The more I read and the more I live the more I am convinced of that. Or perhaps it is survivorship bias. — Lionino

Yes, i think there definitely is a "survivorship bias". Consider that only the best really got preserved. Most ancient Greek principles, from the Ionians, the Eleatics, the atomists etc., were preserved only through the criticism of it, in Plato and Aristotle. So really, what was preserved was the dismissal of the ancient ideas, the refutations found in Plato and Aristotle which demonstrated the faults. Then skepticism, as demonstrated by Socrates, became very important because it was necessary to rid the mind of the ancient foundations which were being demonstrated as faulty. We ought not downplay the importance of this movement, to rid the mind of ancient ideas which were being refuted (the downfall of Alexandria for example).

Faulty assumption. It could be that the physics is bad. Usefulness does not necessarily imply truthfulness.

This argument still seems very relevant today because I would think that most people who embrace computational theory of mind or integrated information theory very much would like to compare the mind to a harmony or melody. It is an "emergent informational process." But for that emergence to be causally efficacious, you need some sort of "strong emergence" that gets around Plato's trap, and that is hard to come by. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't quite see how you think that "strong emergence" gets around Plato\s trap. Can you explain what you mean here?

That's a good point. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Foolos4 simply equivocates with "harmony". The primary definition of "harmony", the one Plato deals with is "the simultaneously sounded musical notes to produce chords and chord progressions, esp. as having a pleasing effect".

But Fool implies a "harmony" could exist without the instrument which plays the notes, by referring to "harmony" as if it meant a general principle of "tuning". This allows Fool to say that the "harmony" as the general principle by which the lyre is tuned, precedes the playing of the lyre. But this is a different meaning for "harmony" from the one that Plato is using, which is the common definition of "harmony", the simultaneously sounded musical notes having a pleasing effect. "Harmony" in this sense requires that the lyre be tuned already, and Plato is arguing against the soul as harmony, not as a principle of tuning.

If we were to clone two human beings, they wouldn't feel like two different persons anymore because their thoughts wouldn't be unique anymore? — Skalidris

I disagree. Identical twins, very similar to clones, obviously feel like two different people. And research on animals shows that clones have different thoughts from each other, and would think of themselves as unique individuals.

Which "I" are you referring to? The notion we have when we are completely awake and conscious? The cloudy version of "I" we sometimes have in dreams? What about people with mental illness, their notion of "I" is completely different, imagine people with split personality, or people with schizophrenia who hear voices. Which "I" are they? I don't think you realize how complex this "I" is, we feel like ourselves when we can access our memory, our feelings, things that we normally access to when we're conscious and awake. I mentioned waking up from fainting in my thread, and the first images and sounds were really different from reality, yet I didn't experience any feelings of weirdness or fear. If I had the same notion of "I" as I do when I'm conscious, I would have felt disoriented and scared. — Skalidris

Didn't I say "the 'I' is the complete package"? That means complexities and all.

How do we know that the notion of "I" is related to consciousness?
...
It's the most intuitive one, for sure — Skalidris

Question answered, by yourself. My point was that coming up with a fictitious scenario, your so-called thought experiment, does nothing to deconstruct that intuition.

If we choose not to trust our intuitions, what rational arguments do we have to say that consciousness is always related to this "I" notion? — Skalidris

If you choose not to trust any intuitions, you cannot make any rational arguments. Rational arguments require premises, and judgement of the premises is based in intuition. If you dismiss all intuitions, then anything might be taken as true or false, and whatever argument you produce would be meaningless, lacking in soundness.

I believe the issue here is the force of habit. "Habit" was first described by Aristotle, as a sort of property (in Latin, "to have") of an active being. When a being has the propensity to act in a specific way, we say that it has a habit. And the habit is a way of avoiding the need for conscious decision making, and employment of the will, for every little act which the being makes.

Aquinas analyzed "habit" quite extensively, questioning amongst other things, where does the habit reside. He determined that the habit must be a property of the potential to act, not the act itself, therefore it is proper to the material or bodily aspect of the being. This is a difficult principle to understand because properties are generally formal, actual, so to assign a property to potential is to say that the potential already has inherent within it, some sort of form, which is not evident as "formal" in the description of the act. I conclude that this is why the habitual act is often contrary to what is "reasonable" as decided by the agent who acts.

The difficulty becomes more apparent when Aquinas considers habits of the intellect. We observe that the activities of the intellect follow patterns of habit, so we need to assume a material aspect to account for the residence of these habits. This results in a very complex Thomistic structure of appetites. The lower appetites (of the senses) are divided in two, concupiscible and irascible, meaning roughly inclined toward and inclined away from an apprehended particular. The intellect however, specifically the will, being inclined toward the general notion of "good", cannot be divided into concupiscible and irascible in that way. However, in the way that the will directs us toward "good" in the general sense, and it exercises will power over the concupiscible and irascible appetites of the senses, there is still a resemblance of that division within the intellectual appetite (will).

A thorough reading of Aquinas' exposé is recommended because it is very well thought out, and revealing of the underlying complexities in the activities of living creatures. Modern, science based descriptions, tend to be deterministically modeled, and these models ignore the role of the free will in the creation, evolution, and destruction of habits. We tend to think of the being as having in-grown, internal inclinations and avoidances consisting of structures like defense mechanisms and control structures. These are understood to interact with the environment in a deterministic (scientific) way, effecting change on both sides. However, this type of modeling, by removing the role of choice by the agent, is an over-simplification which ignores a hugely important, and greatly complicating aspect of the activities of life. It takes the pre-existence of the internal mechanisms for granted, and neglects the role of choice, selection by the being as agent, in the interaction between internal structure and external conditions.

In light of this need, the need to include the role of choice by the being, as agent, on the effects of internal mechanisms, principles of Lamarckian theory become a requirement for a better understanding of the process of evolution. As Aquinas explained, habits must have a real material base. And the habit comes into existence as than effect of choice. And choice may also be active in the maintenance or removal of the habit. Therefore choice of the being as agent, must have a real effect on the evolving material bodies. And of course this is very evident in the role of choice by the being, in reproduction, within Darwinian evolutionary theory.

The relevant point now is that something more than simple "guidance" is required to lead individual human beings toward the good. It becomes obvious that the person to be guided must possess the will to be guided. We can call this inspiration, passion, spirit, ambition, or something like that. Therefore the first step to "guidance" is not an act of guidance at all, but kind of an inversion of this. It is to instill this special quality within the person to be guided, the inspiration required, as the wealthy man did for the children with the offer of toys in your parable. And that is to empower the individual as a real "self", a spirited and ambitious person who will make the break from one's past in order to better the future. This is to make the person a leader rather than a follower. As it turns out, to guide a person in this sense, is not to show them the way, but to inspire them to find the way.

Conceptions of divine command theory obviously go back to the ancient world, but they weren't popular until the Reformation, and they became popular precisely because of modern redefinitions or morality (and were more popular in Protestantism in any event). The more common formulation is that God has authority precisely because God is good, and what goodness is entails this sort of authority. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is exactly the problem I was talking about. It's nothing but a vicious circle. There is nothing there to provide any principles for judgement as to what is good or bad in human actions. God has authority because God is good, and what goodness is, is that God has authority. Anytime someone says "God wants X and God is the authority therefore we must do X", this is just a human judgement, not a judgement from God, and we have no way of knowing what God really thinks about X.

There is a disconnect, a gap, between the human judgement of "good", and any true divine judgement of "good" which cannot be bridged because we appear to have no way to ask God. Therefore it is a mistake to base "good" in the authority of God because this denies us of the capacity to determine what is "good".

The mistake is to assume that, if mankind has any sort of telos, it must be defined by divine command, or that it can float free of the communities in which men live. In the ancient world, the community is prior to the individual.

Consider Timothy Chappelle's formulation of Platonic virtue ethics: "Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see how you bring in "the community" as a source of telos. We know that individuals have their own very distinct intentions, and God is often assumed to have intention in a similar way. But what justifies a claim that a community has any sort of intention or telos. A community is a group of individuals who work together on agreement toward common goals which have been stipulated by various individuals, and are sometimes voted on. The source of the goals is the individuals, not the community. It is true that goals are adopted and passed on from generation to generation through the form of "the community", but the goals are passed from individual to individual, in the same way that a father might pass a goal to a son. "The community" is never a source of goals, nor can any telos be said to be proper to the community, they are the goals of the members of the community..

The quote "Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good." does not imply a community at all. It implies an individual in contemplation of "Good".

In more modern views (e.g. Kant), we might think in terms "rules" that "any rational agent," can agree too (and indeed, recent ethics threads on the board assume this indeed must be what morality is). — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is simply one proposal, and I do not see any reason to accept it as "what morality is". Remember Plato's Republic, and the cave allegory in particular. Only the philosopher gets a glimpse at "the good", while the vast majority suffer from the mistake of thinking that the shadows on the wall are real things. This majority consists of "rational agents" but the philosopher is unable to convince the majority of them, upon return to the cave, because they are victims of that habit. In fact, Plato often implied that "the good" is not what the majority would agree to. The vast majority of men are like children who want candy, totally ignorant of what is truly good for them. We cannot say that these men are not rational agents, but they would never agree on "the good" like you or Kant would suggest. Their ideas and thoughts are directed toward supporting their childish wants, and the term we use for this is "to rationalize". They are still rational agents, but are hopeless in the sense of agreeing to the good.

The perfection of virtue doesn't sit outside the sphere of intersubjectivity and history. It does involve the contemplation of a good that transcends these, but can't be reduced to it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is where you and I seem to disagree, the role of "intersubjectivity". If it is the individual who engages in the contemplation of good, then it must be the individual who determines what is good. Therefore the individual leads the community in demonstrating what is good, not vise versa. If the average person is unable to understand the complexities of "the good", as indicated in Plato\s Republic, and only the philosopher who contemplates good, can even get a glimpse of understanding, then this person who contemplates good needs some power of authority over the community, as having the rightful capacity to lead it. Where could this person turn, to obtain that authority other than to God?

I stand corrected then. Dialectical pride is like the tip of the iceberg. The real issue is not the dialectic exclusion which is evident as the symptom, but rather an underlying ethnic discrimination.

You've lost me again. Free will is given to us. Through the use of free will we give ourselves something which was not given to us, we create for ourselves. There is something here prior, and something posterior. The reasons for our existence are prior to our existence, and the cause of us having free will. But our own reasons, as created by our free will, are posterior.

I meant the latter, the author of that language.

It doesn't matter that your dialect is not one of the excluded ones. Your attitude towards the exclusion indicates an underlying instance of what you have termed "dialectical pride". Otherwise the exclusion would not have significance to you. In other words the exclusion only becomes significant in relation to an attitude of dialectical pride, and, the exclusion is significant to you.

f everything one is, is given to one from someone else, does that not also give one the right to claim any of that as oneself?

Genetically you are half of your father and half of your mother (plus a little mutation), yet you are yourself. — mentos987

By free will we give to ourselves something other than what was given to us.

We could all be puppets playing out a role given to us. But while we live in a world of puppets, we all remain real to each other, and so do our motivations, our "reason". — mentos987

In that case, "one's own reasons" would not actually be one's own reasons, but simply the reasons of the puppet master, as in my explanation.

It seems to me that in many ancient and medieval ethical systems it would be both. There is on the one hand man's telos, which is internal to man (plural), but determined prior to any individual man. On the other hand, there is free man's own reasons for doing what he does, being who he is etc. The whole reason ethics is difficult is that these two can vary from one another in practice. Man can fail to fulfill his telos and fail to flourish, through his own choices. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, and I think that this is why the concept of "free will" was developed, as you describe, to fulfill the need produced by that gap between the prior telos and the individual's telos. The concept of free will allows that the individual's telos is in some way free from the prior telos.

The ideal situation is where man's free choice synchs up to mankind's telos. But there is a wrinkle here in that these thinkers were generally not free will libertarians. However, neither were they modern fatalists. Rather, they embrace a certain sort of "classical fatalism." "Character is destiny," Heraclitus says. They embrace the concepts of "fate" and "divine providence," and elucidate the ways in which man is a slave to circumstance, desire, and instinct, and yet allow that man, both individually and as a society, can manage to become more or less free / self-determining. Part of fulfilling man's telos is precisely becoming more self-determining and more "one's self," rather than being a mere effect of external causes. (Modern existentialism recapitulates part of this, while missing crucial elements) — Count Timothy von Icarus

This might appear to be the "ideal", but it would require having some access to, or some principles relating to, that prior telos, what you call "mankind's telos". But we have no access to that telos, so it's just a pie in the sky "what God wants". Then there is no way of knowing what constitutes "synching up", and individual human beings (following their own telos) will try to make their own determinations as to what constitutes the prior telos, making affirmations about whether or not a particular telos is in synch with the prior, based on nothing real.

Because the supposed "ideal" is left impotent in this way, it cannot be the true ideal. It's a fiction which cannot be obtained, and furthermore, we have no way of even knowing if we are coming close, or even headed in the right direction. Therefore this proposition cannot be accepted as a true representation of "the ideal".

This is why an overflowing love is important in Plato and the Patristics. To hate something to be controlled by it. To be indifferent to something is still to be defined by what one is not. Only love, the identification of the self in the other, allows one to avoid being determined by what is external to personal identity. This translates into a "love of fate," that must accompany the entity that will not be mere effect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Based on what I said above, I would not accept this conclusion. Plato recognized the problem with this supposed "ideal", and exposed it in The Euthyphro. So Plato's designation of "love" as important is based on something other than an appeal to the prior telos, "mankind's telos", just like his designation of "just", "good", et.. Plato makes an extensive analysis of human emotions, feelings, terms described as virtues and vices, good and bad, and their relations with pleasure and pain, and makes suggestions based on this analysis of human beings within the context of human society. So he provides guidance for the telos of the individual from an analysis of the human being, within the condition of human society, and he does not pretend to access that prior telos which you call "mankind's telos".

I think the social view moves towards a climax in Eusebius, who has a proto-Hegelian view of how history can act as an engine spurring man on towards the greater fulfillment of human purpose at the world-historical scale. With the medievals, you also start to see the acknowledgement that, while human telos has certain unchanging elements, it is also shaped by the social-historical conditions man finds himself in. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This idea, (that of an Ideal telos), what you call "mankind's telos" was propagated by the Church as God's intention, what is wanted by God. But this was a pretense developed by the Church in an effort to keep the subjects in line, and it strayed from the earlier teachings derived from Plato, which promoted the free will to decide as the highest faculty. Fundamental to the development of Christianity is the freedom of the individual to willfully join the movement. The turn around which involved telling people that they must conform to the will of God, was the beginning of the decline. St Thomas in particular obscured this principle by describing the will as subject to the intellect, but ultimately he had to admit that the free will is higher in the absolute sense. However, varying interpretations will lead some to believe that the will must be subject to the intellect.

What you describe as human beings recognizing the prior telos, "mankind's telos" as changing, evolving with the evolution of human society, is simply a recognition that this "ideal telos", the intent of God is faulty as a principle for the telos of individual human beings. The supposed "ideal telos" changes with changes in the societal context, and is therefore a reflection of the society, posterior, rather than the true prior telos.

So individual man's reasons are not identical with the the global telos of man. This is precisely because man is not free, and being enslaved to desire, ignorance, and circumstance , man lacks the knowledge and means of fulfilling his purpose. Even modern existentialists seem to recognize the need for some level of self-determination to make life meaningful, although they deny the global telos.

The shift to emotivism is important here. For the existenialist, moral freedom can't be the crowing achievement of man because moral freedom is simply reducible to desire. Due to their focus on the individual, they often lack the same focus on social freedom as well, but not always. Without these, the idea of a telos for mankind does indeed become incoherent and reduce to a single "internal" purpose defined only by the
individual. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The confusion represented in your conclusion here, is just a reflection of the fault in your premise. The fault is in trying to base the telos of the individual in some sort of "ideal" prior telos. The prior telos cannot be accessed by us, even if it is real, so we must base all the principles for the telos of the individual in the real needs of the real individual, here and now, and this is what must shape society. That's what Marx pointed to.

Subjectively they would be your own. From the viewpoint of fellow humans, they would be your own. — mentos987

I don't see that. Can you explain?

Nice try, — 180 Proof

I don't know about "soundly" but, if we have an external "reason" then it may have been "programed" into us and take the form of our own "reasons". — mentos987

That's a good point, but you need to be careful with semantics. If the reasons are external, and preprogrammed, it would be incorrect to call them "one's own" reasons. I think that the "reasons" in the form in which they are attributed to the individual, would be distinctly different from the "reasons" which were prior to the individual, so we could not say that these are "the same reasons" in a different form. They would be distinctly different reasons. And if they are by any means "the same reasons", then we cannot attribute them to the individual.

It's soundly reasonable to conclude that there is no "reason for the existence of mankind" but mankind's reasons.

Is there a reason for my existence?
Likewise, it's also soundly reasonable to conclude that there is no reason for "your existence" but your reasons. — 180 Proof

How could it be "soundly reasonable" that the reason for your existence is your reasons? The intent for a thing is prior in time to the existence of the thing, and in general the cause of a thing is prior in time to the existence of that thing. Therefore the reason for the existence of a thing, as the cause of existence of the thing, is prior in time to the existence of the thing. One's own reasons are an attribute of the individual, therefore dependent on the individual and not prior in time to the individual. It is impossible that your reasons are the reasons for your existence.

Now the supposedly "soundly reasonable" proposition is even more soundly refuted. And the preceding proposition which is also supposedly "soundly reasonable" suffers the same problem.

An initial state did not "begin to exist" within a state of affairs in which it previously did not exist. An initial state simply implies there is no prior state of affairs. — Relativist

In other words, "initial state" is a fictitious ideal.

[

Replying to your comment, the "ball of energy" would not be disoriented because it would only carry the energy to "light up" some neural network, to give rise to this "conscious experience". It wouldn't carry the content of the thoughts. It could be like electricity: if you change the charger of your computer, or the battery, the data and programs in the computer stay the same. — Skalidris

Well I don't see the point then. Consciousness is defined by the thinking activity of the being. If each person continues to have one's own individual thoughts, then you do not avoid the individual nature of consciousness in this way. Having a different ball of energy which charges up the consciousness everyday, does not take away from the individuality of the consciousness. In fact, that is what is the case already, we eat different food every day, constituting a different ball of energy to charge up the consciousness.

If we didn't have the notion of individual, this would indeed happen. But if the notion of individual is simply a structure that the ball of energy "reads", this wouldn't happen. — Skalidris

It's not just the notion of individual which matters here, but the fact that each person has distinct and unique thoughts. Having distinct and unique thoughts is what produces the idea of individuality. The supposed "I" which reads these thoughts is already the same for everyone. "I am a human being". When we separated the I from the thoughts, it's called abstraction, and we come up with something general rather than the particular. But that's not how we conceive of an individual, as having a a separate "I", the "I" being something general. The "I" is the complete package of the individual. So you propose a separation of the "I", but it's unrealistic.

But this is just a thought experiment to challenge this notion of "individual" and show that it could be separated from consciousness. It's to emphasize that this sense of individual could just be a concept in our brain, just like time, numbers,... From the point of view of the thought experiment, there's no reason to think that whenever there's a flow of electron through a circuit, there must be a specific electronic circuit coding for the concept of individual. For living beings, it makes a lot of sense to have this notion and it's hard to imagine that a living being would function without it, but that doesn't make it part of the flow of energy, it doesn't make it necessary for the "conscious experience", they're independent. — Skalidris

What's the point then? You propose a thought experiment to show that we could conceive of things as being otherwise, but the otherwise which you propose is unrealistic. Sure, the notion of "individual" is just a concept in one's brain, but we want the true concept, not a fictitious one. To propose a fictitious one is to say that things could be otherwise, but since the notion of individual is the true concept what purpose does the fictitious one serve?

The attitudes towards Nynorsk and Bokmål are quite separate from this, however. Nynorsk/bokmål are not competing with the dialects; the Norwegian dialects have no standardizes written form, and Nynorsk and Bokmål have no standardized spoken form. Nynorsk is the language that fits my dialect the best, so if dialectical pride played a part, I would prefer Nynorsk. Yet, I prefer Bokmål, because at least its construction was not as stupid as that of Nynorsk. — Ø implies everything

The main reason you gave for dislike of Nynorsk was the way that the author treated certain dialects. So I still believe there is an issue of "dialectical pride" here, though complex and perhaps disguised. If there was no dialectical pride involved you would not concern yourself with the way the author preferred some dialects over others.

In the sentence "the Earth is further from the sun than Venus" , the sun is the frame of reference in which the relation "further" operates. It takes a mind to formulate any proposition; in this one, the Sun is marked as a frame of reference, without which "further" would be meaningless. But does the proposition hold independently of minds, or not? — hypericin

I'm not as forgiving as Wayfarer on this issue. The simple answer is no. No proposition cannot be said to "hold" independently of minds. Each proposition needs to be interpreted for meaning, and a judgement made concerning the truth or falsity of what is meant, in order to determine whether or not it holds.

It appears to me, like you have made that judgement concerning the stated proposition, and you conclude that the proposition is true. You also appear to believe that the proposition will continue to be true into the future, indefinitely, if at some time in the future there would be no minds to interpret it. I see two distinct epistemological problems here.

First, there is the matter of your judgement that the proposition is true. How can we know the correctness of this judgement? Even if all currently living human minds agree with you, a new way of understanding the reality of the solar system might demonstrate that this judgement of the proposition as true, was based in a form of misunderstanding. This is what happened when the geocentric model was replaced by the heliocentric. We really have no idea of how our understanding of spatial-temporal relations may change in the future. And, problems like quantum uncertainty, entanglement, wave-particle duality, wave-function collapse, and spatial expansion, demonstrate very clearly that change to this understanding is inevitable. Remember what happened to Pluto, it was a planet and now it's not.

The second problem is the issue of the indefinite continuation of sameness into the future, as time passes. This problem Hume elucidated in his discussion of causation and inductive reasoning. Things have continued through time, in the past, to exist in a very specific way, and this supports the supposed continuation of the truth of your proposition, into the future. However, we do not know or understand the true nature of passing time, so we cannot make the proposition required to support the claim that your proposition "the Earth is further from the sun than Venus" will continue to be true indefinitely into the future, even if it is true now. What we know is that the future is full of possibility and we only apprehend an extremely small portion of the magnitude of that possibility. Because the future is full of possibility and we only apprehend a very small portion of it, we ought not expect that true or false can be attributed to any statements about future conditions. This was covered by Aristotle when he discussed the conditions under which the law of excluded middle must be forfeited.

I don't see how. It takes a mind to mark something as a frame of reference. — hypericin

A frame of reference is clearly an artificial creation. From Wikipedia: "In physics and astronomy, a frame of reference (or reference frame) is an abstract coordinate system whose origin, orientation, and scale are specified by a set of reference points―geometric points whose position is identified both mathematically (with numerical coordinate values) and physically (signaled by conventional markers).[1]"

How do you think that something other than a mind could mark a frame of reference?

I wonder if the dialects of Norway are more diverse than the dialects of the average country. Norway is a large country, and with a geography that tends to isolate communities. Therefore, I think there's a greater diversity of dialects in Norway than in most countries. In any case, the degree of dialectical diversity is why a programme like Nynorsk is doomed from the get-go. — Ø implies everything

Judging by your reaction, I think I see part of the reason for the degree of dialectical diversity in Norway. When individual people are fiercely independent in their attitude, as you seem to be, then this will be reflected in their language. imagine if every individual insisted "I will only use my language" and each time two people met there was a lot of resistance toward compromise. This would produce extremely localized dialects. So the degree of dialectical diversity is not only dependent on geographical features, but also on the disposition of the people. A person with a different kind of attitude might accept Nynorsk as a welcomed change, inclined to give up the old with a view toward improvement..

Is there's a boil-down source to understand the concept? Im not seeing any necessity beyond trying to support the idea that time doesn't require change, which im not on board with quite yet. Would love to see something about that concept of whcih i have no knowledge — AmadeusD

The issue, as I described, is that time without physical change is logically possible, and there is no evidence to suggest otherwise. How could there be?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/869814
Further, we find that if we do not posit a principle, "an Ideal" which is outside of, and capable of encompassing all physical change, then physical change will be inherently unintelligible. The primary intuition is to posit space as the Ideal outside of physical change, and this produces the idea of physical objects existing in a static 'absolute' space. However, physical evidence (wave-function, space-time activity, spatial expansion etc.) has shown that this idea is incorrect, because it cannot properly account for the reality of moving objects. Therefore, to fully understand the reality of physical change we need to turn to another principle which could be outside of it, and this logically is time.

So Trump is fascist and anyone who thinks that's nonsense is a Trump supporter and trying to gaslight you? — Tzeentch

Why jump to conclusion without reading the post? Didn't schopy actually say:

I would quibble about Trump as actually fascist though. Fascists generally have an ideology. His is just narcissistic self-serving agenda for himself, co-opting the right for this agenda. — schopenhauer1

I think what schopenhaur1 implies, rather than that Trump himself is fascist, is that many Trump supporters are fascist, and they see his actions as an opening of the door, inviting them in. In reality he's just using them for his own personal gain, what schop describes as narcissistic. And, it appears like the number of fascists is sufficient to make opening the door to fascism worthwhile for him.

I think you misunderstood, my opinion is that the notion of subject isn't tied to the notion of consciousness. — Skalidris

I think that this is a false proposition. The subject has operative control over the entire space which constitutes the body, and the consciousness assumes responsibility for the actions of that body. If one consciousness assumed many different bodies as a single unity, it would have to assume responsibility for the activities within the entire space between these bodies, as if this was all part of one body.

What is important here is the unity of the body which is the subject, and the fact that the consciousness can only exercise control over, and responsibility for, the activities within the space occupied by the body because of the strength of this unity. The "balls of energy" thought experiment of the op fails fundamentally, from the outset, because it suffers from the relativity of simultaneity which makes distinct subjects into distinct frames of reference, thereby lacking the unity required for consciousness to pervade. In other words, anytime a "ball of energy", supposedly a consciousness, passed from one subject to another, it would find itself completely disoriented, being in a completely different frame of reference, sort of like if you went to sleep in Tokyo and woke up in London, except much more extreme. The discontinuity would be much more severe because there would be nothing apparent to the senses to connect the two, and no one able to provide the story. Even the intellect itself would be completely lost, having applied no transformation formula to change from one frame of reference to another to recognize the new frame of reference. And if such a formula was applied, then this would indicate that the one individual consciousness is changing location, not encompassing the whole space.

Furthermore, all the space in between the distinct bodily subjects would still be apprehended as external to the subjects, being perceive through the senses. However, the consciousness, as one consciousness for many subjects, would have to apprehend this space as internal space. This would produce all sorts of irreconcilable confusion for the consciousness because it would not be able to distinguish forces of change coming from the inside, from forces coming from the outside, leaving it incapable of intentional activity.

If time consists in either the changes described, or the relation between them, I don't see how that couldn't be happening prior to humans conceiving time in a particular order, to unify perceptions. Though, maybe i'm missing a trick but it seems to be that your suggestion presupposes an 'actual' time, independent of objects passing, rather than time being a description, or set of relations between objects. — AmadeusD

I was replying to the following statement you made: "I take the 'it only exists in the mind' line anyway,". So if time only exists in the mind, how could you think that it would be happening prior to humans conceiving it?

i conceive that the universe, as a whole, does not undergo 'time'.
...
So, prior to sentient minds, there would be the continually changing material of the universe, — AmadeusD

How can there be consistency between these two statements? If the universe does not undergo time, how can anything change?

It is a Kantian conception of time, and i do not believe it results in any of these logical issues. Do absolutely feel free to set me right, if that Kantian thought has been dealt with over the centuries. It almost certainly has, and I am, as I try to make clear, very naive :) — AmadeusD

You don't see how the premise "time only exists in the mind" leads to the conclusion that time could not have been passing before there was minds? I don't see how I need to say more.

"Time" as described by Kant is the abstract notion, not the thing itself. I discussed the difference in this reply to Philosophim a couple days ago:

I like Aristotle's way of describing this. In one way, "time" refers to a tool which we use for making measurements. This is the concept of "time", the abstraction. It is derived from our observations of change, comparing changes to each other, as explained above, to establish a rate of change. In this way the abstraction "time" is the concept by which we measure the rate of change. On the other hand, "time" refers to something measured, and this is what you call time "itself". So for example, when we use a clock, and say what time it is, or use dates like January 8 to refer to today, and say yesterday was January 7, and tomorrow is January 9, etc., we use numbers in a way which is meant to measure the passing of time itself, as far as we are able to, with our limited understanding of what the passing of time really is. — Metaphysician Undercover

Currently, I take the 'it only exists in the mind' line anyway, so i was just probing for curiosity/philosophy sake. — AmadeusD

You ought to see that if the passage of time was something that only exists in the mind, and that since this is what defines "the present", then there would be no "present" independent of minds, and this premise would create all sorts of logical problems for how we understand the reality of the universe. First, the whole temporal extension of the universe, as we know it, would exist all at once, and that makes no sense. Also, when we date things, as having happened millions or billions of years ago, before there were human minds, this would be totally invalidated if time wasn't passing to account for that time which we conclude had passed between now and then.

How do properties of objects change? And i do not mean, 'by what cause', i mean by why 'mechanism', metaphysically, could change occur... How can there be difference between two states? — AmadeusD

This is what I answer with "the passage of time". That has been stipulated to be the requirement for two contradictory states, that they are at a different time, and it has to my mind, been satisfactorily demonstrated. But, we don't know much more about time than that, so many people like Philosophim will argue that time is nothing other than physical change, producing an equality, Time is necessary for change, and change is necessary for time. However, the explanations I have given show why it is logically necessary to premise that the passage of time is a type of change other than physical change, as the answer to "how can there be physical change".

I find this unhelpful. This would seem an intuitive truism, but it explains nought about what's actually happening between A and B, other than the changes. — AmadeusD

Yes, it is a generalization, that it is unhelpful is regretful. The specifics of what "A" and "B" signify has not been stated, they simply stand for the general notion of two different states, and what occurs between these two is described by the general notion of "change". To even begin describing "what's actually happening between A and B" would require a description of the specific features of these two states.

And this is what I'm asking about... — AmadeusD

Yes, as I said it's called "change", and in the ancient days, "becoming". We might use other temporally based terms like "activity" "motion", "transformation of energy", etc..

But that is epistemology. God would know what is good, but He doesn't decide what is good, just like He doesn't decide that 1 + 1 = 2, or that square circles can't exist. — Walter

I think most theologians would argue that God does decide what is good. They clearly claim that human actions are good only insofar as they are consistent with what God wants. So God is above humans in the decision of good. And, if it wasn't God who determines what is good, we'd have to look for a principle higher than God to validate whether a human action is truly good or not, because the higher principle might be inconsistent with what God wants. But theologians would not accept this. So I think it must be God who decides what is good. Why don't you think that God would decide 1+1=2, and that square circles do not exist. Isn't that exactly what God's job is, to ensure that the world is consistent with logic? Otherwise God would not see it as good, and not create it in that way.

I see. If 'time' is the rate, what is the medium of change? As in, what actually represents the change (given the causal order requirement, such as 'cause' can be used here), as opposed to it's ratio compared to ...other changes? — AmadeusD

The statement you quoted said, "or at the very least it is the order, event A is prior to event B". Does that not already answer your question about causal order?

You asked me about the "traverse" between A and B, so I described the measurement of that traversal, and the temporal aspect provides for the rate of traversal. But if we ignore the traversal, and reduce the change to simply A is before B, which is generally what the concept of "causation" does, then we are simply not interested in the time between A and B, the traversal or change itself. However, time is still essential to the description in the sense of before and after.

To say something happens 'more quickly' than something else seems to infer that there's a ratio OF something.. 'change' isn't an actual thing, so just wondering what is being referred to there. — AmadeusD

Exactly, "time" in its conceptual form, abstract form, the tool for measurement, as distinct from time itself (the difference described above), is a sort of ratio. Simple order of before and after does not suffice to account for the change itself, as what occurs between state A and state B. So to measure the temporal aspect of the change we compare it to a standardized change (the traditional standard being the motion of the earth relative to the sun as years, days, hours, and minutes, etc., the modern standard being the vibration of an atom or something like that). The ratio is expressed as a description of the physical change "over time", where "over time" means the standardized change. The other features which make up the description of the physical change are the material elements and their spatial description.

Most usages do require time to complete, but if one thinks of "to change" is "to differ", then time need not be a factor. — jgill

This equates "change" with "difference", which is a mistaken notion. Change is commonly understood as the intermediary between two different things, as how one state becomes another. The standard definition is "the act or an instance of making or becoming different". If we define "change" simply as different, then we have no word, or concept to refer to the act of becoming different, i.e. what happens between two distinct describable states, and this produces a serious logical problem described by Aristotle.

The problem is the incompatibility between being and becoming which was elucidated by Plato, after learning from Socrates' discussions of the riddles of the Eleatics who include Zeno. Here's a brief explanation and simplification of what Aristotle showed. If a state of being "B", is different from a prior state of being "A", then something must happened in between, to account for this difference. What happens in between is known as "change" or "becoming". If we explain this change or becoming, with another descriptive state of being, "C", then a becomes B by passing through C. Now we have state A which is different from state C which is different from state B. Therefore something must happen between A and C, and between C and B, to account for these differences. We could proceed in that form of description, and assume a state of being in between each, such that we would have a series of states like A,D,C,E,B. Since each of these states is different, we need something between each of them to account for the change.

As you can see, this is heading for an infinite regress, where we never get a true understanding of what happens between two different describable states of being. What happens in between, is becoming, or change. This indicates a fundamental incompatibility between static states of being, as represented by unchanging descriptions at a point in time, and the activity, becoming, which occurs between these assumed points in time.

If an act is good because it is what God chooses, "goodness" is meaningless.
So, I think one act can be intrinsically better than another. But perhaps there are acts that are intrinsically equally good. So God actualizing A would be just as good as God actualizing B. — Walter

Hmm, I see things in the opposite way. Since God has the most knowledge possible, if there is supposed to be something beyond God which determines "good", then "good" would be meaningless as absolutely indefinite, or undeterminable, impossible to know.

And, since two acts are distinct and unique, each having a different effect, (and the two possible acts we are talking about are necessarily so, having been stipulated as incompatible), and if all things are taken into account by the supreme knower, it is impossible that two such acts are judged as equally good.

This leaves your final statement meaningless. God, of necessity would choose one or the other, A or B, knowing the effects that each would have, and knowing which is the better choice.

I don't think so. Time is the rate at which state A changes to state B, or at the very least it is the order, state A is prior to state. It is a feature of the change, but not the change itself.

I am begging the question. What is time if not related to the change between objects? :D — Philosophim

From my perspective, time is related to change. It's just that we cannot say that time is change because we understand time as the means by which we relate one change to another. That is why no single change constitutes time, but a multitude of changes. And since all change requires time, we can see that time is logically prior to change as prerequisite. I might even go further to propose that the passing of time is the cause of the change we observe.

Its easy in the first case because time is change between entities. That's why it becomes more difficult in the second case. If time exists apart from the change between two entities, then what is it at its fundamental? If its not an observer, and everything exists without change, what is time? — Philosophim

I think this is wrong for a couple reasons. First, you neglect the internal changing of one object. You can describe internal change as parts moving relative to each other, but this results in the need to assume a fundamental immutable element, not composed of parts, as proposed by the atomists. The fundamental "atom" is required to avoid an infinite regress of divisibility, but I think modern physics shows that the fundamental element is not consistent with observation. This implies that the foundation is something other, like wave motion for example.

The second problem is that whenever an object changes place relative to another, there is nothing there which can be called "time". There is simply change. It is only when we have at least two different changes, that by comparing one to the other, we establish a rate of change, and this constitutes "time" as a measurement tool.

Let me give you another example. In fiction, sometimes a character will have the ability to stop time for everyone but themselves. In such a scenario, nothing changes in relation to one another except for the character. Time itself didn't freeze, but only because there was something that was not frozen, the character. Imagine a universe as a completely frozen still shot where there is no comparative change. Do we not say its a universe frozen in time? I think you answer this in the next quotes I pull from you. — Philosophim

The problem I see here is that we need to figure out a way to get outside of the universe, to see how it comes into being, if we want a complete understanding of it. When we look at what is prior to the universe, if there is no time, then your scenario works inversely, there is only things not moving, apparently frozen in time, because there is no time. But then there is no way to understand how things could suddenly start moving. If we allow that there is time outside our universe, then there could also be activity outside our universe, and this could cause the activity of things within our universe.

So if I understand it right, you believe time is a 'thing in itself'. And by this I mean it is something that exists which we attempt to capture in a meaningful way. For us, that meaningful way is change. But like all 'things-in-themselves' our attempt to grasp it is merely the most logical way we can understand it, not necessarily a full understanding of it as it exists in itself.

Thus if I understand it right, we measure and understand time through observance of change, but that measurement is an approximation and doesn't really capture the idea of 'the present becoming the future'. Change is a convenient way to measure time, but not necessary for it to exist, as time is its own unobservable entity.

This is what I was looking for in your answer. If I understand you correctly, its not a bad take. It leaves itself open to people who state, "How can we know what is unobservable/time is an illusion" people, but I think its acceptable for anyone else. — Philosophim

I like Aristotle's way of describing this. In one way, "time" refers to a tool which we use for making measurements. This is the concept of "time", the abstraction. It is derived from our observations of change, comparing changes to each other, as explained above, to establish a rate of change. In this way the abstraction "time" is the concept by which we measure the rate of change. On the other hand, "time" refers to something measured, and this is what you call time "itself". So for example, when we use a clock, and say what time it is, or use dates like January 8 to refer to today, and say yesterday was January 7, and tomorrow is January 9, etc., we use numbers in a way which is meant to measure the passing of time itself, as far as we are able to, with our limited understanding of what the passing of time really is.

Unless if course, doing B is just as good as doing A. — Walter

Ever read Plato's Euthyphro? The question would be whether an act is good because it is what God chooses, or whether God chooses it because it is good. The former implies that intrinsically A is no better than B, but God choosing it is what makes it good. The latter would imply that one act is intrinsically better that the other, and that is why God chooses it. Which do you think would be the case?

This reflects what Minkowski spacetime infers. This is referred to as being at rest in a particular frame of reference. — jgill

Rest frames are artificial creations. Scientists produce them as required, so they will have some degree of arbitrariness. However, they do demonstrate the logical possibility of time passing without any change occurring. Such a thing is not only logically possible, but as the use of rest frames demonstrates, also extremely useful. I would proceed one step further, to argue that since rest frames are actually necessary for scientists to produce a real model of anything real in the world of real time passage, then in order for the real world of time passage to be understood, we need to replicate, or represent the real rest frame. This implies pre-Einsteinian absolute time.

The issue is that conceiving of all motion as relative greatly facilitates the representation of motions. We can model distinct things as moving relative to each other, without worrying about how they are moving relative to other things, by arbitrarily producing the required rest frame. If the model were to be based on absolute time, then the true rest frame would be required as the ground for modeling all motions.

However, the universe is extremely complex, with all sorts of different motions, so we do not know the true rest frame of the universe. (As analogy, consider that the ancients did not know the sun as the rest frame for the solar system, so they modeled the sun and planets as orbiting the earth in a relativistic way.) Since we do not know the true rest frame of absolute time, special relativity uses the motion of light as a constant, for an alternative to true rest.

This alternative suffices for many applications, but its arbitrariness sets an artificial boundary which limits our capacity to understand. Any motions in the universe which are not consistent with the principles developed as general relativity, (such as spatial expansion, the effects of dark matter, dark energy, and wave/particle duality), fall outside that artificial boundary which the theory imposes on our understanding.

So, as I said in the preceding post, I believe the only way to provide a basis for understanding all types of motions, is to have a model of time passing with no physical change occurring. This would be the true rest frame, absolute time. The passing of time would be grounded in, or modeled according to changes which are not physical, or material changes. Then all physical changes could be plotted against this model of time which would serve as a backdrop.

Ok I see the problem clearly now. From God's perspective, to do A is necessary, needed as good, and God cannot be wrong. From our perspective. we do not know the premises which produced the necessity for the decision, therefore it appears to be contingent, as is the case for us, our choices are contingent. In the case of human beings, we can see what is good, yet choose not to do it for some reason, but God must do only what is good. So God really did not have any choice at all, being omniscient He had to choose one thing, the good, and He could not choose otherwise, not be mistaken, therefore "the will to do A" was necessary. Does that look correct?

The modern understanding of causation as used by the sciences, might involve inductive reasoning, but isn't reducible to inductive reasoning. For example , if all ravens are black, then it must be the case that a sampled raven is black, but one wouldn't want to say that all ravens being black was the "cause" of a raven to be black. So induced hypotheses aren't causes per-se. — sime

What I'm talking about is when events follow each other in time, and the same types are observed to do so consistently, then through inductive reasoning we make a conclusion about a relationship, i.e. we infer causation. So for example, if we apply heat to water and then it boils, and we observe this many times, we make the inductive conclusion that the heat causes the water to boil.

Nowadays, an instance of a 'causal' relation between a particular cause A and a particular cause B, is understood to be relation which asserts that B occurs if and only if A occurs, assuming that nothing else could be the cause of B. This is what is meant by saying that causation involves "counterfactuals". — sime

This is not an acceptable explanation of causation. An assignment of causation does not exclude the possibility of other things having the same effect. So in the example above, saying that heat causes water to boil does not exclude the possibility that something else as well, such as a drop in pressure, could also cause water to boil. That A is judged to cause B does not exclude the possibility that something else might also cause B as well.

Your explanation seems to make a category mistake, switching from the particular to the general. In a particular instance, we will say that A caused B only if we think that other possibilities have been ruled out. So in a particular instance of water boiling we would say that the application of heat caused this, because we've ruled out other possibilities. But then you make A and B into something general, and you make the general statement "B occurs if and only if A occurs". That's a logical fallacy, because in other situations something else could cause B to occur. So in the example, when the application of heat is judged to be the cause of the water boiling in that particular instance, and even if we make the general statement that the application of heat causes water to boil, we do not have the required premise to say that only the application of heat could cause water to boil.

I just mean that they never move. There is no outside observer, there's no beginning, no end. Yes, if there was an observer there that would be a third existence monitoring change relative to themselves. But if there is no observer and no change in any existence, what's the difference between that and no time at all? This isn't a proof, its just a thought experiment to get us to think about the abstract nature of time without an observer. Is 'time' an actual thing? — Philosophim

As I said, the thought experiment is useless, because you have to stipulate whether or not time is passing, to get anywhere, but then you're begging the question. Look, you say that there is two particles, and they are not moving relative to each other. That's all you say. Time could be passing, or time might not be passing, we have no way, from the premises of the thought experiment to determine whether time is passing or not. Therefore it's useless as an effort to try and understand whether time could be passing without any physical change happening.

A universe where two thing exist that have no change, then suddenly there is change. Was there time before the change? Do we retroactively put time before the change? Can there be time if there is no change at all? These are the general questions we're thinking on. — Philosophim

Yes, by the way you phrased the question, there was time before the change. You say "then suddenly there is change". This implies that there is "before" the change, and there must be time for before to become after. Therefore there must have been time before the change, in order for there to have been a "before" the change, and a time when the two things were not moving. Otherwise you could not even talk about the two things existing before the change.

I can imagine time passing, but only because I'm observing it. — Philosophim

Now, I ask you to use logic, and see with your mind, logically, that it is possible for there to be time passing without change occurring.

I'm trying to ask what time is beyond a tool. How do can you realistically measure time in a world without change? If you can't, does it exist? Is the nature of time something more fundamental than a tool of an observer and change? Is it its own existence? — Philosophim

Things do not need to be measured by a human being, to exist.

This is me asking you a simple question. How does time exist in a hypothetical world without any change? — Philosophim

And I'm telling you, it's very simple. Let me try your own thought experiment, maybe that will help. Imagine two things not moving relative to each other, and time is passing. Easy so far, right? Now add your special premise, these two things are the only things in the universe. Where's the difficulty? See, the concept of time passing does not require that anything is moving relative to each other.

We're inventing a half-plank length. And clearly though we can invent infinite time, infinite time doesn't happen in between plank tics. — Philosophim

Right, now you're catching own. We can "invent" half-Planck, quarter-Planck, one tenth-Planck, whatever we want. These are all logically possible. And, at these short time periods, it has been demonstrated that there cannot be any physical change. Therefore it's very easy, and also very logical to conceive of time passing with no physical change occurring.

Sure, I'm not trying to disallow anything though. I'm just trying to understand what the fundamental of time is without an observer. If its not change, what is it? — Philosophim

Notice that I am talking about "physical change", "observable change", and I say that time could pass without any of this occurring. However, I do not intend to exclude "change" in an absolute sense. I described time itself as a sort of change, the process of the future becoming past. The point though, is that this, itself. is not observable. We don't observe the future becoming the past, we observe particular, specific physical changes, and from this we can infer that time is passing. However, time passing, itself, is not observed. And, we must maintain this principle, that time passing is not any specific type of observable change, but a general type of change which encompasses all observable physical changes, in order that we will be able to measure all types of physical changes, through a theory which provides a non-physical, unobservable change, "time", to provide the measurement tool.

I think the intention to do A is clearly a property of the creator.
Now if that intention is necessary, we are stuch with a modal collapse. — Walter

The intention to do A is not necessary, it is a freely made choice. We've been through this already. God's will, is a necessary part of God, but the particular choice, "the intention to do A" is not necessary from God's perspective.

I don't see how we can separate God's Will simpliciter from God's Will to do A. — Walter

Why not? It's actually very simple. Do you agree that human beings have a capacity called will, and this allows them to choose? Do you also recognize that no specific choice is necessitated by that capacity, it is free to make different choices as required according to differing circumstance. So the capacity to choose (the will) and the choice made, the intention to do A, are not the same thing. They must be separate and different types of thing, or else the person would have to always choose the exact same thing when using one's will, and that's not what is the case, we make many different choices. Therefore we must conclude that the capacity to choose, as a property of a human being (or God in this case), which is called "the will", is distinct and different from any particular thing willed, the will to do A, or the will to do B, etc..

OK, by your definition of "contingent", from God's perspective, the thing He creates is contingent. But God's Will, as an essential property of God is necessary. As explained earlier, we must be careful to distinguish between the properties of the creation, and the properties of the creator, or else we produce a pantheist God. Does that make sense to you, and how does it bear on your argument?