The main difference is that you believe any understanding of reality must conform to grammatical conventions (which is a reduction of logic), whereas I believe any grammatical convention should adjust to accommodate a rational understanding of reality that may fall outside of its existing framework, — Possibility

Yes, "understanding" requires consistency with grammatical conventions. And obviously, we cannot change reality to conform to our conventions, therefore the conventions must conform to reality. You and I are in complete agreement to this point.

Where we disagree is as to which conventions correspond with reality, and which do not. I believe that classical conventions of dualism correspond, and are adequate to form a solid foundation for an understanding of reality. I also believe that numerous modern conventions, of physics and mathematics, such as the dimensional representation of spacetime, and some axioms of set theory, do not correspond, and ought to be rejected. You seem to believe the opposite.

A couple of points to clear up here. Firstly, there is a difference of configuration between not requiring ‘materiality’ and being ‘immaterial’. The former acknowledges a variability in the configuration of activity/being, while the latter offers only one configuration - enacting an agential cut that excludes activity sans three-dimensionality from mattering. — Possibility

I think that this is a gross misunderstanding. "Immaterial" does not imply inactive. I think this Idea comes from a modern day misunderstanding of Plato, in which "Platonism" is represented as comprised of the assumption of eternal, inert, passive Ideas, which cannot interact with the material word according to the "interaction problem". In reality though, this is Pythagorean Idealism, which Plato demonstrated has very serious problems. Since Plato's method of dialectics is very difficult to interpret, many modern interpreters do not see beyond Plato's exposé of Pythagorean Idealism to see that Plato was demonstrating the problems with it, mot supporting it, and pointing the direction toward resolving these problems.

So in reality, Plato offered us a solution to the "interaction problem", which involved demonstrating the lack of correspondence with reality of the the theory of participation which provided the support for Pythagorean Idealism. The central problem was that the theory of participation, represents "Ideas" as passive things which material objects partake of. So for example, as described in "The Symposium", a beautiful thing is beautiful because it partakes in the Idea of Beauty. Notice that the immaterial Idea is passive, and the material object actively "partakes". Plato revealed that this is a problem for Idealism, and went on to demonstrate with "the good" (understood by Aristotle as "final cause") that ideas must be active, causal.

Aristotle's metaphysics, with the so-called "cosmological argument" firmly refutes Pythagorean Idealism. He shows that all human ideas require the human mind for actual existence. If any human ideas have any sort of reality prior to being actualized by the human mind, this would be solely as potential. Then he excludes "potential" from the category of "eternal", by showing that anything eternal must be actual. This procedure shows that it is impossible that human ideas have eternal existence, effectively refuting Pythagorean Idealism. However it also shows that it is necessary to conclude actual Forms ("form" having the category of actual, or active) which are prior to material ("matter" having the category of passive potential) forms. In Christian theology, these independent Forms, whose existence is demonstrated as logically necessary by the cosmological argument, are proper to the divine realm of God and the angels. Substance dualism is necessary to support what you might call "an agential cut" between the actual Forms (substance) of the divine realm. which are causally responsible for the activities of independent material things, and the actual forms (substance) of the living human mind, which are causally responsible for the activities of the living human beings.

Okay, you’re making great leaps of assumption here. Not requiring three-dimensionality is NOT the same as non-dimensional. Subatomic particles lack a fundamental three-dimensional inertia. At least one of their dimensional measurements is in a constant state of flux, but this doesn’t render them non-dimensional, only not fundamentally three-dimensional. They can be configured as relevant/significant (material) in a four-dimensional (active) system, but in a three-dimensional (inert) structure they are considered ‘immaterial’. — Possibility

All you are doing here is continuing to obscure the problems of your conventions, with ambiguity. The non-three-dimensional particles you speak of are understood as having an effect ("relevant/significant") in a four-dimensional model, but they clearly cannot be shown to have a position, location, or place, in such a model, so we cannot say that this model shows them to have any actual existence. This is the type of activity we've been discussing, the "four-dimensional (active) system" model is only capable of showing that there is some type of activity which is unintelligible from the precepts of that model. That is why there is a wave/particle duality, quantum uncertainty, and all the other logical problems with this type of representation of subatomic particles. What is observed is the effect of this activity, but the activity itself, as the immaterial cause of those effects cannot be observed. Theologists are very well acquainted with this principle, as God, being immaterial, is understood through His effects, the presence of material existence, rather than through direct observations of Him.

The proposed "subatomic particles" are not particles at all because they cannot be represented as having spatial location, and so are much better (more honestly) represented as immaterial activities (Forms) which have a causal influence within the four-dimensional model.

The proposed "four-dimensional (active) system" is fundamentally deceptive because it reverses the true role of time. This is what I've been trying to tell you, but you refuse to acknowledge that this is the case. The base principles are all three-dimensional geometry, arcs, circles, spheres, triangles, planes etc.. and time is layered on top, as a further spatial feature. This does not allow that time can be properly represented as prior to, and therefore independent from space.

The reason I use a dimensional structure is because it retains an overall sense of logic and rationality as we move between limited systems or conventions of logic: ie. grammar, mathematics, physics. — Possibility

Actually, what you are demonstrating is that you prefer the conventions of mathematics over the conventions grammar. We can say that grammar and mathematics are both forms of logic. And, I can show you how there is inconsistency between these two forms of logic, especially at the most fundamental level, the law of identity. In the logic of grammar, the law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. Two things may be according to some stated parameter, or quality, equal to each other, but two things cannot be "the same", because only one thing can be the same as itself. Being the same is a very special sort of equality which a thing can only have with itself. In the logic of mathematics however, two equal things can be said to be the same object.

Therefore, there is great inconsistency between the logic of grammar and the logic of mathematics. You choose the logic of mathematics, most likely because it has proven itself to be very useful. So your choice is most likely guided by a form of pragmaticism. I choose the logic of grammar because it has been directed by dialectics which is aimed at aimed at correspondence with reality, truth. And the logic of grammar has proven itself to be very useful in this way. So my choice is guided by a desire for truth.

My argument is that the findings are sound, and are compatible with a broader understanding of grammatical forms. — Possibility

No, the findings of quantum mechanics may not be said to be sound, because what the findings show is that a large portion of reality is unintelligible, but this has not been proven. And your attempt to show that there may be intelligibility produced by a "broader understanding of grammatical forms" I have adequately demonstrated, is nothing other than an obscuring of this unintelligibility produced by quantum mechanics, behind ambiguity. That is sophistry

In reality, what good grammatical form (clear definitions and adherence to fundamental principles) shows, is that the reason why quantum mechanics leaves a large portion of reality as unintelligible is that the logic being employed is faulty.

What quantum mechanics demonstrates is that materiality extends beyond the activity of material things. — Possibility

Again, you continue to demonstrate the incoherency of your supposed "broader understanding of grammatical forms". "Materiality" is defined by material, and "material" is defined by matter. And "matter" by common definition, and conventional understanding is defined by the physical presence of material things. Now you propose a "matter", in the form of "a materiality", which "extends beyond material things".

By this proposal there is absolutely nothing to constrain the concept of "matter", because it could be extended to any sort of fictional idea. If the concept of "matter" is not grounded in, or substantiated by, the real existence of material things, then we allow that "matter" and consequently "materiality" may refer to any fantasy or fictitious thing. This is why Aristotle, who first defined "matter" and expressed all the limitations under which the concept was to be understood, explicitly denied the possibility of matter which extends beyond the existence of material things.

I believe it is important to recognize that "matter" is a concept. The concept was produced to assist us in understanding the existence of physical bodies. Matter, as a concept was intended to represent a property of such bodies, a property which all bodies have in common. But if we move, as you propose, and make matter something which extends further than its original concept, something other than a property of physical bodies, then we invalidate the entire concept. All the things which were said about "matter", as a property of physical bodies lose their necessity as truths, because "matter" is now something else. And there is no principle which would allow that matter can maintain its status as a property of physical bodies, and also extend beyond physical bodies. So the entire conception is undermined.

We have a very similar problem when we allow that inertia extends beyond mass. The concept of "inertia" was produced as a property of mass. Now if we allow that there is inertia which is not associated with mass we undermine the concept. Of course the argument would be that the concept of "inertia" would be grounded in something else, just like the concept of "matter" above (which extends beyond material things) would be grounded in something else, but that's not really true. The proposal to allow such changes is just carried out in an effort to make the mathematics work. Therefore there is no real grounding, just an effort to make the equations work out.

So what is really the case, is that when the grammatical logic is strictly adhered to, the mathematics which uses a different and less rigorous form of logic does not produce the desired results. The easiest solution is to compromise the grammatical logic. But this of course undermines the conceptual structure and the rigor of the grammatical logic

Grammatical conventions need to be in the mix, but for them to effectively intra-act we need to accept their fundamental variability and limitations. It seems you’re not prepared to do this. — Possibility

Grammatical conventions must be variable, that I agree with. However the process (discipline) whereby these conventions are questioned, dialectics, is completely different from the process whereby mathematical axioms are question. The former is the philosophical quest for truth, and the latter is the pragmatic quest for usefulness. The two are not incompatible, but compatibility requires a hierarchy of purpose, or intent. The pragmatic quest for usefulness must be guided by the philosophical quest for truth. In other words, the purpose or usefulness must be the quest for truth, or else there can be no compatibility.

Therefore grammatical conventions, which are variable under the auspices of dialectics and the quest for truth, must take priority over the conventions of mathematics and physics which are variable according to pragmatic inclinations. When grammatical logic is altered under the direction of good dialectics seeking truth, this can be known as the evolution of language. But when grammatical logic is altered under the direction of mathematicians and physicists who seek to support the usefulness of their own discipline, we can call this a corruption of grammatical logic.

This is pure sophistry. It is not just elegance that I’m after, but elegant accuracy. Dualism is clunky and ignorant at best - its most glaring ambiguity lies in the absence of a logical, qualitative and dynamic relational structure between ‘material’ and ‘ideal’ Forms. — Possibility

Again, this statement indicates a gross misunderstanding of dualism, which I addressed above.

Grammatical conventions have logical form but are not ‘logic’ in the ideal sense. Accuracy in practise is more indicative of ‘truth’ than words systematically arranged. And the accuracy in our practise of quantum mechanics makes it very clear that the remaining ‘fault’ in temporal conventions is in our grammatical logic, not the physics or maths. — Possibility

I really do not know what you mean by "'logic' in the ideal sense". But I think what I wrote above ought to go a long way toward dispelling this myth, that "our practise of quantum mechanics makes it very clear that the remaining ‘fault’ in temporal conventions is in our grammatical logic, not the physics or maths." It's very clear that what is the case, is that physics and mathematics, in their submission to a usefulness which has been corrupted away from the desire for truth, have succumbed to a severely compromised grammatical logic. Yes, the fault is evident in the grammatical logic, because the inclinations of mathematics and speculative physics have produced the need to compromise the grammatical logic. But this is exactly why we need to go back to the good solid principles of dualism to sort out that mess.

The Principle of Indiscernability is this: if for some entity X, X is, in principle, always and forever indiscernible (for all observers) from Y, then we can assume X=Y. We can assume that X = Y because in all possible cases X will always appear to be equal to Y. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that this principle can only be upheld by making an unjustifiable assumption about the nature of observers. You are saying that if X is indiscernible from Y, for all observers, then X=Y.

The first problem is the problem of induction. No matter how many observers perceive X as identical to Y, we will never know whether or not the next one will. So X=Y can never be proven.

The second problem which is more to the point, is that each observer is oneself, a unique and particular individual, according to the law of identity. Because of this, the observational apparatus and perspective of the observer is also unique to the individual. This makes it highly improbable that two distinct observers will ever precisely describe the very same thing in the exact same way. Accordingly, the criteria for "X", which needs to be the same description provided by all observers, will never be fulfilled, and "X=Y" will refer to nothing.

Because of these problems, the principle is completely useless and not applicable to anything. I think this may be the point that is getting at.

The best thing about him is that he is anti-war. — Hailey

I think that is just an illusion. He demonstrated bullying tactics throughout his life, and with every country that he dealt with as president. You can say that the bully just likes to pick on people, and does not want to start a fight. But people tend to have a limited tolerance for abuse, and when push comes to shove, the fight is actually started by the bullying.

Having said that, what quantum physics demonstrates is that activity does not require ‘materiality’ in the sense of a qualitative three-dimensionality. It only requires two non-commutative variable values, in a measurement relation (ie. one of them corresponding to ‘time’), to be intelligible as ‘real’ activity. But because quantum physicists then describe this as ‘activity’, grammatical conventions dictate that ‘something’ (NOT the activity itself), is what is active. This leads to a chicken-and-egg style dilemma. — Possibility

We are fundamentally in agreement then. But, when you say, "activity does not require ‘materiality’ in the sense of a qualitative three-dimensionality", I say that this activity is immaterial. And when you talk about what "grammatical conventions" dictate, I say that this is what "logic" dictates.

So why hold the penchant for anti-dualism? It seems to me, like dualism is very consistent with what quantum mechanics demonstrates. In fact, it appears like one has to intentionally use ambiguity and obscurity with terms like "intra-action" to hide the fact that what quantum mechanics demonstrates is that the nature of reality is very consistent with what dualism dictates. There is the activity of material things, and there is also activity which does not require materiality, therefore it is immaterial. Doesn't that sound like dualism to you?

Form is this same notion of configuration, a particular way in which something exists. And this apparent distinction between material and immaterial Form is not a binary, but an agential cut enacted between three- and four-dimensional configurations. — Possibility

Again, your reliance on "dimensional" models is misleading you. The activity which you say "does not require ‘materiality’ in the sense of a qualitative three-dimensionality", cannot be "an agential cut enacted between three- and four-dimensional configurations", because this agency must be non-dimension, i.e. immaterial.

This is the ambiguity I am speaking of. You consistently argue for the reality of the immaterial, yet your anti-dualism bias (and I believe I am correct to call it that), inclines you to use obscure and ambiguous terms such as "intra-action", in an attempt to hide the obvious fact that what you are arguing for is in reality a material/immaterial dualism.

It is highly technical, but it’s really just that the relativity of time is in fact a relativity of all four dimensional variables - their non-commutative ‘properties’ are simply the irreducible quality of dimensionality. What Bohr is saying about measurement is that any properties of reality are, at minimum, a relation between two pairs of non-commutative variable values, one of which, for us, acts as time. So we don’t need to assume space or objects - we only need to recognise one of those values as ‘time’, and one of those pairs as our involvement - our entangled embodied subjectivity.

But I don’t agree with the notion of extension from one realm to another. If you invert this dimensionality as starting with time, then distance, then momentum and then position (which is the paradigm shift required), it’s not so much extension as differentiation. And when we talk about mathematics in relation to reality, we are naturally approaching it from a fifth-dimensional perspective: configuring reality according to relations between variable values, undifferentiated as time, distance, etc. So in my understanding, it’s not a ‘separate realm’ at all. — Possibility

This is why classical dualism provides a much better platform for an approach toward the understanding of reality than does the discipline of modern physics. What physicists are starting to notice is the primacy of time. This means that our understanding of reality is only as good as our understanding of time. The problem is that the temporal conventions employed by modern physics, from the continuity of Newton's first law, to Einsteinian relativity, are simply incorrect. On the other hand, traditional metaphysics provides the required principles for a true understanding of time. These principles begin with an apprehension of the substantial difference between past and future, which as I said already, renders Newton's first law without any necessity. And this duality of substance is what necessitates dualism as the true starting point toward an understanding of reality.

I have a preference for an elegantly accurate understanding of reality. Dualism doesn’t cut it — Possibility

I'm sorry that dualism doesn't seem to be capable of satisfying your desire for elegancy. I hope you will consider swapping the desire for elegancy with the need for truth. Then we may happily converse about the nature of time, but only after you put aside all those beautiful symmetries which are proper to the faulty temporal conventions.

Which do you think provides the road to truth, the grammatical conventions which we know as logic, or the temporal conventions by which we practise the manipulation of temporal objects?

I have trouble with this also. But in a social, let's say feminist setting, intra-acting amongst participants can and does produce "objects" - movements - and the flux of cause and effect is cloudy. — jgill

Movements are categorically distinct from objects, and one cannot be reduced to the other. They are fundamentally incompatible in nature. Aristotle demonstrated this very well. We often talk about a type of movement as a concept, as if this concept is an object. But that would be a Platonic object which is categorically distinct from a material object.

As to the notion that time pre-exists space, that's a metaphysical stance and as such cannot promulgate conclusions about the physical world without absurdities like intra-action. — jgill

The absurdity is actually the product of the currently accepted notion of time, and the conceptual structure which envelops it. The problem is in the way that the concept of time is tied to the concept of change. Conventionally, logical priority is given to physical change, such that time is a property of change. But physical change requires that there is something which changes. This is what I'm talking about with the incoherency of the idea of activity without something that is active.

So if we start talking about activity, or change, without anything which is active or changing, we cross into incoherency. However, the nature of material existence indicates to us that there must be a cause of material existence, and this cause must be active. Therefore we must conclude that there is activity which is prior to material existence as cause of it.

In classical metaphysics, this activity which is prior to material existence is immaterial Forms, and this got adopted into Christian theology as a representation of God. And since the concept of time is tied to material change, then God as an active immaterial Form and cause of material activity, must be outside time, i.e., eternal. The problem is with the conventional conception of time, which ties time to material change. or activity. This renders all activity which is prior to material objects, as unintelligible, being outside of time.

So the mistake is the tying of time to material change. This is what produces the absurdities. To conceive of time as prior to space, and material existence, frees us from these absurdities, providing us with the means for understanding the cause of material existence in a coherent, logical way.

I did NOT redefine ‘agency’ - I took that definition straight from Google (source: Oxford Languages). Can I be clear that I am not redefining any of these terms - I am only pointing out the variability inherent in their definitions, etymology and usage. And the relation between logic and reality is not bound by grammatical convention. The fact that quantum physics makes exceptionally accurate use of a logical structure which defies grammatical conventions should prompt us to rethink these conventions in light of reality, not the other way around. — Possibility

Your definition though, did not solve the problem, which is how there could be activity without anything which is active, and how material objects could emerge from this activity. Dualism has already provided a systematic resolution to these problems thousands of years ago. The activity which is prior to material objects is the activity of immaterial Forms, and how material objects emerge from this activity is through an act of will (traditionally, God's will).

You ought to see, that if you just relinquish your bias against dualism, you will readily understand that classical dualism provides a far more comprehensible, intelligible, and coherent approach to this problem than quantum physics does.

Your approach is to simply deny that there is anything active, in this activity which is prior to material existence. But this renders that proposed activity as entirely unintelligible. The way of classical metaphysics is to recognize this sort of activity, which is prior to the activity of material objects, as the activity of immaterial Forms. And, as "forms" their essence is intelligibility. Therefore this activity is necessarily intelligible.

You seem to hold as a goal, the intent of reducing these two, material forms and immaterial forms, to one another, such that there would be no difference between them. This would support your bias against dualism. But then you are left with this fundamental activity, from which material objects emerge, which is completely unintelligible, because you insist that this is activity with nothing which is active. Perhaps, when you apprehend the unintelligibility of the idea, of activity with nothing which is active, you will be inclined to relinquish your bias against dualism, and accept that what is active in this activity which is prior to the emergence of material objects, is something immaterial.

A photon is a particular instance of activity, but what is active here? It’s not a universal, not a type - it IS real, and yet it still has no mass. — Possibility

The photon, as a particular instance of activity, is an incoherent concept. That's what quantum mechanics demonstrates to us. The "photon" is two completely incompatible forms of energy at the very same time, energy transmitted as wave action, and energy transmitted as a moving particle. Further the photon always has the property of "uncertainty". This is the reality of the quantum physics, and you seem to truly believe that it provides a better approach to the foundations of the universe, than dualism does, although dualism has been well thought out, to avoid such problems.

So what does this activity consist of? Energy without substance. A particle of light. A packet of electromagnetic radiation. It’s a pattern of activity without anything which is acting. So is ‘doesn’t follow grammatical convention’ alone grounds to reject the existence of a photon? — Possibility

A photon is not a packet of light. Light can be clearly observed as wave action, refraction, interference etc.. There are many different applications which make use of electromagnetic waves, and although they can be packaged they do not naturally exist as packets. Waves do not move as packets. And, there is very clearly something which is acting in the case of waves, some substance. Waves are the activity of a substance. You simply deny volumes of observational data to claim that electromagnetic radiation is activity without anything acting. This denial of the evidence plunges you into a fantasy world of incoherency.

The ‘problems’ that you point to are the result of limitations that our perspective, language and assumptions impose on reality. If we’re talking about ontology, we need to get past all that - including intelligibility. — Possibility

But why would you assume that reality, or some aspects of reality are unintelligible? That seems to be a counterproductive, self-defeating assumption. The philosophical mindset is the desire to know, and this means everything. Even if it's beyond the scope of one person, we work toward the collective knowledge. If there is something which I cannot understand, I ought not assume that it is inherently unintelligible, but that it is inherently intelligible, and I just currently have not the means to understand it. Then we keep working toward understanding it. If we assume that it is inherently unintelligible, then we give up on trying to understand it.

If there’s one thing I learned from a qualitative understanding of quantum physics, it’s that dismissing ambiguity, uncertainty or incoherence puts limitations on the information we have access to, before we even begin. That doesn’t mean we necessarily have to use that information, but we do need to be honest about choosing to bracket it out intentionally. And when we don’t have sufficient access to information, we shouldn’t make assumptions based on our limited perspective, on conventions or traditions. What we can do instead is look for relations and patterns of logic, quality and energy in the ambiguous, uncertain and incoherent information that we do have access to. — Possibility

I'm not saying that we should dismiss the ambiguity, uncertainty, and incoherence, I'm saying that we should look at it for what it is, and that is evidence that the theories which give us this are faulty. So it's not the ambiguity, uncertainty, and incoherence that we ought to dismiss, we ought to give this high regard, as evidence that the theories which produce it ought to be dismissed. That's the thing, our knowledge is only as good as the theories we apply, and when such defects enter our knowledge it's because the theories we apply are faulty.

Agency is not ‘motion’ - you’re swapping out terms in order to imply the necessity of a pre-existing object. But there is no such necessity. The apparent incoherence of activity without any ‘thing’ to act comes down to grammatical conventions, nothing more. — Possibility

I'm sorry Possibility, but I will not accept this. Not only motion, but the idea of any instance of activity, without anything acting is incoherent. This is due to the categorical distinction between a universal, type, and a particular. Any type of activity, running, jumping, etc., can be described and understood through a description of the type. The description of the type does not imply any particular object involved in the activity, and this is a concept, a universal. But if we assume a particular instance of any named type of activity, there must be something involved in that activity, or else there is no particular instance being referred to, and all you are talking about is the universal conception. To say that a particular instance of activity does not require something which is active, because the universal conception does not require a particular which is active, is to make a category mistake.

You can write this off as "grammatical conventions, nothing more", but that's all logic is, grammatical conventions and nothing more. So you can insist on accepting illogical and incoherent principles, because logic is only grammatical conventions and nothing more, but what's the point to that?

We both agree that time is logically prior to space. I would say that it necessarily follows from this that time is materially prior to space (ie. activity is materially prior to objects). But you don’t seem to agree with this, and your sole argument is that it is ‘unintelligible’ or ‘incoherent’. — Possibility

I'd say it's incoherent, because matter without objects is incoherent. Matter is that which has mass, and occupies space, and that is what defines a physical object. Having mass, and occupying space, (i.e. being matter), yet not being an object, is incoherent. So your use of "materially prior" is incoherent to me, as if there is matter which is prior to objects. But this is incoherent for the reasons above. Being a particular instance of matter, and being a physical object are one and the same thing.

. You dismiss it as such not because it is inherently unintelligible, but because it appears to be so in your perspective. — Possibility

No, it is "inherently unintelligible" as described above. The only way to make it intelligible is to start redefining terms, as you did with "agency". Now "you'll have to redefine "matter", and so on and so forth, until you have a conceptua structure which is completely inconsistent with convention, and any cross referencing would constitute equivocation. What's the point? You\d just be making up a fantasy reality which is completely distinct from grammatical conventions, i.e. logic.

The idea of a particular instance of activity, without anything which is active, is inherently unintelligible. This would be nothing but a universal, a type of activity, and not a particular instance at all. What makes it a particular instance is the particular material which is active. You might insist that it is just a type, a universal conception, and not a particular instance which you are talking about, but then it's just a fantasy in your mind, and nothing real at all.

Or are you that certain as to the perfection of your own intellect, that if you can’t understand it, then it cannot possibly be understood? I’m not saying that everyone should be able to understand it the way that I’ve set it out, but I’m also not going to apply reductionist methodology that dismisses information on the grounds that it doesn’t follow grammatical convention. — Possibility

Yes, I'm quite certain that there cannot be any particular instances of activity without anything which is acting, or active. If you really think that activity without anything acting is a coherent idea, then explain to me what would this activity consist of. What would be the substance here? And, that "it doesn't follow grammatical convention" is very good grounds for rejection, as explained above.

I recognise that my perspective is limited, but that doesn’t mean my mind must be central to any proposed ontology, any more than the fact that I’m on earth means this planet must be central to the solar system. The same logical process can be employed - at a different qualitative level - to propose an ontology where my mind is understood as de-centred and variable, just as any other structure or system. — Possibility

The solar system is not comparable to ontology. We can model, or represent all sorts of supposedly independent things, like the solar system, but ontology does not have as its purpose, to model or represent any independent thing.

It is not the grammatical structure itself but the conventions surrounding it that are insufficient. For instance, the assumption that a verb is necessarily attributed to the subject as agency, which is denied to the object, is inaccurate in relation to what we understand about reality and the structure of events. We can still structure the sentence in the same way, but we cannot assume that this attribution of agency is necessarily what it means, and to insist on this configuration of dynamics in an event for the sake of ‘intelligibility’ is to endorse a variety of material-discursive practices that perpetuate ignorance, isolation and exclusion. This is as much about the reality of that cascade of events within a musical performance or telling time by a caesium clock as it is about cultural theory. — Possibility

I do not understand what you're trying to say here. Of course we can talk about verbs, and the meaning of them, "run", "jump", etc., without implying that any particular thing or object is carrying out that activity. That is not the issue, because in this case we are talking about the conception, what it means. But if we refer to a particular instance of such an activity occurring in the physical world, then we necessarily imply that there is something engaged in that activity. Would you be talking about an instance of running, or jumping, in which there is nothing running or jumping? That's incoherent, right?

Or, are you proposing a special type of activity, in which there is nothing which is active. If so, then you ought to be able to describe this type of activity, conceptualize it. Please explain to me what this proposed type of activity is like, and how it occurs, this type of activity in which nothing is active. Can you explain what is going on when this activity occurs, without talking about something being active?

What quantum mechanics indicates is that understanding the complete nature of reality will take more than the principles of physics. We must accept that the theories are incomplete. Let’s not throw out the baby… — Possibility

Ever read read Plato's Theaetetus? There is no baby there, only flatulence.

But look up the Michelson & Morley experiment - there is no ether. — Possibility

I already have. What these experiments demonstrated is that the relationship between the ether and material objects which was assumed, that they are distinct materials or substances, was a faulty assumption. It does not prove that there is no ether, just that the hypothesis of how the ether exists was incorrect.

THE TRIANGLE IS NOT OUT THERE, but added by the brain as a new meaning that is inferred, not seen — Gnomon

That thing is cool. I actually see a difference in the white between inside and outside the triangle, as if there's a line marking the edge of the triangle. But then I can make the line go away if I want to.

Wouldn't it be bad evolutionary design if our perceptual representations were giving us information about what was going on inside our own head as opposed to the things in the world they are supposed to represent? — Apustimelogist

Consider the way that you read. Do you read words as sounds? What's that all about, seeing things as sounds? Did the brain get so confused that it can't tell the difference between a sight and a sound? You could say that the sound in your own head is a representation of the thing outside your head, the written word, but what kind of representation is that, to represent a seen pattern as a heard pattern? Well, the representation, which is the sound in the head, simply represents what is seen by the eyes, which is an image in the head, so one representation just represents another representation.

If a representation represents another representation, how do you get to the point of concluding that there is something outside the head which is being represented? Suppose the brain just likes to produce things in a willy-nilly way, like the way pure mathematicians produce axioms, with complete disregard for anything supposedly real, in a supposedly real external word. Then, if those created things prove to be useful to the being possessing them, that might be an evolutionary advantage. However, we still cannot conclude that there is anything being represented, by those created ideas, images, or whatever you want to call them, we just have useful tools. Nor can we conclude that there is an real, external, physical world.

Agency: action or intervention producing a particular effect (from Medieval Latin agent-, doing).

This definition does not imply (necessarily or otherwise) that agency is a property of a thing or agent - you are making one of those Newtonian assumptions again. And again, not ‘distinct’, but differentiating agencies. Because we DO just have a whole bunch of activity. The capacity to speak of differentiating agencies within activity is still there - we just need to shed some institutionalised assumptions. — Possibility

It has nothing to do with Newton, but Barad clearly was talking about "distinct agencies" which emerge through intra-action. So even by your definition we have the problem I mentioned of a multitude of particular agencies coming into being, from a general sort of "agency". The general sort is unintelligible as motion without anything which is moving is incoherent. And so this sort of ontology ought not be accepted, because its basic presumptions, or premises, renders the coming into being of things, objects, as unintelligible. That is the recurring problem of all sorts of materialism in general.

I do not understand why you are so obsessed with defending this position, to the point that you incessantly deny the problems which I point to.

But it seems you are so taken with beliefs in representationalism and human exceptionalism that you refuse to accept this. The notion that humanity is not so central and immovable, and that the conventions surrounding grammatical structure are insufficient to ‘represent’ reality, seem too terrifying to contemplate. But just like the work of Darwin and Copernicus before him, the evidence in quantum mechanics is irrefutable. So we must accept it, and do our best to embrace the information and move forward, rather than try to bracket it out. — Possibility

You cannot circumvent the fact that your own personal mind is central, and immovable from any sort of ontology which you might believe in, or propose to others. Pretending otherwise, is self-deception, and then your proposals are attempts at deceiving others.

Yes, our current, conventional grammatical structure is insufficient to represent reality, but this is simply a reflection of a fundamental lack of understanding. Human grammatical structures evolve with human understanding, so grammatical insufficiencies are not paramount to misunderstanding, they can be overcome. Grammatical problems can be resolved in the evolution of understanding.

This underscores the need for clear and precise definitions in ontology, and demonstrates why yours and Barad's use of ambiguity in terms like "intra-action", and "agencies", is misleading, and conducive to misunderstanding. You obscure the unintelligibility and incoherency of your ontology with ambiguity, then produce definitions as required, but the definition is insufficient to account for the complete scope of the usage. This means that any usage outside the provided definition, is equivocation.

What quantum mechanics ought to indicate to you, is that we do not have the principles required for understanding the complete nature of reality. If we must accept the evidence of quantum mechanics, then we must accept this, that the theories by which we approach the foundations of the universe are faulty.

Electromagnetic waves are not unintelligible - they’re just incompatible with representationalism. Without this and other Newtonian assumptions, there is simply no need for any of these acrobatics. The notion of an ‘ether’ is just trying to allay fears: an attempt to describe electromagnetic energy without abandoning representationalism. — Possibility

That a wave only occurs in a medium, is not a "Newtonian assumption", it is simply the way that we understand the occurrence of waves. You are the one insisting that we need to talk "physics". Do you understand the physics of waves? Electromagnetic waves are unintelligible within the precepts of any theory which denies the reality of an ether, because waves without a substance, through which the waves propagate, is an incoherent notion.

I just think your understanding of time is based on a limited perspective, which forces you to accept a dualism. — Possibility

Any true account of time requires dualism because of the substantial difference between past and future. All forms of monism display a gross misunderstanding of time.

What is ‘occurring in the inside of space’ is simply your ongoing constructed prediction - a configuration of activity based on the information available. — Possibility

It is not "prediction" that I am talking about here, it is what is actually happening, as time is passing. Something must determine, or cause what will be, in existence, at each passing moment in time, because the future consists of possibilities. That, something which determines what will be, at each moment in passing time, is what I refer to as what is "occurring in the inside of space". Newton's first law simply takes for granted that the way things have been, continuously in the past, will continue to be the way that they are in the future, unless there is a force which causes things to change. But the nature of free will, and the reality of future possibilities, indicates that any existent thing could change or be changed at any moment of passing time. This tells us that the temporal continuity of existence expressed by Newton's first law is in no way necessary. Yes, things occur the way described, but this is not necessary. This is why Newton himself stated that his first law depended on the Will of God.

When we apprehend the reality, that each and every aspect of material existence could be discontinued at any moment of passing time, we are forced to conclude that the entirety of material existence must be recreated, reconstituted, at each moment of passing time. When we consider where this act occurs, this act which recreates the existence of each material thing, at each moment of passing time, it can only be the inside, or internal part of space.

The thing is that our conceptual reality (inner ‘space’) is not restricted to three dimensions, or even four. It is not grounded in temporality, but in pure relation, differentiating into logical, qualitative and dynamic potential. — Possibility

This is what I am arguing is the mistake. That the conceptual reality of inner space is not grounded in temporality is a mistake. Since what happens in inner space is activity, and activity occurs in time, then to make this "dynamic potential" logically coherent, it must be grounded in temporality. Any dynamic which is not temporal is incoherent and unintelligible. This is why I argue that time must be understood as logically prior to space. Traditional conceptions of space are of "outer space", three dimensional conceptions. "Inner space" cannot be understood through such traditional conceptions of space, because whatever this "inner space" is, it is substantially different from outer space. However, what the two have in common is activity, and what is required for all activity is time. Therefore the means for understanding the proper relationship between inner space and outer space is to understand the nature of time, it's what they both share. So, the activities of inner space are properties of time, and the activities of outer space are properties of time, and the two are related to each other by that subject, time.

I continue to stand by my argument that treating time quantum mechanically is an important step in eliminating dualism. — Possibility

Again, this is what I argue is a mistake. The goal of eliminating dualism is misguided, because it is dualism which gives us the principles which are best suited toward understanding the true nature of time. What quantum mechanics shows us is that the discipline of physics approaches the foundations of the universe with faulty principles, which render the universe as unintelligible. The appearance of unintelligibility is the consequence of faulty principles. This means that all the primary principles must be reassessed and analyzed for mistake. Dualism provides very good direction for how we ought to understand time.

The agencies are differentiating, not distinct. Distinct implies separation, which Barad is very careful NOT to imply. There is a lot of Newtonian assumption built into our use of language, and you’re displaying it here. Agency is not a thing, but activity. Agencies emerge through differentiating, which is intra-action. Just as the particular striking of a chord emerges though a particular song performance, emerging through a particular set emerging through a particular music festival. These are not things but events. So we’re not talking about properties of things, but involvement in events. You can assume that a song existed prior to the festival, but we both agree that we’re talking about particular events, not generalities. We’re talking about a particular performance - one that did not exist, with these boundaries and properties, until it was actually happening. — Possibility

Again, you are hiding (obscuring) the issue through ambiguity and sloppy use of terms. "Agency" refers to the actions of an agent. So this part of what you say: " Agency is not a thing, but activity" is true. But this part of what you say: "So we’re not talking about properties of things" is false. The term used, "agency", implies necessarily that the activity referred to is the property of a thing an agent. That there are distinct agents (as distinct entities) is the only way that Barad has the capacity to speak of distinct "agencies". Otherwise we just have a whole bunch of activity, and no capacity to speak of distinct agencies within this activity.

If we respect this difference, then a number of problems become evident. First, any intra-action activity which is prior to the emergence of agents, cannot be called agency, and it then becomes fundamentally unintelligible. It is activity without anything which is active, because there is no agent, like motion without anything which is moving. This is a fundamental issue with our understanding of electromagnetic energy. Without the ether which is required to understand the waves of electromagnetism, there are waves without a substance which is undergoing the wave activity. Failure to identify the ether has rendered electromagnetic waves as unintelligible to us, motion without anything moving.

Another problem is the issue of how distinct agents could emerge. We have first, activity without any distinct agents. This is a sort of random activity which is fundamentally unintelligible because it is designated as having no agents, nothing which the activity is a property of. Then, from this emerges activity which can be attributed to distinct agents. This is a significant change of category for the proposed type of activity, "intra-action", and we need to account for how such a change could occur.

That is why "intra-action" is really a very misleading sort of proposal. It classes both these very different forms of activity, the unintelligible activity of action without any thing acting, together with intelligible activity, agency, as if the difference between these two is insignificant. In reality, it becomes fundamentally incoherent to try and conceptualize action without an agent suddenly becoming the action of an agent because we need to know where the agent popped from.

I’m not trying to obscure anything. I can’t force a paradigm shift on you, but we are not talking about ‘things’ at all. Language convention leads you to assume that ‘agency’, ‘intra-action’ or ‘event’ in a position of noun means they are individual, pre-existing things or entities. But we’re talking about events within events within events. As Barad says, it matters whether you are talking about an event from inside (in which you are necessarily involved), or from ‘outside’ (where the ‘event’ is internally configured, and treated quantum mechanically). — Possibility

The problem is that "agency" implies an agent which is active, that is how the word is commonly used. Therefore the use of this word, if what is meant is activity without an agent, is a deceptive usage. And if we look at the idea of activity without an agent which is active, then we have an unintelligible proposal. So we ought to conclude that Barad uses the term "agency", or "agencies", intentional, to obscure the fact that what is being proposed is fundamentally unintelligible.

An event without anything involved in that event is unintelligible. And event within event, within event, within event, etc., produces an infinite regress with no substance to the world. This is the very same problem as if we say that matter is infinitely divisible. Each piece of matter can be divided to smaller pieces, infinitely, and the world has no substance.

What I said was that each event has a temporal structure, which can appear linear from within it. When you perceive a particular event from outside it, however, it has to include the other three dimensions, and so is structurally similar to spacetime, which it seems you assume to be something external to or other than the ‘physical’ universe. I am saying there is no ‘external’ perspective of reality - the dimensional perspective here is of an internal configuration to the event, and this is where quantum mechanics comes in. Because if we are observing the internal structure of an event, then we are necessarily involved, and if we are outside, then its internal configuration is unobservable, and must be treated quantum mechanically (ie. like spacetime). — Possibility

If you place yourself, as the subject, within the universe, then you are the agent. "The universe" is a creation of your senses, perception, and mind. The only way to get an "internal configuration" is to understand your own mind and perceptual apparatus, as to how phenomena, and concepts are created by your mind. Otherwise, you look at the universe as something external to your mind.

To be blunt, it is impossible to observe the internal configuration of an event, unless that event is internal to your own body. That's simply the way that sense observation works, any time we make sense observations we observe from the outside inward, and it is impossible to observe the internal configuration. Therefore your portrayal of quantum mechanics as observing the internal configuration of events, is misguided, and simply wrong.

I agree with your last statement here, and I think this is important. QM demonstrates that time is prior to space. So why do you keep bringing Newton into the discussion and insisting on ‘substance’ by way of ‘things’? Are you suggesting that objects exist prior to space? That time is not activity? Or that activity is not agency? This is what baffles me about your approach. — Possibility

"Space" ought to be understood as the property of objects, I think you mentioned this already. That is how the concept has been developed. We produced a concept of space for the purpose of measuring and understanding the properties of objects, so our "space" is fundamentally derived from and therefore refers to the property of objects. Objects are logically prior to space.

This means that we need to go further than space to ground, or substantiate, the existence of objects. Traditionally this was done through concept of "matter". The Aristotelian concept of matter has matter as described in terms of "potential", which is basically possibility. So matter is the potential for change, but this potential itself needs to be grounded in something substantial, and in the Aristotelian conception, this is time. Therefore matter is represented as that which does not change through the passage of time (represented now by conservation laws, mass or energy). This is represented by Newton's first law, which even today maintains its position as the basic premise of physics. This implies that the fundamental grounding, or the fundamental substance of the universe is temporal in nature. The problem is that Newton's first law does not adequately apprehend the nature of temporal extension.

I agree that ‘my reality’ can only ever be internally structured, but I disagree that ‘I am an impenetrable fortress’. Rather, I am an event, a spacetime structure of particular and ongoing internal reconfiguration, entangled with all of reality in our mutual becoming, with which I collaborate to enact an agential cut with every intra-action, every material-discursive practice, marking boundaries and properties that, despite my best intentions, are continually changing. When we invert our understanding of reality from space/objects as prior to time/activity, to time/activity prior to space/objects, then disembodiment is not a question of ‘spatial extension’ to a body, but of arbitrarily differentiating the ‘body’ from being. — Possibility

Consider that "impenetrable fortress" refers to the outside, and nothing crosses the external boundary. Things relating to each other externally through space, is how we model things, but try for a minute to imagine all real relations as through the inside. At each moment of passing time, everything comes from the inside, moving in an outward direction (as indicated by the concept of spatial expansion). So all true relations are through the inside, in the upward direction of time, because change must be initiated prior to the material effects being instantiated at the present moment. This means that all real events, as being causal, actually occur in the inside of space, while the outward expression is just the effect of the true internal event. I used to think of the passing of time as a process which involves the inverting of space. At each moment when time passes, spatial existence inverts from inside to outside.

Suppose we defer consideration of a law of identity, and consider two identical beings in different possible worlds, with the difference between the two worlds being of negligible relevance to the two beings. — wonderer1

The point is, that to be two beings there must be something which distinguishes them as one different from the other. If what distinguishes them one from the other, is "being in different possible words" then we cannot say that the difference between the two worlds is of negligible relevance, because we've already propositioned that this difference is what distinguishes them one from the other. Since being two distinct things rather than one and the same thing is fundamentally a significant difference, then it's necessarily of very significant relevance.

The only way which I see to proceed is to employ the proposition that the difference which makes two things distinct, instead of one and the same thing, is not a significant difference. But that is just asking for all sorts of logical dilemmas because that premise would annihilate our capacity to analyze differences, by saying that differences in general are insignificant. But that makes all things the same, and whatever means we might employ to distinguish one thing from another would be completely arbitrary.

And yet it is not beyond the pale to say that you went to the fridge because you wanted a beer. — Banno

You got me thirsty already, and it's not even 7:00 AM: https://btpshop.ca/

However I took the anecdote as a comment on the distinction between material causation and the Aristotelian final causation. — Wayfarer

When thoroughly analyzed there is very little difference in the application of Aristotle's final cause and material cause, in the sense that they can each be applied toward the very same effects. The most significant difference though is that material cause is potential while final cause can be understood as actual. Because of this "material cause" is inadequate for understanding many of the things it is applied toward, as it cannot account for agency. So "the reason for", and "the cause of" are very distinct in the way that they do, or do not, account for agency.

In Banno's example, if I say wanting a beer "caused me to go" to the fridge (final cause), it is also necessarily the reason why I went to the fridge. Agency is accounted for as an act of the will. But if I say wanting a beer "was the reason why I went" to the fridge, there is no agency implied, causation is therefore not accounted for, and we are left uninformed as to the cause. Then one might look to the brain, or some other factor as the cause.

Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect (1970, 214). — Davidson

So when we say the mental supervenes on the physical, we're saying that if we had two humans who were identical in every way physically, they will necessarily have the same mental state. — frank

Isn't it contrary to the law of identity to speak of "two" physical occurrences which are in every way alike. If they are in every way alike, they are necessarily one and the same, not "two". So the whole premise of this thought experiment, the assumption of two distinct physical occurrences which are exactly alike, is fundamentally flawed making that thought experiment pointless.

I think this is what I was saying above to T Clark, but one of the problems often brought forth by the substance dualist is that there is not empirical proof that brain state X always causes behavior Y because fMRI results do not show that for every instance of behavior Y the exact areas of the brain show activity. — Hanover

So this is an example of the problem exposed above. When "brain state X" is referred to, what is meant is a specific type of brain state, not a particular condition of a brain which is exactly and precisely identical to the particular condition of another brain which is said to have "brain state X". In reality, "brain state X" refers to a generalized "brain state" which ignores many peculiarities of an actual brain's state, making brain state X a broadly universal condition, allowing that two very different brains, can both be said to have "brain state X". So the whole argument about supervenience is just so deeply flawed, and not worthy of serious philosophical discussion.

First of all, you are reading more into what I describe than what is here. Read it again. There is nothing in what I’ve written that deviates from Barad’s explanation - except that my word choice has maybe opened the door for you to insert your own assumptions. Unless you somehow missed my use of ‘not’ in what I described…? — Possibility

Look what your quote from Barad said though:

In contrast to the usual ‘interaction’, which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. — Karen Barad

Notice that the distinct agencies are said to emerge through "their" intra-action. This is what is incoherent. "Emerge" means to come into being. So if the agencies emerge trough this activity, the activity must precede the agencies in time. But "their" intra-action implies that the intra-action is a property of the agencies which emerge. Therefore the sentence quoted implies that the activities which are the properties of the agencies precedes the existence of the agencies. How is this logically possible, that a thing's actions precede the existence of the thing?

You say "The measurement process is an internal configuration, not an activity occurring between individual, pre-existing entities", but I have no idea what this means. If it's not "internal" to pre-existing entities, then what's it internal to? It appears to me, that instead of facing Barad's incoherency you try to obscure the meaning by saying that the intra-action is "internal" without indicating a type of thing which it is internal to.

Where do you get this assumption that an emergence must exist prior to what emerges? — Possibility

"Emerge" means to become, to come into being. And becoming implies a cause, therefore something from which the emerging thing emerges from, whether or not you use the term "from" or "through". You can insist that something can come into being without a cause if you like, but that's just the unacceptable notion of something coming from nothing.

When we ‘keep time’ with the quartz clock we are part of a cascade of internal configurations - within phenomena - that necessarily involve all of the precisely arranged parts, in a ‘clock’ body, keeping time for us through various prostheses. And we are materially entangled with these internal arrangements - the digital count reading the electric pulse reading the amplifier reading the vibrating crystal - whenever we ‘read’ the time as marks on the clock face. And each of these measurement ‘events’ is not ordered in time but roughly simultaneous and NOT identical. — Possibility

This is your obscure notion again, of "internal configurations". Now you say that the configuration is internal to phenomena. "Phenomena" is just a generalization, a universal, a conception. So now, if we are talking about an internal arrangement of parts, we are talking about a logical arrangement, a conceptual structure, conceptual parts arranged by a logical priority. We are not talking about an arrangement of physical parts. "Phenomena" refers to what appears to the senses, and we sense the external of things, not the internally arranged parts. We use logic to model internal arrangements, but then this is not what is actually internal to the phenomena, if "phenomena" is supposed to represent real physical events or objects, but a logically produced model of the "internal" of such.

A two-dimensional continuum is a variable plane - but not necessarily a geometrical one. It’s just describing a relation between two variables. And now either of those variables could exist as time, or distance, or direction, or energy, etc. And the universe begins to take shape, as it were. — Possibility

There is no universe here beginning to take shape, because you have only presented ideals, a two dimensional plane. There is no substance here, nor is there any activity here because there is nothing to be active, no agency. All you have is two ideal dimensions, and nothing taking any shape whatsoever, just the basis for a conceptual model.

Read what you wrote. You are arguing that an activity of ‘not being’ must precede the being of an object. Time prior to space. — Possibility

Exactly. That's what I am arguing for, time must be understood as prior to space if our intention is to understand the nature of reality.

Are you saying that no event can occur within another event? That a music festival, in which a number of acts perform, is not an event because it contains events within it? And a single instrument being played during one of those acts is or is not an event? And a chord being struck? I want to be clear on what you’re arguing here… — Possibility

What I am saying is that "a music festival" refers to something general, a universal, a concept or ideal, and therefore not any particular real event. Likewise for "a generation". To refer to an event, we need to specify a particular music event, or a particular family relation.

This has nothing to do with "events within", it's a matter of the difference between talking about a general idea (a concept or universal), and a particular event. You agreed that any particular event must have a temporal order. Then you went on to say that it is not necessary that all events have a temporal order.

To judge the truth or falsity of this, we must determine what "all events" refers to. Your example, "a generation", indicates that it refers to a generalization, a universal, and not anything real in the physical universe, just an ideal. But I do not think that this is what you had in mind. I think you want "all events" to refer to a compilation of all real physical events, rather than to a concept or ideal. If so, then aren't you just treating all real physical events as a single event, and therefore this particular event must follow the rule that all events have a temporal order?

And if you are treating the compilation of all real physical events as something other than a single particular event, then you need to explain what type of a thing this is, which you are referring to, and how it is possible that all events could exist together as something other than an event. Normally, when we talk about a bunch of events existing together as a single unit, we are just speaking about a bigger event, as your example of music festivals shows. And in the same way that the small event (a chord being struck), has a temporal order, the big event (the specified music event itself) must also have a temporal order, as all events have a temporal order.

Did you explain what "the meaning of the meaning" means during the last week or so of discussion? If so, I must have missed it. Please provide a quote. — Luke

I am now fully convinced that trying to explain anything to you will always be a hopeless effort.

Define ‘good’. It may seem pedantic to insist on ‘intra-action’, but for me it’s about being honest, acknowledging the involvement and variability of all aspects of the measurement setup in the process. The measurement process is an internal configuration, not an activity occurring between individual, pre-existing entities - despite what Newton assumes to be the case. — Possibility

The explanation of intra-action provided for me, by you from Barad, was incoherent by self-contradiction, as I explained. If agents emerge from their "intra-action" then the intra-action must be prior to, and cause the existence of the agents. This leaves the problem of what is acting in the intra-action. Barad called it "their" intra-action, but the activity cannot be "theirs" because it is prior to their existence.

What you describe here is nothing but interaction between the people measuring and the thing being measured, and is not representative of what Barad was referring to in the quote you produced for me. So I am beginning to think that your understanding of "intra-action" is not the same as Barad's

You cannot tell time from the spatial presence of a quartz crystal. Each of these three ‘objects’ provides a different set of values as its relative temporal stability, and where the quartz crystal and caesium electron differ from the sun is that there is no human being ‘doing the measurement’ at the level of the ‘object’. Once the timepiece is set up, we ignore the fact that we have created elaborate conditions for a particular, stable and recurring temporal measurement. — Possibility

I don't see you point. Even with the atomic clock, someone still has to read the clock, just like someone has to read the sun, in order that the passage of time is actually measured. There is no such difference as you claim. The parts of the clock must be precisely arranged in order that it can properly "keep time", but so must the sun and the earth be "precisely arranged" in order to keep time. But the "keeping of time" is not really done by the precisely arranged parts, it is done by the person who observes them.

We call these measurements of ‘time’ by ignoring the variability inherent within the measurement process, including the variability of the very ‘object’ being used to provide temporal stability. — Possibility

All you are saying is that measurements of time are inevitably imprecise. You and I agree here, and it appears that the reason for this imprecision is that the stability of the object, is not as perfect or ideal as we assume it to be. We ought to take this as an indication that Newton's first law, which takes the stability of the object for granted is fundamentally flawed. Therefore, "the variability inherent within the measurement process" is a feature of the principles , the theory, being applied in the measurement process. There is a model of the world, a representation, or map, the Newtonian representation which assumes as a fundamental principle the stability of an object, but this model is fundamentally flawed. However, our measurements of time are based in the Newtonian representation.

But it does allow for it. Spacetime fuses the three dimensions of space and one of time, not into a 3+1 structure, but into a four-dimensional continuum. — Possibility

Any sort of "dimensional continuum" is problematic from the outset. From what it means to be continuous, a continuum cannot have distinct dimensions. So the dimensions of space are arbitrary to begin with. And that this dimensional model cannot adequately represent space is indicated by the irrational nature of pi and of the square root of two. It appears like it might require an infinite number of spatial dimensions to properly represent space as dimensional, but this would be equally problematic. Making time another dimension just magnifies the failures of the dimensional model.

So there is no set or assumed configuration of dimensional structure in spacetime, and that’s the point. — Possibility

This is exactly why the dimensional representation fails. It is completely arbitrary, therefore it is based on nothing real. It is not based in, or does not start in any real aspects of space or time. And of course, space and time must have very real properties as quantum physics demonstrates. So this type of dimensional representation is not based in anything real, and does not capture the real nature of space and time.

Except that mass is not really as stable or inert as it appears. Look closer, and you’ll find activity. The capacity to measure time with a caesium electron is dependent on measuring momentum regardless of its position (as above). Yet the macroscopic state of an atomic clock presents as apparent inertia, with one particular variable having the characteristics of time. — Possibility

Momentum is a Newtonian principle, tied up with mass and inertia. This is why our measurements of time are based in Newtonian physics, which assumes the continuous existence of the massive object, as per the first law.

To emerge’ means to become apparent or visible - there is no temporal order or actual separation implied. It is entirely possible for the emergence, the ‘object’, and the activity to BE or even become simultaneously. — Possibility

This cannot be true. "To become" implies a coming into being, which is a temporal order of not being then being. If the object emerges from the activity, as described by Barad, then there is activity temporally prior to the being of the object, as it becomes during the activity.

We speak about ‘generations’ as events in time, but there is no point in time where one generation ends and another begins for everyone - only between two family members. — Possibility

A generality is not an event, which is a particular. When you refer to "generations" here, you are not referring to events, but to a generalized notion of "a generation". When we speak of the relations between family members we speak of events.

An event, by definition, is something that occurs in time - has temporality - but that doesn’t mean all events fit into some universal linear order. It seems nice and logical, but doesn’t correspond to reality. — Possibility

No, your use of "generations" as if "generation X" is an event, is what does not correspond with reality. This is very similar to the issue above with four dimensional spacetime. It's a useful principle, but its usefulness is derived from the fact that it may be arbitrarily applied, and this is what means that it does not correspond with reality.

I can't agree because I don't know what "the meaning of the meaning" means. You did not explain it. — Luke

And the last week or so of discussion was not absorbed by you at all? The childishness never ceases to amaze me.

If the meaning is the definition, then the meaning of the definition is what? - the meaning of the meaning? — Luke

Yes, that's quite obvious and I don't see why you can't agree. The word has meaning, the definition of the word (the phrase) has meaning, the words used to explain the definition (the interpretation of the definition) have meaning, etc., and none of these 'meanings' is the same as any other. That's why I mentioned earlier that some philosophers like Wittgenstein got very concerned about an infinite regress of meaning. So they like to claim that there is some sort of foundational beliefs, bedrock presuppositions, or something like that, which ground all the meaning by being supported by something other than meaning.

I would agree that a definition is (typically) a phrase, but the meaning of that phrase is not distinct from the definition. There is not the definition on one hand and the meaning of the definition on the other. As I said in my first response to your accusation of conflation that started all this: — Luke

How can you say that the meaning of a word is different from the word. And, that the definition is a "phrase", which is a group of words, yet you claim that the meaning of the phrase is not different from the phrase? Why do you think that the meaning of a word is different from the word, yet the meaning of a group of words is not different from the group of words?

See, you separate the word from its meaning, as two distinct things, yet you combine the phrase, which is the definition, with its meaning, as one and the same thing. You are not consistent. Do you honestly believe that the phrase, which is a group of words, and the meaning of that group of words is one and the same thing, yet also believe that the meaning of a single word is distinct from that word? What is it about a group of words which makes it the same as its meaning?

Here's a suggestion, a way which we might be able to get past this problem. Maybe we should consider that the definition is not really the meaning, even though we've both already agreed that it is. The definition is just a group of words, the phrase, and the meaning of the word is something completely different from this group of words, which is the definition.

You have not always said that the meaning of the word is the definition of the word. Our disagreement over this matter began when you accused me of "conflating the definitions with their meaning, or interpretation". You asserted that meanings and definitions "are separate", with the distinction between them being that meanings are always understood by a reference to examples while definitions are not. — Luke

Your childish behaviour is very frustrating Luke. I definitely differentiated between the definition of the word, which is the meaning of the word, and the meaning of the definition, which is the interpretation of the definition. Based on this distinction, I accused you of "conflating the definitions with their meaning, or interpretation". If you still do not recognize this distinction then there is probably no point to picking up where we left off.

You strongly imply here that "the meaning of the phrase" is the definition, and you have already said that the meaning of the definition is the meaning of the word. — Luke

When I state explicitly, "there is a difference between the meaning of 'past', as 'what has happened', and the meaning of that phrase, the definition", how can you state with any credibility, that I strongly imply that the meaning of the phrase is the definition. You are saying that I "strongly imply" the exact opposite of what I explicitly state, that the meaning of the definition is distinct and different from the meaning of the word (which is the definition).

This is the point I've been trying to get you to recognize. If the meaning of the phrase which is the definition ("what has happened" in this case) is the same as the meaning of the defined word (which is "past" in this case), then definitions would be circular, and defining would be absolutely pointless and meaningless. However, the real purpose of defining is to put the word into a wider context, so that it can be understood in its relations with other words. If the meaning of the word is the definition, and the meaning of the definition is the word, such that the two are one and the same, there would be no such "wider context", only a vicious circle. Therefore, we must respect the fact that the meaning of the word which is said to be the definition, and the meaning of the definition which is the wider context, are two, distinct, and not the same. Then the definition actually serves a purpose toward understanding the word.

Let's start from the top, and see if we can get some agreement. Do you agree that there is a difference between a word, and the meaning of a word? If so, do you also agree that there is a difference between a definition, which is a group of words, and the meaning of the definition? And, if we were to state the meaning of the definition, we ought not state the original word as that meaning, or else we'd have a vicious circle which would get us nowhere fast.

I disagree that "past" means "the type of thing which might be remembered". It's not a different "type" of meaning (i.e. the meaning of a phrase that is the definition) or whatever you are arguing; it just simply doesn't mean that. — Luke

Whether or not you agree with the definitions is not the point here. I already know that you disagree with my definitions, you have made it very clear that you do not believe that these words can be adequately defined without reference to "time". So your disagreement is evident and paramount. But please do not let that subjective bias interfere with your honest and objective judgement of the issue of whether it is possible to do what you currently believe is impossible.

Consider yourself to be a child, as your behaviour demonstrates, with very little knowledge obtained yet. Someone is claiming to be able to do, what you in your childish state of ignorance, believe is impossible. Why not relinquish your subjective opinion, which might just be an ignorance based prejudice, to let that person proceed, and have the opportunity to lead you out of that ignorant state, if that is indeed what it is. After the demonstration is made, you will have ample opportunity to judge the success or failure of the effort. But to deny and ignore the demonstration because what the person is trying to show you is inconsistent with what you currently believe, only serves to perpetuate your childish ignorance.

Newton’s first law makes a claim about the existence of an object that is assumed to not be interacting, but there are, in fact, measurement interactions going on. — Possibility

I think that Newton's claim is supposed to state something independent of measurement. It is what is supposed to be given, without any measurement. To verify, or to apply this law would require measurements, but the law is supposed to represent what is the case regardless of whether the object is measured. That's why It's taken as a given.

Therefore, if we’re honest, each measurement of the ‘object’ is necessarily an intra-action involving an observer or measurement apparatus in a localised yet never isolated spacetime. — Possibility

You still have not provided me with a good explanation as to what "intra-action" means, so why can't we just call the measurement process Interaction?

The passage of time is understood and measured relative not to supposedly measurement-independent objects, but as the change or difference between the measurement/observation of ‘objects’ - that is, how one intra-action relates to another. — Possibility

I don't think that this is the case. The independent existence of the objects, which provide the basis for the measurement of time is taken for granted, as a given, like I explained is the case with Newton's first law. So it does not matter if it's the earth and sun, quartz crystal, or cesium atoms which provide the basis for measurement, they are all objects whose spatial presence is taken for granted.

And again, I do not see the need for "intra-action" here. Why not just describe the measurement of time as an interaction between the human beings doing the measurement, and the object (sun, quartz crystal, cesium atom) which is being used to provide the temporal stability.

The passage of time is understood and measured relative not to supposedly measurement-independent objects, but as the change or difference between the measurement/observation of ‘objects’ - that is, how one intra-action relates to another. This is not Newton’s ‘object’-in-time assumed as a pre-existing individual entity with inherent boundaries and properties. — Possibility

But these objects which we use for the measurement of time are Newtonian objects. I don't think that this can be denied. It is the stability of mass, in its temporal extension (inertia), which gives us the capacity to measure time. I don't think we can pretend that it is anything other than this.

Barad’s ‘object’-in-its-becoming is never separate from the activity through which it emerges. An intra-action is not prior to, but rather constitutive of, the existence of its physical ‘objects’. — Possibility

This appears self-contradicting to me. If the object emerges from the activity then the activity is necessarily prior to the object. That's what "emerges" means.

We need to recognise that ‘activity’ occurs within spacetime - how one activity relates to another. — Possibility

I disagree. As I explained, we need to understand activity as prior to space. And since activity requires time, time must be prior to space as well. And, since the concept of "spacetime" does not allow for this conception, it must be dismissed as inadequate.

“At the fundamental level, the world is a collection of events not ordered in time. — Possibility

As I explained, this is incoherent. "An event" is itself necessarily ordered in time, that's what "an event" is. It's incoherent to speak of events which are not ordered in time.

Time is not an attribute of space - both ‘time’ and ‘space’ are attributes of spacetime. When you’re speaking of ‘time’ here, you’re referring to a linear conception of time. Yet time is localised not just in space, but in spacetime. There is no evidence that space is prior to time, and plenty of evidence that events in nature occur without first being attributed to boundaried and propertied objects. — Possibility

This, that time is an attribute of "spacetime" is what I am saying is the problem. Time must be prior to space, in order to understand the reality of "events" (which are necessarily temporally ordered) which are not "propertied to objects" (consequentially not propertied to space which is the property of objects). So in other words, we need to conceive of time as prior to objects and space, in order to allow for the reality of events which occur without any objects or space, and the current conception of spacetime does not provide for this. It doesn't provide for this because the passing of time is understood, and measurable, only in relation to the movement of objects in space.

As a ‘logical’ sequence these numbered dimensions correspond to how WE construct our representations of space and time - not how spacetime exists, or even how we come to distinguish ‘dimensions’ as such. — Possibility

I really think that you need to consider that "spacetime" is a faulty concept in the way that it limits time to the constraints of objects moving in space. Once you recognize that spacetime is a faulty concept, you'll see that there is no such thing as "how spacetime exists", because there is no such thing as "spacetime". This word just represents a misunderstanding.

I've always said that the meaning of the word is the definition of the word. And, I've also maintained that there is a difference between the meaning of the word defined, and the meaning of the phrase which is the definition.

Since you seem to be extraordinarily obsessed with this issue, I suggest you go back and reread the thread from the point where this came up, I was making a distinction between what the words "past" and "future" mean, as per their definitions, ("what has happened" and "what is possible to happen" ), and what those definitions mean. You had asked me what do the definitions mean, and I explained them by talking about the type of thing that the definition indicated. Then you would not respect the fact that there is a difference between what the word means, i.e. its definition, ("what has happened") , and what the definition means (the type of thing that might be remembered).

I asked what the phrases "has happened" and "to happen" mean. It is unclear whether you are providing the meanings of these phrases - what you think they mean - or whether you are telling me "what gives meaning to" these phrases. I don't think these are the same. — Luke

If you reread from that point to the present, keeping in mind, that what I meant all along, and the distinction I was discussing is the distinction between the meaning of a word (its definition), and the meaning of the definition of the word (the phrase that defines the word). it ought to become very clear to you how you kept misrepresenting me (straw man). You might also see how you childishly insisted that I answer questions which were a product of your misunderstanding and therefore not relevant to what I was saying. Hopefully you might also see how this childish behaviour, this self-righteousness supported only by a lack of understanding, borders on disrespect when you start insisting that you know better than I, what I meant, and refuse to accept your misrepresentation as such.

After you reread, and recognize that there is a difference between the meaning of "past", as "what has happened", and the meaning of that phrase, the definition, which I explained as the type of thing which might be remembered, then we might be prepared to proceed with the discussion.

You appear to be saying that the definition of a word has two different meanings:
(i) the meaning of the word defined, and
(ii) the definition's meaning. — Luke

Luke, please inform yourself of what I've been saying, and quit with the straw men. All you are demonstrating is a lack of understanding which at times plunges into disrespect.

The definition of the word is the meaning of the word. The meaning of the definition is something different from the meaning of the word.

If the meaning of the word, and the meaning of the definition of the word, were both exactly the same, then the definition would tell us nothing meaningful, and it would be absolutely useless. The meaning of the word would be the definition, and the meaning of the definition would be the word, and this would be a vicious circle. Do you agree with me on this? If you agree then we can get back on topic.

What’s the difference between a definition and its meaning? In other words, what is the difference between the definition of a word and the meaning of a word? You are speaking of a definition as though it has no meaning. How can a definition have no meaning? — Luke

Luke, the definition of a word is the meaning of the word defined. The definition itself , also has meaning. Therefore, there is a difference between "the definition", which is the meaning of the word defined, and the definition's meaning, which is the meaning of the definition, and something other than the meaning of the word defined. So, you have the answer to your question "what is the difference between a definition and it's meaning". And please, do not be childish and disrespectful, and insist that I must have meant something other than that.

The definition of a word is the meaning of the word. Then of course, the definition itself has meaning. And, the meaning of the definition is not the same as the meaning of the word defined. Why is this so difficult for you? It's very obvious and straight forward, and also the reason why many philosophers like Wittgenstein in "On Certainty" get concerned about an infinite regress of meaning. Words are used to define words, but then those words need to be defined, etc., without circling back.

If definitions were as you imagine them to be, they would have no meaning at all.

Let's define a "bachelor" as "an unmarried man".
The definition of "bachelor" is "an unmarried man".
The meaning of "bachelor" is "an unmarried man".

The problem (your confusion) here is that you seem to think that nobody is allowed to now ask what "unmarried" means. — Luke

Why are you now trying to turn the table? This is what you insisted, That the meaning of the word, its definition, and the meaning of the definition must be one and the same. I'm the one one trying to talk sense into you. and it appears like you are now coming to respect the difference between the definition "unmarried man", in your example, and the meaning of that definition.

Does this mean that you are starting to understand? The meaning of "bachelor" is not the same as the meaning of "unmarried man", or else there'd be a vicious circle of meaning. If so, we can go back to my definitions. Do you accept that the meaning of "what has happened", which was my definition of "past", is not the same as "what might be remembered"? The latter phrase, "what might be remembered" is meant to explain the meaning of "what has happened".

Your initial distinction was between a definition and its meaning: — Luke

Yes, I made a distinction between the meaning of a word, (its definition), and the meaning of the definition. If there was not a difference between these two, the definition would mean the exact same thing as the word itself means. Consequently, there would be a vicious circle of meaning, if this were the case, and definitions would be completely useless. Definitions, if they were actually like this, would do nothing yo help us understand the meaning of the word.

I got an inkling of this way of thinking, a bit earlier, when you started misrepresenting my defining words as "synonymous" with the words being defined. Definitions are never intended to have the very same meaning as the word defined, that's why dictionaries use numerous definitions for the same word, and ambiguity is a real aspect of language use.

Therefore your representation of my definitions are misrepresentations. You misrepresent what is intended (the meaning of) the definitions. You represent the definitions as being intended to have the very same meaning as the words being defined, when my intent is not to create a vicious circle like that, with the definition, but to put the word into a wider context of meaning, and intentionally act to avoid such a vicious circle. This is the norm with definitions, and your insistence that the two ought to mean the very same thing, demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of "definition", and meaning in general.

Furthermore, your continued behaviour of insisting that you know better than myself, what I meant by a statement, and therefore rejecting my explanation as being inconsistent with the meaning which you apprehended, is nothing but childishness. Explanations are meant to demonstrate how to understand the statement, how to put it into the wider context which the author has in mind.

When you receive a statement, apprehend and understand that statement according to the wider context of meaning provided by your own mind, and the author tells you that this wider context of meaning provided by your mind is inconsistent with the one intended by the author, then you must adapt and try to put that statement into the wider context of meaning provided by the author's explanations if you want to properly understand. This is in contrast to insisting that the statement must be understood according to your own wider context of meaning, and completely ignore the author's explanation. The latter is misunderstanding, plain and simple. And to insist that your misunderstanding is the proper understanding, with complete disregard for the author's explanations, is not only childish, but completely disrespectful.

Look Luke, I was talking about the difference between the stated meaning of the defined word, which is "the definition" (also represented by me as "what the defined word means"), and the meaning of the words which make up the definition (represented by me as "what the defining words mean). The difference referred to therefore is the difference between "what the defined word means" and "what the defining words mean"

Your misrepresentation, "the difference between “what the defined word means” and “its meaning”" is nothing but a straw man. I now understand more clearly the reason why we had that little problem earlier, and the reason for your childish behaviour of claiming that you knew better what I meant by a particular passage which I wrote, than I did. You do not accept that there can be a difference in meaning between the meaning of a statement, and the meaning of the explanation of that statement. Since my explanation of the original statement was not exactly as the meaning you apprehended in the original statement, you concluded that my explanation must be wrong.

Therefore you continue to reinforce my belief that trying to explain anything to you will be a fruitless effort.

Those guys were banned six years ago, I wonder what aliases they had between then and now, and how many other times they were banned.

Straw man, as usual.

You asked for definitions. Then you asked what do the words within the definition mean. In other words you asked me to define the words which were used to define the primary words. Now you insist that there is no difference between the meaning of the primary word, and the meaning of the defining words.

Sorry Luke, but if the defining words meant exactly the same thing as the word defined then defining would be rendered as a completely useless procedure. Since you seem intent on insisting that there is no difference between a definition (what the defined word means), and its meaning (what the defining words mean) I can only say that your obtuseness has left further discussion of these terms as absolutely pointless. The explaining phrases mean exactly the same thing as the phrases explained, to you. .

If the "primary condition" of your definition of "present" is to make reference "solely to conscious experience", then how can "present" refer to anything outside of conscious experience? — Luke

in the way that I explained, with the use of "might", and the example of "sound", through extrapolation.

If the present is not limited to conscious experience, and if the past is not limited to what is actually remembered and if the future is not limited to what is actually anticipated, then there must be something outside of conscious experience or these mental events that determines and helps to define what you mean by "past", "present" and "future". What is it? — Luke

I don't know. That is perhaps the greatest problem of philosophy, described by Kant as the thing-in-itself. Kant claimed we cannot know what it is.

If your definition of "sound" allows "that there are things of that type which have not necessarily been perceived, judged, and categorized as being that type", then your definition of "sound" allows for "what might not be heard". Your definition of "sound" is basically "what might be heard or what might not be heard". — Luke

Sure, I see no problem here. That it might or might not actually be heard is irrelevant, as what is relevant is description of the type.

It indicates that "sound" refers to something external to conscious experience. If (a) sound is something that might not be heard, then it must exist independently of anyone's conscious experience. — Luke

Yes, that is the extrapolation which I used to take "the past" outside of personal experience, giving it a position of objectivity, allowing it to be effectively employed as demonstrated with "sound".

Therefore, I don't see how you can maintain that your definitions of "past", "present" and "future" make reference solely to conscious experience, while you also speak about "the reality of things of that type" which do not make reference solely to conscious experience (i.e. which are not remembered or not anticipated). — Luke

It was "the present" which I claimed ought to be defined solely with reference to conscious experience. This was "what is happening". Then we moved to "past" and "future" which I said ought to be defined in reference to the present. These were " what has happened", and "what is possible to happen". You asked me how were you supposed to understand these two definitions, and I said with reference to the conscious experience of the present, what is happening. And within our conscious experience of what is happening we have memories and anticipations, to help us understand the meaning of those definitions, "what has happened" and "what is possible to happen".

It appears like you are conflating the definitions with their meaning, or interpretation. These are separate. We refer to things, like examples, to understand meaning, while the definition does not explicitly refer to those examples. So, for example "human being" might be defined as "rational animal". Then we could point to a number of people, as examples, to demonstrate the meaning of "rational animal". Or, we could give examples of what it means to be "animal" and what it means to be "rational". In both of these cases, the examples are referred to in demonstrating or interpreting the meaning, they are not referred to by the definition.

So your objection is not really relevant, just demonstrating that you are mixing up the definitions with the explanation of the meaning of the definitions. The definition of "present" refers to conscious experience. The definitions of "past" and "future" refer to the present. In the explanation, or interpretation of the meaning of the definitions I refers to something other.

My choice is beside the point. I have already stated my view that these terms are conventionally defined with reference to time, It is your view and your unconventional definitions of these terms that is presently under discussion. Your view - that these terms are defined solely in terms of conscious experience - clearly implies the radical skeptic position which must lead you to "deny the reality of anything independent". Otherwise, I fail to understand how these terms can be defined solely in terms of conscious experience. — Luke

You do not seem to understand. Defining terms while remaining entirely within a logical structure, does not make the terms inapplicable to things outside the logical system. Actually the opposite is true, and that's why mathematics, a purely logical system, is so highly applicable in the physical sciences. The most purely logical structure of definitions is the most applicable to the world of independent things. The logical structure of a system of definitions, does not deny the reality of independent things, that judgement is based on other assumptions

What do you mean by ‘pre-exist’? Do you mean outside of time? What is being criticised is the notion of distinct entities ‘pre-existing’ their material-discursive involvement in reality. Intra-actions are causal but non-deterministic - the entities only ever exist as such within intra-actions. The assumption that potential and actual must exist as temporally ordered notions is false. — Possibility

What I mean by pre-exist is to exist before, prior in time. So, for instance, two objects can exist without interacting if there is the required spatial-temporal separation between them. These objects would pre-exist any interaction which later developed. Common conceptions of "interaction" assume that objects pre-exist their interactions, in this way. That's expressed by Newton's laws. The first law makes a claim about the existence of an object which is not interacting, then the other laws bring in interaction. So non-interacting is assumed as the pre-existing condition.

Barad suggests that objects "emerge" from intra-action, therefore intra-action is the cause of existence of an object. This claim requires a description of intra-action, which could replace Newton's first law. The problem which I explained in the last post, is that you provide no description of intra-action, just an incoherent mention of quantum events in the "absence of time", by Rovelli.

To restate the problem in a different way, "intra-action" as described by Barad, suggests activity which is prior in time to the objects which are engaged in the activity. This is why it is not "interactivity", it is proposed as some sort of activity from which the objects which are described by Newton's laws, come into existence (emerge). The exact problem is that the passage of time is understood and measured relative to the physical objects which are supposed to come into existence through intra-activity, and whose interactions are understood by Newton's laws. Therefore this proposed activity is incoherent because there is no time in which it takes place. The Newtonian movements of physical objects, in conjubction with the boundary, or limit of electromagnetism are the principles by which time is understood and measured, so prior to physical objects there is not time.

Now, if intra-action is proposed as an activity which is prior to, as cause of , the existence of physical objects, then we have np principles to understand this causal force, this supposed type of activity, because it is a type of activity which is outside of time, by our current conceptions of time, hence Rovelli's description of "the absence of time" as "a boundless and disorderly network of quantum events". What Rovelli means, is exactly as I say above, prior to the existence of physical objects there is an absence of time (by the precepts of our current conception of time) and this renders all activity, or events as unintelligible, "boundless and disorderly".

Clearly, what this indicates is that our current conception of time is inadequate for understanding this realm of activity which has been dubbed as "intra-action". It leaves this activity as appearing to be occurring in the absence of time, activity from which time emerges along with physical objects, therefore the activity appears as boundless and disorderly, completely unintelligible to us as "activity", activity being something we understand as occurring within time.

Naming time as the ‘fourth dimension’ is not a sequential ordering. — Possibility

It is in a way, a sequential ordering, because it makes time an attribute of space. So conceptually, time follows from space as space is logically prior to time. That is why time is understood as an attribute of space, and space cannot be understood as an attribute of time, by the conventional conception of space-time.

My own understanding of physics suggests that spacetime emerged through differentiation or diffraction, rather than as a geometric rendering. That is, in a 4-3-2-1 progression. But if you refuse to discuss physics, then I’m at a loss as to how to present evidence of this. — Possibility

I have no idea what you mean by "a 4-3-2-1 progression" but if you explain, I will pay attention.

Kant does not include the human, experiencing ‘agent’, within the phenomenon - which is also a necessary condition for the existence of phenomena. This is an important distinction. — Possibility

Phenomena are a product of the human experiencing agent. Therefore the human agent is implied necessarily by "phenomenon", and "human agent" is included within the concept of "phenomenon".

I’m beginning to wonder if your avoidance of quantum mechanical aspects of this discussion is deliberate…? — Possibility

Of course it's deliberate. I am a philosopher, not a physicist. I am here to discuss philosophy not physics.

If you look at Whitehead’s philosophy in terms of relational quantum mechanics, it’s not so problematic. First of all, there is no ‘division of reality into distinct events’ - this is a misunderstanding of the structure of spacetime. If you’ve ever watched the interaction of ocean waves, you might have some understanding as to why this notion of ‘distinct events’ is the wrong way to even begin to explain the relational structure of four-dimensional reality. — Possibility

Your analogy of waves does not work. Wave action in water is a feature of particles, water molecules. So wave activity assumes objects, entities, as fundamental, the particles which produce the wave motion. Since you are talking about events as fundamental, rather than objects such as water molecules or other particles, then you need some principles whereby you can talk about "events", in the plural, rather than all of reality as one event. Sure, it's fine to say that distinct events are not real, but then you are being hypocritical when you talk about waves and other distinct distinct events.

‘Intra’ as opposed to ‘inter’ action implies that the action happens within, rather than between.

But it’s Barad neologism, so I’ll let them explain it:

In contrast to the usual ‘interaction’, which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. It is important to note that the ‘distinct’ agencies are only distinct in a relational, not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglements, they don’t exist as individual elements.
— Karen Barad — Possibility

As I explained in my last post, this way of looking at things blurs the reality of temporal priority, leaving causation, and therefore a large part of reality as unintelligible. Consider the following "the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action".

What is being criticized by Barad here, is the notion of distinct entities interacting. This would imply that the entities preexist the activities which are described as interactions. So Barad replaces interaction with intra-action, and says that "intra-action" is responsible for, or the cause of existence of the entities. But where does that leave "intra-action"? It cannot be an activity which involves the mentioned entities, because it is prior to them, as the cause of their existence. So what kind of activity is this? It cannot be within the objects, because it's prior to the objects' very existence. Therefore it must be activity of some other sort, which is the cause of the existence of the entities.

This is why I recommended Rovelli. It’s not a deficient understanding of reality at all - it’s just not a global, externally imposed order. It’s a local, internal one. And there is no aspect of reality that is entirely ‘passive’. — Possibility

I agree that the idea of "global, externally imposed order" is not sufficient. However, I believe that the "local internal one" as described, is also deficient. I agree with many of the principles here, but there is a difficulty with language, and also a difficulty with the concept of space-time.

The existing concept of space does not allow that there is anything internal to a non-dimensional point. and this is what denies the reality of the concept of a local, internally imposed order. By our current spatial-temporal conceptions, all activity must be within space-time. This is because time is conceived of as logically posterior to space, it is the fourth dimension, and time is required for activity. So all activity is represented as spatial activity because time, which is essential to activity, follows from spatial existence.

What is required in order to understand any proposed "internal order", is to allow that time is prior to space, as the zeroth dimension, because this allows for temporal activity which is non-spatial, as prior to spatial activity. Then we can conceive of activity within the non-dimensional point.

The absence of time does not mean… that everything is frozen and unmoving. It means that the incessant happening that wearies the world is not ordered along a timeline, is not measured by a gigantic tick-ticking. It does not even form a four-dimensional geometry. It is a boundless and disorderly network of quantum events. The world is more like Naples than Singapore.
If by ‘time’ we mean nothing more than happening, then everything is time. There is only that which exists in time…. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

This is evidence that Rovelli's perspective is backward, and leaves a vast part of reality as unintelligible. Instead of putting time as prior to space, in which case there could be activity prior to spatial activity, and this activity could be understood as the cause of spatial activity, Rovelli uses the traditional conception of space-time, which puts space as prior to time. This leaves the origin of spatial existence as fundamentally unintelligible. This paragraph is completely contradictory, because "the absence of time" (which is the origin, the beginning) is described as disorderly "quantum events" happening without a timeline . But any event requires time, that's what "an event" is, temporal extension. So this whole paragraph is self-contradicting, and demonstrates the problem with the common metaphysical proposition, that time emerges.

Instead, we need to position time as prior to space, as the zeroth dimension, so that there is true activity within the non-dimensional, (what is known traditionally as the immaterial), then the emergence of space and its attributes, material objects, can become intelligible.

To describe the world, the time variable is not required. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

Again, this is more evidence that the perspective is mistaken. Without the time variable we cannot understand the cause of the world. And without this our understanding of the world is incomplete.

If I accept your definition of the present as "what is happening", then how do "what is possible to happen" and "what has happened" differ from "what is happening" in a way that is not in relation to time? — Luke

I told you, "what has happened" refers to memory, and "what is possible to happen" refers to anticipation. "What is happening" refers to a combination of both There is not need for "time" here.

Memory and anticipation are mental events. Do you also consider "what is happening" to be a mental event? — Luke

Yes, of course. The primary condition of the definition of "present" was to make reference solely to conscious experience. To fulfil this condition "what is happening" must be be understood in the context of what you call a "mental event".

If memory grounds the difference, then the only events that have happened are limited to what humans remember. — Luke

This is not true, as I explained. We can define "past" in reference to what "might be remembered". This is to name the criteria of a type, as I said already. It is how we move toward objectivity. As in the example of "sound", which I mentioned. When the tree falls it makes a "sound" even if no one hears it, if we define "sound" as "what might be heard". By defining in this way, we make "sound" the name of a type, and allow that there are things of that type which have not necessarily been perceived, judged, and categorized as being that type. Likewise, "might be remembered" characterizes a type, and we can allow for things of that type which have not actually been remembered.

Of course the radical skeptic can deny the reality of anything independent, and insist that to be is to be perceived. If you like to take that position of radical skepticism, that is your choice.

Likewise (presumably), the only events that might possibly happen are limited to what humans anticipate. — Luke

Again "what might be anticipated" describes a type, and we can allow for the reality of things of that type which are not actually anticipated.

But if you're telling me that none of these terms is defined in relation to time, then you have some work to do to explain their meanings and the differences between them that are not in relation to time. — Luke

I don't think that this "work" I have to do ought to be very difficult. We all have memories and anticipations, so just try thinking of past and future in terms of memories and anticipations rather than in terms of time. It's very easy, if you dismiss your prejudice, that "past" and "future" can only be defined in reference to time. If my work is difficult, you and your prejudice are to blame for that.

It is unclear to me just how these differ, if at all, when they have no relation to time. — Luke

I told you very clearly how they differ. I even gave the analogy of how "water" differs from "solution". One is pure, the other is a mixture of that thing which is pure in that case, along with something else. That is how they differ. It is only difficult for you to understand, because your preconceived prejudice makes you expect a different type of difference between past and present.

Maybe, just maybe, Trump has gotten himself in over his head this time. We might need a new phrase to describe his upcoming position, 'real bankruptcy', meaning that you actually suffer the effects of having no money, as opposed to Trump's usual position, 'fake bankruptcy', meaning that you declare bankruptcy to avoid paying your creditors, and they suffer the effects of having no money.

I asked what the phrases "has happened" and "to happen" mean. It is unclear whether you are providing the meanings of these phrases - what you think they mean - or whether you are telling me "what gives meaning to" these phrases. I don't think these are the same. — Luke

You asked me for 'my definitions', so this is exclusively what these words mean within the context of 'my definitions'.

o be clear, are you saying that what "has happened" means what "might be remembered", and that what is "to happen" means "what might be anticipated"? — Luke

You are taking "to happen" out of context. The definition is "what is possible to happen".

To be clear, are you saying that what "has happened" means what "might be remembered", and that what is "to happen" means "what might be anticipated"? Does this imply that if something is not remembered then it has not happened and if something is not anticipated then it will not happen? That is, is what has happened or what might happen limited to only what can be remembered or anticipated? In other words, is it impossible that there are events that have happened that we don't remember and events that might happen that we don't anticipate? — Luke

No, this is not a solipsist definition. Just because I do not remember it doesn't mean it has not happened. Someone else might remember it. So "memory" and "anticipation" describe these categories, but the use of "might" indicates that these qualifiers are not necessary conditions. They indicate the type of property being referred to. For example, "sound" could be defined as a wave pattern which "might be heard". Then the tree falling in the forest makes a "sound", even though no one hears it, under this definition.

This does not explain the difference between "what is happening" and "what has happened".

To say that "what is happening" (present) consists of some of "what has happened" (past) and some of "what is possible to happen" (future) does not explain the difference between "what is happening" (present) and "what has happened" (past).

This only says that the present consists of some past and some future. I asked for the difference between the present and the past. — Luke

Yes it does tell you the difference between past and present. The present is not solely past, as past is, it consists also of some future. I am informing you of the type of difference I am talking about. Why can't you accept this? If you asked me what is the difference between water and a solution, I would say that the solution consists of both water and something else dissolved within it. It informs you of the type of difference I am talking about. Why can't you accept this?

Federal prosecutors revealed on Friday that they intend to soon release to Trump's defense team 11.6 million pages and records of evidence, in addition to a hard drive containing images extracted from electronic devices. — Michael

So Trump could hire a team of 1,000 lawyers, and each would have 11,600 pages to mull over. I think there is going to be a request for more time to prepare.

What meaning do you give to the past tense phrase "has happened"? What meaning do you give to the future tense phrase "to happen"? — Luke

As I said, meaning is given to these terms from the human experience of memory and anticipation. What has happened, "past", consists of things which might be remembered. What is possible to happen, "future" consists of things which might be anticipated.

What is the difference between "what is happening" and "what has happened"? Memory may "ground the difference", but what is the difference? — Luke

As I said earlier, I believe that "the present", as what is happening, consists of a unity of what has happened (past), and "what is possible to happen" (future). The difference between "what has happened" and "what is happening", therefore, would be that "what is happening" consists not only of "what has happened" but it also contains some "what is possible to happen", as well.

Bohr’s phenomena is more complex than Kant’s phenomena (‘sense appearances’), in that they include ‘all relevant features of the experimental arrangement’. That is, phenomena as I’m referring to here would also incorporate ‘the agent’, their ‘processes’ and ‘systems’ as you’ve described here, as well as the ‘object’ of their sensibility. — Possibility

In my interpretation of Kant, the agent is incorporated into the phenomena though the means of the pure a priori intuitions of space and time. These are necessary conditions for the existence of phenomena. The exact status of any 'object' might be somewhat ambiguous, because there is a distinction between the object as phenomenal, and the thing in itself.

Agency is not a property of certain ‘agents’ to varying degrees. The inherent dynamism of a reality that consists not of objects in time but of interrelating events (Rovelli) / intra-acting phenomena (Barad) IS agency. — Possibility

"Interrelating events" is the terminology of process philosophy. What Whitehead demonstrated with his process philosophy is that this perspective runs into a very real problem with the issue of how events are related to one another. To begin with, the division of reality into distinct events is somewhat problematic, because the divisions are to a degree arbitrary. But if there is real distinctions, then "an event" takes the place of an object, as a distinct entity, but such assumed "occasions" require relational principles for their existential reality and presentation as phenomena. So Whitehead uses the concepts of prehension, and concrescence to explain relations between events.

The relevant point here is that if reality is broken down into events, then the need for relations between events, to produce a model of continuity as we experience in phenomena, causes the positing of subjective principles (agential activities of creation) to account for the reality of these relations. The result is a panpsychism, because these subjective principles are a requirement for reality as we experience it.

The issue I believe, is that the "event" incorporates space and time into its conception as necessary preconditions for its reality. So, while Kant places space and time as intuitions proper to the human agent, here space and time are already presumed as inherent within the fabric of the universe, as necessary conditions for the fundament feature, the event. Now space and time are external to the human agent, but external agential concepts are now required to explain the reality of phenomenal appearances. This is why Whitehead ultimately turned to God, having no other way to account for the existence of the panpsychic elements which he found necessary to posit, in order to hold his reality together, in the unified form which we experience..

I’m not saying there can be no meaningful distinction, only that there is no inherent one. We make meaningful distinctions all the time, whenever we intra-act within phenomena. But I wonder how necessary is a distinction between active and passive ‘things’, if reality is found to consist of interrelating events, rather than objects in time? Carlo Rovelli’s ‘The Order of Time’ is worth a read in terms of our hope of understanding temporal reality. — Possibility

As I said, I think that the passive/active distinction is necessary in order to understand causation, and this is necessary in order to understand temporal reality. Without this, two distinct events cannot be ordered in time, because it is necessary to understand how one acts one the other, to produce a causal understanding, and therefore a temporal order. Without this distinction, events would be interacting, but there would be no way to order them temporally without determining what part of which event is causing what part of the other event. There is just interaction, and this provides no information for temporal order therefore a deficient understanding of reality..

It enables us to focus on the precision of the intra-action, rather than how we describe it, by recognising ourselves as necessarily involved. — Possibility

Can you explain to me in clear and unambiguous terms, just what "intra-action" means?

You are missing the point Luke. Obviously defining the terms without reference to time is not a problem, because a person can define terms any way one likes, even contradictory, or whatever. The issue is getting agreement on the definitions, consensus that the definitions are acceptable. If I could stipulate the definitions as dogma, and force your mind to understand and follow them in an unwavering manner, even if they were contradictory, then the problem would be solved. Right? That particular problem might be solved, but a much bigger problem would be created.

Now, you've demonstrated to me that it would be impossible for me to define the terms the way that I like, i.e. without reference to time, and solely referencing human experience, in a way which is acceptable to you. After many days of discussion, you have shown me that such definitions would be fundamentally contrary to your beliefs, and you are not willing to relinquish these beliefs, even for the sake of discussion. The discussion always turns to you equivocating your meanings of the terms with mine, in your attempt to say that mine are self-contradicting, or have some similar problem of incoherency. Therefore you have shown that it is impossible for you to dismiss your understanding of what these terms mean, to proceed solely from my premises, for the sake of discussion. Consequently, discussion cannot proceed.

Here's an example. I will propose the following definitions. I will define "present" as what is happening, activity which is occurring. Then, past gets defined as what has happened, activity which has occurred, and future is defined as what is possible to happen, activity which is possible. You will say "what has happened", in relation to "what is happening" implies temporal separation, and cannot be understood without reference to "time". Therefore you will insist that this does not define the terms without referencing time. But this would be your misunderstanding, your failure to dismiss your preconceived need to refer to time.

I will insist there is no need to refer to time, because I am keeping the definitions within the context of human experience, so we refer to memory, not time, to ground the difference between "what is happening" and "what has happened". Then you will say 'but "memory" is not synonymous with "past"'. And this would only demonstrate your misunderstanding of how definitions work. Defining terms are not necessarily synonymous with the terms defined. In most cases the more specific is defined through reference to the more general ("human being" is defined with reference to "animal"). And you will continue to make ridiculous objections to my definitions, based on your preconceived meanings to those terms, without relinquishing those prejudices to start from new premises.

All I have asked is for you to provide some examples of such definitions. You have failed to provide any examples and then blamed me for not helping you find some. — Luke

Luke, do you not even try to read my posts?

So now we're getting to the heart of the matter, your question of what does "present" mean, in the context of the conscious experience of being present. I would say that it means to be experiencing activity, things happening. And so this ought to be the defining feature of "the present", activity, things happening. — Metaphysician Undercover

So if you cannot dispel this idea, that "the present" must be defined in reference to "the time when...", instead of being defined with direct reference to the conscious experience of being present, then we will not be able to agree on anything here, nor could we make any progress in this discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've given you the starting point, the way I would define "the present" with direct reference to the conscious experience of being. I defined it as "activity, things happening". I thought you might agree with this because you had already said "the present is what is happening, occurring". But now I see that you think we need to qualify this with "the time" at which things are happening. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, you have my stated definition of "the present", and as I also stated earlier, definitions of "past" and "future" ought to be produced in reference to "the present".

However, we clearly have no point of agreement concerning "the present", so I cannot make reference to a word which "we" do not have a consistent understanding of. Therefore any attempts to define "future" and "past" would be wasted effort. I'm sorry to say that unless you can accept "the present" as defined, the attempt at discourse has proven fruitless.

I can see that, and I will try to clarify. The important point is that this differentiation occurs within phenomena - the separability is agential, not inherent. — Possibility

The differentiation might be "agential" in the sense that it is a feature of the agent's sensibility, and carried out through the process of sensation combined with other agential processes, memory anticipation, etc., therefore be inherent within the phenomena, or, it might be performed by the agent's application of logical processes. The application of logic to the sense appearances (phenomena) produces a differentiation which is distinct from the differentiation which inheres within the phenomena, produced by the agent's pre-conscious systems. The application of logic toward understanding any phenomenon as actually different from how it appears in sense perception is what Plato strongly argued for when he insisted that the senses deceive us.

Because of this, the proposed agential separation must be understood as complex and multi-faceted. Consequently, restrictions to differentiation, which are fundamentally within the phenomena, making some aspects of separability of the phenomena appear to be impossible, are not really impossible with the appropriate application of logic.

What I’m describing is two setups, two phenomena: one in which the embodied present (inseparable from the future) unambiguously differentiates from ‘the past’, and one in which the embodied present (inseparable from the past) unambiguously differentiates from ‘the future’. There are no inherent boundaries or properties to speak of here, no outside observer, and no way to describe the entire system. The description always occurs from within. — Possibility

These "setups" you describe would be logical separations. They are not separations which are within the phenomena itself. These are propositions for logical proceedings. The problem here is that because there are "no inherent boundaries or properties to speak of here", as you say, within the phenomena, which is how the present appears to us, then such distinctions are somewhat arbitrary, and not necessarily in correspondence with reality. This implies that we need to determine a reality which is beyond, or transcends, phenomenal reality, in order to ground such distinctions in something real.

From the perspective of phenomenal reality, i.e. empirical evidence,and what appears by way of sensation as 'reality', no clear boundary between past and future can be supported. Therefore the unambiguous differentiations you propose, between past and present, and future and present, cannot actually be made without reference to a transcendental reality. Without this, "the present" remains vague, and so do any differentiations proposed.

So when I state that there is no unambiguous way to differentiate between the past and the future, I’m viewing both phenomena from ‘outside’, within a new phenomenon, in which case both ‘the past’ and ‘the future’ are treated not as these previously defined ‘objects-within-phenomena’, but as entanglements inseparable from their respective embodied intra-actions. — Possibility

According to what I stated above, you need reference to a transcendental reality in order to justify the perspective of "outside". The "new phenomenon" which you propose is not a phenomenon at all, being independent, or "outside" all sense appearances, and simply the basis for propositions or premises for logical proceedings. But unless the propositions can be justified, they are nothing other than imaginary, fictitious fantasies. We might consider the axioms of pure mathematics as an example. These axioms are not "new phenomenon", nor are they grounded in any sort of phenomenon, they are taken to be prior to phenomenon, and this is the way that mathematics gets "outside" phenomena.

Are you suggesting there is a mode of description, observation or measurement that does objectively determine ‘the past’? This is my point: that regardless of intentionality, language or other human exceptionalism, there is no referring to an inherent, fixed property of abstract, independently existing objects, except under Newtonian assumptions that have since been scientifically disproven, over and over. It is more accurate that the past, the future, whatever matters “is substance in its intra-active becoming - not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency... phenomena in their ongoing materialisation.” — Possibility

What I am suggesting is that there are strong indications that it must be possible to objectively determine 'the past'. And, the reason why we cannot, at the current position of human evolution is that we have not established the necessary logical premises. I would also propose that the only way to "objectively determine 'the past'" is to establish a very clear and unambiguous understanding of "the present". "The present" is where the future and past meet. The required principles (premises) are not as you propose, a clear distinction between past and present, and future and present, because this would leave the entirety of "the present" as inconsistent with both the past and the future, rendering "the present" as completely unintelligible from any temporal, empirically derived principles. This sense of "the present" gives us eternal immutable Platonic Forms, along with the so-called "interaction problem", and it validates the realm of imaginary, fictitious and fantastic mathematical axioms So the required principles are not as such, but I propose that they are those which establish a clear distinction between past and future.

So the problem which is now arising, is that Newtonian physics, and the physics of "objects" in general are based in a faulty understanding of "the present". The object is represented by Newton's first law as a static continuity of being, staying the same through time, eternally, unless caused by a force to change. The object is then represented by its past existence, and the cause of change to it, is generally represented as the past existence of another object which exerts a force. The consequence of this model is determinism.

The problem which I mentioned is that this is not a proper representation of the object's past existence, because it is actually produced with a view toward the future. The purpose or intent is to model the continued existence of the the object, into the future, for the sake of prediction. Generally speaking, this is the purpose of the conception of "mass" to show a continuity of the object from past into future through inertia. The issue is that this supposed continuity between past and future, is not real. It has been created just for that purpose of prediction. And this presupposes that eternal continuous existence of the object, at the present, unless caused to change. That is temporal continuity.

So there’s a paradigm shift required in how we describe reality. Our physical representations and models of temporal continuity are largely inaccurate, and have been proven so. To continue shoe-horning our ontology to fit these assumptions seems to me an ignorant and dishonest way to do philosophy. I’ve been working my way out of this, and have lately found Barad to be helpful in articulating the connections I’ve been seeing. — Possibility

Clearly I agree with this. The issue with temporal continuity is mentioned above. The problem is the assumed continuity of inertia, taken for granted by Newton's first law. Phenomena gives us the appearance of objects, and these objects are apprehended as a continuity of sameness. That continuity of sameness is expressed in Newton's first law. The problem is that this observed continuity and the ensuing proposition, as that law, is not supported by necessity. This lack of necessity is accounted for by change, and in Newton's laws, the concept of force, which is the cause of change. So the eternal continuity is not a necessity, but this is qualified with "a force is required to alter it". And so long as we can understand the cause of change, and model the forces involved, the lack of necessity doesn't not present us with a problem. We model the causes of change as other temporally continuous objects, and we get the illusion of a determinist world. But when we get to the finer aspects of the universe, free will for example, and some aspects of particle physics, the forces involved are not well understood. Then we reach the limits of capacity for this type of representation, that of temporal continuity, and much of reality remains as unintelligible. So, we must accept that it is required to dismiss this type of representation in order to go further in our understanding.

You asserted that we can "define these terms "past" "future", and "present", and understand them without any reference to a concept of time". I've asked you several times to produce such definitions. Until you produce them, there is nothing to reject. Unless you produce them, there is no support for your assertion. — Luke

I've explained very clearly how "we" can define and understand these terms without reference to time. Obviously though, you will never be able to understand these terms without reference to time. Therefore I was wrong, and "we" cannot understand and define these terms without reference to time.

Don't blame me for your failure to support your argument. — Luke

I firmly believe that the blame is to be directed at you,. You have a very strong propensity toward willful misunderstanding. Denial and misrepresentation, which results in misunderstanding, without any real attempt to understand, is your modus operandi.