These conventions are semantics, and do not erase the fact that there is a ontic relation. An object with the relation labled 90 degrees is logically and ontologically different from an object that we label 45 degrees (under the same set of conventions) - and they are different irrespective of how we choose to abstractly divide a circle. — Relativist

Do you mean that we perceive these as different, our perceptions of such objects are different? I mean science tells us that what we perceive as an object is really a bunch of molecules, which are a bunch of atoms, which are some other particles. So we perceive an edge, a boundary of some sort to those bunches of moving particles, and we measure the edge to be curving (angling?) at the specific degrees. That these angles of degrees are an accurate description of what is really the object, is highly doubtful, so we're best off to just recognize that these are descriptions of what we perceive.

We "start" with a lot of different understandings of what people are free or should be free to do or be, and what they should be free from, and we make sense of that so we can have a sensible conversation. — Dan

Then you have no objective definition of freedom, just a lot of different understandings. Conversation between people with a lot of different understandings inevitably produces misunderstanding, unless you have some objective principles to start with.

This is why I suggested to Amadeus, that we start with something which we both agree on as self-evident truth, the fact that the past cannot be changed. This would have provided us with a fundamental principle as a base determination of "impossible", which we could agree to as the most basic restriction to freedom. Instead, Amadeus insisted that this 'type of impossibility' is irrelevant to freedom. This is very similar to you insisting that only some 'types of freedom' are morally relevant.

Second, constraints and restrictions are not properly understood as only the properties of an agent's environment. — Dan

If you start with an objective definition of "freedom", and protect the concept of "a free agent", you will find that it is contradictory to say that constraints or restrictions belong to the agent, if the agent is truly free.

I totally agree, that a human being is not "free" in the absolute sense of "a free agent" as defined, but the objective ideal concept of "a free agent", being absolutely free, provides a definitional starting point to make judgements concerning the different types of restrictions. Notice that from this perspective, of starting from an objective definition of freedom, "type" belongs to the restrictions, not freedom itself.

Third, there is absolutely not any requirement for constraints to be a part of the agent in order for them to have a type of freedom. — Dan

You say it right there, for the agent "to have a type of freedom". "To have" means it is a property of the thing which has it. If the agent has one type of freedom, and not another type of freedom, as properties, then the restrictions which make the type of freedom this type instead of that type, are also property of the agent. For example, if a thing is red and not green, then the restrictions which make the thing this type of colour rather than that type, inhere within the thing, as property of the thing which has this colour rather than that colour. Likewise, if an agent has this type of freedom and not that type, then the restrictions which make it have this property rather than that property, inhere within the thing.

You are approaching the issue from a backward direction. Instead of assuming "a free agent", as a base "ideal", and then proceeding to look at the different types of restrictions which make a real living human agent's freedom less than ideal, you start with a less than ideal concept of "freedom", and wrongly call this a "type of freedom", when there is no real "type" here to be understood. This is because "type" properly belongs to the restrictions, and by assigning it to "freedom" instead, you have no principles to understand the true types of restrictions. You only have a whole lot of different understandings from different people about "different types of freedom" which are essentially arbitrary, with corresponding arbitrary restrictions. If instead, you started with a pure absolute freedom, as your objective ideal, then you could look at the true, real, natural and artificial restrictions, and understand their different types accordingly.

However, it may be a literature you could benefit from examining, because I think you are mistaken about the issues you are raising regarding types of freedom. — Dan

I already see right through the principles supporting that literature, to recognize the inherent contradiction underlying them, the mistake which I've pointed out to you. There would be no point in me reading it unless I wanted to decisively refute it. However, I'm fairly certain that it is upheld by people similar to you, who would not recognize the refutation when thy saw it. So that would be a much bigger waste of my time than what I am doing here

Are you saying the relation of 90 degrees, that we measure, does not describe an objective fact? Of course, we define "degree" and "90", but the relation we identify as such is not mere opinion - it describes an ontological relation (setting aside the inherent error of making measurements). — Relativist

You can divide a circle into four equal angles, but the convention, that each of these angles is 90 degrees is completely arbitrary. The circle could have had 400 degrees, then the right angle would be 100. Or, we could say that there is an infinite number of degrees within the circle, and within the right angle as well. The issue is with the nature of "a degree". It's not something within the object, but designated by the subject, in a completely arbitrary way (other than that there is a conventional standard). This excludes the possibility of "the four equal angles of a circle are 90 degrees" being an objective fact.

Example: a 90 degree angle is instantiated in objects that have this angle. "90 degree angle" doesn't exist independently in some "platonic heaven" — Relativist

I don't think this is correct. What is instantiated is what we sense as particular things, and that something has a 90 degree angle is a judgement we make. So "90 degree angle" is not an instantiation of the particular, it is a judgement which is made by human beings, produced through measurement.

I do not understand why you think it is an arbitrary threshold, and I think nowhere in the opening post does the situation require for one to need it as a guide as to whether or not someone else assents, nor do I think it is required of you to judge confidence by percentage precisely, but to know that people can have different degrees of confidence when they assent to a belief, and moo is proposing that his position is sound when using the lowest confidence possible. — DreamCatcher

Rarely, if ever, could someone claim to be !00% certain. And, we assent to belief for all sorts of different reasons, making any specific numerical percentage not at all consistent for the same person. If someone you know offers to help you for example, you might assent with a very low degree of certitude. Consider faith and religion for some. But if someone you do not really trust offers you something, assent would require a much higher degree of certitude. This is why I argued that we cannot claim any "threshold of assent". It makes no sense, because if certitude is used to evaluate the threshold, for example, it varies within the same person, depending on circumstances. Therefore we cannot determine any specific threshold for any particular person, assent depends on too many different things.

Try looking at it this way. We begin with the idea that a free agent has freedom, where "freedom" is defined as "without restriction", no constraint. Then, when you say "that some agent X is free from some constraint Y to do or become some thing Z", you place the free agent within a context, or environment described as being "free from some constraint Y". The described context, or environment, is "without constraint Y". Notice, that the property described as "without constraint Y" is attributed to the environment, not to the agent or the agent's freedom.

Accordingly, constraints and restrictions are correctly understood as properties of the agent's environment, they are not properties of the free agent, or properties of the agent's freedom. It is simply incorrect to say that various different kinds of constraints constitute different "types of freedom", because the constraints are properties of the free agent's environment, not properties of the agent's freedom. To represent the constraint as a property of the agent, which is what is required in order to say that the agent has a specific "type of freedom", would necessarily negate (as contradictory) the primary premise of the "freedom" of the agent, that the agent is free, without restriction or constraint. Therefore the reason why it is incorrect to propose "types of freedom" is that it is self-contradicting.

Your appeal to authority doesn't really provide anything, if the philosopher referred to is making the same mistake. That's a common problem with appeals to authority in philosophy. However, if this is your preferred way to approach moral dilemmas and discussions of responsibilities and values, to start with a premise which is fundamentally incorrect as being self-contradicting, then you can proceed without me, because I think it would only create dilemmas, rather than solve them.

I'm not really clear on what you are trying to solve. You haven't shown at all that protecting the kind of freedom that I am discussing is incompatible with consequentialism and the kind of freedom you think is incompatible with consequentialism isn't the kind I'm trying to protect. I don't think there is a problem there. — Dan

I don't think I'm trying to solve anything, just pointing out a problem with what you are doing. I believe that the phrase "the kind of freedom that I am discussing" is oxymoronic. To speak of "a kind of freedom" is to restrict freedom to a specific "kind". But "freedom" means unrestricted. Therefore your approach is incoherent. And you seem to be unwilling to acknowledge this.

Your conception of freedom is, in my view, plainly wrong. Impossibility has nothing to do with freedom. Freedom only obtains when choices are available ("could have done otherwise"). The passing of time negates this, as it is a metaphysical barrier to choice at all. Time does not restrict freedom. It prevents choice. If you do not have gills, the 'choice' to breathe underwater is not open to you. Freedom doesn't enter the discussion on my view. — AmadeusD

We are fundamentally opposed here. "Freedom" does not necessarily imply options, it means unrestricted. It is the rational mind which thinks, and in that activity it apprehends "options". When freedom appears as options, it has already been restricted being constrained to those options which the mind apprehends. Therefore "choices are available" is not how freedom actually exists, it is how it appears after it has already been constrained so as to appear as options.

You and I have a fundamental disagreement as to what "freedom" is, just like Dan and I have a similar disagreement. Dan wants to limit "freedom" to a specific "kind of freedom". But restricting "freedom" produces incoherency because freedom means unrestricted. Each of you wants to restrict "freedom" in your own way, so that it no longer means unrestricted, and I believe yours are both corrupted definitions. You are defining "freedom" as already restricted, and that is incoherent in relation to how we actually understand "freedom".

While I understand what you're saying here entirely, I don't think is a good point. If it's self-evident, stop labouring it. We're already in agreement. There's is no reason to invoke something we already agree with to support further assertions as they plainly cannot do so. This is my point. The passage of time is not an interesting factor in the assessment of Freedom. It is something in light of which we must consider Freedom. We have no choice. There is no discussion. It's not to do with with any denial - it is inapt. — AmadeusD

We agree on it, but you insist that this point which we agree on is irrelevant. I believe it is of the highest relevance. Therefore our agreement ends abruptly in disagreement. This disagreement. concerning the relevance of the point we agree on, is due to the fact that we have a fundamental disagreement as to what "freedom" is. Because of this fundamental disagreement about "freedom", I think the point is highly relevant to freedom, and you think it is not at all relevant.

I can't really get on board with this. Technically I acknowledge it - there is a moment of time at the 'initiation' of an act, and then it;s 'completion' let's say. Noted. But, this does not, imo, make present anything knew. An act occurs in totality. You can't be half-way through an act and leave an act half-done. The entire act is carried out, regardless of the content and consequence. An act is whatever is done in a single action. And I would be extremely clear (at the very least for discussion purposes) that mental acts and physical acts need to be treated separately. — AmadeusD

The problem here is that you simply refuse to acknowledge the relevance of the distinction between past and future. Therefore "the present", which is very often partway through an act ( as I am partway through the act of writing this post at the present time), is irrelevant to you. And you refuse to allow that it has any bearing on "freedom".

No idea what this could refer to. An act is a total action. You can't be in the middle of it other than retrospection (because you can denote the exact time the act took to carry out - in the act, there is no such distinction of time - but this supports my view) is my view. — AmadeusD

I can't grasp your denial. Have you never found yourself in the middle of doing something? If an act is "a total action" to you, doesn't this imply that all acts are in the past? But this is contrary to experience, which demonstrates to us that acts take place at the present.

No. The Freedom doesn't obtain. There is no Freedom to be restricted. Freedom requires that one could (in the case of restriction) otherwise have done so/done otherwise. When the option is empirically, metaphysically not open to you, invoking freedom is empty and meaningless.
I do not have my choice to breathe through gills restricted. I simply do not have freedom in that pursuit. It is not open to me. I could not possibly choose that option. Freedom (to do so) does not obtain, and cannot be restricted. — AmadeusD

Haha, you reject 'empirical fact' when I bring it up, with reference to Hume, now you employ it. Sorry Amadeus, I have no idea what you mean by "freedom" here. Freedom does not mean 'one could have done otherwise', it means 'one can do whatever one wants'. Why push "freedom" which is a property of the present, into the past? All you can do by pushing "freedom" into the past, is misrepresent it.

Your proposal is fundamentally incoherent. You say "I simply do not have freedom in that pursuit", and you pretend that this does not mean that your freedom is restrict in that respect. If not having freedom in that pursuit does not mean that your freedom is restricted in that way, then what does it mean? Suppose you simply do not have freedom in any pursuit. What "kind of freedom" would you have? Or maybe you have freedom in only one or two pursuits. Wouldn't you think that simply not having freedom in all those other pursuits constitutes a restriction to your freedom? The way you are using "freedom", like Dan, is simply incoherent.

No it plainly is not. To Choose is to adopt a mental disposition. — AmadeusD

As far as I know, mental activity is activity. Why deny it?

I think it is pretty clear your version of Freedom is inapt, and unable to describe how humans actually choose and act in the real world. — AmadeusD

I find that a joke, considering that the way you use "freedom" is simply incoherent. And, the fact that you refuse to recognize that acts are occurring at the present, instead of insisting that all acts are in the past. .

Again, these aren't facts about anything, other than that time proceeds unidirectionally and we cannot change an act that already occurred. — AmadeusD

So let's define "act" to make sure we agree. An act is a process, something being done, or happening, an action. As such, we can say that an act always occurs in time, it requires a period of time, such that there is an earlier part of the act, and a later part. "An act that already occurred" has both parts in the past. "An act occurring" has its earlier part in the past and its later part has not yet occurred. And, to some degree we can talk about future acts, having both parts not yet occurred.

We agree that an act already occurred cannot be changed. Do we also agree, that a future act is somewhat indeterminate, having not yet occurred, and subject to "possibility"? Can we agree that future acts are better known as possible acts? If so, this leaves "the act occurring" in a precarious place. The past part of the act occurring cannot be changed, but the future part exists as possibilities. A determinist would say that it's not only the past part which cannot be changed, but the past part determines the future part, and so the future part cannot be changed either. They claim a necessity here, known by cause and effect. However, you and I allow that the future part consists of possibility. But this gives us great difficulty to account for the observed reality that many acts appear to have a necessary relation between the past part and the future part. We call this causation, and this necessity allows us to make accurate predictions.

This is incoherent to me. Making a choice doesn't restrict one's freedom to choose in any sense other than that time moves in one direction. Freedom isn't in play. You already chose. There's no 'restriction'. It's plainly not open to you to make that same decision again. Restricting is both inadequate and inapt. The general fact that time moves in one direction restricts your choices to one's that operate in the same direction. But this isn't at all what you've tried to say.
I'm truly not understanding what lifting you think these ideas are doing? — AmadeusD

As you seem to be having problems with this idea, let's take it very slow. First, you seem to agree that time moving in one direction is a restriction of some sort. How can you say that this is a restriction but not a restriction on one's freedom? What does it restrict if not one's freedom? In any case, you seem to want to dismiss this type of "restriction" as irrelevant, and unimportant, when I see it as being the most important.

Put yourself in the middle of an act occurring, for example. The past part of that act cannot be changed. The future part exists as possibility. Further, the past part, since it cannot be changed, serves as a restriction on what is possible in the future part. To choose is to do something, make a judgement, and is therefore an act itself. What that act does, is selects from apprehended possibilities, as time passes, such that when this future part of the act, existing as possibilities, becomes past, and cannot be changed, the choice has had an effect. Notice, that this is not the past part determining the future part in the determinist way, it is the choice itself which has efficacy. Therefore, in the same way that anything in the past is a restriction, because the past cannot be changed, any choice which is made, since it is an act, has an effect on what comes to pass, and so it contributes to the restrictions of the past, in that same way.

The choice is no longer extant to be made. It is in the past. There is no consideration of Freedom. You would not say that my not having gills restricts my freedom to breathe underwater. I am simply unable to do so. Freedom isn't relevant. The present case is the same, as far as I see it. — AmadeusD

I cannot understand the sense of "freedom" you are ascribing to. If something is impossible for a person to do, then the person's "freedom" is restricted accordingly. If not having gills makes it impossible for you to breathe under water, then your freedom is restricted accordingly. Of course I would say that. And so, the reason why you do not have the freedom to breathe under water is that your freedom has been restricted by you not having gills. What does "freedom" mean to you? If it means the ability to do whatever is possible, then it must be restricted in some way, and that would be by what is impossible. The principal restriction on one's freedom, the most significant restriction to one's freedom, is that which we are "simply unable to do", for one reason or another. Why on earth would you say "freedom isn't relevant" here. Is it because you take such restrictions to your freedom for granted?

So, I believe there is significant disagreement between you and I on what is meant by "freedom of choice". You seem to think that even though the past is fixed and cannot be changed, and it poses significant restrictions on us, these restrictions are simply impossibilities, and these impossibilities have no relevance to our freedom of choice. In other words, all the arguments which determinists make about the past having causal influence over us, you dismiss as irrelevant. Because this is a very significant difference of opinion, and very important to the subject of how habits restrict our freedom, I don't think there is any point in proceeding to discuss "habits" until we sort this out.

I don't think that's a problem. I don't think we need to protect your freedom to go and stab people in the throat. In fact, I think we should restrict your ability to do that. That is very much a feature not a bug. — Dan

Sure, I agree with you. But what I also think, is that we cannot have a moral principle of protecting freedom. This is why I argued that moral consequentialism and the principle of protecting freedom are incompatible. I offered a solution recently, which was to understand freedom as something which transcends morality.

If you are with me so far, then we might take a step further to look at freedom itself, as something outside of, transcending, moral principles. That freedom truly transcends moral principles is evident from the fact that we can freely make choices with complete disrespect for any codes of ethics. However, because you are inclined to understand freedom as something which needs to be curtailed by moral restraint, I don't think you really want to consider freedom itself as something which ought to be protected. Notice, if we properly allow that freedom transcends moral principles, we cannot truthfully say that it ought or ought not be protected. Would you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover

Consider that freedom is logically prior to morality, as that which enables there to be such a thing as good or bad acts. This implies that freedom itself cannot be judged as good or bad, because it is the way that a person uses one's freedom which is what is judged in that way. Therefore we cannot say that freedom ought to be or ought not be protected, it is just something which is taken for granted by moral philosophers.

For example, consider that "many" is logically prior to number. It enables the idea that there is a number which can be assigned to any group which is many. However, we cannot assign a number to "many". In the same way, we cannot assign good or bad to "freedom", it simply enables the idea that acts can be classed as good or bad. So in the same way that "many" is an idea which is taken for granted by mathematicians, "freedom" is an idea which is taken for granted by moral philosophers.

If one's confidence is at 50% on something, then I think they have not assented to a belief. They do not believe either way. If they past 50% confidence on something, then they have assented to a belief, but their confidence may be extremely low. Without using decimal numbers, the lowest confidence is 51%. — DreamCatcher

I think that's an arbitrary threshold. It might work as a guide as to when you've crossed the threshold, but it's useless as a guide as to whether or not someone else assents. Personally, I cannot judge my confidence by percentage, and I don't even really understand how confidence relates to assent, so your post is useless to me.

Our disagreement appears to two twofold. First, we disagree as to the causal efficacy of habit. Second, we disagree as to the metaphysical significance of the passing of time. Each of these disagreements has an affect on how we individually understand freedom and its restrictions.

Concerning the first subject of disagreement, I cannot tell you exactly what a habit is, or how it works, but I've given you examples as to how, when we act through habit, we do not consider other options, and I've explained how it is logically impossible to choose another option if the other option is not present to the mind. Therefore I conclude that it is impossible for one to choose another option when the habit is in force. You, on the other hand, define "habit" as "loosely held sequences of thought in response to common stimulus" or, "a vague, not-well-defined series of neurological actions that usually follow each other to an end". By these terms, "loosely held", and "usually follow each other", you exclude the necessity of the cause/effect relationship which I assume to constitute a habit, and you thereby deny the necessity which I attribute to "habit". I conclude therefore, that this aspect of our disagreement is based in a difference in understanding of what "a habit" is. You deny the necessity of the cause/effect relationship within a habit, which I assert.

The second part of our disagreement is a bit more difficult for me to understand. Clearly the passing of time imposes significant restrictions on our freedom, and we seem to agree on this. However, for some reason I cannot understand, you dismiss the importance of this as "entirely self-evident, and uninteresting", and you refuse to allow it as a point of discussion. In metaphysics, the self-evident is of the utmost importance, because it is used to form the base, the foundation of ontology, and from this we construct an understanding of reality. Therefore we cannot dismiss the self-evident fact that the passing of time imposes significant restrictions on our freedom, as "uninteresting" in a discussion of freedom, just because it is something which as "self-evident". We ought to agree on this self-evident fact, and use it to form the base for a wider understanding between us. It is therefore the most interesting to "us".

What I propose therefore, is that we concentrate on our points of agreement, what we take as self-evident. If we can agree on the way that the passing of time bears on possibility and impossibility, and therefore on our freedom, we can proceed toward applying these agreed upon principles to the nature of "habit", and by this means we might overcome some of our points of disagreement about how habit affects our freedom.

So, after giving it some consideration I will address the points of your post, beginning with the aspects concerning the self-evident fact about the passage of time, From this, I will try to build an understanding of points of agreement between us, and bring this to bear on the larger point of disagreement, the nature of habit. I'll get back to you later.

I mean, I would also be happy to say that I am protecting freedom to make certain types of choices, if that would be more agreeable to you linguistically. — Dan

This does not address the problem. Since you are employing your principles to dictate the "types of choices" which you are protecting, then all you are really doing is proposing a restriction to my freedom of choice.

To be clear on what the subject of discussion is, this is what I said to Dan:

As I said, not choosing, rather than choosing, provides the most freedom, because every choice made restricts one's freedom with respect to that choice already made. And, since the measure of value is freedom, as you say, then the highest value is to not choose, because this provides the most freedom. And, not choosing is what enables deliberation and contemplation. This is consistent with Aristotelian virtue, which places contemplation as the highest activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand this difference, between protecting and promoting freedom. Bad habits are morally relevant, and habits guide our decisions when we do not take the time to deliberate. To protect one's freedom of choice requires that the person resists the formation of habits in one's thinking. To be inclined this way, i.e. to resist habitual thinking, requires that freedom be promoted, because choosing not to choose is an intentional skill requiring will power to develop, and the desire for freedom is the required intention. This is where consequentialism really fails us. It does not properly provide for the value of will power. — Metaphysician Undercover

When you engaged me I had said:

I explained why the person's choice is restricted by habit. The habit prevents the person from properly considering other options. This is a very real and very strong restriction to one's freedom to choose. The most significant restriction to one's freedom of choice is a failure to consider all the possibilities. The person is free to choose any option, but literally cannot choose an option which doesn't come to mind. The best option may not come to mind, due to the person\s preexisting habits of thinking, so the person's freedom to choose that option is restricted accordingly.

And, back to the point we started with, making a choice restricts one's freedom in much the same way. The choice is made, and the person proceeds accordingly. Proceeding with the choice firmly decided restricts one's freedom to choose otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Notice the last paragraph.

You replied to me with:

This isn't a restriction. I'm with Dan on this. A restriction would mean you are unable to do the thing. In this case, you're just misguided. Any instance where a further option is suggested to you leaves you open to considering it. Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really. Habits are flimsy, mentally speaking, versus the ability to take on new information. — AmadeusD

It seems like a lack of context produced a misunderstanding of what I was talking about.

What I am claiming is that in the case of acting by habit, the choice is made, the person proceeds accordingly, and it is not possible for the person to consider other options because the actions which follow from the habitual choice have already been initiated, by that act of making the choice.

To avoid further misunderstanding, here's a concrete example. When I'm sitting in my house, and I hear my dog barking at the door, my habit is to immediately get up and let the dog in. So, as soon as I hear the dog barking, I respond with the decision to let the dog in, and I proceed accordingly. This is my habit.

Now here's the issue. When I act according to my habit I do not consider other options. It's true as you say, that at the time when I hear the dog bark, I could consider other options. But this, considering other options, is not what I am talking about, I am talking about acting by habit, in which case other options are not considered. Furthermore, I am saying that when the person does act by habit, it is impossible for the person to consider other options because this actually contradicts what is meant by "acting by habit". So, if when I hear the dog barking, instead of automatically getting up to let it in (acting by habit), I consider possibilities, "is that my dog?", "does the dog want to come in?", "should I get up, or ask someone else to let it in?", etc., then I am not acting by habit, I am deliberating.

Here's a couple more examples to help elucidate what I am talking about.

Consider the use of logic and mathematics as habits of decision making. Whenever we apply mathematics we exclude other possibilities through a learned habit of thinking. So for example, if I'm having some people over for a dinner party, and I want to determine how many people to prepare for, I might think four couples are coming, so four times two is eight. At this point I decide that eight is the tally and I proceed accordingly. Notice that by applying that habitual way of thinking, I accept the conclusion and I exclude all other possibilities. I know that there are other possible ways to determine the number, I could go through each name individually for example, but I do not do this, I name the couples and multiply by two. That way of thinking is a habit for me, and if I started thinking about other ways to figure out the total number, i would not be acting by habit, but deciding from options.

Here's an example which is more relevant to the moral principles which Dan is talking about. When I leave the grocery store, my habit is to look for my car in the parking lot, get into it and drive home. I never once consider the possibility of taking another car from the lot, because my habit is to look for my own. I do not think about my key only allowing me to use my car, so this is irrelevant to my decision making, that decision to find my car and drive it, is completely habitual. If I started consering other possibilities, like taking someone else's car, I might be dissuaded from that by the fact that my key wouldn't work, but I would only consider these other factors if I wasn't following the habit of looking for my car to drive home in.

The point is that when you act by habit you do not consider other options, that's what acting by habit is. If you consider other options before choosing, then the choice is not an habitual one. This is not to say that the person could not have overpowered the habit, and considered other options, it is to say that the person did not do this. And, as we've discussed, the fact that the person did not consider other options at the point in time when the choice was made, implies that it was impossible for the person to choose any other options at that point in time.

If the choice has already been made, there's no discussion to be had. I think, in this sense, it's basically "I agree, but why did you bring this up then?" — AmadeusD

So, the reason I brought this up is described in my earlier posts to Dan, as reproduced above. I was arguing that making a choice restricts one's freedom to choose.

Obviously, yes. The choice has already been made. Any shred of time prior to the act of 'choice', i disagree. Anything can get in between the two. So, hopefully this answers both 'versions' relatively succinctly and clears up what I was apprehending vs what you were wanting to hear. — AmadeusD

Now, relate this to habit, and freedom. When the habit kicks in there is no time prior to the act of choice, during which the person deliberates. The person finds oneself in a specific type of situation, the habit kicks in, and the person acts accordingly. If the person prevents the habit from kicking in, and creates a "shred of time prior to the act of 'choice'", for the sake of deliberating, then we cannot say that the person's act is habitual, it is deliberate. So in these situations which I am talking about, the habitual decisions, this idea of a shred of time prior to the choice, is irrelevant. It's very similar to a reflex. You ask me "what's 2+2?", and I say "4". There's no deliberation on my part. Through some sort of reflex I apply the process I know will produce the answer. Then I state the answer.

This is a different issue, again. I'm not implying you've conflated, just that this is separate. My response here is essentially "Not until you act, but once the act takes place, that choice is made "in time" with no recourse". The freedom to re-choose, or change one's mind prior to acting is clearly available in essentially any situation where we're not considering some form of mind-reading. Again, this is only go to apply to certain types of decision, but this is at least a separate issue to the one we've come to terms on (as I see it). — AmadeusD

I believe that we need to consider even the thinking process itself as a type of acting. In this way we can understand ways of thinking as habits, and we can see how habits restrict our freedom of choice. Take the example of applying a mathematical solution to a problem. When the problem is presented, the person will apply mathematics as applicable, and this is a habit. The person goes straight to the habitual way of solving the problem without considering any other ways.

It's true as you say, that after solving the problem in the habitual way, the person can still re-choose to do it in another way, and in grade school this was called checking your answer. However, in practise we most often don't bother to do this checking, we tend to just work out the answer in the customary way, then continue on. Because the habit is generally quite reliable, we often do not doubt it.

No. I don't think it's possible to choose otherwise (it seems you also?) therefore freedom isn't relevant. "Could have done otherwise" seems to be required for freedom in these types of contexts (choice, ethics etc..). Again. perhaps I'm missing something but this seems clearly a state-of-affairs about the direction of time and not a philosophical point about freedom or choice. Every single moment hat passes precludes us from altering the prior moment/s ad infinitum. Self-evident and uninteresting. — AmadeusD

It is a freedom related issue. At the time when the person is making the choice, the person has freedom to consider more options. At the time when the choice is made, the person does not have that freedom. Therefore we can conclude that the act of judgement is an act which limits one's freedom. Furthermore, "making the choice", (and this is when the person has freedom), exists as a duration of time, but the habit limits that amount of time to the very minimum. So the habitual choice, as a type of choice is a type which restricts freedom even more.

Those are two distinct events, as far as I'm concerned (goes to the above, i guess!) which somewhat materially changes the implications made out in your comments. — AmadeusD

The point is that when the decision is made we stop actively considering options. Making a decision always has consequences, of some sort.

I agree that it is moral reasoning that is being used to determine what kind of freedom we should protect and what we shouldn't, though I'm not sure that is quite what you mean when you say "moral principles". Even if it were, it still wouldn't follow that what I'm suggesting we protect is moral restraint. — Dan

To put it bluntly, I do not agree that you can properly call what you are claiming to protect, "a type of freedom". Really what you want to protect is a type of choice, choices which belong to a person. To ensure that the person's choice is within the criteria of that type, requires that the choice be constrained. Within those constraints the person's freedom is protected. This is not protecting a type of freedom, it is protecting freedom as long as the free agent respects certain boundaries. And this is what I call moral restraint.

Also can I take it from you not answering that you didn't read the initial primer? Because that would really help to clear a lot of this up. — Dan

I read some, but I didn't get too the end.

What I am suggesting ought to be protected is not moral restraint, and you have again moved from "we don't need to protect people's choice to take others' choices away from them" to "we should only protect the choice to do what is right". These are not the same. — Dan

You explicitly said you are only interested in "protecting a specific type of freedom" , and this type of freedom is qualified by moral principles. Do you agree that this is a moral principle which you use to determine the type of freedom which you are interested in protecting? That is the reason why I conclude that what you are interested in protecting is really moral restraint rather than freedom. You want to protect a certain type of free choice, but not another, and the distinction is based on a moral principle. so I conclude that what you are promoting is moral restraint, not freedom.

This is a retrospective fact, and I've been extremely clear to the point of feeling a bit silly that this isn't what's on the table right now. — AmadeusD

As I said, I'm the one who set the table. It appears like you want to replace it with your own setting

It seems to me you're putting the choice ahead of a set of possible choices thereby ipso facto making them unavailable because the choice is already made. — AmadeusD

Correct, the choice has been made. That's what I've always been talking about, having made a choice. We are looking backward in time from the point when the choice has been made. By definition, at the point in time when the choice is made, the choice has been made. Notice the past tense, "the choice is made". I was not ever talking about the time prior to making the choice, when options are being considered, that is your changing of the setting of the table, I was always talking about the time when the choice is made.

The fact that you didn't think of it simply isn't something that makes it impossible. It makes it unlikely, at best. — AmadeusD

Do you, or do you not agree, that at the point in time time when the choice is made, it is impossible for you to have made a choice which you did not think of? If you do not agree then there is nothing for us to discuss. If you do agree, then quit making statements like this, which makes it appear like you do not agree. Very clearly, the fact that the person did not think of the option at the time when the decision was made, makes it impossible that the person could have chosen that option at that time.

If the idea is that one's mind restricts one's mind I think there's more work to be done. — AmadeusD

Roughly speaking, I think that this is the case. One's mind is a system which acts to restrict one's actions. And, as i said earlier, by restricting one's actions a being increases one's freedom. This is commonly known as will power. In general, the mind serves to prevent us from proceeding on reflex, impulse and habit, and this "will power" allows us greater freedom.

What I've disagreed with is that one not having an option consciously in mind while weighing options makes that option impossible to be made. — AmadeusD

See, this is how you are changing the setting of the table. I was not talking about the time spent "weighing options", I was very explicitly talking about the point in time when the decision is made.

Let me review the point I made. I said that every choice which is made, restricts one's freedom. I said that not choosing allows one to deliberate and contemplate. Notice that "weighing options" is consistent with deliberating and contemplating, and this is enabled by not having made the choice. Having made the choice puts an end to weighing the options. By putting an end to the weighing of options, making the choice is an act which restricts ones freedom

The process of "weighing options" is clearly not what I argued is what restricts one's freedom. What restricts freedom is the act of judgement, which is the choice itself, the decision.

All of our language, reviewing the exchange, indicates this version of the problem. The choice to be made, not a choice already made. I have, again, tried to be excruciatingly clear about this. — AmadeusD

Perhaps you misunderstood what you engaged with when you engaged me. But if you look at my discussion with Dan, you'll see that I was very clearly saying that every choice made is a restriction to one's freedom. And, I said that not choosing enables deliberation and contemplation, what you now portray as "weighing options", and this enhances freedom, as not passing judgement.

If all you're saying is that once a person has settled on (to make this easy...) 2 out of 10 options to deliberate about, then they are now precluded from choosing the other 8. This is for several reasons, but none of those reason are because it is impossible. — AmadeusD

You have reversed the causal order here. I am not saying that when you make a choice it is because other choices are impossible, I am saying that when the choice is made this causes other choices to be impossible. What I am saying is that the choice makes it impossible to choose otherwise, because the choice is an act which occurs in time, and when it is made it cannot be undone. If we ever get to the point of agreement on this, we could look further at the possibility of reconsidering.

You need to consider the context of the statement. The argument was that when you make a choice, (and this means when the decision is made) this is an act which restricts your freedom. It restricts your freedom because you exclude the other possibilities, by having chosen what you chose.

So, it's possible I'm agreeing with you and feel as if some time was wasted talking about two separate issues imprecisely. But i've had fun. Having just skimmed the remaining in your post, forgive some glib replies - they run the same risks as the above. — AmadeusD

Yes, I think we actually agree on the first part, but now to the significant part. Do you agree that each time you make a choice, you are actually restricting your own freedom? This is what deciding, making a choice is, restricting your freedom to choose otherwise. It is a self-imposed restriction, and adhering to the decision prevents you from reconsidering or choosing otherwise.

Further, as I described above, I think the mind actually works as a system which is constantly imposing restrictions. By restricting choices it increases freedom, and by making choices it restricts freedom.

Impossibility just isn't int he discussion. — AmadeusD

"Impossibility" is the key principle, it is the centerpiece of the discussion. It is a very significant feature of our temporal existence. As time passes it is impossible to alter what has already occurred. This is the basis for the reality of "impossibility" in this context. When a decision is made actions are carried out accordingly, and this creates impossibility where prior to this was possibility. Without this "impossibility", making a choice would not restrict one's freedom.

Bingo bango bongo. Im unsure why you got through several hundred words from each of us before noting this clear distinction between what you're claiming and what actually is.. — AmadeusD

it seems you misapprehended the setting of the table, thinking it to be something other than it was.

The problem is that a free rational agent may completely understand, and make a choice which you think ought not be protected because of your moral preconceptions. The situation would be such that you do not understand the agent's free rational choice, as "a rational choice", due to those preconceptions. In this case you would not be interested in protecting that agent's "freedom". In the interest of claiming that you actually want to protect the agent's "freedom", you moved toward portraying such an act as not free (in the sense of morally relevant freedom).

I believe "freedom" is not an appropriate word here. What you want to protect is better known as "moral restraint". You are interested in protecting free rational agents' ability to understand and make choices which are consistent with specific moral principles. In other words, you would encourage people to think in a way (develop good thinking habits) which inclines them to freely choose good behaviour through what is known as "moral restraint".

Notice my earlier argument that habits constrain one's freedom. But habits can be classed as good or bad, and in this case you are interested in cultivating good habits. I believe that we ought not portray this as "protecting freedom", as this is really a deceptive slogan, because what we are really doing is curtailing freedom in a good way.

If you are with me so far, then we might take a step further to look at freedom itself, as something outside of, transcending, moral principles. That freedom truly transcends moral principles is evident from the fact that we can freely make choices with complete disrespect for any codes of ethics. However, because you are inclined to understand freedom as something which needs to be curtailed by moral restraint, I don't think you really want to consider freedom itself as something which ought to be protected. Notice, if we properly allow that freedom transcends moral principles, we cannot truthfully say that it ought or ought not be protected. Would you agree?

Verbal assent would be acceptable except the two parties might later have disagreement as to what exactly was agreed to. The handshake helps to reinforce the memory that there actually was an agreement which took place, but it does little or nothing to ensure that the two parties have consistent memories about what was agreed to. Therefore if there are any important details it's wise to put them on paper.



Assent is assent. There is no distinction to be made between the lowest threshold and the highest threshold of assent. Verbal agreement, the handshake, and the signed document, are all indications of assent. One is not a higher threshold and the other a lower threshold, they are all different forms of assent.

The issue you speak of appears to involve what @javi2541997 calls "implied" assent. If there is not some form of explicit assent, then the threshold of "assent" is not really crossed. In that case one might request a handshake to actually cross the threshold.

Implied consent is really very problematic as many rape trials indicate. All sorts of subliminal and unconscious actions may be claimed to have been interpreted as consent. Imagine if I suddenly grabbed your hand, and forcefully shook it, because your actions implied to me that you had crossed the threshold of assent. Then, I later claimed that you shaking my hand was proof that you had actually crossed the threshold. Really, I shook your hand and you did not shake my hand, and there was never assent.

This is why my first post on this thread stated:

Therefore the "freedom" perspective and the "consequentialist" perspective of moral virtue are inherently incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact that you want the right to choose which of my choices ought to be protected indicates that you are interested in restricting my freedom rather than protecting it.

What does lowest threshold of assent mean?

I'm not sure what is meant by "evolved independently" when we are talking about things evolving in one species.

However, having a greater number of neurons available, to associate in more complex ways, things going on in visual cortex and things goings on in auditory cortex, might have been rather important. — wonderer1

The point is that spoken language and written language have fundamentally different purposes. The principal use for spoken language is communication, so it would have evolved in ways to facilitate that end. The principal use for written language is to serve as a memory aid, so it would develop to facilitate that end . Therefore the written language is fundamentally personal, rather than communicative. Consider Wittgenstein's private language example. Being personal, there may be aspects of written language which are designed to make it intentionally non-communicative, like secret code is for example. In any case, you ought to be able to see how the two are fundamentally different, as the principle purpose of one is to communicate with others, and the principle purpose of the other is to communicate with oneself at a later time.

This means that it is very probable that the essential aspects of one are not essential aspects of the other, so the development of each of the two, needs to be considered separately. History and archeology may be misleading to us because what persists from ancient times, and is available to us now as evidence, is only the written material. So anthropology. to the extent that it relies on archeology, cannot provide an accurate history of the development of spoken language.

It is relevant to the OP in that Everett follows Peirce in arguing for an evolution of language where indexes led to icons, and icons moved from signs that looked like the referents, to symbols where the relation was arbitrary. — apokrisis

I think you ought to notice that "signs that looked like the referents" indicates written language. And written language is viewed, while spoken language is heard. The two are very different, and have very different uses, so it is quite reasonable to consider that they evolved independently. At some time, in the relatively recent past, the two began to be united, when spoken words were given written symbols, and vise versa. This unification may have produced the "explosion" you refer to, but it in no way signifies the beginning of language use.

In an analysis of many different spoken words, Plato shows that this distinction, between spoken words that sound like the referent, and spoken words which have an arbitrary relation, is not a useful distinction. The ones which appear to have an arbitrary relation may be just so old that the word has evolved so as not to reveal its origins in some sort of similarity. So unless the history of the symbol is clearly known, the distinction may be completely misleading.

You have misunderstood. — Dan

No, I don't think I have misunderstood. You state explicitly what I have already acknowledged, there is only a specific type of freedom which you believe should be protected, the freedom to act in a way which is acceptable by your moral principles. To me, this is not "freedom" at all. In reality, freedom of choice allows one to make choices with complete disregard for any preconceived principles, moral or otherwise. So if one wants to protect freedom then this is what needs to be protected. Your proposal to protect a certain type of freedom, and disallow that there is any moral value to the other types of freedom, as not morally relevant and therefore valueless, is nothing but a proposal for a veiled restriction to freedom.

It is true that I am claiming that a certain type of choice should be protected, specifically those choices that belong to the person or persons in question. I have discussed the reasons for this in the primer I provided and more deeply in the material referenced within. — Dan

OK, so do you see that preferring one type of choice to be "protected", over the other types, is not an instance of protecting freedom, but the very opposite?

Look at Saddam Hussein's WMD for example. When there is a faulty interpretation of the intelligence, people are not "making stuff up", because they firmly believe in the truth of their interpretation. It's a failure of the intelligence system.

Regardless, when a person provides false information which they believe to be true, the person is not guilty of making stuff up.

Obviously you can't stop Trump from just throwing random bullshit out there, but that could at least be framed by consistent messaging. — Echarmion

Yeah, well now that there's been a switch in the competing candidate, the crew focused on consistent messaging will become irrelevant, and the random bullshit will inevitably ramp up, to fill the void. Should be interesting.

But they did. — NOS4A2

No they didn't. Read the closing of the article which you yourself referred:

"There is no evidence to support Musk's claim that Sussmann or the Clinton campaign peddled information they knew was untrue. Multiple witnesses testified that respected cyber experts harbored genuine national security concerns about the data. Sussmann's lawyers repeatedly said he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the material when he provided it to the FBI."

I am saying that only a certain type of freedom is being used as the measure of value, specifically the freedom of persons over their own choices. Only this limited kind of freedom is what ought to be protected, rather than freedom of all kinds. — Dan

Ok, so this is what I am saying is problematic. To protect the freedom for a certain type of choice, while excluding the freedom for other types of choices as having no value, is really a matter of restricting one's freedom rather than protecting it. Those other types are denied value so as to deny the possibility of choosing them. So what you are proposing is that freedom ought to be restricted rather than protected.

I didn't say that commiting an act of violence to prevent you stealing my car wouldn't violate/restrict your freedom. When I said "stop you from doing so" I wasn't implying that I was going to physically attack you. Commiting violence in such a circumstance would restrict/violate your freedom, though of course it may be justifiable to do so as long as it prevents greater violations of freedom. — Dan

Well, how else would you stop me from stealing, with a threat? And of course the threat would not constitute a restriction to my freedom of choice, because that choice does not belong to me (not one that I am free to make under your proposal because it has no value).

Here's a question. Why the inconsistency in your principles, between one's freedom of choice, and one's freedom to act? If you physically prevent me from stealing your car, with the use of violence, you accept that this is a restriction of my freedom. Therefore I am fundamentally free to act in that way. However, when we discuss my choice to steal your car, you say that I am not free to make that choice, because that choice does not belong to me. Therefore I am fundamentally not free to make that choice.

Do you apprehend the inconsistency I am talking about? In the case of making choices, I am not free to make certain choices (let's say bad choices), so persuading (by threatening for example) me to change my mind does not violate my freedom, because that sort of freedom has no value in this context. However, when it comes to acting out choices, using violence to prevent one's actions is a violation of one's freedom, even if the act has no value (is a bad act) in this context.

To physically prevent me from stealing your car, with the use of violence, requires that you restrict my freedom to act. You do not apply your principle that I am fundamentally not free to make that act, because it has no moral value. But to persuade me not to steal your car, does not restrict my freedom of choice, because you apply the principle that this is a choice which I am not free to make in the first place because it has no value.

It appears to me, like your principle is a reversal of what is really the case, if we made a real description. What is really the case, is that I am completely free to make the choice to steal your car, and nothing (neither persuasion nor threat) can actually prevent me from making that choice. But I am not free to carry out that act, because I may be prevented with physical violence. Furthermore, the prevention with violence is not a restriction on my freedom because principles of law dictate that I am not free to act in this way, so the prevention is justified therefore not a restriction of my freedom. However, there are no principles of law which dictate that within my mind I am not free to decide to steal your car. So long as I do not end up acting in that way, nothing will restrict that freedom.

Therefore you really have things reversed. People are fundamentally not free to make certain actions, because they will be prevented with violence, and this violence is not a restriction to their freedom. And these free actions of authority over one's own body and property are the type of freedom which serves as a measure of value. Other actions (bad acts), we are not free to make because of physical prevention, and such prevention is not a restriction to our freedom because it is justified, and so these acts cannot be admitted into the freedom value scale. In the case of choices however, we are inherently free to choose anything because and nothing justifies a restriction to the freedom of choice, therefore all choices must be allowed some value. We can use means of persuasion and even threats, but these do not qualify as a restriction on one's freedom of choice. And freedom of choice is fundamentally unrestricted.

We don't need to weigh your choice to steal my car against my choice to not have my car stolen, because one choice is the sort that should be protected morally and the other isn't. — Dan

This is precisely the example of why your principle is a vicious circle. The good choice ought to be protected. Which is the good choice? The one which "belongs" to the person to make. How do we know which choice "belongs"? It is the morally good choice.

In reality, we need to question which choice "should be protected morally". And this means that we need to weigh one against the other. You seem to assume that we can just take for granted which one ought to be protected. But this locks us in the vicious circle produced by 'what has been taken for granted', in the moral context. And as you demonstrate, we are not free to make decisions outside of this moral enclosure because they are designated as void of moral value. In other words we get entrapped within our own preconceived moral principles, what we take for granted morally, and deny ourselves the freedom to make any moral choices outside those preconceived boundaries by designating them as having no moral value.

Again, I am not defining "freedom" generally as only the kind I refer to here, but I am using "freedom" within the context of freedom consequentialism as a shorthand for "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices". That is the thing that I am claiming is morally valuable, and I will sometimes say the freedom to make one's own choices to make that clear. I am using the word "freedom" because it seems like the most applicable of the available options, but if you have a better suggestion, I'd happily use that instead. — Dan

It appears like what you are actually doing is giving priority to moral consequentialism over "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices". You take one type of choice, which has been designated by some preconceived moral principles (taken for granted) as "the sort that should be protected morally", and you propose that the ability to make this sort of choice ought to be protected. But this is not at all a matter of protecting "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices", it is a matter of protecting their ability to make a certain type of choice. In fact, what you are proposing is that the freedom of rational agents to make their own choices ought to be restricted in a way such that only those which are consistent with the preconceived moral principles ought to be protected.

I am not defining freedom by reference to what is morally relevant. I am defining what is morally relevant by reference to freedom. I'm not begging the question, you have just misunderstood what I said. — Dan

You've referred to "morally relevant" in relation to freedom of choice, a number of times. Here are some examples.

I mean, the type of freedom is quite a limited one already. It isn't the freedom to do anything that is to be protected, it is the freedom to make choices over what belongs to the person in question. If you want to steal my car and prevent you doing that, that hasn't violated your freedom in a morally relevant way (depending on how I do the preventing) because stealing my car was not your choice to make. — Dan

Here, you appear to be limiting the meaning of "freedom", to a "type of freedom" which you believe to be relevant, which you call "morally relevant". In this example, you claim that your act of violence which prevents me from doing what I have freely chosen to do, does not violate my freedom. You make this claim by saying that I am not free to make such choices over your property See, you are restricting the meaning of "freedom" to circumstances which you believe are "morally relevant", in order to say that you can physically prevent me from carrying out an act, without violating my freedom. That is clearly a highly restricted sense of "freedom". A person is free to choose what is morally good, but not free to choose what is morally bad. So "free" and "not free" are defined by reference to what is morally good and bad.

No, the principle I'm claiming is that my car, being my property, is something that belongs to me and not something that you get to make choices over, morally speaking. As I mentioned in the primer, the kind of freedom being protected here is specifically over those choices that belong to you. Whether or not to steal my car is not a choice that belongs to you, because it is [my car. — Dan

Here again, you refer to a "kind of freedom" which is being protected, the freedom to make choices about things which belong to oneself. So, as I pointed out, in order to determine which free choices qualify as those which need to be protected, we first need some moral principles to determine property ownership. Therefore you are producing a very special definition of "freedom", a special type of freedom, and this is the only kind of freedom which qualifies as "freedom" to you, in relation to your proposed principle that freedom ought to be protected. That other forms of free choice do not qualify is evident from the fact that you proceed to argue that a person does not have the freedom to make choices about someone else's property. In reality, you want to protect the freedom to make good choices, but not the freedom to make bad choice, so you argue that making a bad choice is not a free choice, (in a morally relevant way), so that you can claim to be protecting freedom of choice.

These bad choices, the choices to do things with others' property (steal for example), you claim are not "morally relevant", but this is blatantly false. Clearly the choice to steal someone else's property is a choice which is morally relevant, as morally bad, and it is a choice which one freely makes.

No, I am saying that only the freedom to make certain kinds of choices is morally valuable. Specifically, the choices over that which belongs to the person, their mind, their body, and their property. — Dan

Now you continue with that blatant falsity expressed above. Clearly, the kinds of free choices which are morally relevant extend far beyond choice concerning what belongs to the person making the choice. As I explained, a very large portion of morally relevant choices actually concern other people's property, such as when I decide whether or not to steal your car, in the example. Clearly, this is a morally relevant choice, which I freely make, concerning someone else's property. Restricting the meaning of "freedom", such that I am not "free" to choose to steal your car, because you assert that this choice is not "morally relevant" is complete nonsense. You have totally distorted the meaning of "morally relevant", to support your unjustified opinion that this sort of "freedom" ought not be protected, therefore it ought not be classed as a choice which can "freely" be made. Obviously, that is nonsense.

I would say that threats that don't involve threatening to restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way are not coercing a person in a morally relevant way. Threatening someone's property does involve threatening to violate/restrict someone's freedom in a morally relevant way, specifically their freedom over their property, so that would be coercive in a morally relevant way. — Dan

Here, we find the crux of the problem. Any threat to restrict one's freedom is morally relevant. However, you have totally distorted the meaning of "morally relevant", to say that restricting one's freedom to do a morally bad act is not morally relevant, so that this form of restricting one's freedom is not a morally relevant restriction of freedom. This allows you to hang on to your principle that freedom (in the morally relevant sense) ought to be protected. In reality though, the very nature of "freedom", what it means to be free, implies that one may freely choose to do what is morally bad just as much as what is good. And choosing to do bad is just as morally relevant as choosing to do good. But you do not want to protect that sort of "freedom", true freedom, you only want to protect "freedom" by some twisted distorted definition which suits your morality.

I would say that threats that don't involve threatening to restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way are not coercing a person in a morally relevant way. Threatening someone's property does involve threatening to violate/restrict someone's freedom in a morally relevant way, specifically their freedom over their property, so that would be coercive in a morally relevant way. — Dan

I have a problem with this approach. We are attempting to define "freedom" for the purpose of setting moral principles. If we proceed by reference to what is "morally relevant" then we produce a vicious circle. We define "freedom" by what is presupposed as "morally relevant", and this produces moral principles based on those presuppositions. To put it bluntly, this is the fallacy known as "begging the question". You are basing what constitutes a restriction to one's freedom on your preconceived ideas as to what is "morally relevant", consequently the moral principles derived from your conclusions will simply be a reflection of your preconceived ideas of what is "morally relevant".

Instead, I have proposed that we analyze the nature of "freedom", and proceed from there toward determining moral principles which would respect a person's freedom. This would utilize an understanding of "freedom", with a true definition of the word, based in an analysis of the human condition, rather than a definition based in one's preconceived ideas about what is and isn't morally relevant.

So, I proposed that we start with a distinction between the freedom of choice and the freedom to act, as I think that understanding the difference between these two could assist us in understanding the nature of freedom. However, you seem to have no interest in understanding the nature of freedom, only a desire to define "freedom" relative to some preconceived notions of morality. That sort of discussion, where the person demonstrates oneself to be completely unwilling to free oneself from the constraints of one's own preconceived ideas does not interest me.

I don't think this is convoluted in the least. I think I have been fairly clear from the beginning that what is morally relevant is a person's ability to understand and make those choices that belong to them. If you keep that in mind in reading my responses, I think it will be clear what I mean. — Dan

As I said already, in my opinion, restricting "morally relevant" to the "choices that belong" to the person, simply excludes the true essence of "moral value". "Moral value" is a principle of judgement aimed at judging choices which we make concerning what belongs to others, how we treat others, including respect for their goods and chattels. We cannot restrict "morally relevant" to choices which concern 'one's own' body, mind, and property, without losing track of what morality truly is.

Furthermore, as soon as I mentioned that this would require principles to determine what is truly "one's own", this started a seemingly infinite regress of principles required for a person to accurately determine what is "one's own". You started with body, mind, and property, but then you had to make exceptions to include freedom and rights which refer to a person's position relative to the public world, rather than what is "one's own". As soon as you included freedom you produced the vicious circle by defining "freedom" with "morally relevant", in an effort to bring it into the category of "one's own", having already defined "morally relevant" in reference to "one's own".

Simply put, you are trapped within your own ideas of what is morally relevant, refusing to accept, and denying the relevance of the ideas of others, because "morally relevant" for you implies that the ideas must be your own ideas to be morally relevant. As soon as you accept that the ideas of others might be morally relevant, and open your mind to them, freeing yourself from the restrictions of your self imposed solipsism, we might make some progress.

Only threats that threaten to restrict/violate your freedom would be morally relevant. So "I will shoot you" clearly would, but "I won't be your friend anymore" wouldn't be, because someone else being your friend is their choice to make, not yours. — Dan

Let me see if I follow you. A threat against one's freedom to act constitutes a restriction to one's freedom of choice, but a threat concerning anything else does not. Does this mean that a threat to take one's property, or threats against other rights which a person has, which do not involve one's "freedom", do not qualify as coercion? Sorry Dan, but your restricted definitions are getting too convoluted and difficult for me to understand.

Yes. Yes it does. The only other option is to say that one is prisoner of their own moral outlook. Which would be weird, to say the least. — AmadeusD

Why do you say this is weird? I think it's not only reality, but obvious. Are you familiar with the concept of original sin? We are all prisoners of our moral outlook, that kind of goes without saying.

Im unsure we're using these words in the same way, if this is your response.
"could have done otherwise" is the metric generally used, and the fact that you know something means it could have come to mind. There's not much more to that, in terms of what we're talking about. — AmadeusD

We must adhere to the facts though. The fact is that the other option did not come to mind. This implies that the reason why the person 'could not make the appropriate choice' is because the person did not put enough effort into the decision making. It does not absolve the person from responsibility, it simply provides an explanation as to why the person made a bad choice. The person has lazy decision making habits which restrict one's freedom of choice.

Otherwise, we are never free to choose anything, at any time. We are restricted by our current conscious access to whatever is in our minds and this changes drastically from moment-to-moment depending on environmental triggers (or lack of, i suppose). If you have a different metric you're using, please outline it. — AmadeusD

We are always free to choose, we are just not free to choose our restrictions. You seem to believe that a person is free to choose the restrictions which one's own body serves up, as if one could choose one's own body, or one's parents or that kind of thing. There are restrictions to our decision making capacity, which our physical bodies force upon us, which we cannot overcome no matter how much effort we make. So in the process of decision making there is two extremes, the rash, quick decision (which I called the lazy decision above), and also the overly extended, lengthy effort of trying to consider every possible relevant piece of information, when this is impossible for a person's mind to do anyway.

You seem to be using post-hoc "Well, it happened in way X therefore way Y wasn't possible" which is clearly wrong. If it's not that, i'll need some help. — AmadeusD

No, that's not what I'm saying at all. So I'll repeat. When the person makes a choice, there are specific options present to that person's mind. And; it is impossible for the person to choose an option which is not present to one's mind at the time of choosing. To state it very clearly, in the terms of your example, I am saying that it was not possible for the person to choose Y, if Y was not present to the person's mind as an option at the time when the choice was made.

You look at the situation and you determine Y was possible. I agree, Y was possible. Further, you might judge and say that the person ought to have chosen Y, and I might agree, yes, the person ought to have chosen Y. Further, we might agree that the reason why the person did not choose why is because Y, as an option was not present to that person's mind, if we agree that Y would have been the obvious choice for the person. So, our only point of disagreement seems to be that I say it was impossible for the person to have chosen Y at that time, because Y was not present in the person's mind, as an option, at the time when the decision was made. You seem to think that it is possible for a person to choose an option not present in the person's mind at the time of making the choice. I think that this is impossible.

You're conflating post-choice with pre-choice. I doubt Dan intends (and I dont) to suggest one can retroactively change one's decision. You could override it, but you can't undo it. Obviously. — AmadeusD

You seem to be agreeing with me, that choice occurs at a point in time. Now, do you understand that weighing options occurs pre-choice? Then a choice is made. Do you see, that when the choice is made, the chooser cannot then proceed to weigh options not brought up, as if the choice wasn't yet made? At this point in time, the point when the choice is made, it is impossible for the chooser to consider options not brought up, because the time of considering options is pre-choice. Therefore it is impossible for the chooser, at the time of making the choice, to consider any options not already present in the mind.

Once a choice is made, you're not free to choose otherwise due to the law of identity — AmadeusD

Yes, so this is the key point. A choice is made at a point in time. After the choice is made one cannot choose otherwise (except by changing ones mind, reversing the choice). So, at the point in time when the choice is made, if the person has not brought all the relevant information into the decision making process, then the decision making capacity of the person is impaired, restricted, by that failure to bring up the relevant information.

You can argue all you want, that the person could have brought more information to bear on the problem, and therefore could have made an unimpaired, or unrestricted choice, but the simple fact is that in the example, the person did not, and therefore when the person acted to choose, the person's choice was restricted by that habit or laziness, or whatever it was which caused the person to not bring forth the pertinent information.

You're just, for whatever reason, assuming that the example is one in which nothing brings the option to the subject's mind. I have been explicit that this isn't what I'm describing. — AmadeusD

It's my principle, my description, and that is exactly what I am describing, a case when nothing brings the other option to the person's mind. You and I look at the person, and say the person should have seen option Y, but the fact is that the person did not. Now, we have to separate the act of choosing, as a point in time, from the act of bringing forth and analyzing the information, which goes on for a period of time. In that period of time when the person is analyzing the information, for some reason option Y did not come to mind. Then, at a point in time, the person chooses, and I am claiming that the person's freedom of choice is restricted by the fact that option Y did not come to mind. The person's freedom to choose from all the possibilities is restricted by not having all the possibilities present. Therefore the person's freedom to choose is restricted The reason why option Y did not come to mind is irrelevant. .What is relevant is that at that point in time, when the person makes the choice, the person's freedom to choose from all the possibilities is restricted, therefore the person's freedom of choice is restricted, because that option is not there, in the person's mind.

No. It would be impossible to make a choice which was not consciously accessible at the time, say after a concussion. It is possible that anything could bring something not currently in ones waking consciousness. Again, your bar is way the hell too high. — AmadeusD

You are not distinguishing between the process of bringing options to mind, and the point in time when the decision is made. You recognize that when the decision is made, it cannot be otherwise, by the law of identity. You also recognize that "it would be impossible to make a choice which was not consciously accessible at the time". Now, you need to also recognize that the possibility of something bringing up a thought "not currently" accessible, is an irrelevant possibility, because it would be post hoc to the choice being made. At the point in time when the decision is made, only currently accessible information is relevant. So it does not matter that something could potentially bring up some other information. At the point in time when the choice is made, all the bringing things up in the mind is in the past. Because this is all in the past at that time, it is impossible that something else could enter into the decision making process. It's in the past, therefore it is impossible for it to be otherwise.

No. They are obstacles, I'd say, but not restrictions. Having no legs is a restriction on your choice of mobility. — AmadeusD

You are not recognizing the difference between freedom to choose and freedom to act. Having no legs is not a restriction on your freedom of choice, it is a restriction on your freedom to act. Without legs you can still choose to stand up and walk, you just cannot actually do it. People often choose to do things which are physically impossible. And, it is very important to distinguish between freedom to choose and freedom to act because threats appear to restrict one's freedom to act, but they do not restrict one's freedom to choose.

These aren't facts. Not meaning to be rude - but there are no facts being discussed. — AmadeusD

We are very clearly discussing facts, the facts about the temporal order of the process of making a choice. It is a fact that a person cannot choose an option not present to one's mind. And, it is also a fact that at the time when the person makes a choice, other options not considered are irrelevant to the choice which is made. What is a matter of opinion is whether this constitutes a restriction on one's freedom of choice. Once we get the facts sorted out we might be able to reasonably discuss the matter of opinion.

Good to know. :up: — apokrisis

I think you already knew that.

We are what we eat and we now eat fossil fuel. Coal saw world population explode from 0.5 to 2 billion. Fertilizer and oil resulted in a population increase to almost 8 billion by 2020. For a while, until middleclass antinatalism started to kick in, we were going not just exponential but super-exponential. — apokrisis

You are framing things to suit your purpose. There was many factors involved in the population explosion,, medicine, antibiotics, etc..

We "is" constrained by our genetics... — apokrisis

Being constrained by genetics is quickly becoming a thing of the past.

No, ideologies, biases, and prejudices do not restrict someone's freedom (generally). Religious faith may do so more often as there is often a threat of eternal damnation or something similar involved. Freedom is restricted by threats because the choice is coerced rather than free. If I point a gun at you and tell you to give me your wallet, your choice to do so isn't free, it is coerced. I have restricted your freedom to choose what to do with your wallet by forcing you to choose between giving it up and being shot. That is how coercion restricts choices, and the same thing is going on with laws. — Dan

OK, so your principle is that freedom of choice is restricted by threats, because a threat is an act of coercion. It appears to me, like restricting one's freedom is something which one person does to another person. And a good example of this is through threat. I have a couple questions.

First, are there specific types of threats which qualify as restricting one's freedom, and other types which do not? For example, if I threaten to not be your friend if you do not share your desert with me, is that a restriction of your freedom? To put it simply, does every instance of "I will punish you if you do not..." constitute a restriction of freedom? Further, does the threat to withhold a reward, or deny a pleasure, constitute a restriction to one's freedom? Suppose for example, a man's wife says "no sex unless you...", does this constitute a restriction to the man's freedom of choice? If it isn't the case that every threat is a restriction to one's freedom, how would you draw the line between ones that are, and ones that aren't?

The next question concerns the possible situation where the person doesn't care about the threat, so that the threat has no effect. Suppose the person puts a gun to someone's head and demands the wallet, and the person says "fuck you" and keeps walking. Is the threat still a restriction to the person's freedom of choice? It doesn't appear like it restricts the person's freedom of choice whatsoever. But this produces a problem. The very same threat might restrict a person's freedom in some cases, and not restrict the person's freedom in others. This becomes more evident in the other examples I gave above, where the punishment threatened is milder. Depending on how the severity of the threat is perceived, some people will respond to the threat, others will not care about it. Then the very same act may or may not restrict the person's freedom

It appears to me, like threats restrict freedom sometimes, but do not restrict freedom other times. Is that a fair conclusion? Depending on how the threatened person responds, freedom may or may not be restricted by a threat. If this is the case, then the restriction of freedom is really an attribute of the response to the threat, not an attribute of the threat itself. This is what I have been arguing, it is the thinking of the threatened person, which follows from the threat, rather than the threat itself, which actually restricts the person's freedom. This is very evident from the fact that some threats "work" while others do not.

For a clear example of how not knowing about an option does not restrict one's choices, let's consider how I might get to work tomorrow. Let's imagine that I am considering driving or walking, but I don't know that a bus route has opened up near my house and goes right by my work. My lack of knowledge about the bus route here doesn't make my choice less free. My freedom isn't restricted by the fact that I could have done things that I didn't know about or just didn't consider. I am still able to apply my rationality to the choice in question and make it freely. That there were other options I didn't consider is not a problem. — Dan

Obviously, your freedom of choice is restricted in this example. The freedom to choose the bus as your mode of transport was denied from you. That is a restriction to your freedom of choice. Another person who knew about the bus could choose the bus, and therefore that person's freedom has less restrictions than yours.

I think that we need to recognize that in no situation is a person's freedom of choice absolute, it is always restricted to some degree. We always say that a person's choice "is free", but it is also always implied that there are restrictions to a person's capacity to choose. So a person is always capable of making one's choice "freely", but there is also always restrictions to that freedom. Whether or not you knew about the bus does not affect the fact that you made your choice freely, but it does affect the degree of restrictions to your freedom. Not knowing about the bus made your freedom of choice more restricted than someone who knew about the bus, regardless of the fact that you both chose freely. Knowledge affects the restrictions to the freedom, not the freedom itself.

Biosemiosis helps us get our global metaphysics right. — apokrisis

That... is highly doubtful. Definitely not a map I would follow.

The future is open. The question becomes how we can expect the predictable state of the world to reshape our social values at a fundamental level. — apokrisis

First principle for the mapmaker to acknowledge, as the essential aspect of making a good map for the future, is that the future is in no way predictable. To start with a principle of predictability will not produce a map, but a step toward hell.

It has already been discussed that rules may be considered objects. — Lionino

...

I am correctly stating these two are distinct views, one may be a formalist without being a platonist and vice-versa.[/quote]

The question then, is how do you think that rules can be taken as objects, in a way which is not platonist? I already explained how the concept of "intersubjective objects" is inherently platonist.

You talk about "rules" without specifying what kind of rule you are talking about. — Lionino

I am talking about prescriptive rules, as I said, ones which people follow when they are doing what they should do, such as when they are doing mathematics. All prescriptive rules can be classed together as the same type, and this distinguishes them from descriptive rules which are commonly understood as inductive principles. Any further division of type is not necessary at this time.

If it is a mathematical rule, see the first line in this post and then this post. — Lionino

I don't deny that rules are subject to the platonist/nominalist debate. In fact that's what I am claiming, and that's what we are debating. I am saying that if you state that rules are understood as objects (whether or not those objects are claimed to be fictional is irrelevant), then you have taken a platonist stance in this debate. Further, I am claiming that all common formalist positions on this matter are platonist as well. I am not saying that it is impossible to produce a nominalist ontology of rules, I am saying that formlism relies on platonist ontology. And I've supported my claim with explanations. I am waiting for you to produce evidence which is contrary to what I am claiming, but you do not seem capable of finding any.

And I have no idea what Tones has been talking about.

The language must have been invented by satanists...I mean...platonists. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Our language is very much platonist. And this is the reason why Plato's writings are still available to us after more than two thousand years. He has had great influence over our culture, and those human beings in authoritative positions have had great respect for platonism, so platonism is extensive through our institutions. Therefore our culture and language have extensive platonist features. If you had education in the history of philosophy, you'd know this. Furthermore, the Catholic church was very much platonist influenced, and the Church, for an extended period of time, controlled the use of language through the use of force. This is known as The Inquisition.

The fictionalist position is that mathematical truths are fictional (that was already explained further by me above), and, since they are nominalists, that there is no such thing as abstract objects. That is the position, engaging in a debate about "object this object that" is pointless as you will choose to tailor the meaning of "object" to suit your ends. — Lionino

I think we've gotten beyond this talk of "objects". We've moved on to "rules", because rules are what formalism takes for granted. Platonism takes mathematical objects for granted, formalism takes rules for granted. These seem very similar to me, though you seem to have a desire to drive a wedge between platonism and formalism. That is why I said we need to look into the ontology of rules. If rules are supposed to exist in the same way that platonic objects are supposed to exist, then there is no real difference between the two.

Your reference to fictionalism inclines me to think that you want to portray rules as fictions. But this does not suit the nature of rules. Rules are guidelines for behaviour, principles of what one ought to do. Rules fall into a completely different category from fact and fiction and cannot be classed as either.

Ok, am I supposed to disagree? Formalism is still not disguised platonism, much less nominalism. — Lionino

We still haven't determined that yet, because we haven't determined how formalists account for the existence of rules. I think formalism generally takes rules for granted. Then the rules simply "are", just like platonic objects simply "are", and formalism is a form of platonism.

I don't think that is how habits work at all, but even if we imagine that it is, not realizing an option was available to you (generally) isn't a restriction on your freedom either. You are setting too high a bar for freedom. — Dan

Why do you say that not knowing a specific option doesn't restrict your freedom to choose it? I don't understand what you think freedom is. Do you think freedom is the capacity to do the impossible? That's what it seems like, if you think that a person can choose an option which is not present to the individual's mind.

I think you're somewhat glossing over the difference. The thread of enforcement creates a materially different scenario. You can - literally - have your freedom removed, rather than be unable to access it (for lack of a better way to delineate). I'm not saying this is the best take, but I think there's a difference here. — AmadeusD

You're not getting anywhere. The threat to -literally- remove one's freedom does not remove the person's freedom. You are jumping from the possibility of loosing one's freedom, to the conclusion that this is an actual restriction on one's freedom. A threat is just that, a threat. It is not an actual restriction to one's freedom, just a threat to it, that is plain and simple. The possibility (threat) of me being locked up in jail if I steal Dan's car, in no way limits my freedom to choose to steal Dan's car. I have a very difficult time believing that neither you nor Dan can understand this. I think that both of you are simply denying the facts because the facts are inconsistent with what you believe.

Just because it didn't occur to you in the moment doesn't mean you aren't capable of having made that choice. — AmadeusD

Yes it does mean exactly that. If you truly believe what you say here, explain to me how you think that a person is capable of choosing an option which does not come to the person's mind. If the option did not occur to the person at the moment when the person is making the choice, then the person was not capable of making that choice.

This is actually the issue which Dan and I started with. I said that making a choice restricts your freedom, because you are constrained by that choice made, while not choosing, deliberation and contemplation, provides you with greater freedom. At the moment when the choice is made, a person is constrained, and restricted, by that choice, and being only capable of choosing the options present to mind at that time. But it is only the act of choosing which forces those restrictions. If the person does not choose, one is allowed to find other options at a later time. If the person chooses, and something comes up later, it's too late to alter the choice already made.

You ought to see that it is logically impossible for a person to be capable of making a choice which does not come to one's mind. "Choice" requires something that is chosen, and the one choosing can only choose from the options present. Therefore it is impossible that a person is capable of choosing an option which does not come to the one's mind.

Something as simple as having encountered a slightly different shade of green prior to making the decision might have put you in mind of the 'other' option/s. — AmadeusD

Sure, if something different had happened, then the options might have been different. But we can only take into consideration what actually did happen. Counterfactuals are irrelevant because they refer to what did not happen. And, it is impossible to change what has already happened. Therefore counterfactuals deal with what is impossible, and are therefore irrelevant when considering these possibilities.

The different shade of green did not happen. The other option did not come to the person's mind. It was impossible for the person to choose that other option, when the choice was made, because that option was not present to the person's mind. The person's freedom to choose that option was therefore restricted.

I think if you were to make your point as one about things you don't know then it could be run, but in it's current form its basically saying "it's in the shadows, so it can't be real" as regards these other options' availability. — AmadeusD

I don't understand what you\re trying to say. The other options are not "in the shadows", they are simply not present to the person's mind at the point in time when the decision is made. Since they are not present to the person's mind it is impossible that the person can choose them. It's very simple and straight forward. I really cannot believe that you guys have such a hard time to understand something so obvious.

Yes, you very much can. There are entire therapies dedicated to this mechanism. Memories are very, very rarely actually lost. This is why I made the point earlier that, sure, if you didn't know the thing you couldn't drag it up even with the aid of environmental triggers. — AmadeusD

It doesn't even matter if it is possible to drag up the memory or not. What matters is whether the person actually does drag up those particular memories. If the memories are not pulled up, then the person cannot use the information (which may be deep in the mind somewhere anyway) in the decision making process. Not pulling up the information restricts one's freedom of choice by leaving options concealed. It is impossible for the person to choose an option not revealed. This is why habit is so important as a restriction to one's freedom. A lazy habit inclines one not to pull up all the relevant information which is stored in the brain, and this restricts the person's freedom to choose other options.

It's very clear, that lazy thinking habits restrict one's freedom of choice. I find it very difficult to believe that intelligent people like you and Dan actually dispute what is so obvious. Do you not agree that prejudices, biases, and ideologies in general are real restrictions on one's freedom of choice? What about religious faith? Is this not a restriction to one's freedom in your mind? Where would you draw the line? Prejudice, ideology, and religious convictions do not restrict one's freedom, yet respect for the law does restrict one's freedom? How so, by threat? As explained above, threats don't actually restrict one's freedom of choice. I think you and Dan need to reconsider.

It's just you not thinking about an option that you had. — Dan

It's a lot more than simply not thinking about something, it's knowledge not held, information not available to that thinking mind. An observer might say option X was available to the person, but if the person was lacking in that information, the option was not available to the person.

A restriction would mean you are unable to do the thing. In this case, you're just misguided. — AmadeusD

But that is exactly the case with Dan's perspective. Dan thinks laws, and the threat of punishment are restrictions. But these do not prevent one from carrying out those acts. Neither of us assumes that it is necessary that a restriction prevents in an absolute sense, to be a "restriction", so this criticism is completely irrelevant.

This is why we need to distinguish between freedom to choose and freedom to act. Here we have the basis for impossibility, restriction in an absolute sense. Some things chosen are impossible to achieve in actions due to physical restrictions. This is the case when someone is physically prevented with violence for example. Physical impossibility is an absolute restriction, making the chosen act impossible.

And, in the context of freedom of choice some options are impossible for a person to chose because they are not present to the person's mind. Do you agree that a person is unable to choose an option which is not within that person's mind? This would be the case when the person has a lack of knowledge for example. An observer with more complete knowledge would say that the person should have chosen X, but in reality it was impossible for the person to have chosen X because the person did not have that knowledge. This impossibility of choice is comparable to physical impossibility of action.

Any instance where a further option is suggested to you leaves you open to considering it. Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really. Habits are flimsy, mentally speaking, versus the ability to take on new information. — AmadeusD

Yes, suggesting a further option makes that option available, and the restriction is no longer complete, absolute, in the sense that this choice is no longer impossible for the person. But that is irrelevant to the fact that this choice was impossible at the prior time.

Now the force of habit is very relevant. If choosing the newly presented option requires thinking in a way not familiar to the person, the option will automatically be rejected. This is very evident in discussions at TPF. People are firmly entrenched in their habits of thought, so that it is extremely difficult to teach them to accept a new perspective. This relates to the attitudes underlying one's use of language, which Wittgenstein talked about in On Certainty, as bedrock propositions or something like that. These underlying principles, which are actually attitudes, are what a person assumes cannot be doubted. This makes it extremely difficult to change a person's habits of thought, and accept a new option which is unacceptable from the perspective of the existing attitude. Therefore mentioning a further option brings that option into the realm of possibility, but existing habits still restrict one from choosing it.

What do you mean by "not really" in this sentence?
"Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really."
Your habits dictate the information available to your thinking mind, information in memories. This is a very real and absolute restriction, you simply cannot dig up information which has been forgotten. And, the way that your mind works, in its habits, greatly restricts your capacity to take on new information. The new information must be taken up in a way which is consistent with the existing way of thinking. If it's not, it's rejected as incomprehensible, or nonsense. This fact is very evident at TPF.

In the case of the habit, the person's choice isn't being restricted at all. — Dan

I explained why the person's choice is restricted by habit. The habit prevents the person from properly considering other options. This is a very real and very strong restriction to one's freedom to choose. The most significant restriction to one's freedom of choice is a failure to consider all the possibilities. The person is free to choose any option, but literally cannot choose an option which doesn't come to mind. The best option may not come to mind, due to the person\s preexisting habits of thinking, so the person's freedom to choose that option is restricted accordingly.

And, back to the point we started with, making a choice restricts one's freedom in much the same way. The choice is made, and the person proceeds accordingly. Proceeding with the choice firmly decided restricts one's freedom to choose otherwise.

It sometimes looks as if people are talking about different things - Does anxiety have an object, real or imagined, towards which it is necessarily directed - final exams, getting cancer, or whatever - or can one just be suffused with a feeling of anxiety about everything and nothing? — unenlightened

I think that when anxiety is directed toward a specific thing it is understandable, and therefore generally not in itself disconcerting. Depending on what the object is, the anxiety will reach a level corresponding with the importance of the object. This is understandable as the level of anxiety tends to remain consistent with the importance of the object.

When anxiety appears for no apparent reason, and has no specific direction, this is a completely different situation. Then it feeds on itself, unnerving the individual, making that person a victim. This I believe is the nature of a panic attack, anxiety without an object.

A threat to one's freedom is not an actual restriction of one's freedom.

So we're right back to square one. Coercion restricts one's freedom by having an influence on the way one thinks, and therefore one's choice, just like habits restrict one's freedom by influencing the way that one thinks, and therefore one's choice. It is the person's choice which actually restricts the person freedom to act, not the threat, because the person could choose to disregard the threat. Therefore the threat is not a real restriction. You say that a threat coerces, but only if it succeeds, and the fact that it may fail demonstrates that it doesn't actually restrict one's freedom to choose. The necessity required for causation is lacking. It's something else (how the person who is coerced responds to the threat) which actually does the restricting.

Your refusal to acknowledge the reality of the restrictions on the freedom of choice, and the freedom to act, is just evidence that the habits of a closed mind restrict one's freedom to adequately judge an hypothesis.

For anyone who doesn't understand what the number 1 is, it makes perfect sense to ask: "What kind of thing is the number 1. The answer, for a platonist is: "It is a mathematical object". The answer, for a nominalist is: "It's not a thing".

Pick your choice. Or, you can maintain your position as someone who doesn't understand what the number 1 is, and keep asking "What kind of thing is the number 1?"

To say, "the number 1 is a fictional thing," provides nothing by way of explanation, because we are left with essentially the same question; "What kind of thing is a fictional thing?". That's just an evasion; an indecisive move of avoidance practised by a slippery sophist. The sophist then slides off and starts talking about the number 1 as if it is a platonic object, hypocritically insisting that it is not.

You want "endless" growth. Well what if we stop a minute to let you define that as some sustainable balance over a long enough term. Let's hear what you really want out of "a life". — apokrisis

Endless growth is the idea which I said we should give up on. It's like the idea of endless life, impossible and inherently selfish.

You want "endle — apokrisis

Or if instead this is the moment to rewrite the script – in a way that is rationally believable – then let's see what that looks like as a social balancing act. Pragmatically it might mean 90% more time with the family, as you all dig the homestead dirt, and 90% less time consuming stuff so that wealth no longer has that demand side plughole to flush the global ecology down. — apokrisis

My point was that a "balancing act" is not the appropriate alternative. We still need something with an upside, but with an upside which is other than growth, based on external changes rather then internal changes. And whether something is external or internal is dependent on how we define the fundamental unit.

But ecologically growth doesn’t have to end. The limits to growth are limits in terms of certain unchecked exponentials. Population. Atmospheric carbon. Ecosystem destruction. — apokrisis

I don't see how you can say that growth doesn't have to end, then go on to list the restrictions which will necessitate an end to growth.

Also it is arguable that given time we could run civilisation much as we know it off the solar flux and a big investment in sensible green tech. — apokrisis

Maybe we have your catchy slogan right here: "time to start living off the solar flux". What is the solar flux?