The reality of non-physical actuality is demonstrated by logic, and the logic proceeds from premises derived from physical activity. The aspects of physical activity which lead to the conclusion of the non-physical cannot be understood by "physics", so the non-physicalist concludes that these aspects of reality can be approached through other processes of understanding, metaphysical principle which allow for the reality of the non-physical.

The physicalist metaphysics however, renders these aspects of reality as fundamentally unintelligible. So for example, we have everything within the realm of science which gets designated as "random" (random mutations of genes and abiogenesis, random fluctuations of quantum fields and symmetry-breaking), being rendered as fundamentally unintelligible by physicalism, whereas the non-physicalist would argue that such things are actually intelligible, if approached through non-physicalist premises.

"Strong emergency" in the title is very eye-catching. I thought it was going to be a thread about the relationship between down-ward causation and global climate change, as an example of a strong emergency.

In my opinion, this addition by Bedau is superfluous: you do can actually describe the properties of an emergent phenomenon with "normal" physics, where its substructure is usually irrelevant, so a form of "coarse graining" will happen (f.i. with Bohr's atomic model the substructure of the atomic nucleus is irrelevant, only the electric charge of the nucleus plays a role; and you need a new theory (namely quantum mechanics) to describe that phenomenon) — Ypan1944

I don't think this is correct. The strong force of the atom's nucleus is not understood by physics. And since the negative charge of the electrons is balanced by the positive charge of the nucleus, separation of the electrons from the nucleus is not possible. There would no longer be electrons if separation occurs, but free energy as photons. So the electron's "electric charge" is dependent on the atom's nucleus for explanation, and the nucleus cannot be left irrelevant.

Supervenience is therefore completely different from "downward causation". — Ypan1944

I find you have not provided a good explanation of "downward causation", only giving a general outline, and stating distinctly what downward causation is not.

Problems occur if you consider the elements of a set to not be themselves sets. Set theory only talks about sets. It does not, for example, talk about individuals.

The lists only list other lists... — Banno

The question of what "a set" is, the definition of "set", becomes an issue when you consider the possibility of an empty set. If a "set" is taken to be the type, category, or definition which indicates the criteria of membership, then an empty set is possible. If "set" is supposed to refer to the group or collection of elements itself, then an empty set is impossible because that would be a non-existent collection of elements. The "non-existent collection" could not be understood by that definition, because that would mean "set" is understood by the category, not the elements in membership, So it is at this point, when we consider the possibility of an empty set, that we need to make a judgement about the relationship between individuals and sets.

It wasn't meant to be a literal example, it was meant to give you a visual of something not being there, then there. The big bang is another typical example. Does that work better? — Philosophim

No, the big bang does not work better. Something not being there, then there, is not the problem, because the thing could move there. What is the problem is absolutely nothing, then something.

And I've asked you to give a concrete example. I've even noted that I believe you aren't doing it because you know if you do, your point will collapse. That's a challenge anyone who believed in their point would rise to. — Philosophim

It was a logical argument I provided. Concrete examples are unnecessary, either you can show me the weakness in the argument or not. You have not even tried, asking for a concrete example instead.

Ok, and a first cause is that which is not caused by something else. This does not show that what I stated is wrong. Cause 'implies' change? What does that mean? The definition of cause has been clearly noted, you've recognized it, and this doesn't address the point at all. Also, no example despite my request. — Philosophim

You still have not addressed the argument. A "cause" must have an effect. This means that something is caused to change. That is the effect of the cause. The thing which changes exists prior to the cause, and posterior to the cause. It doesn't matter whether the cause is a "first cause" or not, the thing which is caused to change by the cause, exists prior to the cause.

I've already gone over reason and prior reason. I was the one to say these words first to Ludwig, " All causes are reasons, but not all reasons are causes." So are the words I used to validate my points now invalid? — Philosophim

Yes your argument is invalid. You say, if there is no prior cause then there is no prior reason. That is an invalid conclusion if "not all reasons are causes" is true.

So I think we're done. I hope our next conversation doesn't have as much animosity from you next time. Especially after we started off so nicely when I said it was good to see you. Remember that? Lets end this on a high note. — Philosophim

There's no animosity on my part. It just seems like you get upset when you start to apprehend your mistakes.

So what judgement call are you actually hesitant in making? That the approaching object is John? Haven’t you tacitly made that call already, by not thinking it is any particular object at all, insofar as your proposition makes no mention of what you think the approaching object may or may not be? In effect, you’ve thought it unjustifiable to name the approaching object, which your proposition in fact represents. Another way to say you’re hesitant in making a judgement call, is to say you just don’t know. Which is fine, of course. — Mww

The judgement I was speaking of was whether or not the approaching object is John. But I think I see your point, this implies that I've already judged that it is a person, and for some reason, or reasons, I've singled out John as the person it may be. This would be what is at issue, the reason why I've decided it may be John, because this would be the "evidence " which I am considering, what justifies naming the approaching object with that name.

So the situation is, that the name "John" has come to my mind as possibly the correct name for the thing I already have judged as an approaching person. And "John" I associate with a particular individual whom I am acquainted with. Since the name "John" has come to my mind, and is the name I am considering, I ought to conclude that there is some thing, or things, which I have already judged as evidence of John. We have distinguished two types of evidence, direct evidence, as the consideration of the visual image, and the indirect, incidental, as things like the quality of my visual capacity, and the fact that I am expecting John.

It appears to me, like as @Michael pointed out, the incidental evidence is actually much stronger than the direct empirical evidence. The direct evidence in this case relies on making an association between the immediate visual image, and the memory. But this association must be allowed to be overruled by the incidental evidence. This means that direct, immediate, empirical evidence is at a low level in the scale of reliability. Incidental evidence, prior knowledge, like knowledge about the fallibility of the senses and memory, and in this case knowledge about John's habits and intentions, must be allowed to overrule direct empirical evidence.

In relation to arguments for "Physicalism", I would say that this is strong evidence against physicalism. Physicalism is mostly supported by the idea that direct empirical evidence is the most reliable. However, it is now quite clear that direct empirical evidence places very low on the scale of reliability. We must allow that logical arguments based in prior knowledge are far more reliable as evidence for or against physicalism. And the logical arguments which have stood the test of time are mostly against physicalism.

I understand and can accept most of that, with the exception of suspending judgement. From the perspective of critical thought, to think is to judge, from which follows suspension of judgement is impossible. — Mww

I think that the exact relation between thinking and judgement is a very difficult issue. And, depending on how one would define each, both being somewhat ambiguous in general use, would dictate the relationship established. But if "judgement" occurs on a multitude of different levels, then some thinking would be prior to some judgements and posterior to other judgements. Any way, if you feel inclined, I'd like to see the principles from which you draw that conclusion: " From the perspective of critical thought, to think is to judge, from which follows suspension of judgement is impossible."

It's not the judgments are compatible, its that the experience is compatible with both conclusions. If it was not compatible with both conclusions, then there would be no doubt. — Bylaw

The simple claim "the experience is compatible" is simply meaningless without clarification. Experience is meaningless without some sort of interpretation of it, and this would require a description in words, or at least some form of association. How we choose the words, such as "John" in the example, as a form of association, is a form of judgement. So talking about "experience" without judgement makes no sense. There is judgement inherent within any sort of reflection on experience.

The parts of the experience that might lead you to think John is approaching
are hard to consider evidence that John is not approaching.

But in in a situation where you are not sure John is approaching, but you think he is, the overall experience you are having contains evidence that he is not approaching. There is something about the entire experience that leads to doubt. — Bylaw

As Mww has (I believe) accurately described above, these different judgements are completely distinct judgements. "The thing looks like John", and "my eyes are faulty" are not necessarily related at all. Even distinct judgements of the visual impression itself are not necessarily related. "The coat looks like John's", "The type of walk does not look like John's", for example. Without the question "is that John", the individual parts of the sensual experience are unrelated, "red coat", "favours the right leg". Then, upon the question "is that John", the incidental evidence also becomes very important, "I am expecting John", "my eyes are bad so the visual sense experience is not reliable", etc., are now very important aspects of the overall experience.

The doubt, is dependent on how the various distinct judgements, direct empirical, and the indirect incidental, which are all part of the overall "experience", are related to each other. So, we must apply a further formula, or system of judgement to classify the distinct judgements as reliable and unreliable. And, as I showed above, direct empirical judgement needs to be be classed as low on the level of reliability.

So, there must be elements of the experience that FIT with it not being John approaching.

(and for what it's worth, it seems to me FJ has been fairly patiently trying to get his point across and felt it was important that you come up with the scenario and also that the scenario had specific features. I certainly could have missed things, but it seemed like your reactions included some negative assumptions about his attitudes and intentions which did not help the discussion. ) — Bylaw

FJ refused to separate different judgements which are very clearly distinct, as Mww shows. "That coat looks like John's coat", "my eyes are not very good", and "I am expecting John at this time", are all very distinct, and fundamentally unrelated judgements. FJ refused to separate these very distinct judgements, conflating them as one self-contradicting judgement. That is what my scenario shows, that FJ conflated very distinct judgements into what was claimed by FJ to be one judgement, which was demonstrably a self-contradicting judgement if it was actually one judgement.

I don't see your point, rain is the effect, the cloud is the cause. The water though, preexists the cloud.

Please articulate an argument supporting this premise. — ucarr

A cause, by definition, has an effect on something. The thing which it has an effect on must preexist the cause. In other words, "cause" implies "change", and "change" implies something which changes.

Naive question. Am I not right that, strictly speaking energy is work done - the capacity to do work is called "potential energy", isn't it? — Ludwig V

I don't think this is quite right. Energy is the capacity to do work. Something active has the capacity to do work, and this energy is kinetic energy. Something inactive, but in a condition to become active has potential energy. So for example, the energy within a fuel source is inactive, therefore potential energy, requiring ignition to become active and become kinetic energy. Each is the potential to do work, in slightly different forms.

I've given several examples. All I'm asking is for you to do the same. I'm not asking for proof that such a thing exists, just give me a possible example of something which makes logical sense that could exist. In my mind you're dodging the issue here. — Philosophim

I've seen you put up some examples of a possible first cause, (like a photon suddenly coming into existence from nothing), but none of your examples make any sense to me. A photon is a quantum of electromagnetic energy, it comes from an electron, it doesn't just come into existence from nothing.

Metaphysician...I've been kind so far and given you as much benefit of the doubt I can. This is stupid. You are better than this. Go to anyone else besides me and say that sentence and watch their confused looks. This is why I keep asking you for examples. If you cannot show how such a statement can logically exist I'm going to assume you're trolling or you are arguing in bad faith. Work on this and give me something good to think about please. — Philosophim

I've told you why it is illogical to say that there is nothing prior to the first cause, it's restated at the very beginning of this post, in my reply to ucarr. Please read it. All you do is make illogical assertions and say that anything other than your illogical assertion is "stupid".

What? No. If there's no prior cause, then there is nothing prior which caused a first cause to exist. If there is nothing prior to cause something, there is no prior reason for the existence of it either. — Philosophim

Reasserting the same invalid conclusion gets you nowhere. That there is no prior cause does not imply that there is no prior reason, because reason is the broader term. Do you not understand this? All causes are reasons, but not all reasons are causes.

Now we can reason about the existent thing. But we cannot say there is a prior reason, as there is nothing prior that caused it. Please demonstrate a situation in which there is no prior cause for something, yet there is a prior, and by this I mean temporal, reason for it. — Philosophim

And, as I've explained repeatedly, that there is not a cause prior to the first cause does not mean that there is nothing prior to the first cause. This is another instance of invalid reasoning.

I'll try explaining again. Lets take an example of a photon that appears without prior cause. Now, once it exists, it is bound by causality by what it is. Meaning it can't suddenly act like an atom, because it is a photon. It can't interact with other things as an elephant suddenly, because it is a photon. It is the first cause in a causality chain only because nothing caused it to exist. But its continued existence begins a causal chain with whatever happens at the next time tick of its existence. — Philosophim

A photon appearing uncaused makes no sense. Photons are known to have a source. This is how the history of the universe is understood through analysis of cosmic background radiation. If photons could appear from nothing, then the universe could not be understood in this way.

If there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. — Philosophim

Invalid conclusion repeated again.

Random is not inconsistent with an explanation, — Philosophim

"Random" explains nothing.

Quite so. It's perhaps worth noting that the same applies to what happens after the heat death of the universe. — Ludwig V

The supposed "heat death" is an interesting issue. The heat death is the result of entropy which is the natural effect of the passage of time. "Entropy" refers to energy which is unavailable to the system, but cannot be shown to have escaped the system. So by the rules of the conservation law, that energy must still be within the system somehow, only not available to the system.

This leaves us with the question of, "what form could this energy have?". It is not "energy" as we know "energy", because "energy" is defined as the capacity to do work, and this energy is denied of that capacity. It is only "energy" because the law of conservation dictates that it must be conserved as "energy".

This is very similar to the problem I exposed with Philosophim's "first cause". There must be something prior to the first "cause", but it cannot be a "cause" by the definition which Philosophim says we must adhere to. Thus my suggestion of a different type of "cause" (which is analogous to a different type of "energy" produced by entropy, a type of energy inconsistent with the definition of energy).

Since Philosophim insists that we cannot use "cause" in this way, we have to look at "the reason" for the first cause. So this is analogous to "the reason" for entropy, which is a violation to the absoluteness, or ideality of conservation of energy, in a way similar to "the reason" for the first cause being a violation to the absoluteness or ideality of "the first cause".

As for your eyes…..the weather, the crowd, you’re being intentionally tricked, a whole menagerie of incidental evidence….. each is the content of an individual judgement, the compendium of which determines the experience you’re going to have, affirming your thought, in which case it is John, or negating it, in which case it isn’t. — Mww

So this is the doubt which flannel jesus is obsessed with. Flannel seems to think that the doubt created by all that "incidental evidence" implies that when I judge my experience of the empirical object, either "evidence of John", or "not evidence of John", I am assuming that the one judgement is compatible with the opposing judgement.

As this appears to be illogical, then how does a person actually relate to this incidental evidence, doubt, which is contrary to one's actual judgement? I believe this would be a psychological issue and the answer would vary between one person and another, and even within the same person, from one situation to another, depending on the type of doubt involved.

So, consider this example. The object is approaching at a distance, and my eyes are not very good (incidental evidence), so I'm hesitant to make the judgement call. However, I am expecting John (incidental evidence), so I am inclined to make the judgement that it is John. Now we have two distinct types of incidental evidence, my past experience of weak eyes inclining "do not judge", and my anticipation, intention to meet John, inclining "make the judgement".

Notice what I've done. I've classed the incidental evidence as influencing whether or not the primary judgement is actually made. I believe that is the proper representation of "doubt". When an individual is in doubt, judgement is suspended. Some forms of incidental evidence remove doubt, increasing certitude, (like @Michael's example), and incline "make the judgement" while others increase doubt inclining "do not judge".

So, when we go back to look at the primary judgement, the object is approaching at a distance, and I am considering whether my experience of seeing that object is evidence of "John is approaching" or not. Some incidental evidence will incline me toward a hasty judgement, and some will incline me toward a tardy judgement. A hasty judgement is a feature of an underlying attitude of certitude (I'm expecting John, it must be him), and a tardy judgement is a feature of an underlying attitude of doubt (my eyes are weak I ought not judge). The same person will have certitude in some respects, and be doubtful in other respects, depending on how the individual apprehends one's own strengths and weaknesses. And in some situations, like if my eyes are weak and I am expecting John, the two attitudes will be conflicting.

You said your evidence was that you saw a guy who looks like John approaching — flannel jesus

Strawman. I said:

I'm standing on the street and I see something at a distance. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't have to write paragraphs and paragraphs about the minutiae of the philosophy of judgement... — flannel jesus

That is why I am disinterested and have designated discussion with you as pointless. I'm here for the philosophy.

Something circular going on here. It's a feeling I have had for this entire thread. — jgill

It appears there is a vicious circle. Philosophim removes the infinite regress, or eternal circle of causation, breaking the chain by inserting "reason" instead of "cause" at some unspecified temporal point. The breaking of the chain produces a "first cause". But there is no reason given for why the chain begins at one point in time rather than another point in time, i.e. why X cause is the first ,rather than Y or some other cause being the first, leaving the selection of the point in time at which the first cause appears, as totally random. But random is inconsistent with "reason". So philosophim refers back to causation, saying the reason for the first cause is the first cause itself, and that produces the vicious circle. But a vicious circle does not constitute a reason or explanation.

You have demonstrated that you have no interest in discussing the judgement by which something is labeled as evidence, not even agreeing with me that a judgement is required to label something as evidence. Discussion is pointless.

also agree this would be a problem. But I am not using the term reason to explain another cause. That would clearly contradict my notion that a first cause is absolute, so I think even a moderately charitable reading of what I've been expressing would conclude I'm not attempting to blatantly contradict myself. — Philosophim

But you are making unjustified claims about "the reason" for the first cause's existence.

I have noted many times why this must be, but it might have been missed. First, I'm using 'reason' as an explanation. "Why is this a first cause?" Reason: Because it has no prior cause which caused it. Pretty simple. — Philosophim

It's not as simple as you make it sound. The question is not "why is this a first cause" because you have not identified a particular "concrete" cause which you claim is a first cause, and asking why is this a first cause. You have provided an argument which shows the need for a first cause. So the question is the more general, "why is there a first cause?". And you might answer it in a similar way, "because there is necessarily a cause without a prior cause". But this does not suffice because it does not answer the question of what is prior to the first cause, and why whatever it is which is prior to the first cause cannot be called "a cause". That's what makes a first cause a first cause, it is the explanation why a first cause is a first cause, the reason why whatever it is that is prior to the first cause cannot be called a cause.

See, "because it has no prior cause" does not answer the reason why any particular cause is a first cause, because that requires showing the reason why whatever it is which is prior to the first cause cannot be said to be the cause of the first cause. We cannot simply assume that there is nothing prior to the first cause because that is unjustified.

And I'll note again, "reason" is not being used as "cause", but explanation. So to your point, "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations, yes. — Philosophim

"Because it exists" does not suffice as an explanation for anything.

Your point has largely been, "Maybe there's a prior cause to the first cause." This is what I'm addressing. I have not seen a concrete example that demonstrates a situation in which there is a first cause, then you show that logically, there is actually a prior cause to that. If we had a concrete example, we could look at that. And if you have and I've missed it, don't get mad, just repost it. — Philosophim

Since you refused to accept conventional philosophy concerning different types of causation, I've found that I have to approach your argument from the distinction you've made between "cause" and "reason". I realize that it is pointless to try to explain something to someone who has no interest in understanding, because understanding would demonstrate that person to be wrong, so I have given up trying to talk to you about final causes. Going forward I will talk about "reason" instead, because this is a term you used.

Look, if there's no prior cause for something, there's no prior reason for something either. — Philosophim

That is unjustified. To make that claim, you need to demonstrate how all reasons are necessarily causes. But you've already admitted that there are reasons which are not causes. And, you said that the first cause has a reason, but not a cause, so you support that admission in your usage. Furthermore, you have no premise which allows you to conclude that the reason for the first cause is not prior to the first cause, because you have not properly established the reason for the first cause. All you've said is that the reason for the first cause is that there is no prior cause. But that's only the reason why it is "first", it is not the reason why it is "cause". And that is a requirement for the reason for "first cause", that we have the reason for it being called "first", and the reason for it being called "cause".

Give me a concrete example of what you mean by a first cause having a prior reason without that prior reason being the cause of the first cause. — Philosophim

I don't know what you're talking about here. You've excluded the possibility of a prior reason being the cause of the first cause through definition. Therefore a prior reason of the first cause must necessarily be something other than a cause, and what you ask is nonsensical. A concrete example of the prior reason for a first cause is not required until you produce a concrete example of a first cause. I tried giving you concrete examples of first causes already, with free will acts, but you ended up rejecting them because they refuted your argument.

Give me an example. — Philosophim

Example of what?

I just typed out the definition of reason and noted I'm using it as a synonym to 'explanation'. I'm uninterested in your opinions that I have no logic, I'm interested in if you can take the logic I've noted, and give a good example of counter object that would demonstrate that my logic is wrong. — Philosophim

As said above, "it simply exists" does not qualify as an explanation. So if you are using "reason" as synonymous with "explanation", you'll have to do better.

Incorrect. You only have empirical evidence of things which have prior causality. As I've noted, we do not have empirical evidence of things which do not. This does not negate the logic that there necessarily must be a first cause. — Philosophim

I don't dispute your argument about "there necessarily must be a first cause", I dispute the further unjustified conclusion you make, that the first cause cannot have a prior reason.

No, I don't need to do anything. I've clearly laid out what a cause and first cause is as defined here. You need to demonstrate with some concrete examples why this definition is either impossible, contradictory, or doesn't make sense. — Philosophim

Your request for concrete examples is completely out of place. You have a purely abstract logical argument about an abstract concept "first cause", and you make an unjustified conclusion concerning the first cause, i.e. that it cannot have a prior reason. This is all abstract logic, there is no place for a concrete example.

If you simply don't like it, that's not my problem. Its on you to demonstrate how one of the most basic logical statements you can construct, "There can be no cause prior to a first cause" is somehow illogical. To my mind where I have given you every benefit of the doubt I can, you have not done so. — Philosophim

I've already demonstrated that. How quickly you forget. A "first cause" is "first" in relation to a specific chain. There may be a multitude of different chains. The "first" of one chain may be prior in time to the "first" of another chain. Therefore the assertion "there can be no cause prior to a first cause" is illogical.

Do you understand that if there is something which caused the Big Bang, then the Big Bang is not a first cause? A first cause is not an opinion or belief. It is a reality that we either know about, or do not know about. — Philosophim

As I've explained to you already. Your conception of "first cause" is a product of an unnecessarily restrictive definition of "cause", one which does not provide for all the things which are commonly, in philosophy, known as causes. Therefore it really is an opinion, your opinion. But you got tired of hearing about that, and I got tired of telling you that.

You spoiled the fun. I was waiting to see how long it would take flannel jesus to actually justify what was claimed, through a description of probability like you did, rather than repeatedly asserting the same thing over and over again without justification.

The first ball being blue is strong evidence that the box now contains 99 blue balls. However, the first ball being blue is compatible with the box now containing 99 red balls, i.e. the first ball being blue does not prove that the box doesn't now contain 99 red balls. — Michael

The only thing I can say here is that maybe probability does not actually qualify as "evidence" in a strict and proper sense of the word. I'd like to dismiss your example, because it is manufactured,. The scenario must be staged, two boxes, with the right coloured balls must be produced, and then the person who doesn't know which is which, must choose a blue one and make the judgement. So I'd say your example, and therefore the evidence of what you are trying to prove, is manufactured. In other words, you've manufactured evidence to support flannel jesus' claims.

So let me offer a different example. Take my example of seeing something approaching on the street. Now suppose that since I've seen John approaching everyday at about the same time for the past month, I apply this probability as "evidence" that what I see is John approaching. This supposed "evidence" is not directly related to the thing being judged, but related through some general principles of inductive reasoning. So the problem which Hume demonstrated is relevant. I agree that the observations of John at all those other times, and the resulting probability is still "evidence", as it still supports the truth of the claim, but it is a slightly different sort of "evidence". Rather than being directly related, it relates through a logical inference. So we can categorize two distinct types of evidence. Isn't this other type of evidence what is commonly known as "circumstantial evidence"?

The same principle would apply to your box of balls example. Even though the example is structured so that you can assert "strong evidence", nevertheless, it is still circumstantial evidence, not being directly related to what is in the box, but related by some form of inference.

What? YOU'RE the one who told ME it was evidence. If I'm prejudiced by granting that it's evidence, SURELY you are too, right? YOU told ME it was evidence. — flannel jesus

That's exactly the point. You ought not take someone else word for it, when they hand you something and say "this is evidence of X". You need justification, and this allows you to make the judgement yourself as to whether or not it is evidence. Otherwise, someone will hand you many different items saying these are all evidence of X, and you'll come away thinking X must be true because there's a mountain of evidence for X. That, I propose is the way that you behave toward physicalism. Someone else makes the judgement "X is evidence of physicalism", and since it's consistent with the hypothesis you already believe (physicalism), you accept "X is evidence" as true.

That is prejudice, no judgement of what is claimed as evidence, by you, because it is claimed to be evidence of what you already believe. Then more and more people may claim it as evidence in that prejudiced way, while the originators of that claim die off, until there is a small percentage of those who believe that it is evidence, who have actually judged whether the supposed evidence is evidence or not.

Then "X is evidence of Y" could become the bias of convention. And, we could have a large percentage of the overall population claiming "X is evidence of Y", and only a small percentage saying "X is not evidence of Y", solely because "X is evidence of Y" is the bias of convention. But if we look only at the people who have actually judged for themselves, whether X is evidence of Y or not, it could turn out that the vast majority of them believe X is not evidence of Y.

n fact, that's the entire reason why I asked you to come up with a scenario and an example of evidence instead of providing one myself - I was predicting exactly this sort of thing from you. I present a scenario, I say such-and-such is evidence, and you find some weird reason to decide "that's not evidence". — flannel jesus

If you cannot defend you judgement "X is evidence" by justifying this claim, then I suggest that there is something wrong with that judgement. If you are simply saying "X is evidence of Y", because you have a prior belief in Y, and someone told you that X is evidence of Y, then you are prejudiced.

The "evidence" points to one thing being the case, but it's not certain, and you can always conceive of ways in which you would have that eviddence, even if that conclusion is not the case. Fingerprints - a person can be on trial, and have evidence be submitted that their fingerprints are at the crime scene, and nevertheless they didn't commit the crime. It's possible for your fingerprints to be somewhere and you still did not commit a crime there? Those two things are... compatible. — flannel jesus

I already pointed out to you, that context is the key factor to evidence, so this type of example is simply useless. Just because a person's fingerprints are at a crime scene doesn't mean that those fingerprints are evidence against the person. So this type of example is pointless.

Evidence is not synonymous with proof. — flannel jesus

You are not understanding what I am saying. In no way did I say that evidence is proof. This is because the judgement of "evidence" is subjective in the way that I described. And, the opinion of a subject does not constitute proof. That is why I need to justify my claim of "evidence", and you ought not take what I claim to be "evidence" as evidence without justification.

As I said, an individual knows oneself, and also knows one's own judgements to be fallible. So when I recognize what I see down the street as John, I take this recognition as evidence that John is approaching. However, I am in no way certain that John is approaching because I also recognize the fallibility of my capacity to recognize a person at such a distance.

The only logical permission for the evidence to not support the approaching object as being “John”, is upon the instantiation of additional evidence in the form of different empirical qualities derived from subsequent perceptions, but not of the same evidence by which the representation was determined. It is by the analysis of these different qualities, and those of sufficient disparity from the antecedents, that the thought of the approaching object cannot in fact be “John”, which is, of course, a significantly distinct and entirely separate judgement in itself. — Mww

What about the factor I mentioned though, an underlying doubt, or attitude of uncertainty, recognition that my judgement may be mistaken? I think that this would have a source other than empirical evidence. So as much as I believe that the approaching thing is John, I am uncertain because I know that my eyes are not good, and this uncertainty would be circumstantial evidence supporting the approaching object as being not-John.

To me, it makes perfect sense how I framed it. — flannel jesus

I know it makes sense to you, because as I've already mentioned you think, in an illogical way. Some study of critical thinking may be useful.

You have evidence. The evidence you have increases your confidence that John is approaching, but you're not certain it's John approaching because the thing you're experiencing as evidence, you could also experience if John were not approaching. — flannel jesus

You demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of "evidence". Evidence is a judgement that the object supports the hypothesis. However, you begin with the assumption "you have evidence", without reference to the required judgement. Therefore you have prejudice, you believe that the object supports the hypothesis prior to the judgement, because it is taken for granted as "evidence".

This prejudice is clearly evident in your reference to physicalism. You seem to think that the occurrence of a physical reality, and the scientific understanding of it, are evidence of physicalism, without the requirement of a judgement against these objects which are supposed to be the evidence. They are received as "evidence". So you seem to say, it could still turn out to be the case that physicalism is wrong, but I'll adhere to physicalism until someone proves to me that physicalism is false. In the meantime, I will not review the evidence because it has already been granted the status of "evidence".

I don't think there's anything outlandish about what I'm saying here. — flannel jesus

It's not outlandish, just prejudiced, which unfortunately is the norm.

It does not mean that Kant is correct. Scientists showed us in the 20th century that time and space are affected by physical facts. — Lionino

Do you mean, scientists show us that they adapt their conceptions of time and space according to the different problems which arise, and the new evidence?

However, that information you have, that evidence, is COMPATIBLE with the statement "John is not approaching", isn't it? — flannel jesus

No, of course not! Why would I judge it as evidence of "John is approaching" if I thought it was compatible with "John Is not approaching"?

You're not certain John is approaching - the only reason you're not certain is because you know there's a way where you could experience seeing what you're seeing, while it's simultaneously true that John is not approaching. — flannel jesus

I am not certain because I know I might be mistaken. I do not in any way think that "John is not approaching" is consistent with what I see, or else I would be inclined not to judge what I see as evidence of "John is approaching". That "I might be mistaken" is a completely distinct judgement, a recognition of my underlying fallibility. It is not a judgement that what I see is compatible with "John is not approaching".

So the statement "I see what I think is John approaching" is completely compatible (but not evidence for, just compatible) with the statement "John is not approaching" - compatible because they can both be true at the same time. — flannel jesus

That statement is a strawman. The correct representation is "I judge what I see as evidence that John is approaching". When you acknowledge the proper representation you ought to see that if I judge what I see as evidence of X, there is no way that I can consistently claim that I also judge it as compatible with not-X.

If they couldn't both be true at the same time, then you would be certain John was approaching.

Make sense? — flannel jesus

Not at all, you use a strawman to make your point. When you say "I see what I think is..." you incorporate the judgement about the fallibility of my judgement, about what I see, into that statement. The fallibility is implied by "what I think is...". But this statement represents the conditions posterior to the two distinct judgements. That is to conflate two distinct judgements, that I judge what I see as John, and that I judge my judgement as fallible, incorporating them into one statement.

Obviously, if I couldn't recognize the thing I saw, as John, I could not claim that it is evidence of John. And that is what makes your representation plainly wrong. I must recognize what I see as John, judge it to be John, and incompatible with not-John, or else I have nothing that would indicate that what I see is evidence of John. There are two distinct levels of judgement which must be respected if you want to properly understand the situation. Each is a judgement of "is" which excludes "is not". I judge what I see as John, excluding is-not John. And, I judge my judgement as fallible, excluding is-not fallible. If I in any way allow doubt into my judgement as to whether or not what I see is John, I have no warrant to "evidence of John".

So, let's look at the situation properly. I know myself to be fallible, that is an underlying attitude. I see something which I judge to be compatible with "John is approaching" and incompatible with "John is not approaching". Since I know my underlying fallibility, I conclude that what I see is "evidence" of John approaching, rather than certainty that John is approaching.

Make sense?

In the case of the Big Bang, time and space are created by it and do not exist before it. — Ludwig V

Time and space are conceptions we apply toward the understanding of our surroundings. Kant calls them pure a priori intuitions. It does not make sense to say that they are a part of the things which surround us, just like it doesn't make sense to say that numbers and geometric shapes are a part of our surroundings.

If you see a ball for example, and say "that is a sphere", this is a description, and "sphere" refers to the concept used to describe the ball. You are not saying that there is a conceptual sphere there in your environment, rather you are saying that there is an object there which is representative of the concept, so that "sphere" is the acceptable concept to describe it.

Likewise with time and space, these are concepts we use to describe the world around us, so it doesn't make sense to say that time and space were created by the Big Bang. It is more appropriate to say that the universe, which we understand through the concepts of time and space was created by the Big Bang. However, it is acceptable in common vernacular to say "time and space are created by it", just like it is acceptable to say, when pointing to a ball, "that is a sphere".

So nothing can be prior to it, whether cause or reason. — Ludwig V

Based on what I said above, this is not a sound conclusion. It appears like the intuitions and concepts which we use to understand our world, and our universe, would not be applicable toward understanding the reality of whatever the conditions were prior to the Big Bang, but this does not imply nothing can be prior to it, in any absolute sense. What it is that was prior to the Big Bang would most likely require a completely different conceptual structure to understand it.

But, it seems to me that a cause cannot exist outside time, whereas a reason can. So there is reason to think that there might be a reason for the Big Bang. But I don't see that there could be a cause for it. (I have no idea what the reason might be, but there seem to be some interesting speculations around.) — Ludwig V

If you adopt a separation between the world around us, and the conceptions employed by us to understand that world, as I explained above, this provides the premises required for logic to extend beyond the world of empirical evidence. This is what we find in pure mathematics for example, logic which goes beyond the empirical world. I suggest that in this way we can find the principles required to understand statements like "prior to the Big Bang". It's simply a matter of recognizing that concepts naturally conform to the things which they are applied to, and if we want to understand what is outside of those things, like cause of and prior to them, we need to provide the concepts which can do this.

Can you think of a situation where you have evidence for a claim, but the evidence does not leave you certain that the claim is true? Please describe that situation, the evidence, and why you're not certain the claim is true even after finding that evidence. — flannel jesus

OK, if you don't want to come up with your own example, here's something nice and simple for you. I'm standing on the street and I see something at a distance. I think that it is a person approaching, and I think that it is John, so I conclude that what I see is evidence that the claim "John is approaching" is true. I'm not certain that it is John approaching, yet I conclude that what I see is evidence that "John is approaching" is true.

Does this suffice?

I know where the information can be found. You have not demonstrated any specific type of other cause, only vague, "maybes". So far the main point is that a "first cause" means there can be no prior cause by definition. Since you cannot give me a concrete example that gets past this, I see no evidence of any refutation. — Philosophim

My discussion of intention, free will, final cause, did not consist of vague maybes.

Ok, this is a much better point! What you're missing is the phrase 'prior reason'. If you noted I'm not saying that there isn't a reason for a first cause, I'm saying there is not a prior reason. — Philosophim

That, as I demonstrated is a faulty conclusion. The conclusion is that there cannot be an event prior to the first cause as the cause of it. The conclusion "there is not a prior reason" is unsupported.

Just like I told him, there is overlap because if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. — Philosophim

You have no premise to draw this conclusion. A "cause" as described by your "chain of events", is an "event". We might say that a cause, or an event suffices as "the reason" in some instances, but it does not in all instances. This implies that "reason " is the broader term, with a wider range of meaning. If the inverse was the case, if all reasons were causes, then "no prior cause" would imply "no prior reason". But that is not the case, so "no priior cause" does not imply "no prior reason". Conversely, "no prior reason" would imply "no prior cause" as "reason" has logical priority over "cause", "cause" being included within "reason".

The reason why there can be no prior reason for a first cause, is that there is no prior causal event. There can be a reason as an explanation for why a first cause exists, "That is it simply exists." But there cannot be a prior reason, as there is nothing prior which causes it. Does this clear up the issue? — Philosophim

Again, you have no logic to support this conclusion, that the reason for the first cause could only be "it simply exists". Your argument does not deal with reasons at all, it deals with causes, so any assertions you make about the reasons for the first cause are only unsupported opinions.

This is not an empirical argument. This is a logical argument. When Einstein constructed his theory of relativity in regards to large bodies, logically, it was sound. It was only after they observed and measured an eclipse that they could empirically confirm it to be true. I make no empirical arguments here. I simply note that logically, if we continue to examine any chain of causality, whether that be finite or infinitely regressive, we will eventually run into a first cause. So no, there is no empirical observation as of yet that refutes this claim, nor any empirical observation that confirms this claim. This discussion is not an attempt at empirical proof, but a logical proof. As such, unless you can logically refute it, it stands.

And this, so far, is the only weakness I've seen in the argument. It is only a logical argument. A logical argument does not mean empirical truth. By the way, Bob Ross is the only other poster to my mind who understood and communicated this right off the bat. Well done, I consider him one of the best philosophers on these boards. :) So, if you wish to say, "I don't care about what logic says, I only care about empirical proof" then I will simply nod my head and state, "That's fine." But that in itself does not show it is a false logical argument. — Philosophim

My reference to empirical evidence was simply to show that your definition of "cause" is not consistent with empirical evidence, it is therefore a false premise. And this inconsistency, false representation, is why it is difficult to understand the nature of "the first cause" which is necessitated by your argument. Your definition of "cause" is false, and as I've explained many times to you already, you need to broaden your understanding of what a "cause" is. Otherwise you're just stuck with an unsound argument, based on a false definition of "cause", produced by a misunderstanding.

.

I'm a jury member on a murder trial. The prosecution has show me <some piece of evidence> which I rationally consider evidence that the defendant committed the murder, BUT that evidence still doesn't leave me 100% sure the defendant committed the murder. I'm not 100% sure because <...>. — flannel jesus

Did you not read my post? I answered that question already, here:

So let's proceed in the way you suggest. I have judged the item to be "evidence" of the claim being true, and this implies that I have judged it as incompatible with the claim being false, as warranted by the obligation described above. However, I am still uncertain as to whether the claim is true or not, because the evidence is insufficient to thoroughly convince me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly I said that I judged the item as 'evidence" of the claim being true, without being certain of the truth of the claim that it is evidence for.

Why do you not agree with me that to rationally consider the item as evidence that "the person committed the murder", or that "the milk is in the fridge", it is necessary to judge that the item is incompatible with "the person did not commit the murder", "or "the milk is not in the fridge". Why would you dispute this?

I think it would be illogical to judge the item as evidence for the truth of "the person committed the crime" or "the milk is in the fridge" yet also believe that the item is compatible with the falsity of the statement. How could you honestly say that the item supports the truth of X, while you believe that it is compatible with not-X? The two, X and not-X are clearly incompatible, they cannot be consistent with one another, and everything consistent with X is not consistent with not-X. Clearly it is illogical to judge the item as consistent with not-X, yet also supportive of X, as "evidence" of X.

And why do you think the degree of certitude is at all relevant? Something can be accepted as evidence without the requirement that it produces certainty.

Can you think of a situation where you have evidence for a claim, but the evidence does not leave you certain that the claim is true? Please describe that situation, the evidence, and why you're not certain the claim is true even after finding that evidence.

If you can't think of a situation like that, let me know. — flannel jesus

Ok, I will try to put myself into that imaginary scenario, so we can proceed. I am considering the truth or falsity of a claim. Someone presents me with something said to be evidence of the truth of the claim, or perhaps I simply find something which I would like to judge as to whether or not it is evidence of the claim. Is this consistent with the imaginary scenario you suggest?

If so, let me continue. To judge it as evidence for the claim being true, I would be obliged by due diligence to ensure that it is inconsistent with, or incompatible with, the claim being false. If the potential "evidence" is apprehended by me as compatible with the claim being false, I could not judge it as evidence of the claim being true. So to continue with your imaginary scenario, let's say I judge it as indicative of the claim being true, which implies that I have also judged it as incompatible with the claim being false, and so I label it "evidence" of the claim being true.

The degree of certitude which I have concerning the truth of the claim, following the judgement that the item is "evidence", is irrelevant. I may be highly certain, somewhat certain, or still very skeptical. This would depend on how indicative the evidence is, how much other evidence there is, and the relations between the evidence.

So let's proceed in the way you suggest. I have judged the item to be "evidence" of the claim being true, and this implies that I have judged it as incompatible with the claim being false, as warranted by the obligation described above. However, I am still uncertain as to whether the claim is true or not, because the evidence is insufficient to thoroughly convince me.

Is that what you mean?

This is not an argument. If you have in mind a particular idea, please demonstrate it. If not, my point stands. — Philosophim

I was just telling you where the information can be found. There's much reading and too much for me to present to you here. Your argument is refuted by the possibility of other types of causes, along with the fact that the "first cause" which you conclude is a different type, as I've shown. I've already described how "final cause" is a different type. If you do not want to further your study then so be it.

The chain is just a visual metaphor. How does your proposal work? How do I have a first cause, then have another cause that causes the first cause without there being a causal link between the two? You have to understand by this point, what you're proposing without a concrete example is coming across as a clear contradiction to me. — Philosophim

OK, I'll stick right to the point. The issue is how you switch from "cause" to "reason" in your argument, without proper definition. You demonstrate the necessity of a "first cause", then you conclude:

""4. Alpha logic: An alpha cannot have any prior reasoning that explains why it came into existence. An Alpha's reason for its existence can never be defined by the Z's that follow it. If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself."

You continued to insist that there cannot be any prior reason for the first cause, despite the fact that I pointed out that this is not a valid conclusion. And above, you even denied your own statements with the following:

"Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. If there is no other reason for its existence, there cannot be any rule which made it come into being. Meaning the only logical conclusion is that its existence is truly random as I've defined above."

Simply put, your conclusion of "first cause" provides you with no premise for making any statements about the reason for the first cause, without further premises to define what "reason" means. Your conclusions about "the reason" for the first cause are invalid. You cannot conclude that there cannot be a prior reason for the first cause, or that the first cause is its own reason, because you have no premises about "reasons". Any such statements are not conclusions but personal opinions not supported by the argument.

So, I'll explain another time, in a slightly different way, why your argument is self-refuting.

In your argument, "cause" requires a definition to be meaningful. It is defined by "prior" and it is defined by "chain of events". "Chain of events" is not metaphorical, it is part of what defines "cause", and what necessitates a "first". If you don't like "chain", you could call it a procession of events or something like that. but each cause is "an event". The existences referred to are "events", and each event is a cause.

You show that there is necessarily a "first cause", which means a first event. You then proceed to assert that there could be no "reason" for the first event, as prior to, and being the reason why the first cause occurs. However, "reason" has a different meaning from "cause". And since "cause" is defined by "event", and "prior" "a reason" might be something other than an event, yet still prior, as demonstrated by free will and intention. Your argument does not exclude the possibility that the reason why a first cause occurs could be something other than an event.

Further, the argument ends up being self-refuting because it demonstrates its own definitions to be inadequate, false. That's what I've been trying to explain to you. An "event" as we know it has a cause and an effect, a prior and posterior. This is because it occurs in a duration of time. But the argument produces the conclusion of a "first cause", and this is not consistent with "event" as we know it. Therefore your argument's definition of "cause", restricting it to an "event" is inadequate, false, because the meaning of "event" which is necessitated by the argument is inconsistent with empirical evidence of events. The argument produces the conclusion of an event (first cause) which only has a posterior part, without the prior part, and this is inconsistent with observation. This demonstrates that your definition of "cause" is false causing the argument to be self-refuting.

You might move to replace "cause" in your argument with "reason", but this creates a number of other problems for the argument because the reason why an event occurs might be intention, which is other than "cause" by the definitions required for your argument.

I notice that here, as elsewhere, you use the word "reason" at this point, instead of cause. "Reason" and "cause" are not synonyms, are they? At least, not in philosophy. So what is the significance of this change in language? — Ludwig V

This is exactly the problem, addressed above. The issue is that the reason for an event may be the cause of the event. This occurs in the case of intentional acts. But the two "reason" and "cause" are in no absolute way, equivalent or interchangeable. And, as I explained to Philosophim already, if we move to allow that "cause" of an event includes also the "reason" for the event, as a type of cause, then we must remove the defining feature of a chain, series, or sequence, because this type of cause does not occur in a chain. But Philosophim is disinterested in other types of cause, and wants to adhere to a definition which involves the sequence, or series. However, adhering to that definition invalidates the switch to "reason". Furthermore, it renders Philosophim's argument as self-refuting because the argument itself demonstrates that the "first cause" requires a distinct definition inconsistent with the description of the rest of the causes in the series or sequence. In other words the argument demonstrates that it's premises are inconsistent with empirical description.

I think you've already told me why you disagree. If you think you can justify what appears to me to be very clearly illogical behaviour, with an appeal to authority, then be my guest, give it a try.

But that's not what I'm stating. I'm stating the first cause period. This is not a specific type of cause, so there can be no other invented type of cause that is separate from what I'm defining. — Philosophim

That is not correct. You stated the first cause in a "chain of events". This does not imply "first" absolutely, it only implies first in that chain. That is what allows you to say there might be a multitude of first causes. If you accept this, then you know that "first" does not mean "the first cause period".

So, I suggest to you, that if you better understood the concept of "cause", and the multitude of different types of "cause" which have been described over the years, you would see that some types of "cause" do not occur in chains. And, just like the first cause of one chain might be prior in time to the first cause of another chain, a cause which is of a different type might be prior in time to all the first causes of all the chains.

I'm a bit at a loss here on what you're trying to say. Its very simple. Either something is caused by something else, or it isn't. Its not complicated. I'm not sure a final cause makes sense unless this cause ended all of reality. Otherwise causality continues. — Philosophim

Sure, either something is caused by something else, or it is not, that's self-evident. However, you wrongly conclude that the first cause in a chain of causes could not have been caused by a different type of cause, a type of cause which does not operate in a chain.

I recommend that you read some philosophy concerning the concept of causation. Aristotle's outline of the four principal ways that "cause" is used is a good place to start.

Are you saying that in front of the first cause of a chain, there's another chain that causes the first cause in the first chain? — Philosophim

No, I am proposing that there is a type of cause which does not operate through a chain. You seem to be stuck on the idea that all causes must be described as a part of a chain. Look up Aristotle's "formal cause" for an outline of a type of cause which is free from the constraints of a chain. Then you might start to understand how "final cause" as the defining feature of intention and free will is a type of cause which is independent from any chain.

No, I'm clearly noting the definition of "First cause" is that there is no prior cause. — Philosophim

This is incorrect. You are saying that the "first cause" is the first in a chain. The fact that you allow for a multitude of first causes, being the beginnings of a multitude of chains, each one possibly starting at a different time, indicates without a doubt, that you do not mean "that there is no prior cause".

Incorrect. When I say "my first birthday" I mean, "My first birthday" No other days. First birthday. First cause. No other causes. You are saying, "There could be prior cause to the first cause" is the same as "There could be prior birthdays to the first birthday". This is clearly wrong. If the other days in the analogy are making it difficult, eliminate them and just say, "First day". You cannot have a prior X to the "first X" by definition. — Philosophim

Philosophim, do you read what I write? I clearly stated that there are "significant days" which are prior to your first birthday, not that there are "prior birthdays to the first birthday" as you straw man.

Your statement, "I mean, 'My first birthday' No other days" is demonstrably impossible. There is 365 days in a common year. All those "other days" are implied by "my first birthday". Your first birthday comes a year after your birth. That means that it is impossible that there are "no other days" of significance prior to your first birthday.

No, I've already stated the reason it is a first cause is that it has no prior cause that explains its existence. Its part of the definition which I feel I've been pretty consistent and clear on. — Philosophim

That is not your definition, it is your conclusion, which I'll mention again is an invalid conclusion. Your definition of "first cause" is as stated in 1) of the op the beginning of a "chain of events": "there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows."

You then wrongly conclude that there can be no prior cause which explains its existence. And if your intent is to combine the two into one definition, then there is inconsistency within that definition, which warrant it being rejected as unsound. It is commonly accepted that causes (free will) may act independently of the chain of events.

I'll admit when I'm wrong no problem, I do it all the time. — Philosophim

Then get on with it. Why do I have to repeat the same thing over and over again, while you keep insisting that your mistakes are not mistakes?

I'm insisting my conclusion is valid because you have not presented a valid counter to it so far. I'm claiming, "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition." You're proposing "A first cause could have some prior cause". You are stating, there could possibly be a prior X to a first X. If this is the case, isn't this a contradiction? — Philosophim

You accept that there could be a multitude of "first causes" as the beginnings of a multitude of causal chains. Since there is nothing to ensure that the various beginnings are all at precisely the same time, then please confess to your mistake. The following statement or so-called "definition" is incorrect, or inconsistent: "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition".

Since your two so-called definitions of "first cause" are demonstrably inconsistent with each other, you need to choose one or the other. Is a "first cause" the beginning of a causal chain, or is it "first" in an absolute sense, meaning that there could be no cause of any sort, prior to it in time?

I meant exactly what I said. The word "existent' in English is an adjective, not a noun. It means specifically, "having existence or being; existing" https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/existent#:~:text=adjective-,1.,existing%20now%3B%20present%3B%20immediate

An existing thing describes a thing with a verb. Except that people might say that thoughts are not things. So I don't want to describe things, I want to describe what exists.

We largely agree on most of what's being said here, so lets not nitpick over petty grammar though. I really want to figure out this difference between us. — Philosophim

This does not at all help me to understand what you meant by "set of existence".

A prior cause means its part of the chain of causality. I'm more commenting on this comment so you understand what I meant by first causes. A few chains intersecting somewhere is an intersection of causality, and a continuation. The intersection is not a first cause. Multiple first causes would be the start of each chain. When we get to multiple first causes, its probably better thought of as a web, with the first causes being the beginning of each strand. — Philosophim

Now you propose to define "prior" in a way which renders "prior in time" as unintelligible. If each chain has a "prior" which is specific to that chain, then you have no way to produce a temporal relation between one chain and another. Each chain would have a "first cause", but we would have no way of saying which first cause is "prior" to another first cause because you have defined "prior" as being relative to the chain itself, rather than an independent measurement of time. It would be much more intelligible if we maintain a distinct flow of time, and judge "prior" relative to the time of occurrence rather than the position in a chain.

If you would like, you can introduce why you think Aristotle's four causes is pertinent to this discussion. — Philosophim

That's very straight forward. In your argument you restrict "cause" by definition, to mean an event which occurs within the context of a chain of events. But the way that we understand reality involves using "cause" in ways which are other than the context of a chain of events. This was very well explained by Aristotle. In our understanding of reality we use "cause" in the way of "final cause", intention and free will, and this is a type of "cause" which is independent of any chain of events. Therefore your definition, which restricts "cause" to an occurrence within a chain of events is not representative of the way that we understand reality, and is thus a false premise.

I do not think that GPT has been adequately dealt the capacity to judge what counts as "evidence". GPT has not been trained in critical thinking. It will just cite things which people like flannel jesus, who judge evidence illogically, state is "evidence".

my disagreement with you wasn't about physicalism, it was about evidence and compatibility. Have you corrected yourself on that point yet? — flannel jesus

I surely disagree with this. Let me present my evidence, in no way is it compatible with "my disagreement with you wasn't about physicalism".

The evidence for physicalism doesn't push the probability of those other ideas to 0. That's okay, the available evidence doesn't have to push other ideas to 0 - I, as a physicalist, have no problem with that. "The probability that I am wrong is above 0" is not a particularly hard thing for me to say here. — flannel jesus

What are you saying, I'm a physicalist but I'll own up to the possibility that physicalism might be wrong? I'm a physicalist and I don't mind admitting that the probability that physicalism is right is about .999...? — Metaphysician Undercover

The guy I was responding to said that the best evidence for physicalism still leaves the door open to other theories. I'm just expressing that *that's okay*. I'm okay with that, I don't see a problem with that. — flannel jesus

I would think that "physicalism" is quite strict, not allowing for the possibility of an open door. Isn't that what physicalism is, saying that there is no possibility of anything other than the physical? Opening the door would be rejecting physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Me, as a physicalist, saying "the evidence for physicalism could also plausibly still be compatible with non-physicalist ideas" is not me rejecting physicalism. — flannel jesus

I don't see the logic. If it is compatible with non-physicalist ideas, then it is not evidence for physicalism because it's equally evidence for non-physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

It was your attitude about what constituted "evidence for physicalism" which interested me.

Do you accept the fact that there are situations where when you have evidence of X, that evidence can still be compatible with not-X? — flannel jesus

No, I would not accept that, it's what I insist is illogical. If the object is judged as compatible with not-X it is illogical to judge it as evidence of X. Only things judged to exclude the possibility of not-X can be judged as evidence of X. If it is judged as compatible with not-X it cannot be accepted as evidence of X

That kind of illogical thinking, which you demonstrate very well, produces an arrogant self-deceiving certitude which inclines one to aggressively assert "X is true because all the evidence supports X", all the while knowing that all of the so-called "evidence" is actually compatible with not-X. That all of the supposed "evidence" is compatible with not-X means that it is not really evidence of X at all, and there is no evidence of X. It is simply an illogical way of judging what counts as "evidence of X" which produces self-deception by way of confirmation bias. The "logic" of a closed mind apprehends everything as evidence for what it believes, and shuts out every other possibility as improbable.

Good. That's what meta was disagreeing with me on. He was not correct about that. — flannel jesus

Thanks to this discussion, I now think I understand the faulty logic which persuades you of physicalism. Stuff which you judge to be compatible with non-physicalism, you illogically judge as evidence of physicalism, by appealing to ignorance.

There are limits to what "first" means — Philosophim

The issue is the limits to what "cause" means, not the limits to what "first" means. Reference to "chain of events" implies a specific meaning for "cause", that of "efficient cause". However, the category of "efficient cause", the type of causation implied by "chain of events" does not include all the possible types of cause. Therefore the first cause in a chain of events could have another type of cause as its cause.

I've clearly defined what a first cause would be correct? — Philosophim

Yes you've defined it as the first in a chain of causes. However, there are other types of causes which do not occur in a chain like that, specifically the one I mentioned, "final cause". Therefore a "first cause", as defined by you, could still have a cause prior to it, so long as it is a type of cause which does not occur in chains, as per your definition.

There is no prior thing which causes itself to exist. — Philosophim

This is where your logic is wrong. The valid conclusion is that there is no earlier part of the chain. But this does not exclude the possibility of a different reason for the first cause. The first cause could have been caused by a type of cause which does not partake in the chain, like final cause. The first cause, by your definition, is very explicitly the beginning of the chain. This implies that the reason for the first cause, the cause of the first cause is something which cannot be said to be a part of the chain. You wrongly conclude that there can be no cause whatsoever, prior to the first cause, by wrongly assuming that there cannot be a type of cause which is free from the chain.

What I don't agree on is how this difference is anything but the fact that a first cause cannot be explained by a prior cause. — Philosophim

That's not what the argument shows. The argument shows that the first cause is the first in a chain. It does not show that there cannot be a prior cause, it shows that the prior cause cannot be a part of the chain. "First" is in reference to the chain, it designates the beginning of the chain. It does not designate "the first cause" absolutely. This is evidenced by your insistence that there could be many first causes. Which of them would be the first first cause? And since the occurrence of something from nothing (first cause coming from absolutely nothing) is completely incomprehensible, and unintelligible, we ought to conclude that what is implied is that there is a cause prior to the first cause which cannot be understood to be a part of the chain. That is the most reasonable assumption.

By definition, I cannot be wrong. — Philosophim

"By definition, I cannot be wrong"? Are you saying that the definition of "Philosophim" is "the person who cannot be wrong"?

The only difference between a first cause and a normal cause is that a first cause cannot have something prior which explains its existence. That's it. Meaning by definition, there can be no other cause which explains its existence. — Philosophim

You are wrongly interpreting your own argument. The difference between the first cause and the other causes in the chain, is that no part of the chain is prior to the first cause, whereas parts of the chain are prior to all the other causes in the chain. This in no way implies that the first cause "cannot have something prior which explains its existence". That conclusion requires a further premise, that the only thing which can explain something's existence is the extension of a causal chain prior to the thing's existence. But this premise is simple determinism, and is disputed by anyone who believes in free will, so it is not acceptable as a sound premise.

If you want to explain to me why there isn't a contradiction, please demonstrate how its not a contradiction for someone to claim that having a first birthday one year after giving birth, doesn't necessarily mean they didn't have a prior birthday. — Philosophim

I've been explaining, but you are not listening. Here, I'll refer to your example, "my first birthday", if that might help. When "my first birthday" occurs, or when it is referred to, it means the first in a chain of significant days. But this does not imply that there are no other significant days in your life prior to your first birthday. So prior to your first birthday, there are many other significant days in your own life. Likewise "the first cause" in your example refers to the first cause in a particular chain of significant events, but prior to the first cause there may still be many other events which have significance relative to the first cause.

I'm trying to have a conversation to see if what I'm claiming holds upon scrutiny. — Philosophim

The fact that you keep on insisting that your conclusion is valid, after scrutiny shows you that it is not, inclines me to think that your are improperly attached to your conclusion, and would resort to trickery to persuade people of it.

I claim a first cause is logically necessary. Not that there can be only one first cause. Meaning other things can exist in the universe, and something appears uncaused by anything within that universe. Meaning that the replacement of 'cause' with 'things' doesn't work. — Philosophim

You did not understand the analogy, or else you are in denial. Hopefully you'll understand with the birthday example. But if you do not, I'll be more convinced that you are arguing to deceive, not to understand.

I don't see it being particularly fraught myself, but I'll define it if need be. Take any set of existence. What caused that set of existence is anything outside of that set of existence which is needed for that set to be. A set which does not need anything outside of itself to exist, is a first cause. — Philosophim

Sorry Philosophim, but "set of existence" seems to be incoherent. Do you mean "set of existents" or "set of existing things"? Maybe you could make another try.

Anyway, by Aristotelian metaphysics, each and every existent has two distinct requirements needed for it to be. One is matter, the other is form. In this way there is always at least two distinct types of cause needed for a thing to be. If one of these types of cause forms a causal chain with a first cause, there is still the other type of cause, which may well be prior to the first cause of the causal chain.

It is as a mathematical "fact", but it might not appear in nature. — jgill

The important issue, which you might have seen me argue at numerous places and times on this forum, is to go further than to say "it might not appear in nature" but to question whether it is possible for such a thing to occur in nature.

The point being that mathematics consists of ideals, and the ideals can be very useful in application. However, it's debatable whether it's even possible that any of these ideals could actually exist in nature. So the irrational nature of pi for example provides for a strong argument that the ideal circle simply cannot exist in nature. Then we can replace the question of what is it about mathematics which makes it so useful, with the question of what is it about the natural reality which makes it so that it does not perfectly correspond with the ideals of mathematics. It is this part of reality, the part which makes it so that it does not correspond with the mathematical ideals, which makes reality difficult to understand.

I think Trump is going to win the Republican caucus.

Only an AI could run against him.

Thoughts? — L'éléphant

Trump is an AI, complete with hologram form, created by the deep state, or the deep fake, or maybe the deep Putin, who knows?.

Literally any other person would be able to answer the question with ease. It's not trickery, you're just weird. — flannel jesus

This is simple denial of the trickery you employed. If you do not address the issue that I mentioned, which exposed your question as trickery, I will continue to assert that you are simply denying the trickery employed.

Do you agree that "evidence" is a judgement? And if so then please stop talking about evidence as if it is some sort of independent object.

I'll explain what I did say again one last time and allow you a fair chance to be more honest next time you post to me: what I said was not "it is EVIDENCE for and against a claim", I said you can have something that is evidence for one claim and COMPATIBLE with another claim. If you want to know the difference, feel free to ask — flannel jesus

Look flannel, "EVIDENCE" is a judgement made concerning the object, that the object supports the truth of the statement. "COMPATIBLE" means consistent with. Whatever object is consistent with S is not consistent with not-S, by way of contradiction, unless the object is completely irrelevant. If the object is completely irrelevant it is not evidence. If the object is judged as consistent with S, (supporting S, is evidence of S), then it cannot also be judged as COMPATIBLE (consistent) with not-S without contradiction.

"1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows"

I expected clear logic: Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one thing that does not. — jgill

Philosophim's statement is rather meaningless. We could just as well replace "cause" with "thing" here, and say either all things have a prior thing or they do not. What we do in this case is assume a temporal separation between the thing and the prior thing, such that they are distinct "things". That's what "cause" does here, it implies a temporal separation between the thing known as the effect, and the thing known as the cause.

Now we have a series of "causes", or "things". The series may or may not proceed infinitely. The issue which arises when we apply this to the real world of empirical evidence, is that each of the separate, distinct things, or causes, must differ from each of the others, as this is what the nature of time and change indicate to us. However, we use the same word for all of them, to signify that they are all of the same type, or category, a "cause" or a "thing". In statements like Philosophim's the word used "cause", is meant to be all-inclusive, most universal, so as to create the appearance that there could be nothing outside that category. Then what appears, is that if there is a "first cause", there could be absolutely nothing prior to the first cause because "cause" is meant to be all-inclusive. But that's deception, because there must be criteria as to what constitutes a "cause" so there could always be something else outside that category. And that's the deception which Philosophim argues, that prior to the first cause, there could be absolutely nothing, therefore no reason for the first cause's occurrence. That's why I proposed switching for the word "thing", to expose this sort of sophistry. If there is no thing prior to the first thing, it appears like there is absolutely nothing, but that's a mistaken conclusion. What "thing" actually represents is a category, or type, and there might be something prior to the first thing which is outside that category.

That's why I'm trying to get Philosophim to recognize the need to assume different types of "cause". The proposed causal chain really only represents one type of cause. So if we accept that "cause" in this usage represents only one specific type of cause, then we can allow that prior to the first cause there is a distinctly different type of cause. This is completely consistent with what the empirical evidence demonstrates to us about the temporal succession of the coming into being of a multitude of things of the same type. We can see the need to posit a first of that type, but this does not imply "first" absolutely, just a division or boundary, a temporal limit to that type, and prior to that type is a different type. So for instance we could say either there is a human being prior to each human being, or there is a first human being. Evidence indicates that human beings must have a beginning, so we are inclined toward a "first" human being. Positing a first human being does not exclude the possibility of prior beings of a different type.

...but represents the convergents of analytic continued fractions... — jgill

The key word here is "represents". The problem with representations is that they do not qualify as being the thing which they represent. That's why the word "represents" is used, to signify that it stands for something, but it is not itself the thing which it stands for. And to complicate this problem we can create representations which are completely fictional, having no real thing which they correspond with. They represent something imaginary. So in a discussion of whether or not infinite chains are real, a representation of an infinite chain serves no purpose.

You're waffling too much for me. It seems like you're deliberately trying not to understand, but it's possible this is really just all too much for you. Since you can't answer my straight forward question, I'm going to bow out of this conversation with you. I don't see it going further if you cannot give a simple answer to my simple question. — flannel jesus

Your question is simple trickery as I explained, like the old example 'have you stopped beating your wife?' Answering it would be to agree to your terms which demonstrate a gross misunderstanding of the nature of "evidence".

So, are you now admitting that you do not have a clue what the word "evidence" means? Do you agree that "evidence" is a judgement, and that it is incoherent to claim the very same object to be evidence both for and against the truth of a particular statement?

Simply asserting that conceiving of a universal is not the outcome of a physical process is unpersuasive in light of understanding things like this: — wonderer1

I was not asserting that conceiving of a universal is not the outcome of a physical process. I was claiming that the thing conceived (time in this case) is not a physical thing regardless of whether it was conceived by a physical process. Would you say that fictitious things created by the imagination are physical things just because they are the product of a physical process?

Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. — Philosophim

This is what I dispute. You do not have the principles required to say "there is no other reason why it exists. You have your own reason for assuming a first cause, the logic you demonstrated and this produces your conclusion, that the reason for it is "It exists without prior cause", but you cannot be certain that this is the correct reason for it. Therefore unless you know that your logic (the logic which concludes the reason for the first cause is solely to be the first cause) is absolutely certain, without any flaws, then you are not justified in claiming this reason. And, I've already shown you that your treatment of infinite regress and the eternal circle is flawed, so I think you ought to also accept that your reason for the first cause is also flawed.

The only difference is that it does not have a prior cause. — Philosophim

This is an essential difference though. All the other causes are known to be contingent, dependent on a prior cause, and that is how we know these causes through empirical evidence and inductive reasoning. This cause, the "first cause", has an essential difference, it is not known directly by inductive reasoning, but by deductive logic, which makes it necessary. Therefore what you call "the only difference" is a very significant difference, which makes the two types of causes categorically distinct, one type contingent, the other necessary.

You've lost me here. How is it different? — Philosophim

It is different because causation in the causal chain is defined by empirical observations, and inductive principles. Being an inductive generalization, the causes must be all of the same type, by the defining principles, to be placed in the same category. That there is a prior cause to any contingent cause is a defining feature. If it was not a defining feature we would not have the appearance of infinite regress. The "first cause" does not have this defining feature, therefore it cannot be placed in that category, it must be a distinct type of cause. However, it is still a "cause" in some sense because it has a similar type of effect, which allows you to make it part of, the base for, the causal chain. Therefore we need to allow for the reality of at least two distinct types of "cause".

The reason for the first cause is its own existence simply being. — Philosophim

That's your reason for the first cause, but you may be wrong.

Can you explain why? I've presented a clear argument why it is absolutely not predictable which I'll post again. The reason why patterns, rules, and laws happen is because there is a solid reason besides itself. A reason that does not involve itself, is a cause that is separate from itself. A first cause can have no other cause besides itself. There can be no outside constraint that forces it to be. There can be no outside constraint that forces it not to be. It simply is. Thus it is completely unpredictable and not constrained by any outside cause. — Philosophim

I've already explained, but I'll try again. When you say " A first cause can have no other cause besides itself", this is not a sound conclusion. What the logic shows is that the first cause cannot have a "cause" in the same sense of "cause" as in the causal chain. This does not exclude the possibility that the first cause may have a "cause" in another sense of the word. And, that there is at least one other type of cause is a necessary conclusion from the argument, due to the fact that the first cause is another type of cause.

This is almost true. First, first causes will never be predictable no matter how much we study them. Study assumes that what is consistent today will be consistent tomorrow. The appearance of a first cause can never be consistent, because some other cause was making it consistent. It would be consistent if it just happened to appear consistent. — Philosophim

You are simply not accepting the reality that the first cause could have a "cause" in another sense of the word "cause", a different type of cause. And, that there is at least one other type of cause is a conclusion made necessary by the argument.

This right here is the crux. No, this is a contradiction. A first cause cannot, by definition, be caused by another cause. — Philosophim

Again, you are not accepting the possibility of other types of causes. The argument demonstrates that the first cause cannot be caused by the type of cause which constitutes the causal chain. But the argument also demonstrates that the first cause is itself a different type of cause, like I explained. That is how the infinite regress is avoided. Therefore the reality of other types of causes is already demonstrated by your own argument, and there is nothing to prevent us from hypothesizing that there is another type of cause which is the cause of the first cause. There is no contradiction, just different types of causes, which the argument demonstrates is a necessary conclusion.

Not exactly. "Not a thing" isn't equivalent to non-physical. For example, a process doesn't need to be a thing, in order to be physical. — wonderer1

I see there is a need to distinguish between "process" as a particular process, a particular event which is happening to a particular physical object, or objects, and "process" in the sense of a generalized, or universal, type of event which may happen with objects. The former is a physical event, the latter is not, being conceptual and applicable to many different physical events, in a descriptive way. If "time" is said to be a sort of process, it is the latter, a generalized or universal conception, and therefore not physical.

Very simply, can you imagine a scenario where you have evidence for X being true, while unbeknownst to you, X is actually false? Can you imagine any scenario at all like that? If yes, what is it? — flannel jesus

In that scenario, whatever is "unbeknownst" to me, is irrelevant to my judgement. Do you recognize that whether or not something is "evidence" is a judgement? I judge the object, as evidence for X, therefore I judge it as incompatible with not--X. Whether X is actually true or false is irrelevant to my judgement, my judgement is based on the things I apprehend as evidence, and I do not ever apprehend the same thing as evidence for X and evidence for not-X because that would be contradictory.

Therefore your example is simple trickery. You add "while unbeknownst to you, X is actually false" as if it is relevant to my judgement of whether or not the mentioned thing is evidence for X. But it cannot be relevant at all because it is stipulated as |unbeknownst". If I knew X was actually false, I would not consider the thing as evidence for not-X. I would have to be skeptical first, but this would negate my knowing.

It appears to me. like you do not understand the nature of "evidence". You seem to want to make it a property of the thing being judged, rather than accept that it is a judgement. When you come around to understand the true nature of evidence, that "evidence" is a judgement, then you might understand that it is inconsistent, contradictory, to judge the same thing as evidence for X and evidence for not-X. In this case we'd have to dismiss the thing as non-evidence.

So I'll ask you in a straight forward way, do you understand that "evidence" is a judgement?

When I speak of a chain receding to infinity that doesn't leave much to grasp at philosophically, so one resorts to the "being" of the chain , like yanking on an emergency cord. — jgill

What I find in metaphysics is logical demonstrations as to why this idea of "a chain receding to infinity" is unrealistic. That type of chain is shown to be logically consistent and therefore logically possible, and even attractive to some people, as seductive in a a sort of aesthetic or emotional way. That is the rhetoric of sophistry, which persuades by evoking pleasant feelings like pride, confidence, power, and courage. However, our experience, empirical evidence, can produce inductive principles which when employed as premises demonstrate logically why such a chain is not physically possible. Of course there is an issue with inductive principles as shown by Hume, so those who enjoy thinking about, and conceiving, chains receding to infinity, often feel justified in presenting these as if they could be real physical existents.

Exactly, that's what i said, time is not physical.

It is useful, but It's not a description. Spatial concepts, geometry, dimensions and such, are all like this, very useful, as mathematical axioms are, but they are not descriptions. These postulates are a priori, while descriptions are a posteriori. There is no physical thing being described.

The point though is that physicalism, by definition denies the possibility that non-physicalism is correct. That's the point of physicalism. Therefore contrary to what you claim, if the evidence is compatible with non-physicalism, it is not evidence for physicalism. Compatible means that the two can coexist without conflict. If there is no conflict between the evidence and non-physicalism then this is clearly evidence against physicalism.

Likewise, if the DNA evidence is COMPATIBLE with the person person being not-guilty, then it is not evidence of the person's guilt. Evidence must support the thing which it is supposed to be evidence of, and nothing relevant can be COMPATIBLE with both of two opposing statements.. If the supposed evidence is COMPATIBLE with the opposite of the thing which it is meant to support, then it is faulty and therefore not evidence for that thing, but evidence against it. This is why I said that it is the context of the found DNA which determines whether it is evidence or not. Whether the DNA is COMPATIBLE with the person being guilty or not-guilty is determined by the context. If the context of the DNA is COMPATIBLE with both then it is irrelevant, evidence of neither.

Then this I need to be clearer. The idea is that a first cause is not separate from the chain but is part of the chain, or the chain itself. A first cause is not explained by anything outside of itself, therefore must be explained by itself, and is the start of its impact on causality. — Philosophim

This is what I think makes your sense of "first cause" unintelligible, the stipulation that it cannot be explained by anything other than itself. So let me explain why I believe this.

The first cause is stipulated to be part of the causal chain, therefore it is the supposed to be the same type of cause as any other of the causes in the chain. However, it has a fundamental difference, the chain does not extend beyond it to the earlier time. That makes the "first cause" actually a completely different type of "cause", its existence cannot be said to have been contingent on the occurrence of a prior cause as is the case with the other causes in the chain. Because of this difference we must class it as categorically different from all the other causes in that causal chain, and the same for all the other causal chains. In other words, the "first cause" does not abide by the inductive (general) principles by which we describe all the other causes of causal chains, it cannot be observed to have a cause, therefore we must categorize it separately.

Now, we have a distinct type of cause, the "first cause", which is stipulated as different from all the other causes in the causal chain. You say that the first cause is not explained by anything other than itself, but this claim is not justified. What is justified is that there is no cause for the first cause, "cause" being as described in the sense of the causal chain. But now we've determined a different type of "cause". Since we have now determined the reality of a different type of cause, there is nothing to indicate that there cannot be any reason for the first cause, the first cause being a completely different type of cause itself. Therefore there could be a reason for the first cause, that reason being a type of cause which is other than a "cause" as described in the causal chain.

Yes, this is the way it is. Of course, if you disagree with this, that is of course your choice. I have never seen real randomness proved in science, only an inability to measure properly. — Philosophim

What you do not seem to grasp is that there is no need to assume real randomness. That a first cause is necessary may be proven logically, but it does not follow that there can be no reason for the first cause. It only follows that there cannot be a cause of the first cause, in the sense that "cause" is used in the chain of causes. However, as I explain above, by determining a "first cause" you have already shown that there is a type of cause which is other than how "cause" is used to refer to causes in the causal chain. Therefore we have the premise (a different type of cause) which is required to say that the cause of the first cause may be a different type of cause, rather than concluding randomness.

By the way, I like your previous idea that first causes can influence the brain. If it is the case that we had very tiny things popping into existence all over the place constantly, it could very well apply a real randomness to outcomes as they bounce against the chemistry of the brain. But this is the only way randomness, according to the definitions I've provided, could ever come into the universe. — Philosophim

The problem though, is that this explanation doesn't quite work. If the first causes are truly random as you insist, then the brain would have absolutely no way of predicting the occurrence of them, so it could not construct itself around them, or have any way to possibly use them. That's why I backed away from that idea. But free will demonstrates that the brain can and does make use of the first causes as they pop into being, so there must be some way to, in some sense, predict their occurrence. This is why I decided there must be some type of cause for their occurrence, but the cause is a "cause" in a sense other than "cause" in the sense of the causal chain.

So there is no rule as to what should appear as a first cause without referring backwards from any chain. Meaning if I'm staring at a blank area of the universe, there's no prediction as to what could appear as a first cause. — Philosophim

I don't agree with this. The "first cause" is simply a special type of cause, different from other causes because it marks the beginning of a causal chain. What this means is that it is not predictable in the same way that other causes are predictable. But this does not imply that it is not predictable in an absolute way. Once we start to identify the real existence of first causes, we may start to understand that they have patterns of occurrence, and that they are, through some mathematical principles, predictable. That there is not a cause for their occurrence, in the sense that "cause" is used to describe the causal chain, does not imply that their occurrence is absolutely unreasonable.

But once that first cause appears, it is what it is. And what a thing is, is defined by rules based on its makeup and the way it consistently interacts with other things in the universe. The status of 'first cause' lasts for only one time tick in the universe. Once a second tick happens the cause of the existence of the thing at the second time tick is the existence of the thing at the first time tick. — Philosophim

I don't quite follow this. Once the cause appears, it is in the past, and what persists at that time is not the cause, but the effect. Any posterior interaction is the effect of the first cause acting as a cause, and this is not a first cause, but a regular part of the causal chain. Therefore I do not see how you can talk about "the way it consistently interacts with other things in the universe". That appears to be contradictory.

A first cause is extremely literal and simple. "That which is not caused by anything else besides the fact of it existing." — Philosophim

The problem, as I've shown you, is that this definition of "first cause" is not necessitated by your argument. The argument shows that the first cause is not caused in the same way that other causes in the causal chain are caused. But, by showing that there is necessarily a first cause, you also show the first cause to be a type of cause which is not the same as the other causes. Since the argument demonstrates that there is more than one type of cause, this allows that the cause of the first cause might just be a different type of cause. Therefore you do not have the premises required to conclude that the first cause is not caused by anything. It may just be caused by a different type of cause.

What I'm noting is that because a first cause has no prior causation for its existence, there can be no constraints on its initial existence. Now this is only if we have no causal chain to examine. If we have a causal chain, we can work its way back up and see specifically what the first cause of that chain is. — Philosophim

See, you are denying the possibility that the reason for the first cause might be something other than what is evident as a causal chain. But this denial is unjustified. Further more, we see that it is very common place that the reason for an event is other than a causal chain, and that is the case with intentional acts. So not only is your assertion that if something occurs without a prior causal chain it cannot have any reason whatsoever for its occurrence, unjustified, it is also demonstrated by evidence to be false.

For example, if the big bang is the actual first cause of existence in the universe, then we can trace physics back to it, and attempt to demonstrate conclusively that there is nothing prior to the big bang. It doesn't mean that we can trace physics back to the big bang and then randomly claim, "It was actually a little bang". — Philosophim

Taking this example, "the big bang", we trace the causal chain to that event, and as you say, we determine it to be a "first cause". This does not imply that there is "nothing prior to the big bang. What it implies is that there is not a cause of the big bang in the sense that "cause" is used in tracing the causal chain to the big bang. So we must allow the possibility that the reason for the big bang is something other than a "cause" in the sense of the causal chain which was traced, i.e. a different type of cause.

Physics describes time as one of the dimensions of space-time. — wonderer1

That is not a description.

Finding a murder suspects DNA at a crime scene is often evidence that they committed that crime. However, finding that DNA is still COMPATIBLE with the idea that they did not commit the crime. A bayesian understanding of evidence clears this up quite cleanly. — flannel jesus

You are not providing the relevant information in your example. That the DNA is evidence of the person committing the crime is dependent on context, where and how it was found for example. The context of the item (the DNA) is what is relevant, and either supports or does not support (constitutes evidence for or against) the suspect. It cannot be evidence for both without contradiction. You simply make it appear to be evidence of both by removing the relevant context, thereby making it evidence of neither. In this case it is not evidence at all.

If you think that the Bayesian method provides for the very same thing to be evidence for two contradicting hypotheses, then please explain how you arrive at this conclusion.