Because they are!!! We observe fundamental particles interacting with each other and producing — Nickolasgaspar

Not really, we observe activity, and assume that there is particles involved in this activity. The "matter" which is supposed to substantiate the existence of the particles is just an assumption.

Empirically regular properties that we can observe , quantify and predict. — Nickolasgaspar

See, the properties are observed, not the particles.

Matter is "cosmic energy" at a specific energetic state. Fundamental subatomic particles are registered as energetic glitches with a set of properties (charge spin etc). Since we are well in the quantum scale our empirically evolved language has limited explanatory power. — Nickolasgaspar

I haven't the faintest idea what you might mean by "cosmic energy", and how this might relate to "matter". Can you just leave that aside please, and stick to the subject, "matter".

Are you expecting a definition like " milk from a cosmic cow"? Its a freaking label we put on this specific phenomenon that appears to be the sole enabler of everything we can interact and detect.
You can google "matter" you know!. There are definition and descriptions (analysis of its parts). — Nickolasgaspar

Again, I haven't the faintest idea what you are talking about here with your metaphors. Can we just stick to the subject?

Yes I agree. I don't see a question. — TheMadMan

Doesn't this answer the question of the op then: "How does matter arise from consciousness?". "Matter" is an assumption which the conscious mind makes. We could then proceed in a method similar to Berkeley, and inquire as to whether this is a necessary assumption. Berkeley concludes that it is not.

Anyone can search the internet for material to back up one's biased opinions. Your referenced "academic material" was off topic and not interesting to me. Sorry Nickolasgaspar. (Now I apologize, so I am somewhat affected by your suffering, or maybe just being polite).

I guess we both know why you are avoiding this challenge and to be fair when I lay facts on the table...nobody really want's fight for a lost cause.
Its your right, enjoy whatever this is (but its not philosophy). — Nickolasgaspar

The more you beg the less I am inclined toward submission. I will enjoy, while you suffer, but I'll make it perfectly clear, in all honesty, my enjoyment is derived from what I am doing, not from your suffering. There is no "shared experience" here (to quote Janus), because you've had no success in your attempt to communicate.

Thats what we know on the scientific front.
Im asking philosophically and even experientially. — TheMadMan

As I said in the first post we assume "matter" as the reason for the observed temporal continuity, consistency, in those observed properties and measurements.

No, I see that you are extremely biased and opinionated, you pay no attention to reason, therefore I have no inclination to give you what you beg for. Your suffering has no emotional affect on me.

What you are describing as matter is just the physical properties, observed and measured. My question is for all levels of matter that we know, to the quarks. — TheMadMan

Isn't all we know, at all levels, "physical properties, observed an measured"? So, what more are you asking for?

By studying our world we observe properties of matter giving rise to the everything around us...not the other way our. — Nickolasgaspar

Why do you say that these are properties of "matter"? If all we observe is properties, and "why" questions are fallacious teleology, how do you get "matter" here?

Correct , the diversity of properties emerging from different arrangements of matter is the amazing thing. Asking "why" this is possible its like a kid asking his mum ....why the sky is blue as if there is a purpose behind it. — Nickolasgaspar

Again, if we observe arrangements, what is this "matter" you assume here?

I beg you to prove unfair. — Nickolasgaspar

Beg all you want, it just doesn't move me.

How does matter arise from consciousness? — TheMadMan

Matter is purely conceptual. Traditionally it's the concept Aristotle used to account for what was observed as the temporal continuity of sameness. As time passes it appears like some aspects of the observed world do not change. "Matter" was proposed as the concept which relates to the real unchanging features of the observed world. What does not change as time passes is matter. So, simply put, we see that some features remain unchanged as time passes, we figure there must be a reason for this, and we posit 'matter' as the reason for this. That is how "matter" arises from consciousness.

Like….the only possible analysis of the one reduces to the other? If I made such a preposterous deduction, I would not be so inclined to admit to having a degree in philosophy. — Mww

You actually made an even more preposterous reduction Mww. I explained very clearly why there must be some form of "judgement" inherent within sensibility, and you then reduced this "judgement" to a faculty of "thinking", deducing that only an act of thinking could produce a "judgement".

Surely you must understand that subconscious mental activity is just as much a part of the human psyche as conscious mental activity. Why not acknowledge that this subconscious activity involves some form of "judgement" just like conscious mental activity involves judgement?

Or, we could have it your way, and insist that "judgement' implies "thinking", so that we would have 'conscious thinking' and 'subconscious thinking'. But 'subconscious thinking' really doesn't make sense because thinking is considered to be the act of the conscious mind. And that\s why you were right to suggest that we should have it my way. And in saying that, you are just as right as I am.

I think MU needs a "reality check". — Janus

That's rich, coming from the person who insists on something called "shared experience". And when asked to explain how this makes sense, you refer to a shared plate of food as an example. Reality check: a plate of food is not at all the same type of thing as experience.

If you would have explained how we share our experiences through language and communication, I would have accepted this as a valid justification of "shared experience". Instead, you wanted to pose "shared experience" as a necessary requirement for language and communication, instead of accepting the reality that language and communication are a necessary requirement for "shared experience".



I've been arguing honestly, but you and I are speaking in completely different ways. That is the honest truth, and it's been obvious since the beginning of this exchange, when you asserted that there is no such thing as a specific scientific method, and insisted that there is a specific method which constitutes the philosophical method. We obviously have contrary opinions as to what constitutes "science" and "philosophy". Whether the ideas you express are what you honestly believe, or not, doesn't really concern me, I simply recognize them as fiction.

This is tantamount to proposing that sensibility thinks, from which follows that given that understanding is the faculty of thought, there are now two thinking faculties in the same system. What a mess that would turn out to be. — Mww

Yes, and what a mess the human being is. We're torn apart by the difference between rational thought and bodily desires, such that we are sometimes overwhelmed by emotional feelings, anxiety and stress. Plato found many examples, (of what you crudely express as "two thinking faculties in the same system"), such as the thirsty man who knows that the available water is not potable. This man is torn by the two "faculties" in the same system. Therefore the evidence supports what I said, two distinct sources of "judgement" inclining us toward contrary actions.

You tell me. Something tastes good, turns out to make you sick, so……what, it really didn’t taste good?

Have it your way. — Mww

Of course, because you realize I'm right. How would you define "good"? Or would you simply equivocate with two senses of "good", one for things that taste "good", and another for what is beneficial to your survival, or "rationally good"?

I'm not wasting further time on your distortions. — Janus

Of course not. Like Mww above, it becomes overwhelmingly obvious that I am right. When the meaning of what you say is actually analyzed, it is revealed to be an absurdity.



That a principle is useful in application, and therefore can be used in making predictions, does not imply that the principle is "scientific". The axioms of mathematics are very useful in making predictions, but they are not scientific. Do you recognize the difference between a scientifically proven hypothesis and an axiom? Any way that you might formulate the principle of relativity, it is always an expression of an ontological principle, an axiom, not a scientific theory. Consider the following formulations;

The principle of relativity states that there is no physical way to differentiate between a body moving at a constant speed and an immobile body. It is of course possible to determine that one body is moving relative to the other, but it is impossible to determine which of them is moving and which is immobile. — https://www.tau.ac.il

In physics, the principle of relativity is the requirement that the equations describing the laws of physics have the same form in all admissible frames of reference. — Wikipedia: Principle of relativity

Notice that the first formulation is a statement of what is impossible. it is impossible to differentiate between an immobile body, and a body moving at a constant speed. How do you think that this, if it was presented as an hypothesis rather than as an axiom, could be tested in experimentation, so as to confirm it as a scientific theory?

The second formulation is a derivative of the first. It affirms that any body moving at a constant speed can serve as the grounding for a frame of reference, a point of rest (rest frame), and the laws of physics will be equally applicable from each. Notice how this is a grounding principle for the laws of physics, as stated in the quoted passage, describing how the laws of physics may be applied. It is expressed as a "requirement" for the laws of physics, thereby separating the principle of relativity from the laws of physics. It is not itself one of the laws of physics, but an ontological principle, an axiom, which dictates the applicability of the laws of physics.

Because you seem to misunderstand the difference between axioms and scientifically proven hypotheses, Nickolasgaspar, I suggest that you look a little more closely into the difference between what is derived from science, and what is derived from ontology. That ought to improve your understanding.

Two experiences of the same thing at the same time qualifies as a shared experience in my lexicon. — Janus

That your "lexicon" describes two distinct, but similar experiences as one shared experience indicates that it is not logically rigorous.

f we shared a plate of food that would not entail that we ate exactly the same items on the plate: that would be impossible. — Janus

If you do not understand the difference between two people sharing one plate of food, and the two distinct experiences that these two people are undergoing while sharing that one plate of food, and you conclude that because it is one plate of food being shared, the two experiences must be one shared experience, then I'm afraid that I am at a loss to dispel your misunderstanding of this matter. I'll give it a try anyway.

Let's start with this. Do you understand the difference between an event, and the participants in the event? Do you agree that the fact that the participants share in the event, does not imply that what is the property of any of the participants, is shared by the event, as property of the event? That would be a composition fallacy.

So here's an example of this fallacious way of thinking. Suppose someone gets raped, and one of the two participants in that event has a very enjoyable experience. And you conclude that since this person who has the enjoyable experience, is a participant in a shared experience, the other participant also has a very enjoyable experience as well, being a participant in that shared experience. Do you see the problem with your fallacious "shared experience"?

No it isn't. Its a scientific theory that ticks all boxes. It provides a sufficient narrative, hasdescriptive power non extreme conditions and it offers accurate predictions allowing us to producetechnical applications. — Nickolasgaspar

It's incredible the way you just make things up. Are you a professional fiction writer?

If we both see the same kinds of things in front of us that qualifies as a shared experience. — Janus

No, it means that we are each having the same kind of experience. Two distinct experiences which are both of the same kind does not justify the claim of one "shared experience".

This is definitely true for the quantitative infinite, but I'm not so sure about the qualitative. — spirit-salamander

I do not see how "infinite" could be anything other than quantitative. I don't see how to conceive of an infinite quality. What would that even mean? Notice that the "omni" prefix sometimes used to describe God's qualities, does not mean "infinite". In fact it's more like the inverse of infinite, as the limit to the quality, whereas "infinite" means unlimited.

Certainly, what you say has never been uncontroversial:

"In VI. 4. 2 Plotinus connects the problem of soul's presence in body with a larger issue, that of the presence of intelligible reality in the sensible world. He is aware that in doing this he is confronting one of the most difficult problems facing any Platonist. Among the difficulties presented by Plato in his Parmenides concerning the theory of Forms is that of the presence of a single Form in a multitude of particular sensible objects (131ac): how could one Form (for example, the Form of beauty) be present in many (beautiful) things without being divided up among them?
The presence of the Form in a multitude seems to mean destruction of the Form as a whole, as a unity. This cannot be right. But to save the Form's unity, one must abandon its presence in many things. This too is unacceptable. Plato himself gives no clear indication as to how one is to resolve this dilemma. Aristotle considered it as yet another decisive reason for rejecting Plato's theory of Forms (Metaphysics, 1. 6). The problem remained unresolved, lying deep, as a possibly fatal flaw, in the heart of Platonic philosophy. The Middle Platonists were aware of it, but they contented themselves with references to the ‘mysterious’ relation between intelligible and sensible reality. Plotinus' Ennead VI. 4–5 is the first Platonist text we have which faces the issue squarely." (Dominic J. O'Meara - Plotinus - An Introduction to the Enneads)

Plotinus' own solution is also considered controversial by some. — spirit-salamander

The theory of participation is flawed, and Plato exposed this. I believe that Aristotle did provide a workable resolution by placing actuality as necessarily prior to potentiality, his so-called cosmological argument.

The concept of individual parts partaking of the whole, makes the whole passive, as being partaken of, without changing. But the active parts must receive their actuality, or activity from somewhere, as cause, and the somewhere cannot be the passive whole. This is why Aristotle proposes a further actuality, which is properly an immaterial actuality, like the soul, which therefore cannot be described in spatial terms, like the activity of parts.

Plotinus does not provide a solution, because the One which is proposed as the source of all, is said to be an infinite potentiality. But this meets the problem which Aristotle expressed, an infinite potentiality could not actualize itself. So there is no means (cause) whereby everything could proceed from the One.

Great example commonly used in favor of this argument is Albert Einstein's approach in developing the Theory of General Relativity. Something that is also important is that the Theory was "Verified" and accepted a over a night after a historic observation without having the chance of any falsification period! (so falsification is not always important too!). — Nickolasgaspar

Instead of using Einstein's relativity as an example of how science is tainted, you ought to simply realize that this theory is unscientific. The principle of relativity, upon which Einstein's theory is based, is unverifiable, therefore not science, it's ontology.

After all if I ask you to describe the scientific method...you will end up naming a bunch of actions.
The same is true for Philosophy.
1. epistemology (first learn what we know and how we know something -on a specific subject).
2. Physika (reevaluate or update your epistemology through empirical evaluation).
3. Metaphysics. reflect on that updated knowledge and use it to construct hypotheses reaching beyond our current knowledge
4.5.6. What are the implication of those hypotheses in Ethics , Aesthetics and Politics.
Restart...project your conclusions on our current body of knowledge ...etc. — Nickolasgaspar

That's strange, I have a degree in philosophy and I was never taught any of this. it's very fictional, and not at all representative of how philosophy is actually taught, in my experience.

I know that most philosophers are shocked when they hear these things for the first time, but I find them to be far more important than any other aspect of Philosophy...if our goal is to become good Philosophers. — Nickolasgaspar

Right, most philosophers are shocked when they hear of your "philosophical method", because it's absolutely foreign to them. Why do you call them "philosophers", when the philosophical method is foreign to them?

There is a form of judgement regarding intuition, or, sensibility itself, which describes the condition of the subject, as such, in his perception of real objects. Best represented as how he feels about that which he has perceived, as opposed to what he may eventually know about it. That the sunset is beautiful is empirical, how the subject reacts to the mode or manner in which the sunset is beautiful, which are given from the sensation alone, is an aesthetic judgement by which the subject describes to himself the state of his condition. — Mww

This is close to what I was suggesting, but let me take a slightly different aesthetic example, to make things clearer. Suppose it's a nice summer day and I walk past a garden of flowers, and notice a vast array of different shades of colour, and I think about how beautiful all those different colours are, in that particular array. Within my sensibility I have distinguished all sorts of different shades of colour, so that I perceive, or see, the landscape as completely varied in colour, and beautiful in this way.

What I am saying is that inherent within my sensibility, there is some sort of "judgement", which "decided" to present this display to me in a way which is beautiful, or pleasant. And if we move here to "pleasure" instead of "beauty", the nature of this sort of "judgement" becomes more emphasized. We cannot describe the pleasure we get from sensations in terms of a simple physical reaction to external stimuli because something inherent within the sensibility must judge whether the sensation ought to be experienced as pleasurable or as painful. This is the type of "judgement" which I think we must consider as inherent within sensibility. It is not my conscious mind which upon receiving the sensation decides that the sensation ought to be classed as pleasurable, the sensation is already judged as pleasurable before I have time to think about it. And of course this is even more emphasized with pain.

It is easy to see one cannot be deceived by how he feels, insofar as his feeling IS his condition at the time of it. — Mww

I don't buy this at all. I think what you propose here is sophistic trickery. I think that "judgement" which inheres within sensibility could very often be wrong. What happens if I eat something, and I think that it tastes good, but it ends up making me sick? Clearly that inherent "judgement", which judged it as good was mistaken. You might argue that the inherent judgement was "pleasurable", and this is different from "good", but this doesn't suffice, because being sick is not pleasurable either.

Therefore there is a problem with your qualification, "at the time of it". You'd say that at the time of eating the substance, it was pleasurable, and I was not mistaken in that sensation. But clearly there was a mistake involved here, the mistake which made the harmful substance appear at that moment to be pleasurable. I think that this condition, "at the time of", is really a deceptive phrase. Nothing is ever judged in relation to "the present moment", it is always judged in relation to the past and future.

So perhaps it might be true as you say that a person is never wrong in a judgement of "at the time of", but this is not a real judgement which is ever really made, so it must be disregarded as irrelevant. Our judgements are directed toward what just happened, or what is about to happen. For simplicity sake, I might say "I am doing...right now", but if I have to truthfully describe my actions, I must make a division between what I just did, and what I am about to do. Then "at the time of" becomes an illusion.

Say you are with someone and she says, "See that dog over there; what kind do you think it is?". Say it's a very large dog, maybe a Great Dane. Do you think the other person is likely to say "Oh, it's so small, maybe a Chihuahua"?

Have you had many experiences something like say you are with some people in the city and you see a car speeding towards you and another person says "Oh, look the waves are breaking well, and there's a lovely dog running towards us; let's go for a swim"? — Janus

I do not see the relationship you are trying to propose. Words are meaning based, therefore based in intention. There is no logical relation between a person's experience and a person's use of words. Similar acts of word usage do not imply the same experience. The similar acts may be used to justify a claim of similar experience, but two distinct yet similar experiences does not make one "shared experience".

If you don't think we can generally agree about what objects are where, what kinds of objects they are, how large or small, and so on, then I don't know what planet you are on. — Janus

You seem to be missing the point. What I objected to, is your use of "shared experience". All that is required for agreement is similarity, and two similar things (experiences) does not justify the claim of one "shared experience".

My argument assumes total alteration. — spirit-salamander

I don't see how you come to the conclusion that God must be altered. To take away, or subtract from the infinite leaves it no less infinite. So if the defining feature of God is "infinite", subtracting from Him would leave Him still infinite, therefore unaltered. This is what Socrates argued of "the idea". It doesn't matter how many things partake of the same idea, the idea remains the same regardless.

“…. For truth or illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it is thought. (…) But in accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgement—neither a true nor a false one….”
(A294/B350) — Mww

Intuition itself maybe be mistaken. Perhaps, faulty intuition ought not be called false judgement, if we should restrict the definition of "judgement''. But this is a different matter. However there must be some form of "judgement", though not rational judgement which is inherent within intuition, and this "judgement" may be mistaken. Since there is already some form of judgement inherent within the intuited sense perception, and this judgement may be mistaken, it is very clear that sense perception may be deception. That is self-deception, which is often considered as a virtue because it is the basis of courage, confidence, and certitude. But taken beyond reasonable levels, following intuition becomes a vice, due to the propensity for mistake.

First of all there isn't such a thing as "A" scientific method. Science have many methods but that is a different topic. — Nickolasgaspar

The scientific method is very explicit, consisting of hypothesis, experimentation, observation, etc.. Why do you think that there is no such thing as the scientific method?

Now if you noticed I identified the method of philosophy I was talking about (Aristotle).
The fundamental steps are the following.
1. Epistemology
2. Physika (Science)
3. Metaphysics
4. Ethics
5. Aesthetics
6. Politics
and back to epistemology for additional knowledge.
So if a scientist or anyone decides to skip those first two basic steps he is placing his inquiry on a really shaky ground. — Nickolasgaspar

I do not see how this describes a method at all, you just name a bunch of subjects.

The ONLY training one needs to do philosophy is to reason correctly, obey the steps of the philosophical method and challenge his preconceptions. — Nickolasgaspar

Well, naming a bunch of subjects does not provide a "philosophical method". Perhaps if there was such a thing as "the steps of the philosophical method", it might be a simple matter for the person to get trained in the philosophical method. However, unlike the explicit scientific method, I really do not think that there is an explicit philosophical method which a person could follow.

Why should God, as One, not be His own divisor or boundary-puller, directed towards Himself? — spirit-salamander

If God is necessarily one, then He cannot divide Himself. If He is capable of dividing Himself, you cannot describe Him as necessarily one.

Even if a principle must always have parts, I refer to the Injury Problem: — spirit-salamander

This is an expression of the same problem. It assumes that God is one, and many at the same time. But until the proper principle is applied, which could allow the same thing to be one and many at the same time, the problem described is just fictional, a derivative of the base contradiction of being one and many at the same time.

Okay, then I say God was totally inactive before creation. — spirit-salamander

This doesn't resolve anything, because now you need a cause to make God become active.

Would you agree thatcreatio ex nihilo in the strict sense can only mean creatio ex deo?

The scholars or experts in the philosophy of religion: Daniel Soars, Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker, Bill Vallacella (Maverick Philosopher) whom I quote in the OP see it that way. They all advocate panentheism instead of theism in order to avoid the logical problem. The same applies to the mystic Jakob Boehme.

If in theism stuff of God is the "material" for creation, and considering the following: — spirit-salamander

You'd have to explain to me these proposals before I could assess them properly.

Doesn't it follow that God must use himself up completely in creation? — spirit-salamander

No, because we haven't properly accounted for how "parts" as distinct individuals could exist as a united "whole". Until we establish the proper relationship between parts and whole, such speculation is useless.

The point is that we describe these relations in spatial terms, then we want to transpose spatial relations to establish a temporal priority. But you have provided no principles of commensurability to relate spatial terms to temporal terms.

So for example, you describe God as one whole. This would imply no space within God, as separating one part from another, because this would indicate that god is a multitude. Then (implying temporal posteriority), God divides into parts. But where does the space within God come from? Now we say, that this space is due to the fact that God is active. But space within God implies that God is a multitude, rather than one. So we go around in a vicious circle which is unresolvable, until we remove the idea that God is one. Then God is necessarily a multitude. But how do we call this multitude by one name, "God"? This can be resolved by looking at the possibility of a relationship which is other than spatial.

Anything we say is going to be framed in terms that derive from our shared experience and understanding of the empirical world as well as our intuitions and speculative imaginations. — Janus

How does "shared experience" even make sense to you? From all that I can glean from my own experience, it appears very obvious that my personal experience is radically different from anyone else whom I have relations with.

If this is difficult for you to grasp, try this little experiment. Sometime when you are with a group of people, randomly ask, 'what just happened?'. You'll see that the answers vary just as much as the people in the group.

How can you speak of a "shared experience" when this is so oxymoronic?

We can learn to navigate the empirical world more or less effectively, but if our perception and understanding of the empirical world were at odds with the underlying real nature of things it seems reasonable to think we would not do well. — Janus

Notice how you use 'perception and understanding". This is because we use the rational mind to resolve all the problems which sense perception presents us with. You speak as if the senses provide us with an accurate representation. In reality, the senses provide us with huge problems, problems which the rational mind has some success at resolving. So it's really not the senses which provide us the capacity to navigate, its the rational mind.

The reason I mention this, is because it provides a kind of conceptual background for making sense of the claim that appearances are deceptive. — Wayfarer

That's a very enlightening passage from the CPR. It demonstrates how "matter" is just a concept, and it is simply an assumption made by us, which is used to explain why our sense perceptions of the world or so radically inconsistent with what our rational minds tell us the world must really be like. We posit "matter" as the medium between rational understanding, and sense perception, as the reason for this inconsistency.

This is the true understanding of "matter", that it is simply a concept, and as Berkeley demonstrates, not a necessary concept, but one which has been chosen. Notice how Kant describes that when we apply this concept "matter" in its true form, all proposed spatial relations are internal rather than external. As objects having spatial relations with one another is simply how we represent the proposed external reality, and there is no necessity to this representation. It is just what is customary to us, as consistent with that assumption of "matter".

As a Scientist he is limited by Methodological Naturalism's principles to keep his work within a specific demonstrable realm, not because of a ideological bias but due to Pragmatic Necessity.(Its where our methodologies and evaluations function).
So by definition his interpretations and conclusions are pseudo scientific. — Nickolasgaspar

This, in no way is an accurate representation of how a scientist philosophizes. The method of philosophy is not the same as the method of science, so when a scientist philosophizes, that scientist may or may not have some training in philosophy. And if the scientist has some training in philosophy, the degree of training will vary from one scientist to another. This degree of training will be evident in the philosophy which the scientist produces.

"Pseudo science" on the other hand is the inversion of this, when someone without proper scientific training makes an attempt at science, without applying the appropriate scientific method. That you confuse these two is evident from the fact that you switch from pseudo science to pseudo philosophy in the course of your post. You don't seem to know what you're talking about.

C 1. God is absolutely simple. Otherwise, He would not be the first and most original principle.

C 2. Accordingly, He has no parts to offer for transformation. Rather, He would have to give Himself completely for this purpose. In fact, in His simplicity, He is so much of one piece that He would be entirely the power that would serve to transform.

D Therefore, God has completely transformed Himself into the universe. — spirit-salamander

I don't see how you derive what you call "D" here. If God is One, and was active prior to His creation, what prevents Him from being active currently?

What I see first is contradiction within B 2:

B 2. However, the transformation of a transcendent substance into mundane things is possible.

If all that exists at a given time, is one substance, then all is one. Accordingly, it is impossible that one becomes two. or any other multiplicity, unless there is something which is other than the one, which serves as a boundary, or divisor, within the one, to make two, or the proposed multiplicity. Therefore it is contradictory to say that One can transform itself into Many. This proposition implies that the One is not really one, or the Many is not really many.

Because of this, we need to look more closely at your principle that God is simple. You say that God must be simple, as the "most original principle". But this as well is contradictory. The nature of "a principle" is such that it always consists of parts. There cannot be a principle which does not have constituent parts which comprise the principle.

So, allow me to return to my original objection. To "be active" is a principle which implies the necessity of parts. There is a number of things implied within this concept "active". There is a substance which is active, there is space to be active in, and there is time. If God was active, then those three required parts of the principle "active" are necessary.

I conclude that your argument is misdirected in a number of ways.

If the non-mental does interact with the mental however, that raises questions as to how that is even possible. — Ø implies everything

You might start with the simplified question of how any sort of interaction is possible.

since our perceptions allow us to navigate the world fairly smoothly, it is reasonable to assume that they are giving us more or less accurate information. — Janus

I guess that depends on how how you define "accurate information". Are you saying that since we nourish ourselves, reproduce, and manage a little entertainment as well, this means our senses must be providing us with accurate information? Even single cell organisms manage to nourish themselves and reproduce, therefore "navigate the world rather smoothly". So does the capacity to entertain ourselves imply that we are getting accurate information? Not really, because in general fiction provides better entertainment than fact.

If the world in itself were nothing at all like the world we perceive, then fitness (or anything else) would seem to be impossible to explain. — Janus

Our perceptions of the world need not resemble the world in any way, in order for us to develop some sort of understanding. All that is required is consistency in usage. For example, the words we use, and mathematical symbols we use, do not resemble in any way the things they refer to, yet the usage of words and symbols develops into an understanding. This is the nature of "meaning", it is based in consistency of usage, not in resemblance.

Hoffman seems to be making the point that we ought to look at the relationship between the human mind and the supposed "world", which is developed through sensation, as a relationship of meaning rather than a relationship of facsimile. The way that the world appears to us is a product of how meaning is apprehended.

Or, to put this in a better light, if we want to understand the reality behind how things appear to us in sensation, we ought to look at how meaning appears to us because the sense apparatus has been developed to aid us in dealing with things which are meaningful, significant, and important to us. So, to understand the way that meaning appears to us, our best and most direct examples are in the use of language and symbols.

What we can see, as a starting point here, in an analysis of the use of symbols, is that the principal usage of symbols is as an indicator, or sign, of some form of classification, type, or universal. The use of the symbol acts as a memory aid, so that a sophisticated concept is signified with a simple symbol, facilitating the memory. There is no need for the symbol to resemble the category. If we now look at the act of naming a particular object or individual, use of a proper noun, we can see the same thing, there is no need for the name to resemble the named particular, only a need for the mind to have the capacity to make the required association.

So if we look at sensation now, we can see that the lower level senses, the tactile senses of taste, touch, and smell, deal exclusively with types, general or universal feelings. We associate similar smells, tastes, or feelings, as "the same" sort of feeling, and we have little if any capacity to distinguish unique peculiarities. Hearing gives us a better tool for distinguishing peculiarities of the particular circumstances, and seeing is even better. Notice that the two basic categories, the principals of the fundamental tactile feelings, are pleasure and pain, and these are subdivided with a whole range of sub-categories. None of these in any way can be construed as resembling the thing sensed.

If we look at the higher senses now, hearing and seeing, there has been developed a stronger capacity toward distinguishing uniqueness and peculiarities. Still, there is no basis for the assumption that the way that the peculiarities of the individual circumstances of sensation are being signified is a mode of resemblance. And, as the evidence of the lower senses indicates to us, it is highly unlikely that it is a mode of resemblance. So if we take the electromagnetic activity which sight is sensitive to for example, we see that a very narrow range of wavelength is interpreted through the eyes. it appears like distinguishing tiny differences within this very limited range has proven to be more meaningful than interpreting a very wide range of wavelengths. But of course, we can understand that colour in no way resembles electromagnetic waves.

Idealism, one way or another, has it that there is nothing that is not related in some way to mind. Hence things only exist if they stand in some relation to mind. — Banno

You ought not describe everything in monist terms. From a dualist perspective, (and many idealists are dualist) there is an unintelligible aspect of reality. So not everything has a relation to the mind, as there is that which does not have a relation to the mind, and this is consistent with idealist dualism.

From the dualist perspective, the issue is which fundamental aspect of reality has priority, is it the intelligible or the unintelligible. Depending on how one understands this priority, the person is either an idealist dualist, or materialist dualist.

Oh thanks, that makes more sense. I couldn't figure out what you were asking, now I can answer the question.

So, how could physcal interactions produce free will? — Dfpolis

Physical interactions do not produce free will, it comes from something else. If Lamarckian evolutionary theory is closer to reality on this point, then so be it. Darwin's theory was accepted for its scientific merits, not for the philosophical aspects. Lamack's treatise on habits is more consistent with Aristotle, (as implying final cause), than Darwin's vague allusion to chance.

Just a suggestion. Let's call whatever it is that is behind the appearance of the rock, a "rock". — Banno

This doesn't work, because what is behind the appearance of the rock could be all sorts of strange interactions, meaning, information, which is not included in the meaning of "rock". So this would mislead us into thinking that we know what we do not know.

As an analogy, 'let's say that the meaning of the word "rock" is rock. It doesn't work to say that the meaning of the symbol is the symbol.

As I argued in my article, there is no reason to think that physics has no intentional effects. — Dfpolis

I believe that intentional effects are fundamentally incompatible with Newton's first law. A force acting from within a body, to alter the motion of that body, cannot be described a force acting on the body.

The missing essential is the interface, viz., the entanglement of data-neutral-wrt-order of the phenomenal universe and operational intentionality of agent-intellect. — ucarr

Wouldn't the "missing essential" be knowledge itself? This would be the mode of interaction.

With active order absent, we have a chaotic jumble of disconnected attributes. — ucarr

The problem with this is that we could not even call this "attributes", because "attribute" refers to an apprehended order. That's the reason for separating matter from form. In principle, matter is the absence of form. But Aristotle demonstrates that in reality the absence of form is logically impossible. So this is kind of like the concept of "infinite", a very useful concept which has no corresponding physical reality.

About the seed: I wonder if it does not already have all the order that the mature tree will have, but packed tighter. — Dfpolis

I do not think that this could be the case, because the growing seed is subjected to external forces, these are accidents, and the way that the growing form responds produces a unique order. So within the seed itself there is an allowance for the development of an order which is not already there. This is why evolution is possible, and consequently a reality.

This capacity to create order is what makes life so difficult to understand. That the order (form) is created as a response, rather than casually determined from the accidents, is what I've been telling you is very important to the understanding of sensation and intellection. This provides for the reality of a being with free will, the form in the mind must be created from within, rather than determined by the external accidents.

I do see that they're both flawed. Do you mean that this leads to idealism? — frank

Where else are you going to turn to get principles for understanding the reasons for these flaws?

Here's my incredible photoshopping skills at work. — Michael

I'd say, that's much better.



When you understand that indirect realism undermines itself, as proposed in the op, and the problems of direct realism persist, the door to idealism will open within you. I'll be waiting for you at that door, which opens inward rather than outward.

But you defined the latter as the same as the former. 'How many marbles are in the jar' is a mental quantity in your mind, which tautologically is going to correlate to count, also the mental quantity in your mind, no matter which number you choose. Interaction with the jar (counting) seem unnecessary for this. — noAxioms

Right, that's the way ontology works, we make definitions which accord with the way that we understand reality, and we proceed from those principles. If you think that you have a better ontological understanding of this matter, (perhaps you think that God always counts how many marbles are in the jar, or something like that), then propose your better definition.

You seem to suffer from the same problem as Wayfarer, which is insistence on applying the premises and definitions of idealism to falsify a view that isn't idealism, which is a begging fallacy.' — noAxioms

This is obviously because idealist premises are the one which best correspond with the reality of the situation. You haven't provided any reasons why you think that they are not the best premises, only the attitude of 'those are idealist therefore reject them'.

The representation in the op is incorrect. it is inherently biased, direct realist, by showing the external as the same as the image which the direct realist has in mind.

What the diagram needs to show is that the direct realist, and the indirect realist both have the same, or similar image in the mind. But the direct realist thinks that this image is as the external world is, and the indirect realist thinks that it is not.

Indirect realism is a prevalent ontological view because it is supported by ideas derived from modern science. Principally, there is the idea that the world really consists of a bunch of tiny particles moving at a high speed, or perhaps even in some sort of superposition, and objects don't really exist in the way that that they are imaged through sense representation.

I believe that ideological conformity requires effort because evolution is a fundamental, essential feature, of the living organism. Intensified societal change makes conformity more difficult, and attempts at conformity become less successful. The only way that ideological conformity can persist is if the will to conform is cultivated. Traditionally, this was moral training, cultivating the desire to be good.

If you think I described a particular stop sign, then surely you can inform me which one was specified.
The sign thing was simply my attempt to figure out how you distinguish ‘perspective’ from ‘point of view’, something you’ve not clarified. — noAxioms

I didn't see that either of us was trying to distinguish 'perspective' from 'point of view'. What would be the point of making such a distinction?

You did not answer my question about this, and it’s important. Correlates to what? — noAxioms

The number which correlates with the defined parameter. I went though that already. There's an object described as a jar full of marbles. The defined parameter is 'how many marbles are in the jar?'. There is no specific number which correlates with this parameter until someone counts the marbles and establishes that relation. You can say that someone estimates, guesses, or assigns a random number, these are all different modes of counting, and the mode of "counting" is not relevant. The point is that there is no answer to the question of "how many marbles are in the jar?" until someone answers it.

No, they are grounded in the reality of change. — Dfpolis

That's not accurate, because they are grounded in before and after, which is a specific feature of change. Your definition was "according to before and after". So if time is a measure of change, it measures only this particular parameter, that which relates to "before and after".

But the problem is that these other terms such as "lately", "long ago", "suddenly", introduce another aspect of time, other than "before and after" and that is duration, temporal extension, the meantime between before and after . So temporal measurement requires not only a judgement of before and after, but also a method for measuring the time (duration) between these, the meantime.

No, the potential and the actualized ground before and after. — Dfpolis

You have this backward, before and after are used to ground potential and actual. That this is the case can be seen from what you refer to as "actualization". Actualization is the concept which establishes a relationship between potential and actual. Without that concept there is no direct relation between those two, and no way of deriving "before and after". Therefore "before and after" are not derived from potential and actual, and are not grounded in potential and actual.

Instead, "actualization" is used as a concept to relate potential to actual, by establishing the temporal relation of "before and after" between potential and actual. So, that there is a relationship between potential and actual is established with "actualization", and that this relationship is the relationship of "before and after" is established by the nature of "actualization".

"Actualization" represents the meantime, the duration between before and after. In traditional Greek terms this is "coming-to-be", the time between being not-X, and being X, in the condition of change, the act of generation. Therefore the concepts of "potential and actual" are grounded in the empirically observed reality of "coming-to-be", which occurs in the temporal duration (extension) of the meantime between before and after.

Change is measurable according to before and after, say in the movement of clock hands. The act of measuring this produces time as a measure number. — Dfpolis

Before and after set the boundaries of the parameter to be measured, which is the duration, or extension of time in between these two, the meantime. This is how we employ the "now" as Aristotle explained, we project it as a point in time, using it to establish boundaries to segregate a specific temporal duration. One instance of the projected "now" represents the before, the other represents the after, the duration between is measured.

It is necessary that "before" and "after" represent something empirically real, this grounds the projection of the now in real. And, in order that the temporal duration measured is applicable, the measured duration must also be something empirically real. Accordingly, the temporal duration measured, as the meantime between the two artificial boundaries created by the projection of the "now", is equally real and measurable and empirically verifiable, as is "before and after".

Potencies are grounded in actual states of nature, not the mind. — Dfpolis

Yes, potencies are grounded in actual states of nature, but potencies are produced by the mind. What is described by us, is what we claim as "actual", and from this we derive through the application of principles, specific potencies which are attributable to that described actuality. So potencies are grounded in actual states, but the "actual states" are descriptions which we produce, and these are themselves grounded in empirical observation.

The important point is that we cannot directly describe the world in terms of potencies, because what is derived from the activity of sensing is actualities. So it is only actualities, forms, which are grounded in the world; "grounded" meaning supported by empirical observation. From an analysis of these forms, actualities, along with the application of specific principles derived from an understanding of change, we can describe potencies. But the key point to apprehend is that there are "principles" which lie between, and separate the descriptions as actualities, and the derivative potencies. So both actualities and potencies are "grounded", but actualities are grounded directly by empirical observation, while potencies are grounded by actualities, through the means of principles which relate potencies to actualities. As described above, in Aristotle this relationship is established with the concept of "actualization", which is derived from the ancient understanding of "coming-to-be".

The discussion of time begins in ch. 10. There he notes that "no part of it is" (218a6). So, we need to be aware that while it is convenient to speak of beings of reason (ens rationis) as though they exist simpliciter, they do not. Time, as a measure number, exists only in the minds contemplating it. So, you need to distinguish between what is a convenient way of speaking, and Aristotle's doctrine. — Dfpolis

I really think you need to reread that section, you might come to a better understanding. He clearly talks about time as being measured and he describes how time exists. This is what he says at 226b, 28:

"We have stated, then, that time exists and what it is, and in how many senses we speak of the 'now', and what 'at some time', 'lately', 'presently' or 'just', 'long ago', and 'suddenly' mean."

Notice that all these terms, all these ways of speaking, are grounded in time being something real. This is not a matter of "a convenient way of speaking". What is the case, is that there must be a real difference between the time referred to as "now", and the time referred to as "before now", and "after now", or else the distinction of before and after is incoherent. In other words, if time isn't something real, before and after make no sense.

As a number, it is not something existing in nature, but a mental entity resulting from a numbering operation. — Dfpolis

Aristotle was a student, of Plato, and numbers were considered to be existent things, as well as the symbols we use to count things. That's why he says number is used in two ways, what is countable, and that with which we count. Time is what is countable, therefore the terrain, not the map.

This is entirely compatible with the classic definition of time as the measure of change according to before and after. — Dfpolis

Sure, but don't you see that in order for "before and after" to have any meaning, there must be time which is something real in nature, to give these words significance. So consider that we use time to measure change according to before and after, as you say. We can't just assign "before" and "after" arbitrarily, these designations are grounded in empirical observations, and this is the manifestation of time in its real, natural occurrence. Before and after are not mere fabrications of the mind, these words refer to a real, observed order in the physical world. The glass fell off the table before it broke on the floor. If there was no real order here, it would make just as much sense to say that the glass broke before it fell.

There is no point in continuing to pile quotation on quotation. You are misinterpreting the text. — Dfpolis

I agree there is no point in looking at quotes, or even discussing what Aristotle thought, what is important is what we believe, you and I, and what is the truth to this matter.

What is measured is time potentially. The result is time actually. — Dfpolis

I don't get this at all , maybe you could explain. Doesn't time have to actually pass before it can be measured? How could one measure the potential passing of time? It seems to me like that would be a fictional measurement. Therefore I think you might want to reconsider this, as you seem to have it backward.

In our minds, in theory, we can work with all sorts of time intervals, and time durations, these mental constructions we might call "time potentially". Also, when we hand a name to a duration, like "day", "hour", "second", these are 'time potentially", because they do not refer to any actual, specific time period. But when we use a clock to measure time, the passing of time, this is actual time, as time is actually passing. The clock provides us with a measurement, "ten seconds" for example. But this is back to a mental construction. "Ten seconds" is potential time, unless we relate this to the actual passing of time in the world, for context, and say in qualification, "the ten seconds when...".

Where? — Dfpolis

That would be "Physics" Bk 4, Ch 11-14.

In Aristotle's definition, the territory is the changing world. Time is a coordinate we place on its map. — Dfpolis

I don't think you've read the section of the "Physics" which I refer to, if this is what you think.

219b: "Time then is a kind of number (Number, we must note, is used in two senses --- both of what is counted or the countable and also of that with which we count. Time obviously is what is counted not that with which we count: these are different kinds of thing.)"

That is not a definition because it is implicitly circular. The result of measurement is time. So, by your definition, time is both the source and result of measurement, which leaves us completely in the dark about what we are measuring. A's definition makes clear what we are measuring, viz. change, which he defines with no reference to time as "the actualization of a potency insofar as it is still in potency." — Dfpolis

It only becomes circular if you allow "time" to have both definitions, which would be equivocation anyway. So your argument that it is circular is an argument based in equivocation. The explicit equivocation is that "time" refers to both the thing measured, and what is produced by the measurement. If we adhere to the one definition, that time is what is counted, then the thing produced by the measurement is not time, but theory relating to time.

As an analogy, let "quantity" refer to the thing counted, and "number" refer to the counting theory. When a quantity is counted, the counting theory is employed to produce a theory which represents the thing counted. "There is x number of C in the lot", would be an example of such a theory produced from counting. Whether or not the theory is sound is not relevant here.

It may be the case that Aristotle in some ways establishes an equivalence between time and change, but he does qualify this by saying that time is the number of "continuous change". He defines "change" in terms of coming to be and passing away, and further with "cause". "Cause" is analyzed even further and divided into potential and actual. In a number of ways he describes how causes precede the end, and he also argues how time is a necessary condition for change. Therefore change is defined with reference to time. This is why he proceeds in the "Physics" from "change" to motion and time.

No, it does not. It allows us to eliminate misconceptions about spatially separate events. Some events are before or after a given event, no matter how we measure time. Others are not. If we fix upon a single place, the sequence of events is never in doubt. — Dfpolis

That sure looks like inconsistency to me. If one way of measuring time results in a reversal of before and after, in comparison with another, and time is defined with reference to before and after, then there is inconsistency within the way that time is measured.

Aristotle's defines time as "the measure of change according to before and after." — Dfpolis

He also says, that in another sense "time" is what is measured.

Of course, you could change the definition of time, but then you would need to ensure that it agreed with our normal time when the new definition reduced to that case. — Dfpolis

"Time" as that which is measured, is completely different from "time" as "the measure of...". One's the territory, the other the map, so to speak. But, they both agree with a "normal time", to some extent. Notice though, that the definition you provided is qualified with "according to before and after". This means that we must refer to an apprehended "before and after" to be able to employ time as a measure of change. And this is where the problem which points to, lies.

Since this is a very real problem, we ought to start with the other definition, that time is what is measured. Then we can say that "before" and "after" are products of the measurement of time, and the inconsistency in before and after which ucarr points to, is attributable to the way that time is measured, distinguishing between the measure, and what is measured. And, we can say deficiencies in the way that time is measured creates the appearance of inconsistency in before and after.

That time is what is measured is more consistent with our wider range of experience with the concept of "time" anyway. For example, when someone says what time it is. And when we see the problems of measurement exposed by the relativity of simultaneity, we can start to apprehend the need for more than one dimension of time, in order to give us precise measurement.

Good thing I didn’t specify a particular stop sign. — noAxioms

In your question you asked about describing "parts of the world". This implies particular stop signs. So it just means that your example was not relevant to what you asked for.

I know Bell’s point, but the marble thing is classical and thus doesn’t illustrate the point at all. — noAxioms

You are not grasping the fact that an act of measurement is essentially the same whether it is classical or quantum. There is an act, "measurement" and there is a result produced from the act of measurement, which is "the measurement". The idea that the result, the measurement, exists prior to the act of measurement in a classical measurement, is a fundamental misunderstanding of the act, which is misleading you into thinking that there is a difference in this matter, between classical and quantum measurement.

We could use the map/terrain analogy. The act of measurement is part of the act of making the map, and the resultant measurement is part of the map. The idea that "the quantity" is actually part of the thing measured (terrain), instead of a product of the measurement (part of the map) is a basic misunderstanding of the act of measuring.

In the example, the thing measured is called "the jar of marbles". The parameter is "the quantity of marbles in the jar". To describe the thing (jar of marbles) in terms of parameters requires parametrization which is a human act of defining boundaries. In this respect there is no difference between a classical measurement and a quantum measurement. The "quantity" is the result, posterior to the act of measurement, as derived from and posterior to parameterization. These are human acts which are necessarily prior to the existence of the quantity. This principle is validated by the nature of description in general, as "the property" is representative of the quale, so a property is part of the map, not the terrain.

What Bell is pointing out is that the vulgar way of understanding "measurement" misleads us because we commonly think that the quantity is what is measured, not what we assign to the thing after we measure it. The vulgar way confuses map and terrain. In mundane measurements this mistaken view is inconsequential, therefore it has propagated. But this view misleads us when we consider quantum measurements. It is not the case that quantum measurements differ in this respect, as you propose, it is the case that the vulgar way of understanding "measurement" is mistaken, and misleads us.

That’s a pretty idealistic statement. Not being one, I deny this. — noAxioms

It appears like your anti-idealist attitude is making it difficult for you to understand the nature of the act of measurement.

For instance, I described a stop sign, all without either of us observing it. — noAxioms

To describe a type of thing, a stop sign for example, is not the same as describing a particular thing, like a particular stop sign.

It seems a form of reality supervening on models instead of the other way around. The baguette is skinny and long. The baguette is circular. Both are equally valid. Something like that. — noAxioms

It's not that they are equally valid, but they are equally true, "true" meaning corresponding with reality.

But the baguette being circular and skinny-long are not wrong descriptions, but neither are they complete. Neither fully describes the thing. — noAxioms

If you do not think that "long and skinny" is inconsistent with "circular", then so be it. I don't think that's something I can convince you of.

It was fixed, but then before they were counted, somebody goes and adds a handful more. — noAxioms

You are not grasping the point which Bell is making. The number is not fixed, because no one has determined the quantity. The quantity is not fixed until someone determines it. How could it be? Do you have an explanation as to how a specific numbered could be associated with the objects, unless someone counts them? Does God establish that relationship between the number and the container? If not, who does, if no one counts them?

It does not matter what is counted. What matters is how many marbles are in there. — noAxioms

Obviously, it does matter. If they are not counted there is no number which correlates. Tell me how there could be one specific number which represents how many marbles are in there, if they have not been counted. Who would designate which number that is? And if no one designates the number, how can you say that there is a number which represents how many marbles are there?

Would you also argue that the winning number for a lottery is already designated before the draw is made?

No, I’m asking for vocabulary that you would accept in describing parts of the world that are not in a laboratory or anywhere else where attention is being paid by some human. — noAxioms

Describing something requires paying attention to it. How do you think that someone could describe a part of the world which has no one paying attention to it? You are asking for the impossible, what is excluded by contradiction.

OK, maybe I’m confusing your usage of both, and my stop sign example was a difference of perspective, in which case I need an example of a different PoV that isn’t a different perspective. Point of view usually means appearance from some specific location in space, but you seem to be using the term differently.
None of this seems to have anything to do with relativity theory. — noAxioms

Yes, you seem very confused as to what I was trying to say. I did not express it very well, so we better forget about that. It's very apparent that you have a completely different idea about what relativity theory says from what I do.

Relativity theory isn’t different depending on one’s realism stance on quantum theory and works pretty much the same either way. — noAxioms

It isn't the case that relativity theory is different depending on one's realism stance, but it is the case that a true realism cannot be maintained in the application of relativity theory.

Consider that within any system of formal logic, one must maintain consistency with the axioms. Any premise not consistent with the axioms cannot be employed because it would cause contradiction and incoherency. Take what you said above for example. Axiom: to be described requires that the thing described be observed. If we now proceed with the premise that we can describe something which has not been observed, we'll run into some incoherency.

Realism is not consistent with relativity. Refer back to Galileo's initial development of relativity theory. His point was to show that the orbits of the planets could equally be represented by the geocentric model, or the heliocentric model. By relativity theory each model is equally correct, there is no such thing as the "real" representation. That each representation, or description, is equally correct, and they are contradictory to each other, is the reason why relativity is not consistent with realism. Are you familiar with "model-dependent realism". This is an attempt to make relativity theory consistent with realism, but it isn't a form of realism at all. It just borrows the word "realism", assuming itself to be the closest thing to realism which we can get under the precepts of relativity theory.

The actual physical system isn’t any different due to your choice of description... — noAxioms

Yes it is different. The actual physical system is as described, and the descriptions differ. That's the point. There is no axiom which allows us to say that the physical system is different from what is described, because that would imply that the description is wrong. And, the descriptions differ according to one's choice of description. Therefore the actual physical system is different depending on one's choice of description. For more information read about model-dependent realism.

If you are a hard core realist, there is an escape from this trap. The escape is to realize that relativity theory is not truthful. What it says about the world is a falsity, and we just use it as a useful tool, but the tool is not a truth. Then we can reject model-dependent realism as just a manifestation of relativity theory, and we can maintain a true realism.

Marbles in a jar is a classical system, and yes, the count of them is fixed before they’ve been counted. At the quantum level, which is what Bell was talking about, these things are not necessarily true. — noAxioms

What Bell is saying, is that this idea, that the number of marbles in the jar is fixed, prior to the count is a misleading idea. The quantity of marbles, the number which corresponds with the physical situation, is only determined through a judgement. So the idea, that the number is fixed, prior to the count is a false idea.

Think about this. If the number is fixed, prior to the count, then it is necessary that nothing changes in the meantime, the time between the fixing and the count. If it is even possible that something could change, then we cannot say that the number is fixed. So we tend to think along the lines of Newton's law of inertia, and we figure that a force would be required to change things, so if the jar is watched in the meantime, we'd see if a marble was added or removed. Therefore if we exclude all the ways that we deem are possible ways that the quantity could change, then we can say that the number is fixed. But what if we do not apprehend all the possible ways, and there's other ways, what a physicalist might call "magic" or something like that. The proper conclusion therefore, is to recognize that the number is not actually fixed prior to the count, because there is always some logically possible way that it could change in the meantime. The idea that the number is fixed prior to the count, is just another useful tool that is not the truth about the situation.

Responding to you is very time-consuming, and not enlightening as we go over the same points repeatedly. So, there is no sign that we are approaching agreement. — Dfpolis

I believe we have come to have a much better understanding of our differences, at least I think I understand your perspective much better. The biggest gap between us seems to be concerning the nature of things like selection, choice, decision, and judgement, as well as the relationship between possibility and these. So if we get together again, we'll know where to start. Until then, thanks for the stimulating conversation.