet they are persuaded to buy into a specific lottery because the prize is much bigger than others, clearly they do not know what that choice to buy the ticket means. A lottery with a larger prize does not indicate that the odds of winning are better. In fact the reverse is usually the case. And since 'bad odds' is the reason for abstaining from buying in the first place, the person clearly does not know what that choice, (to buy into a lottery with the worst odds) means.

First, I would say that when someone makes a choice on a "whim" they are likely responding to the reason of "I felt like it", but this is neither here nor there really. Second, and much more importantly, this is not wrong because what someone wants has nothing to do with whether their choice is understood. Understanding a choice isn't about what reasons one has for making it. — Dan

This entire paragraph is absolutely senseless. How can you say the response "I felt like it" even resembles a type of understanding of one's choice? Further, and much more importantly how can you even think that what someone wants can be divorced from any understanding of one's choice? Isn't it the case, that a choice, any choice, and every choice, is in some very significant way, related to what the person wants?

Understanding a choice is about what reasons one has for making it. In fact, that's what understanding a choice is, knowing the reasons for the choice. If the reasons are not consistent with the choice, then the choice is incoherent and it is misunderstood. That is why understanding a choice is very much "about what reasons one has for making it". And if there are no reasons (whim or caprice), there can be no understanding nor misunderstanding. I really cannot even imagine what you must think "understand" means. Your use is totally foreign to me, appearing like you just sort of make up random shit as you go.

It does make sense. It may have been the best choice in terms of expected value from the perspective of the person and the information they had at the time, but turned out to be the wrong choice due to information that they didn't have access to. — Dan

You do not appear to have understood my criticism. You can argue that "it does make sense", but this requires two distinct values systems for judging the same decisions. The first is "the perspective of the person...at the time". The second system for judging the same decision, includes "information that they didn't have access to".

The two are very clearly incompatible, in a very strong sense, contradictory. The first explicitly does not include information which the second explicitly does include. So the two systems for valuing the judgement are based in contradictory principles. This allows you to say that according to the one system of valuation it is "the best" decision, and from the other system of evaluation it is a "wrong" decision.

As I said, you've been demonstrating this problem of employing two incompatible systems for evaluating decisions, from the beginning of the thread. One system employs a consequentialist evaluation scheme, while the other values freedom of choice, and bases judgement on your stated principle "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". As I've told you a number of times now, these two systems of valuation are incompatible. Consequently, you distort the meaning of "one's own choices" twisting and turning it in all sorts of fantastic ways, in your attempt to establish compatibility. Of course no amount of twisting and turning will allow you to put that square peg into the round hole. You are attempting to make contradictory principles (the square thing and the round thing) compatible.

None of this has anything to do with incompatible moral values or scales — Dan

Of course it does! You clearly expressed two distinct (and contradictory) scales for judging the person's choice. By the one scale (the perspective of the person making the choice), the choice is judged as "the best". By the other scale (a perspective which takes into account information which the person does not have), the choice is judged as "wrong". Clearly the two judgements contradict each other, the best decision cannot be the wrong decision. And the obvious reason for this contradiction is that the two scales, upon which the judgements are based, employ contrary principles.

I would also say they are made for a reason, but whether or not they are made for a reason makes very little difference between understanding one's choices (as I have said many times) is not about what reasons one has for making those choices. — Dan

What could you possibly mean by "understanding one's choices" in this context? If whether or not a choice was made for a reason makes very little difference to "understanding one's choice", what does "understanding" mean. It cannot mean "what it means to make the choice", as you say, because "the reasons for the choice" is implied by "what it means to make the choice". "Meaning" implies what is meant, and this implies intention. How could one know the intention behind the choice without knowing the reasons for the choice?

I mean, we are devolving into nuh-uh territory here. I disagree. That isn't what I am talking about when I mention someone "understanding their own choices". — Dan

I know that isn't what your talking about when you mention "understanding their own choices". In your usage "understanding" appears to have no meaning at all. As I explained, when you say "the ability to understand and make one's own choices", "understand" is completely redundant. We could pull it out, and simply proceed with "the ability to make one's own choices" instead, without changing your intended meaning.

However, you do seem inclined to give "understand" some meaning in a retrospective sense. If a person can look back in time, and say "I made that choice", then the person "understands". the choice. This appears to be your usage of "understanding". If a person looks at the choice after the fact, in retrospect, and recognizes oneself to have made the choice, then would say that the person understands the choice. The problem is that this is unrelated to the ability to make a choice. The ability of a person to make a choice is to look to the future and choose accordingly, and the ability of a person to "understand" (by your usage) a choice is to look to the past and recognize that a choice was made.

Is this what you are proposing, two distinct aspects of decision making? One, the ability to make a choice, looking to the future and choosing, and the other the ability to understand a choice, looking to the past and recognizing that a choice was made?

Responding to reasons to make such a choice is very much something that happens before making the choice. Responding to as in being responsive to, being able to make a decision based on reasons. — Dan

I think you really need to clarify this, because it is not consistent with what you've been saying. Making a choice on a whim, or impulse, clearly does not include responding to reasons to make that choice, before making it. Making a choice on whim or impulse is exactly the opposite of this, choosing without considering reasons before making the choice. Yet you say so long as the person can give reasons in retrospect, then the person "understands" the choice. This is why I propose the separation above, between looking forward in time, and looking backward in time, so that there is no ambiguity in our use of "understands".

Further, it making a choice that is contrary to what you want, or especially contrary to what you wanted in the past, does not mean the person didn't understand the choice. — Dan

Clearly this is wrong. If the person wants X, and on a whim chooses not-X, then it is impossible that this choice could be "understood", in any sense of the word, because "whim" implies that the choice was made without reasons. Looking forward in time, prior to the choice, "whim" is given as what inclines the choice, and whim distinctly means without a reason. So the person chooses what is expressly not wanted, without reason. That cannot be understood. And, looking backward in time, after the fact of the choice, any reasons given for choosing what was not wanted would be fictional, made up as rationalizations, because acting on a whim clearly denies that there are reasons for this behaviour. Therefore, from both perspectives of "understand", it is impossible that the person could understand that choice.

Whether a person understands their choice is all about what is going on in their mind. The disagreement here is that you think acting in a way that is counter to one's desire is proof-positive that one did not understand the choice in question. I don't agree. I think people can act counter to what they want while still understanding what they are doing. — Dan

What is at issue here is not "acting in a way which is counter to one's desire". We do that all the time, for good reason, in an understandable way. This on its own, in no way implies that the person did not understand one's choice. Often this is simply a case of changing one's mind. And changing one's mind occurs with reason.

What is at issue is acting in a way which is counter to one's desire, without a reason for that act. This is what is known as acting on a whim, impulse, caprice, emotional urges, being overcome by passion, etc.. There are subconscious forces which incline one to act without considering reasons. We can understand the reality of this type of act through the reality of habits and addictions. We cannot ignore the reality of these causes of action, because they are very commonplace. When these inclinations to act lead to actions which are contrary to what an individual has expressed as one's desire, then it is clear that the actions cannot be understood by the person who chose them. The choice is made without considering reasons, and it is contrary to what has been expressed as what is desired. How do you think that such a choice could be understood?

It would be entirely reasonable to praise someone for making the best decision they could while acknowledging that it turned out to be wrong due to factors they couldn't have known about. — Dan

This makes no sense. If the person made the best choice that they could, you cannot say that the person made the wrong choice, unless you are judging "best" on a different scale from your judgement of "wrong". If "best" and "wrong" are consistent in principle, then it is impossible that the person's best choice is the wrong choice.

That is a problem you've consistently demonstrated since the beginning of the thread. You employ two distinct scales of moral value, and this statement is perfect evidence of that fact. One scale allows you to say the person made "the best decision they could", while the other scale allows you to say this same decision which was "the best" decision in that set of circumstances, was also the wrong decision.

This problem is indicative of the general problem with your approach. You are attempting to reconcile two incompatible moral scales, one which values the freedom of choice of the individual (providing the basis for the judgement of the person's "best choice"), and the other which values the moral principles of consequentialism (providing the basis for the judgement of the "wrong" choice).

As soon as you recognize that these two value scales are incommensurable, and fundamentally incompatible, then you will give up on your attempt to establish compatibility between them. However, as you've indicated, you've already wasted a good part of ten years on this problem, and you also seem completely unwilling to admit that this was wasted time, so you forge onward. Therefore I conclude that you will most likely continue in your futile effort, refusing to admit to yourself, that your time has been wasted, and so you dig yourself deeper and deeper into an endless pit, by wasting more and more time.

No I didn't. I said the actions of agents with free will were not wholly caused by preceding factors but rather by the agent themself and were in principle not predictable. It's absolutely fine for actions to be caused by the person performing those actions making a choice. I would say that is exactly what I think causes them. It's not that I don't think actions have causes, it's that I think the agent is generating new casual chains rather than is just a link in a casual chain that stretches back to the origins of the universe. — Dan

OK, we can work with this premise if you like, that choices cause actions, but then you need to respect the separation between choice and action, as the separation between cause and effect. In the case of cause and effect, the cause necessitates the effect, but occurrence of the effect does not necessarily mean that the associated cause occurred. This is because different things can have the same effect (raising the temperature causes water to boil, as does lowering the pressure, for example).

This implies that the occurrence of human actions does not necessarily mean that a choice was made. Would you rather deal with the type of actions mentioned by me above, acting on a whim, caprice, impulse, emotional urges, being overcome by passion, and even habit, which are contrary to one's expressed desire, as actions which occur without a choice? This way, instead of classing such actions as ones which are not understood, we'd call them actions which are caused by something other than a choice.

Look, if you think the Jews had no moral rights under the Nazis then it follows that the Nazis did nothing wrong in exterminating them. I can't argue with someone who thinks that way. — Clearbury

Clearbury, you are jumping to conclusion without the required premises, therefore your argument is illogical. That's why I've bee telling you that you need to justify your principles. In the argument stated here, you have only one premise, "the Jews had no moral rights under the Nazis". Then from this one premise you jump to the conclusion: therefore "the Nazis did nothing wrong in exterminating them". You need a premise which provides the link between "moral rights" and "wrong" behaviour.

To assume that "wrong" is opposed to "rights" is to confuse different meanings of "right", and this is known as the fallacy of equivocation. So you need to clear up the obvious equivocation implied when you say that if a person thinks that the Jews had no moral rights under the Nazis, then the person thinks that the Nazis did nothing wrong in exterminating them. In reality, the one is just evidence of the other. The exterminations are evidence that a lack of rights is the truth.

Please allow me to guide you in rephrasing your argument so as to escape the obvious fallacy you have committed. You need a second premise. The premise needs to state that the code of rules called "moral rights" dictates exclusively, what is morally right and what is morally wrong, in human actions. Then you might conclude that if a person does not have the moral right to live it is not wrong to kill that person.

Do you understand this requirement? If not, I think you would be just demonstrating yourself to be an irrational fool. So please reformulate your argument, with the premises required to avoid the obvious equivocation which is implied by it, in its current state.

The "intuitions" in question are relevant to survival. If there is a world external to ourself, it would be necessary to have a functionally accurate view of that world. If there is not such an external world, what would explain this false intuition? — Relativist

Whatever it is that kills people would be the explanation here. It doesn't have to be "the world". We call whatever it is, that seems to be not a part of oneself, "the independent world", and we have a conception of what "the world" means, including the intuitions of space and time. If the conception of "the world" is wrong, then it is not the world which kills us but something else. That "a world external to ourselves" kills us would be false. The intuitions are false.

No, it's not. Our sensory perceptions aren't oracles that magically know truths beyond what we could possibly perceive. Further, the error has not prevented science from learning more precise truths- such as a more precise understanding of space and time. — Relativist

What does "more precise truths" mean? Either a proposition is true or it is false, the idea that one truth is more true than another doesn't make any sense.

Bergson’s critique aligns with Kant in suggesting that time is not merely a succession of isolated moments that can be objectively measured, but a continuous and subjective flow that we actively synthesize through consciousness. This synthesis is what lets us experience time as duration, not just as sequential units. It is our awareness of the duration between points in time that is itself time. There is no time outside that awareness. — Wayfarer

This is the issue with Zeno's arrow paradox, which supposedly demonstrates that motion is impossible. The problem was analyzed extensively by Aristotle, as sophistry which needed to be disproven. The analysis, along with other examples, resulted in the conclusion that "becoming" is distinctly incompatible with "being", and this in part leads to the requirement of substance dualism. The other required premise is that they both are real.

Any measurement of time requires a beginning point and an end point. Determination of these points requires the assumption that there is a describable "state-of-being" at such points. The "state-of-being" is describable as how things are, at that point in time, so it is necessarily assumed that no time is passing at that point when there is a state-of-being. Therefore the "point in time" has no temporal existence or reality, it is removed from temporal existence which is existence while time is passing. If we allow that time is actually passing within a point in time, then the "state-of-being" is lost, because change will be occurring within the point in time. Consequently, precision in measurements of time will be forfeited accordingly. But in order that we have any capacity to measure time at all, it is necessary that the "state-of-being" is to some extent real.

This is what Einstein's special relativity does, it allows variance, or vagueness within the point in time, by assuming that simultaneity is relative, consequently any "state-of being" is relative. By accepting this principle we accept that it is impossible to make precise temporal measurements, because there is necessarily variance in the state-of-being at any point in time due to the relativity of simultaneity, making any proposed state-of-being perspective dependent. This means that there is no real, independent state-of-being, consequently no independent "world". The "state-of-being" is still a valid principle, making temporal measurement possible, but it is perspective (frame) dependent. When the different perspective-dependent states-of-being are compared they are reconciled by the assumption that the only real existence is activity (becoming), one motion relative to another with no absolute rest. The activity (becoming) which is occurring gets a different description dependent on the perspective.

There are ways around this problem, but they are all very complex, and conventions tend to follow Ockham's principle. As Aristotle and Plato both demonstrated, reality consists of both becoming and being, This produces the premises required to make substance dualism the logical conclusion. But understanding the nature of time, and why it imposes on us the requirement of dualism, takes more than a casual effort.

I have justified my belief. Perhaps you missed it. Here it is again: if governments determine what rights people have then the Jews had no rights under the Nazis (and thus in exterminating millions of Jews, the Nazis violated no one's rights, certianly not the Jews they exterminated).
The Nazis violated the rights of the millions of Jews they exterminated
Therefore, governments do not determine what rights people have.

That is a case. It is an argument and its conclusion follows from its premises and its premises are obviously true. — Clearbury

I don't follow your argument. Those people had no rights under Nazi rule, that's why they were exterminated. If they had rights they would not have been abused. This seems pretty clear, just like the slaves in the US had no rights. The second premise, that their rights were violated, is from the perspective of a different community, one other than the Nazi community who denied them of rights. This community has a different conception of what rights Jewish people have. Therefore, your argument seems to actually prove the opposite of what you claim. The rights that people have is something determined by the community.

Note, I am talking about moral rights here, not legal ones. — Clearbury

Morality deals with good and bad, "rights" is not the subject of moral philosophy. Rights consist of rules, and although they are usually consistent with ethical rules, they are more properly understood as legal rules. This misconception of "moral rights" could be the root of your confusion.

The issue is much simpler than people think. It is almost always wrong to use violence or the threat of it against another person. No one - no one worth arguing with, anyway - seriously disputes that. Yes, it can be justified under some circumstances - when one is in immediate danger or someone else is - but not otherwise. (There's of course room for a bit of debate over when one can legitimately use violence against another, but not much....every reaonable person is going to agree that the boundaries are pretty tight, even if there's no consensus on precisely where they lie). — Clearbury

I think this is a very faulty principle Clearbury. It is based in what "every reasonable person is going to agree" to. The problem is that there are very many unreasonable people in the world. And, those unreasonable people will not agree "It is almost always wrong to use violence". Being unreasonable, they perceive many instances when violence is called for. Because of this use of violence by unreasonable people, the reasonable people have reason to return that violence with defensive violence. Therefore your claim that "it is almost always wrong to use violence" is proven to be false by the fact that many people are unreasonable. Violence is a fact of life which needs to be reckoned with.

Why would we have these intuitions, if they aren't consistent with reality (i.e. true within the scope of our perceptions). — Relativist

Intuitions are not formed to be consistent with reality. According to evolutionary theory they are shaped by some sort of survival principles.

Why think our abstractions about space and time are false? — Relativist

There is much reason to think that our conceptions of space and time are false, spatial expansion, dark matter, dark energy, quantum weirdness. Anywhere that we run into difficulties understanding what is happening, when applying these abstractions, this is an indication that they are false.

Special relativity demonstrates that our perceptions of space and time aren't universally true, but it also explains how it is true within the context in which our sensory perceptions apply. — Relativist

Well sure, these conceptions are true in the context of our sensory perceptions, that's how we use them, verify them, etc.. But if our sensory perceptions are not providing truth, that's a problem.

I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that. — Relativist

How would you propose that we could do that? How do we verify that our sensory perceptions are giving us truth?

But so entertaining goes far deeper, I believe, than claiming physical reality to be on par to something one hallucinates or else can imagine at will or so forth. As individual first-person points of view we are all bound to the physicality that surrounds, and our very lives are dependent on there being a sufficient degree of conformity to it. — javra

What one hallucinates, and what one imagines at will, are very different concepts, and ought not be classed together in this context. This is because we need to maintain some kind of division between things created by the mind which are not created consciously by will, and things willfully created. This is necessary to allow for the reality of the mind's subconscious activity in creating things like sense perceptions, images etc.. And when we allow that sense perceptions are creations of the mind, this enables us to properly understand things like dreams and hallucinations. But it also exposes the fact that what we know as "physical reality" is just a creation of the mind.

The fact that our lives are jeopardized by this force (I'll call the medium "a force" in this context) which we know as physical reality does not imply that our lives are dependent on it. Those are two different concepts. Our lives are dependent on that which gives us life, whatever it is which throws us into this situation of jeopardy, but the force which jeopardizes us is not necessarily the same as that which we are dependent on.

Because of this, it is incorrect to say "we are all bound to the physicality that surrounds". The reality of free-will indicates that this boundness is not real. It is an illusion which we have created. The illusion has been created (part of it subconsciously through evolution and instinct, and part of it consciously through education and science), because it assists us in understanding and dealing with "the force" in our actions. The important point to understand here is that this force is power, and as much as power is a force which can appear as if it restricts and binds us, it can also be harnessed and used to enhance one's freedom. But in order to use the force in this way, we need to understand it, and to understand it we represent it in the determinist model which produces the illusion that we are bound by it.

Still, a drop is typically understood as that amount of liquid which might remain intact and maybe fall as such from a stick which had been placed into the liquid. — javra

This is incorrect. You are simply defining "drop" as a quantity, for the purpose of your analogy, when "drop" is really not commonly understood as a quantity. My OED has as the first definition "a small round or pear-shaped portion of liquid that hangs or falls or adheres to a surface". Notice that the shape and activity of the thing, as an individual object called "a drop", are the principal features. The quantity is secondary, and is simply stated in the relative term of "small". "Small" does not indicate any specific quantity.

But importantly, if no solipsism then, necessarily, the world can only be brought about by a multitude of minds - and not by a sole mind. — javra

You are not getting the important point. The judgement of "no solipsism" may be only the creation of a mind. So we cannot produce the necessity required for your conclusion. "The world" might still just be the creation of a lonely mind, which likes to have other minds to keep it company. Once we accept that the subconscious part of the mind is engaged in creating (as evidenced in dreams and hallucinations), we cannot claim that just because the other minds are not willfully created by my conscious mind, they are not created by the mind in an absolute sense. The other minds might still be created by the subconscious part. The conclusion of "no solipsism" might be just a tactic (evolutionarily produced or something) which is allowing the mind to better deal with the force.

To be clear, are you then saying that if the so-called "medium" of physicality in total - to include my physical body and its brain - is not something that is an aspect of my own mind it would then need to be something the occurs as an aspect of some other individual mind? — javra

I mentioned that as a possibility. The issue here is that we do not know, and we cannot exclude anything as impossible until we do know, because that could mislead us.

As to the initial question, (I take it that) there is an actuality, or set of actualities, which affects all observers equally irrespective of what the observes believe, perceive, imagine, want, interpret, etc. — javra

This cannot be true, we can almost exclude it as impossible. We know each person to have a distinct perspective, and this necessitates the conclusion that the so-called "set of actualities") does not effect observers equally. The "distinct perspective" necessitates the conclusion of unequal effects. The equality you refer to is a creation of the mind. We create equality to understand each other.

Do you deny there being actualities which occur irrespective of what any one individual sentient being intends, believes, and so forth? — javra

What you call "actualities" is I believe, what I called "force". The problem with your question is that the force is understood as relative to the agent, so it does not make sense to ask about its existence independent of the agent. It is only a force relative to the thing which wants to move. We can only understand it in its relation to us, because that's the only existence which it has to us. It appears to us as "a force" because of our living tendency to act, but without that tendency to act, it may be nothing at all. So what appears as "the force", the independent reality, may actually be nothing, in the purest sense of the word. That's why I say questions about an independent reality are really incoherent.

God, pull up your pants please. We don't need to see that.

I am not sure I can argue with someone who thinks a person has a right if and only if the government of any community of which they are a member says they do. That view is so plainly false to me that I am at a loss to know how to argue with someone who is willing to embrace its implications. — Clearbury

Try demonstrating, or showing with logic, that what you believe is actually true. It's called justifying your belief. If you strongly belief that "a right" is more than just something which a community of human beings bestows upon you, then you ought to be able to provide support for this belief. Otherwise your belief is nothing other than a desire, you believe it because you want it to be true. And if that's the case you need to consider what RogueAI is saying, perhaps you want something which is impossible.

Fair enough. I'll try. First, we all know in our heart of hearts that solipsism is false. Therefore, ours is not the only mind that currently occurs in the world. Given this fact, we then entertain the metaphysical reality/actuality that there can be no world in the absence of minds (in the plural). — javra

What we can conclude from the assumption that solipsism is false, is that there must be something which separates one mind from another, some sort of medium. But we cannot exclude the possibility that the medium is an illusion, or mind-created, as a sort of deficiency in minds' ability for direct communication with one another.

Via one convenient though imperfect analogy: We all know that an ocean is not one single drop of water. Given this fact, we then hold the conviction that there can be no ocean in the absence of individual drops of water from which the ocean is constituted. — javra

This one doesn't make sense to me. What is a "drop of water"? Why can't we say that the ocean is a single drop of water? And to me, "a drop" is an isolated quantity of water, so it makes no sense to talk about a body of water as if it is made of drops. If a number of drops put together makes an amount of water which is more than a drop, so that it cannot be called a drop, the entire amount exists without any drops within it, as a drop of water is an isolated thing. If a number of creeks coming together creates a river, it doesn't make sense to conclude that a river consists of a bunch of creeks.

In a roundabout way, the same can then be upheld for any non-solipsistic idealism: the physical world is mind-independent when it comes to any one individual mind (or any relatively large quantity of minds) - this even thought it is mind-dependent in the sense that no physical world can exist in the complete absence of minds. — javra

Sorry javra, I just cannot understand what you are saying here. This is what I get from it. If there is a complete absence of minds, then there is also the complete absence of a physical world. In that sense there is no mind-independent word. However, if there is so much as one mind (or a multitude of minds), then there must also be a mind-independent.

So how does the existence of a mind (or multitude of minds) necessitate the existence of a mind-independent world? If it is the existence of a mind, (or minds), which necessitates that world, how can it be a mind-independent world?

As one possible summation of this, within any non-solipsistic idealism, there will necessarily be an external world that occurs independently of me and my own mind. — javra

I don't deny that there would be something outside my own mind, what I called the "medium" above. But why conceive of this as "a world", or "a universe", or even "reality", as all these refer to mind dependent things, if you want to think of the medium as mind-independent? But, since I believe in the reality of numerous minds, there is nothing to persuade me that the "medium" is not something inside another mind, therefore not mind-independent at all.

We obviously perceive space and time... — Relativist

I don't think so Relativist. Kant names these as intuitions which are the necessary conditions for the possibility of sensory perception. So from that perspective space and time are prior to perception. Another type of ontology would hold that space and time are logical abstractions, posterior to perceptions. We deduce from our perceptions, the conclusion that there must be something which we conceive of as "space", and something we conceive of as "time". But there is no indication that we actually perceive whatever it is which we call "space", or "time".

Can you give me any reasons to change my mind? — Relativist

Read the op, and what I said in my last post. Only minds provide a spatial-temporal perspective, and without assuming such a perspective, all these supposed mind independent things, the world, the universe, even "reality" itself, are completely unintelligible.

If what is addressed by the term “reality” (I presume physical reality which, in a nutshell, is that actuality (or set of actualities) which affects all minds in equal manners irrespective of what individual minds might believe or else interpret, etc.) will itself be contingent on the occurrence of all minds which simultaneously exist—and, maybe needless to add, if the position of solipsism is … utterly false—then the following will necessarily hold: reality can only be independent of any one individual mind. As it is will be independent of any particular cohort of minds—just as long as this cohort is not taken to be that of “all minds that occur in the cosmos”. — javra

I really can't understand what you are saying here javra. Perhaps you could rephrase it?

Do you really doubt there exists a mind-independent reality? — Relativist

I think the idea of a mind-independent reality is really incoherent. Reality is something which minds create, as pointed out by the op. If you try to imagine the world as existing without any point-of-view, from no perspective at all, it becomes completely unintelligible, so it cannot be imagined. That's because "reality" as we know it, is point-of-view dependent. So the idea of a mind-independent reality really is incoherent.

The state has been conceived as a person for quite some time, for example in Hobbes, but at least as far back as Ancient Rome. — NOS4A2

I would argue that these are faulty political theories. The problem being that anyone can produce a political theory designed for one's own special purposes. That's the approach of the tyrant. As dedicated philosophers, we scrutinize such theories for soundness.

Those in charge are people. And might does not make right. — Clearbury

Still, "people" is different from "a person". The former implies a multitude unified by some principle. The latter is an individual. The question is what unifies some, such that you refer to them as "people", yet others in your discussion are individuals, "a person". Obviously, the unified "people" have far more power than an individual person. You seem to think that there is something wrong with this, but it's just a simple fact of nature, that unified people as an entity, have far more power than distinct individuals as entities. If you want to negate this natural fact, or show it to be wrong, then you have some work to do.

Therefore, what it is just for those in charge to do can be determined by considering what it would be just for individuals to do to one another. — Clearbury

You have not provided the premises required to validly make this conclusion. Look at the difference between the relations, and consequent activities, required between individuals, to produce a unified whole, and the actions required to maintain an already established unified whole. The former involves principles of internal relations, designated as "good", conducive to unity. The latter must include principles to deal with external relations which are destructive to the unity, designated as "bad".

Anything conducive to unity can be understood as an internal relation, good, and anything destructive is external, bad. Under these principles any activities which are bad, are not understood as internal person to person relations, but are understood as external forces destructive to the unity. The destructive forces must be dealt with in ways other than as person to person relations which are conducive to the unity. Therefore they cannot be classed as the same.

It seems to me, like you want to deny the principle of "unity", and put every individual on equal standing. If so, then you cannot us terms like "the state". And if you speak about a special class of "people" who are "in charge", then you have to clearly identify what they are in charge of. So if you say that they are in charge of maintaining some type of unity, then this necessarily gives them special status to determine things which are destructive to that unity, and corresponding special powers to prevent these destructive things.

I take it to be morally self-evident that might does not make right. If I am more powerful than you, that doesn't mean I'm entitled to trample on your rights. I am simply more able to do so, but not more entitled to do so. So if it would be wrong for me to use force against you, then it is also wrong for a person with more power than I have to use force against you. And that now applies to the state and politicians. They have more power than the rest of us, but they are not more entitled to force us to do things than the rest of us. — Clearbury

You seem to be confusing "the state" with "a person". So your example ("If I am more powerful than you, that doesn't mean I'm entitled to trample on your rights. I am simply more able to do so, but not more entitled to do so.") is not relevant. The example compares the power of two persons, but then you go on to talk about the power of "the state". The state is not a person. So if you want to compare the power of the state to the power of a person, and the justifiability of the use of force by each one of these distinct entities, you need to start with a good definition, or conception, of what each one of these is. Otherwise it's a pointless exercise.

I don't know how there can be understanding if there is nothing to understand — Patterner

Understanding, is of meaning, and meaning does not consist of things. This is how we can avoid the infinite regress. If a thing, in this case an object of knowledge, consists of parts in specific relations to each other, and each part is itself a thing, then an infinite regress is implied. But if we allow that understanding is prior to knowing, then the object of knowledge, the fact, can consist solely of meaning without any things, and the infinite regress is avoided.

Entirely likely. But it is, as you just said, s fact that is learned, And if it 'will be integral to an understanding at a later time,' then it is not when learned. It is just a fact. — Patterner

But "the fact" which is learned, is produced, created, by understanding. The fact is a judgement, let's say a judgement that X is true (this penny was minted in 2003). The judgement depends on, is supported by, or is created by, a specialized understanding which is specific to the knowing of that particular "fact'. The understanding may consist of other objects of knowledge, "facts", in relation to each other, but as described above, this is not necessary. And any time that there is a new fact in your mind, this new fact is supported by a new understanding.

That's true. But I don't always learn any amount of any type of understanding underlying anything each time I learn a new fact. I know what metal is. I know what a penny is. I know who Lincoln was. I know about the calendar. Learning that a particular penny in my pocket was minted in 2003 does not give me any new understanding of anything. — Patterner

I think the difficulty here is with your assumption that understanding must be of something. Consider understanding to be the relationships which create the whole from the parts. As such, it is an unobserved part of the whole, which is determined through retrospect and logical analysis. Context is of the essence here, because a so-called "fact" which is learned as a fact at one time, will be at a later time, integral to an understanding.

This is why there is the appearance of infinite regress, each "fact" is composed of smaller facts united by understanding. But those smaller facts must be also composed of even smaller facts, so some would propose fundamental elements, similar to atoms, elements of knowledge.

Now, consider that you can learn about a relationship between two things, yet be completely unfamiliar with the whole, which would put the learned relationship into a larger context. Faulty speculations, and assumptions about the larger context is what leads to a lot of misunderstanding.

What I am saying, is that knowing is what produces closure to the understanding, making a whole "thing" out of the underlying understandings (or misunderstandings). And knowing is fallible because it may consist of misunderstandings. This is where mistake is common, in producing closure, judgement, which creates an object of knowledge, a supposed fact, when there is misunderstanding inherent within that object.

So your example, "that a particular penny in my pocket was minted in 2003" is an object of knowledge, a particular "thing", a supposed fact. However, I assume that it consists of an understanding of the relation between the penny and the numbers printed on it. That's how you learned this fact, by looking at the numbers. But this fact requires an understanding of the relation between the numbers printed, and the actual time of printing. We can call that "the meaning" of the printed numbers. But there is always the possibility of misunderstanding here. Suppose the company doing the minting used the same mold for a number of years, producing coins with the same numbers for numerous years, or their timing for updating molds did not correspond with calendar dates. Then you would have misunderstanding of the meaning of the printed numbers, producing the possibility of a false "fact".

So all your examples, ("I know what metal is. I know what a penny is. I know who Lincoln was. I know about the calendar."), are individual objects of knowledge, which rely on underlying understanding. To facilitate discussion, we often will simply call the underlying understandings "meaning". So those objects of knowledge imply that you understand the meaning of "metal", "penny", Lincoln", "calendar". To look at these understandings is to look inward into existing conceptual structures, objects of knowledge, with the use of logic, to understand "meaning". Though the simple term "meaning" facilitates discussion, "meaning" is actually very difficult to understand. To look outward, is to utilize the internal understanding to create an object, a larger whole, such as your example 'this penny was minted in 2003'.

Some of this probably seems very counter-intuitive, and confusing, because the 'moving outward', creating the larger whole, is actually moving from the more general toward the more specific, or in your example, even the particular coin in your pocket. Therefore the larger whole is actually the more precise, specific individual. But this is based in Aristotelian logic, in which the more general inheres within the more specific. So for example, "human being" inheres with "Socrates", as a defining feature essential to an understanding of "Socrates". And, "animal" inheres within the definition of "human being", as an essential feature, required for an understanding of "human being". And so on. In this way, we can understand context as having the more general inside the more specific. Then the whole, being the object of knowledge is the most specific, and ultimately the individual, the particular.

I took a class on the philosophy of AI not that long ago and it revolved almost entirely on the processes you could use to structure atomic propositions relative to some agent, with desires just represented at a certain sort of atomic belief that needs to be made true (with action being determined by other atomic beliefs about how to make the desire proposition true).

It was interesting, but I couldn't help thinking that this seemed to be structuring the model of intelligence around what is easy to model and not how thought actually works. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's not how thought actually works, because it's far to simplistic. A computer is far faster than a human mind, in doing the things that it does, but those are always simple tasks. Then, since it's so fast at doing simple tasks, we can assign it a whole bunch of simple problems, and when it solves them all very quickly that creates the illusion that it is doing complex problems, when it really is not.

The issue of "understanding" mentioned by Patterner, is the way that parts fit within a whole. That is a complexity. From the Aristotelian perspective, and what you mention, when you remove the part from the context of its whole, you cannot get a complete understanding because you cannot observe the thing's function. The thing's function is what it is doing, so it's an activity, and this is a concept of relations to others. That leaves two ways of looking at the thing, one is to describe the thing, what it is, and the other, what it does. So by Patterner's example, "the bat" names the thing described as the "long, thin, tapering thing". But within the context of the game, it is what one hits the ball with. Meaning can be developed in these two distinct directions.

I don't think it makes sense to say we understand single facts. — Patterner

I don't think it makes sense to say that we know single facts. Knowing requires understanding. So there is always some type of understanding which underlies any instance of knowing.

Your example is context dependent. Look what happens when I change the context. To know the game of baseball requires that you understand that the spherical thing is a baseball, the long thing is the bat, and the mound is the pitcher's mound.

Understanding provides the connections required for knowing. So, your supposed single facts, are really made possible by underlying connections (understanding). There is a relation between the spherical thing, and the name "baseball". Likewise with the names "bat", and "pitcher's mound". These are all instances of understanding, when you understand the meaning of a word. Then each of those words having meaning which goes beyond the simple relation between name and object, given by the context of the game, baseball.

Then Trump implies that there is no need to be bashful about these secret admirations. Bring them out into the open, as he does with his admiration of tyrants. This allows the vicarious pleasure to envelope the individual in the virtual subsumption of fantasy, allowing greatness to penetrate the individual.

Trump is a symptom of the righteous distrust common people have of the political elites and rich people. — Benkei

How ironic, when Trump names the richest man in the world, Leon Musk, as a special secretary to audit government expenses. Hidden within the proposed "distrust for rich people" there is a secret admiration and envy, which defies reason.

Understanding trivial matters is still understanding.

How do we take the step from the doctrine of the mean to a sort of Hegelian higher understanding? — KrisGl

I don't think it's a matter of taking a step from one to the other, rather accepting that both are different ways of looking at the same thing. The path toward higher understanding must be a sort of skepticism, because it must be based in the belief that one's current understanding is somewhat deficient. So the current understanding must be questioned in order to produce the higher understanding. The "higher understanding" is simply a matter of bringing the unknown into the known. That is a matter of producing consistency.

Aristotle showed that if we hold fast to the three principle laws of logic, identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, then sophists such as Zeno can prove absurdities. Simply put, there are aspects of reality which were known as "becoming", activity, change, which appear to defy these fundamental laws. What he determined was that the reality of becoming, motion, activity, and change, requires the reality of possibility. And, he designated possibility, "potential", as a fundamental violation of the law of excluded middle, that which may or may not be.

Hegel's position on this dialectical problem, is that the law of identity is unnecessary. From this perspective, the aspects of reality which defy understanding, do so because they have no identity. Because of this, they have no formal properties, therefore not even the law of non-contradiction can be applied. The opposing properties of being and not-being, roll together in the activity of becoming.

The "higher understanding" which I am alluding to, is simply recognition that these two perspectives are just different ways of looking at the same thing, "the unknown". Aristotle looked at the three fundamental laws and determined that the existence of "the unknown" is due to faults in those laws, specifically the third law, excluded middle. Allowing exceptions to that law produces modal logic, and all sorts of what i would call "designer logic", designed to deal with things which appear to violate the fundamental laws. The Hegelian approach places the deficiency the "fault" you might say, as inherent within the nature of reality. From this perspective, it doesn't matter how we manipulate the laws of logic, there are things which simply have no identity, therefore cannot be understood by us. To bring these aspects of the unknown into the known would require a logic which treats them as something other than things with identity. Either that, or we just accept that these are unknowns which simply cannot be known.

How is it that sometimes this way of risk management thinking is reinterpreted, "aufgehoben" to use Hegel's term? And why is it that every explanation of how we might shift our thinking here seems to be inadequate to explain exactly how it happens? At least no explanation comes to my mind which would lead necessarily to this new way of thinking or maybe being. — KrisGl

This is exactly the problem. There are always aspects of change which evade our understanding. We can never explain "exactly how it happens". The philosopher's desire to know drives one to request that explanation, but it cannot be provided. At first glance, we attribute these issue to being a problem with our language. The language isn't really designed for a complete and full understanding, it has evolved to be efficient for practical purposes. Then when the philosopher tries to apply it in a way to produce an accurate understanding problems appear. So we blame deficiencies in the language. Then we reshape the language (designer logic), and find that similar problems still emerge. Therefore we are faced with the possibility that maybe the problem goes beyond just an issue with language, maybe there is a problem within reality itself, which makes it impossible for us to understand.

Is my understanding increasing? — Patterner

Yes, I would say that learning something new like that is an increase to your understanding.

Reaching that higher level of understanding seems to me to not be a necessary outcome of accepting the fact that neither rashness nor cowardice are worth pursuing. — KrisGl

Well, do not place too high of a standard on "higher level of understanding" then. If you learn something new everyday, then aren't you reaching a higher level of understanding every day?

What would you think of the idea that concern for certitude, for knowing and doing "the right thing" has its rightful place in some realms of acivity/communication, but not in others? — KrisGl

This is another issue covered in Aristotle's Nichomacean Ethics. There are different levels of certitude which are proper to different subjects of study. I agree with this principle, and we can see it clearly in comparing the consequences of failure in different activities. When the consequences of failure are very significant, then a higher level of certainty is required before proceeding, in comparison with when the consequences of failure are less significant. There is an entire field of study called "risk management", which deals with these principles.

And do you think that once a state of higher understanding is achieved it is stable? Or can we backslide? — KrisGl

I don't think backsliding is likely, in general, except when our minds get feeble, like in old age. So, in that sense backsliding is also inevitable. But the significance of it is avoided by passing the responsibility to the next generation, therefore gains are maintained.

However, since absolute certainty is never achieved, the "higher understanding" is never stable. As in my reply above, about learning something new everyday, the horizon, beyond which lies the higher understanding, turns out to be a false boundary, merely the appearance of a boundary, created artificially by the 'hinge propositions' we assign certainty to, as the canvas to our representations. So in some sense the skeptic is always crossing that boundary, but in another sense, the horizon always maintains its appearance in front of us, being simply reformulated, so that we discover (create) new horizons as we travel the journey.

Well, in me you have a kindred spirit, but you will be hard-pressed to find more than a tiny handful of contributors to this forum who endorse anything other than some variant of realism. — Joshs

The internet is a double edged sword. It lets a tiny handful of kindred spirits who are seeking to better their understanding (misunderstanding) of reality, like us, unite and work together toward this end. On the other hand, it lets tiny handfuls of freakish evil-doers unite and be empowered by each other, in their quest to destroy all that humanity has worked so hard to develop.

What pragmatic solution would you propose? — KrisGl

The obvious, I think, is that we proceed in our activities without certitude. We can apply the traditional principle of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. The two extremes are considered vises, and virtue lies somewhere in between. Proceeding into action with too little certitude is rashness, or carelessness. Requiring too much certitude produces a lack of confidence, which is fear or cowardice.

This implies that we always proceed with some degree of misunderstanding. Because we see this within ourselves, through introspection, when we adopt the 'observe myself' position, we avoid the infinite regress of justification by accepting the fact that we proceed without certitude. When certitude is not requested the infinite regress does not appear.

Further, recognizing that we always proceed with some degree of misunderstanding conditions us to be prepared, always, for the appearance of the unknown. That in itself is a higher level of understanding. This could be known as a 'meta' level cautiousness, which is neither cowardice nor rashness. In the Hegelian dialectic of Being, instead of taking the middle path between the two extremes, as Aristotle proposed, the two extremes are rolled together into one, annihilating each other, and producing a new position, which instead of being the mean between the two, is an assimilation of the two, and this is that higher understanding.

How is that relevant?

Isn't that just a matter of law enforcement going after the law breakers? Getting "the state to go after him", seems like nothing other than pointing out to the law, where the law may have been broken. Isn't that basically what Trump did with Clinton?

Is this a term only to be used when "success" is evident - to understand is to understand correctly or there is no understanding at all - or is there such a thing as "wrong understanding"? — KrisGl

Wrong understanding is usually called misunderstanding. It's a tricky concept to grasp, because to the person who has the misunderstanding, it is not distinguishable from understanding. So in any situation where a person believes oneself to understand, it may actually be misunderstanding which the person has, but it is impossible for that person to actually know whether it is misunderstanding, or understanding.

This implies that there is a third person perspective required; an observer is necessary to make the distinction between understanding and misunderstanding. Or, a person may act as the observer oneself, at a later time in retrospection, through introspection. The observer either corroborates the understanding/ misunderstanding, which strengthens the belief that it is understanding, or else provides a distinct understanding, indicating that one, the other, or both, are misunderstanding. Then we might seek another observer, and so on, to the point where we might ask if it is ever possible to know for sure whether an apparent understanding is not really a misunderstanding. I believe, this is commonly known as the infinite regress of justification, and it's an issue looked at by Wittgenstein in his critique of skepticism.

but Trump’s enemies have also used the state to go after him. — NOS4A2

What does that mean?

Because people are capable of acting contrary to their own desires and/or having contrary desires. That really isn't what understanding a choice is about. — Dan

Yes it is what understanding a choice is about!

If a person goes out to the second hand store with the desire to only buy a shirt if it's 100% cotton, then comes home with a shirt of unknown composition, and can give no reason for making that choice which is contrary to the desire, clearly it is impossible that the choice is understood.

No, I am saying that the kind of understanding of a choice I am discussing here isn't about what reasons one has for a specific choice, it is about knowing what the choice is and what it means to make that choice such that one CAN respond to reasons regarding that choice. It is prior to what you are discussing. — Dan

Obviously, the person buying the shirt does not know "what it means to make that choice". They've made a choice to do something contrary to what they wanted to do, which they will likely regret in the future.

Being able to "respond to reasons regarding that choice" is irrelevant because such questioning is after the fact, and the person can make up any sort of fictional rationalization in that response. To "understand a choice" is to know the truth about the choice.

I think we are close to agreeing on a point here. Except that it's not just reasoned choices. The choice to act some way can be praiseworthy or blameworthy regardless of whether one has made a reasoned choice or acted out of habit or on a whim or what have you. Seems to me that you could do away with considering these differently at all and just look at the consequences. — Dan

I think the difference is that the reasoned choice is always either blameworthy or praiseworthy, but the non-reasoned choice does not necessarily fall into one of these two categories. When there are reasons for the choice we can judge the reasons, and we can always make a decision as to whether the choice was correct or incorrect, based on an interpretation of the reasons. (The fact that you and I might disagree as to that judgement is irrelevant, having the reasons simply enables a judgement.)

Without reasons for the choice, the choice may or may not be judgeable. Many instinctual responses are judgeable, many are not. The ones which are not, are generally not judgeable because the context by which a judgement could be made is not evident. The judgement of good or bad, correct or incorrect, is relative to the context of the act, the circumstances. When reasons for the act are available, the context is explicit. When there are no reason available, the context must be inferred. The problem is that there is two distinct types of context which one could consider. One is the physical conditions of the choice, the other is what is in the person's mind at the time of the choice, and this includes one's perception of the immediate physical circumstances, as well as the person's intentions, mental associations, and memories etc. And things like mental illness become a factor.

Now, what I believe is the important factor, and this seems to strike at the heart of our disagreement, is that the primary, and I'll say "correct" context for judgement of a choice, any choice, is what is in the person's mind. This is because that is what is evident to the person when making the choice. And, any perception of the immediate physical circumstances is subjective, so that limits the reliability of "the physical conditions" as the context. So when we go to judge the person's choice, and we put the person's choice into the context of "the physical conditions", this presumed context is a product of the judge's perception, not the choice maker's perception. That, in my belief, taints the judgement.

I think I can represent our disagreement in the following way. You think that the primary context of a choice is the physical conditions in which that choice is made, and I think that the primary context is the mental conditions in which that choice is made. So, when a decision is made, which is completely divorced from the current physical conditions, this choice will be completely irrelevant to you, yet it may prove to be extremely relevant to me.

Imagine, a person is sitting at home, thinking about going shopping tomorrow, and deciding to buy a used shirt only if it's 100% cotton. The next day the person is shopping, and buys a shirt of unknown fabric. For you, the context of this choice is the person walking around the store looking at shirts, deciding which one is comfortable, and buying that shirt. There is no issue of the decision which the person made yesterday, because it is not part of the physical context. For me however, the context is the mentalscape, and here, that contrary decision, even though it was made yesterday, is very relevant.

The second count also misrepresents me completely as I have not claimed that mental processes are not the cause of our physical actions. — Dan

Yes you did make that claim. You explicitly stated that your belief in libertarian free will excludes the possibility that choices or actions are "caused". And, the act of volition, which causes a choice, or a physical action, separates the mental processes of thinking from the physical acts. Therefore it is impossible that mental processes, thinking can cause physical actions. This is the means by which you separate decisions made yesterday (to buy a sort only if it's 100% cotton) from decisions made at the current time, as not relevant.

So you decided on the term "influence" instead of "cause". This is the root of your incoherency. You keep wanting to portray actions as united by necessity to choices, as if choice necessitates the action. However, your belief in libertarian free will does not allow that there is anything which necessitates the action. This inclines you to leave no separation between choice and action, such that volition constitutes a choice, which is one and the same thing as an action. Choice and action are the same, because you refuse a causal relation between them but you still need that necessity to uphold morality. But this places volition, the act of the free will, as separate from mental processes, thinking. And by your belief in libertarian free will it is impossible that the act of volition could have a cause, so mental processes, thinking, cannot be the cause of our physical actions.

The whole problem here is that your belief in libertarian free will does not allow you to understand causation in the terms of final cause, which allows that thinking is the cause of free will choices, in that sense of "cause".

I'm going away so expect no replies for a while. — Dan

Thanks for the notice Dan. It's been a pleasure.

Again, "why did you do that" doesn't really factor into it. I might ask them if they know what choice they are making (in this case, giving up ownership of some money in exchange for a shirt) and what it means to make that choice (eg, if you give up this money, you won't have it in the future etc), but why they want the shirt is more or less beside the point (except in some niche cases where they think it will protect them from aliens that are chasing them because they are suffering from a delusion, or something to that effect). — Dan

The question is why did the person buy a shirt which they know is of unknown fabric, when the person's desire was to only buy a shirt if it is 100% cotton. Do you not see that the action as contrary to the person's desire? How can you claim that a choice which is contrary to the person's desire, is understood by the person?

I would accept not applying one's rationality also. So long as the person understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it if they choose to, then that is sufficient. If they then decide to do things for no reason or just because they felt like it or whatever, then that's fine. — Dan

How does that make any sense to you? You are saying that the person understands the choice, even if the process of understanding it hasn't occurred yet. That makes no sense at all. You are allowing that the person can look back in time, after the fact, and say I did that for X,Y, and Z reasons, when those reasons really did not enter into the person's decision making process at all. This is nothing but allowing yourself to be lied to, and deceived by the person's rationalization.

The person can make up an excuse, after the fact, for acting in a specific way (what I called "rationalize" above), when the excuse does not at all represent the real thought process of the person at the time of making the choice, they are just applying their rationality to it after the fact. And you would accept this 'after the fact' rationalization which is really a false representation of what thoughts actually led to the act, as proof and justification that the person knew what they were doing at the time.

There are a great many things that we allow to happen which do require a choice. — Dan

That's exactly what I said, and very clear evidence that your claim that there is no distinction to be made between choosing to act, and allowing things to happen, is false. The claim that there is no distinction to be made is your reason for choosing consequentialism as an acceptable moral philosophy. Clearly, you need to revisit that choice.

I'm not suggesting that people are morally responsible for things they couldn't prevent (ought implies can and all that), rather I am suggesting that the whether you are actively doing something or simply letting it happen when you could easily prevent it doesn't make much of a difference. — Dan

But there is clearly a huge difference. The type of "understanding" employed in each of these two distinct types of situation is completely different. Do you not grasp the fact that watching something happen, "observation" only allows you to understand what has happened after it has happened? We can watch an act in process, extrapolate from principles of cause/effect, and make predictions about how it will play out, or end, but when these predictions involve the actions of a free agent they are extremely unreliable. On the other hand, when you are actively doing something, you can, and ought to apply these principles of cause/effect, and make such prediction prior to even beginning the act.

Do you not see the difference between having the time to understand, and make the required predictions prior to acting, and observing an act in process, with absolutely no prior knowledge about it, and having to make predictions concerning it 'on the fly'? This is an indication of why the nature of time is of the utmost importance to moral philosophy, but both you and @AmadeusD refused to accept this fact.

First, it seems very odd to say that you choosing to walk on past rather than saving the drowning child is "disallowing yourself to act". — Dan

Why do you say this? The natural human urge, or tendency, is to have compassion and sympathy for a crying child. It is an instinctual response. This is the evolutionary reason why the child cries, and the mother attends. It is also why big aid charities such as UNICEF used to play television commercials showing children in horrible conditions in an effort to get you to donate. To prevent yourself from responding to a child in need requires will power, control of one's emotions.

My question is, why does any of this matter? Does any of this lead to us not being blameworthy for things we let happen? — Dan

It matters because the thought process, the "understanding", which supports the disallowing of actions, (known as "will power"), and the thought process, the "understanding" which produces actions (choosing to act) is completely different. Furthermore, once you allow these two differences of thought processes, and come to recognize the distinction, you'll see the need to provide a third category, simply "allowing" oneself to act. And this type of action, is devoid of any real thought process. Therefore we cannot say that it is a choice which is understood. This type of choice is driven by things described by words like instinct, emotion, passion, urge, whim, habit, etc.. And, there is a vast multitude of them occurring all the time, they are morally relevant, so we need to be able to account for them in a moral philosophy.

This is the true representation of "things we let happen", that category of choices which we do not understand, things that we just happen to do, like buy the shirt. And, we must be blameworthy for such things if we want to be able curb the mistakes which often follow from such choices.

Your representation of "things we let happen" is really meaningless, because this type of situation you mention, is reducible to a reasoned, or understood, choice of not to act. Reasoned choices, whether to act or prevent acting, are always blameworthy or praiseworthy, so there is no question, or issue here.

There is simply a requirement for different principles of judgement to be applied due to the temporal reality of the nature of acts in general. As explained above, planning an act is prior to the act, and responding to an act is posterior to observation of an act in process. That is why there is a big difference between first, second, and third degree murder, for example.

My question is, what are you claiming I am wrong about when it comes to evaluating moral decisions or giving moral guidance? — Dan

As I've explained, your adherence to consequentialism is based in misunderstanding. This misunderstanding inclines you not to make a distinction between choosing (mental process) and acting (physical process). Further, your belief in libertarian free will inclines you to deny that mental processes are "the cause" of physical actions, and this reinforces your refusal to make a distinction between mental processes and physical processes.

So you have a vicious circle of unsound logic. There is a belief in libertarian free will, which denies the causation between mental processes and physical processes, but this is based in a false representation of causation. Then, your incoherency is to unite the mental choice with the physical act, making them one and the same, as if the physical act is a necessary effect of the mental choice, and this supports a unity of the two as simply a physical act. The mental choice is divorced from the physical act as 'not the cause of it' by actually uniting it to the physical act as 'one and the same', leaving the mental choice gone, irrelevant by that incoherency. Then, in your consequentialism you focus on the physical act only, having illogically shown the mental thought process as irrelevant. But this is a misunderstanding.

You are really not helping me Dan. I really do not understand what you mean by understand. You provided a sort of definition, but when I gave an interpretation of your words, you claimed my interpretation is wrong. So I am continually left with nothing to go on.

This is all based on the false premise that there needs to be a judge in order for their to be a fact of the matter. This just isn't the case. The truth is not determined by the judgment of an observer. The truth simply is, and it is up to us to find it as best we can. Also, this all seems to come from you seeming to think that I was claiming a bunch of stuff that I wasn't. — Dan

We are not talking about "truth, "or "fact", we are talking about "understanding". Whether or not something is understood is a judgement which must be made, otherwise anytime someone thinks that they understand, and claims to understand, that would constitute understanding, even if the person really misunderstood.

I mean, you can say that there is an objective fact of the matter, of whether the person understands one's choice or not, but this is not relevant because we do not judge according to the fact of the matter, we judge according to what we think is the fact of the matter. So, we need some principles as to what constitutes "understanding", so that we can make the judgement as to whether one's ability to understand one's own choices is enhanced, or limited by specific factors.

This is where you and I have significant disagreement, as to which factors play an important role in one's ability to understand one's own choices.

As I said in a previous post I would say that to understand one's choices it to comprehend/recognize the nature of the choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to it. — Dan

So, as a demonstration of our disagreement, if I apply this definition which you provide above, to the shirt example, I think it is very obvious that the person in the example does not understand one's own choice. This is obvious, because the person has two contrary choices, (or a choice which is contrary to a desire if you wish to express it that way), and there is no reason given why one results in the selection rather than the other. Clearly that there is no reason, indicates that it is impossible to "apply one's rationality to it". When the choice that the person made is contrary to the desire that the person had, and there is absolutely no reason given for that choice, then we need to accept that there is no rationality to that choice either, and therefore the person did not understand one's own choice.

"Why did you do that" probably wouldn't be high on my list of questions in order to determine if they understand their own choices. I might ask them about the nature of the choice they are making, and try to ascertain their general level of mental competence. I might also check whether they are suffering from any delusions which lead to them not knowing what choice it is they are making. — Dan

Then why do you not accept that the shirt example is a case of a person not understanding one's own choice? The person has the desire to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton, and then for no reason at all buys a shirt of unknown composition. If we ask the person "why did you do that?", there is no answer provided in the example. We can only conclude that the person did it on a whim or something. However, you deny that choosing on a whim is a case of not understanding one's choice. But "whim" is defined as "caprice", an unaccountable change of mind.

You say you want less from "understanding" than I do. In reality you want nothing from "understanding". Your principle is really "the ability to make one's own choice", and "understand" plays no role at all. So long as the person is capable of speaking and can give an answer to "why did you do that?", such as "I felt like it", this qualifies as "understanding" the choice, to you.

This is because you do not want to deal with all the real issues concerning "understanding" one's own choices which I've been bringing to your attention. These issues are the role of habit, education, deception, and things like that. Further, since your principle of "understanding" is to be able to "apply one's rationality", you would accept all different sorts of what is known as "rationalizing", and other specious forms of explanation as "understanding".

Do you think that if we asked the person why they bought the shirt, and they said because they thought it was 100% cotton, even though there was no tag or other indication, that would qualify as understanding one's own choice? And, if we asked the person why they thought it was 100% cotton, and they answered because that's what I wanted it to be, that would qualify as understanding, wouldn't it? This is because "applying one's rationality" does not mean the same as applying sound logic, nor does it even imply being "reasonable", as "rationalizing" indicates.

Does this have anything to do with whether or not there is a distinction between acting or allowing which I suggested is the reason consequentialism is the best approach to morality? — Dan

Yes, it's very relevant, that's what I've been explaining, and why I've been saying that you ought to reconsider your belief in consequentialism. The simple fact is that "allowing" does not require a choice. The vast majority of things which occur do not require any choice from me. Disallowing does require a choice, as does acting. So disallowing is classed with acting, and allowing is something completely different.

You can give many examples which create the appearance that allowing is a choice, but these are false for the following reason. All choices are personal. The choice to act is personal, something I do my self. The choice not to act is personal. The choice to allow something else, not of my choice, to occur is a choice not to act in an attempt to prevent it. So, like I explained a choice not to act is a choice of disallowing myself to act. So what you call "allowing" is really a choice of disallowing. "Allowing", in a true sense of allowing something to occur, is something completely different which is neither a chosen act nor a choice to disallow action. We can carry this principle to our personal selves, just like the others, to consider how we allow things like habit, impulse reaction, whimsical buying, etc.. These are personal actions which occur without real choice, nor are they disallowed by choice. They require a special category because they escape the reason which guides our choices which either disallow us from acting, or cause us to act. This type of action, the ones which are simply "allowed", can never be understood.

and now this odd behaviour; — Amity

Socrates may have been "catching forty winks" before that dinner party. If I remember correctly, he ended up staying up all night drinking. Alternatively, you might consider that since he was described to be less drunk than the others, after that all night drinking, he may have been intentionally avoiding the pre-dinner cocktails, shots, or whatever was the custom. Those are real kickers to one's inebriation.

. I am not unduly concerned re Socrates. Simply noting his behaviour as told. And wondering. I think sometimes he needed to be alone with his thoughts. Perhaps, this was a way of preparing himself... — Amity

Consider, every minute aspect of description, written by Plato, has importance, and small things mentioned earlier can develop more importance later. And, the association between the earlier and the later is usually not mentioned, leaving it up to the reader to draw the link (deduce causation). A significant part of the dialogue concerns etiquette (notice "beauty" is the property of institutions), and Socrates is a bit of a social misfit. If you are socially inept (as I am), you may find some good party strategies in this dialogue.

I really think I need to figure out how you are using the word "understand", because it's not making any sense to me.

I would say that the person had competing desires and that they gave in to their urges rather than stick with the better course of action long-term. — Dan

I think I see what you're saying here. What I call "choice" you call "desire", and what I call "act" you call "choice". So when the person decides to buy a used shirt only if it is 100% cotton, you call this a desire, and insist that it's not a choice, because it's not acted on, and the person's choice (act) is to buy the shirt of unknown fabric. I find this to be a very strange and confusing use of words which precludes the possibility of a person changing one's mind. What I call changing one's mind, you call "competing desires". I find this to be a very deficient description, but I'll try to follow you.

So here's the scenario you describe for me. A person has competing desires, then the person acts. The act is the choice. Where do you place thinking, decision making, in this process? We have to address this because you refer to "understanding" one's own choice, and "understanding" describes this thinking process. Is it fair to say that thinking, decision making, is a sort of medium between desires, what you call "competing desires", and the act which is the choice? (I intentionally say that the act is the choice rather than say that the act is representative of the choice, because you explicitly do not distinguish between these two.) And would you agree that "understanding" and its contrary "not understanding", are terms used to describe a judgement against this medium process, thinking, decision making? "Understanding is a judgement of correctness, and "not understanding" is a judgement of incorrectness in the associated thinking process.

I assume that in all cases of acting (choosing), there are competing desires, otherwise a desire would lead directly to an act, without any medium, and there would be no choosing. Do you agree? And would you agree that the medium, consisting of thinking, could be judged as either understanding or not understanding?

Now, the important point, who would make this judgement? The judgement of whether the thinking process was correct or incorrect, understanding or not understanding, must be made by someone. We cannot say that the person engaged in the thinking process, making that choice, also makes the judgement of correct or incorrect, or else all cases would be judged as correct, because the person would not make the choice unless they thought it was correct. Their judgement would have to correspond with the thinking process, because the choice actually is that judgement. Therefore the distinction of understanding/not understanding would be meaningless. In all cases of making a choice, the person would understand the choice, and there would be no question of the possibility of not understanding.

That would be the case if the person making the choice was the one who judged whether the choice was understood or not. All choices would be understood, and none not understood, and the use of "understand" in your principle, "the ability to understand and make one's own choices" would be redundant and meaningless. Your principle would be more clearly stated as "the ability to make one's own choices". Is this what you mean with that principle? Or do you want "understand" to hold some significance?

If the latter is the case, then we need to look to a third party, an observer to make the judgement of understood or not understood. Do you agree with the reasoning here? This means that we have to ask the acter, why did you do that, or something similar, and access the acter's thinking process in some way. From an analysis of the thinking process we can judge correct or incorrect, hence understanding or not understanding.

Do you agree with this Dan? If not, tell me please what you mean by "understand" in the context of the principle "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". I think that if we say a person understands one's own choice, this is a judgement we pass on the person, not a judgement that a person would pass on oneself, because that would be meaningless. If you agree, then could you name some criteria which would be used in that judgement? When we ask the person "why did you do that?" what sort of guidelines ought we to follow in our judgement of whether it is a case of the person understanding the act or not understanding the act?.

I am saying there is no important difference between acting or allowing, so "inaction" is as morally relevant as "action". — Dan

But the examples I mentioned are cases of disallowing, i.e. preventing one's one actions. This is distinctly different from "allowing". So the difference I am talking about is the difference between acting and disallowing one's own actions. It is not a matter of "allowing" the actions of others, those are irrelevant. What is relevant is the choices (actions) of oneself, and the difference I am talking about is the difference between allowing oneself to act, and disallowing oneself to act. In the shirt case for example, adhering to the principle "I'll only buy a shirt if it is 100% cotton", is a choice (I believe it is a choice anyway), which would have disallowed action in the circumstances of the example. However, in the example the person allowed oneself to act.