On the second, however, I think I’d go with judgement associated with desire rather than will, in which case the judgement is aesthetic, in association with practical reason, but in accordance with a particular feeling, or perhaps more accurately, in accordance to some arbitrary degree of a general feeling. As has been hinted elsewhere herein, account must be made for necessarily different causalities corresponding to these thoroughly incongruent kinds of objects. — Mww

But isn't what you describe here really just an instance of willing? Judgement according to an arbitrary feeling, or according to logical reasoning, each, if it initiates action, is an instance of willing. But the problem I have, is that we can make a judgement that a specific act is needed, yet not proceed toward the action, as in procrastination. So that's why I thought a separation between judgement and will is required.

Ehhh….I’m reluctant to let the will be subservient to anything within the human condition. If there is any way whatsoever, in which the subject has even the slightest modicum of self-control, in which he is the arbiter of his own circumstance, only restrained by natural limitations, then there must be a means for it, and if that means is called will, so be it. It’s as simple and certainly as plausible as….we might think we can talk and swallow at the same time, only to find out we cannot, an altogether empirical determination, but we can always think a thing within our limitations we might do, then find out we can either cause or not cause the doing of it, which is a rational rather than empirical determination.
———— — Mww

I agree, that's why I think will ought to be separated from judgement. But then where does that leave will? Let's assume that the subject actually is "the arbiter of his own circumstance", yet is still "restrained by natural limitations". How could this be possible? The law of inertia says that a body will continue to move as it has in the past, unless caused to change by a force. It would appear like "natural limitations" would include the law of inertia, therefore the subject would have to act on itself, as a force, through the means of the will, to cause change to one's own motion.

Suppose the will is such a force now. How can it be directed as to where to act within the body, and when to act on that part of the body? This is the issue Aristotle approached with the powers (potencies) of the soul, powers such as subsistence, self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection. These powers are not necessarily active all the time, so they must exist as potentials which must be actualized when required.

The soul itself is the fundamental principle of actuality of the living body. But I ask now, how can that fundamental actuality (what we're calling the will here) direct itself as to which potentials to actualize, to create activity? Acting as a force, from within a body, with some sort of choice as to which parts of the body it acts on and when, means that it must be itself, not behaving according to the law of inertia. This is why we can understand the soul, or the will, as immaterial, it is a cause which does not act according to the laws which apply to material bodies.

But even that is just a diversion, because I've still not addressed my own question, how can these actions be directed. The will is not moving according to the laws of material bodies, but can it be truly directing its own movements? So, I'll go back to the gap between "natural limitations" and "arbiter of his own circumstance". The natural limitations are the laws of nature, which enforce a specific order to actions. But there appears to be some sort of loop hole which allows for a type of random action, exempt from the laws of natural order. The soul can make use of this loop hole to make randomish acts in a sort of trial and error way. But still, trial and error requires some sort of judgement as to which acts are successful, and which are not, and success is measured in relation to an end. So I still haven't really freed the will from the need for an end, and the need for a judgement.

But if man means mankind a stronger argument can be made. — Fooloso4

This is addressed in the Theaetetus, discussed above. Some men, the followers of Parmenides, have standards which are completely incommensurable with the standards of other men, the followers of Heraclitus. So the idea that a unity of "mankind" could produce an uncontestable measurement is discredited. Then we are thrust backward toward the idea that true measurement is relative to the individual. But that subjective position cast doubt on the validity of measurement in general, making it completely relative.

You don't really mean to say this. The universe is not an object of the senses. You don't actually see the totality of everything. The universe is not a place. — L'éléphant

I don't see your point. To see something does not require seeing the totality of it. I look at my car, and I see it. Having a motor, transmission and drive shaft are essential parts of the car, but I do not see them. Likewise, "the totality of everything" is essential to the universe, but I can still see the universe without seeing the totality of everything. We could say "a multitude of H2O molecules" is essential to being a body of water. But I see a body of water without seeing any molecules of H2O. Your argument clearly fails.

That is a weak rejoinder. With any object of the senses the boundaries are determinable, and an object of the senses has a location. Where is the universe located? — Janus

It's your argument which is weak Janus. The true boundaries of a sense object are always indeterminable. What is the boundary of a smell? A smell consists of molecules which are sensed. How many molecules of the specific gas are required before it is smelled? Of course that depends on many factors. There is no determinable boundary to a smell. Nor is there a determinable boundary between blue and green, nor red and orange. The true boundaries of colours are indeterminable.

Your claim that any object of the senses has a determinable boundary is simply unjustifiable. How is it that I feel the heat of the sun on my skin? Am I touching the sun? If so, where is its boundary? If not, then where is the boundary which marks the edge of the sun? And how is it that the moon affects the tides in the oceans on earth? If we place a boundary at the edge of the visible part of the moon, between the moon and the earth, then is the moon's gravity not a part of the moon? If the moon's gravity is not a part of the moon, then what is it? And if it is a part of the moon how can it have an effect on earth if the boundary of the moon is between the earth and moon? That a sense object has determinable boundaries is just an assumption of convenience, which is not at all a truth.

These boundaries we refer to are not "determinable", but arbitrarily stipulated. Therefore the object's "location" is also arbitrarily stipulated according to the stipulated boundary. Then we position the object in relation to a number of other things to assign a location. Where is the sun? The centre of the solar system (consisting of a number of things). Where is the solar system? In the Milky Way (consisting of a multitude of things). Where is the Milky Way? Etc.. So when it comes to the question "where is the universe located?", we can make an equally arbitrary answer which positions it relative to a number of things. We can locate it as "everywhere". This is simply to say that its location is relative to the location of everything (consisting of a multitude of things). So we locate the universe relative to a number of things, just like we locate the sun relative to a number of things, and there is no fundamental difference.

You see, your argument has no strength. It is extremely weak due to unsound premises.

There's another thing which this brings to mind. It occurs with respect to 'akrasia', a term used by Socrates to describe the state of acting against one's better judgement, or weakness of will. It refers to a lack of self-control or discipline, where an individual acts on their desires or emotions rather than following their rational beliefs. Akrasia is often considered a form of moral failing or lack of virtue. Famously, in Protagoras, Socrates attests that akrasia does not exist, claiming "No one goes willingly toward the bad" (358d). If a person examines a situation and decides to act in the way he determines to be best, he will pursue this action, as the best course is also the good course, i.e. man's natural goal. — Wayfarer

I think this is a very difficult, deep and twisted subject. If I could make it intelligible to you you'd have to change my name to "the unmuddler". Augustine gave it much consideration and only progressed slightly. Aquinas gave some guidance by expounding on Aristotle's concept of "habit". "Habit" is a very strange concept, fundamentally meaning "to have" as a property or attribute, but the attribute is understood as a potential (being the propensity to act in a specific way), rather than something actual. This means that it's not a property in the sense of a formal aspect of a thing (describable in terms of form), it is a property of a thing's potential. So the habit, under Aquinas, becomes the property of potential, and it is very difficult, if not unintelligible, to conceive of something without actual existence having properties. It appears like the properties can only be imaginary. So I think we should not jump to any conclusions about what Plato is arguing in the passage you quote.

Notice I say Plato, rather than Socrates. This is because I believe that what Plato is demonstrating often varies greatly from what Socrates argues. Plato uses an argumentative form whereby Socrates will put forward a common fundamental belief, something which it appears like no rational person would doubt (perhaps even a Wittgensteinian bedrock or hinge belief). Then Socrates will show absurd logical conclusions which will follow from that belief if it is steadfastly adhered to as a premise. In this way Plato demonstrates problems with commonly held beliefs. In the argument of the Theaetetus, it is shown that if we adhere to the premise that knowledge is true judgement, then there is no such thing as false judgement.

The argument which you refer to in Protagoras is somewhat more difficult because there is a number of premises which are involved, which need to be isolated. Plato does not properly separate the premises to give a good indication of which ones are causing which problems. First, there is the general idea that pleasure is good and pain is bad (354-355). But this basic premise causes a problem because there is something known as "being overcome by pleasure", in which case the person acts badly. So if pleasure is good, being overcome with good (pleasure) could cause a man to act badly. That's nonsensical. This produces a discussion about how we judge immediate things relative to far away things, and the immediate appear bigger than the far away things, so skill in the art of measurement is required for judging pleasures near in time in relation to pleasures far away in time.

From here (357) there is difficulty because Plato has driven a wedge between pleasure and good (I believe this division is more evident in The Gorgias). The problem is that true pleasure occurs at the present in time, while knowledge and judgement are in relation to future pleasures. Notice that both the near and far away pleasures are each equally in the future. The future pleasures are not true pleasures, but potential pleasures, existing only in relation to the mind or imagination. So the separation between pleasure and good relies on having "good" relate to future possibilities, and "pleasure" refer to what occurs at the present. This allows one's judgement of "good" (measurement in relation to future pleasures) to be "overcome by pleasure"(which is occurring at the present), and the person acts badly. The difficulty is that now there is nothing real to relate "good" to, how to scale future pleasures. The supposed future pleasures which are compared, and measured by principles of knowledge are not real pleasures (pleasure being what occurs at the moment), they are "goods", what is desired for the future.

So from this point onward in the dialogue we have no grounding or basic principle for understanding the influence of what is occurring at the present moment (pleasure or pain), on our knowledge based judgements toward future goods. The division has been established to allow for "being overcome by pleasure" at the present moment. This is important toward understanding the quote you produced: "No one goes willingly toward the bad". The type of action referred to as "being overcome by pleasure" is characterized as something other than a willful act. It is not the manifestation of a knowledge based judgement concerning the future, it is the persistence of what is occurring at the present (bodily based, like inertia). We can call this type of act an act which is devoid of end, no view toward the future, just a living in the moment, and we must assume that it has real presence in human activity.

This separation becomes evident in the next part of the dialogue, concerning "courage". Protagoras separates courage from the other virtues, the others being knowledge based, courage is claimed not to be knowledge based. This is because the other virtues require will power to prevent being "overcome" at the present time, for the sake of future goods. "Courage" appears to be of the opposite type, requiring one to act swiftly at the present without a view toward the future. It involves turning away from what we know about the future (the fears this knowledge causes), to act against this knowledge. However, Socrates insists that "courage" has an opposite, "cowardice", one being an inclination to move toward what is feared and the other an inclination away from what is feared. So both are characterized as an inclination to act toward the future, therefore knowledge based, and distinct from "being overcome by pleasure" which is more like inaction.

Back to your quote now. "No one goes willingly toward the bad". The truth of this statement relies on how we define "willingly". If we define it as a knowledge based action derived from conscious judgement, the statement holds true. But then there is the tendency for bodies to persist in their movements, as they have done in the past (law of inertia), and these actions are distinct from knowledge based actions derived from conscious judgement toward the future. And this is where "habit" enters the scenario. People do move toward the bad, but it's not "willingly" by that definition, it's the continuation of past action, inertia, a body will continue to move as it has, unless forced to change its course. Notice we have the advantage of the concept of "inertia", which the presocratics did not have. .

But this opens a whole can of worms, because legally we need to hold people responsible for their actions even if they are derived from habit (inertial based rather than consciously willed). Therefore that definition of "willingly" or "willful" is fundamentally unacceptable, and we need to go back to the drawing board.

Socrates denies that it is possible to act against your better judgement. — Wayfarer

Based on what I wrote above, we need to be very careful in stating what Socrates affirms or denies. Many of his statements, as written by Plato, are expressed as a necessary conclusion which results if we adhere to specific premises. And, Plato is often questioning those very premises in a skeptical way. So he shows that by adhering to the premise which he doubts, a conclusion which is completely inconsistent with common evidence will result. In other words he is showing inconsistency between common conventional beliefs.

That it is impossible for a person to act against one's better judgement is one of those conclusions, absurdly contrary to common evidence. It is produced from the premise that virtue is knowledge. So this premise "virtue is knowledge" is what is at question. The common evidence which is contrary to the conclusion is what is called "being overcome by pleasure", in which case a person does act against one's better judgement. Now, "virtue is knowledge" is highly doubtful because virtue requires the capacity to resist being overcome by pleasure, which is the situation where knowledge actually does not rule one's activities. So in those situations where knowledge is not ruling, virtue requires something other than knowledge. No degree of knowledge can give one the capacity to overrule the reality that pleasure often overrules knowledge. This is why "the good" appears to be outside the apprehension of the mind, as ais arguing.

Now, we do have a compromised solution, the proper quote: "No one goes willingly toward the bad". But this only ties the willful act to the knowledge based act, producing the conclusion that all those instances of being overcome by pleasure are not willful or knowledge based acts. But this leaves a whole class of human acts which cannot be called "willful".

Judgement. All-important, hardly comprehensible. As in other things, the ancients didn’t attribute to judgement its due, while on the other hand, subsequent philosophies may just as well have made theoretical expositions regarding it, damn near incomprehensible.

At the very least, seriously complicated. Like…what is it, are there different kinds, from different sources, relating, and related to, different conditions. Is it its own faculty, or is it part of another.

All that being said, I’ve come to reject JTB as inadequate, and “knowledge as true judgement” as misplaced functionality. Which, of course, are themselves merely judgements of mine. — Mww

I'm in agreement. Judgement is not well understood, by anyone. And judgement is not the same as knowledge, nor is true judgement knowledge, whatever "true judgement" means. I like the approach of Augustine, which is a theoretical separation of distinct functions of the mind, or intellect. He proposes three aspects, memory, reason, and will, which seem fairly consistent with what I experience. But when I look at judgement it appears sometimes to be associated with reason, as logic forces judgement, and sometimes it appears to be associated with will, as I am free to make judgements without even employing reason. Aquinas shows a similar issue, will he says, is generally subservient to reason. But ultimately, in the absolute sense, will as the initiator of action must be free from reason, and this is why we can make unreasonable judgements.

Because there is this crossover of the categories, it is likely that those three categories are not formulated quite right. I think I would prefer to completely remove will from the intellect, leaving memory, reason, and judgement. Will, as the initiator of action must be separate from judgement to allow for the common temporal separation between judgement and action which results in things like procrastination.

The universe is an object of the senses. I see it anytime my eyes are open. That I don't see all of it doesn't mean that I don't see it.

Everything is not itself a thing, which means it is no-thing. So everything is nothing. But no-thing is not nothing. So everything is not nothing.

Also no thing is everything...there is othing that is everything, so...nothing is everything...QED

Wordplay! — Janus

Yes it is wordplay, but it's based in denial that there is such a thing as "the universe". Under conventional definition, the universe is a collection of all things. Hence if the universe is a thing, then everything is a thing, the universe. So only by denying that the universe is a coherent whole, as a thing, can the wordplay even begin.

The proposed answer, justified true belief, is Theaetetus', not Socrates. It proves to be inadequate. It faces the same problem. What justifies an opinion? After all, the Sophists were skilled at giving justifications for opinions, both true and false. In order to determine if an argument is true, to have the ability to discern a true from a false logos, requires knowledge. But this knowledge is not itself a justified true belief. — Fooloso4

Actually the problem with justification is laid out in the discussion of the relationship between the parts and the whole. Justification is said to be "an account", which is to break the thing into parts in analysis and explain the reason for each part. However, there is a need to assume base parts which are indivisible, to avoid infinite regress. But then these base parts cannot themselves be justified. Wittgenstein investigates this. The other issue is the question of whether the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. If so, then justification cannot properly disclose the true idea, and any account will fall short of accounting for the whole.

Since justification is shown to be inadequate Socrates falls back on true judgement, near the end of the dialogue, and asks how could justification add anything substantial to true judgement anyway. But true judgement has already been shown to be inadequate because it produces the conclusion that false judgement is impossible, therefore any judgement would be knowledge. So the dialogue ends without anything conclusive.

I’d even go so far as to say, for its time, both those guys thought deeper into the human condition than any one else ever has, at least those present in the historical record. — Mww

Well, there's always Thomas Aquinas as well, a very adept thinker himself, who showed a good grasp of both Plato and Aristotle. He worked very hard to prove consistency between the various thinkers who came before him, and he provided a synthesis of numerous different philosophers. That's not an easy task.

Sidebar: I would like to say there are no false judgements. Regarding….

the arguments where "false judgement" is shown to be impossible.
— Metaphysician Undercover

…..what was the conclusion? Are they, or are they not, possible? — Mww

As I interpret the dialogue, false judgement is shown to be impossible. But this conclusion is derived from the premise that knowledge is true judgement. So there's a dichotomy set up between knowing (truth) and not knowing (falsity), and its by adhering to this dichotomy, and allowing nothing in between, that the conclusion is produced.

But Socrates prepares us for this by discussing the difference between Parmenides (all that is is, and all that is not is not) and Heraclitus (all is becoming). Starting with dichotomous principles as the premises for understanding the nature of knowledge, as Parmenides did, would render knowledge as unintelligible if knowledge is a from of becoming. The principles of being and not being are fundamentally different from, and incompatible with, becoming. That's what Zeno showed. So I would say that the lesson to be learned is that describing judgements in terms of true and false, doesn't provide an adequate description of judgement.

The Aristotelian solution is to affirm that ideas, i.e. abstract objects, have potential existence prior to being "discovered". Discovery of abstract objects is the actualization of potential.

The use of "potential" here is very important to Aristotle's understanding of necessity and contingency. The point is that any potential, by its very nature of "potential", provides no necessity toward actualization or even the way that it is actualized. So in general, a potential admits to many possible different forms of actuality, being capable of being caused to be actualized, in numerous possible ways. That is the basis of "contingency". When a thing comes to be from potential, its existence is contingent on the causes which actualize it, making it that thing rather than something else.

Therefore, under the Aristotelian resolution, ideas and abstract objects have contingent existence rather than necessary existence. This is because they require this cause, the actualization by a human mind, to bring them from that realm of potential, to having an actual form (formula). And, because there is no necessity here, they may be actualized in different ways. So for example, the true nature of space and time is very difficult for human beings to understand, and is fundamentally not understood when approached by human beings. The mathematicians in the field of pure mathematics are free to produce axioms as they please. They are not constrained by necessity, and the axioms produced are contingent on the workings of their minds. But this this contingency turns out to be "necessary", in the sense of needed. The mathematicians may produce axioms freely, and the ones deemed as needed are adopted. This principle is very evident within the scientific method. A variety of hypotheses can be produced freely, and tried (the trial and error of the scientific method of exprimentation), allowing us to judge which of the freely produced axioms best match the reality of the universe.

When the mathematical axioms seem to work very well, and are assumed to adequately match the reality of the universe, we start to take them for granted, and assume of them, the status of "eternal truth". This feeds the illusion that they have always existed as such, and are "necessary" (in the sense of could not be otherwise), manifesting in the ontology of Platonism. But the real sense of "necessary" which is applicable here, is that these axioms are the ones which are deemed as needed for our purposes, and the adoption of these principles is based in pragmaticism. Therefore the specific ideas and abstractions which come into being in the human mind are contingent on the desires and intentions of free willing human beings, which act as the final cause of their existence.

"Final cause" is Aristotle's rendition of Plato's "the good", and Plato can be understood as refuting Pythagorean Idealism which is now called "Platonism". This begins in Plato's middle period where he proposes "the good" in The Republic as that which makes the intelligible objects intelligible. Modern day "Platonism" receives its name from a misunderstanding of Plato, which interprets Plato as supporting Pythagorean Idealism rather than rejecting it. Socrates was fascinated by Parmenides, and the Eleatics had a sort of contentious relationship with the Pythagoreans revealing fundamental faults in idealism. These were arguments like Zeno's which contemporaries dismissed as sophistry.

This rift in ancient idealism, I believe was the beginning of the demise of it, which Plato seized upon. The misunderstanding, that Plato supported this ancient idealism rather than exposing its weaknesses, has been propagating ever since the time of Plato through a form of Neo-Platonism. There are what Aristotle referred to as "some Platonists" who continued with Pythagorean Idealism even after Plato decisively replaced the mathematical Form of One with "the good" as the first principle. Placing "the good" as higher than any Form, and the prerequisite cause for the "discovery" of Forms, effectively dismisses that form of idealism. I believe it wasn't until Aquinas showed true consistency between Aristotle and Plato, that Aristotle became respected as the true follower of Plato.

Color is an interesting example for "natural code". The vast majority of the different colors which we experience are created by life forms, flowers for example. If there were no life forms, the colors of the world would be very bland.

What this implies is that if you want to include colors into a code of meaning, you need to include all life forms into your definition of meaning, so that colors can be properly represented as meaningful. The colors of flowers, as well as some ornate creatures, are very meaningful to their reproductive cycles. This is why colors have inherent or innate meaning as indicates. We have a natural tendency to see an array of colors, like a field of flowers, or a colorful bird, as beautiful. This recognition of beauty demonstrates the innate tendency to perceive colors as meaningful.

So, the "relativistic objectivity" which you refer to, needs to be adapted to allow that living beings other than the human ones, produce and interpret meaning. This would adjust "objectivity" relativistically to allow that beings other than humans employ a code of meaning which is displayed in their usage of color. The result is that the term "code" may not be appropriate. We ought to say that meaning is based in something other than code.

A crime is a crime without police, prosecutor or courts being involved. When someone steals your wallet, he's a thief and committed a crime. Miraculously, that's even true when he's not prosecuted. — Benkei

What if there are no stated laws? Would he be guilty in the eyes of God if he believed in God, and not guilty if he is atheist?

To say that nothing is everything, is to state a self-contradicting misconception.

That description does not match the language in the dialogue. Socrates directly refutes Cornford's statement, "The dialogue is concerned only with the lower kinds of cognition", when he corrects Theaetetus' idea that knowledge is perception: — Paine

I agree that Cornford's statement is inaccurate.

At 187a, Theaetetus takes a second shot and says opinion is knowledge. After Socrates shows that as inadequate, Theaetetus says: — Paine

Let me put this in context. Theaetetus claimed that knowledge is perception, and they had discussed the principle of Protagoras, "man is the measure of all things". This lead them to a discussion of the difference between the opinions of Heraclitus and the like, that everything is in motion, and Parmenides with his group, saying all is One, and at rest. This led to a bit of a digression which threatened to derail the whole discussion by dragging it into a bigger problem, so Socrates moved to get back to questioning whether knowledge is perception.

He successfully separated knowledge from perception by associating perception with sensing. Then he discussed how something other than a sense must distinguish colour from sound, and also make judgements about likeness, difference, equality, numbers, also what is and what is not. So Theaetetus agreed that knowledge is something different from perception. Determining what knowledge is not, is said to be at least some progress toward determining what it is (187a)

Next, they turn to "judgement", and there is an issue because judgement might be true or false. True judgement is said to be knowledge. But there is a problem with false judgement, it appears to be impossible because it would involve not knowing what we know (188-190). Then Socrates offers the analogy of a block of wax. Knowledge is imprinted in the wax, and this is related to perceptions in judgements (191-196). Again, it is concluded that false judgement is impossible.

Then it is revealed that the problem with these arguments is that they use "know", and the usage of that term assumes something about knowing which ought not be assumed. So he proceeds to analyze what "having", or "possessing" knowledge means. He presents the analogy of an aviary where a man hunts and collects birds. The soul is like an aviary full of collected birds (pieces of knowledge). There are two types of hunting here, one whereby the man hunts birds (knowledge) in the wild, to bring into the aviary, and the other where the man hunts birds (knowledge already within the aviary. False judgement would be a matter of grabbing the wrong bird from within. But again, this cannot be right because it would mean that the man has no way of distinguishing the correct piece of knowledge which he has already learned. And if we say that some of the birds are pieces of knowledge, and some are pieces of ignorance, then how is it possible that a man with knowledge cannot distinguish knowledge from ignorance? So the issue is not resolved

At 201 it is proposed that knowledge is true judgement with an account. But this proposal ends up circling back on itself because "an account" really adds nothing to "true judgement". Then we still have the same issue with "true judgement", which was already discussed.

The addition of an account does not repair the problem that true opinion is different than knowledge. Socrates statement here does stow, however, that true opinion can come from knowledge and good judgement. That is a far cry from not being able to rule out the "possibility of falsity." — Paine

I suggest you reread the arguments where "false judgement" is shown to be impossible. The problem revealed is that their use of "know" assumes that what is known is true. And this is what supports the arguments against false judgement. It results in the problem of not knowing what is known. So it is this criteria, that 'what is known is true' (knowledge is true judgement), which allows these arguments and leads to this problem.

Therefore it is an inverted type of argument. The argument demonstrates that false judgement is impossible. Simply put, it does this premising that knowledge cannot consist of falsity, and, that every judgement is based in knowledge. Therefore false judgement is impossible. The inversion comes about because we must reject the conclusion as inconsistent with the evidence. False judgement is possible. And so, as Socrates indicates, we have assumed something wrong about knowledge in the first place, and proceeded with an inaccurate presupposition. This must be the idea that knowledge cannot consist of falsity. it is true judgement or opinion..

In other words, insisting that knowledge must consist of truth (i.e. ruling out the possibility of falsity within knowledge), is what makes it impossible for Socrates and Theaetetus to come up with an acceptable definition of "knowledge".

But as I said, humans are self-aware beings. We can make decisions, decide on courses of action, plan to get or to avoid, and so all - all manner of things. Doing that, we constantly make judgements about what matters, what can be ignored, what must be acquired, and so on. That happens from from the autonomic level up to the conscious level, constantly. Sensory perception is only one element in this, the other being intellection or rational judgement (not to mention impulse, desire, emotion....) So what you're talking about is not something simple. — Wayfarer

Another good reason why the mind is radically different from a sense, and ought not be classed as a sense.

How would you deal with goals and intentions under this scheme of "bodies"? A body has a past, and by inertia tends to continue to be as it was, in the past. This is contrary to intentions and goals which seek change. So, from your perspective of "bodies", how do you relate to the desire for change?

For example, look at this quote:

The soul of the body of society can be conceptualized as its history. — introbert

The body can be conceptualized as the history, but the soul does not submit to such a conceptualization. From a conceptualization of the history of society we cannot get an accurate account of its goals. We can make some unsound inferences, but unsound inferences do not give us an adequate understanding of the soul.

It's at the beginning of Bk. 3, On the Soul. Basically, if there was one common sense (the sixth sense), which could receive the objects of multiple senses, sound and colour for example, that sense organ would receive both types of sensations through the same medium (the same organ), so that it would not be able to distinguish between a sensation of one type, and a sensation of the other type. So for example, it would not be able to distinguish that a sound is a different type of sensation from a colour, because both would be received through the same medium..

Therefore we must conclude that the mind, which has the capacity to distinguish one type of sensation from another type of sensation, is not itself another sense. This is basic to understanding "categories". The thing which separates or distinguishes one category from another cannot be classed as either.

My problem, everyone's except for a few perhaps, is that the only conduit for perception (both of ourselves and the world out there) is our senses (the 5 physical and the sixth, mind) and there's no reason at all why they should be truthful or untruthful. The reality of noumena is not as urgent an issue as the unreliability of our phenomena. — Agent Smith

Why would you class the mind as a sixth sense? The idea that the mind acts as a sixth sense was dispelled by Aristotle, a long time ago. The mind unifies the senses, it does not act as a distinct sense.

I'm not seeing your point. Socrates surely deals with JTB in the Theaetetus. The bulk of the problems confronted within in this dialogue concern the requirement for truth in knowledge, i.e. the requirement that the possibility of falsity be ruled out. The common notion of "knowledge" is that knowledge must contain only truth, and contain no falsity. But the members of the dialogue find no way that anything which is commonly called "knowledge" could have the possibility of falsity ruled out. So at the end of the dialogue it is revealed that this has probably been a mistaken approach.

This is nonsense. You have a reference to such a crazy definition from a consensus physics reference from the last century? What even is uniform existence? That a body must be the same everywhere? A carrot cannot taper? I presume you to be an absolutist and maybe get your definitions from the sites supporting such, but this is not the consensus definition as used by physicists. — noAxioms

"Uniform existence" is having an unchanging presence, as in not being acted upon by forces; what is described by Newton's first law, which is commonly referred to as "the law of inertia". Check the Stanford article I previously referenced:

The laws of Newtonian dynamics provide a simple definition: an inertial frame is a reference-frame with a time-scale, relative to which the motion of a body not subject to forces is always rectilinear and uniform, accelerations are always proportional to and in the direction of applied forces, and applied forces are always met with equal and opposite reactions. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-iframes/#QuasInerFramNewtCoroV\

No, not at all. I can for example reference the inertial frame of Earth when referencing the twins scenario. No duration is specified or necessary when identifying that frame. — noAxioms

That's a fictional "inertial frame", not properly formulated, so not an actual inertial frame. I could reference "the inertial frame of my right big toe", but unless it's properly formulated as an inertial frame, it's just fiction. Your terminology is not logically rigorous noAxioms. That's why I needed to point out your equivocation with "relative". Notice the above quote, "with a time scale". Any proposed inertial frame would be completely useless without a time scale.

One should bear in mind that what we do when we discuss metaphysics is not what Aristotle had in mind when he was discussing his views. — Manuel

What Aristotle proposed as the fundamental question of metaphysics, is the question of why a thing is the thing which it is, rather than something else. He dismissed the question of why there is something rather than nothing as somewhat incoherent, unintelligible, and replaced it with the question of why there is what there is instead of something else, as the fundamental question of being. This puts causation into its proper context by recognizing that the idea of something coming from nothing is fundamentally flawed.

I encourage any Q-physicist reading this post to consider enrolling in this course. — jgill

I would say, only if they are inclined to speculate about the true nature of reality. Otherwise they should be satisfied to carry on with the calculating.

This issue is very similar to the question of how long (temporal duration) the present is. Each of your three proposed beings has a different length of "now", or "present". You can see that having a different length of "now" results in having a completely different perspective on the universe. Because of this (and other issues with time) some philosophers have suggested that a true understanding of time would require a two dimensional time. The second dimension would provide a true representation of the width or breadth of the present.

On the contrary, just like many other conditions in the universe, perhaps consciousness has a goldilocks zone, that human consciousness falls directly in the center of.

If consciousness is fundamental it must operate on all magnitudes. If it is emergent, then perhaps we are the only things within the correct range of rate for such a property to emerge.

The idea that such starkly different consciousness could exist would make it very difficult to define what consciousness is.

Looking at a vine from human frame rate it appears motionless. But a time-lapse shows a writhing, swirling, active, feeling plant stretching out its tendrils, flexing its foliage and reaching for the skies. Very much alive. And much more sentient seeming. — Benj96

This is why it is necessary to have a true understanding of time in order to have any adequate understanding of consciousness or the universe in general. We need real principles as to exactly what the present is, and if it is necessary to assume a second dimension of time we need real principles to base that in. Until we discover these principles, any designation as to how long the present is, will be arbitrary.

The discussion in Theaetetus advanced well beyond where Cornford placed it. — Paine

What is exposed in Theaetetus is that all the conventional ideas about knowledge, and what knowledge is, are faulty. When they look for something which fits the various descriptions of "knowledge" by common belief, (such as JTB), nothing can actually fit, or fulfill the criteria of the proposed descriptions. So they conclude that they must have the wrong idea about what knowledge really is. Cornford sees this as an indication that we need to turn toward understanding "Forms" to produce a true understanding of the nature of knowledge.

Suppose I am a typical Q-physicist, following the mathematics but paying little attention to authorities in my subject babbling woo about interpretations. Please elucidate the training program in metaphysics I would need to complete to be considered competent in metaphysics. Be specific as possible.

Would I need to attend the University of Metaphysics? Would a bachelor's degree be sufficient? — jgill

I would say any university with a good philosophy program, and adequate courses in metaphysics. I'm not about to judge the merits of any particular university though.

Not quite. All motion can be specifed relative to a frame, specifically an inertial frame. Light speed is specified relative to (and is fixed only relative to) any inertial frame, so it isn’t an exception. — noAxioms

I think you've distorted the reality here noAxioms. An "inertial frame" is a theoretical derivative. It is derived from any situation with a body assumed to have uniform existence. Without the mass showing uniform existence there is no inertial frame. Therefore the body at uniform existence which provides for the inertial frame is prior to, and the defining feature of, any particular inertial frame. So there is at least one motion which is necessary and absolute to the inertial frame, therefore not relative to it.

You seem to see an exception when I don’t. Mathematically, how does this work? — noAxioms

As I said, the speed of light is relative to the passage of time, as is the inertial frame. By the basic principle of relativity (not special relativity) all frames employ the same passage of time, and their motions are relative. The inertial frame show no change over a duration of time. By special relativity, every frame is inertial relative to the motion of light, no change over a period of time, in relation to light. That is an absolute, hence the motion of light is exempt from the principle of relativity. Because of this exemption, the passage of time must be conceived of as unique to each frame. The mathematics is simple, the required length contraction and dilation of time. But the math gets more complicated when dealing with acceleration (general relativity).

You seem to see an exception when I don’t. — noAxioms

I've made my case. You insist otherwise, making claims supported only by equivocation. So I see no point in proceeding because you simply continue to insist on a perspective which cannot be supported.

It is exactly relative in that sense. — noAxioms

I explain how it is "absolute" and you say this is exactly how it is "relative". Yes, "relative" in that sense, but that is not the sense of the principle of relativity, which formulates all motion as equally relative. So when you say that the motion of light is always the same relative to any moving body, that claimed "relative" is an absolute, which is an exception to the principle of relativity.

Sounds like you’re now in denial of what an inertial frame is, perhaps suggesting that any inertial frame with something moving (or accelerating) in it isn’t a real one — noAxioms

An accelerating body cannot be the basis of an inertial frame the two are incompatible. The inertial frame is theory, therefore categorically distinct from any bodies. To speak of an inertial frame with something accelerating "in it" is just deception. The accelerating thing is not "in" the inertial frame, it is relative to it.

OK, this is pretty much rhetoric from the relativity denialist literature. You’re entitled to this opinion, but none of this is part of relativity theory. — noAxioms

You are clearly the one in denial. The characterization of simultaneity is the central aspect of special relativity. This is because both the "inertial frame" from the traditional principle of relativity, and "c" are grounded in the passage of time. This is how Einstein relates the motion of light to bodies involved in the relativity principle, by making stipulations about the passage of time and simultaneity. Rejecting facts simply because they are the facts reported in "relativity denialist literature" is not good academic practise.

OK, so where should light be at the rate of one hour per hour (just guessing at the rate)? IOW, what the heck does that statement even mean? What if time passed at one second per day? How would that affect where goes or what we see? — noAxioms

Your mind appears to be absolutely void in the conception of time. Do you agree that the passage of time is an essential aspect of the concept "inertial frame", a duration of time is necessarily implied by "inertial frame"? I think we'd better get agreement on this fundamental feature before we start to discuss whether that duration is a day, an hour, or a second, because we can go two ways toward determining the length of that duration, by relating that duration to the motion of bodies, or relating it to the motion of light.

What are the advantages of doing that? It seems absurd at face value. — frank

The advantage is versatility. This versatility is what allows things to be "equal in one respect and unequal in another", as Socrates points out in Wayfarer's quoted passage. Two things can be equal in weight, or height, or width, or type, or duration, whatever you want.

The perfect, ideal equality, which Socrates refers to as "abstract equality", gets reformulated by Aristotle as the law of identity, which is indicated by .

As Socrates argues in the Phaedo, no two things, being different by the very fact that they are two things, can obtain ideal equality. Therefore, as you argue, we as human beings have an idea of perfect equality which no two things can possibly display to us. So Aristotle looks at this idea of perfect equality, and determines that it can only describe something real if it describes the relationship which a thing has with itself. This is the law of identity, a thing is the same as it itself.

This provides us with the difference between "equal" and "same" (when we adhere to a strict definition of "same"). "Equal" is a relation between two distinct things. "Same" is proposed as the relation between an object and itself. It is important to notice that "same" is artificial, a human designation derived from the a priori, and it is not proper to say that an object establishes a relation with itself, as if it were two distinct objects. This is the problem with using "relation" to speak of identity, it implies two objects, when the law of identity is meant to strictly enforce the ideal identity, the separate and independent One.

What we can see, or at least what I think we can learn from this, is that Plato (Socrates) segregated the ideal, abstract "equality" from all the actual instances of usage of "equal". it's a perfection, or ideal, which falls outside the scale of usage. In a way it marks the limit to the scale of perfection, but it also leaves the scale unlimited because nothing which is measured by that scale can obtain that perfection, but anything can be measured. This is similar to the traditional us of "infinite" as an ideal. Then Aristotle takes this ideal, which doesn't appear to refer to anything real by Socrates' argument, only a phantom intuition in the mind coming from God knows where, and he assigns something very real to it, the particular, as expressing perfect equality by being "the same" as itself. Now the particular, an individual, independent object, as a unity, can be apprehended as the real ideal, One.

In this way the existence of such ideals, which neither Plato nor Socrates could explain, as appearing to come from somewhere within (through recollection), are validated as having a real and true referent. Aristotle does the same thing with the ideal "infinite". He shows how the sense of "infinite" employed by mathematicians lacks in perfection, being a potentiality rather than an actuality. This is similar to the way that the mathematician's use of "equal" lacks in perfection as shown by Socrates. Each use of "infinite" is derived from a failure to meet the true ideal infinite, which is "eternal". Then he separate "eternal" as the ideal, from "infinite" as the imperfect representation occurring in common usage, and shows how the "eternal" is real and actual as implying what is outside of time.

"Equal" is an arbitrary designation.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/777555

Actually the "idea" got reduced to the way that the word may be used. Endless possibilities for use got reduced to "arbitrary" actual use. I don't really care about any designations of "ism", so the warning that I'm on the road to behaviorism doesn't phase me. But it's surely not what I'm driving toward, so something's misdirected in your characterization.

If the word may be used in any way one wants, then how is it that the idea of equality is not arbitrary? Put it this way, there's a word I can use, "equal", to assign a relation between two things, the relationship of "equality". I can assign that relationship to any two things I want. How is it that the meaning of this idea "equality" is not completely arbitrary? What it means to be equal could be anything I want.

No one really knows exactly whats going on at the quantum level. If you simply follow the math and avoid all this metaphysical stuff, you do well at predicting. Apparently. Once the science popularizers get into the game, however, you see the Earth in basketball nets. Best to let the Q-physicists argue it out. My opinion. FWIW. Not much. — jgill

Leave the metaphysics to be done by the physicists? Surely that's a mistake. Metaphysics consists of different principles which physicists have not been trained in.

It seems germane to the topic. — Wayfarer

I agree. At first glance, it appears to me like "equal" is a completely arbitrary designation. But such a designation must be justifiable, so it requires a reason. However, the prerequisite "reason" may be extremely variable, from a specific purpose, to an underlying similarity, or a combination of both. This leads back toward "equal" being an arbitrary designation.

But it’s motion IS relative to material bodies, or rather relative to any inertial frame including the one in which the material body is stationary. The second premise says that directly. — noAxioms

Try looking at it this way noAxioms. By the principle of relativity no body can be truly at rest unless all bodies are at rest. So "inertial frame" is a sort of arbitrary designation requiring only constancy, uniformity. Motion which stays the same as time passes is the principle of relativity's "rest". And as you say, the motion of light "c" is relative to any inertial frame. But "inertial frame" is a feature of the theory, it is a theoretical observational tool derived from the uniformity observed in the passage of time. What defines the "inertial frame" is the uniform, constant passage of time. Therefore the speed of light is not grounded in, or relative to any material bodies, it is relative to the defining feature of the "inertial frame", which is the uniform passage of time.

I understand your point, however the specific contrast being made was between an observer qua reference frame and an observer qua rational agent. Only the latter can be understood as a user of quantum theory, and thus active in that sense.

Unfortunately, I was not able to easily follow the rest of your post. Perhaps you could concisely state your claim and quote specifically from SEP what you're arguing for (or against). — Andrew M

I figured you wouldn't easily follow the post. It's an unconventional perspective, therefore adjustments to fundamental assumptions are required for understanding. So I'll give you the gist in a more straight forward way.

The first point is that I do not accept the proposed contrast between "observer qua reference frame and an observer qua rational agent". All observations are human (rational agent) based activities. We can however, make a separation between the types of tools used by human beings in observation. We can distinguish the use of theories as tools, from the use of material objects as tools. It's easy to see that these two types of tools are fundamentally different, so this provides good grounds for a separation of distinct types of observational tools.

So we can start with the "frame of reference", and understand this as a theoretical tool intended to aid in the interpretation of information received in observation. It is a feature of basic relativity theory which allows for choice in observational interpretation. All that is required is a valid "rest frame", or in the terms of the referred article, "inertial frame". The rest frame provides a grounding for the application of temporal measurement through the assumption of uniformity or constancy in the existence of mass relative to the passing of time. This is what is required for Newton's first law to be applicable. This law being a description of the existence of material bodies relative to the passage of time. So whenever the motion of an object is constant relative to that of another, we have the means for representing those objects relative to an independent measurement of time, and therefore a choice of inertial frames. Each is a valid inertial frame as constant relative to an independent measurement of time.

The point I made in the last post is that special relativity effectively robs us of that choice of inertial frames by denying the validity of the independent measurement of time. Instead, it assigns an absolute value to the speed of light. There is still the illusion of a choice of inertial frames, but any such choice must be rectified in relation to light, so the absolute value assigned to light actually nullifies any truth to such a choice.

Under special relativity the passage of time is not represented as relative to the inertial frame (as Newton's first law describes it with the constant, or uniform existence of mass), it is relative to the electromagnetic activity. In other words, the passage of time is not understood as, and measured as a constant relative to moving bodies, it is understood as a constant relative to the activity of light. The important point is that this means that there is no true inertial frame. Mass was defined as the temporal constant, now light gives the temporal constant. The concept of "inertial frame" is rendered invalid because no frame of reference can be constant. Each frame is moving relative to light, and time is understood as relative to light, so there can be no valid rest frame. The result is that uniform or constant motion, the property of an inertial frame, which is how Newton relates the passage of time to the existence of mass, is not a valid concept. Therefore there is no valid concept whereby the passage of time is related to the existence of mass.

That, as I understand it, describes the theoretical aspect of observational physics. There are two distinct theoretical frameworks for interpreting information received in observation, the Newtonian perspective of "inertial frame", of the temporal continuity of mass, and the Einsteinian perspective which I'll call "energy". One bases the passage of time, therefore the standards for understanding time, in the constant uniform existence of mass, the other bases the passage of time in electromagnetic activity, "energy". There is an inconsistency between these two theoretical tools, which is displayed by the concept of "relativistic mass".

From here, we can move toward understanding the other type of observational tool, the material objects which are employed as aids in receiving information. Consider an observational glass like a magnifying glass. Interpreting information received through the use of such a tool requires an extra layer of theory. We need theory as to how the light is affected by the glass prior to being observed by the human eye. This is the theory which goes into the production of the glass. Understanding the theory by which the glass affects the light, and by which the glass was produced, is an important feature required for a proper interpretation of the information received through the glass.

Now consider the equipment used in typical wave-particle experiments, detectors and things like that. Within the equipment itself, there is built-in interpretive theory. So the information received by the observational equipment is interpreted according to the applied theory, and presented to the human being as already interpreted, an interpretation based in that theory. And, as explained above, we have two inconsistent theories with respect to temporal information, the inertial frame perspective (Newtonian), and the Einsteinian perspective, "energy". Therefore it is very important that we know exactly how (by which theories) the equipment interprets temporal information.

On the contrary, he brought light to be included in the principle of relativity, that it moving at c was such a law of physics that was unchanging, part of the principle of relativity. — noAxioms

I believe this is an improper interpretation noAxioms. The principle of relativity makes all motions equally relative to each other. To stipulate that one movement, "c", is exempt from that principle, is to remove it from the application of that principle, "relativity", and give it special status, and we are left with "special relativity".

I see it as bringing light into PoR, and you see it as being taken out. — noAxioms

I think you are "seeing" it incorrectly then. Prior to Einstein there appeared to be no way to make the motion of light compatible with the principle of relativity. It was a practical problem involving the difficulty in measuring the speed of light. If light was included within the application of the relativity principle, then the person on the embankment, and the person in the train car, would have to measure the light from the same source as having a different speed. Einstein saw that as very impractical, (and of course the difference is very small in proportion), so he suggested that we just stipulate that the speed of light is always the same, and we produce principles to make adjustments to the different frames of reference accordingly.

Therefore, he does not bring light "into PoR" as you suggest. He leaves light as exempt from PoR and makes adjustments to PoR to allow that light can be related to it. So we have the substance of material bodies (mass) understood as obeying the principle of relativity, and light which is in a separate category of substance which does not obey relativity. Special relativity states the principle by which these to distinct substances can be related to each other. General relativity works out the details of this relation. The problem is that the whole idea that we can employ the relativity principle, and arbitrarily exempt something like light from it, for simplicity sake, is fundamentally flawed. That special exemption produces all sorts of problems which cannot be resolved. The result is two distinct and fundamentally incompatible (evidenced by "relativistic mass") temporal perspectives, space and time from the theoretical framework of light, and space and time from the theoretical framework of mass.

But it’s motion IS relative to material bodies, or rather relative to any inertial frame including the one in which the material body is stationary. The second premise says that directly. — noAxioms

You are using "relative" ambiguously, and you need to be careful not to equivocate. In the relativity principle, the motion of bodies is "relative" in the sense that velocity varies according to the frame of reference. But the motion of light is constant, "an absolute" in relation to the motion of material bodies, not variable or relative in that sense. Therefore it is not "relative" in the sense of the relativity principle. So when you say the motion of light is "relative to material bodies" you are using "relative" in a way other than it is used in relativity theory, because every body regardless of its relative motion (according to relativity principle) is essentially at rest "relative" to light.

But those are all frame effects, not observer effect. For instance, a clock coming at you fast will tick slow in your inertial frame, but it will be observed to run fast. Observer effects and frame effects are not the same.
There are objective demonstrations of say length contraction, contraction that is real regardless of observer or choice of frame. That makes length contraction part of ‘a true perspective’, if that phrase is to have any meaning. — noAxioms

I think our respective understanding of terms is too far apart for me to properly address this, but I'll try anyway. To put it simply, the observer chooses the frame, so "frame effects" are observer effects. They are effects produced by interpretive theory. Special relativity impairs the observer's capacity to employ the relativity principle by producing those special effects. Those effects are the result of giving light the special status which exempts it from the relativity principle, yet still allowing light a special relation to the bodies whose motion the relativity principle is applicable to.

See, the ace is not a one, it's an ace. In some cases a person might be able to use the ace as a one. But having multiple possibilities is just part of what makes an ace an ace rather than a one.

Since I can't see how any of you have addressed anything I've actually said, I have no response to make. — Janus

If you do not grasp that a priori truths, and universal rules of logic like the law of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, make statements about internal thoughts rather than particular external objects, and that these universal principles are much more accurately confirmed, and certain, than statements made about particular external objects, then we'll just have to leave it at that.

No, not the axiom! Being axiomatic is considered being self-evident; but it is clearly not self-evident that aces beat two's! — Banno

The point, as small one, is that there is a distinction between stipulating a rule and taking it as self-evident. — Banno

In philosophy axioms are supposed to be self-evident truths. But this is not the case in mathematics. In mathematics axioms are simply stipulated. This is what provides for the field of "pure mathematics", there are no such restrictions concerning the production of axioms. In philosophy we want to have basic rules which restrict the creation of rules (must derive from what is self-evident), but the mathematician wants to create rules in a way which is complete freedom from all rules. In general though, the mathematical axioms produced are reflections of practise already in process. This ensures that they will turn out to be useful. So practise usually precedes rules, and the rules are formulated to confine the practise to activity which has already proven successful.

Alternatively, when the deuce-holder yells,"two is greater than one, a pair of twos beats a pair of aces," I yell "aces high!" Deuce-holder then yells, "numbers don't lie!" I then yell, "legal stipulations trump common sense!" — ucarr

The poker analogy is completely out of place. Aces are not ones, just like jacks are not elevens, queens are not twelves, and kings are not thirteens. Poker is a pattern based game, not a math based game.

Yes, and excellent post MU. — Andrew M

Thank you Andrew. Compliments are very rare around here so they are appreciated when received.

The notion of an observer gained importance in physics already before the development of quantum theory. One of its most prominent appearances is in Einstein’s original article on special relativity [27]. Here the “Beobachter” plays a key role, for quantities such as time and spatial locations are only defined relative to them. Special and general relativity still portray the observer in a passive light — Testing quantum theory with thought experiments, p4-5 - Nurgalieva and Renner

I believe that the notion of a 'passive' observer is actually inconsistent with relativistic physics. Passive observation must be from a "rest frame', or else it cannot be said to be "passive". And, the position of "rest" provides a foundation for the concepts of "mass" and "inertia" as the defining features of rest.
These features are described as the resistance to change. So "rest" implies a special power or capacity, resistance to change, which is the capacity to continue to be at rest. We can say that staying the same as time passes, i.e. 'being at rest', is the base attribute of mass, and the larger the quantity of mass, the greater the capacity to resist change. However, under Newton's laws, any constant motion is equivalent to being at rest in its resistance to change. This allows for relativity theory, and true "rest" is fundamentally incompatible with relativity theory such that a designation of "rest", or a "rest frame" is basically arbitrary. This feature is what provides for the wide ranging applicability and the great practical power of relativity theory.

Since the other necessary condition of "rest", or "staying the same", is "as time passes", the arbitrariness by which we can designate "rest", which relativity theory provides us with, also has an effect on our capacity to measure time. The position of "rest" is the base observational perspective from which change is noted, and recorded , providing the principles for measuring time. If "rest" ever became truly, or absolutely arbitrary, then our measurements of the passage of time would also be absolutely arbitrary.

The precepts of special relativity place a limit to the arbitrariness of rest by using the speed of light as a cap or a ceiling to the maximum velocity a thing can be moving, and still be "at rest", or a "rest frame". But this produces some "subtle differences" (as mentioned in my last post) with respect to our understanding of mass and inertia. Strictly speaking, through true application of special relativity, a photon moving at the speed of light cannot have inertia, or mass, because it cannot be at rest relative to any object. Therefore it cannot provide what is required for a rest frame. Nor can it have the capacity to resist change, nor any temporal duration of existence, these being the attributes of mass.

But "energy", as the defining attribute of a photon, something necessarily in motion, (instead of mass as the defining attribute of something at rest), is truly observed to have temporal duration, persistence. This requires that the photon be assigned a "relativistic mass" to allow that energy is a temporal constant. In my understanding, the difference between rest mass (invariant mass) and relativistic mass accounts for the difference in how the passage of time is conceptualized from the two different observational perspectives. These being the perspective of energy, and the perspective of mass. From the observational perspective of mass, the passage of time is relative. From the observational perspective of energy the passage of time is absolute.

So any particle which is assigned a velocity that is measured relative to the speed of light (measured as moving energy), rather than measured relative to other particles (measured as moving mass), requires a "relativistic mass". This means the particle of energy's mass (resistance to change) is determined according to an absolute principle of temporal duration (energy), rather than a relative principle of temporal duration (mass). It ought to be evident to you, that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the two observational perspectives. These two are the perspective of energy , (employing an absolute conception of the passage of time), and the perspective of mass, (employing a relative conception of the passage of time).

There is a good article on inertia in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. If you take the time to read it, you might notice the incompatibility described above, along with the conventional resolution, explained in sections 2.2 - 2.5. You'll see that the resolution is found in how general relativity employs "rotation". Rotation is an ancient concept (described by Aristotle as eternal circular motion) which allows for a central point of rest (absolute), with motion relative to that absolute.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-iframes/#QuasInerFramNewtCoroVI

There's an 'observer effect' in Einsteinian relativity which nobody objects to. — Andrew M

The "observer effect" is actually the significant feature of relativity theory in general. I believe Galileo showed that observations of planetary motions based on a Ptolemaic description could accurately be transformed to be consistent with observations based on a Copernican description. The principle of invariance demonstrates consistency between the two. The 'observer effect' comes about as a result of the subtle differences between the two, where exceptions to the laws need to be applied. We can call these exceptions the effect of observational perspective, hence 'observer effect'. So one observational perspective will deal with the subtle differences, making exceptions to the principles, in a way which is completely different from another. Analysis of this 'observer effect' can guide us in judging one observational perspective as better than the other (Copernican is better than Ptolemaic).

What Einstein does with "special relativity" is to give 'special' status to light, freeing it from the principles of relativity, to allow that its motion is not relative to the motions of material bodies. This amplifies the 'observer effect' by greatly increasing the possibilities for subtle differences. Now there is a need for principles like time dilation, length contraction, relativistic mass, and things like that. These concepts are the 'observer effect', the need to adjust fundamental principles of measurement to allow for the possibility of the multiple observational perspectives implied by relativity theory. It is very important to understand these differences if one wants to consider the likelihood of a true perspective.

It seems to me that both of you are using unnecessarily complex language coupled with inherently inadequate dichotomies to discuss the subject matter. — creativesoul

I have been trying to adhere to the dichotomy proposed by Janus in an effort to show that the application of this dichotomy is not useful toward a true understanding of reality. Janus proposed a separation between knowledge of external, public things, like material objects, and knowledge of internal, private things, like thoughts, sensations and feelings. The knowledge of external is called "science" and the knowledge of internal was given a lessor value, like subjective opinion.

Then Janus proposed that one's knowledge of external things would be more reliable than one's knowledge of internal things, because it is in some way "confirmable". I've argued that Janus has this backward. All knowledge of external things is dependent on principles derived from internal knowledge, and is therefore only as reliable as the knowledge of internal things which supports it. This is commonly expressed in terms of a priori/a posteriori.

Of course each observation of an object of sense is particular, and the details of those observations in general are publicly confirmable. — Janus

We'd better get this clear, an observation may be of a particular, if that is what is observed, a particular. But I do not think we should jump to the conclusion that an observation is itself a particular. Observations, I think are better described as relations, and relations require more that one particular. And an observation is more like a relation than a particular. Therefore I really don't think it's correct to call an observation a particular.

If I say "This car is made of steel" this assertion can be publicly checked and confirmed or disconfirmed. If I say " This thought I'm having is about a car made of steel" this assertion is not publicly checkable and cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed. That, in a nutshell, is all I'm saying. — Janus

You are making my argument easy for me Janus, by demonstrating the faults of your position. Look, to confirm your proposition "this car is made of steel", I need to know what you mean by these words. And of course your thoughts are not publicly available to me, except through your words. I could point out to you that the car might be partially made of steel so we ought not either confirm or deny your proposition. Therefore, in reality, despite what you say, your proposition is not easily confirmed or disconfirmed. But of course, you could proceed to employ a Banno style trick of sophistry and insist that what you meant is that the parts made of steel are made of steel. But then the external public thing would play no role at all in the confirmation. We'd base the confirmation on logic alone.

On the other hand, your proposition "This thought I'm having is about a car made of steel", is very easy to confirm. This is because it is an undeniable truth that we think about the words we are saying. Even talking in one's sleep involves a strange sort of thinking which occurs when we are sleeping, dreaming. Therefore you cannot say "a car made of steel" without thinking about a car made of steel, and it is confirmed that the thought you were having when you said "a car made of steel" was about a car made of steel.

From this, it ought to start becoming clear to you that statements about internal things are much easier to confirm, to a far higher degree of certainty than statements about external things. This is why valid deductive logic provides us with a very high degree of certainty. And when our conclusions tend to faulter its because of weakness in the premises, unsoundness in premises which are often inductive conclusions made from observations of external things. So a proposition like "the parts which are made of steel are made of steel" produces a very high degree of certainty, and is easily confirmable, because it does not rely on any external observations, only an internal process of thinking logically.

We know no more now about Anaximander's notion of "Apeiron" than we did at first utterance; we know no more now about Plato's notions of "Forms" or "The Good" than we did at first utterance; we know no more now about Aristotle's notion of "Eudaimonia" than we did at first utterance; we know more now about Kant's notion of "Categorical Imperative" than we did at first utterance; and we know no more now about Leibniz's notion of "Monads" or Spinoza's notion of "Substance" than we did at first utterance. — Zettel

Speak for yourself Zettel. Employing a vague unqualified "we" like this, is rather pointless.

Do you or anyone else here ever post anything other than unsupported sentiment? — Zettel

It's one thing to state an unsupported sentiment as "I believe...", but quite another thing to state an unsupported sentiment as "we know...". The former may be a truth, the latter is a falsity.

Why'd you poke me buddy? I'm trying to get some work done here. Hey, wanna go for a beer?