Only man can confer rights. Man is not a rights holder. Rather, he is a rights giver. — NOS4A2

This is an incorrect representation of "rights". A right is an equality, therefore a balance. You portray it as something which is completely dependent on the act of giving, thereby denying the balancing part which is the act of taking. So that aspect, whereby human beings assert their rights, claim their rights, and thereby take their rights, you deny by saying "man is not a rights holder". In reality there is a balance between people claiming "these are my rights" and standing up for that, which is a matter of taking, and people saying "those are your rights", allowing you specific unimpeded actions, which is a matter giving.

Unless you portray "rights" as a form of equality, or balance, whether it is "natural rights" or whatever, which you are portraying, it is not a correct portrayal. But since you are portraying rights as something given by human beings, you are not portraying "natural rights" anyway, and the op is improperly named.

The point though, is that the PSR (sorry, I said PoR in the last post, but I meant PSR) is only circumvented by assuming the reality of randomness. And that would render "will" as unintelligible, or nonsensical, as is "blind striving".

There are ways in which the artist may attempt to minimize the role of the PSR in one's creations, by employing elements of randomness, but this exclusion of the PSR cannot be complete. The artist must choose a medium of presentation, and this choice is always made with a purpose. So even if the goal is to minimize the role of the PSR, this cannot be complete, because that is in itself a goal and therefore subject to the PSR.

Will is blind striving. But is it? Let me examine… — schopenhauer1

There is no such thing as blind striving. Striving must be directed or else whatever it is that is occurring cannot be called "striving". That's what "striving" implies, directed actions.

Schop posits Forms as immediate objects of the will. So what this could mean is that forms are created in order to have desires to achieve so the goals can be directed towards something. — schopenhauer1

So this is backward. "Will" implies goals. The goals don't need to be directed toward something, because they are what actions are directed toward. The actions are the means, the goals are the ends. So subjugated goals are means, and the goal which the means are directed toward is logically prior to the means. Therefore the object which the goals are directed toward, if it is supposed to be a Form, is prior to the goals which are directed toward it, as these are the means.

So in a way, Will does have a telos, that is, to create never ending goals for itself in the goal of completion. — schopenhauer1

Since you reversed the logical order, it is not really a never ending process. The means are determined, and carried out, the goal is achieved. That's why the goal is called "the end", when it is achieved it puts an end to the process.

If you posit a further purpose (goal) for the will itself, a purpose to the process of creating goals for itself, that purpose would itself be an end which would be achievable, by that nature of being an end. Therefore the process could not be characterized as never ending. So if this were the goal of completion, that would be an achievable goal and the process would not be never ending. But if the process whereby the will creates goals for itself is completely purposeless (contrary to the PoR), this would turn out to be a never ending process. But that perspective, of course, is to deny the PoR.

Fundamentally, humans are driven to survival, not toward selfish promotion. If it works toward our survival that we abuse one another, we will, and the same holds true for cooperation. But we don't intuit our best survival techniques a priori. We learn through trial and error (natural selection). — Hanover

It appears like you are mixing things up here. The natural tendencies which I am born with, form the basis of my intuitions, the innate features which influence my thinking. It is not I who has learned these through trial and error, these are qualities passed to me from others who lived before me. And since the qualities I get in this way, have been selected for by natural selection, rather than by the agent doing the testing, we cannot call it "trial and error". That's a different concept from natural selection. In order to call this trial and error we would need to assume an overarching "life" as a form of being, which is learning from natural selection.

So we actual do intuit our best survival techniques a priori, because they are produced prior to one's own experience, and are innate to the person. But this was not a case of learning something through trial and error, it was a case of something being produced by natural selection. On top of this, the complicating factor is that natural selection has produced the capacity for an individual to learn from one's own experiences in one's own environment, and make decisions based on these learned factors, rather than the innate features. Now the learned knowledge appears to have the capacity to overrule the innate in judgement. And, we must consider this capacity to learn anew, and overrule the selected for qualities, to be a selected for quality itself. Therefore it appears like one of the innate tendencies, which has been selected for, as well-suited for survival, is the innate tendency to allow for the innate tendencies to be overruled by something freshly learned. On the other hand, it seems like this would have to be self-destructive. Allowing all those qualities which have been selected for as best suited for survival, to be overruled by a free will whim, would have to be itself a self-destructive quality. So the basic innate tendency is a tendency toward self-destruction, nut this constitutes "survival" for that overarching being of "life".

Starting five days ago, I said exactly the opposite. — Mww

I thought you said cognition doesn't involve things, it's only a matter of relating conceptions. I'm going to go back and reread that post.

That’s not all we’re doing. Relating conceptions IS the judging. And we don’t make a judgement about a thing; we cognize a thing, from the relation of conceptions thought as belonging to it. And, need I remind you, we’re talking about things here, real spacetime objects….you know, the things not in our heads (sigh)…..represented as phenomena, which in the thinking process, requires something else from understanding not yet considered. — Mww

OK, I see now, you said judging is relating concepts, and we do not make a judgement about a thing. However, you say we cognize a thing. So I'm confused now, what does "cognize a thing" mean? I see here, an act of relating conceptions, which you insist, is the act of judgement. But then there is also an act of cognizing a thing, described here, which is the act of thinking that the conceptions belong to a thing. Isn't this itself a judgement? And isn't it a judgement about a thing? It seems to be an instance of relating the conceptions to an assumed thing, rather than to other conceptions, and this is a judgement about a thing.

Now, I really do not understand the nature of this "thing" you were talking about back then, five days ago. Maybe if I took the time to question you properly back then, we wouldn't have spent five days getting nowhere. How is it that there are things which a person cognizes, but a person doesn't make a judgement about a thing, only thinks that certain conceptions are related to that thing?

Then you go on to make a short statement about what a thing is, but it doesn't really make sense to me. So it probably went right past me.

That which enters the mind as phenomena is that physical thing which represents how that feeling is to be understood. — Mww

Are you saying that the physical thing actually enters the mind as phenomena? Is this, in your belief, how we cognize a thing? The thing enters the mind as phenomena, and when the mind relates conceptions to it, this is cognizing a thing? If this is the case, then why do you not say that this is a form of judgement?

To me, I think that this is what I've been describing as the highest level of cognition, judging possibilities. But you seem to place it at the lowest level, not even obtaining the status of judgement. Deciding which conceptions are related to the thing, which appears as phenomena, is a matter of judging possibilities. Under Aristotelian conceptions, matter is potential, so the material thing is the substance of possibility. Judging possibilities, which is fundamentally judging things, is what I would say is the highest form of judgement. Furthermore, this type of judging often consists of moral judgements, because the things which enter our minds as phenomena, appearing to us in the form of possibilities, are often other human beings.

Yeah, well….my true understanding of reality demands they be separated. Guess I just haven’t reached the end yet.

But this exchange is getting pretty close, what with the conversational inconsistencies, and the Platonic and the transcendental being fundamentally incompatible. — Mww

I really don't believe that the Platonic and the transcendental are fundamentally incompatible. I think there is a medium between the two, which is the Aristotelian. And I think that the transcendental is in many ways, a rejection of Aristotelian terminology. The Aristotelian terminology is based in a Platonic relating of concepts, and this is what creates the appearance of incompatibility. So what I see is a rejection of the Aristotelian interpretation of Plato, but this does not prove to be fundamentally incompatible with Plato, as Plato can be interpreted in numerous different ways. It's difficult for a philosopher to be fundamentally incompatible with Plato, even if one tried, because Plato offered so many different ways of looking at everything.

That sounds like an absolutist statement, which sort of violates PoR. PoR might be used to say that any body is in motion relative to certain frames. Without the frame reference, motion is undefined. — noAxioms

It is not an absolutist statement, it is a deductive conclusion derived from two premises, the PoR, along with an inductive conclusion derived from empirical observation. It is observed that as time passes, there are always things moving. Along with the PoR we can conclude deductively that any existing body is always in motion.

You are reversing logical priority here. The concept "frame of reference" is derived from the principle of relativity, not vise versa. So motion was defined first, as relative (PoR), and then the concept "frame of reference" was developed as the means for measurement. The PoR discusses the motions of bodies relative to each other, and there is no need for a concept of frame of reference in this discussion.

Only when the intent is to put numbers to the motion, measure it, is the reference frame needed, due to what the PoR assumes. So the PoR gives one of the basic rules for constructing the frame. Also, we need a rule concerning the conceptions of space and time to be employed in the measurement. Newton employed a fixed, static backdrop of space, from which a coordinate system could be applied, along with an "absolute" time. Time is absolute in the sense of constant and continuous. Einstein proposed an alternative conception of space and time.

As per above, the conceptions of space and time are essential aspects of the conception of frame of reference. Also, Einstein used substantially different conceptions of space and time, from Newton. Therefore we can conclude that the substantially different conceptions of space and time employed by Einstein result in a substantially different form of "frame of reference".

I’d have said ‘every moment of time’. I don’t see what the word ‘passing’ adds to that. — noAxioms

There's a big difference in conception of "time" here, which we can apprehend through analysis. Some would posit "the present moment" as a moment which clearly and concisely separates the past time from the future time. No time passes at "the moment" in this conception because it is a precise, non-dimensional, division, similar to the way that a non-dimensional point divides two line segments. The past, along with the future, provide a complete representation of time, and the moment is an arbitrary (yet substantialized, and justified by "the present)") point in time. The abstracted point, removed from the assumed real point at the present, may be projected anywhere in time, to produce specific durations, like specific line segments.

So when I said "every moment of passing time", I implied that within any "moment" there is inherently some duration of time. This denies the reality of the abstracted "point", implying that instead of being a non-dimensional point, like a point which divides one line into two line segments, it is an infinitesimal point, such that there is some time within that point. Now there is not a clear and precise division between the two time segments past and future, as some time passes within the present moment. And since "the moment" is the dividing point by which time is measured, the time which inheres within the moment under this conception, evades measurement. It escapes from being measured. The measured durations are the line segments, yet some time inheres within the points which provide the boundaries to a segment, so that the boundary is somewhat vague, and this time within the point ends up as an unknown relative to the segments produced when a line is divided.

The first conception of "the moment" discussed above, is consistent with the Newtonian conception. The passage of time is constant and continuous and such consistency provides the basis for the assumption that we can posit points of division anywhere, just like what was done with traditional spatial conceptions. The second conception of "the moment" is consistent with the one employed by Einstein. This is understood as "the relativity of simultaneity". The moment in time which marks "now", as the divisor between past and present is not a clear and precise, non-dimensional point. Each frame of reference is allowed to have an independent and separate point which divides the two line segments, past from future. Within the frame of reference, the point is still supposed to provide a clear and precise non-dimensional divisor, but the vague boundary occurs when different frames, the basis from which measurements are made, are related to each other.

Under the Newtonian proposal, there is supposed to be an absolute divisor, "the present", which is substantiated or justified by human experience. This grounds all measurements of time as being consistent with each other, based in the experienced "present". Einstein removes this, saying that "the present" is relative to the frame of reference, rather than the human experience of a division between past and future. As a result, we have no basic principle to resolve any discrepancies in measurement which manifest as the result of the positioning of the divisor, the point which measured time segments are relative to, as measurements are made as time passes at the present. Resolutions would be arbitrary.

Simply put, Einstein recognized that human experience cannot provide a clear and precise non-dimensional division between one time period and the next, and he exploited this fact to employ the principle that there is no precise division between future and past. Consequently the Einsteinian observation perspective is based in this assumption, and all observations recorded from this perspective will demonstrate this feature, as conclusions reflect premises.

Our intuition is doing something more than just a straight forward self-interest. — Banno

Of course, isn't that obvious to you? We didn't need the experiment to demonstrate that. We have certain deep seated tendencies which some people call innate ideas. In the Plato/Forms thread we discussed the innate idea of equality. In your referenced experiment it shows up as a sense of equity. In philosophy this sense of equality serves as the basis for conceptions like "natural rights". The same intuition which makes me want to punish you for not being fair (even at my expense), also inclines me to believe in human rights and equality.

We might, as philosophers, delve into an investigation as to how such innate ideas exist,. And we'll see, as Plato did in his investigation into the meaning of "just", the reason for a wide range of human behaviours in the responses demonstrated in the experiment. There is inconsistency between individuals within one's own particular understanding of the supposed innate ideas. The supposed innate ideas manifest differently in different people. We might take this as an indication that there is no such thing as an innate idea, but if you go to the other extreme you end up in unenlighten's category of sociopath.

So we might reject the descriptive terms, "innate ideas", as wrong because they give an inaccurate impression of what is there, but we cannot deny the reality of the behaviour, and its cause, which the words are meant to refer to. The discrepancy between the description and the thing described indicates that we have a poor understanding of what is there. Therefore further philosophy is required.

And here we’ve switched from cognition of things, to that which can only be moral constructions. — Mww

I never made a switch. You said a long time ago that cognition does not involve things. I've been talking about considering possibilities, and making judgements. Moral principles very often enter into these considerations, that's unavoidable.

Maybe we've been misunderstanding each other all along, and that's why we can't work out our differences.

Remind me….didn’t we agree feelings are not cognitions? And didn’t we agree the judgement of cognitions is discursive in the relation of empirical conceptions, but the judgement of feelings is aesthetic in the condition of the subject himself? — Mww

You've unduly restricted "judgement" here, to either feelings or empirical conceptions. And I never agreed to this restriction. I agreed to leave feelings aside, as not entering cognition (though I still believe that feelings influence cognition).

Since abandoning feelings, I've been talking about judging possibilities. I think that all forms of judgement are reducible to a matter of judging possibilities. In other words, judgement requires possibility. To judge is to make a decision, and "decision" implies "choice", which implies "possibility".

Why are they being intermingled, when each is of its own domain, and have no business interfering with each other? Allowing the one to cross over to the other weakens the human condition of intrinsic duality, the prelude to a blatant contradiction. — Mww

It is not a matter of allowing one to cross over, and intermingle with the other, it is a matter of what is natural to the human condition. Such intermingling is a natural part of the human condition, which we cannot rid ourselves of. This is why feelings influence cognition. When I am upset, for example, I can't think straight. I cannot prevent the feeling from influencing the thinking, so I have to wait unit the feeling subsides. This situation is not describable as preventing the feeling from intermingling, which I cannot do, it is describable as suppressing the thinking until the feeling which has a bad influence on the thinking, subsides. Getting rid of the feeling requires a diversion, meditation, or some other calming practise. If they both occur at the same time, the feeling and the thinking, they automatically intermingle.

Still, best to keep them separate in philosophical dialectic practices. — Mww

I don't thinks so Mwww. The separation you propose is not real, therefore in dialectical practises which are directed toward the understanding of reality, it's best not to accept that proposed separation. This is why Plato placed "the good" at the top of all knowledge. In the end, right/wrong is inseparable from good/ bad, and they are both meant to be based in a true understanding of reality.

HOWEVER, where I see conundrums in Schop's metaphysics is when he starts discussing the Forms as the "immediate" object of Will. This smuggling in of Plato, gets problematic as we now have to ask "Why?" and there seems to be little answer, other than the post-facto that we know objects exist. Also, how do these Forms turn into the sensible world of "phenomenon" that is of the PSR variety? All of this just gets confusing.

ARE the forms and the phenomenal representation of them mediated from the PSR "primary" along with the WILL? He did say, the World as Will AND Representation, afterall. If it is primary with the Will, how could the Will be "objectified"? It was then ALWAYS objectififed. — schopenhauer1

I would say that the independent Forms are of God's Will, and the phenomenal representations of them are of the human will, as basic idealism, though I am very unfamiliar with Schopenhauer in particular.

If we remove God, then any proposed independent Forms are unsupported and meaningless conjecture. The only "world" or "worlds" are those created by human wills, and there is nothing to justify anything external.

ARE the forms and the phenomenal representation of them mediated from the PSR "primary" along with the WILL? He did say, the World as Will AND Representation, afterall. If it is primary with the Will, how could the Will be "objectified"? It was then ALWAYS objectififed. — schopenhauer1

In my opinion, the op does not make clear the relationship between the PSR and the will for Schopenhauer. It is stated as "no object without a subject" which is no consistent with my understanding of the PSR, and also the inverse "no subject without an object" is derived without any demonstration of the logic behind this inversion. So it is no wonder that you are confused. Maybe can help to explain this.

My takeaway from my hour of research here is that as actual dollars increase, rejections decrease, but to the extent we can afford to fuck those who try to fuck us, we will, but there is a limit to how much we will spend on the joy of vindictiveness. — Hanover

Ahh, I see. The real self-interest, or greed factor does display itself, but in the actions of the receiver rather than in the actions of the one who makes the offer. That makes sense, because the one making the offer is in the unknown and must make decision based on possibility or assumed probability, and might be punished by the other for making an ill-judgement. The one receiving has only two possibilities, take, or punish the other. And the amount taken has a value in an outside system. So punishing the other, which is only a part of the experimental system, becomes less and less relevant as the reward in the outside system, which is fundamentally more important, increases.

In other words, I don't mind punishing another for bad behaviour, if it only costs me a little. And if the amount of bribery is sufficient, and the bad behaviour is rather insignificant, anyone would gladly refrain from punishing.

Interesting, basic and to the point. It may be, that reality is far different from the way that it is conceived by scientists.

I believe the key to understanding this principle is to recognize the reality of time. If the future consists of possibilities, and the past consists of events which have been actualized, then the present must be conceived as the time when possibilities are actualized. This "present" would need to be be a "time period" which consists of some duration, during which possibilities from the future become actualities in the past. For reasons demonstrated by some philosophers, this transition can not be instantaneous, the present is not a "moment", not a non-dimensional division between past and future. "Actualization" itself implies an act which requires some amount of time for possibilities to be actualized at the present time.

Time is measured as it passes, so all measured time is in the past, necessarily, requiring action (actual motion) to make a measurement of time. As we move toward measuring faster and faster motions (pure energy) in our experimentation and practise, we deal with shorter and shorter periods of time. When the present is conceived as having temporal duration, then part is future-like, and part is past-like. In dealing with extremely short periods of time we deal with the part which is future-like, consisting of possibilities, just starting to become actualized. Moving further into the future-like part of the present in our practises provides us with more "power" over how possibilities are actualized at the present.

As the article states, this "new" perspective is not actually "new". It is as old as philosophy itself, and has manifested as the theological perspective. It is from this perspective that moral principles, and our understanding of free-will is derived. The human mind partakes in the future-like part of the present, that part which is immaterial, being prior to the measurable physical activity which occurs as time passes. From this position it has the capacity to direct the actualization of possibilities as time passes. This is the Aristotelian biology, which places the soul as the first actuality of a living body. All the capacities (potencies or powers) that the living being has, are understood as possibilities for actualization (potentials), under direction of that first actuality.

In the mini-treatise preceding this conclusion, and following from your argument just above it, there is not much with which to take exception. Pretty much conforms to what I’ve been saying. I might counter-argue that conclusions can follow immediately from the considering. The only way for there not to be a judgement at all, neither in affirmation nor negation of the considering, is if that which was under consideration wasn’t even imaginable in the first place. Hence the principle…that of which the imagination is impossible the object cannot be conceived. Or, if you prefer, the conception of the unimaginable is empty. — Mww

Yes, it's turning out that we're not really very far apart in our opinions. Nor were we really, at the beginning of this exchange, it was just a matter of fact that we use slightly different terminology, and there was a need to hammer out some details.

But there are still some significant points of disagreement. Why do you think that the only way in which there is no judgement, is if what was being considered was unimaginable? What about my example of relating possibilities, and leaving judgement until later? Suppose I am considering my course of action for tomorrow, and I would like to go to place A, place B, place C, and place D. I have a number of possibilities for ordering these events A,B,C,D, or A,C,B,D, etc.. I decide to keep an open mind on this decision, between now and tomorrow morning, in case new, relevant information comes up. Clearly, what I am considering is imaginable, and also I haven't yet made the required judgement.

Do you understand this situation differently than I do? Or is there a matter of terminology which I am missing?

To which I adamantly object: the highest level of cognition is not judgement. The source of all human cognitive error, insofar as such error is in fact error in the relation of conceptions to each other, judgement, cannot be the highest level to which cognition can attain, from which follows the possibility of error far outweighs the possibility of correct thinking. — Mww

Wait a minute, this conclusion is not valid at all. You proceed from the fact that error is possible, to the conclusion that it is more likely than not, without the required premises. Just because there is an aspect of cognition (judgement) which provides for the possibility of error, doesn't mean that error is more likely than not when this faculty is being used.

It is my belief, that this aspect of cognition, judgement, is the highest level of cognition, for that very reason, that it provides for the possibility of error. It allows for the possibility of choice, and this same freedom of choice is what allows for the possibility of error, as an unavoidable byproduct. It is the highest level of cognition because it provides us with the greatest capacity for the largest variety of activities. So it also provides for the greatest possibility of a good life, due to the nature of ongoing risks and dangers which need to be avoided in order to have a good life.

Reason the faculty subjects judgement, and thereby the cognitions given from them, to principles, by which the immediate judgement is regarded as conflicting or sustaining their antecedents. It is here phrases like, “I knew that” and “Now I know that”, hold as, or become, truths. — Mww

This is where take the determinist perspective which I adamantly object to. Reason does not subject judgement, and this is the crux of our disagreement. That reason does not subject judgement is evident from Socrates' argument, and what in the dialogue is called "being overcome by pleasure".

The issue is not a matter of "I know that", or "I knew that", It is a matter of "I know that I ought not do this, but I am doing it anyway". Reason tells the person "I ought not do that", but judgement has the person do it anyway. In this case we cannot say that reason subjects judgement.

HA!!!! Yeah….everybody that speaks involves himself in language games. I let my abject abhorrence of analytic philosophy impinge on my transcendental nature; I only meant to try making it clear when we say stuff like we do this or that, the manifested doing has no personal pronouns connected to it. If, as you say, we think in images….kudos on that, by the way…..it is absurd to then demand that images themselves invoke personal pronouns. Recognition of this removes the Cartesian theater from being a mere oversimplication, as you claim, but eliminates it altogether. — Mww

Doesn't it make sense to you if I say "I walk to work each day", or "I go to bed each night", as these are activities which I do? Would you recommend removing the "I" from these statements? Thinking is an activity as well. So why doesn't it make sense to you to say "I think", "I relate concepts to each other", and "I decide"? Why does this conjure up an idea for you of an homunculus, which you for some reason think is a wrong idea? It makes no sense to me, to remove the subject, the "I", and propose that thinking is something which just happens, judgement just happens, decisions just happen, intentional actions just happen. What does "effort" mean to you? Is effort something that just happens as well?

Yeah, Schopenhauer is not arguing that objects have subjectivity, only that they have an inner aspect, the inaccessible object-in-itself. He calls it will or will-like on the basis that the thing-in-itself is undivided, so what is inmost in us, being part of the wider thing-in-itself, is what is inmost in everything. — Jamal

This is very consistent with the Christian (theological) view of the temporal continuity of objects, commonly represented as inertia. Newton stated that his first law of motion is dependent on the Will of God. If God pulls out His Will (which is His choice to do at any moment as time passes), then the temporal continuity of objects, which constitutes the material existence of an object, represented as mass, disintegrates, and we have no more material objects.

Sorry @T Clark that reply was meant for

My sense of fairness is worth more that $1 or even $10. If it were $10,000, that would be a different thing. On the other hand, telling someone to go fry ice when he tries to stiff me for thousands might be worth it. — T Clark

That's right, monetary value systems are based in equity, fairness. If someone else gets nine to my one, it is in my "self-interest" to reject the entire system, putting us each at zero.

The issue of the "reality" of mathematical objects. Over two millennia have passed with no consensus. When we speak of Platonism isn't that something from ancient times? — jgill

As I see it is, there is really no question about the reality of thoughts, ideas, concepts and abstractions. Very few people would deny the reality of such things. The problem arises from how we talk about these things. The words we use which facilitate such communication often do not properly represent the way that we understand (or fail to understand) these things. Notice for example, I've referred to thoughts as "things". I really do not believe that thoughts are even similar to material objects which I also call "things". With talk like this, we create an environment where ambiguity and equivocation are highly probable.

So, we talk about mathematical "objects" and we also talk about physical "objects". What is implied by this talk is that there are two types of objects, one type having the properties which mathematical objects have, and the other type having the properties which physical objects have. Then we need principles to distinguish one type of object from the other type, and this is where the difficulties arise. When we try to separate two distinct types of objects we employ a reductive analysis, and they end up "converting" into each other.

What is implied by this, is that we cannot maintain a separation between two distinct types of objects. There is not any real principles to separate the two. The separation of two types of objects is not supported by reality and our attempts to create such a separation are fraught with problems because it is a fictional categorization.

Now we are left with a choice, which of the two types of "objects" provides us with a real representation of what an object is. What Plato argued, with the cave allegory, is that the intelligible objects, thoughts, ideas and abstractions, are the real objects. The supposed physical objects are really just the reflections of the true objects which are the intelligible. However, the majority of human beings, the masses, live in a world directed toward fulfilling their bodily desires. Therefore they prioritize their bodily senses, and they refuse to follow what the intellect demonstrates to them. Accordingly, they reject the guidance of "the philosopher", who has come back from his journey into the intelligible in an effort to disillusion them, returning to the cave where the others are imprisoned by their sense inclinations. They refuse to be led toward the truth.

What this shows is that ubiquitously, folk do not make decisions on the basis of rationally maximising their self-interest. Some other factor intervenes. — Banno

You need to recognize a person's attention to probability, odds. If the person offers $0 they know the odds of acceptance are zero or close to it. As the amount offered increases, so do the odds of acceptance. The person offering 50% of the money is making a pretty safe bet, and will still reward one's own self-interest. Therefore you cannot conclude that the person offering 50% is not "rationally" trying to maximize their own self-interest, while the person offering 10% is. Otherwise you'd have to say that buying lottery tickets is "rational". In other words, being rational is respecting the odds.

That kind of thinking is where the notion of Cartesian theater, or the dreaded homunculus, comes from. The relation of conceptions just IS judgement. WE don’t relate; there just is a systemic process in which that happens. Beware of….and refrain from, at all costs….those abysmally stupid language games. — Mww

I don't agree with this at all. I see a clear difference between relating concepts to each other, and making judgements. As I explained, when I am planning for action, I consider numerous possibilities (relate these concepts), then I make a judgement as to my best course of action. If relating the concepts, and making the judgement was the same thing, I couldn't relate possibilities without coming to a conclusion, which i often do. If judgement was not separate from reasoning, we could not have free will. If the act of relating possibilities to each other (thinking) necessitated a conclusion, then it would be the possibilities themselves which cause the conclusion, rather than the will of the thinking person. That is how we can say that the will is free, because decision is not causally determined in this way. Are you determinist?

There is nothing inherently wrong with the notion of the Cartesian theatre, and the homunculus, other than that it is an oversimplification. It doesn't properly represent reality because it is an oversimplification, but it is a very useful concept for understanding dualism. In that sense it is no different from fundamental concepts of math, physics, and other sciences. They are over simplifications so they don't accurately represent reality, but they are still very useful. A straight line, being one dimensional doesn't represent anything real, but it is very useful. Inertia doesn't represent anything real, but it is simple and useful.

And the infinite regress commonly cited as a problem with the homunculus is unjustified because the will which causes the act is immaterial, while the person acting is material. Therefore the act of the will is a completely different type of act from the observable act of the human body, and cannot be compared in the way necessary for infinite regress.

Note the rela-TION of conceptions is not the relat-ING of them. Relating, which is the subsuming of a manifold of minor conceptions as schema of a greater, technically, a synthesis, is done by imagination; judgement merely signifies the relative belonging of them in the collection, one to another. — Mww

It is you who is playing a silly language game here. The act of relating two conception together, will cause a relation between them, in the mind. But it does not necessarily cause a judgement. I can relate possibility A to possibility B, thereby causing a relation between them, and still not decide which one to proceed with in my actions. We might say that in establishing this relation, I did make a judgement, the judgement not to act. But if this is the case, then every thought is itself a judgement. Just to think of possibility A is to make a judgement. And even to have any thought enter the mind at all would be to make a judgement. Even to remember something would be to judge. Then there would be no difference between thinking and judging.

The problem now is that we'd have no difference between deliberating and deciding. Clearly there is a difference between deliberating, the thinking activity which leads up to making a choice, and deciding, which is the finality of actually choosing. We must allow for this difference to allow for the fact that some deliberations are quick, while others are slow. Therefore it cannot be just considering the possibilities only which causes the conclusion, or else all conclusions would be immediate after the possibilities were considered. So, I believe that the cause of the conclusion, judgement, comes from something other than the act of considering the possibilities.

So it is that, under the auspices of this particular theory, because no cognition of a thing is at all possible from a singular, stand-alone conception, a synthesis of a collection of conceptions is itself necessary for cognition and all which follows from it, and because the synthesis is necessary, the judgement follows from it necessarily. So, no, there is no relating of conceptions without judgement signifying the relation. — Mww

Your use of "necessary" and "necessarily" here indicate that you are determinist, and this is either the result of, or the cause of your refusal to separate reasoning from judgement.

Let me take a look at your proposition here. A collection of conceptions is necessary for cognition, and it is what results from cognition. You ought to recognize that this is a vicious circle of causation. If a collection of cognitions is the effect of cognition, then how could the initial collection of conceptions come into existence, which would be required for the first act of cognition, which would be required to cause the first collection of cognitions?

Here's another proposal, let's look at what "synthesis" means here. Suppose we have existing separate conceptions, not yet related so as to form a collection. These are the things which will be the parts to a collections the parts of a whole. And let's say that there is an act required to "synthesize" these conceptions to make them a collection, a whole. You'd be inclined to say that this is cognition, the act which relates the parts, synthesizes, and produces the whole. However, cognition is required already, to support the existence of the parts, the concepts which will be united in synthesis, allowing them to exist in a way where synthesis is possible. By that fact, that they exist in a way which will allow for synthesis, it is implied that they have some sort of relations to each other. So we need another name for the act which causes the synthesis.

I think we can see this in all natural situations where there is a whole with parts. We need an act which supports, or causes the existence of the parts, and another distinct type of act, which supports or causes the unification of the parts as a whole. So each level we pass through, where a whole becomes a part of a larger whole, in synthesis, a different type of act is required from the act which made the part a whole in the first place.

Sidebar: there is a caveat here regarding the cognition of things, but for the sake of simplicity, it shall be overlooked, re: intuition. For the mere thinking of things, the synthesis of conceptions holds by itself, and judgement works the same way for both. — Mww

I think we are actually not far from agreement. You notice that at the base level of cognition there is needed a different type of act, intuition. I am arguing that at the highest level of cognition, judgement, there is also the need for a different type of act.

Think about it. Has it ever occurred to you that, say, this thing (a perceived object) can’t be “__” (a cognized known object) because it’s missing some property (a conception) already understood (judged) as belonging to (synthesized with other conceptions) that certain “__”? — Mww

I don't think I understand you here. Are you talking about changing my mind because I recognize that I made a mistaken judgement? If so, that's fairly common. If not, what are you asking?

Rhetorical question, because that is precisely what you did right there, which would be readily apparent to you, when you examine what and how your disagreement came about. — Mww

Again, I don't understand. Did I misunderstand your question?

Here, but, the above is not really an argument for will as being Kant's thing-in-itself....it seems only to establish will as the "inner side" of representations (he doesn't even mention thing-in-itself" in the above)... So he still needs to get from "will as inner side of representation" to thing-in-itself. How does he do that??
he later relates will and thing-in-itself? I would assume it would be soon thereafter (one would think). — KantDane21

Here's a simplification, KD21, which may or may not help you to understand.

When I look into my internal self, in introspection, I notice that the representation of myself as a body is a creation of my mind. And, the part of my mind which demonstrates the power to create is the will. So I can conclude that the representation of myself as a body is a creation of my will. From here I can proceed toward understanding the general principle that any representation of a body which I may hold in my mind, is equally a creation of my will.

If I assume an independent body which influences my will in its creation of the representations of bodies which I hold in my mind, I have no way to assess this influence unless I can understand how my will creates these representations. In other words, if I look toward any proposed noumenon, or thing-in-itself, I reach an end to my investigation, at my own will. I see that my will is responsible for creating the representations of things, within my mind, and unless I can make a thorough understanding of how my will does this, I have no approach to any proposed noumenon.

You can see that this analysis goes deeper than Kant, because it looks for the cause of phenomena, the cause of the appearances of bodies within the mind. Kant has proposed a separation between phenomenon and noumenon. If this separation is true and real, as proposed by Kant, then there cannot be a direct causal relation between a noumenon and a phenomenon. This is because a direct causal relation would allow us to know the noumenon through the implications determined from an understanding of cause and effect. So the reason why we cannot know the noumenon is because there is no such causal relation. This is because one's own will is what creates the phenomenon.

How this relates to the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) is a bit more difficult. I believe the relationship is something like this. The PSR states that there is a reason for the existence of anything, and everything. When we look at the occurrence of representations within our minds, phenomena, we must turn to the will as the reason for their existence. So the reason for the existence of bodies, (as how noumenon appear to us), is a cause in sense of Aristotelian "final cause", a teleological willful cause. This means that there is a reason for, in the sense of a purpose for the appearance of bodies, as this appearance has been created by the will.

That's the exact definition I copied above:

"Uniform existence" is having an unchanging presence, as in not being acted upon by forces; what is described by Newton's first law, which is commonly referred to as "the law of inertia". Check the Stanford article I previously referenced:

The laws of Newtonian dynamics provide a simple definition: an inertial frame is a reference-frame with a time-scale, relative to which the motion of a body not subject to forces is always rectilinear and uniform, accelerations are always proportional to and in the direction of applied forces, and applied forces are always met with equal and opposite reactions.
— https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-iframes/#QuasInerFramNewtCoroV\ — Metaphysician Undercover

I think, "uniform existence" and "unchanging presence" are adequate descriptions. Notice that "uniform" is even used in the passage. "Motion" is taken for granted by me, for the reasons I gave already. Under the precept of the relativity principle any existing body is always in motion. "Existence" is how I described a body relative to a time-scale. The problem appears to be that you did not have a very good understanding of what an inertial frame is, so you did not recognize my description as a good one. You were trying to deny the importance of an essential aspect of the inertial frame, the time-scale.

So we have two features of the inertial frame. Firstly, what I called "uniform existence", which is the unchanging presence of a body not being acted upon by forces, and secondly, a time-scale relative to this body.

Would you agree that the inertial frame is just an ideal, and it does not actually represent anything real in the real world of physical, material bodies? In reality, whenever time is passing a body is subject to forces, and there is no body in the universe which is not subjected to forces at every moment of passing time. So the "inertial frame" is really just a convenient fiction, serving as a pragmatic principle to base mathematical calculations around. It really does not serve as a good representation of what is actually going on in the world. The use of "rectilinear" to describe the uniform motion which the inertial frame is based on, is a dead give away for revealing the fictitious nature of the concept. No true motion is really rectilinear, but this assumption supports the use of vectors (discussed above with jgill), in that fictitious misrepresentation of motion.

Agreed, but you’re in a different systemic time. In the time I used, re: “with respect to cognitions…”, which makes explicit the conceptions have already been related to each other, which means judging has already been accomplished, satisfying the conditions necessary for knowledge. I’m saying it is stupid to grant the possibility of suspending a judgement that’s already happened, which implies the possibility that something has become known. — Mww

Don't we relate conceptions to each other, without necessarily making a judgement, as in the case of considering possibilities? We relate possibilities without necessarily judging, because sometimes the possibilities are not well enough known to support a judgement. So when Socrates talks about comparing possible future pleasures in Protagoras, isn't it possible to suspend judgement in a matter like this? And the problem he referred to is that the ones closer to the present appear bigger than the further away, just like when looking at spatial objects. Socrates said we need to do some sort of scaling. Probability would be an important factor, but once we assign probability we have judged.

Therefore I think it's actually quite common to relate concepts without judgement. If I am trying to figure out the meaning of a philosophical passage for example, I'll consider numerous possible meanings, relating words in different ways, without making a judgement if I'm not convinced that I understand. If, when considering possibilities, one starts to assign probabilities, this implies that judgement is being made.

If, by "cognition", you refer to a process which leads to knowledge, you must admit that there is a time while that process is occurring, which is prior to the knowledge being produced but this is still "cognition". That time period might be a long period or a short period depending on how one suspends judgement. And we can't really assume that there is necessarily pieces of knowledge being used in the cognitive process, or else we'll require prior knowledge for each new piece of knowledge, resulting in an infinite regress implying that knowledge has always existed. So I think it is completely reasonable to assume that we have cognitive activity of relating concepts, thoughts, images, perceptions, whatever, without judgement.

Then Socrates brings up the virtue of courage, which Protagoras has argued is distinct from the other virtues. It is different, because it appears to invert the priority of knowledge. Courage is to proceed into the unknown. This is to make a judgement when it appears like judgement ought not be made. When it appears like judgement ought to be suspended, courage allows us to make the judgement any way.

Nahhhh, it isn’t. Pleasure is the feeling, fun is merely the relative qualitative measure of it. Would you agree that every quality of feeling is reducible to one or the other of only two of them? — Mww

No, I would not agree with that at all. Plato produced a good argument, (I believe in the Gorgias), which demonstrates that feelings cannot be reduced in this way. Socrates' argument was that pleasure is not the opposite of pain. If it was, then all pleasure would be a matter of being relieved from pain. Therefore acquiring pleasure would require a want of that pleasure, which would be the condition, pain. This would be the necessary prior condition to pleasure, being deprived of that pleasure, which would be pain. Then he described how some pleasures do not require the prior pain, therefore these pleasures are not opposed to pain.

From this we can say that pleasure is one general category of description, and pain is another general category of description. But this does not mean that all feelings are one or the other, pleasure and pain might just be different aspects of the same feeling. The reality, I believe is that many feelings are a combination of the two, each type of feeling combining aspects of the two in its own unique way. So the two categories are simply an aid for description, and real feelings don't obey those boundaries. It's better, I believe, to have numerous different categories of feelings, each of which may or may not have aspects describable as pleasure or pain.



Sorry frank, I explained in my last post why we ought not derive ideology from an historian. You haven't shown me anything to make me believe that Moses Finlay is anything other than an historian. I think the idea you presented, that modern dualism is based in a conflict between religion and science is very good evidence of why we ought not derive ideology from historians. When it comes to ideology the historians just make stuff up to add substance to their narrative. The problem being that it is fictional and therefore not substance at all. So I've got nothing further to say.

"History" is the faulty perspective in looking at ancient ideas. So you only replaced the better perspective with the worse, when you allowed history to taint your view.. "History" is created from the perspective of the intentions of the modern day person, looking backward in time with specific goals. And "intention" guides and shapes our understanding, as explained by Plato's conception of "the good". So the understanding of ancient ideas, which is given from the perspective of "history" is necessarily flawed, by understanding those ancient ideas through the lens of an historian's intention rather than directly pursuing the intention (meaning) of the ancient person who produced those ideas. This is why Plato objected to narrative as an inaccurate source of knowledge. It is twice removed from the actual ideas which are represented. Instead of looking directly at the expression of the ideas, therefore once removed, to look at the narrative is to look at a representation of the expression, therefore twice removed. It's the difference between primary source and secondary source. But when the secondary source is an historian, there is not even the intent to understand the true meaning of the expression, only the intent to put into the context of an overall narrative created by the historian.

Plato gives us a very good glimpse into how ideas are passed down through time. In the earlier times there was no writing, and stories were passed by word of mouth, accompanied with chanting and song to aid in memory. But this was very defective because each generation would produce changes, interpretations guided by the intentions of the interpreters. So a person living at one time, looking back hundreds of years toward the source, trying to understand the true meaning of the myth, would have to make an attempt to account for all the intermediate changes. This would require determining the cultural conditions of that intermediary time which influenced the interpretations. For Plato this was to determine how the myth was transported from its origins to its current position.

However, written material provides far more stability, allowing us to look directly at the expressions from ancient times. But there is still the difficulty which Plato outlines, we interpret according to our intention which we have now. And this includes translations. So when we look back at ancient material we still have to take into consideration intermediary intentions, translations, and cultural influences on one's own intentions.

The perspective of "history" does none of this, looking only at material artifacts, to make some general conclusions about people and cultures. So it provides a very much inferior way of looking at the ideas of ancient people. Interpreting the words of the ancient people, though there may be layers of intention between the interpreter and the original speaker, provides the only real course toward understanding the ideas of the ancients. Looking at the ancient ideas through the intent of an historian, to put the writer's ideas into the context of the historian's own narrative, provides no real approach to the intent (meaning of the writer.

What are the "real" attributes of space? — jgill

I wouldn't know the answer to that question, nor would anyone else, I believe. The point though is that we can represent space in two fundamentally different ways, as being a real thing with real properties (though unknown), or as completely abstract, being a conceptual tool to help us understand the existence of things. In the former, we are constrained by a desire to know the real properties of space, and produce models accordingly. In the latter, we are constrained only by arbitrary principles, pragmaticism, according to what serves the specific purpose. This is the basic difference between absolutism and relativity. Absolutism dictates that there is an absolute truth to the way that motions are modeled, while relativity dictates that differing models of motion are equal.

So, in the case of "the continuum", continuity is a principle based in the Aristotelian conception of "matter". Matter is how Aristotle accounts for the continuity of sameness as time passes, consistency in existence. Continuity is a temporal concept. So Newton gave matter a principal property, "mass", and mass is proposed as the means by which temporal continuity is maintained, the first law, inertia. That is supposed to represent a "truth" about time, the continuity of mass, as inertia. But geometric representations of space, perfect squares, perfect circles, perfect triangles, the number of degrees in a circle, the number of spatial dimensions, etc., derived as mathematical axioms, are not supposed to be "truths". They are abstractions created for practise, and mostly derived from practise, containing the arbitrariness which pragmatism relies on.

Special relativity takes the arbitrariness of spatial abstractions, and assigns it to our conception of time. Under this conceptual structure there is nothing real, no "truth", to ground the continuity of time. Continuity is now based in spatial conceptions, and the true basis for the conception of continuity, time, is left as obsolete. Since the conception of "space" has no real continuity, being arbitrary because of its base in pure abstraction, and "time" has been subsumed under "space", we are left with no principles for a real or true "continuum". Our lived experience of temporal continuity, and the only access we have toward an understanding of "true" continuity, is made no longer relevant, by denying its bearing on our concept of "time". The "continuum" now is just another arbitrary spatial concept, guided by pragmatism, and our real experience of continuity which is the continued existence of material objects as time passes, is not allowed to have any bearing on this conception of "the continuum". So our conceptions of mass must be manipulated to be consistent with the arbitrary conception of "the continuum", instead of altering the conception of "the continuum" to be consistent with our true observations of mass.

I had no idea that this was such a big confusion among some of you. I thought it was intuitive what an "object of perception" is. I took it for granted that this comes easy. — L'éléphant

You ought to read Kant and Berkeley. That there are objects of perception is intuitive, what an object of perception is, is not.

But you never, ever, have come to the point that you are outside the mound perceiving it. Never. — L'éléphant

Why do you think that perceiving is done from the outside? Isn't it the case that the person perceiving is in the centre of the field of perception, perceiving one's surroundings, one's environment? So if perceiving is to be described in terms of inside/outside, the perceiver is inside, and what is perceived is outside the perceiver.

I wouldn’t accept that reason is a causal feeling. At bottom, thinking is the reasoning process, and we do not think our feelings. While thinking is an innate human ability, the constituent objects of which aggregate over time to reflect the condition of the intellect, feeling is an innate human quality reflecting on the condition of the subject itself, the constituent objects of which subsist in themselves as wholes. The former reduces to experience, the latter reduces to conscience. — Mww

If I understand you, you are saying that feeling is a property of the whole subject, while thinking is a property of a part, the intellect. So thinking is a capacity of that part, the intellect, and it is what the intellect does. Feeling, as a quality of the subject, is a property of the human subject, and therefore not an activity which could be assigned to a specific part.

I take things here to mean represented by phenomena. Real spacetime objects. A conclusion with respect to a thought about things would come about naturally, but it wouldn’t be a judgement. All judgement does in thought of things, is relate concepts to each other, this being the discursive kind as opposed to the aesthetic, the relation itself called a cognition. Reason concludes whether the immediate judgement conflicts with antecedent judgements, hence determines the truth of the relation. — Mww

Well, I think this is just an avoidance of the question. We don't have "real spacetime objects" within our minds when we're thinking, we think with concepts, or at least with images. So you can't dismiss judgements about things, as not being judgements, because judgements only relate concepts to each other. When we think about things, that's what we're doing, relating concepts to each other, and from this we may make a judgement about the thing.

Or do you mean to separate images from concepts, so that thinking about a thing is a matter of relating concepts to an image? So would you say that the image is not properly a part of the intellect, not a part of the thinking, but more like a feeling? How would the phenomena, or image, relate to the intellect, so that the person could be thinking about it, if it wasn't in the mind, and part of the thinking?

With respect to cognitions in an empirically grounded logical system employed by the understanding, to suspend judgement reduces to denying the very knowledge phenomena provide, which reduces to not knowing what is known, which is absurd, the efforts to do so is called stupidity. — Mww

This is exactly the problem Plato uncovered in that part of Theaetetus. Positing "false judgement" resulted in not knowing what is known. But what was exposed was a misconception of "knowing". Here, you are saying that phenomena provides knowledge in an empirically grounded system, and suspending judgement would be to deny that knowledge, i.e. not knowing what is known. The problem is that this is a misconception of "knowledge". Phenomena does not provide knowledge, it provides a material condition, or a condition necessary for the possibility of knowledge, which is not in itself knowledge. So when "knowledge" is conceived in the way I propose, suspending judgement reduces to preventing the production of knowledge, not to not knowing what is known.

With respect to volitions in a rationally grounded logical system employed by the will, to suspend judgement is not to deny the volition, which would lead to the same absurdity, but to deny the rationality of it, which is certainly possible, and even occasionally observable, but herein the efforts to do so, is called immorality. — Mww

So, I do not see how you can separate a rationally grounded system from an empirically grounded system, in the way that you do. If you separate the phenomena, images, or whatever you want to call it, from the intellect, to provide an outside grounding, making the phenomena necessarily known, then it cannot get into the mind in the first place. If it's in the mind, then it's just part of a rationally grounded system.

It appears to me, like you want to have your cake and eat it too, forcing a separation between thoughts and feelings, but then allowing the feelings into the mind as phenomena, which might ground the knowing in some kind of necessity. Is that what's going on here?

The guy exhibiting stupidity elicits pity; he who exhibits immorality, elicits disgust. Ya know what’s ironic here? It is actually impossible to accuse ourselves of being stupid, in the pathological as opposed to the incidental sense, then proving it, but we can very easily accuse ourselves of being immoral and very easily prove it. Why? Because it is impossible to know why I might be stupid…..if I knew why I couldn’t be stupid….but it is easy to will the proper moral volition, then completely and utterly disregard it. In addition, with respect to the subject himself, there is no feeling per se in being stupid, but there is always a feeling necessarily conjoined with being moral with its complementary feeling in being immoral. — Mww

This is the inversion of not knowing what is known, it's the problem of knowing what is not known. When we allow that knowing is a form of becoming, we allow an intermediary condition, between knowing and not knowing, between being and not being. This is how Socrates approached that sophistry. So just like there is a feeling associated with being immoral, there is also a feeling associated with being stupid, it's a feeling of ignorance. So this feeling, which motivates the philosopher, is the intermediary between not knowing and knowing, and all feelings are similar. Likewise, phenomena are intermediary between not knowing and knowing.

Ehhhh….depends at which point one is examining the system. If he thinks an end is the act, then will could be the means, insofar as will does not cause an act. If he thinks an end is the determination of how to act, but not the act itself, then will can be said to cause such determination. The former causality of will as means is a volition, the latter causality of will as cause proper, is an imperative.

Havin’ fun yet? — Mww

I don't know. Fun is a feeling. And I can suspend judgement, can't I?

Do you agree that it's a mistake to project our own mental/physical division on the dialogs? That distinction, so embedded in our own worldview, didn't exist around 2400 years ago. If they thought of the realm of the gods or Hades, they thought of concrete places. Likewise, the forms weren't thought of as vaporous categories. They're actually part of the makeup of the world around us. — frank

No, I do not see that as a mistake. This is because truths are timeless, eternal as some say, and comprehensible to all subjects. So, what was relevant 2400 years ago is relevant today. That's what really impressed me when I first picked up Plato years ago, because I had to for school. I thought, what's the relevance of this ancient stuff, until I read it. And it blew me away because it all seemed so relevant.

Lattice field theory avoids virtual particles, which are mathematical conveniences. — jgill

Hmm, there seems to be an incommensurability between the lattice representation, and the continuum representation. Here's from Wikki' entry on lattice guage theory:

"When the size of the lattice is taken infinitely large and its sites infinitesimally close to each other, the continuum gauge theory is recovered...
...Such calculations are often extremely computationally intensive, and can require the use of the largest available supercomputers."

I think the issue with the lattice representation is that the designation of a quantum (discrete unit) of space is completely arbitrary, not based on any real attributes of space itself. Then it becomes just a matter of re-representing a spatial continuum as an infinity of spatial units. That an infinite number is required demonstrates the incommensurability. But when mass, forces, and motion are represented, there's probably no significant different from points and vectors, because it appears like they are just trying to reproduce this in a different form anyway.

I'm curious how you would express what you have said in the context of field theory. — jgill

I think that field theory gives properties to space itself, the electromagnetic field for example. But since the electromagnetic field is observed to react with massive objects like atoms, or even just electrons, through quanta, the tendency is to give the quantum of energy a particle-like existence, as a point. This is very similar to what I said above, that the object with mass is represented as a point (centre of gravity). It's a matter of simplicity, to interact with a particle with mass, which is represented as a point, the thing interacting is also represented as a point. As I said above, I believe this is inaccurate. So in as much as the representation of fields might in some way represent real spatial attributes, the points in the field, which are supposed to be particles are not adequate representations. But these points are needed to explain how the field interacts with mass which is represented as a point, a centre of gravity for the sake of simplicity. So what is needed is to get away from representing mass as a point. Then when the field interacts with mass in the way of quanta, it is not at a point in the field.

Consider the way that an electron interacts with a proton in an atom for example. The interaction does not occur simply between a point where the electron is, and a point where the proton is. The interaction is occurring everywhere within the orbital, so it is understood as the "electron cloud". It is not the case that at any moment, the electron is at some point in the cloud, it is the case that at every moment, the electron is everywhere in that cloud. This is because "the electron" does not exist as a particle at a point, that's just a representation which was made for simplicity sake, to show its mass as being at a point.

I'm not familiar with Richard Swinburne, but I will check your reference.

Isn't this something to do with the parable of the three horses, being the various appetites? That the appetitive part of the soul overwhelms the rational part? Would seem like 'plato 101' to me, but then what do I know.... — Wayfarer

Neither am I familiar with "the three horses", and I'm a bit thrown off by your use of "appetites" (plural) here. Aristotle had an "appetitive part", referring to bodily desires, and the source of action toward such desires. But "appetites" is more proper to Aquinas. He proposed two principal types of appetites, sensitive and rational and made further divisions beyond this. Each appetite is directed towards a "good". Notice that even bodily desires are directed towards "a good". This was to maintain consistency with Aristotle's separation between apparent good (sense appetite) and real good (rational appetite). The sensitive appetites would remain unintelligible if not directed towards a good, so that good is designated as apparent, and not necessarily real.

From Aquinas' perspective, the entirety of the living being, body and mind, has appetitive motivations. Appetite is the source of movement, in general. The problem which Plato inherited from the pre-Socratic idealists, was that the whole realm of intelligible objects, therefore the intelligible realm in general, was portrayed as passive, inactive, eternal objects, which could have no causal efficacy. This is often referred to by modern monists as producing the problem of interaction. Plato showed this problem to inhere within the theory of participation. So he introduced "the good" as the source of motivation, activity, and therefore causal efficacy in the intelligible realm. This made a clear division between bodily appetite and intelligible good.

Prior to this, causal motivation of human beings, 'appetite', had to come from the world of sense objects, therefore manifesting as bodily desires. This was the only source for active causation in the human being. But Plato recognized that the intellect itself had to have within it causal motive power, and this he proposed as "the good". Now he had a clear division between bodily motivation represented as sensual desire (appetite), and intellectual motivation represented as the good. From the latter developed the concept of "will", which became Aquinas' rational appetite. But Plato proposed a medium between these two sources of active causation, as passion or spirit. Passion could ally with the body to overwhelm the mind, or it could ally with the mind to subdue the body. In any case, passion is the medium between body and mind, which along with "the good" or Aristotle's "final cause" as the source of activity within the intelligible realm, resolved the problem of interaction.

Notice that following Aristotle all sources of motivation are represented under "good", whether real or apparent. This provides consistency throughout the entirety of the human being, so that there is no conflict between body and mind, as Plato represented the body and mind within a sort of conflict. This allows the intellect to smoothly rule over the body by making the bodily desires intelligible as "goods", and as Aquinas proposed, the intelligible goods of the will are equally "appetites".

The issue is that you get dimensionless points (no volume of space occupied by the points), in space, which have properties, as point particles. Traditionally, a point could not be a body with properties, but its mass might be represented as a point, the centre of gravity. So the point became a very effect way to represent a body's mass for calculations in physics. The centre of gravity. You can see though, that the point does not provide a very truthful, or even accurate representation of a body, which really exists in the area around the point, though it provides a very useful representation of its mass for many practises.

But when we start to break bodies apart, getting down to smaller and smaller parts, the concept of "mass" breaks down as well, being a feature of a body's way of occupying space as a coherent whole. That's why "density" is an important concept in relation to "mass". So for instance, if you propose to break apart a massive particle, like a hadron (proton, neutron) into its composite quarks, it's mass cannot be accounted for. The mass is more like a property of the space that the combined quarks are existing in, as a coherent unity, and this is known as the strong force. So further particles, gluons, might proposed to account for the existence of this force, but these would be represented as points, therefore not properly representing the area.

You ought to be able to see that the strong force is a property of an area of space, the area within which the hadron exists. That area is responsible for the existence of the hadron and its mass. So when it comes down to the nitty gritty of providing a true and accurate representation of mass, the point, as the centre of gravity, fails badly. In reality, "mass" refers to how a body is extended in space, so when a physicist tries to break a massive hadron into its composite point particles, its mass cannot be adequately represented.

If the physicist does not respect this difference between theory (representing mass as a point), and practise (the experiments demonstrate that mass cannot exist at a point), then the physicist will continue into that theoretical fantasy land, a fictional world requiring the assumption of "virtual particles", in a pointless attempt to maintain the representation of mass at a point.

I don't see the point. That "sacrifice" exists doesn't mean that sacrifice is good. In fact, an examination of most instances of sacrifices will probably show that they are generally misguided, and very often far from good.

I'm inclined to agree with Banno that on occasion one has to sacrifice one's happiness for good, implying they aren't the same. I'm shocked Aristotle missed such an obvious fact. — Agent Smith

As I said, this would require proving that there is something better than happiness, to show that one ought to sacrifice happiness for this better good. Just stipulating that X is better than happiness, therefore you ought to sacrifice your happiness for X does not suffice.

That's part of the reason why I disagree with Aristotle on that point. However, the argument is not as simple as Banno makes it look. To prove that point one would have to show how something is better than happiness. Just stipulating that X is better than happiness doesn't prove the point. That is the problem which Plato had with those who equated good with pleasure. You can't just stipulate that good is something different from pleasure, and leave it at that. That does not convince anyone. You need to produce descriptive premises concerning "good", and descriptive premises concerning "pleasure", and show how the nature of each of these differs from the other. As Plato found out, it's not an easy task to convince someone who already believes that good is pleasure.

The point though, was how Aristotle moved to put an end to the infinite regress you noted. The thing he named as the ultimate end (wanted for the sake of itself), was perhaps not the correct solution, but he showed a way toward that solution. We could name "the good" as the ultimate end, but that's completely intangible. Swapping "the good" for "happiness" provides us with something tangible, while being slightly more palatable than "pleasure".

Oh my. Whereas the simplest vector spaces (in R^2 or C) have vectors which can be represented by little arrows in the Euclidean or complex planes, most vectors in QM go far beyond this and cannot be so described. See Hilbert space. — jgill

The basic principle of the vector remains the same, but the vector space described is more complicated. The complexity of these vector spaces is what gives rise to the idea of "inner products". The use of "inner" makes it sound like these are properties internal to the point. In reality they are how the point relates to other points (by means of vectors), therefore external relations.

I fear that doesn't work. Why is happiness good? — Agent Smith

I disagree with it as well, but the reasons are given in the Nichomacean Ethics. Basically there is the appearance of infinite regress, as you described. So Aristotle looked for something "self-sufficient", wanted only for the sake of itself, because that would put an end to that regress. If X is good because it is for the sake of Y, and Y is good for the sake of Z, and Z for A, etc., he figure that there needed to be something final, that all the others would lead to, as ultimately being for the sake of that final thing. That's the ultimate end, wanted only for the sake of itself. This he assumed is the person's happiness.

I think it more correct to say judgement depends on, or follows from, an instance of willing, but one is not the other. An instance of willing is the immediate determination of an act, therein called a volition, in accordance with a feeling; to judge is to relate the correspondence of the volition to the feeling that caused it. — Mww

But would you class judgement as part of the reasoning process? Suppose reasoning is the feeling which causes a volition. Then, if we say that the mind reasons, i.e. thinks about things, would a conclusion (judgement) come about naturally as part of the reasoning process, or is there a separate act of will required which constitutes the judgement or conclusion ?

This has a bearing on the nature of logic, because we say that logic necessitates the conclusion. But if a separate act of willing is required then one might suspend judgement even in the cases of logical necessity. And I wonder if this is possible. If a person understands, and apprehends the logic, is it still possible that they might reject the conclusion, or at least suspend judgement. On the other hand, if it is impossible for a person who understands the logic, to reject the conclusion, then it would appear like there is no separate act of willing between the reasoning and the judgement.

Ahhhh….possibly the greatest source of abhorrence in metaphysical practices, in which the warrant for a principle which is both entirely sufficient in itself and absolutely necessary as a merely logical terminus, yet completely unavailable to empirical justification, must be given a place in a sub-system of the human condition. It is here your loophole makes its appearance, as the very epitome of abstract rationality. — Mww

Isn't this just the nature of philosophy though, especially metaphysics, to seek an understanding of things which escape empirical justification. It is tied up with wondering "why". Socrates said philosophy is based in wonder. There is a type of empirically observable occurrence which appears to happen for no apparent reason, empirically. This is the act of will. Since there appears to be no material cause we ask "why" it happened, which implies an intentional cause. Once we accept the reality of this type of causation, the non-empirically justifiable cause, of an empirically observable activity, we can much better understand the mindset which posits God as the immaterial cause of the universe.

It’s abhorrent because to be useful it must be accepted as legitimate, and hardly anybody wants to merely accept anything carte blanche. Made worse by the stipulation that the thing requiring mere acceptance is never allowed to pertain to the system granting the acceptance. It’s the same as…conceiving a thing, but prohibiting that conception from acting on or even within the system that conceived it. How absurd is that!!!! Can you walk without moving your foot??? — Mww

It does pertain though. It's related as cause to effect. The actions of human beings are observable with the senses, yet the causes of these actions, will and intention, are not observable through the senses. The abhorrence, I believe derives from the simplistic idea that sense observation is the only cause of knowledge and knowledge is what leads to human actions. Not wanting to complicate things, people deny the causal role of intention and rational thought in the production of knowledge, so the suggestion that these things which are not observable through the senses, have real causal effect in the world, seems abhorrent to them. To put it simply, the attitude is that dualism is too complex, and monism provides me with as much as I need to know about causation; so don't try to pass your dualist ideas on me because I have no use for them.

The purpose of a will is to cause an end. It is the end itself that is judged, the willing of it be what it may. The secondary question would then be….what end does the will purpose itself toward, but the primary question must remain…how is the agent in possession of such a will informed as to does or does not the end he wills satisfy the need he feels. And TA-DAAAA!!!, there’s where your preference to….. — Mww

I think I have to disagree with this characterization of "will". I think that what is caused by the will is the means to the end, not the end itself. This puts the acts which are caused by the will into the domain of observable by the senses (material), while the end itself, as the desire or want, stays within the unobservable realm (immaterial).

So for example, you talk about feelings as what leads to an act of volition. Let's say that I have a sort of feeling within myself, which is thirst. I don't automatically go for a drink of water, as if the thirst causes the volition, I first use my mind to recognize the feeling as a need for water. Then I can produce the end , which is the goal of a glass of water. Or perhaps, my mind is habitualized so as to go straight from the feeling, to the end, which is to have the goal of getting a drink. Whatever the precise process is, the point is that the mind produces the end, then I believe it is the will which initiates my act of going to get a drink, and that is the means. I believe it is this separation between the end and the means, or I can express it as the separation between the intentions or goals, and the actions which are taken to bring about the goals, which allows for long term goals, and delay between judgement and acting. I think it's important to represent the real possibility of delay between setting a goal, and acting to fulfill it.

.meets its authority, but…..

I think will ought to be separated from judgement.
— Metaphysician Undercover

….is contestable on theoretical grounds, insofar as will remains connected to judgement of a certain kind, itself removed from the intellect as well. — Mww

I believe the will must be separated from judgement in theory, to account for the reality of the separation between judging and acting. As mentioned above, this is necessary to allow for the reality of long term goals and delayed actions. So perhaps we have the relation between judgement and will backward. If the will is active, continuously, all the time, then judgement is what prevents certain actions (this lead to the concept of will power) to allow for others. Then the human body is a continuous hive of activity, and the will is preventing all sorts of possible activities and this is allowing other activities to proceed smoothly. Then the whole idea that the human will initiates specific actions is sort of backward backward. If I want to get up off the couch, for example, I block a whole lot of internal energy flow, to allow this energy to flow smoothly toward moving my legs. What I think of as willing a particular action, and having it proceed from that act of will, would really proceed by way of block a whole lot of other internal actions, which induces that one to go ahead.

It is somewhat off topic, but we are within the theme of dualism, and discussing indirectly, the problem which Plato brought up in the Protagoras, the problem of "being overcome by pleasure". This is when a person acts in a way which is contrary to one's own judgement. You say here, that this action which is contrary to one's rational judgement would still involve a sort of judgement, but the judgement is removed from the intellect. I would characterize such actions as a lack of judgement. So I used the concept of "inertia" above. The person just continues moving in a way which requires the least effort, or will power, allowing oneself to go with the flow. So the person knows at the time that the action is bad, and the person does not want to do it, but they do not have the will power to prevent it from happening.

Inferring is not the same knowing as seeing the "object of perception", as MU said earlier in his post. Knowing through the object of perception means you actually use your 5 senses to get to know an object. You see a walking, talking person, you are perceiving that person as other person. — L'éléphant

To use all five senses to know an object requires that your mind unifies the information from each of the five. This would be a form of synthesis. The senses don't know anything, the mind does.

That is why Aristotle proposed "happiness" as the end which breaks the infinite regress.

But the issue is, what do these mathematical representations represent in the real material world? Or do we simply deny that there is a real material world? Perhaps our senses deceive us.

The problem with vectors is that they represent things (forces and movements) with one dimensional straight lines, when we know that in reality these things act in a multidimensional way. This produces a fundamental requirement of stacked vectors to represent a multitude of dimensions. Since the vector is a line segment, it fundamentally represents a relationship between points. However, through terms of usage which manipulate human thought, we come to believe that a vector represents properties at a point, forgetting that it really is a relationship between points.

So we get terms like "inner product' which appear to represent something which is internal to a point, when in reality it represents that point's relation to other points in a dimensional representation. Then there is a whole class of concepts such as "angular momentum" and "spin" which through the terminology used appear to represent something internal to a point, when in reality they are produced by relating that point to other points dimensionally.

The issue is, as I said at the beginning, the straight line of a vector does not accurately represent a multidimensional activity which has curves inherent within every infinitesimal point. So real movement from one infinitesimal space to the next is not accurately represented with straight vectors, and the longer the vectors are, the more the inaccuracy is magnified.

Sounds and smells. like the visual images and tactile sensations of objects are stimuli. but the former are conceived, and hence perceived, as being effects of the actions or processes associated with the objects we can feel and see. The idea of objects of the senses does not require that all sensory stimuli be conceived and perceived as objects; to claim that would be a lame argument indeed. — Janus

I can't agree with what you are saying. You are classing hearing and smelling as distinct from seeing and touching. But it seems to me that hearing and seeing are much more similar to each other as the reception of waves. So why would you separate them in categorizing types of sensations?

I think the traditional categorization is to place touch, taste, and smell together as tactile senses. The tactile senses are understood to operate through an action of molecules. Then hearing and sight are somewhat different because they operate through the reception of waves.

I think that if you want to talk about objects of sense, we'd be talking about molecules, because these seem to be the only objects which are actually sensed, and they are sensed by the tactile senses. That there are any objects other than these must be a conception of the mind.

You don't need to see every detail in order to a whole object from some perspective. — Janus

I can't agree with your definition of "whole" either. You imply that sensing some random parts constitutes sensing the "whole". So whatever parts constitutes "the whole" is just an arbitrary judgement you make for the purpose of supporting your argument. In reality, the whole is the complete, all there is, the entirety of something.

You can move around many objects so as to see them from all sides, and in principle you could do this with a star or even a galaxy. — Janus

And this is, is just a demonstration of sloppy thinking on your part. To imply that something which could be done "in principle" is what is actually done in practise is just a false premise.

You are completely ignoring what I said a number of posts ago. We cannot, even in principle, sense the boundaries of the things which we call objects. That is what I demonstrated with my examples of the sun and moon. We do not sense the gravity which is a part of the moon. Yet this part of the moon is right here on the earth, as we know by the tidal effects. Therefore the boundary of the moon must be beyond the earth, and not at all sensed by us. We do sense the light of the sun so this part of the sun is right here touching us. But we do not see how far that part of the sun extends, we don't see its boundary.

You're forgetting one thing -- you can't step outside the universe to observe it. — L'éléphant

I don't see how that's relevant. You cannot observe anything from outside of it. To observe it requires that it has an effect on you, and this means that part of it is touching you. If part of it is touching you, you are not outside it. That was the point of my example of the sun. I feel the warmth of the sun on my skin, therefore part of the sun is touching me. We know this as the sun's electromagnetic field. So, just like I am not outside of the moon because I am within this part of it which we call its gravity, I am also not outside of the sun because I am inside this part of it which we call its electromagnetic field.

Objects of the senses have visually or tactitlely determinable boundaries. Visual objects have edges and tactile objects have surfaces. Sounds and smells are not objects, but stimuli. — Janus

As I explained, those are not true boundaries, they are just what appears to be a boundary through that particular sense. And, since sounds and smells are sensed, but you say they are not objects, your whole general category, "objects of the senses"' breaks down. What is sensed is stimuli, as you now admit, not objects.

Then with our minds we decide which parts of our environment which we are sensing qualify as "objects". You, for no good reason want to disqualify "the universe" from being an object. Why? Do you have any reason for this desire, even if it's a bad reason?

You are just digging yourself a deeper hole with each post Janus.

We can look at distant galaxies and stars and see the whole of them — Janus

That's nonsense. I look at a distant hill and I can't even see the whole of it. I don't see each rock, each tree, each molecule, or each atom, and I don't see the whole back side of it. Your premises are terribly wrong. If you want to make a respectable argument, I suggest that you put a little more thought into your premises. And if you did that, you would see that you haven't an argument to make, because there are no true premises which would support what you are arguing.

then according to Protagoras what Socrates says is true, in which case what Protagoras says is false. — Fooloso4

I don't know about this. If what Protagoras says is false, then we cannot conclude that what Socrates says is true either. So it's just a vicious circle of nothing, which doesn't tell us anything about the truth or falsity of what either of them says.