How can an object such as an apple, having a self-identity, have infinite possibilities ? — RussellA

The identity is within the object itself (as the law of identity states, it is the same as itself). The object's identity appears to any one of us as infinite possibilities because I can name it whatever I want.

“For every property F…..” F can be any property, such that if F belongs to x, and if x is identical to y then it is necessary that F belong to y. If F is the property of being round, and if x is round and y is identical to x, then y is round. That’s fine, in that x is, e.g., a round cue ball and y is, e.g., an identically round baseball. Which is also fine, insofar as the conditional is “for any two objects”, satisfied by one cue ball and one baseball.

It remains that a cue ball is not a baseball. But if x is to stand as identical to y, one of every property F is obviously not sufficient to cause x to be identical to y because of F. So keep adding F’s to x, maybe hundreds of F’s, such that when those properties also belong to y, they become closer and closer to both x and y being either a cue ball or a baseball. Still satisfies “for any two objects”, as well as for any property F which belongs to x also belongs to y.

The kicker: “For every property F….”, in order for the cue ball x and the baseball y to be identical, every property F must belong to both equally. It follows that in order for x to be identical to y, a space F belonging to x is the same space F belonging to y, and x and y simultaneously be commonly imbued with every other possible F equally. But two objects sharing the same space F is a contradiction, which negates the case. It must be, then, that they occupy different space F’s but still be commonly imbued with every other F equally. How does that happen, you ask….surely with bated breath. Well…..the space of x in one world, and the space of y in another world. What else????? — Mww

Well, this does little for me. I'd rather stick to the Leibniz principle, and hold the belief that if any true statement made about x is also true about y, they are really one and the same thing. Then it's a mistake to talk about what "x" and what "y" refer to as if it were two different things, because it's really one and the same thing. To say that they each exist in a different space in a different world doesn't do it for me, because that is actually saying something different about each of them.

Hence contingent identity, contingent on the possibility of other worlds. Under the assumption of another merely possible world, however, such world can only have possible space, from which follows only a possible y can have the property of possible space, or, more correctly, only a possible y can occupy a possible space possibly, which reduces to a real x being identical to a possible y, which is not the original argument. In effect, then, in order to assume x = y identity necessarily, mandates a veritable maze of contingent possibilities.

And that’s a category mistake. Dunno if it’s yours or not, but it works, doesn’t it? The article goes on to circumvent these mistakes, re: “let us use necessity weakly”, or actually, to deny them altogether, re: “I will not go into this particular form of subtlety** here because it isn’t relevant”, in order to justify the notions contained further on in it. — Mww

Yes, I'd say that's a good description of the category mistake involved, it annihilates the separation between possible and actual. It's actually a very similar error to one which is common in mathematical axioms, especially ones which deal with infinity. You'll see for instance that a "countable set" is one which can be counted using the natural numbers. But the natural numbers are not actually countable, being infinite. So they take the true defining feature of the natural numbers (impossible to count, by definition of "infinite"), and replace it with a different defining feature (logically possible to count), and come up with "countable".

But still, if a theory starts out illogically, and if the circumventions are not all that valid, wouldn’t it jeopardize the whole? Kripke is just saying, if it was this way, we could say this about it. But if it couldn’t be this way, why still talk as if it could? He goes on to talk about it in a different way, that’s all.
(** existence as a predicate, reflecting on existence in possible worlds) — Mww

That is the weird and wonderful reality of the world we live in. We still go on to talk about it simply because it is possible to talk about it. Ultimately, this ought to become the central point, the reality that It is possible to say things which are completely untrue, and still have people make a very good understanding of what you have said.

So, what are they actually understanding in this situation, we might ask. When someone has a very clear and accurate understanding of something which is false, we can't say it's a misunderstanding, because they actually do understand. What is it that is understood then? What is the subject matter of falsity? Is it "possibility"? In a way, it must be, because the only way to give reality to possibility is to annihilate the reality of truth, and that seems to leave us with falsity. The only remedy, if we desire to push forward in this vein of understanding nothing (which can't be called misunderstanding) is to equally annihilate falsity, leaving us with something like a model-dependent realism. But this means we must completely deny identity, so it requires an ontology similar to dialectical materialism.

For example I could identify as a Police Officer. Is that problematic? Does it entail I should have to do some police work? Am I undermining the police force? — Andrew4Handel

I identify as the greatest metaphysician of all time. It is problematic for me, because I need to keep this fact undercover so that I do not end up like Socrates. So I intentionally hide my true identity from others, and present myself as an idiot.

Someone might be deceiving one's self however in self presentation. We can deceive ourselves and hence portray a false image of ourselves not reflecting some facts about us. — Andrew4Handel

Considering what I wrote above, where does my deception lie? Am I deceiving others in not portraying my true self? Am I deceiving myself by portraying a false image which others can see through, seeing the true me? Or am I deceiving myself by thinking that I am something other than what others see me as?

Kripke didn't want to unite contingent with identity, he wanted to unite necessity with identity. — RussellA

That might be a better way of putting it, but it really means the same thing due to the way that "contingent" is being used. The contingent statement is really just a special type of necessary statement, as a proper separation between the two is not provided. This is just a category error, but it is intended as the means to bridge the gap between identity and logical necessity.

The two of course are fundamentally incompatible, as identity is within the thing itself, while logical necessity is within the human mind. Therefore identity will always present itself as infinite possibility, hence fundamentally incompatible with logical necessity which is a limitation of possibility. That's why it's an exercise in sophistry.

When I enjoy content I tend to value it more, regardless of its actual merit. — Tom Storm

That, I would say, is the subjective nature of "value". It appears tp me like we are always seeking to objectify our systems for evaluation, but we can never completely rid ourselves of that subjective aspect.

Best I can do is tell if something is riffing off fallacies and banalities. And I am more likely to value a contribution if I can understand the position being articulated on account of clear English and coherent conceptual framing. — Tom Storm

I can see why being able to understand what is written would be a primary concern when judging for quality, but wouldn't this be more like a prerequisite thing? Not being able to understand the material would exclude it from the category of being judgeable (as to quality), and clear understanding would mean it's easily judgeable. So this would be a type of preliminary judgement, judging the judgeability.

Fair. Do you have such a criteria or can you imagine one? — Tom Storm

I'm considering this question right now. I never really thought about judging the content on TPF before, maybe this is a subject which has come up because of the short story competitions where members are asked to judge pieces of work. I am not naturally inclined toward making such judgements. To me, this is like judging the quality of individual people. Who is a higher quality person than another? We are all different in unique ways, having a mix of good characteristics and bad. Judgement of the overall quality of the person would require a formula for summing up the good and bad. And some characteristics would have to be weighted as more important than others. That's a very difficult subject.

Sorry, but it's entirely legitimate to ascribe the predicate of existence of Mary in a possible world. Why is there so much confusion about counterpart theory or possible world semantics? — Shawn

The point I was making, is that in this situation, the predicate "exists", is predicated as a possibility, therefore a possible predication, as is the case in "possible world" language use. "Mary", as the subject, on the other hand, must be given a place in relation to the possible predication. "Mary" does not signify a part of the possibility, the predication is the logical possibility. We can say that "Mary" represents an individual, but we still cannot assign "existence" to this individual without justification, as is the case with all such logical subjects. That it is logically possible that the individual represented by "Mary" does not exist demonstrates that we cannot assign existence to that proposed individual without justification. Only when "Mary" is shown to refer to a real physical individual (substance), can we say that Mary exists.

Otherwise "Mary" just signifies an individual in the general sense, in abstraction. And when "Mary" signifies an individual in the general sense, the logical possibility that Mary exists, takes on a completely different meaning. When "Mary" is not assigned to any specific individual, then the logical possibility of Mary's existence just means that it is possible that there is an existing person named Mary.

Kripke wants to unite the contingent with identity... — Mww

That's what I would call a category mistake.

Sure, the first time they hear the phrase "there is a possible world such that blah-blah-blah". Then someone explains it to them, and they're all good. The only problem here is your stubborn insistence that people can't or shouldn't use terms in a way you don't like or agree with. But that's a problem on your end: possible-world semantics works, it is a useful tool, and so logicians and philosophers are going to continue to use it. If you don't like it, you're free to not participate. — busycuttingcrap

Again, you're failing to grasp the issue. The separation between the logical subject and the physical object provides the force for Aristotle's refutation of Pythagorean idealism, commonly known as Platonism. So the fact that logical subjects are not individuals, or particulars, is the premise whereby the illusions of Platonist fantasies can be dispelled.

Take the proposition of the op for example. "We are math". If the "we" of this statement refers to a multitude of physical individuals (conventional usage), then the answer to the question of the op is no, because there is a separation of category between these physical objects referred to with "we", and the logical subjects of mathematics. To say "we are math", when "we" is understood in this conventional way would be a category mistake. But if "we" is understood as a logical subject instead of a collection of particulars, then there is no such category mistake, and Platonism is allowed to flourish. Then there is nothing to prevent "we are math" from being a true proposition.

Of course, it ought to be obvious to you, that "we" is not a proper logical subject, it is vague, ambiguous, and not well defined. So the latter use of "we" ought not be allowed into any logical proceeding because of the ambiguity it brings with it. And this is exactly the problem with your and Banno's use of "individual". You insist on allowing an individual to be a logical subject (above mentioned category mistake), thereby introducing this ambiguous, ill-defined, form of logical subject into your logical proceedings, 'the individual'. I've argued against this practise in many threads on mathematics, where the ill-defined logical subject which is claimed to be a particular entity is called a mathematical object. But this is just a well-known category mistake, which was thoroughly exposed by Aristotle in his efforts to disclose the pervasiveness of sophistry in his time.

So I agree completely with you in your assessment of "your stubborn insistence that people can't or shouldn't use terms in a way you don't like or agree with". But I disagree with your characterization of this being a "problem", in this particular instance. My stubbornness and insistence is well justified and supported by the fact that what you and Banno propose constitutes a well-known category mistake. And this type of behavour, of insisting on allowing such ambiguity into your descriptions of logical possibilities, displayed by you and Banno, has been well documented as the basis for logical sophistry. So my insistence is warranted as well. Therefore my insistence that you use terms in a way consistent with good philosophical practise is not a "problem" at all, but has already been well demonstrated to be the solution to a problem, while your practise is the problem.

In the expression "an individual exists in a possible world", the word "exist" is being used metaphorically, not literally, in the same way that it is being used metaphorically in the sentence "I existed on my desire for vengeance". The problem with a metaphorical language is that meaning depends on context and if the context is vague then the meaning is vague. — RussellA

RusselA, we know that metaphor has its uses. But creating ambiguity in terms which already are well-defined in philosophy, for the purpose of sophistry, is clearly not a good use. That is very poor epistemology.

The problem is, that if we said "an individual exists in our actual world", are we still using "exists" metaphorically or literally ?

And then again, where does this "actual world" exist. I think it exists in the mind, though others would disagree. But even "the mind" is a metaphor.

IE, an individual exists in a possible world metaphorically, a possible world is a metaphor, exists in our actual world is being used either metaphorically or literally, and our actual world exists either metaphorically in our minds or literally as mind-independent. — RussellA

Metaphors do not provide good premises for logical proceedings. That is why we separate out ill-defined things like "particulars", "individuals", "objects", and speculate metaphysically about the existence of these things, rather than allowing them into our logical premises. When we allow ambiguity into the premises, soundness suffers.

I think it's you who needs to read more carefully, I asked "why" do you feel that this personal preference of yours constitutes a higher quality? I didn't ask why it is your personal preference. Generally we distinguish between things which we like due to personal preference, and things which we like due to higher quality. Personal preference does not equate with higher quality for most of us.

I generally associate high quality with pellucid English sentences that state things elegantly and simply. — Tom Storm

So this is a specific type of form which you believe to be of a higher quality than others. Can I ask why you believe that this type of writing, rather than some other type like Platonic dialectics for example, or other types of less pellucid language used by modern philosophers, would constitute higher quality philosophy?

If we stipulate that we're using phrases like "there is a possible world such that X" to mean "X is logically possible", then that's what we mean when we use those phrases- if you don't like it, too bad. — busycuttingcrap

It seems you misunderstand the situation. I have no problem with you using the modal language mentioned here. Sure, "there is a possible world..." means ... is logically possible. That's obvious, and not an issue.

The problem is when people like you and Banno, also Kripke, use ontological language to talk about how an individual "exists" and the "existence" of an individual within your modal logic. This is what creates confusion for people. Aristotle set this separation years ago, to combat sophism. The individual exists as primary substance, and is therefore separated out from the logical structures. That is the difference between the subject which serves for predication, and the object which has separate, independent existence.

I'm sorry that you object to people using ontological-sounding language to talk about modality and possibility rather than existence, — busycuttingcrap

The problem is that you use "existence" to talk about something other than existence. What's the sense in that? If you're talking about modality rather than existence, then obviously the appropriate thing to do is not to use "existence". Let me remind you again what you said.

So yes, an individual "exists" in numerous, maybe even uncountable, possible worlds, because there are numerous, maybe even uncountable, logically-possible propositions, predicates, etc that we can say of a given individual. — busycuttingcrap

It appears that you stand corrected. The same individual does not exist in numerous different possible worlds, because if individuals did exist in these possible worlds they would be distinctly different individuals, according to the possibilities proposed. Therefore they would not be the same individual. If they were considered to be the same individual, the law of non-contradiction would be violated.

For some reason, since that's not a position I actually hold (nor is it likely one Banno holds, either). We're just that diabolical I guess. :roll: — busycuttingcrap

Regardless of what you "actually hold", it is what you actually said. That's the problem, what you say is not consistent with what you actually believe. So you are diabolical in your attempts to describe things in ways which you do not yourself believe.

And the Kripke explanation quoted by RussellA above, makes the very same deceptive statement, stating something which nobody actually believes

What do I mean by ‘rigid designator’? I mean a term that designates the same object in all possible worlds. — RussellA

There simply isn't any objects in logical possibilities (possible worlds), and nobody actually believes that there is, despite the fact that many people like busycutter, and Banno, argue that there is.

Regardless, I'd like to ask the general question of the title of this thread in terms;
A) If true, are you looking for higher quality content?
B) If false, disregard. — Shawn

As is the case in the world in general, in regards to most everything, we're always hoping for high quality, but never expecting to find it, because it is rare. How we respond to the rare occurrence of higher quality is what is pivotal, because not expecting to find it leaves us vulnerable to shock and a wide variety of other emotional responses which may happen.

So you might ask questions like the following. Do you recognize quality as such? Do you recoil in shock at its occurrence? Do you attack it aggressively in fear of the power that superlativeness has over you? Are you humbled by quality?

All these are considerable issues for anyone seeking higher quality, and the key is a person's ability to recognize the occurrence of higher quality. Anyone who actually believes that higher quality is possible ought to have clear criteria as to how to recognize its occurrence. Otherwise its all subjective and simply emotional responses to differences, producing the condition of 'my content is always the higher quality content'.

The alternative, is to start from a fair and unbiased position of 'all content is fundamentally equal in quality'. This makes quality attributable to something other than content. Then we can look at the numerous different features of writing, allowing for the reality that each person has one's own preferences as to which of the different features higher quality is being looked for. Consequently, the meaning of 'higher quality' would differ according to one's preferences.

None of what has been said here is making ontological claims; it is only setting up consistent ways of talking about counterfactuals. — Banno

The concept of "counterfactuals" has ontological assumptions intrinsic to it. By designating something as counter to fact, you assume to know the fact, and that's an ontological claim.

That's the problem with your way of looking at logical possibilities. You make ontological assumptions, like the existence of the individual, such that the individual becomes a necessity within your possibilities (in all possible worlds). But this necessity is not a logical necessity at all, its just produced from your ontological assumption, the existence of the named individual. If you remove the necessity of the individual, to support your claim of making no ontological assumptions, then the logical possibilities (possible worlds) look completely different (explained above).

The claims in question aren't ontological claims; that's the entire point. They sound or look like ontological claims, but they are not. So when I say that "there is a possible world such that X", for instance if I say "there is a possible world such that MU is president of the United States of America", I am not making an ontological claim, I am not asserting the existence of anything: the phrase "there is a possible world such that X" is synonymous and interchangeable with the phrase "X is logically possible/self-consistent/non-contradictory". So I'm not asserting that there exists any such world, I'm just saying that the proposition of MU being the president of the USA is logically possible/does not entail a contradiction. — busycuttingcrap

Sure, this is what you say now, but both you and Banno were making ontological claims. Banno said that in every logically possible world, mww is still the same individual, the same person. That is an ontological claim about the person named mww, which is completely independent of the logical possibilities you are talking about. And you yourself said the following:

I think you're missing the point/meaning of possible-world semantics, MU. Aside from people like Lewis (who is a realist wrt possible worlds), "existing in a possible world" is (essentially) just a different way of saying that something isn't contradictory, that it does not entail a contradiction. That's it. So saying an individual exists in a possible world is only to say that some particular description, predicate, or state of affairs involving that individual is logically possible- it doesn't involve any contradiction or inconsistency.

So yes, an individual "exists" in numerous, maybe even uncountable, possible worlds, because there are numerous, maybe even uncountable, logically-possible propositions, predicates, etc that we can say of a given individual. — busycuttingcrap

Notice, you assume the existence of an individual here. That is an ontological claim. Without the assumption of the existence of the named individual, logical possibilities take on a completely different role. Consider your example "MU is the president of the United States of America". If we assume the existence of a person named MU, then you are saying that it is possible that this person (with ontological status) is the president. But if we do not assume an ontological person named MU, then you are saying something completely different. You are saying that it is possible that the person who is the president is name MU. That is because we haven't given any necessary existence to an individual named MU.

These differences are dependent on the ontological assumptions made. So in this quote above, you are assigning ontological status to "an individual", then you are proposing to use modal logic to make statements of possibility concerning this assumed ontic individual. And you conclude that the individual "exists" in each of these numerous different logical possibilities. But that's where you are wrong. Each of the logical possibilities is a description, a predication, which could possibly be assigned to the individual. The 'possible predication' is not being assigned to the individual, it is proposed only as a possibility. Therefore the individual is really not there, in that logical possibility, because no actual predication is being made in that scenario of logical possibility (possible world). The individual must maintain an existence, separate from the possible predication, to maintain logical consistency, and ensure that the predication is a possible predication rather than an actual predication.

In this case, the 'possibility' was maintained to exist between the individual and the predication. We have the actually existing person, name MU, and the possible predication "is the president...". In the other case I described, there is no assumed person named MU, just the possibility "MU is the president...". The two cases have very different meaning, and the difference is due to one's ontological assumptions concerning the individual, MU.

Sure it does: "existing in a possible world" means not entailing a contradiction. And there are numerous claims we can make about a given individual that do not entail contradictions (remember, "there exists a possible world" is synonymous with "does not entail a contradiction"). — busycuttingcrap

But the claim was that the individual exists in the possible world, not that what is said about the individual exists in the possible world. We know that the predication, the claim about the individual is a possibility, and therefore exists in the possible world. What is at question is whether the individual exists in the possible world.

So I'll tell you again, and maybe you'll make more sense of it this time. If the designator ("MU" for instance) is assumed to name a real individual, with existence in the world, this is an ontological assumption which denies the possibility that the named individual is a part of any logical possibilities proposed (therefore not a part of the possible worlds). So in this case, we cannot say that the named individual has any existence in any of the logical possibilities. This is already denied, because the real existence, the reality, or actuality of the named individual is already assumed by that ontological assumption, therefore no possibilities about the existence of that individual can be entertained. The reality is that the existence of the person is completely removed from, and irrelevant to the logical possibilities scenario.

And so this suffices to address your concern about "the existence of the individual": as far as modality goes, the existence of an individual in different possible worlds is the same thing as having multiple logically possible/self-consistent propositions or predicates we can assert of that individual. MU "exists" in multiple possible words... because there are multiple propositions or predicates we can assert of MU that do not entail contradictions. — busycuttingcrap

This is where your mistake lies. The problem is that with logical possibilities we can make contradicting predications, because they are only possible predications. So we can say for example it is possible that the person we know as MU is the president, and also that it is possible that the person we know as MU is not the president, if we do not have the actual predications for MU required to make that decision.

And this is why these cannot be considered as predications, they must be considered as possible predications. And, as I explained, this puts the division between possible and actual between the predicate and the individual, such that the individual is actual and completely separated from the predicate is a possible predicate, and therefore there is no proper predication.

If we claim as you state, that the same individual, the one we know by MU, exists in many possible worlds, then we have logical inconsistency because the law of identity and non-contradiction would be violated. We'd have to say that this same person, MU, is president in this possibility, and also not president in a different possibility, but in both scenarios is still the very same person. Well we cannot say that these are the very same person without contradiction, so the two scenarios would have to involve different individuals. Instead, we must say that just the predications are possibilities, and the individuals are separate from these possible predications (worlds), being actual and real. Therefore only the possible predications are within the possible worlds, while the individuals are not. In Aristotelian terms, the individuals are primary substance.

It seems like you didn't hear me the first time. Every time you read "there is/exists a possible world such that X, Y, or Z", mentally substitute "it is not contradictory/inconsistent that X, Y, or Z". Possible-world semantics isn't actually making an ontological claim (at least, not if you're not David Lewis), its making a claim about logical consistency. And so obviously, the actual world is a possible world, since "being a possible worlds" means "not being contradictory/logically inconsistent". And the actual world is not self-contradictory or logically inconsistent, so, it is a possible world. I mean, obviously, how could the actual world be actual, if it wasn't possible? — busycuttingcrap

OK, I understand what you are saying here. Now the problem is that when someone like Banno says that X,Y, or Z refers to "an individual" this is an ontological claim. So you can have your X, Y, and Z referring to nothing if you like, or even refer to a type, and claim logical consistency, but as soon as you say that one of these refers to an individual then you need to account for the existence of that individual because you have made an ontological claim.

Sure it does, because "existing in a possible world" isn't an existence claim about other worlds, despite appearances to the contrary. Replace "existing in a possible world" with "being logically possible/self-consistent", and your objection disappears. — busycuttingcrap

This does not solve the problem, because Banno's claim was that the designated individual exists in numerous possible worlds. And this produces logical inconsistency because the description of the designated individual is different in the different logical possibilities. Therefore these cannot be the same individual in distinct logical possibilities because of that inconsistency. Each logical possibility must necessarily represent a distinct individual.

So for instance, it is possible that MU is male, and it is possible that MU is female. In these two logical possibilities (these two possible worlds), "MU" does not refer to the same individual. In one possible world the individual is male and in the other possible world the individual is female. Therefore if the claim is that MU refers to an individual within each of those possibilities, these are necessarily two distinct individuals, on male, one female.

Understanding how certain technical terms are actually used in the relevant sub-field is actually just about the opposite of misguided philosophy: its trying to understand what philosophers mean, on their own terms. So its sort of necessary for a proper understanding of any philosopher. But I was admittedly tentative about engaging with you on this, because you are, frankly, sort of known for being stubborn about these things and not amenable to correction. But I assure you, as someone who spent most of their undergrad philosophy degree focusing on contemporary analytic philosophy and philosophy of language (so, for instance, folks like Saul Kripke), you're simply misunderstanding what these terms usually mean, in the context of contemporary philosophy/modal logic. — busycuttingcrap

Great, now are you ready to address the issue, which is the existence of the individual, in relation to logical possibilities, because you seem to have completely skirted the issue in this post.

Here's an example for those of you having difficulty understanding. In possible world #1, X is red. In possible world #2, X is not red. Clearly it cannot be the case that "X" refers to the same individual, unequivocally, unconditionally, or in any unqualified way, or else there would be contradiction, in saying that X is both red and not red.

So we have two principal choices, either "X" refers to a different individual in possible world #1, from what it refers to in possible world #2, or else it is just like a placeholder within those possible worlds, as a representation of a single individual which is supposed to exist in a separate world all together. The latter is the conventional interpretation. The contradicting propositions are statements of possibility for an individual believed to exist in a separate actual world. But this means that "X" refers neither to an individual in possible world #1, nor to an individual in possible world #2, but to an individual in some separate world. In those 2 possible worlds, "X" just provides a means for us to talk about possibilities for that individual which exists in a completely separate world.

It appears like the existence of the Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, has produced an acceptance of the other principal interpretation. When the numerous different possible worlds are each assumed to have actual existence, as in MWI, then X must refer to a different individual in each possible world. Being a part of a different world in each case would render the individuals as different individuals. If X is taken to refer to the same individual existing in many different worlds at the same time, incoherency results from the contradiction of saying that numerous different things (different by way of each having a different description) are actually one and the same thing.

Carry on with your terribly misguided philosophy (if one can call it that) then.

According Kripke, his wooden lectern is made of wood in every possible world where that lectern exists. There are all sorts of properties we could change and still have the same lectern, but being wooden isn't one of them.

It's an essential property. Do you disagree with him about this? — frank

Trying to get through to Banno is like banging your head on a brick wall. Banno's been trying to argue that the essential property (what's common to every possible world), is the individual.

Kripke brought up possible worlds as an aid to understanding how modality works. There are ways of parsing modal expressions that turn them into nonsense, and I think MU would be inclined to do that. He'd say we can't assert that Nixon could have lost, because if he lost, that wouldn't be Nixon.

I think this confusion arises from trying to do something ontological with modal expressions, when that's not the intent behind them. We're generally just playing with logical or metaphysical possibility, and that's the way possible worlds should be taken: as logical hypotheses. — frank

Yes, that's exactly the point, "an individual" speaks of something in a completely different ontological category from what a "logical hypothesis" speaks of. So Banno's attempt to bring the individual into the logical hypothesis was a category mistake.

We see this same mistake quite often when people speak of "possible worlds". They will say for instance, that one of the possible worlds is the actual world. But the possible worlds are just representations, logical hypotheses, and although one of the possible worlds might be judged as the correct representation, or some feature might be common to a whole set of possible worlds, it is still not the actual world, as this is a distinct category from the representation.

So yes, an individual "exists" in numerous, maybe even uncountable, possible worlds, because there are numerous, maybe even uncountable, logically-possible propositions, predicates, etc that we can say of a given individual. — busycuttingcrap

No, that's the category mistake described above. An individual does not exist in any possible worlds. As frank explained, possible worlds are logical hypotheses. Individuals are actual objects in the physical world. There might be individuals represented by such hypotheses, but no individuals exist in these hypotheses

Banno is operating on a very false idea of what an "individual" is. A name which picks out an individual designates an object in the world. If we represent possibilities for describing that individual (possible predications), each possible world is a different representation, therefore each would signify a different individual. If some of the representations have something in common, this does not mean that they represent the same individual. To represent the same individual would require that the representations (possible worlds) have everything in common.

If there was a single feature of the designated individual which was common to all possible worlds, we would say that this is a necessary, or essential feature of the individual. We could not entertain the possibility of a representation of the individual without including that feature.

Face it Banno, you're wrong. An individual cannot exist in numerous possible worlds. If the designator picks out something which is common to numerous possible worlds, it is clearly not an individual.

It looks like you're pretty firmly wedded to the idea of a Cartesian theatre. — frank

No, actually I'm not, I think it's a very simplistic representation of dualist principles. I just hear people asserting that this representation has been disproven (when to my knowledge it hasn't), and I want to know if I've missed something, or if someone has come up with something new. But all you had was the false representation of infinite regress, which I've seen before.

I'm not, but it does occasionally jar me to know that I'm a product of chemicals and customs. :grimace: — frank

If it jars you then why believe it? When something is so highly counter-intuitive, then you ought not believe it unless it is well proven. That it's pop-culture obviously does not imply that it's been proven.

We know that a rigid designator picks out the very same individual every possible world. — Banno

There is no such thing as the same individual in different possible worlds. That's a bad fiction which allows that the same individual has contradicting properties in different possible worlds, which implies that they cannot be the same individual. In other words, violation of the law of non-contradiction occurs if you call them "the same individual". Therefore "the individual" must be proper to one possible world only, and any other possible world would have a different individual. Never the twain shall meet. Frank's got the right idea, you are lost.

It's just clear that who you are is culturally and chemically mediated. Whether you are a lawyer or a gangster, that stuff depends on your environment. Was there lead in the water you drank as a child? Did you inherit schizophrenia? Were you sexually abused? Was your father a billionaire? Did you become a heroin addict?

You'll be a very different person in each of these cases, with very different emotions and cognitive functioning. This leads us to ask what the homunculus is supposed to be. — frank

I don't see how this is relevant. The homunculus is what allows oneself to adapt to such a wide range of environmental factors, like what you describe. Without such an "inner being" the living creature would not be able to change itself in the ways required to make the best of those various different circumstances. Simply put, it allows us to learn, which is to make changes to ourselves. So it is the homunculus itself which allows for what you describe, that every person is a very different person according to one's adaptations, yet still a person.

The idea of a Cartesian theatre is subject to the development of an infinite regress if we imagine that the stream of data coming into the CNS is being witnessed by an internal person. — frank

This proposed internal regress is bogus. The Cartesian dualism holds that the supposed "internal person" is non-material, therefore its method or mode of witnessing the data cannot be represented as a stream of data which needs to be witnessed again. Therefore the propose infinite regress is actually broken at the very first step, and only created by a strawman representation which does not properly represent substance dualism.

Yes, the faulty premise is that the psyche is a full fledged being that is somehow independent of the body and the body's environment. For a lot of reasons, we know that can't be what's happening. The homunculus fallacy is just part of that. — frank

How do you understand "independent" here? Does it simply mean not dependent on? Obviously it is completely unrealistic to present the two substances of substance dualism as completely independent of each other, and no form of dualism actually makes this claim. Platonic dualism for example, places the material as dependent on the immaterial, as the immaterial is understood as prior in time to the material.

So representing the homunculus as "independent of the body" is not necessarily a faulty premise. If we adhere to Platonic dualism, the homunculus could be properly independent of the body (not dependent on it), while the body is dependent on the homunculus. Further, since the homunculus is supposed to be of a completely different substance the infinite regress is avoided.

The question then can be apprehended as an issue of how the homunculus can observe, and interact with the material world. This interaction is understood through the concepts of intention, final cause, free will, and choice. When we understand that the homunculus is not dependent on the material body, we have the premise required to apprehend these concepts, because we establish the order of necessity in its proper one-way representation, as required by the one-way nature of time. Time makes necessity a one way direction.

The homunculus is prior in time to the body, such that the existence of the body is dependent on the homunculus, as the effect is dependent on its cause. But the reciprocal relationship is not one of necessity. The cause is not dependent on the effect. Nor is a cause necessarily an effect, because this would produce the dreaded infinite regress which we must avoid. The body has a relation with the homunculus which is a relationship of necessity, the homunculus is necessary for the existence of the body. But the homunculus has a relationship with the body which is not a relationship of necessity, the body is not necessary for the homunculus. The body therefore is contingent, and its posteriority in time, from the perspective of the homunculus, makes its existence better described or understood in terms of possibilities. This is what allows for the reality of the freedom of choice, and the reality that the internal homunculus is better described in accordance with the principles of dualism as the operator of the body, rather than the passive "sitting inside your head looking out" which Banno stated.

So the homunculus is only a logical problem if we're using it to explain something about consciousness. — frank

I really don't see why the homunculus is a logical problem, maybe you could explain this problem for me. I realize consciousness presents us with a problem, but I think it's more of a problem of premises rather than a problem of logic. If the homunculus is inconsistent with some other premise, maybe it's the other premise which is the problem.

I would say creativity is the reordering of things that exist into a concept that you have not encountered before. — Philosophim

Creativity must be more than just a simple reordering of parts because it produces a unity out of things (parts) which were previously not unified. This is why a whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Prior to the creation, the things which will become the parts cannot be said to be "parts" because their existence is completely separate from each other, and independent. The creative acts makes them into "parts" by unifying them.

So the creative act, by being an intentional act, gives something to the creation (the whole) which cannot be attributed to any of the parts, nor to the sum of the parts. Often this is called "meaning", or it's sometimes called "beauty", sometimes "function", and there are various other terms which are used to describe what the creative act gives to the created thing which cannot be attributed to the parts themselves, and therefore must be the product of the act itself, or the intention of the act.

In any attempt to understand the nature of creativity it is very important to recognize the reality of what intention gives to the creation, as a separate aspect, independent from what the material parts give to it. This importance manifests in the choice of medium, as each possible medium (material aspect) presents the artist with different restrictions (impossibilities), along with different freedoms (possibilities).

There is an artistic exercise which can be carried out to help one understand the important role of intention. We can attempt to completely remove the role of intention from the creative act, proceeding without any prior images or ideas of what will be created. Then we work completely "in the moment", creating in a random way, doing whatever comes to mind as time passes. Through this exercise the disunity of bits and pieces caused by lack of intention becomes very evident.

The problem is that you refer to a number of very different acts "sensations, thoughts, and so on", and conclude that they comprise a single act called "consciousness". Don't you think that the unification of these vastly varying acts requires something like a "homunculus"? Or do you appeal to magic as the source of such a unification?

I'd call consciousness the act (activity) of having sensations, thoughts, and so on; a more active notion than taking it as a thing that does the experiencing. A step further form the homunculus. — Banno

How does this step us away from the homunculus? If consciousness is an activity then there must be something which is doing that activity. It cannot be the human body which is performing this activity because there is no observable act of the body which could be called the act of being conscious. So the thing which is performing this act of consciousness must be something other than the body, but it sure appears to be within the body. Therefore we are lead from consciousness is an act, to the homunculus as the actor.

Quote when I did this. — khaled

OK

Considering I defined them to be the same I would say my intent is pretty clear: — khaled

Just when I thought we were starting to make some progress, you take us right back.

On the other hand we have accounts of how numbers are used in our everyday practices, which can include, for the mathematicians amongst us, quite complicated and sophisticated machinations. Numbers are to be understood not by setting up definitions from first principles, but by learning to make use of them. — Banno

This is really not the case, as the process of learning mathematics is more complex than what you represent it as. At the most basic, fundamental level, we simply learn usage, as you say. But then as we progress in our education, we must enter into a learning of abstract concepts. At this point there is a change, so that the student's mind evolves from learning simple operations of using numbers, to learning specific rules for use. That is actually a big difference, and you might see that it aligns roughly with the difference between arithmetic and mathematics.

The point here is that we cannot accurately make blanket statements like yours, " Numbers are to be understood not by...but by...", because "numbers" in the sense of arithmetic, and "numbers" in the sense of mathematics, is two different uses of the word.

We would verify his definition by comparing it to our use of the number two, checking that what Russell defines is indeed adequate for the everyday tasks we set for that number. We would verify or falsify his definition by comparing it to our use of "two". after all, any stipulated definition is evaluated by comparison with the empirical facts of language use.

That is, the use of the number two has priority over any contrived stipulation. — Banno

In light of the difference described above, this statement is very problematic. In the higher levels of mathematics we are definitely taught to follow stipulations, axioms, while in the lower levels of arithmetic we are taught to follow demonstrated usage. The difference marks the development of the student's mind from practical application, to the understanding of theory. The understanding of theory is based in the learning of rules, rather than a simple learning of use.

The result is that within mathematics we have a sort of struggle, or disequilibrium between theory and practise. You say that practise has priority over theory (your statement "the use of the number two has priority over any contrived stipulation"), but this is not really the case. Mathematics, being a high level abstract form of logic, proceeds in the opposite way, theory is prior to practise. This is obvious in the history of modern math, theory precedes the application, and therefore shapes practise.

The difficult issue is that the theory must be derived from somewhere, and it is common practise in the development of mathematical axioms, to produce axioms which are derived as a description of common usage. This creates the appearance that usage has priority over theory.

That presents a problem which I've pointed to numerous times on this forum, of which many members are ignorant, and even actively deny. If the proposed axioms are meant to be a description, or representation of usage, and they are not an accurate representation, then falsity is allowed to enter into mathematics. Mathematics is such that the rules must be followed, and the rules are given priority over usage, so rules which are supposed to be representations of usage, which are faulty representations, must be followed, thereby allowing self-deception within mathematics. Usage appears to have priority over theoretical rules, because the theory appears to be a description of usage. But in reality, the theoretical rules are what shape usage, and that this is true is evident from the fact that faulty descriptions may be used as rules.

Do you think math is discovered or created? — khaled

I think it's very obvious that mathematics is created by human beings. But I also think it's pointless to discuss such an issue with you, because I've come to see that when there is an obvious difference between two things, (like the value and the thing valued), you just define one so that it is the same as the other, deny the difference, and argue your point from a position of denial.

So I'm quite sure that if we proceed in a discussion as to whether mathematical axioms are created or are discovered, you'll end up defining "discovered" in such a way that it has the same meaning as "created", just like you defined the "value" given to the point at which something boils, to be the same thing as "the point at which something boils".

So for example, when human beings 'discovered' consistency in the way that water boiled, and that there was a point which boiling came from not boiling, and we 'created' a value for this point, you will simply define this creation of the value to be the very same thing as the discovery of the thing which is valued, and deny the separation between the discovery and the creation.

Here's an example to elucidate the difference. say you are walking in the wilderness, and you discover something new, never before seen by a human being. You go back to your fellow human beings and describe and discuss that thing. A name is created, and given to the thing. Do you apprehend, and accept the difference between discovering the thing, and creating the name for it?

No it isn't. Let's first assume that all the items are boxes without a doubt, for simplificiation. Regardless of what system we make up, there will be a correct answer within it, not so for pure fiction. — khaled

This is just begging the question. If you assume a realist premise, you will get a realist conclusion. If we want a correct answer to how many boxes there are, the first thing we need to do is stipulate what qualifies as "a box", otherwise there can be no correct answer.

You assume that the choice has already been made, as to what does and does not qualify as "a box", and therefore someone has already gone through and sorted the items, effectively counting the objects already. That's how you conclude that there will be a correct answer. Who do you think, makes this decision as to what qualifies as a box and what does not, God? Do you think that God has already counted the boxes?

What problems arise if we consider values to be real in the same way that boiling point is real? — khaled

I think the principal issue is that there are different ways to derive "the value", as I described. Each formulation of "the value" is correct in accordance with its formula, though they are different. This is fundamentally a relativistic perspective. The value assigned is relative to the formula employed, and is correct, but different from the value assigned relative to another formula.

Now, when we point at something "real" in the world, like a pot of water which starts to boil, we want to know the cause of that activity, and this is where the problem of thinking that the value is real arises. If we think that the formula produces a value which is real, we might tend to believe that any specific formula provides a true representation of the cause. So for example, if we think that 100 degrees Celsius is a "real" value for the boiling point of water, then we would tend to believe that the real cause of the water boiling is that it reached that temperature.

However, as I explained already, this is not a true representation, air pressure is just as important, but not expressed in that formula. Therefore thinking that the value is real, misleads us into thinking that the faulty representation which the formula is derived from, is a true representation. But we know that the representation from which the value is derived, is not necessarily true, because we know that there are different values for the very same thing, produced from different representations, all of which are considered to be correct.

Now the problem is that we have no way to determine the true representation, the true cause, if each is equally correct ('model-dependent realism'). Each is itself a real representation, therefore a true representation, and if they are incompatible, that's just the way reality is, it has incompatible parts. So the assumption leads to the conclusion that reality is impossible to understand because it has incompatible parts. That reality is impossible to understand is not necessarily the truth though, it is just a conclusion produced from the assumption that the incompatible values are equally real.

I think there is a problem with saying values are fictitious, being that if they are fictitious, then changing them should not mean we are wrong.

Take the Santa Clause story. That's fictitious because even if you change the story so that Santa uses flying horses, you're not "wrong". It's a work of fiction after all you can do whatever you want. Santa could be a vampire.

However if you have 5 boxes lined up in front of you and you say there are 4 boxes, you are wrong. That tells me that values aren't works of fiction. They refer to something we commonly understand. — khaled

This is not true, because even in a work of fiction there are conventions which must be adhered to otherwise you step out of that specific fictional story. So if you say that Santa uses horses instead of reindeer, you are wrong, because you've removed yourself from the acceptable convention, and you ought not call your fictitious character by the name Santa. Notice I use "ought" because you still can if you want, but you would be out of line with the convention.

Your "boxes" analogy needs to be revised to be applicable. You premise "5 boxes", so by that premise "4 boxes" is wrong. You need to start with a premise like "a multitude of items", or "a line of boxes" then we have to assign values and there is a judgement to be made. The premise "5 boxes" already makes that judgement. and so by that premise anything else would be wrong, even though someone might argue that one item is not correctly a "box" or something like that. So your analogy needs to premise that the evaluation has not yet been made, then you can see that evaluation is similar to a work of fiction..

Sure, I believe they still exist. And to be clear we are discussing values correct? Like "100 degrees Celsius". I must say that seeing a realist that believes that "boiling point" exists but that its value doesn't exist is a first time for me.

I'll start with asking you, if you think these values don't exist, then what are we referring to when we use them? — khaled

OK, so we're talking about values. That's right then, we have understanding, I do not think that values exist. I believe they are mental constructs, products of the imagination, which like any other objects of fiction, do not exist. So when we "use them", they are used just like a creative work of fiction, from which there is an intent to achieve some sort of goal, or end. So by the same principle that a lie (which intentionally refers to something non-existent) is useful, so also are values (which intentionally refer to something non-existent), are useful.

As an analogy, consider a parent who tells a child a fictitious story about Santa Clause, for the purpose of some goal of culturing love and good will within the child. Be aware though, that fictitious stories can be used for all sorts of ends from evils like deception, cheating, fraud, stealing, to good things like the love and good will mentioned above, along with social institutions, and products created through the fictitious stories of mathematics and engineering.

The value of the gravitational force depends on gravitational constant, the masses of the object, and the distance between them. Which for some reason makes it so that the value of the gravitational force doesn't exist

And yet the gravitational force exists.

The value of the boiling point depends on pressure, the type of liquid, and a bunch of other things. Which for somea reason makes it so that the value of the boiling point doesn't exist.

And yet the boiling point exists.

It's the exact same situation with the exact same logic. I don't know where you got this distinction: — khaled

As I said, the issue is with your statement that "there exists a temperature at which something boils". This is completely different from the statement "the boiling point exists". The former, "a temperature" is a value assigned to the latter, the named thing, "boiling point".

Do you apprehend the difference? Suppose there is a pile of money on the table, a bunch of paper notes. Do you see the difference between the pile of paper, and the value assigned to it? If you do, then let's stick to the value, and inquire whether the value exists. Please do not keep saying that you only want to talk about the pile of paper, implying that you think that if the pile of paper is determined to be existing, we can somehow infer from this, that the value is also existing. That's a pointless exercise in the context of this thread.

So if you just want to discuss whether "the boiling point" exists, instead of your original claim that "the temperature at which something boils exists", this is not even relevant to the thread, and rather pointless to discuss. But if you honestly want to discuss whether the value which we assign to that thing named "the boiling point" exists, the thing which you call "the temperature at which something boils", then I'm ready to proceed.

So the value of gravitational force does not exist since it varies based on what units/formulas we use? Is that what you're saying? — khaled

Yes

But the "boiling point" is on exactly the same level as "gravitational force". We use both in formulas abstractly. And neither are talking about a specific value. — khaled

"The boiling point" when represented as a specific temperature value, (which is what you were saying, the temperature at which something boils) is a specific value. "Gravitational force" is something general and does not represent any specific value. So, the value which is assigned to the "gravitational force" depends on the circumstances and the formula used to figure that value. But the specific value, 100 degrees, which we call the boiling point, is derived from the application of a formula. So the former, the general description of "gravitational force" is a descriptive statement prior to the application of formula, while the latter, 100 degrees, posterior to the application of a formula, as a value produced from that application.

Yes, but in all of these cases, the boiling point exists yes? There exists a temperature at which something boils, although we can use arbitrary units to represent it leading to different values. — khaled

No, there is not a temperature at which something boils. That is the point. There is no such thing as the temperature at which something boils. That's what I've been telling you. The temperature at which a liquid will boil depends on the air pressure. Try taking some water to the moon and see what happens to it. Maybe someone has already done this experiment, google it.

you seem to be working with a homunculus-like view of the self, as if you were sitting inside your head looking out, receiving raw inputs of information that you interpret using a priori scripts. That is a view often attributed to Kant, although there are Kantians who deny it. The homunculus is, for several reasons, to be rejected. — Banno

What's wrong with the homunculus? That seems to almost exactly describe my conscious experience. It seems like I'm inside my head looking out, only not sitting, and I don't know if any of the "scripts" (they seem more like memories to me) are apriori or not.

In this case, I think, there would be no equivocation, as you say, neither any kind of interaction of two types of objects. — Alkis Piskas

Why assume no interaction? I see no need for this assumption, and the human use of mathematics and engineering in creating things in the physical world demonstrates that there definitely is interaction.

Based on my own experiences of not just dreams but also on borderline sleep experiences and lucid dreaming, I would say that they come from some kind of objective source. At times, I have visionary experiences which are like intricate art work and they seem as if they are far beyond my own rational creative power. I would like to do art based on these but it is difficult because I can't recall the exact details when my eyes are open. — Jack Cummins

If I were you, I would not assign the creative power to the rational element. The rational element, by what it means to be "rational" is quite simply conformed through training and societal forces. Training and habituation robs the rational element of the capacity for creativity.

I discussed this briefly recently in the thread called "The Will". the need to separate the will as the initiator of action, from the rational mind, as the judge of which course of action to take.

In this case, where you are looking to promote creativity, originality, it is imperative to separate the will as the creator, from the control of the habituated rational mind which stifles creativity, in order to let the creative juices flow. Meditation might be a good practise, but your description of borderline sleep, and lucid dreaming provides another approach. In sleep, the creative mind is freed from rational influence, so to harness the creative power you would need to have the rational mind play the role of a passive observer, without influencing the direction of the creative power. What I do sometimes is when I wake up after a dream I memorize key ingredients of the dream which appear to possess creative potential.

However, if one does believe in the existence of the collective unconscious as objective, the realm between the personal and collective sphere may be complicated. That is because characters in novels may be sub personalities of the authors. — Jack Cummins

I look at the unconscious as the instinctual, the intuitive, what is given or inherited through genetics. In this sense it is "collective" as what has been collected over millions of years of being, but this might not be "collective" in the way you are using it. Each person's collection of past experiences (prior to one's birth) is unique to the person, and so it is not "collective" in the sense of a person being a part of a united whole, rather "collective" in the sense of being a united whole composed of a collection of parts. It is interesting though, how different people share many identical parts (indicated by genetics), having common ancestors. And then there are mutated parts, which are the source of creativity within the being, and the essential aspect of evolution.

But I didn't say the existence of gravity. I said "gravitational force". Specifically because it is also a value that varies with a lot of factors. But it exists. — khaled

"Gravitational force" is just another way of saying "gravity", it is not an expression of a gravitational value. That gravitational force is just a general reference, rather than a specific value is evident from the fact that the gravitational constant expressed by "g" in the formula "mgh" is applicable in approximation on the earth only. If we want to produce a gravitational value for other places we must employ a different formula. This might be a formula such as you proposed, a relation between two masses and distance, or it might be something more vague like what is expressed in general relativity.

But by your logic, since the gravitational force depends on distance, and the mass of the two objects, it doesn't exist. — khaled

No, by my logic, the value assigned to any specific instance of gravitational force does not exist, because it is somewhat arbitrary depending on the formula chosen to figure the value. Likewise, the value assigned to the boiling point of water at average seal level air pressure might be 100 degrees, or 212 degrees, or even 373 degrees, depending on the formula employed. And this does not even account for the formula required to determine average sea level air pressure.

I am making no claims about whether gravitational force exists, or whether boiling water exists, I am making claims about the measured value of such things.

So "tree" here is a reference to an individual. Is 'two" an individual in this way? — Banno

In set theory, I think we can say that the number two is an individual in this way.

Numbers are abstract objects. They do not actually exist. — Alkis Piskas

It might appear like a very acceptable approach, to say that abstract objects are objects, only a different kind of object from physical objects, but then we need acceptable principles to set the two apart, or else we'll have equivocation between two types of "objects" in logical proceedings. As Banno indicated, this is problematic, because it presents the issue of interaction between the two types.

What Plato showed, is that if there is a distinct class of objects which are abstract (intelligible objects), then we must place all the ideas, including moral ideas such as "just" and "virtue", and aesthetic ideas like "beauty" into this class of abstract objects. Then the subjectivity of the supposed 'abstract objects' becomes apparent.

What Plato described is that the objectivity of abstract objects is provided for by "the good", because the good is the "object", or "objective", in the sense of the goal. Abstract objects are "objective" in the sense that they are useful toward goals.

This sets up the solution to Banno's problem of interaction, the good is the means by which the two types of objects interact. Furthermore, we have the principles here to properly distinguish the two types of objects in an effort to avoid the logical fallacy of equivocation. The abstract, or intelligible objects are associated with intention, (goals), as "the good" which is desired, and the other type of objects, sensible objects, are associated with the material world as particular things, which Aristotle assigned the law of identity to. By the principles demonstrated in Plato's cave allegory, the intelligible objects are more 'real' to us because we understand them directly with the mind, rather than through the unreliable medium of sensation. That this is truly the case is supported by the fact that there is a separation between the identity which we assign to a particular sensible object, and the identity which the object has in itself.

And yet taxes exist.... — khaled

So what? Boiling water exists too. But that wasn't your claim

My point is simple. The amount you have to pay in tax varies a lot. And yet taxes exist. Hence just because the value of it varies does not mean the thing does not exist.

Same with gravitational force. Gravitational force exists even though the gravitional force changes based on distance. — khaled

You've changed the subject with your analogies. You were not talking about whether boiling water exists, you were talking about the existence of the temperature at which water boils. So the existence of gravity, and the existence of taxes is irrelevant. What you were talking about is the specific quantity which is assigned to a thing, a measured value, and whether that measured value exists or not.

The word "two" refers to the objectively real number 2, just as "tree" refers to an objectively real tree. — Art48

That would only be the case if a Platonist ontology is true, that there is such a thing as the number 2. Since "2" is used in numerous different ways, it's very doubtful that there actually is an object referred to by "2".