Any description of the past OR the future is always in relation to a particularly embodied present. It seems to me that what you’re referring to is the difference between a living being’s relation to the past and their relation to the future, in terms of what is possible and what is impossible for them, in that moment. There is no unambiguous way to differentiate between ‘the past’ and ‘the future’ - an embodied intra-action (observation/measurement) occurs with one OR the other, but not both simultaneously. — Possibility

This seems contradictory to me. If an embodied intra-action occurs with one or the other, but not both, then this implies that there is an unambiguous way to distinguish between past and future. The embodied intra-action, as described clearly provides the means for an unambiguous differentiation, because it must occur with one or the other and not both. And to say that "there is no unambiguous way to differentiate" contradicts what is implied by the description of the embodied intra-action.

But the important point is that all of this separability occurs within the phenomenon of one’s unique temporality. “No inherent subject-object distinction exists.” So the past as we describe it is only relatively ‘determined’ - Newtonian physics justifies ignoring this relativity by presuming that one can always reduce the effect of measurement interactions to the point where they are negligible. Quantum physics has demonstrated this presumption to be false. — Possibility

The reason why "the past as we describe it is only relatively 'determined'", is because of our mode of description. There is always intent, purpose behind any use of language, therefore any type of description. Intent, or purpose is a view toward the future, therefore "the past as we describe it" is always conditioned by the future as we anticipate it, as the description is conditioned by intent. But the future we know is full of possibility, and so this possibility is allowed to be reflected into the past which we describe. Therefore we allow that the past is only relatively determined, in our descriptions, because this allows the past to be more consistent with the future which we know as undetermined, thereby supporting our physical representations, or models of temporal continuity.

By changing material-discursive practices, measurements and observations of ‘the past’ (marks on bodies) change, which can alter ‘the facts’ of what happened. — Possibility

I really don't understand what you are saying with this statement. Things change, marks on bodies change such that a measurement of the marks might be different in a remeasurement than in the original measurement. But these changes do not happen in the past, they happen at the present, while time is passing. So I do not see how changing material-discursive practices can cause the past to change.

What I’m referring to has nothing to do with counterfactuals or intentionally choosing to ‘change things in the past’ according to the classical ideal of causality. It isn’t that the past or the future consist of possibilities, but that intra-actions “change the very possibilities for change and the nature of change”. In this sense, how we may intra-act in the future with ‘the past’ (through techno-scientific practices, for instance) remains full of possibilities in gaining new information about the past, while other information becomes irrelevant to the future. To paraphrase Barad, since there is no inherent distinction between object and instrument, these ‘possibilities’ cannot meaningfully be attributed to either abstract object (the past) or abstract measuring instrument (the future). — Possibility

There very clearly is a meaningful distinction to be made between the object and instrument, as there clearly is a distinction to be made between the act of operating, and the thing being operated on. To deny this distinction is simply to deny the reality of the distinction between active and passive. And if we deny this then all things become equally active and passive, such that we rob ourselves of any principles of causation, along with any hope of understanding temporal reality.

I've offered many propositions as to how to proceed in making these definitions. I've gotten no agreement from you concerning this procedure. To offer a definition which would undoubtably be rejected because you've shown very clearly that you disagree with the direction I am taking, would only be foolish. Therefore I have no definitions to offer.

If you think this is a cop out then so be it. I think it's simply a recognition that productive discourse is impossible without some agreement, which we have none of. In other words, if we cannot work together to produce the required definitions (which we clearly cannot do), then any proposed definitions would be useless, because I cannot force you to accept what you've demonstrated you will willfully reject.

You've missed my point here. I was countering your assertion that "Time cannot be described or defined without these references" to McTaggart's A-series relations of "past", "present" and "future". The B-series relations are an alternative to the A-series relations. Therefore, time can be described using the B-series instead of the A-series, which refutes your assertion that time cannot be described without reference to the A-series. — Luke

That point is irrelevant. Of course one can define "time" however one wants, but if it's not recognizable as time, then the proposition would be unacceptable, and the definition would be pointless and irrelevant. So really all you've demonstrated is that you misunderstood what I meant.

You might say that this is all that I am doing, seeking to define terms like "present", "past", and "future" in new ways which render them as unrecognizable. But that's why I am taking the time to explain why the things which we know, that bear those names, ought to be understood in this way.

The purpose was to refute your assertion that time cannot be described or defined without reference to the A-series. — Luke

You could have done that simply by stating that one can define a word in any way one desires. It would have the same effect, you would just demonstrate that you misunderstood me.

There's an easy way to settle this dispute which is to provide your definitions of these terms without any reference to a concept of time. I've asked you for these definitions several times now. Are you ever going to provide them? — Luke

I've given you the starting point, the way I would define "the present" with direct reference to the conscious experience of being. I defined it as "activity, things happening". I thought you might agree with this because you had already said "the present is what is happening, occurring". But now I see that you think we need to qualify this with "the time" at which things are happening.

I really do not think that such a qualification would be useful, because "time" is a very misunderstood term, and referring directly to a term which bears a high level of uncertainty would produce a very unstable foundation for any following definitions. That is why I've been seeking to avoid the use of "time" in these definitions.

Unless we can agree on the starting definition, which would be the reference point for the following definitions, there is really no point in proceeding. You would simply say that I am using my free will to define terms however I please, and I am rendering these terms as unrecognizable. There is no point to that. Propositions are proposals, and proposals are useless unless accepted. So unless we can agree on the initial step, the principal proposition, there is no point to me pointing toward the higher steps. You need to accept the truth of the principal premise on its own merits, not by looking at what it might lead to.

My use of tense in "what did happen" (past) and in "what will happen" (future) in contrast to "what is happening" (present) clearly indicates that time is involved here. — Luke

You are demonstrating equivocation here. You switch from B-series "time" to A-series "time" when you make this equivalence, and that is equivocation. That's the usefulness of McTaggart's distinction, we cannot exchange these designators "what did happen", and "what will happen" with "past" and "future", and say that they both, equally imply "time", without an equivocation in the term "time". It requires two very distinct and incompatible conceptions of "time" to make this equivalence.

Therefore rather than indicating that time is involved, you are indicating that what you say is incoherent, relying on an equivocal notion of "time".

Furthermore, as I pointed out it is fundamentally unacceptable to exchange "future" with "what will happen". And, I believe that this difference is at the root of McTaggart's perception of the need to distinguish between A-series and B-series.

This ambiguity in "time" is the reason why we ought to avoid using "time" in our principal proposition. This will allow us to build up a conceptual structure based on the conscious experience of being present. Then we can produce a conception of time which is consistent, and unambiguous, rather than the equivocal use which you promote.

Time is not objectively linear - there is no inherent temporal separability between past and present. Rather, we enact this cut within the phenomenon of experiencing temporality, and the boundaries and properties of ‘the past’ and ‘the present, living being’ remain dynamic, ever-changing in relation to each other, whenever and however they intra-act (as opposed to interact which implies pre-determined boundaries/properties). — Possibility

But what about the future though? Isn't it necessary to have a "cut" between future and past, to distinguish between what is possible and what is impossible. Perhaps you don't believe this?

The apparent determinacy of the past is inseparable from its present intra-action, enacting a particular embodied cut within such intra-action that delineates ‘the past’ from agencies of observation, including ‘the present’. Any difference between one such agential cut and another may not be obvious, but it is NOT zero.

Both the past and the future are full of possibilities in which we can ‘partake’. We are continually reconfiguring, reworking and re-articulating ‘the past’, including what we have previously considered to be ‘determined’ or ‘actual’. — Possibility

Do you really believe this? The possibilities of the past are known as counterfactuals, and that's completely different from the possibilities of the future. If you really believe what you say here, can you explain to me how the past, which we've previously considered to be determined, could consist of real possibilities which we could choose from, to actualize through our actions, just like we do with future possibilities. I mean, aren't you saying we can choose to change things in the past?

Not true. According to John McTaggart's widely referenced classification, "past", "present" and "future" are used to order (or describe) events in time; they are the ordering relations of McTaggart's A-series. Alternatively, events in time can be ordered (or described) using the ordering relations of McTaggart's B-series: "earlier than", "simultaneous with", and "later than". See here. — Luke

The use which you describe here is a way of describing time, just like I argued. This supports what I said, "past", "future", and "present" are used to order events and describe the flow of time. The B-series does not provide us with a conception of "time" in any conventional sense. It is a conception produced by McTaggart and offered as an alternative to the conventional conception of "time". That is similar to what I am doing here, except I am doing it with "the present", offering two distinct ways of conceiving of "the present".

You, however, seem to be having great difficulty recognizing what is "conventional". Since there are many conventions, as I said, we should perhaps use a different word. Maybe "traditional" would be a better word. Instead of talking about what is "conventional", I will use "traditional". The traditional way is the way that our modern usage is grounded, and permeates through the usage of classical physics. The usage of the B-series, since it was just proposed by McTaggart, is limited to modern speculative philosophy and metaphysics, the B-series conception of time is not the traditional conception of time, and so I would argue it is not conventional either.

The rest of your post demonstrates that we did not really agree on how to produce a definition of "the present", when I thought we did. I was assuming something like the following.

I've already answered this. The present is what is happening or occurring;... — Luke

Now I see you do not accept this, and what you really meant was that the present is the time when things are happening or occurring. This means that you think we cannot define or understand "the present" without putting that term into the context of a conception of time.

That is exactly what I am arguing is the mistaken approach. I believe that we need to understand and define "the present" first, with reference directly to conscious experience, independent from any potentially misleading concept of "time". Then we might produce a concept of "time" accordingly. See, the concept of "time" ought to be derived from the concept of "present", rather than vise versa.

So if you cannot dispel this idea, that "the present" must be defined in reference to "the time when...", instead of being defined with direct reference to the conscious experience of being present, then we will not be able to agree on anything here, nor could we make any progress in this discussion.

Perhaps by understanding that ‘the past’ is determined only within phenomenon, and has agential, rather than temporal, separability from either ‘the future’ or ‘the present’. The ‘living being’ does not simply partake, but, like all material bodies, acquires specific boundaries and properties through open-ended dynamics of intra-activity - as Barad says, “humans are part of the world-body space in its dynamic structuration”. — Possibility

I really can't understand this. Could you try to explicate? What does it mean to say that the past has agential separability, for example? And what does "open-ended dynamics of intra-activity" mean?

How does "time" imply the descriptions of past, present and future?
Why do the descriptions of past, present and future not imply time?
What do the descriptions of past, present and future describe, if not time? — Luke

We use "past", "future", "present" to describe and even define "time". Time cannot be described or defined without these references. But we can also use these without referencing time, as I've been demonstrating. We can discuss these concepts, and define these terms "past" "future", and "present", and understand them without any reference to a concept of time. We can refer solely to human experiences, being present, memories and anticipations, and understand those terms without consulting the further abstraction which is the concept of time.

We weren't discussing this. I had been using the words "past", "present" and "future" in accordance with their conventional usage, where they refer to periods of time. Until very recently, I was unaware that you were trying to create new meanings for these words from scratch in order to accommodate your metaphysical theory. — Luke

You were questioning me, on my usage, and my definitions. I was talking about (1) defining "past and future" with reference to the present, and (2) defining "the present" with reference to past and future. Although there was earlier discussion of the present consisting of duration, when we moved on to discussing definitions of these terms, there was no indication that time would be a defining feature.

That you think the convention is that these terms refer to periods of time, is what I believe is your mistake. This is your hidden premise, which made us incapable of agreeing on what the convention is. I thought the convention is to define "present" in reference to past and future, but you thought the convention is to define "past and future" in reference to the present. It now appears like you hold this opinion because of your hidden premise, that all three of these refer to periods of time.

Until very recently, I was unaware that you were trying to create new meanings for these words from scratch in order to accommodate your metaphysical theory. — Luke

I think this is blatant BS. No matter how many times I tell you, that I am making distinctions between the way these words are actually defined in conventional usage, and the way that I think they ought to be defined, you still continue to deny that I am doing this. After I've told you this many times, and you continue to insist that you never knew that this is what i was doing, you must expect the accusation of BS to arise sometime.

Regarding what you say here, what does the word "present" mean when you say "the experience we discussed, being present"? Does it mean the same as when you refer to "the present", as in "past, present and future"? It seems like only moments ago that you were accusing me of conflating the present with one's conscious experience, but it looks like that's exactly what you have done here. — Luke

This is the issue we've been discussing. Does "present" mean the separation between past and future, (past being defined by reference to memories, and future being defined by reference to anticipations), or does "present" mean something derived from the conscious experience of being. I think the former is the convention, and the latter is the way it ought to be.

So now we're getting to the heart of the matter, your question of what does "present" mean, in the context of the conscious experience of being present. I would say that it means to be experiencing activity, things happening. And so this ought to be the defining feature of "the present", activity, things happening.

If there is a difference between "the present" and the experience of "being present", then what is that difference? — Luke

This is the difference I stated earlier, the difference between what is experiencing, and what is being experienced. So if the present is defined by activity, then "experiencing activity", is different from "activity" by that qualification. So "experiencing" is itself a special type of activity which occurs at the present, and that is how it is different from the more general "activity" which is what defines the present. In other words, "present" encompasses all activity, while "the experience of being present" refers to one specific type of activity.

Furthermore, you already acknowledged earlier that the past is not synonymous with memories and the future is not synonymous with anticipations. Here, you say that memories and anticipations "are implied by these terms". But if "past" and "future" are not synonymous with "memories" and "anticipations", and if "past" and "future" are not in reference to time, then how do you define "past" and "future"? — Luke

Do you not recognize a difference between the meaning of "implied by" and "synonymous with"? If "past" and "future" are defined with reference to memories and anticipations, this does not mean that these are synonymous.

According to this logic, you (and everybody else) must have the same hidden premise.

The meanings of the terms "past", "present" and "future" that I have argued for is consistent with their conventional definitions. Look at these and you will see that they are in reference to time. I'm not offering an idiosyncratic metaphysical theory; I'm demonstrating that your theory either relies on the conventional definitions of these terms or else becomes nonsensical.

Now, please explain what any of the terms "past", "present" or "future" mean if they are not in reference to time, as I asked you to in my previous post. Your inability to do so demonstrates that your theory is nonsense. — Luke

This is irrelevant. We agreed to start from a definition of "the present" whereby "the present" is defined with reference to the conscious experience of being present. We both agreed to that. There was no mention of "time" in that agreement. Therefore your mode of referring to "conventional definitions" and "time" is only misleading you, preventing you from looking directly at the conscious experience to provide the definition. Your presupposition, or prejudice, is that the convention is to define "the present" with reference to the conscious experience of being present. Therefore you believe that convention will provide this definition of "the present" for us which refers directly to the conscious experience of being present. But then you resort to the convention of referring to "time".

Now, I've been telling you over and over, that convention has a completely different definition of "the present", which is not at all consistent with the conscious experience of being present. So the truth of the matter is coming out. You desire to define "the present" with reference to the abstract concept, "time", rather than with reference to the conscious experience. But this is contrary to what we agreed on, as the way that "the present" ought to be defined.

Use your capacity to think Luke. None of those terms imply time. "Time" implies the descriptive terms of past present and future, but not vise versa.

As we've been discussing, past, future, and present are defined in reference to each other, and there is no necessity of "time", only the experience we discussed, being present, memories, and anticipations are implied by these terms. "Time" refers to a concept created by a synthesis of these three. And, depending on how they are synthesized the concept varies. hence there are differing concepts of "time".

I suggest that the reason why our discussion has failed to progress is that you have a preconceived idea of "time", and this preconceived idea of "time" requires a specific relationship of past , future, and present. This is your "hidden premise".

Is there only one Trump supporter on this whole forum? — RogueAI

I think that says something about the quality of the forum.

When I say thought, I mean linguistic thought. Love begins in caring and nurture, you know nests, sitting on eggs, wagging your tail when the human looks at you. — unenlightened

Right, that's why I said love is prior to thought, and thought requires love, in the sense that love is necessary for thought. This is evident in human beings, as thoughtfulness is the result of love, and thoughtlessness is what results from a lack of love.

Thought is derived from love, as a necessary precondition. So love is even deeper within the internal than thoughts are.

Being unfolds in time. But thought is unimportant, in the sense that it does nothing to complete us and fill the void, only love can do that. — unenlightened

I would agree that love fills the void, and love is expressed in actions rather than thoughts, but I think thought is still required in a secondary way, as a cause of loving acts. Isn't it true that thoughtfulness is an indication of love, even if love does not actually require thoughtfulness for its existence? I don't see how thoughtlessness could be consistent with "love". This relationship between thoughtfulness and love demonstrates that thoughtfulness is dependent on love, such that love is essential to, or necessary for thoughtfulness. And loving acts are dependent on thoughtfulness in much the same way, such that thoughtfulness is necessary for loving acts. And loving acts are necessary to fill the void.

We might say that love comes from somewhere deeper than thought, and is prior to thought, therefore does not require thought, but the outward actions which express love require thought. So thought is like a filter between love and the actions it produces, it attempts to constrain the actions to be truly consistent with what is needed. Loving acts, though they may succeed in filling the gap of what is lacking, and what is needed, are really just an outward expression, or representation, of the true love which is deep within, as the cause of action. And love itself is even deeper within than thought is, as prior to (cause of) the thoughtfulness which itself is prior to the loving acts as the cause of conformity; that is conforming to what appears to fill the void.

But it's all a backward representation, because the true "void" which needs to be filled, is deepest within,
inherent within the thoughts, inherent within the love itself, whose lacking and need produces the inclination for action in the first place.

But for the rest, it looks to me that you have simply swapped interior and exterior and repeated the Cartesian dualism. — unenlightened

I really cannot understand how dualism is avoidable in an accurate understanding of reality. This is due to the nature of time. The problem is that the future is indeterminate, consisting of possibilities, while the past consists of what actually is determined. Being unfolds in time, as you say, and this is at the present, so the living being partakes in both the undetermined future, full of possibilities, and the determined past, full of actualities. How can we understand this two-fold reality without a dualist framework?

I think - I cannot doubt that I think because to doubt is to think, therefore I am certain of my existence as thought. — unenlightened

What thought signifies to me is need, lacking. We think because we are in need. So when Descartes put thinking in relation to being, he should have recognized that we think because we are lacking in our being. We are, each of us, incomplete. So I think, not because I am, but because I want to be.

Sounds a bit like the internet. But I think you are continuing the Cartesian split and trying to account subjectively for objectivity which must result in the same kind of contradiction - here we are sharing ideas through physical means, are we not? Interior requires an inexplicable exterior and neither can account for the other that it rejects. Can we not reject the split, except as a methodological tool for understanding one aspect of a single world? And then characterise that aspect that our scientific method brackets off, not as another world, and not as ideas, but as the meaning and the caring of the world. — unenlightened

I am not actually denying the exterior. It is what it is, and that is what I described as a faulty representation. That does not make it unreal, as a representation it is real, but faulty. Likewise, "the physical" is very real, as a representation, it is just lacking in its capacity to accurately model how the universe actually behaves. So we can go to the "single world" scenario, but only by recognizing that the scientific method is not properly modeling the single world.

So here's the point. It seems like we share ideas through the external world, speaking writing, radio, internet, etc.. This is what you call physical means. In a basic sense, we reach outward, touch things, and move them around. But these supposed outward movements all come from an inner source, supposedly moving outward, and they end by altering the inner aspects somewhere else.. The supposed outward movement changes the supposed external world, in a way which other people can sense, perceive, and interpret for meaning. But this may be a complete misunderstanding.

Now imagine that there is nothing out there, nothing external, and all this activity is really happening in the internal aspects of bodies, and through the relations of inner space. There must be a boundary between the inner space, and the external nothingness. So each time that it seems like I reach out with my hand to touch something I am really hitting that external boundary behind which is nothing. The activity which you, or anyone else might see, and interpret as me reaching outward and touching an object is really all occurring within internal space, and you're actually seeing it through inner space. Though we model this interaction as occurring through external space, and as the external boundaries of objects hitting and moving each other, the real activity is occurring within the inner space of the objects, and their internal relations to each other. So when I reach out and move the object with my hand, we model it as the external part of my body exerting a force against the external part of the object, and this moves the object. In reality, I am moving it by means of the internal aspects of my body affecting the internal aspects of the object, through inner space, and it simply appears like the external part of my body exerts force on the external part of the object. through external space.

Talk of being penetrated is a little unmanly, and that might explain why philosophers prefer to think that it is no worldly thing, but ghostly phenomena that enters "the mind". — unenlightened

I, am an impenetrable fortress. Nothing, I repeat nothing, from that "external world" can infiltrate my defenses, and move me. All which exists within my mind comes from the inside. Thus is my reality.

There is however, a sense in which ideas come to my mind from somewhere other than my mind. Since they cannot penetrate through my fortress, and enter from the external, and "ghostly phenomena" is silly talk, I conclude that they enter my mind through "inner space". And since the ideas which enter my mind through inner space seem to be very similar to the ideas which enter your mind through inner space, I can conclude that we are very well connected through inner space.

Scare quotes for "the mind" because it seems to imply a universal generalised 'realm of ideas' in which your mind and my mind float ethereally in a universe of ideas, supping on the nourishing philosophies that abide there and remaining essentially disembodied. — unenlightened

Yes, it's good to understand "inner space" in terms of disembodiment because there cannot be any spatial extension, which is a requirement for bodies, in the intensional realm.

"A mind" might better be imagined as the emergent will of the population of cells that constitute a body in interpenetrative relation to an environment. Where 'will' can be understood as the action of the organism, in terms of a discriminating response. Air is taken in, oxygen is preferentially absorbed and CO2 is preferentially released in exhalation, and that discrimination continues until the organism dies. These cells always knew the difference that science has lately named. — unenlightened

Now you've lost me. You're talking about the internal "mind" in terms of external bodies and movements, and things penetrating the impenetrable fortress. I suggest you go back to the drawing board, and refigure your ideas from the inside. Don't let that thing you call "science" penetrate your soul from the outside inward, thereby corrupting the entirety of your mind.

Science is then an aspect of the emergent (constructed) will of a social species, emerging from a 'method' or practice of interaction with the distinguished social and physical environments. The method in turn being distinguished from more varied (chaotic) practices that did not make the hard distinction between the social and the physical as religions and polities. — unenlightened

Science was a mistaken venture from its outset. The human beings thought that they could proceed outward from the inner space, and find freedom in a supposed vast expanse of the assumed outer realm. But they are now finding out that there is really no way to escape the penitentiary to the outside, as there really is no outside, no such thing as an external world, or "outer space". The humans have found out that everything which happens happens through the inside, and we just misrepresent these happenings, and mistakenly misunderstand them through three dimensional or four dimensional geometry which portrays, or models, all this activity as outside.

Until we recognize that true freedom can only be found through inner space, we'll be continually banging our heads against that impenetrable wall to the external; a process which prevents us from the freedom of disembodiment. Why bang our heads endlessly against a barrier which we know from experience has real substantial existence, instead of turning around and finding true freedom through the interrelations of inner space?

Thus a crude physicalism in outline. — unenlightened

Physicalism is dead. The scientific method which kept knocking itself silly by banging its head on the impenetrable boundary has finally given up the ghost, which has retreated to the inner space.

It is part a problem of terminology. On the one hand, a wavelength of 420nm is a different colour to a wavelength of 470nm, but on the other hand, even though we can distinguish them, we perceive them both as the single colour blue. — RussellA

The point though, is that no specific named colour can be defined simply with reference to a particular set of wavelengths. This is because the sensation of colour is far more complex than simply detecting particular wavelengths. The richness and aesthetic beauty of colour is a feature of combined wavelengths, just like harmony in music. Add to this, the way that the eyes have evolved to break down the combined wavelengths into distinct parts, and then the brain reunites the distinct parts in a form of synthesis, to produce one colour, and you have a very complex system for sensing color.

Clearly, we do not perceive two different colours as "the single colour blue". We perceive them as different colours, and call them by the same name, "blue". It is a matter of categorizing the two as the same type, not a matter of perceiving them as a single colour.

What is this:"actual present"? What is it, and what reason do you have for believing there is any such thing? — Luke

I answered this:

This is where we had our most profound disagreement. You referred to past as what has been, and future as what will be. I said that this is incorrect, because "what will be" implies determinism and our conscious experience indicates that the future is indeterminate, consisting of possibilities. This substantial difference between determined past, and indeterminate future, implies that there must be a real, identifiable division between past and future, which we can know as "the present". You denied this substantial difference, and consequentially the foundation for a real identifiable, independent "present", with an appeal to compatibilism. — Metaphysician Undercover

This barely answers my questions. By "representation", I take you to mean concept of "the present". But how could that concept be more accurate? More accurate in relation to what? — Luke

The above quote answers this too.

After all of our discussion about "past", "present" and "future", it never dawned on you that we were talking about time? — Luke

I was very deliberately not talking about "time". That we were talking about time is your misinterpretation, your mistake. I told you from the beginning, dismiss your principles of measurement for the purpose of this discussion of "the present". We were talking about "the present" and it's relation to "the past" and "the future". The nearest I got to "time" was when I said that the present must consist of duration. At that time we could have discussed whether "time" is implied by "duration". I believe it is from the experience of duration that the concept of time is derived. So duration is implied by time, but not vise versa

I can't take it for granted that when defining "past", "present" and "future" we are talking about time? That's absurd. — Luke

We were talking about defining terms. Taking for granted, as part of a definition, that which is not explicitly part of the definition, is a logical fallacy, the hidden premise. As explained in the quoted article, it is most likely the root of our disagreement, you were holding a hidden premise. You thought time was implied by talk about "present" "past" and "future". But we were discussing the defining of these terms in reference to each other, not in reference to time. How "time" is related is a further matter.

Do you honestly think I was suggesting that a human perspective and "the present" are identical? We are discussing time, aren't we? — Luke

It's what your arguments implied, and then you confirmed it by saying that "the human observer" may be replaced by "the present". This is what you stated "What you call 'past the human observer', I would call 'past the present'. So you are saying that "the present" signifies nothing more than the human observer.

This is very significant because I've been arguing that we need to separate these two in conception. So we need to define "the present" in terms of the conscious experience, but recognize that the actual present is distinct and different from the conscious experience of being present. In this way we can come to see the faults in the way we represent "the present" according to the conscious experience.

You don't seem to be able to follow the argument because you've been insisting that the two are inseparable. And then you went so far as to suggest that "human observer" could be replaced with "present". You will never be able to understand how the human conception of "the present" is faulty if you do not allow for that difference.

As I have made clear in my previous posts, the present is defined in terms of WHEN we are consciously experiencing. I'm obviously not saying that the present is conscious experience. — Luke

We have no conception of time in this conceptual structure we are creating from our agreed upon starting point, beginning with the premise of "the present" as defined in terms of conscious experience. That is what I indicated to you when you said that you could define "past and "future" with direct reference to "the present". I said that this would require a conception of time. Now you are attempting to employ a conception of time, without defining your terms. You now say, the present is "WHEN" the conscious experience occurs.

But what is "WHEN" referencing, other than the past implied by memories and the future implied by anticipation. I told you that such a definition, one like you seek, really ends up defining "the present" in terms of past and future. Now you're trying to avoid referencing past and future, by referencing time as "WHEN". But there is no way to ground this proposed conception of time, and "WHEN" other than in the past which is implied by memories, and the future implied by anticipations. So it's nothing but a trick of deception.

How? What do you mean by "an accurate representation"? What sort of "representation" do you mean? And how could its accuracy be improved? — Luke

There are many ways that the representation, or conception of "the present" could be improved. The most important thing I believe is to recognize the substantial difference between past and future. This substantial difference you yourself denied in your reference to compatibilism. So for example, if you had a more accurate representation of "the present", you would understand why compatibilism is unacceptable.

I thought it was understood that we were talking about time, and that you would therefore understand that I was referring to equating the present time with the time of observation. But I guess I overestimated your basic comprehension of the issue. — Luke

No, it was never understood that we were talking about "time". This is an attempt by you to smuggle in a hidden premise. You cannot take such things for granted when defining terms. We were talkin about "the present" and we made it as far as a discussion as to whether "the present" ought to be defined with reference to "past" and "future" or "past" and "future" ought to be defined in reference to "the present". We failed to agree on what the current convention is on this matter.

So, there is a misunderstanding between us as to how these terms, "present", "past", "future" are currently defined by convention. You say that the convention is to define past and future in reference to the present, and I told you that this would require a conception time. Now you are trying to smuggle in that hidden premise, as if it is somehow already within our definitions. That is a logical fallacy. Perhaps our disagreement is the manifestation of this hidden premise, as described bellow:

The third type of premise difficulty is the most insidious: the hidden premise. It is sometimes listed as a logical fallacy — the unstated major premise, but it is more accurate to consider it here. Obviously, if a disagreement is based upon a hidden premise, then the disagreement will be irresolvable. So when coming to an impasse in resolving differences, it is a good idea to go back and see if there are any implied premises that have not been addressed. — https://wrtg213x.community.uaf.edu/resources/recognizing-logical-fallacies/

I must have missed that. Can you point me to it? Or, just explain again how the difference between past and future indicates that there must be a true independent present. — Luke

This is where we had our most profound disagreement. You referred to past as what has been, and future as what will be. I said that this is incorrect, because "what will be" implies determinism and our conscious experience indicates that the future is indeterminate, consisting of possibilities. This substantial difference between determined past, and indeterminate future, implies that there must be a real, identifiable division between past and future, which we can know as "the present". You denied this substantial difference, and consequentially the foundation for a real identifiable, independent "present", with an appeal to compatibilism.

Yes, past the human observer at the present, for that is always the temporal location of the human observer, when all observations are made. — Luke

This is your mistake then, you equate the human temporal perspective with "the present". I explained in the last post, and a number of times earlier, how this is a mistake. The conscious experience does not give us an adequate representation of the present. Therefore these cannot be equated.

"The present" is subjective, as much as "here" is subjective. — Luke

That's a faulty assumption as well.

You said previously that the present ought to be defined in terms of conscious experience. Do you no longer belive this? Otherwise, how is this independent and objective?

Also, you just complained above that there was a "pretense of avoiding the subjective perspective" wrt the present, but now you want to avoid it? — Luke

I think you misunderstand. Defining "the present" in terms of conscious experience does not mean equating the two. It means defining "the present" precisely how it appears directly from our experience of it. But of course there is a difference between the being who is experiencing, and the thing experienced. So the conscious experience of being present is not the same thing as the present which is being experienced. And so, the definition must respect this difference.

Yes, the present ought to be defined in terms of conscious experience, because it is only by doing this that the incoherency within our understanding of time will be exposed. Then to rectify the incoherency we will need to seek the true independent nature of the present. So the first step is to provide an accurate representation of "the present" in terms of conscious experience. The second step is to apply logic to the premises derived, thereby demonstrating that the continuity which is assumed of conscious experience is not a true representation. Conscious experience misleads us. And the third step is to seek the real points in time which the logic demonstrates as necessary. In other words, a very clear and unambiguous representation of how "the present" appears from conscious experience must be provided in order that we can apply logic to determine the problems with this representation.

They're not equivalent, that's right. One is a person and one is a time designation. The only so-called equivalence they have is that the observational perspective is temporally located at the present. — Luke

Then why did you equate "past the human observer" with "past the present" at the beginning of this post? I separated the two for a reason. Then to deny my reasoning, you equated the two. You very explicitly said: "What you call 'past the human observer', I would call 'past the present'",

So you denied my proposition in order to discount the logic which follows from that premise, then later you turn around and say that you really believe the proposition is true. Now I'll have to turn around and go through the logic all over again, at which point you'll deny the truth of the proposition again, only to accept it later on when it becomes convenient for you to do so again.

What makes you think there is a "true independent present"? — Luke

The difference between past and future, which we discussed a few posts back, which we know about from our conscious experience of being present, indicates that there must be a true independent present.

The objective definition refers to time which has gone past what and time which has not gone past what? — Luke

Past the human observer I suppose. As I said, definitions always have an implied subjective perspective which if it enters into the definition would lessen its objectiveness. Sound for example is waves, but ones that are heard. That's why the proverbial question, 'if a tree falls in the forest with no one there, does iy make a sound?'.

The issue that you point to here, is part of the reason why I argue that the conventional definition is not good. There is a pretense of avoiding the subjective perspective by referencing "time" instead of the observer, but it is really not very successful. Unless the passage of time is conceived of independently from the human perspective, and "the present" is independent from that perspective, the subjectivity cannot be avoided. An independent, objective "present" is the way I proposed, as how "the present" ought to be defined. Start with the human perspective, produce a definition of "the present" whichas much as possible, is independent from that perspective, then proceed toward understanding past and future from there.

How do you define the past and future from the passing of time? As shown above, this requires you to use phrases like "gone past" and "not gone past", but then you must specify what it is that these have gone past and not gone past. The past has gone past what? The future has not gone past what? The obvious, and only possible, answer is: the present time. What else could it be? — Luke

No, your supposed "obvious", and "only possible" conclusion is not correct, and completely illogical. These phrases, "gone past", and "not gone past" imply a relationship with an observer. As I said, there is always an implied observer in so-called objective definitions. "Sound" is the vibrations which are detected by the ear. "Colour" is the electromagnetism detected by the eyes. There is much electromagnetism not detected by the eyes, and that does not qualify as "colour".

That is exactly the problem with the conventional definition. "Past" and "future" are defined in relation to an implied human observer. Then, to define "present" we simply turn around and replace, or exchange the observer with "the present". From here, we can extend the past indefinitely, far beyond the observer. But this is an inaccurate and invalid exchange, because the two (observational perspective, and present) are not truly equivalent.

Therefore, what I argued is that we ought to start from the observational perspective, and produce a definition of "the present" which recognizes the difference between the observational perspective, and the true independent "present". This allows us to understand that the conscious experience of being present provides us with a faulty representation of "the present", as I explained already.

The goal was to provide a definition of the present in terms of the past and the future; to derive the present from the past and the future. I don't see how this example fulfils that goal. I don't agree that this definition of the present is given in terms of the past and the future. There are innumerable things which are not the past or the future. — Luke

OK, you do not agree that "not the past or the future" fulfills the goal of defining the present in terms of the past and the future. So be it. That's why you are so difficult to hold discourse with. When you can't somehow twist and contort the words in some equivocal interpretation, to misrepresent, in order to support what you are arguing (that the other person is contradictory for example), you simply deny the obvious. Do you not see, within the words of the single sentence of the provided definition ""the period of time"? That there are innumerable things "not the past or the future" is irrelevant, because the definition refers to "the period of time" which is not the past or the future.

If the human could distinguish 1,000 colours, this would probably give the brain too much information to satisfactorily process. Therefore, the concept of 7 colours seems a good, middle-of-the-road evolutionary solution — RussellA

What if the human eye could distinguish a million different coulors?

HOW MANY COLORS CAN HUMANS SEE?
Researchers estimate that most humans can see around one million different colors. This is because a healthy human eye has three types of cone cells, each of which can register about 100 different color shades, amounting to around a million combinations. Of course, this will vary for people who have a color impairment (or are ‘colorblind’).

In terms of shade variation, the human eye can perceive more variations in warmer colors than cooler ones. This is because almost 2/3 of the cones process the longer light wavelengths (reds, oranges, and yellows).

While millions of potential colors may seem overwhelming, color guides and tools like Pantone offer users different ways to organize and manage colors. There are also so many ways to describe the colors we see. Check out our guide to the characteristics of color for more. — https://www.pantone.com/articles/color-fundamentals/how-do-we-see-color#

Colour is not wavelength.

Are you suggesting that the word "here" cannot be defined and has no definition/use because of its subjectivity? It seems to me that the word "here" is very commonly used in our language. If we normally seek objectivity in definitions, then why doesn't this objectivity apply to the word "here"? The word "here" has its definitions and uses. — Luke

I am not making any statements of necessity, so I am not suggesting anything about how any word "must be defined", or "cannot be defined". That's why I talked about how I think "the present" ought to be defined, and how it actually is defined, by common convention. So subjectivity does not equate with impossibility.

Given your assertion that the present is defined in reference to the past and future, you have once again failed to answer my questions. If we start with only the past and the future and attempt to derive the present from them, then what is the past in the past of, and what is the future in the future of? What determines the location of the present in between the vast temporal regions of the past and the future? And what determining factor(s) can we find within the past and the future that might help us to narrow down the present to less than the duration of a millennium? — Luke

As I explained earlier, there is always a human perspective implied, in any definition, but in the case of a so-called objective definition the perspective does not enter as a defining feature. The definition refers outward toward features of a larger world, not inward toward th subjective perspective. So "up" and "down" are not defined in relation to a spot, "here", they are defined with reference to higher and lower elevation. And right and left are not defined by the perspective of the individual, who might say "here", they are defined with reference to north south east west; 'stand facing north, and to the east is right. The same is the case with past and future. They are not defined objectively with reference to the present, the objective definition refers to time which has gone past and time which has not gone past. The reference is the passing of time, not "the present". This is the conventional way, as I've argued.

If we start with only the past and the future and attempt to derive the present from them, then what is the past in the past of, and what is the future in the future of? — Luke

As I said above, the reference is time, "the past" refers to the past part of time, and "the future" refers to the future part of time. That is the convention. This is very straight forward, and I'm quite surprised by your need to ask.

What determines the location of the present in between the vast temporal regions of the past and the future? And what determining factor(s) can we find within the past and the future that might help us to narrow down the present to less than the duration of a millennium? — Luke

The convention is that "the present" signifies a point, moment, or duration, "now", which separates past from future. You see, the convention, which is to look for objective definitions rather than subjective, defines "the present" with reference to the past and future. And "past" and "future" are defined with reference to the passing time. As I said earlier, there is of course, a human perspective implied, as is the case with all objective definitions, because human beings make the definition, but the perspective is not referred to in the definition, because the definition is intended to be objective. Like up and down, right and left, always imply a human perspective, but the definitions refer to something outward, objective, rather than inward to the subjective perspective.

Provide an example of how you can define the present with reference to the past and future. — Luke

That's done, above. The present is the point, or moment, or duration, which divides or separates the past from the future.

You could probably just look it up somewhere. — Luke

Good idea, here is https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/present

"the period of time that is happening now, not the past or the future:"

More fake indictments. What's next, more fake court proceedings? Then more fake legal expenses for Trump?

I do not see that as being the convention at all. I don't know where you get this idea from. Once again: in that case, the past and the future would then be in the past and the future of what? You can't start with the past and future and determine the present from there, because the past and the future are in the past and in the future of the present, by definition.

The convention is to locate "the present" in terms of one's temporal location, (e.g. when one is experiencing, when things are happening) much like we locate "here" in terms of one's spatial location. If you do not define the present in terms of one's conscious experience or when events are happening or when one is acting or speaking, then what is the determining factor in deciding when the present is situated between the past and the future? — Luke

We are talking about defining terms, which is completely different from locating places. You can locate a place with "here", but "here" will not serve to define the location because it is completely subjective, and we normally seek objectivity in definitions. Likewise with the present, "now". So to define a place, we refer to the surroundings, and to define the present we refer to past and future. This is because of the desire for objectivity.

So take "here", and say there is up and there is down relative to here, also there is right and left relative to here. However, "here does not serve to define up and down, nor can it serve to define right and left. To define these, we turn to something else, to give the meaning of these terms, in order to have objectivity for universal application. Likewise, you can say that there is past and future relative to now, or present, but this does not serve to define past and future. To give past and future objective meaning we turn to something else.

I think you and I will never find agreement as to what "the convention" is with respect to defining these temporal terms. And as I said, there is a number of conventions, so I think this course of discussion is pointless.

If you agree - as you state above - that the present is defined relative to experience in this way, then why do you also claim that the present is defined relative to the past and the future? — Luke

Luke, I agree that the present ought to be defined this way, but I do not believe that it actually is defined this way, in conventional usage. I've repeated this so many times now, why can't you understand the difference between what I think ought to be the case, and what I think is the case? It doesn't matter that you do not agree with my assumption as to what is the case, the differentiation is within what I believe. You cannot conclude that since this differentiation is false, it therefore does not exist as my belief, and proceed to act as if I have not explained this difference which I believe in

I reject your presupposition that "past, "present" and "future" must be defined in terms of how things "actually appear to us from our experience". There is nothing necessitating that all words must be defined or used this way. — Luke

I did not say that they must be defined in this way, I just pointed out that there is consistency to this way.

A compatibilist free will is entirely consistent with "what will be". — Luke

I don't think we can make any progress here either. I do not believe that it is possible to have a coherent form of compatibilism, so we are on completely different ground here.

Regarding my application of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle to MU's claims about the everyday experience of the present as a positive duration rather than as a theoretical and dimensionless point, it should be clear to the observant that it is self-evidently true (from MU's proffered claims and my proffered scientific support for them) we are, acting individually, attempting to do the work of science and philosophy. Such efforts at this website should come as no surprise. — ucarr

The important issue comes into sight when you place this premise of the present as a duration, alongside the premise of the substantial difference between past and future. From our experience, we see the past as determined, and the future as indeterminate (consisting of unselected possibilities), therefore a substantial difference. If the present is itself a duration, yet it is also the period of change between indeterminate and determined, this conception allows that some aspects of the world become determined (go into the past) prior to other aspects, in a sense of "prior" determined by their relative positions within the width of the present rather than the traditional linear time. This makes the duration of the present a second dimension of time, rather than a segment of linear time.

Kant's contemporary Jacobi, in his famous Letters on Spinoza (1785), wrote: "Through faith we know we have a body, and that other bodies, and other thinking beings are present outside us." I believe he was in line with Kant except that he uses the word "faith" instead of "intuition". If they are distinct that would be too many faculties — Gregory

But look, it's said "Through faith we know...". This implies that faith is the cause of that knowledge. Faith is not the knowledge itself. So we still have the question of how faith or intuition can cause knowledge.

The English speaking world has determined that not only is the wavelength of 700nm named "red", but also the wavelengths 620 to 750nm are also named "red". — RussellA

But all sorts of combinations of wavelengths are also correctly called "red"

.

It is not true that we learn how to perceive the colour of the wavelength 700nm by knowing its name. I don't need to know the name of the wavelength 700nm in order to perceive it. — RussellA

We're not talking about perceiving the colour of the wavelength 700nm, which is just one specific instance of red, we are talking about perceiving the colour red, in the general sense. "Red" in the general sense cannot be reduced 700nm, nor 620 to 750nm. Your examples are just an attempt to avoid the issue because explaining what it means to perceive one specific type of red does not explain how we perceive red in the general sense.

According to what you say here, my proposition would be more acceptable because it's supported by experience. — Luke

Sure Luke, but until you provide the support your proposition is unsupported. And what experience provides the support, other than memories and anticipations? That's the point!

I can agree to this: that we define the present time relative to the time we are consciously experiencing, that we define past and future times relative to the present time, and that we remember the past and anticipate the future. What I don't agree to is your recent statement that what follows from this is that the present time is therefore defined relative to past and future times. For example: — Luke

OK, so we've advanced in our agreement here. present, past, and future, are all defined by experience. Now the issue is the way that these are related to each other. What I proposed, which you expressly do not agree with, is that the convention is to take past and future as the real defining features of time, and position the present relative to these. Evidence of this, is that "the present" is often understood as the divisor between past and future, and that "the present" is relative, according to the relativity of simultaneity.

Also you provide evidence of this convention by insisting that future consists of "what will be" instead of as "possibility". The latter is how the future actually appears to us from our experience of being present, while the former, which is your proposal is how you contrive "the future", in order to facilitate your position of "the present" as a divisor between the two.

I do acknowledge though, that there is more than one conventional way as to how present, past, and future are all related to each other, and that there are conventions which make "the present" the defining feature, and then position past and future relative to the present. This is the way I say that these terms ought to be defined.

Defining the terms in this way helps us to properly understand and represent the difference between past and future. Acknowledging this difference makes us recognize the discontinuity between past and future, and this indicates that the representation of time as a continuity cannot be true. The discontinuity is exposed by properly understanding the future as consisting of possibility rather than making "the present" a continuity between what has been and what will be.

If this is a "mistake" of determinism, then it must also be a "mistake" of free will. I do not exclude our free choices from influencing what will be. Moreover, it must equally be a "mistake" that reality is the actualisation of only one outcome. — Luke

You deny the possibility of free will by saying that the future consists of "what will be". As I explained.

Only one outcome will happen. You may note that I do not preclude the (very likely) possibility that my planning and booking an overseas holiday will lead to me actually going on it. — Luke

Sure, only one outcome will happen, but the future does not consist of that one outcome because there are many possibilities of what may happen. Therefore the future does not consist of that one outcome, it consists of the many possibilities, because that there are many possibilities as to what may happen is the truth of the matter..

Something must come to pass in the future one way or another. — Luke

Again, I agree, something will come to pass, but what that is, is undetermined. Therefore what the future consists of is something undetermined. It does not consist of "what will happen", because there is no such thing as what will happen; that is undetermined.

As regards the intuition of the colour red, which is procedural knowledge, the brain knows how to perceive the colour red when presented with a wavelength of 700nm. — RussellA

This makes no sense to me. There are many different shades of red, produced from many different combinations of wavelengths. We learn how to perceive the colour red by learning how to correctly apply the word "red". Without learning the word "red", we would perceive many different shades of colours without knowing any of them as "red". For example, the Japanese classify colours in a way completely different from us.

Kant was in a bind because his reason could not prove there was something besides appearance and his intuition was locked unto the empirical. — Gregory

But Kant posited something distinct from both reason and appearance, intuition.

Why do we need an argument or premise for the passage of time? How about this: time passes such that what is yet to happen becomes what is happening becomes what has happened. — Luke

It's called "justification". Such propositions are meaningless if not supported by experience or evidence. I could propose this: time passes such that what has happened becomes what is happening, becomes what will happen. Why would your proposition be more acceptable than mine?

The future is what will happen regardless of, or including, our expectations of what will happen. — Luke

As I told you, this is incorrect. The future consists of possibilities, not of "what will happen". That is the mistake of determinism. If the future consisted of what will happen, rather than possibilities, there would be no point in deliberation concerning one's actions. Since there is usefulness in such deliberation, because we can make choices and act accordingly, it is clear that the future consists of possibilities rather than of what will happen.

f I plan and book an overseas holiday, I might end up taking it, but something unforeseen might prevent me from going. We'll see what happens. — Luke

Exactly as you say, the future consists of "we'll see what happens" (meaning numerous possibilities), not "what will happen".

The future is not the plans or anticipations, but the reality of what will come to pass — Luke

This is a false representation, a misconception. There is no such thing as "the reality of what will come to pass", the reality of the future is possibility. What comes to pass only becomes real when it comes to pass. This is why Aristotle argued that we need to provide exemption from the law of excluded middle to allow for the reality of the future. His famous example is the possibility of a sea battle tomorrow. There is neither truth nor falsity to the proposition "there will be a sea battle tomorrow", because it has not been decided. That was Aristotle's argument for exceptions to the law of excluded middle. Propositions concerning the future are neither true nor false. And it does not matter that you can look back after the fact, and suppose that before the fact that proposition would have been true, because the nature of reality is that before the fact it could have gone either way. In other words, there is no such thing as the reality of what will come to pass in this matter. After tomorrow has come to pass, there is such a reality, and a truth to that question, but that's only when it's in the past. Prior to the even there really is no truth or falsity to the matter.

I don't deny that we remember the past and anticipate the future, but memories are not the past and anticipations are not the future. — Luke

I didn't say that memories are the past, nor that anticipations are the future. I said that we have defined the present according to conscious experience. Now if we want to give past and future positions relative to the present, we must refer to conscious experience as well, as this is what defines "present". And, conscious experience gives us memories and anticipations which we can use to position past and future relative to the present.

Assessment – MU’s thesis has something new to say about time and quantum entanglement within the macro-space of everyday human experience. — ucarr

Thanks ucarr, you've provided a satisfactory explanation of what I've been arguing. In relation to the uncertainty principle, I will say that the issue is the way that we have come to represent points, mathematically as limits, through calculus. As we approach the limit, the margin of error approaches infinity. So if in the case of time, the limit is a point in time, known as "the present", then as we approach that limit uncertainty is maximized.

The number of human chromosomes was published in 1923 by Theophilus...; — Wiki

Theophilus Thistle, the successful thistle sifter,
In sifting a sieve full of unsifted thistles,
Thrust three thousand thistles through the thick of his thumb.
If Theophilus Thistle, the successful thistle sifter,
Can thrust three thousand thistles through the thick of his thumb,
See thou, in sifting a sieve full of unsifted thistles,
Thrust not three thousand thistles through the thick of thy thumb.

Wiki says now we know "the true number", simple as that. But of course that's not exactly true, because there are variations in the number, types, and arrangement of chromosomes listed on that very page. More importantly, for more than 30 years every biologist and every doctor believed it was a fact that humans have 48 chromosomes. Of course, we now believe they were all wrong, but it ought to give one pause. — Srap Tasmaner

Tell me now Srap Tasmaner,

If Theophilus Thistle, the unsuccessful thistle sifter,
in sifting a sieve full of unsifted thistles,
Thrust not three thousand thistles through the thick of his thumb.
How many thistles has Theophilus Thistle the unsuccessful thistle sifter,
while sifting unsifted thistles through the thick of his thumb,
thrust through the thick of his thumb?

Yet without intuition you can't have faith, the act Kant considered the crown of practical reason — Gregory

Faith is not a type of knowledge. Is it a cause of knowledge?

In today's terms it's referred to as Innatism. Chomsky mentions it. — RussellA

Well, where is Chomsky when you need him?

SEP - Innateness and Language
The philosophical debate over innate ideas and their role in the acquisition of knowledge has a venerable history. — RussellA

Here, "the acquisition of knowledge" is mentioned. But surely there is a difference between the conditions required for the acquisition of knowledge, and knowledge itself.

Wikipedia - Innatism
In the philosophy of mind, innatism is the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs. — RussellA

I do not think that what might be called "innate knowledge" would classify as "knowledge" under a strict epistemological definition, like justified true belief. And since these two senses pf "knowledge" must be different, then there is ambiguity and the possibility of equivocation in any logical argument proceeding from the premise that we are born with "knowledge".

This is why Aristotle distinguished between different types of "potentials". We are born with the capacity to obtain knowledge, and this is a specific type of potential, as the capacity to learn. After we learn, we have a different type of potential, we've ascended to a higher level, which is the actual possession of knowledge. The two, what we are born with, and what we acquire, are in the same general category, as "potential", but they are very different in character because one is logically prior to the other, as a necessary condition for it.

If we use the very general category, "potential" to refer to them both, there is less chance of equivocation, because unless specified, "potential" refers to a very general category. "Knowledge", on the other hand is more often used in the more specific sense of epistemology. So talking about a type of "knowledge" which we are born with is more conducive to equivocation because many people think of :knowledge as what we acquire through learning and education, and something which is justified through the use of language. But we do not possess the skill of language when we are born, just an innate condition which inclines us with the desire to learn.

We have intuitions. — RussellA

Really? Do you think so? We claim to have sensations. We claim to have thoughts, and ideas. But do we have intuitions? "Intuition" appears to refer to a faculty or means by which we obtain knowledge directly, without the need for sensation nor reasoning. I assume "an intuition" would be an object of knowledge acquired through intuition.

But is it really appropriate to call something acquired through intuition, Knowledge? Don't we assume a separation between the cause and the effect, as if each of these refers to something distinct from the other? So if intuition is the means by which someone might obtain a specific type of knowledge, it would be the cause of this type of knowledge. Then why would we call the knowledge itself, as the effect derived from this cause, "an intuition"? Consider, "a thought" refers to a past act of thinking, which is the cause of the currently existing "thought", and this is way that "a thought" as an effect, is differentiated from the act of thinking, as the cause.

If, however, I suppose there to be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali),then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia). — RussellA

The issue here is the type of "intuition" which could receive the noumena. Notice that Kant distinctly states that there is an intuition which these objects of understanding called "noumena" are given to. This implies that the noumena are not foreign, or unintelligible to the intellect, as they are received through a type of intuition. The problem though, is that if we cannot identify the type of intuition which receives the noumena, then we don't seem to have the capacity to understand them at all.

The intuitions which receive sense phenomena are named by Kant as space and time, and from this Kant produces the categories by which phenomena are understood. And I think it is implied by Kant that neither of these intuitions, space nor time, is the intuition which apprehends the noumena, otherwise we might produce an understanding of them through those same categories.

So the type of intuition which receives the noumena is left as undisclosed by Kant. Furthermore, the exact nature of "intuition" in general is left as unclear. Each named category represents a determined intuition by which its object is received, so there must be a distinct intuition for each category. Each determined intuition is a judgement made. The intuition through which noumena are received has not been determined by Kant, so that is left as a judgement not made by him.

I don't see any difference. It follows from the definition of "the present" as that time when things are happening, etc., that the past is what has happened and the future is what is yet to happen. Therefore, the present does signify the division between past and future. What difference do you see? — Luke

We need a premise concerning the passing of time, to get from the present as what is happening, to "what has happened" and "what is yet to happen". In the case of "what has happened" we have memory to refer to. In the case of "what is yet to happen", it is much more difficult because of the way that we look at the future in terms of possibility. So as much as we like to think of the past as what has happened, we cannot think of the future as you propose. Therefore we cannot describe the relationship between past and future, nor the passing of time, until we have a better premise about the future.

The past and future are both defined in terms of the present, and the present is not defined in terms of either the past or the future, so there is no circularity. I already explained how they are different: "has been" was present and "will be" will be present. — Luke

Again, the future cannot be defined in terms of what will be, because that is not how we relate to the future as conscious beings. We act to cause what we want to happen, and prevent what we do not want to happen. So as much as we might truthfully say that we think of the past in the terms of what has happened, we cannot truthfully say that we think of the future in terms of what will happen. This is because we have some degree of choice about what will happen. And that creates all sorts of dilemmas and anxiety about what one can and cannot do, and what one ought and ought not do, etc.. Because of this, "the future" is not simply an opposing term to "the past".

I agree that we remember the past and anticipate the future. I don't agree that memory and anticipation distinguish the meanings or definitions of the terms "past" and "future". — Luke

The issue though, is that we've agreed that "present" ought to be defined in terms of conscious experience. So when we move forward now to define past and future in reference to "the present" we need to maintain this status of "the present" as the definition provided by conscious experience, which we agreed was being, or existing. From this position of existing as conscious beings who experience "the present", we can only have an indication of anything which we might call "the past", through memory. Memory is the only thing which indicates to us that there is anything distinct from the present, as the past, so we have no choice but to define "the past" with reference to memory. And defining future is similar, but somewhat different.

How else would you propose that we could define "past" and "future" in terms of the present, when "present" is defined in this way? Without reference to memory we have no way to derive a "has been" because all that can be present to the mind would be what is happening. And the future would be a similar situation, we'd have all sorts of activity occurring, but no premonitions about what might be about to happen, or what was needed. So I don't see how we can bring our minds to the bigger picture of "has been", and "may be" (or something like that) without referring to these other parts of our experience of being present.

How does that follow? You said in the first quote above that you agreed the present should be defined in terms of when things are happening, occurring, existing, one's awareness, an utterance, etc. Why do you now say that "being and existing" get defined in terms of memories and anticipations? — Luke

To be perfectly clear to you, so that there is no misunderstanding, I will reproduce the rest of the context here. Prior to this I had said the following:

I agree that "the present" ought to be defined like this. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is how I believe that "the present" should be defined, as you propose, with reference to conscious experience, being, and existing. Notice the use of "ought". However, as I've been saying, I do not believe that this is the convention, I believe that in convention, present actually gets defined in reference to past and future, not vise versa, as it should be.

So, as I proceeded, the text you quoted appeared:

But then we see that "being and existing" gets defined in terms of having memories and anticipations, so the present is then actually defined in terms of past and future, because being and existing are described as having memories and anticipations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Would you please take notice that I proceeded from saying that the present "ought to be defined like this", to later saying "but then we see that...", and this implies that what ought to be the case is not what we actually see, or what actually is the case. In other words, I believe that the convention is to define "the present" in a way other than how it ought to be defined.

I don't agree that "being and existing" gets defined in terms of having memories and anticipations. But neither do I see how it follows from this that the present is actually defined in terms of past and future. Memories are not the past and anticipations are not the future. We experience both memories and anticipations in the present; they are about the past and the future, but they are not the past and the future. Furthermore, when are "being" and "existing" described as having memories and anticipations? — Luke

This is where we disagree. You seem to think that "has been", and "past" can be derived from the conscious experience of existing, or being present, without reference to memory. And the same for future. I do not see how this is possible, if we adhere to "the present" as being defined in the way we both agree it ought to be defined.

And, the only way to explore the problem I am describing, is to address the means by which these conceptions are derived from each other. Then we can see the difference between defining the present with reference to memories of past, and predictions of future, and defining the past and future with reference to the present. Pretending that these are both the same is no solution.

But we cannot even approach this problem until you provide some propositions, or a description of how you would like to make "past" and "future" something intelligible to a conscious being existing at the present.

The effect of this false randomness of boundary placement is to render the present an abstraction whereas, per your thesis, the present is an existential flowing of time no less than past/future. — ucarr

A slight correction here. The "flowing of time" is an appearance, how time appears to us. And, it is from this appearance of time, as a continuous flow, that the idea of placing points of division in any random, or arbitrary place, is derived. So, as per my thesis, the existential, or ontic present, is not to be conceived as a "flowing of time". The "flowing of time" is an illusion created by the deficiencies in the living being's ability to produce a true representation of time. We tend to think of human beings as being so far advanced in comparison to other animals in this respect, but in reality we're all very primitive in our capacity to apprehend the nature of time.

This means the present can’t be rendered a mental abstraction without introducing distortion into the perception of the existential reality of time. — ucarr

I would say that perhaps you have this backward, though I'm not quite sure what you meant. I think that the present is a mental abstraction, and it cannot be anything other than an abstraction for human beings. This is better explained in theological texts, by the fact that the human soul is inextricably united to the material body as a result of the original sin. This, being united with a physical body renders the soul's understanding of the immaterial, and all that side of the present which consists of the immaterial, which is the future, as limited to abstraction and conjecture.

So I would rather say, that we have an abstraction of "the present" which can be and is useful, but we have no perception of the existential reality of time. And since we cannot have a perception of it, it will always be an abstraction rather than a perception, and this leaves us limited in our capacity to obtain truth.

In the above you seem to be signed on to the arrow of time having only one direction. For you, per your above statement, that direction is from the future to the past. That claim caused my reverse-temporal universe statements. — ucarr

I now see why you think of this as "reverse-temporal". You see the present as what is flowing, not time as what is flowing. So you see time as a sort of number line of order, with the present as moving along that line. We might say that the present is flowing through all the dates. But this cannot be realistic because we would need a strong propellant to move us temporally through a static universe, and we see no evidence of the present being propelled. Instead, the evidence indicates that all events, and even things around us get moved into the past, and this is the result of the energy of the universe.

If we conceive of time as flowing, doesn't it have to be flowing from future to past? As time passes, isn't the past growing larger and the future growing smaller? How could the flow be the other way. Again, you might think that there is more time behind us, and less time in front of us, because we are being propelled. But in reality, all the force is experienced as being from the other side, so this does not make sense.

How I understand the above quote: One of the main objectives of your thesis is to establish the present within the flowing stream of time. — ucarr

The flowing stream of time is a specific description from the perspective of the human presence. This is the perspective which gives us the continuous time. What I argue is that this is really an illusion and not a true representation, so I apologize for accepting it initially, and misleading you. What I argued is that to put the present within time itself requires that we conceive of the conscious experience as being within time. This produces the conclusion that past and future must inhere within the conscious experience of being present.

So to model the present as an independent feature, instead of being a feature of the observer, requires that we find real substantial points in time which can be employed to distinguish past features from present features within the conflated unity of what we experience as "the present" As Luke argued, points or boundaries are a logical necessity to distinguish distinct parts. But the convention of continuity is to arbitrarily place a point at any time. This is what marks the difference between conceiving of the present as outside of time, and the present as inside time.

How I understand the above quote: The crux of your correction of the misconception of present time is the show that the present, being rooted within the flowing stream of time, differs existentially from a notion of the present as a static POV artificially demarcated by non-dimensional points. — ucarr

From the "static POV" of "the present", time appears to be a continuous flow., into which we can arbitrarily insert points of separation. From the "active POV", the continuous flow is replaced by an interaction of past aspects with future aspect. The need for "interaction" is the result of a mix of causal determination form the past, and freely willed selections from future possibilities. This implies that within any arbitrarily placed point of "the present", there are spatial aspects which are already determined (necessarily past), and also spatial aspects which are possibilities (still in the future). So the distinguishing features (points) appear to be spatial features.

How I understand the above quote: You have flipped your position to coincide with the conventional conception of the present as a non-flowing i.e., static perspective. Henceforth, one can only conclude you've renounced you earlier plan to correct the convention. — ucarr

No, as explained above, the "continuous flow" of time is what I believe to be the mistaken representation. When "the present" is the external perspective, or POV, sense observation appears to imply a continuous flow. But when the present is conceived of as within time, then there appears to be interaction between past and future. It is the need to account for the reality of interaction which inclines me to reject the "continuous flow".

How I understand the above quote: We're inhabiting a temporal universe running in reverse. If our universe has a finite lifespan, it began (inexplicably) at its endpoint and now runs backwards toward its beginning and, presumably, will continue beyond its conception into non-existence. I'm pondering whether that means our reverse-temporal universe is a one-cycle only universe. Also, I observe that our reverse-temporal universe is rigidly deterministic. Everything populating the present was always assured of existing exactly according to its current manifestation with the proviso that the evolving present keeps transitioning to younger manifestations of all existing things. — ucarr

I don't understand this at all. Why do you understand this as reverse? How do you orient yourself? Do you think that facing the future is facing forward, or do you think that facing the past is facing forward? If you think like I, then facing the future is facing forward. Do you see that the (apparently) continual onslaught of the future, is a force against you, which you always have to be thinking about to avoid mishaps? We spend our time thinking about what is coming at us in the future, trying to find the ways and means for making better lives for ourselves. This is what I mean by the flow of time being the future coming at us, and passing into the past, when you try to put the "static POV" into the "flow of time". However, when you consider that we make actions within this position, to change what is coming at us, we must take the "active POV".

How I understand the above quote: You have flipped your position back to positing the present as a flowing stream, albeit a reverse-temporal flowing stream that, paradoxically, you claim is a feature of the flow of time, yet not the flow of time itself. — ucarr

As explained, I think the flow of time is an illusion, which coexists with, and supports the idea of positing arbitrary points. Both of these are actually inappropriate, so I'm sorry to have misled you by initially accepting it.

Can you explain how the reverse-temporal flowing of present time is not the flow of time itself? — ucarr

I really don understand this "reverse-temporal flowing" stuff.

What's childish and silly are the obvious lies you have given to account for your contradictory statements, rather than acknowledging that your shifting position has been a result of my questioning and that your argument cannot support your attempts to overturn conventional grammar. — Luke

I'm sorry Luke, but I see no point in trying to explain anything to anyone who simply disputes my explanation, insisting that I'm being dishonest. When you ask for an explanation, please be prepared to accept it, otherwise you reduce the discussion to disrespectful bickering.

The definition of "present" is independent of the definitions of "past" and "future". The present is defined in terms of when things are happening, occurring, existing, one's awareness, an utterance, etc; not in terms of the past and future. As I have repeatedly told you, it is the past and future which are defined in terms of the present, not the other way around. — Luke

I agree that "the present" ought to be defined like this. Where we disagree is whether this is the convention. I do not think that it is the common practice. Maybe just some philosophers think that way. I think it is more common to define "the present" as "now", where "now" signifies the division between past and future. However, there are numerous different conventions in practise, so I think we could both support what we believe as "the convention", or "conventional".

Since we both agree that "present" ought to be defined this way, we can take it as a starting point for discussion.

I've explained this several times and it's not difficult. If "the present" is defined in terms of being and existing, then "did happen" is synonymous with "has been" or "did exist" and "will happen" is synonymous with "will be" or "will exist". The past is what was present. The future is what will be present. — Luke

What I ask for is how are these terms conceived. We have the present, as being and existing. The question is how is "has been" different from "will be"? You cannot say that one is past and the other future, because these are what we are trying to define, so that would be circular. What I proposed earlier is that we refer to memory and anticipation, as what distinguishes past and future. Do you agree?

But then we see that "being and existing" gets defined in terms of having memories and anticipations, so the present is then actually defined in terms of past and future, because being and existing are described as having memories and anticipations. So what I proposed earlier is to describe being and existing in terms of sensing, which is the more immediate activity of being present. This leads to the conclusion that the present consists of a duration of time. Still, we are within the present, and have not yet found the means to define past and future.

For those interested in the history of these kinds of political projects - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lysenkoism — apokrisis

Thanks for the interesting reference apokrisis. But I think the Wikipedia article somewhat misrepresents Lamarckism, especially here: "In contrast, Lamarckism proposes that an organism can somehow pass on characteristics that it has acquired during its lifetime to its offspring, implying that change in the body can affect the genetic material in the germ line.[2][3]".

What Lamarck proposed is that it is the activities of the organism, "habits", which may produce a change in the offspring, not that a change to the parent's body produces a change to the genetic material. I think that this is a critical difference to respect, because the habit doesn't necessarily cause a a change to the physical body engaged in the activity, but it causes a change to the genetic material.

This is relevant to the op because it assigns priority to activity, over changes to the passive material form which are observed as the effect of the activity. But misappropriating the effect of the activity, and assigning it to the body performing the habit (the parent), rather than assigning it to the offspring. is the straw-man representation of Lamarckism which opens it up to ridicule.

I'm sorry ucarr, I did not make myself clear. I cannot conceive of the present itself as a flowing stream. It would have to be the perspective from which the stream is observed. The changes we see all around us are evidence of the flowing time. Time is flowing from future to past, as the date of tomorrow, which is in the future, will become the date of yesterday. Death is a case of being forced by the flow of time, away from your observational point of the present, into the past.

If we want to give "present" an objective referent, as something other than the subjective point of view, Then it would be the process which is the future becoming the past. This is what we observe at the present, as change. It is a feature of the flow of time, yet not the flow of time itself.

My question to you was whether you agreed that past and future are defined relative to the present time. I did not ask you about what you had said earlier, that "the only coherent way is to define past and future by the present". I did not ask what is "coherent" to you, or whether you find it coherent to define the terms this way. I find it odd, then, that this is how you understood my question about whether you agreed that past and future are defined relative to the present time. I find your present explanation - that your response to my queston was a correction to what you said on page 1 about coherency - dubious at best. — Luke

As I said, your original question was incomprehensible to me. The part which followed "if not..." was a very poor representation (straw man) because the "view" I am arguing is how I think "present" ought to be defined, not how I think it is defined. The difference between these two is the point of this discussion. So I just addressed the first part, which was to answer "not", and explain my answer. The question after "if not..." made not sense.

Furthermore, I don't see any point to pursuing this issue. When we are discussing the writing of a third party, like we've discussed Wittgenstein in the past, it is often useful to compare different interpretations, the author not being there to answer our questions. In this case, I am the author, so I can explain what I meant by any particular passage. It's ridiculous for you to think that you can interpret what I meant better than I can myself, and then claim that what I meant was to contradict myself. Some other authors might be insulted by your behaviour, but I just find it very childish and silly

Presentism defines the present in terms of existence. Most conventional/dictionary definitions define the present in terms of things happening or occurring now or at this time. In philosophy and grammar, it is common for the present to be defined in terms of the time of an utterance. — Luke

In my understanding, presentism is inconsistent with the conventional definition of "present", because presentism treats past and future as unintelligible, which is clearly not the common convention.

I've already answered this. The present is what is happening or occurring; the past is what did happen or occurred; and the future is what will happen or occur. — Luke

We have no reference for "what did happen", or "what will happen". Based on what we agree on, we have only "the present", defined in terms of being and existing. How does "did happen", or "will happen" enter your conception?

If the present is a flowing stream of time that commingles with the past on one side & the future on the other side, most we conclude logically that past/future, like the present, are flowing streams of time? — ucarr

I would say that if the present is analogous to a flowing stream, then the future is the part flowing toward you, and the past is the part flowing away from you.

a) the present is outside of time; — ucarr

This is not what I am arguing for, it is what I called the "conventional" perspective, which I am arguing against as a misconception.. What I called "the conventional definition" (which Luke took exception to because it is inconsistent with what he thinks of as "the conventional definition) , puts the present outside of time. It puts the present outside of time as a derivation of the perspective from which the passing of time is observed. I am arguing that this is a misunderstanding of time, and that we ought to conceive of "the present" as a feature of time itself.

b) the present is the standard of reference against which past/future are defined; — ucarr

That's what I propose, to define past and future with reference to the present. But I argued that the convention makes past and future the reference against which "present" is defined. (again, Luke disputed that this is conventional). The convention, I say, is based in the distinction between memories and anticipations, events which have passed and those not yet come, and this distinction produces the conclusion of a "present moment" which separates these two distinct aspects of our experience. So this convention, I have claimed, defines "the present", as the separation or distinction between past and future.

If you are wondering how this puts the present outside of time as per my response to your (a) above, it is because this separation becomes, in practise, an arbitrary application of a non-dimensional point. The non dimensional point has no temporal extension, and cannot be understood as a part of passing time. So this, what I call "the conventional definition" (disputed by Luke, as not really the convention), cannot include "the present" as a part of time, because anytime we try to insert this observational perspective into the passing of time, whether as non-dimensional, infinitesimal, a short duration, etc., it requires arbitrarily placed points of separation between the present, and the rest of time, past and future. Therefore this "present", what I call the conventional one, is always incompatible with a true understanding of the passing of time.

c) events evolve over past/future through the lens of the present which is outside of time. — ucarr

This is what the conventional definition (again with the appropriate qualifications on "conventional") provides us with. We employ "the present", as we would employ a point in space, for the purpose of measurement. The so-called "lens" is the mode of employment. Depending on the purpose, the point which marks "the present", when we start the stopwatch (or whatever device of measurement), varies in precision and other features of arbitrariness.

The employment of "the present" thus described, is always an attempt to put the observational perspective (the present of the conscious being) into the thing being observed (the passing of time). However, what I've argued is that this does not provide us with a representation of "the present" which is consistent with "the passing of time", because of this assumed separation between observer and thing observed.

What I have been arguing, is that to properly understand time, we need to proceed from a different starting point. We ought to start with a conception of "the present", which allows for the flow of time within the present, therefore past and future within the present. Then there would be no incompatibility between the present, and the flow of time, because we would not start with the assumption that the present is a separate observational point, from which we observe the passing of time. The passing of time would be understood as occurring within the observational point, which we call "the present".

How do you counter-argue the claim "experiencing the passing of time," is measuring time? — ucarr

Measurement is of quantify. And we do not experience any distinct points, or quanta of time, which would provide for such a quantification. That is central to this discussion.

So our experience of time, in itself, does not provide what is necessary for measuring time. Therefore we end up measuring time by comparing physical activities, usually cyclical activities.

I note that you were not referring to convention here, but to your own opinion. — Luke

Yes I was referring to the convention, and I really think that's obvious. I also think it's very childish of you to be arguing in this way.

It is my opinion, of the convention, read through it. It continually refers to "us", and how we have produced these conceptions. It is a correction of what I said earlier, because earlier I said that I could see no coherent way to define the present by reference to past and future. But then I realized that this is actually the convention for defining time, and it is coherent. It is coherent, but as I argue from that point onward, mistaken. It is mistaken because it is not properly grounded with true premises (it divides future and past instead of uniting them) but it is still logically coherent.

So, I was definitely referring to convention at that point, not to my opinion of how "Present" ought to be defined. Also, I said that I was mistaken earlier, in reference to having said that I could think of no coherent way to define present by reference to past and future. That was my mistake, because I later realized that this is the conventional way, and it actually is logically coherent, just flawed in premises

Did you misspeak when you said "the only coherent way is to define past and future by the present." on page 1? — Luke

Yes, as above, I misspoke because at that time, I did not recognize that it could be coherent to define present relative to past and future. I then recognized that it was coherent, but a misunderstanding, and misleading.

The answer to both of these questions is: the present. — Luke

No, the present does not go by, nor is it yet to come. Both of these refer to time, as what goes by. But the present is the perspective from which it is observed to go by. That's why I said earlier, that this conception, the conventional one, gives us "the present" as a perspective, a view point, and it does not provide for a "present" which is a part of time. And I criticized you when you separated yourself from reality.

Past and future are defined relative to the present. — Luke

We'd be better off to yo say what "present is defined "in reference to", rather than "relative to", because "relltive to" is ambiguous. Every definition is "relative to" a human perspective, or view point. But the view point, or perspective from which a definition is made, does not necessarily enter into the definition. We do not commonly include that, though it is implied as necessary, because there is a person making the definition. So when past and future are defined as what has gone by, and what is yet to go by, this refers directly to time itself, as that which is passing us. This definition refers to time gone by, and time not gone by. However, it is implied that there is a human perspective, from which this judgement is made. The definition is "relative to" the human perspective, which we might call "the present", but the perspective does not enter the definition by way of reference. That is not necessary, a human perspective is always implied in all definitions. The definition does not include the "us", as not a required part of it, though it truly is "relative" to us. By not including the "us" which the definition is relative to, we produce the illusion of an objective definition.

Most supposed "objective" definitions are like this, and it creates fodder for philosophical discussion. We can define "red" for example, as a specific range of wavelength, creating the illusion that there is no observer necessary for there to be the colour red. But there is a problem here, because most incidents of naturally occurring light, judged to be "red" are combinations of different wavelengths. The convention in definition, is to remove the need for a point of observation, from the definition, to create an objective definition, but such definitions are always somewhat lacking, therefore open to philosophical criticism. Hence the proverbial philosophical question, "If a tree falls in the forest with no one there, does it make a sound?"

So, yes, past and future are defined "relative to" the present, because the present is taken as the subjective view point, and every definition is made relative to a subjective view point. But from here onward, I'll say that in the conventional definition "present" is defined in reference to past and future, but what I propose is that past and future be defined in reference to the present. That both of these definitions are created from, and therefore relative to, the subjective view point which we know as "the present", is irrelevant.

Again, this contradicts what you said earlier: — Luke

I see no contradiction. A definition is not the same as a description, you ought to know this Luke.

This could not be misconstrued as anything but you defining the present as an overlap between past and future. — Luke

Again, you are confusing the description, which is posterior to the definition, with the definition, which is prior to the description.

I agree that the present is defined relative to experience or being, but I disagree that it is not conventionally defined this way. The present is conventionally defined in relation to (or as the time of) being, existing or happening, and the past and future are conventionally defined relative to this, with the past as what has been, has existed or has happened, and the future with what will be, will exist or will happen. — Luke

I've never seen "the present" defined like this. But I've discussed time enough to know that there are many differing and even contradicting conventions. So it does not surprise me to see that this is the convention that you are familiar with, and that it is different from the convention I am familiar with.

Since we are in agreement about the way that "the present" ought to be defined, we can get back to the points of my argument. Now, we have only a definition of "present", and we have no definition of past or future, because they are to be defined in reference to the present. That we agree on. Do you see that "being", "existing", and "happening" are all verbs, referring to activity. And you seem to agree, earlier, that such activity must occur in a duration of time. So we have a temporal duration, within which activity occurs, and we call this "the present". Are we agreed so far? How do you propose that we proceed to define "past" and "future" in reference to this duration of time as being or existing at the present?

Can you accept, as another representational example of your above claims, the lap dissolve, a scene transition mechanism essential to the continuity of motion pictures? — ucarr

I suppose, the "lap dissolve" seems analogous.

This is evidently false. You have it backwards. The past and future are conventionally defined in terms of the present. — Luke

I gave a complete explanation. The past is defined as what has gone by in time, and this is substantiated by memory. The future is defined as what will come in time, and this is substantiated by anticipations. The present is defined by now, which is supposed to be neither past nor future.

You, on the other hand, are proposing that the present is defined in terms of the past and future, because you define the present as an overlap between the past and future. — Luke

I do not define the present as an overlap between the past and future. That there is such an overlap is a logical conclusion which is produced from defining present by conscious experience, instead of defining it in relation to past and future as is the conventional way. You really don't pay attention to what I write sometimes Luke.

Here is more of your earlier quote, by the way. From page 3 of the discussion: — Luke

Yes, that post of mine is consistent with what I am saying. You can see, that is the conceptualization I am critical of. Your post is a little incomprehensible to me though, so I might not have addressed your question.

Conventionally, the present is defined relative to the past and future, and this what I am arguing is a mistake. The present ought to be defined relative to conscious experience, and from this we'd derive the conclusion of an overlapping past and future. It took me a while at the beginning of the thread to realize that the problem with the conventional conception is that "present" is defined relative to past and future rather than conscious experience. That is why my understanding of "present" which is based directly in conscious experience is so different from the conventional. Making the present the separation between the mutually exclusive past and present, instead of defining it in a way which is based directly on experience, creates the problem I've been talking about.

Right, I think that what is really the case, is that "the present is defined relative to the past and the future". That is the conventional definition, as I explained in my last post, It is "what is really the case". What I am proposing is something other than the conventional definition. My proposition is that we ought to define past and future relative to the present. This is not "what is really the case" it is what I believe ought to be. Notice in the following paragraph that I characterized the separation between past and future, which results from the conventional way of defining present as a misrepresentation, a misunderstanding.

What I am arguing is that this separation between past and future is a misrepresentation, a misunderstanding, as the present is really a unity of the past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are quite correct to say that I revert to common usage at times, and that is because I make much effort to explain common usage, to reveal its faults. That is what I am arguing, that our way of speaking, our grammar of language, from which you derive your temporal conceptions, is misleading, because it is based in some fundamental misunderstandings concerning the present and the nature of time in general.

What you need to do in order to understand what I am saying, is to pay close attention to the difference between what I am criticizing and what I am promoting. This is very important in philosophy. It is a common mistake here at 'The Forum' for people to take quotes from philosophers, Plato especially, but also other greats like Aristotle, completely out of context. They present these out-of-context quotes as representing something which is being promoted, without recognizing the reality of the context, that the author is being critical of that perspective.

Then what is your conception? How do you define "the past" and "the future"? — Luke

"Present" is defined by conscious experience, the presence of being. Past and future are defined by before and after in relation to a duration of time which is the present. Before and after are defined by the order observed in temporal duration.

There is "the past" which is not part of "the present" (call this P1), and "the past" which is part of the present (call this P2). There is also "the future" which is not part of "the present" (call this F1), and "the future" which is part of the present (call this F2). — Luke

Yes, you seem to be finally getting it.

Can we not distinguish P1 from P2 and F1 from F2? — Luke

Right, we cannot make these distinctions, now you're catching on. Due to the problems already discussed, we cannot establish such points of division. These points are arbitrarily assigned, not distinctions based on anything real.

Most people call only P1 "the past" and only F1 "the future", with "the present" as its own distinct third period of time that contains neither P2 or F2 (inside it) and to which P1 and F1 (outside it) are relative. I think you sometimes revert to this common usage, too. — Luke

Right again, the way we speak displays a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the present, and of time in general. I discussed the reasons for this. The fact that I sometimes speak in the conventional way does not lessen my claim that I think this is incorrect. It's like a bad habit.

I think this common usage is apparent in your claim that at the beginning of time there is all future and no past, and that at the end of time there is all past and no future. For what are "the past" and "the future" relative to in this scenario? — Luke

That was not a claim, it was an example to help you understand the nature of the overlap, and that it is not necessary that all past overlaps with all future in such an overlap. You didn't seem to understand so I gave you an example. Notice I said "if" there was a beginning in time, then this would have been the case at that time. If the example confused things more, then forget it. You seem to be understanding now without it.

I am not making any claims of necessity about the relation of P1 to P2, and F1 to F2. Since we cannot determine the points of division, it may be the case that all past overlaps all future, in the way of proportions, like I suggested. Conscious experience gives the appearance that there are such divisions, but conscious experience may be misleading us.

In your argument, the past and future are not defined relative to the present, as it is per common usage; instead you define the present relative to the past and future, as an overlapping region containing parts of each. — Luke

I don't think that this is quite right. Convention defines "present" relative to past and future. We have conscious memories, and conscious anticipations, as you and javra assert, and these represent past and future. By recognizing that there is past and future, we posit a "present" which is now, the centre of the conscious experience of the living being, as the separation, or division between the past and future which we are consciously aware of. So conventionally, we have started with past and future, which we are consciously aware of, and have defined "present" accordingly.

My proposition is to start with the conscious experience of the present, and define "present" according to the conscious experience of being present, directly. Then we move from this definition of "present" to define "past" and "future". This is opposite to the conventional way which derives "present" from a recognition pf past and future.

And what we notice in our experience of being present, is that we observe activities, motions. From this we can conclude that there is a duration of time at the present because motion requires the passing of time. And, we can say that any length of time is divisible into a before part and an after part. In relation to the present we can call the before part "past" and the after part "future".

Would you find it more acceptable to say that the future part is before the past part?

So why would there be all future and no past at the beginning of time on your view? This appears to be defining past and future relative to the present, with the present presupposed at the beginning, and all of time as F1 outside it. — Luke

Right, I define past and future relative to the present, and the present relative to conscious experience, as I've said numerous times. This is different from the conventional way, which defines present relative to the past and future, and past and future relative to conscious experience. Does that make things clearer for you?