Definitely a feeling for me. I feel happy. I would also say that there is a deeper state, a disposition, or something like that, which often allows me to overcome the inclination toward negative feelings and maintain, or restore happiness, like tuning in to TPF for example as a diversion. Diversions are very useful.

P.S. there's a math prof on YouTube who questions if real number "really" exist. — Art48

There is no need to assume any such thing as a number. We have numerals which are symbols, and the symbols having meaning which is dependent on the context of usage, like all symbols. The assumption of numbers is just a useful fiction employed by mathemagicians, which allows the ontology of Platonism to overrun the sciences.

Fill your cup and join the brigade of happiness. Its a joyful time of year.

Maths and formal logic are exemplars of disciplines that don't afford much importance to creativity. — Benj96

This is exactly wrong. Pure mathematics is nothing but creativity. That's why math is usually classified as an art rather than a science.

'Creativity is fundamentally the ability to come up with new ideas. An alternative term for it might be free imagination.' — Jack Cummins

Platonists would account for creativity by saying that new ideas are "discovered" rather than created. Ironically, Plato himself demonstrated this description to be inaccurate, turning instead to "the good" as the source of creativity. Appeal to "discovery" is like a cheat, avoid the difficult question of how a new form comes into existence, by saying that it already existed eternally, and was merely discovered. Determinism and "eternalism" use the same cheat, anything which appears to be new is said to have been predetermined for all time.

Happy! When I'm reading The Philosophy Forums I'm happy. Enough said!

I take it you are looking in a mirror when you manifest such words. — universeness

No, see the difference between your attitude and mine? I don't profess to know the right way, I only criticize what is obviously the wrong way, thereby keeping my mind open toward alternatives to the conventional, when the conventional has proven itself to be deficient. You seem to think that since it's the conventional way it's the right way. Then you try to argue that the obvious deficiency is acceptable, and that the ideal can still be held to be ideal despite the obvious deficiency.

Banno is correct, you are wrong! — universeness

The fact that this formulation would require an infinite amount of time, ought to indicate to you that it is actually the "wrong-headed" approach.

Have a look at the response by William Beaty and his use of 'electricity cannot be created or destroyed' and 'electricity generators don't generate electricity,' and also have a look at the 42 comments.
'Electricity is not energy it is a flow of electrons.'
Its the movement of air that causes wind. The 'energy' is the movement. Energy is transferred, due to movement of individual components. Like humans doing a Mexican wave. Each human does not move laterally they only undulate up and down but there up and down undulations cause a cumulative lateral energy waveform. The up and down undulations are conserved/transformed into a cumulative lateral, observable waveform. — universeness

I've seen it explained by Dr. Feynman (a good explainer). We ought not think of the energy as electrons moving through the copper wire, but think of the energy as moving through the field around the wire.

Banno is correct, you are wrong! — universeness

This is the mistake you incessantly demonstrate. You simply assert completely unjustified statements, then go into complete denial when evidence against your assertions is presented. You'd be much better off to keep an open mind toward things which you do not understand, rather than adhere to a prejudice which is derived from who knows where, and prevents you from furthering your understanding.

You can go with the millionaire who refuses the label due to the $100 he/she/hesh can't (in your opinion,) satisfactorily account for, if you prefer. — universeness

If it's a temporal issue, like energy is, that missing $100 becomes a huge problem when we extrapolate. If, the rate of loss is that in every second of passing time there is a 100 missing, then the entire million is gone after 10,000 seconds of time. Banno would say, just figure the loss as a fixed, invariable percentage of the total sum, then the amount missing per second becomes less as the total sum becomes less, and we have an infinite amount of time before its all gone. But there is no justification for the application of Banno's principle. It might well be that the overall quantity per time stays relatively fixed, therefore percentage increases as time passes. The cause of loss is unknown therefore how the rate of loss is fixed or unfixed in relation to the passing of time, is also unknown.

This is what you and the other two in the peanut gallery are not getting. The missing quantity occurs as time passes, all the time, therefore the loss is cumulative over time. If, in extrapolation over very large or very tiny time frames, and large or tiny space frames (according to the relationship between these two established by applicable theories), the cumulated missing or gained amount is not accounted for, these long range and short range projections become useless. And, it is impossible to account for the missing amount because it is necessarily an unknown, due to the nature of "energy" being the product of theory laden calculation.

"Sir, there is a sum of money you must pay to the government called taxes"

"Aha! But this sum of money changes for different people at different times in their life! Therefore there is no sum of money I must pay to the government called taxes! Taxes aren't real!"
. — khaled

That's right, because it's arbitrary. There is no such thing s the sum of money you have to pay, claim some expenses and other deductions, and lower the amount if you do not like it. And so tax issues can either be settled arbitrarily out of court, or become long drawn out court cases.

If only it was that easy. — khaled

You're wrong here though, it's not easy, but more difficult. The easy way is to just give in to what they say, give them what they ask for. The more difficult way is to find all the deductions you are eligible for, and reduce that amount of taxation.

That's the way reality is, the simple representation ('water boils at 100 degrees') is not the truth. The truth is complex and difficult. 'There is a temperature at which water boils' is the simple representation, but it\s not the truth, as the truth is much more complex and difficult.. We simply chop off the complex and difficult aspects, ignoring them, for the sake of making life simple. But that puts us in Plato's cave.

Here's why your wall analogy fails badly. A wall is a physical object, while the law of conservation is an abstract principle, a concept. Various physical objects will be called by the same name, ("wall" in this case), despite all sorts of deprivations. A concept must be exactly as defined, or else it's something other.

:up:
By the way, the wall analogy is not accurate because a "wall" missing a few bricks is still a "wall", but missing a few from "conservation" is not "conservation". And since there is not conservation, the law is false. And it's not a matter of seeking the missing energy, the ideal is not reality. So the thing which appears to you like it is a wall, is actually not a wall at all, because we can walk right through it. You can't stop thinking that it's a wall, and you don't believe in ghosts, so your recourse is to deny the obvious. Keep calling it a "wall", or "conservation", when it is not.

That is a non-sequitor. Just because it varies with another value doesn't mean it doesn't exist. — khaled

As I said, it means that there is no such thing as "the temperature at which something boils", which is what your claim was. The same thing will boil at many different temperatures. Spin it however you want, but your claim was false.

I really don't know, and I'm not inclined to make any judgement on that. Why don't you ask him?

I've tried that route, but maybe we could have greater success in combination.

Lee Smolin is a great contributer to the physics and the human community. I will leave it to him to dispute your sophisticated, skewed interpretations of his work. — universeness

Good, summon him up, I would appreciate that greatly.

The temperature at which something boils exists, therefore the boiling point exists. — khaled

The boiling temperature varies with pressure, so it is relative. Therefore it is not true that there is a temperature at which something boils. And accordingly it is not true to say that such a thing exists.

That is the issue with Platonic realism, it only gets validated through absolutes. However, principles of physics such as "the boiling temperature" are always relative, and therefore cannot validate such realism. So the Platonic realist turns to principles which are more "pure", free from the influence of the physical world, mathematical axioms, and attempts to demonstrate that these are absolute.

Science via scientists will always strive to improve any shortfalls or imperfections apparent in the very dependable current laws of physics which continue to demonstrate robust predictive power.
I predict your viewpoints on the conservation laws will remain mostly ignored and ridiculed.
Meantime, I will continue to listen to the real physicists regarding the laws of physics and continue to read posts from sensationalists like yourself, as a form of curio and entertainment. — universeness

Actually, contrary to your personal prediction, there is a growing movement in this direction already. It's sometimes referred to as the quest for a "Theory of Everything", and it is required because of the inconsistency between the laws of quantum mechanics and the laws of general relativity. So your prediction has actually been proven wrong already.

That's why I gave the reference to physicist Lee Smolin, and further information on quantum gravity. But even with "real" physicists disputing your views, all you can say is that quantum gravity is "hotly debated", and "we are just too far apart to be able to establish effective communications". Yes, we are far apart, because you would not even consider the enormous problem of modeling a conglomeration of massive objects like a galaxy, as having a centre of gravity. You will never move on toward discussing possible solutions when you deny the problem. And it is your insistent denial of the problem which leaves us "too far apart" for effective discourse.

Of course, the reasons for these new theories, which I've pointed you toward, are the shortfalls of the current laws, which lead to occult concepts like dark energy and dark matter. These are the shortfalls in the predictive power, due to the falsity which you deny and refuse to acknowledge. Your claim of "robust predictive power" is what is ridiculous. As reflected by your personal prediction made above, which has already been proven wrong, your idea of successful prediction is sorely deficient. Ignore and deny any evidence which is inconsistent with the prediction, and deem the predictive power as robust.

If this is where you are in your musings then we are just too far apart to be able to establish effective communications. — universeness

I knew this way back when we first engaged. You simply refused to accept and discuss the reality of the situation, opting instead to insist on the truth of some ideal.

We need to address the issue of how the ideals which are employed diverge from the reality which they are supposed to be modeling, if we want to progress in any true understanding of reality. Simply insisting that the model is a true representation, when the observations clearly demonstrate otherwise, is a pointless venture.

You totally ignore the issue of the arbitrariness of "mass" which I already explained to you. The value for mass is assigned to objects in a way to maintain consistency with theories of energy, just like the value for height was assigned in the glider experiment, in a way to maintain consistency with the conservation law, therefore it was a matter of begging the question. The idea that galaxies are "gravitationally bound", and expansion only occurs in intergalactic space, is just a convention meant to facilitate calculation. A massive object is assigned a centre of gravity, and the space within an object is not understood to be expanding, because that would make traditional concepts for representing the interactions of objects (like Newton's first law, inertial mass, etc.) inapplicable, wrong.

But the problems which arise from this conventional way of figuring mass and gravitation, demonstrated by the need for things like dark energy and dark matter, indicate that this conventional way of determining mass and gravitation is fundamentally incorrect. The incorrectness is very intuitive, because we know that objects consist of parts which are separated by space, so it would be very inaccurate to assign a centre of gravity to a large object, simply ignoring all the distinct parts, and therefore not assigning a separate centre of gravity to each part. This is why your statement, and reference to things which are "gravitationally bound", demonstrates you have little understanding of the issue. Take a look at quantum gravity:
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/could-gravitys-quantum-origins-explain-dark-energy/
https://www.space.com/loop-quantum-gravity-space-time-quantized.

So, are you suggesting that the expansion of space over time, directly affects the local measurement of 22 cm of paper? — universeness

No, it doesn't affect the measurement, that's done here and now. I am saying that the feature of reality which we know as expansion, will affect the paper if it exists for a long period of time.

A 22cm measurement would have been the same 10 billion years ago and it will be the same 10 billion years from now. The measurement is invariant and is not affected by the expansion of the universe. — universeness

This is what I am saying is false, this sort of invariance. Banno says:

This is just wrong-headed. — Banno

But if you knew a little more about these concepts, like spatial expansion, and dark energy, you'd see that this type of thinking is not wrong headed at all, it is well justified. Take a look at the article I linked to above, concerning dark energy. Though it is stated that the proposed solution is most likely incorrect, the stated problem, that expansion is accelerating, is very real. Issues such as this demonstrate that invariance is what is really "wrong-headed".

I think your attitude toward the anti-schizo establishment can be categorized as a paranoia. This puts you in the schizo category. It's a no-win situation for you, because you only encourage the divide which sets you apart and gives them power over you.

This is the common problem with any sort of anti-establishment movement. Characterizing yourself as anti-establishment (even if establishment is characterized as anti-...) puts yourself into a me against them situation which is guaranteed to render you as an oppressed individual, not having the power of the group.

I believe that the only true way to get what you want is to actually break down the divide which you seem to be intent on emphasizing. This allows you to disguise your anti-establishment passion, giving you entry into the establishment. Then you might be allowed to work from within to bring about the changes you desire. Positioning yourself as an individual who has willfully distanced oneself from the group, and is picked on because of this difference, will not get you much sympathy.

Is it the philosopher's task or aspiration? It isn't like the relevant information hasn't been presented. The public at large is responsible for what it consumes. Perhaps philosophy should try to sensationalize itself? — Pantagruel

In Plato's cave allegory it is the task of the philosopher. After escaping the cave, and getting a glimpse of the true reality, it is the responsibility of the philosopher to go back, and educate the others. The task is very difficult because the public, as you imply, is already happy in its current consumption. So I don't think it's a matter of simply presenting the reality to the public, it's more like a matter of forcing them to face reality.

That's just wrong. Quantum Electrodynamics is not about everyday stuff, but measures the fine-structure constant to ten decimal places. — Banno

This only demonstrates that you misunderstand Quantum Electrodynamics. The principles are established through observation, and the measurements you refer to, are simply an act of applying the principles. I went through this already, a number of times in this thread, because it seems really difficult for some people here to understand.

Energy is not ever directly measured. Measurements are made, and then the quantity of energy is calculated through the application of formulae to the measurements. So any supposed measurement, which is made in terms of energy (like what you suggest), is a theory laden calculation, and not a direct measurement at all. The amount of energy is calculated through application of the formulae, and the supposed measurement is a conclusion from the calculation.

As if accuracy were cumulative; as if, when I measure a piece of paper as being 22±0.1cm, somehow the error will grow such that after a week it's 22±0.7cm This is just wrong-headed. — Banno

You still don't understand. The error is in the formula through which the extrapolation is made, not in the initial measurement. That extrapolation is based in the assumption of invariance. And the assumption of invariance is the error. So for example, if your paper is measured at 22 cm, the error is in the assumption that it will continue to be 22 cm through an indefinite period of time, if it is not acted upon by a force which would change it. That's basically Newton's first law, the law of inertia, and that law is an expression of this error, the error of assuming that invariance is the natural condition of passing time.

The reality is that the simple passing of time will cause change, as if the passing of time were itself a force. And this we know from the concepts of entropy and the second law of thermodynamics, as well as spatial expansion. Invariance is a myth, a falsity. Though it is a useful principle, it is a falsity if presented as a representation of reality.

So here we are, two mutually indestructible foolish dialecticians. I don’t mind that either. — Mww

I'm good with it.

Let me see if I can help you two to understand the principle. It's quite simple really. The idea is that the laws of physics which we use are only accurate when applied to what is immediately present to us, the here and now. That is all that is observable to us, and all that these laws are tested on. The principle is that the further we project away from the immediate here and now, the less applicable the laws are, due to a changing, or evolving universe.. That this evolving universe idea describes the true nature of reality is supported by the concept of expansion of space, and the need to posit dark energy.

So in the example I gave, if in ten years time, we lose .01 percent accuracy in a specific law (the particular number used is just an arbitrary example), then over a million years that error is multiplied by 100,000 times. The error of .01 percent over ten years, represents the rate of change that the universe is undergoing, away from the applicability of that law.

As for Plato's cave, really big cave if you ask me! After 2.5k years of dedicated effort, we're still inside it. — Agent Smith

That is due to the failure of philosophy. The philosopher's task is to lead the people out of the cave. After 2.5k years, the philosophers have failed, and we remain, in the cave.

No. The relevant issue is that again you have shown that you do not grasp the maths. 1% of ten is not a smaller fraction than 1% of a million. — Banno

You seem to have difficulty understanding that what I have provided is good reasons to reject the mathematics of invariance. I have no doubt that the mathematics of invariance produces the invariant conclusion you claim. The issue is whether this mathematics produces a good representation of reality.

The existence of error, no matter how it is expressed in percentage, or whatever, indicates that invariance is a false representation. Your conclusion relies on the mathematics of invariance, and what I explained is why we ought to reject such mathematics of invariance because it provides a false representation as demonstrated by the existence of error. This is what is explained by Dr. Smolin in the referenced book. So you have not given anything relevant in your appeal to invariant mathematics, only the assertion that the application of invariant mathematics provides a conclusion based in invariant principles. That's useless toward the topic of discussion, which is whether invariance is a true representation of reality.

You need to address the issue, and explain why you believe that invariance provides us with a realistic representation. I have explained why we ought to reject such invariance as unrealistic. Now if you do not accept this, show why, or show how, invariance is a better representation. But simply stating the principles of invariant mathematics does nothing for you.

Smell is not a thing, therefore cannot in itself be an experience at all. — Mww

All I can say here, is that you use "experience" in an unusual way, which makes it difficult for me to understand your perspective. I think you are saying that an experience is necessarily of a thing. But I would think of an experience as being of an event, and an event is categorically distinct from a thing, as the activity which things are involved in. So I would understand the essential aspect of experience as activity rather than as things.

We might as you say, conclude the presence of things from experience, with a premise such as 'if there is activity then there is things which are active', but the soundness of this premise needs to be investigated, and i think that's what process philosophy does.

So I do not believe that we can get to the assumption of a particular thing in the way that you say. The "smell of coffee" is a generalization. And each time someone says "I smell coffee" this is a general statement which does not in itself give credence to the conclusion that there is in existence, a particular thing called "coffee" which is being smelled at that time.

And of course science supports what I am saying here because the experience of smelling is known to consist of an interaction of molecules inside the nose. So in this more scientific understanding there is the assumption of a multitude of things, molecules, with many differences, hence the wheel with a wide range of descriptive terms.

The assumption of "a thing" (coffee) being smelled, or "things" (molecules) really depends on the purpose of your communication. In some cases we would say there is a thing (coffee) giving off the specified odour, and that thing is smelled, but in other cases we would refer directly to the odour, assuming that there is something wafting in the air (molecules), which is what is being smelled.

Notice that the type of "thing", or "things". assumed to be involved in the activity of providing you with the experience of smell can vary greatly. This is because the existence of things is just an assumption made by us, to facilitate communication. We sense activity, and to talk about the activity we assume things which we say are doing the activity. But the type of things which we assume are doing the activity varies depending on our purpose. And so for example "things" in high energy physics is fundamental particle, and there becomes some question as to whether these things actually exist. And of course there is such questioning because "things" at any level of communication are simply assumed to facilitate the conversation.

Because coffee is an empirical object, the rule must follow from that which is the case for any empirical object, and that which is the case for any empirical object which makes the rule and thereby the circumvention of irrational reasoning possible, is the sensation by which objects are presented to us in order for there to be anything to even assign non-contradictory conceptions to in the first place. — Mww

This describes the basic premise you hold, which I don't agree with. You say "objects are presented to us" through sensation, and from this premise you conclude that "coffee is an empirical object". But I think that all sensation consists only of activity (consider the example given by others, neurological activity). What I think is that the mind creates the objects, as a type of conception, to facilitate understanding and communication. That the objects are created by the mind, rather than given by the senses is evident from the fact that the same sensation (smell in the example) can be explained through reference to different types of objects. In one description, coffee is the objects sensed. In another description, molecules are what are sensed. And in the neurological description there is some electrons or some vague type of object. This is very clear evidence that the objects are not presented to us by sensation, they are created, and assumed by the mind, in its attempt to understand its own experience of sensation.

Am I to understand by this, that the act of deceiving is the presupposition for the cause of errors in judgement? All we need to justify that, is posit what the act of deceiving is. If judgement is part of the cognitive process, the act of deceiving as cause must be antecedent to the error contained in the judgement as effect, thus also contained in the cognitive process. So what part of the cognitive process deceives? What’s worse, apparently, is whatever part that is, it may not deceive, thus may not be the cause of errors in judgement, which is to say there isn’t one. So some part of the cognitive process both deceives and doesn’t deceive, and the only way to tell which, is by whether or not there are errors in judgement. But determining whether or not there are errors in judgement can only arise from a judgement made on whether or not there has been a deception. — Mww

I don't think you are properly representing "judgement" here. Judgement necessarily applies to something external to itself, there is something judged. Even if the judger wants to judge one's own judgement, that's a second judgement which places the first as outside the second. So "judgement" necessarily implies something external, as it is always of something external or outside the act of judgement. This implies that the evidence employed in the judging, what is mulled in the mind, must say something about something other than itself, and this is what we know as inferring. So the error in judgement is principally a wrongful inference concerning the external to the mind judging.

The act of deceiving is to mislead the judge in the presentation of evidence, so as to create an erroneous inference. Notice that the concept of deception employs a separation between the judger, and the presenter of evidence. We assume such separations all the time, and this is the same principle whereby we assume "objects", through an assumed separation between a thing and its environment. The assumption is done for the sake of understanding. So for the sake of understanding, we assume a separation between senses and mind, and this allows that the senses deceive the mind. The senses present to the mind, evidence in such a way as to mislead the mind and create erroneous judgement.

The issue, or outcome of all this is that separation is very real and results in erroneous judgement. Separation is also the principle by which we assume "objects". However, our assumption of "objects" has a strong degree of arbitrariness, depending on purpose. This means that our understanding of separation has a strong degree of arbitrariness as well. But since separation is real, and is responsible for erroneous judgement, there ought to be real principles which we can produce for an understanding of separation, which would allow us to understand real objects.

What a incredibly foolish….errr, irrational…..way to do things, wouldn’t you say? Let’s just remain with the idea there isn’t a deception, there is only a subsumption of conceptions in a synthesis of them that doesn’t relate to that which the conceptions represent. That this doesn’t belong to that isn’t a deception, it’s merely a misunderstanding, which manifests as a error in judgment, proven by a different understanding that does relate different conceptions properly. Simple, sufficient, logically non-contradictory. What more do we need? — Mww

I strongly disagree with this. I think that to deny the reality of deception is what is incredibly foolish.

Oh, but I can, and I’m justified in doing so, if the point to make was the valid notion of differences in experiences relative to differences in the objects senses. — Mww

OK, you can do what you want, it's a free world, but I don't buy your justification because you are making a very similar category mistake to the others. You were saying that "the smell of coffee" is experienced as a "thing", rather than saying what it really is, a generalization. It is this fact, that "the smell of coffee" represents a generalization, which allows for the vast variance within how "the smell of coffee" is described, that is demonstrated by Banno's flavour wheel. This intrinsic variance, along with the possibility of contradiction, indicates that what "the smell of coffee" refers to is not a thing.

Deception is merely error in judgement, and judgement is not what the senses do, so….. — Mww

Again, you are misrepresenting. Error in judgement can have many causes. Deception is a cause of error in judgement. It is not itself the error in judgement. You ought to separate the means from the end. That the error in judgement occurs, as the end, is evidence that the deception has been successful. But the act of deceiving is not necessarily successful. When we recognize that deception is a valid possibility as a cause of error in judgement, we can take measures to prevent it, and that includes not relying on that which might deceive (the senses in this case).

And you really should relinquish your love affair with David Stove. — Mww

:up:

The relevant issue is the applicability of the law. Application demonstrates a degree of error, the cause of which is not accounted for. Since it's not accounted for, we do not understand it. If the activity described by the law, which the law is applied to changes over time ,then the margin of error, and the applicability of the law would also change over time. That is what Smolin deals with in "Time Reborn". He calls it "the evolution of laws", and he uses the concept to support his theory of "cosmological natural selection". Other relevant concepts include quantum gravity, anthropic principle, variability in the mass of fundamental particles, and of course expansion with dark energy.

The significant feature here, which is very relevant to the discussion on conservation of energy is expansion, and the need to posit dark energy. The need to assume "dark energy" in cosmology demonstrates that the traditional concept of "energy" (its quantity dictated by human calculations) along with the proposed conservation of this energy, cannot account for all the 'real' energy in the universe.
https://physicsworld.com/a/dark-energy-emerges-when-energy-conservation-is-violated/

If, as the article claims, the concept of dark energy is the product of the violation of conservation, then we can see that at earlier times in the universe, when expansion appears to be faster, what is really the case is that conservation is less applicable. The crux here is the real degree of invariance of mass of the electron. It is assumed that the electron has a constant rest mass. But an electron is not at rest, and can be induced to a high speed. And the electron is the common means by which we relate the massless (immaterial) photons to the massive (material) particles.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1112.0225

Check out Lee Smolin's "Time Reborn". He is a PHD physicist and he provides a good explanation as to why we ought not think of the laws of physics as timelessly invariant.

I think the opinion that the conservation laws are not prefect is a rational sound landing zone, but typing that they are false or untrue, leaves you skidding all over the place or leaves you like that millionaire, who rejects the label, as they can only absolutely account for $999,900. — universeness

The fault which makes me say "false" is not that the law is an approximation, or imperfect. The fault which leads to the accusation of "false" is in the way that the law is represented, and applied, as timelessly invariant.

So, the issue is that we as human beings occupy an extremely limited spatial perspective, and also an extremely limited temporal perspective. Our range of possible observations (possible to us) is very small in relation to the broad temporal spatial extent of the universe. We do experimentation in this narrow range of observational capacity and produce our laws from this.

Now, the observations do not match the laws perfectly, as you say, and there is some slight variance, even within our small range of observational capacity. Yet we extrapolate from these laws to the wider universe applying the laws as if they are perfect representations. in this mode of extrapolation. In this mode of extrapolation, we cannot adjust for the imperfections, the variances, because we do not know the causes of them.

Here's a simplified example. Suppose some experimentation is carried out over ten years, and it proves to have a relatively insignificant margin of error of .01 percent, and we produce a law based on this. If we extrapolate from ten years to a million years, then the margin of error might be multiplied 100,000 times. The law becomes useless. But since we have nothing to apply in making that extrapolation, except that law, we'd proceed and produce conclusions about that time period of a million years, which would be completely wrong. And we'd have no way to make adjustments for that margin of error within the law, because if we could do that we would know the cause of the error, and we'd simply write the law in a way to eliminate the error.

Coffee with sugar will always be experienced as coffee with sugar, coffee with just milk will be experienced as coffee with just milk. — Mww

No, no, no. You cannot make blanket generalizations like this. A small coffee with triple sugar is much different from a large with single sugar. And the experience of a coffee with milk and just a couple grains of sugar is much more similar to the experience of a coffee with just milk, than it is to the experience of a coffee with sugar, despite the fact that it is a coffee with sugar. That is why it is commonly said by philosophers that the senses deceive us.

So you are now saying that since George Eliot was also named Mary Ann Evans, these are two distinct individuals, and that the author of Middlemarch and Mary Ann Evans are different people. — Banno

No, I never said any such thing, and I can't see how this is relevant.

We can have two different descriptions of the very same thing. We can have two names for the very same thing. We can have a description and a name that both refer to one thing. — Banno

The point was that Isaac implied that they are not the same thing, by explicitly confirming that there is not a one-to-one correspondence relation between what the specified "neural activity" refers to, and what "I smell coffee" refers to. Clearly, we do not have two different names of the same thing then.
In the case where two distinct names refer to the same thing (like your example), there is a one to one correspondence in what the names refer to.

Further, if "neural activity", and " I smell coffee" are both descriptions, rather than names, then there is no identified, or named thing which these are supposed to describe. If you don't identify the thing which is being described, then there is no reason to believe that they describe the same thing. You have two separate descriptive phrases "neural activity", and "the smell of coffee", and no entity identified as the thing which these both describe.

If, as Isaac seemed to want to say, one is the named thing, and the other a description of the thing, then what "neural activity" and what "the smell of coffee" each refer to are of separate categories, like one being the subject, and the other the predicate. So in this case it would be a category mistake to say they both refer to the same thing, as "red" does not refer to the thing which is describe as being red, unless we are identifying the particular red of that thing.

Another possibility would be that there is an assumed thing, which the specified "neural activity", and "smell of coffee", as descriptive phrases, are both describing. But what could this third thing possibly be? And why assume a third thing which we have no indication of its existence, just because that's what's required to support such a piss-poor ontology?

So no matter how you look at it, what Isaac was saying did not make any sense.

You failed to note "provided this functions as part of the task at hand". Look to the use. The meaning of a sentence is found in its use. — Banno

The point was that it cannot function for the task at hand, as that would be made impossible by the prescribed circumstances.

On your argument, the copy of Joyce's Ulysses sitting next to me on the bookcase is two different things, a novel and a block of cellulose. — Banno

You're not quite right there Banno, because "novel" and "block of cellulose" are both descriptive expressions, and neither names a particular thing like "the copy of Joyce's Ulysses sitting next to me on the bookcase" does. The latter is the name you have given to the item, indicated by the definite article "the". The other two are descriptive terms used to describe the item, that is evident from your use of the indefinite article "a" rather than the definite article "the".

Therefore in your usage neither "a novel" nor "a block of cellulose" name a thing, as indicated by the indefinite article. So your statement that these are "two different things" is fundamentally ungrammatical, and simply employed as a trick of sophistry for the sake of a failing argument. Those are just two different descriptive expressions which could be used to describe one and the same thing, the named article. Neither "a novel" nor "a block of cellulose" name a thing, and you practise deception by suggesting that "two different things" are named here.

Of course it can be described with any word one wants to use, and provided this functions as part of the task at hand, that's fine. That's how words work. — Banno

The point though, is that anything which can be described with any word that one wants, (i.e. there is no degree of correctness or wrongness to the description, and absolute arbitrariness is allowed for), will actually not be described at all, when that arbitrarily chosen word is applied. This is because the consequence of designating the thing as describable by any word, is to designate that there is no correct description. And this designation is not itself a description, it is a statement about the thing which does not describe it. In "talking about" a thing, we can go beyond description to say something about the thing which is not descriptive. That allows us to say, about the thing, that it cannot be described, without self-contradiction.

This is part of the reason why "the ineffable" is so difficult, and appears as sort of a paradox. "Description" is a limited expression, it implies a certain type, or way of saying something about something. "Description" is bounded to allow that we can say more about a thing than the concept of "description" allows. This implies that "description" is a part of a larger category "talking about".

Then we have "naming" of the thing, which is categorically different from describing it because it is meant to identify without saying anything about the thing. That's why naming can be absolutely arbitrary, it does not necessarily say anything about the article. So as a basic philosophical principle, "naming" does not say anything "about" the the thing, it is categorically distinct from "talking about". We can apply a name without saying anything about the named thing.

However, we can twist and distort the concept of "naming" to fit it into the category of "talking about". We can say that naming is to say something about the thing, to say that it is the thing which bears this name. (The problem though, and keep this in mind, is that this is deception, because simply naming a thing does not actually show which thing bears that name.) Now we have created a form of "talking about" a thing which is distinct from describing, yet in the same category (through the means of that deception). The categorical separation between "talking about" and "naming" has been annihilated.

So we use "the ineffable" to name (notice the definite article) the thing which we cannot talk about. And if we maintain the categorical separation between "naming" and "talking about", there is no problem with the concept of a named thing which cannot be talked about. But when we make "naming" a form of "talking about", then even to name a thing as the ineffable is contradictory, creating the appearance of some sort of paradox. But this is really just the result of that faulty procedure which describes "naming" as a type of "talking about".

ndeed. It does exactly that. — Isaac

So, before you explicitly said there is no one-to-one correspondence, now you explicitly say there is one-to-one correspondence? What are you really saying?

Will is then linked to choice and as you say, we can drive a wedge between the two. What does the world look like now? — Agent Smith

As I said, will is wrongfully linked to choice. When we drive a wedge between the two it is to change the way we look at the world. Then the world looks more real because we see causation in a realistic way. Consider Plato's cave allegory, the real existence of "the good" is not even acknowledged by those still in the cave.

That's your claim. It's not what I've said. — Isaac

What you said is that there is a lack of one-to-one correspondence, and then you described this as a gap. I can remove "gap" if you want, and say that the lack of corresponds presents a "difference". This implies that the two are not the same.

It's not missing. The difference is that one's a name and the other is a
So epiphenomenalism then? Just because a correspondence has yet to be empirically demonstrated does not mean there isn’t one.
— Mww

collection of neurons firing. — Isaac

So, the difference implies that the named thing is not the same thing as the described thing.

You've misunderstood reference. 'The apple' refers to the apple. They're two different things (one an expression, the other a fruit). They don't both 'refer' to different things. 'The apple' refers. The apple is just an apple. — Isaac

You have this wrong. It is not me misunderstanding, I fully understand, that you are producing a bad misrepresentation. This is not analogous to "apple" and "fruit", where "fruit" refers to the type of thing which the apple is. "Neurons firing" refers to a completely different type of thing than the named thing, "smell", and cannot be said to be a type of smell.

If your proposal is that the named thing is "neurons firing", and a special type of neurons firing constitutes a smell, then we might have something to work on. But the proposal that "smell" is the named thing, rather than the descriptive term, and "neurons firing" is the descriptive phrase rather than a named thing, is simply nonsensical, and cannot take us anywhere.

Of course it does. Your spleen is in the group {parts of MU}. — Isaac

You've changed the name from "MU" to "parts of MU". Of course the name "parts of MU" name the parts, that is explicit. But the name "MU" does not name any of the parts, which was your claim that it names the parts.

That group was christened by naming something MU which was not a simple. You christened that group by naming the entity MU even though you do not know it's actual constituents. The point of all this being that you don't need to know what makes up the sensation 'smelling coffee' in order to name it. — Isaac

No Isaac, that's still nonsensical, logic does not work that way. Naming a thing such as "MU" does not imply that you've "christened" a group named "the parts of MU". That's a basic category mistake. You ought to distinguish between naming an individual thing, and naming a group, collection, set, or type, of thing. If the thing named is supposed to be a group, then this must be made explicit in the naming, as you do with "the parts of...". But if you just name a thing "MU", you are naming one individual, not a collection of things.

ndeed, but denying a one-to-one correspondence is not, I think, the same as denying a correspondence of any sort.

What I'm saying is that we group some loose collection of neural activity as 'smelling coffee' so whenever any activity which falls into that group occurs we're inclined to think that we're smelling coffee. — Isaac

Isaac, in order to say that a specific collection of neural activity corresponds with smelling coffee, this must be a one-to-one correspondence. Otherwise that activity could sometimes signify something else, or smelling coffee could occur without any of that neural activity. It makes no sense at all to say that this neural activity corresponds with smelling coffee, but it's not a one-to-one correspondence. If it sometimes corresponds, and sometimes does not, then we cannot make the general conclusion that this neural activity corresponds with smelling coffee.

The contention that the aroma of coffee cannot be described in words is blatantly wrong. — Banno

Yeah, judging by your wheel of aroma, it can be described in pretty much whatever words anyone wants to use. And something that can be described in whatever words anyone wants, is pretty much the same thing as something that can't be described with words at all.

Sure there is an association but the question is how closely are these two related. If we premise that all willed acts are chosen acts, then we run into the problem which Socrates and Plato exposed. Sometimes choices are not acted upon, we do not end up doing what we choose to do. This would demonstrate "choice" to be more broadly defined than "will". Not all choices are willed.

And when we start driving this wedge between choice and will, it starts to appear possible that some willful acts might not even be chosen. This is what happens sometimes when we act from habit. You might willfully choose to walk to the store, for example, but you do not consciously choose all the particular actions which get you there, like each individual movement of your legs and feet. So there is a cause and effect process which proceeds from the willful act which makes it not required to choose each particular aspect of a willful act, after the causal chain is put into action. Therefore we do not necessarily choose the particular acts which follow from the habit, but in relation to moral responsibility, and law, these acts are still willful acts.

Now we've broken the association between will and choice, showing that it is a faulty representation. Not all chosen acts are willed, and not all willed acts are chosen. We have no means for logical implication either way. Choice does not imply will and will does not imply choice.

But this dead end does necessarily impede our process of understanding "will", because we have other alternatives. And by the process of elimination, understanding advances. "Will" is commonly associated with "intention", such that a willed act is necessarily an intentional act and vise versa. We might assume that there is an equivalence between the two. All willed acts are intentional, and intentional acts are willed. And when we look at the defining feature of "intentional", we find "purpose". The common definition is such that all purposeful acts are intentional acts. "Intention" is what gives purpose to an act. So when we look at an act, and judge that there is purpose to the act, we can say that it is an intentional act, and being intentional implies that it was willed. We can conclude that a purposeful act is an intentional act, and rely on our judgement of "purpose" in acts, as an indication of whether the act is willed. ( "Choice" having been shown to be unreliable.)

Of course you will see all sorts of mechanistic acts in artificial things, which have purpose, and wonder how it is that each of these acts is a willed act. But artificial things are created, so their very existence is willed, and so by extension each act of the artificial thing is instilled with intention by the willful act which creates the thing. So the intention of a willed act has the capacity to continue in time far beyond the point in time which the act was willed, through the chain of cause and effect. This is the consequences of a willed act. The "end" might be far in the future from the beginning, but it is still intentional as the result of a willed act.

It seems that some other posters are of the view that will is tied/linked to choice. — Agent Smith

I addressed this issue already. Choice is made by the mind, reason, or rational intellect, and the will is not "tied" to that choice or else it would not be free. If the will were tied to choice, we would not be able to do other than what we choose as the right thing to do. But experience shows us that people often make a choice about what ought to be done, then still end up acting otherwise, without being forced to act otherwise. That is because the will is free, and not tied to choice.

Will, to me, is simply a kind of desire. — Agent Smith

Desire is just an inclination toward an object or goal. Will is what acts on the desire. That we do not necessarily act on our desires indicates that will is not a kind of desire.