It's no wonder you can't discuss philosophy with me, you refuse to accept the points that Wittgenstein makes, which I point out to you, insisting that I misunderstand. If you wouldn't be so encapsulated by your own interpretation you'd see that there is much more to his writing than could possibly be grasped by any particular individual, and you'd approach interpretations which are radically different from your own interpretation with more of an open mind.

So the fact remains, that you are denying, or ignoring the importance of the phrase "what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him?". If you would accept this, you would see that it is not necessary that there is anything in the box, "...for the box might even be empty". Then the word "beetle" cannot be the name of a thing. The possibility that the use for the word "beetle" is to name a thing , has been ruled out by the fact that the box might be completely empty.

Instead, you state "the object could literally be anything". But this is a misrepresentation. What Wittgenstein has actually said is that there might not be an object. This misrepresentation appears to cause you to be stumped in your understanding because you end your passage with:

,

Does it then follow from this that we cannot talk about our internal experiences of pain, hope, joy, sadness, etc? Obviously we can talk about these things, we do it all the time. This then brings us back to the notion of how meaning does get a foothold. — Sam26

But if you would simply recognize the difference between naming, and describing, which I explained to you, and the fact that a description does not require a thing which is described, as it might be totally fictional, then you would have no problem with understanding how "the thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all". This "game" being referred to is a game of description, where descriptive terms like "pain" are being employed not to describe "things", but to describe inner feelings, which are decidedly not things. The proposed "thing in the box" is actually not a thing at all, and we ought not assume that one could assign a name to it as if it were thing.

Now there is no issue, or problem, of how meaning gets a foot hold, because it is demonstrated by Wittgenstein as a matter of describing inner feelings, which is distinctly not a matter of naming things. A problem only arises when we assume the inner feelings to be things. Then we have the incompatibility demonstrated by Wittgenstein, between what it means to be a thing which can bear a name, and what it means to be an inner feeling which can only be described.

We've got Agent Smith, and now Agent Tangerine. Where's Agent Bruce?

The strange thing with squares is that they do stay the same after rotation. It's relation with surrounding squares may become different, but the square by itself stays the same. — AgentTangarine

That's the problem though, how can a thing be rotated like that (a force being required to rotate the thing) without changing the thing? The force must have an effect, and the effect is to rotate the thing. But nothing else changes so there must be a change to the thing rotated to account for the expenditure of force required to rotate it.

If you play soccer with a ball protected by a coat then the ball beneath the coat will be the same ball before and after the game. Demanding that the ball stays the same under kicks and stops will introduce forces in the ball. Demanding that it stays the same in free flight will render it force free (this is the essence of Noether's theorem,). — AgentTangarine

Clearly the ball is changed, even after employing the "coat" as a sort of forcefield to protect the ball. The forcefield is not absolute, perfect, ideal, or else the ball inside would have eternal existence exactly as it is, inside that forcefield, never being capable of being changed in there.

The only misunderstanding, is if someone wants to talk about the thing in the box in this way (again it's not me or W.). It would be the interlocutor responding to Wittgenstein's beetle example, i.e., they would be trying to describe the thing in the box as a kind of picture. So, the only confusion here, is you not understanding the point of W.'s remarks. — Sam26

Clearly it is indicated by Wittgenstein that it is not necessary that there is something which the description refers to. So you seem to ignore this part: "then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him?", to support your claim that I misunderstand.

What you are missing (misunderstanding), is, as Wittgenstein says, that it is not necessary that there is anything in the box. So it is you who demonstrates misunderstanding when you talk about "the thing in the box". If it is not necessary that there is something in the box, then you display misunderstanding by referring to "the thing in the box".

And as I explained, that's why naming is completely different from describing. Naming ("beetle", for example) requires that there is an object which is named, otherwise it is not an act of "naming". "Describing" does not require that there is an object which fulfills the stated description.

And that is why we can describe our inner feelings, but we cannot name them, because there is no "thing" there to be named. To say "I have a pain", is not to name something that I have (like naming it 'beetle" for instance), it is to describe a feeling.

I don't know what to tell you MU, you do this all the time, and no matter how many times people try to explain it to you, you seem stuck in a place that no one can free you from. And, this is why I generally don't respond to your posts. Luke spent a long time with you trying to explain your misunderstandings, but to no avail. All I can tell you is that your interpretations of W. are so far from the norm, that I wonder if we're both speaking English. — Sam26

Oh, so here we go with the ad hominem fallacy. You thought that I misunderstood something in the past, therefore everything I say ought to be dismissed as misunderstanding.

Whatever you say Bruce.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l9SqQNgDrgg

Let us continue with Wittgenstein’s thinking: “If you say he sees a private picture before him, which he is describing, you have still made an assumption about what he has before him. And that means that you can describe it or do describe it more closely. If you admit that you haven’t any notion what kind of thing it might be that he has before him—then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him? Isn’t it as if I were to say of someone: ‘He something. But I don’t know whether it is money, or debts, or an empty till (PI 294).’”

Even if you say that the inner thing is a kind of picture, you are still making an assumption with no content. There is no way to describe it, you cannot see inside the other person’s box, so it is an empty assumption. And, of course, if you admit, Wittgenstein says, that you have no notion of the thing in the box, then how is it that you want to say there is something there? Maybe you could respond, “Because I have these kinds of inner things.” Yes, there are these internal experiences going on, but none of us can observe these internal happenings, it is like the beetle in the box example. Does it then follow from this that we cannot talk about our internal experiences of pain, hope, joy, sadness, etc? Obviously we can talk about these things, we do it all the time. This then brings us back to the notion of how meaning does get a foothold. — Sam26

Notice how you've moved from "object and designation" here, toward "description". These two are fundamentally different types of language use which cannot be conflated without the creation of misunderstanding and confusion.

An object can be named without the requirement of any description, there is simply some form of pointing it out. On the other hand, a description can be made without the requirement of a thing being described. In the case of an "inner experience" there is no possibility of pointing out the particular object, just some general sort of "feeling", therefore there is no possibility of object designation. So we produce a description without a thing being described.

Therefore we must bear in mind that descriptions do not require any object designation. In fact, they are based in general feelings where there is no object being described. And, the inclination to request the object being described (point it out for me), is a mistaken adventure. There is no "thing in the box", and descriptive terms are derived from something other than 'the properties of a thing'. They are derived from general feelings.

In logical language use we employ both types of language use together. We point to a thing, giving it a name, and we utilize descriptive terms for that thing. What we need to respect is that the descriptive terms are not justified by the features of any particular things, they are justified by consistency in general feelings.

Are you averring that there is such a thing as a square? I myself would say that squareness is a quality, and that quality retained by that thing that possessed it notwithstanding rotation. — tim wood

The point is not whether a thing would maintain one, or even some, of its qualities, when being moved, that is not the sense of "symmetry" I am talking about. The question is whether a thing could maintain all of its qualities when being moved. In pop metaphysics, "symmetry" is taken to refer to a thing, which has transformational invariance. There is assumed to be real symmetries existing in the world, things which are defined by this feature, (which is not a real feature, but an abstract tool). Consider that moving something requires the application of a force. How would it be possible to apply a force to a thing without in some way changing the thing?

Or using your criteria of movement as change and change meaning no-longer-the-same, then it would follow that nothing is ever even the same as itself (not least because we know that everything is in constant motion), and thus nothing could ever be sensibly said of anything. (Because the thing spoken of, by the time spoken, would no longer be that thing.) And any abstraction would necessarily apply to no thing - and absurdly, not even to itself. — tim wood

This is not relevant. The law of identity allows that a thing changes, as time passes, yet the thing maintains its identity as the same thing. A thing's "identity" is not based in properties or attributes, its based in the thing's temporal continuity of existence. This principle provides for us, the means to understand the reality that a thing may be constantly changing, thereby having contrary properties, yet remain being the same thing.

While their may be an iota of wisdom in this, it is at the same time non-sense. — tim wood

I don't see the basis for your accusation of "nonsense". Is that your general approach to things you do not understand? Instead of trying to understand you just designate it as nonsense.

Perhaps the bedrock here is that there is no bedrock. Truly all is seeming - qualities - and not being. But we take it for being; it works as being and for being, and that's an end of it! Or where would you go with your ideas? — tim wood

This is self-defeating, as self-contradicting. You are saying we assume being (take it for being), when it's really not being. Yet you say "truly all is seeming". Well, it seems to be being, so your claim of "not being" is completely unsupported.

Reread the post of mine you've quoted. There's no mention of a "particular species". I wrote "natural species" with "our" in parenthesis to include h. sapiens. Maybe not clear enough ... well, "natural" connotes any other species as well as ours; so 'what's good for each species for thriving' is specific to each species and therefore differ, by degrees (not kind), from one another, suggesting that moral concern is, on a naturalistic basis, inherently pluralistic (i.e. inclusive). — 180 Proof

Sorry for the misunderstanding. But now the sentence appears incoherent to me. Obviously what is good for some species is not good for other species. There is a natural competitiveness in the world which leaves most organisms in a state less than "thriving". The thriving of all species is completely counter to the natural process of evolution. Are you suggesting that morality should be based in an effort to put an end to evolution? This would not be naturalistic at all.

Anything other than that particular species.

'Natural goodness', as Philippa Foot, says is the immanent "source of the ethics" for natural beings – pursuing what is good for ((our) natural species') thriving and avoiding / reducing what is not good for ((our) natural species') thriving. A modern formulation of fundamental insight shared by Laozi, Kǒngzǐ, Buddha, Hillel the Elder, Epicurus-Lucretius, Diogenes the Kynic, Seneca-Epictetus, ... Spinoza, et al. — 180 Proof

There is a problem with basing ethics in what is good for one particular species. Much will be sacrificed for the good of that particular species.

Are you saying that if I turn a square 360 degrees it is no longer a square? — tim wood

No, I am saying that the square is no longer the same as it was before you turned it. The fact that you turned it means that you changed it and it is no longer the same. So if you represent a square as being able to be turned without being made different than it was before you turned it, you make a false representation.

That reality is intelligible is the presupposition of all scientific endeavours: that the intelligibility science proposes is always subject to empirical verification means that science never actually explains existence itself but must submit itself to a reality check against the empirical data. This existential gap between scientific hypotheses and empirical verified judgment points to, in philosophical terms, the contingency of existence. There is no automatic leap from hypothesis to reality that can bypass a "reality check." — Neil Ormerod, The Metaphysical Muddle of Lawrence Krauss

This is an important point. Some modern metaphysics will remove this necessity, that reality is intelligible, to posit a fundamentally unintelligible "chaos" as the first principle. This is the consequence of materialism. Under Aristotelian principles, form is intelligible, matter is not. Giving priority to matter renders reality as fundamentally unintelligible.

The importance is not the question of which perspective is true. It could very well be true that reality is fundamentally unintelligible. However, since we are in a position so as not to know which is true, we must posit that reality is fundamentally intelligible, in order to support the scientific endeavours required to determine which is true. If we take the materialist perspective, and posit that reality is fundamentally unintelligible, there will be no motivation toward determining the true nature of reality, this being designated as impossible. So this perspective, that reality is fundamentally unintelligible, is demonstrably the wrong position to take, regardless of whether or not it is true.

I don't think that you are properly representing the concept of "equality" Qmeri, and this is what is giving you the problem. This concept allows us to overlook differences to assign "the same value" to two distinct things. Notice that it is "value" we are dealing with, therefore the overlooking of differences is supported within a conceptual structure. So it must be done within a logical framework, defining what sort of value supports the type of "equality". In the case of "all human beings are equal" this is a legal framework which supports human rights.

This sense of "right", is very closely related to "right" in the sense of correct. We consider it to be the correct thing to do, to assign equality to human beings, and this "correctness" supports the value judgement which is presented as human rights.

Since this form of equality is based in a judgement of correctness, it is fundamentally incorrect to argue against it. This is why your thread has gone astray. You are presenting yourself as saying that it is somehow acceptable to argue against what is by definition correct. This would be like arguing that it is acceptable to break the law.

The argument you want to make actually can be made, in a somewhat rational way, but you need to take yourself outside this conceptual structure which assigns correctness to equality. By using the term "inequality" as you do, ("...if you argue for inequality..."), you do not free yourself from that conceptual structure. "Inequality" is simply what is opposed to equality. So all you do is present yourself as opposed to equality, therefore opposed to what is correct, and necessarily incorrect.

Not for all P. P must have certain qualities to be either true or false: call it truth-capable or false-capable. Lacking those, the LEM, then, simply does not apply. — tim wood

Yes that's what I was saying, we have an exception to the rule, the rule does not apply. Sorry if I didn't express myself clearly.

One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. — tim wood

As argued by scholars who have followed Aristotle, it is somewhat unclear what is meant by 'one must be true and the other false' in this context.

In this case it would have been clearer if he had said 'either one or the other must be true". It is important to understand the difference between these two ways of expressing this, because in the latter, truth or falsity is assigned to the relation between the propositions, which is expressed as "one or the other". So truth is a property of that proposition, "one or the other", and not the property of any one of the two propositions. We can say "one will happen", because this does not specify which one will happen, while implying that the other is excluded by the happening of the one. But we cannot unambiguously say "one must be true", because at that time neither is true. If you read the entire section this ought become clearer to you. And the ambiguity is evident in the years of debate which followed.

The best description in On Interpretation is found at 19a 7-23:

Yet this view leads to an impossible conclusion; for we see that both deliberation, and action are causative with regard to the future, and that, to speak more generally, in those things which are not continuously actual there is a potentiality in either direction. Such things may either be or not be; events also therefore may either take place or not take place. There are many obvious instances of this.
...
It is therefore plain that it is not of necessity that everything is or takes place; but in some instances there are real alternatives, in which case the affirmation is no more true and no more false than the denial; while some exhibit a predisposition and general tendency in one direction or the other, and yet can issue in the opposite direction by exception.

Of course Aristotle's best treatise on potentiality (that which may either be or not be) is found in his Metaphysics, a a large section of that text is devoted to this, and a thorough reading is required to understand what he is saying. Here he expounds on the principle established in his Physics, that the concept of "matter" serves to represent the real existence of potentiality in the field of physics.

And here we are at absolute presuppositions. They're both absolutely presupposed in their respective systems. Not,, then, a question of right, but of efficacy. You mention the "force" of gravity. Absolutely, and it works: F = G(m1)(m2) / r^2. F of course for force. The only trouble being that these days and for some time, gravity has been understood not as a force, but as a curvature of spacetime, objects merely following shortest distance paths, geodesics, through spacetime. Gravity as force is a sometimes convenient fiction, and the math works well-enough, but not how it works according to best understanding.

So we're back to models. And your point remains obscure and obscured. — tim wood

That's exactly the point, the nature of the presuppositions affects the efficacy of the model. These models are all effective in some situations and less so in others. That the model becomes ineffective when pushing its boundaries, or parameters, is evidence that it is deficient. Notice that the ineffectiveness is within the boundaries, when the model approaches its boundaries, not outside its boundaries (in which case it wouldn't even be applied), therefore the deficiency is within the model itself, attributable to faulty presuppositions.

My point remains, and is not at all obscure. The presuppositions employed by the models of modern physics fail to account for the difference between past and future, the future holding real possibility. These models are inertia based models based in the assumption (presupposition) that what has been in the past, will necessarily continue to be in the future, unless 'forced' to change.

This presupposition is directly contrary to what Aristotle demonstrated as the nature of "matter", holding the capacity to either be or not be, allowing for the reality of free will. What is clearly described by Aristotle is that there is no such necessity with regard to future events, as distinct from past events. So the necessity attributed to inertia is a false necessity, not a true property of "matter" as defined. It is posited for the sake of producing effective models, making it a pragmatic presupposition which is necessarily untrue because it contradicts the definition. Matter has no properties, properties are formal. So the models break down and fail near their limits, due to the reality that the necessity assumed (as inertia) is a false (contradictory) necessity.

Can you clarify this? Let P be the proposition that tomorrow I will have turned to the left. P is today neither true nor false. What is the exception to the LEM? What reality? — tim wood

The LEM dictates that P must be either true or false. You have said, P is neither true nor false, hence an exception to the law.

But what would be here the difference between the logical and the ontological possibility, the possibility having been arrived at as a possibility? — tim wood

In the case of yesterday there is a truth or falsity to "I turned left". Either it actually occurred or it did not. In the case of tomorrow there is neither truth nor falsity to "I will turn left" because I could do either. Look up Aristotle's famous example, "there will be a sea battle tomorrow". It must be the case that we believe it to be neither true nor false, or else we would not deliberate in decision making.

I think this is misleading. To be sure, this true of all models. But this just a conscious setting aside of the irrelevant - not a deficiency for a model. It leaves open the question as to whether it is a good or a bad model. — tim wood

If you understood the difference, you would see that it is not irrelevant. Newton's law of inertia for instance states that a force is required to change the motion of a thing. But imagine the difference, if it was required to apply a force at every moment of passing time, to maintain any constant motion. These are two very distinct ways of looking at inertia with completely different implications. But which one is correct? Since motion appears to us to be constant, we take constant motion for granted. Then we say a force is required to alter it. But what validates the notion that there is not a force (such as gravity) being applied to every massive object at every moment of passing time, which maintains its constant motion? If this is the case, then we need to understand what sustains this force, to be able to understand motion.

You might like this — Wayfarer

What is actually needed, is a definitive separation between the two principal senses of "potential", being logically possible, and ontologically possible.

In relation to future events, there is ontological possibility, in the sense that I might stand up and walk to the right, or I might go straight ahead, to the left, or remain seated. As Aristotle pointed out, even though one of these will come true as time passes, it is incorrect to say that there is a truth or falsity to any of them, at the present time. That we say there is no truth or falsity with respect to such future events necessitates that we allow exception to the law of excluded middle to account for this as reality. If we would say that such statements were both true and false, this would necessitate that we allow exceptions to the law of non-contradiction.

In the other principal sense of "potential", logically possible, we can look at past events which we are unsure of and establish logical possibilities for what actually occurred. In this case there is a truth or falsity to what occurred, but we are unable to determine with certainty what is the case, so the possibilities are not ontological they are logical.

Now, the situation gets confusing when we realize that we can apply logical possibility toward future events in the act of predicting. When we do this there is no need to separate logical from ontological possibilities to produce an accurate prediction. All that is required is a universal law, like Newton's first law of motion, which extends the actuality of the past, into the future, through that designation of necessity provided by the law. So, for convenience, all future possibilities are treated as logical possibilities as provided for by the law.

Science is derived from observation which provides us with the true or false representation of what has occurred (the past). Through universal laws derived from induction, and the principles of causal determinism, we create models which extend the past through the present, into the future, with complete disregard for ontological possibilities which do not fit into these models. The models are deficient because they do not recognize the true nature of the present, as a divisor between what is ontologically possible, and what is ontologically actual, conflating those two senses of "potential".

You know all about Mickleson-Morley - it's generally accepted there is no aether. — tim wood

The problem here is that what you state as "generally accepted", is not a valid conclusion from Michelson-Morley experiments. These experiments demonstrated that the relationship between the aether and a massive object was not as proposed. The conclusion that there is no aether is simply invalid logic.

Which opens up the question of the independent reality of descriptors. Two pears and two pears are four pears. The pears are real, but the two, four, addition, equaling, all of that, ideas, nothing in the reality that holds the pears. Similarly with odds. — tim wood

Ok, now do you see that by your analogy, the Fourier transform is numbers applied to waves. The waves are real, just like the pears you say are real. The numbers you claim are not.

Bottom line for me, if you insist the waves are real, then what is the nature of their reality? — tim wood

I already answered this for you. Until we know the nature of the medium, within which the waves exist (commonly known as the aether), we will not know the nature of their reality.

Wave functions produce probabilities, they do not describe probabilities. The mathematics employed is a description of waves, and what is produced through the application of the math is probabilities.

Consider that one can record statistics endlessly, and the statistics are useless for prediction unless they are employed. If a person desires to make a prediction, one must employ some principles which describe an activity enabling a prediction. We cannot jump from statistics to prediction without such a principle. Imagine you that you assign a successive number each time the sun comes up, 1,2,3... until you get to 6348. You want to predict the next one, 6349. But that number is useless and doesn't qualify as a prediction without a description, "the sun will come up". In the case of a wave function, the principles employed describe a wave activity, and the application of these principles produces probabilities, enabling prediction.

I don’t think so. I think there are strong objections to the single home theory, but they don’t touch the idea of a word being at home in a language-game, having a role or a function. It’s easier to see in the negative: if you’re working on a bit of carpentry and you have the wood, hammer, nails, screws, drill, ruler, sandpaper, and so on, then the soldering iron doesn’t belong here. — Srap Tasmaner

I think you are changing the subject by switching to the negative. The issue is the affirmation that a word has a home (or possibly more than one home). By proceeding in the negative, as you suggest, all you can do is keep saying 'this is not the word's home', and 'that is not the word's home', so on and so forth. You would always be left with a multitude of possibilities such that if meaning is directly related to the home, as Sam26 suggested, we could never have certainty of meaning.

I know that we are not necessarily looking for certainty, as you say, we are simply looking to accomplish a purpose. However, the context of Sam's post indicates that the issue we are dealing with is the question of distinguishing one "sense" from another, and in the case of logic, certainty is the purpose. So the problem is well exemplified with the way that people use the word "know". There is an epistemological sense of "know" which implies justified. Justification requires logical proof, and this requires that a word's use be limited by a definition. Ambiguity and the possibility of equivocation nullifies any attempt at justification.

So you might really be talking about something completely different from me. You are saying, so long as we can exclude misuse of the tool, we can proceed with the tool in a vast multitude of correct uses. Excluding misuse will exclude the possibility of mistake, and the tool will always serve the intended purpose. But you do not appear to be considering the fact that word usage has at least two sides, the person who hears is distinct from the person who speaks. And, the person speaking cannot exclude the possibility of mistake by the person hearing, in the way you propose, because where the word "doesn't belong" varies from one person to another.

Look at Sam's interpretation of Banno's chosen word, "congenital", a few posts back, in relation to my interpretation. I think that this word does not belong in that context, there is no language game which supports that use, and Banno is wrong to use that what in that way. But Sam, in my opinion fabricates a game which supports that use, and claims that Banno is simply within the rules of that game. As demonstrated by this example, and multitudes of other similar examples which abound in this world, your proposal, that we might just decide that a word "doesn't belong here", is completely inaccurate, because someone else will come along and use it there. And this incompatibility between one person saying it doesn't belong, and another saying it does, will result in the word not serving the intended purpose, and misunderstanding.

The homonym business — eh, it’s almost semantics. The one argument against it would be that in introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in, you’re relying to some degree on people’s understanding of how the word is used elsewhere — either for the metaphor, or by making a case that there’s a strong analogy between the known use and the new one. It would be hard to pitch a known word as an empty vessel you can add a new meaning to at will. (A somewhat outlandish metaphor can do the trick. Timothy Williamson got mainstream philosophers to talk about “luminosity”.) — Srap Tasmaner

I don't agree with this at all, and I believe that this is why this issue is so "tricky". I think we have to distinguish between two very different "ways" of "introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in". If you are relying on peoples' understanding of how the word is used elsewhere, then you are not actually introducing the word to a new game, you are forming an extension on an old game. This is the sort of overlap which Banno referred to with "family resemblances". But this is where the game analogy breaks down and fails, though people like Banno will refuse to accept this fact. What Wittgenstein represents as a game, is one specific way of using the word. If we allow now, that "a game" consists of two distinct ways, even if one is related to the other by a family resemblance, we contradict the premise of "a game". Therefore distinct uses must be distinct games despite the reality of "overlap" This is the age old issue in Plato's Parmenides, of the incompatibility between One and Many.

That is the one "way" of "introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in", allowing that the two games have a relationship (family) with each other. And the problem is that this really negates the effectiveness of the game analogy. Meaning is attributable to this relationship between games, not to any game. We now have to assume something within language, which is very significant and important to meaning, which is outside any particular game, as the relating of one game to another. This is equivalent to "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts". We have to allow that there is something which makes a whole a whole, which is not a part of the whole. It's a sort of dilemma, and the solution is to reject the analogy. Language-games are proposed as the parts, but the whole which is "a language" is not a congregate of such parts. Therefore the proposal is unacceptable.

That "way" we might call the natural way. The other "way," we might call the logical way. The logical way is to strictly define the word, making the usage specific to one particular game, thereby excluding all relations with other games. Excluding relations with other games is very important, to avoid the tendency to equivocate. This way is exactly opposed to relying on peoples' understanding of how the word is used elsewhere, because that way of understanding consists of a multitude of relations between games (which "game" fails to capture because the understanding lies in the relations, not in the games) and this sort of understanding is extremely conducive to equivocation.

With respect to the two "ways", the logical way is consistent with the "language-game" analogy, but the natural way is not. So the language-game description really fails to capture the true nature of natural language, being based in the logical way which is opposed to the natural way.

One point from the other direction doesn’t seem to be brought up much: must a word have a single use in a language-game? Why couldn’t a word have multiple uses in the same language-game? — Srap Tasmaner

In essence, this is exactly why the game analogy fails in accounting for natural language. "A game" as demonstrated by Wittgenstein is a single type of usage. To avoid violating, or contradicting that premise, a double usage cannot be one game. So a usage is a game, and this principle allows for the reality of logical proceedings, free from equivocation. However, natural language is directly opposed to this, deriving meaning from a multitude of very distinct usages. One might portray these distinct usages as distinct games, but that's really a step in the wrong direction. The real production of distinct games is the artificial process of creating distinct logical premises, and distinct logical proceedings. The natural process of deriving meaning is a comparison of individual, particular, instances of use, which cannot be portrayed as games. They cannot be portrayed as games because the game representation assumes that each instance of usage proceeds with the intent of establishing a rule for general usage. Natural language use does not often proceed with the intent of establishing a rule, it just proceeds with the intent of accomplishing the purpose in that particular instance. So when a person compares distinct instances of usage to derive meaning, this is not a matter of comparing distinct games, because that intent, of demonstrating a game is not necessarily there in these distinct instances.

More importantly, I don't see that your interpretation has any traction. — Sam26

Which one of my interpretations? I offered two completely different. You are the one who brought up a word's "home". How do you interpret this concept? Does a word have only one "home" in one language game, or does it have a "home" in every language game which it is used in? If the former, how would we know which game is the home game? If the latter why would we call this the same word, if it has many different homes? And what sense is there to saying that something has numerous homes?

I’m sympathetic to your thinking in this post, but this is backwards. That is, you’re talking here about reflecting on the meaning of a word, analysing it, theorizing it, rather than using it. When it comes to use, either a word will do for your purpose or it won’t — or it can be made to work the way you want or it can’t. Think first of cases of trying to use a word for some purpose rather than of scrutinizing the word; the point of a tool is to use it when it will get the job done, not to contemplate it. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so when deciding on what words to use, making the judgement as to whether the word will serve the purpose or not, Sam26 said we need to "think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home". So, if the word is a tool, to make that judgement as to whether it will get the job done or not, we need to find the language game which is the word's home. Whether or not this is "scrutinizing the word" is irrelevant, but this is what is suggested that we need to do. One cannot just pick up any tool, and expect that it will get the job done, so we look at a word's 'home game' to determine whether it will get the job done. How do we determine the word's 'home game'?

But doesn’t the ‘words are homeless’ line of argument contradict the ‘homonym’ argument? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that is the point. They are two very distinct, perhaps even contradictory perspectives. That's why I started off with the suggestion that there's a sort of paradox here. The homonym argument says that since each different game in which a word is used is a distinct "home", then really these ought to be considered as distinct words. But then we might annihilate the relations between one game and another, which Banno pointed out is an important part of meaning, in the article on family resemblances. Now, in this homonym scenario each game is a distinct game, as a distinct home for the words within it, and every word in a different game, even though they might sound and be spelled the same, are different words. You can see that this is an unrealistic scenario because it denies the importance of the relations between one game and another.

However, if we go to the other option, that the same word is used in many games and one of the games is the word's home game, which validates the word's meaning, we have an equally unrealistic scenario. We have no way of knowing which game is the home game, and then the word becomes "homeless" completely free from constraints, like a tool we might be able to pick up and use for any purpose.

I think we do better to take in more rather than less of what’s going on, so that we can see the hammer being a part of — being ‘at home’ in — each ensemble of tools and practices where it is useful (cabinetmaking, house framing, tractor maintenance, surveying, etc.), but not part of others where it is not. I’d lean toward multiple homes, with both hammers and words. Someone used to using a hammer in only one way for one sort of job might be surprised to find other people think of it quite differently, and the same thing happens with words sometimes. (Someone might use a chisel as a doorstop for years without the slightest idea what it’s ‘really’ for.) — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so the other two ways I mentioned are both completely unrealistic, being like two extremes, neither of which properly describes the reality of the situation. Now you propose a word has "multiple homes". I would say now, that the word "home" does not serve any purpose any more. The same word, like the hammer, has a different job, in many different games. We can't say that any particular game is the home, so it's rather meaningless to say that every game in which it appears is a "home" for it.

Now we're right back to square one, having resolved nothing. Suppose one wants to decide whether a word will serve a particular purpose or not, how could one proceed? I have a job to do and I want to know whether the hammer will serve the purpose. Each job, or purpose is unique, distinct from every other one so it doesn't make sense to start looking through all the different language games that the word has appeared in, or all the different things I've ever done with a hammer. How do you think the judgement is made? If I do not look at one game as the home game, and I do not consider all the different games, what do I do, take a few games and make an average or something?

All right! The wave function describes waves. What sort of waves do they describe? — tim wood

What sort of waves are described is the problem, isn't it? Until the aether is identified that question cannot be answered. Right? We know that waves are described, because that's what the Fourier transform (which is central to a wave function) does, describes waves. Therefore the name "wave" function. We just don't know the medium of those waves. But we know that the waves are real because the transmit energy.

You brought up this issue of "the language game that is its [a word's] home". But if you'd prefer not to discuss it then just say so.

So, when we think of meaning, think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home. If for example, we’re talking about epistemology and how we justify a conclusion, then we’re using the word know in a way that’s determined by the logic of that language-game. The problem that arises, is when we take the use of a particular word in one language-game, and try to apply it in another language-game where the word is used in a completely different way, i.e., it has a different use, or it functions differently. This is not to say that a word can’t have the same use in a different language-game, but to say that it’s use maybe different; and thus, it may have a different sense. — Sam26

Since a word has a place in numerous different language-games, would we be correct in saying that the word has a number of different "homes"? You seem to imply that for Wittgenstein, only one of the language-games is the word's true "home". If this is the case, then what is the word's position in another language-game? How is it possible that we look to a word's home language-game to understand its meaning in a completely different language-game? Obviously, the situation I described, that the word is a distinct and different word in each different language-game, with its own home in that game, is not the case, if a word has a one "home" game that determines its meaning.

So, what is the case? If any particular instance of a word's meaning is not dependent on its use in that specific game in which it is being used at that time, and it is actually required that we determine the word's "home" game to know its meaning in that other game, how do we determine its "home" game? I assume that if we do not know with certainty, the word's "home" game, we cannot know with certainty the word's true meaning. Do you agree with this?

Or, is this idea of a "home" game just a ruse? One might search forever, trying to confirm the word's "home" never really being sure which game is the word's "home", therefore never really being sure of the word's meaning. Perhaps the idea that there is one "home" game is just wrong, and the word has a home in each different game which it is used. Then shouldn't we say that these are distinct words, like homonyms, each with its own home in its own game? On what principle then do we say that it is "the same word" used in different games? Oughtn't we say that a word is homeless, and is free to go and find a place wherever one wants it to be?

Wiki, wave function: "A wave function in quantum physics is a mathematical description...". I am going to assume you were being facetious. — tim wood

Well of course, a wave function is a mathematical description. And what the mathematics describes, is waves. That's what I said "'wave function' describes waves". I didn't think anyone reading this would be so uninformed as to require the qualification "using mathematics". That the description is made with mathematics is self-evident. I'm not being facetious, you are just being unbelievably ignorant.

Are you familiar with the Fourier transform which is central to the mathematics of a wave function? It describes wave frequencies.

History
Main articles: Fourier analysis § History, and Fourier series § History
In 1822, Joseph Fourier showed that some functions could be written as an infinite sum of harmonics.[10]

Introduction
See also: Fourier analysis

One motivation for the Fourier transform comes from the study of Fourier series. In the study of Fourier series, complicated but periodic functions are written as the sum of simple waves mathematically represented by sines and cosines. The Fourier transform is an extension of the Fourier series that results when the period of the represented function is lengthened and allowed to approach infinity. — Wikipedia: Fourier Transform

The infamous "uncertainty principle" is a feature of the principle referred to here as "allowed to approach infinity". We really know that neither the actual time value nor the actual frequency of a real wave could be "infinite", so this assumption introduces a degree of uncertainty (falsity) into the mathematical description.

Coming from you that convinces me otherwise. — 180 Proof

You ought not say things like that 180. It just demonstrates that you are convinced by ad hominem. And that's known as a fallacy. Relying on ad hominem to make judgements of metaphysics is just not good. Why do you base your metaphysical judgements in fallacious logic?

...even though you've taken a leap of whatever off of the raggedy edge of my post. — 180 Proof

That's hard to avoid. The entire post is a ragged mess, best to abandon.

actually this question and tim woods response makes me question whether the study of the evolution of the universe is actually 'history'. The web definition of history is 'the study of past events, particularly in human affairs e.g. "medieval European history". — Wayfarer

I think the word "history" is used to create the illusion of science, by the authors. By calling it "history", the metaphysics which consists of speculations about the early universe. is presented as if it might be science.

I'm not smart enough to dumb down my 'philosophical via negativa' any further especially for someone who won't bother to read it.
How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?
— The Sign of the Four, chap. 6
Last attempt (paraphrasing Arthur Conan Doyle):

'If we eliminate (negate) the ways the actual world necessarily could not have been or cannot be described, then what remains is every way the actual world – phase space – possibly could have been or can be described.' — 180 Proof

Eliminating the impossible does not give us the truth. Such a method always leaves us with possibility because the logic operates within that category. And truth is what actually is. So we still have a categorical separation between what we get from eliminating impossibility (i.e., possibility), and truth (what actually is).

And, the proposition that all reality consists of mere possibility, without anything actual, is inconsistent with sense observation. In other words, to class the actual as impossible because it is other than possible is contrary to empirical evidence (it is a sophistic trick). So we are still left with a gap between what the logical process of eliminating impossibility gives us (possibility), and what sensation gives us (actuality). This gap needs to be closed if are to claim a proper understanding of reality. To deny the gap, by claiming that the actual is impossible because it is something other than possible, is a sophistic move of ignorance.

When you work out what it is you are claiming, then your posts might be worth addressing. — Banno

If you want to look at the issue I brought up, as a civilized, rational human being, without resort to insult, then follow me here.

I was enquiring as to what Wittgenstein means when he suggests that a word could have a "home". It is implied that when a word is used in many different language games, one particular language game might be the game which is "home" to the word. How could we ever determine which game is the home game for any given word?

Don't take it personally.

When you work out what it is that I am claiming, then you might be capable of making an intelligent reply, instead of off the cuff ad hominem, like the following:

And this is another example of Metaphysician Undercover's congenital logical problem. — Banno

What kind of bullshit purpose is "congenital" supposed to serve here? Are you racist?

"Family resemblance" implies that they have family in common, just like Wittgenstein says: "Something runs through the whole thread—namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres". Therefore there is something in common, it's just in a way other than one might think. It's the overlapping which they have in common. So what you describe as "games held certain similarities and relations with each other", is what they have in common, these relations, like a family consists of relations. And we call this, what they have in common, "family".

That's actually the conclusion of my post above. Why don't you ever take the time to read my posts through to the end? Because of this you commonly misrepresent me.

Therefore the nature of "understanding" turns out to be comprehending how one instance of use overlaps, or relates to another, as the relationship between one game and another, as opposed to understanding the meaning of a word. — Metaphysician Undercover

Care to explain yourself?

Now, would you say that because a tool is being used differently in a different context that it's a different tool? — Sam26

Yes, I might say that the same object used in two different ways, is two different tools, like in the case of a multitool, and I'll explain further below. But what I was discussing is a word's "home". You referred to a word having a "home" in a particular language game. But if the word has a place in a number of different language games, like a tool has a number of different uses, how would we determine which language game, or use, is the "home" of that word, or which use is the "home" of the tool?

If it turns out that the word has a number of different "homes", wouldn't we have to say that these are actually different words? Homonyms are considered to be distinct words aren't they? Likewise, if a tool is defined by its use, then the same object could be two different tools, depending on how the object is used. Suppose a "saw" is what cuts wood, and a "knife" is what cuts meat. Then the same object could be both a saw and a knife, two different tools, depending on how it is used. And a multitool is a lot of different tools.

In case you're not following, here's a couple examples. I think most people would agree that "right", when it means correct, is a different word from "right" when it refers to one side of a person's body. But in the case of "see" they would say it is the same word whether it refers to seeing with the eyes, or seeing with the mind.

Obviously you wouldn't because that would be silly. — Sam26

I'm not making a pun, so don't consider this as silly. Homonyms are understood to be distinct words.

His argument is based on the idea that there must be something had in common by all uses of a word that make it a use of that word. The argument for family resemblance shows that this need not be so. — Banno

I don't see how "family resemblance shows that this need not be so". Obviously "family resemblance" implies having something in common. So how can the argument for family resemblance show that the uses need not have something in common?

And this is another example of Metaphysician Undercover's congenital logical problem. His argument is based on the idea that there must be something had in common by all uses of a word that make it a use of that word. The argument for family resemblance shows that this need not be so. — Banno

OK, so I'll ask you the question Banno. How would you distinguish between homonyms (in the case of two different words with the same sound and spelling), and one word having two different meanings? To take your analogy of "family resemblances", why would we say in the case of homonyms, "those two words are just like identical twins", but in other cases, "that's the same person"

So, when we think of meaning, think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home. If for example, we’re talking about epistemology and how we justify a conclusion, then we’re using the word know in a way that’s determined by the logic of that language-game. The problem that arises, is when we take the use of a particular word in one language-game, and try to apply it in another language-game where the word is used in a completely different way, i.e., it has a different use, or it functions differently. This is not to say that a word can’t have the same use in a different language-game, but to say that it’s use maybe different; and thus, it may have a different sense. — Sam26

What you describe here is a sort of paradox, which might even be called a contradiction. If a word's "home" is its position within a particular language game, but the same word might be used in different games, then it has distinct homes. So we have the problem of the same word having numerous homes. To resolve this problem we ought not think of these numerous and distinct uses, of what appears to be the same word, as actually being instances of "the same word". Having different homes, therefore different meanings, ought to indicate to us that they are distinct words, despite having the same outward appearance. Therefore we ought to apprehend these words which appear to be the same, yet have different homes, as different words.

If we adopt this position, we have a new problem, which is the necessary boundary between a word with one home, and a word which appears to be the same word, yet has a different home, so is really a different word. Since both instances appear to be the same word, yet we conclude logically that they are not the same word, having different homes, we need other principles to distinguish them. It's kind of like they are identical twins. How we might distinguish the words is through context, the word's home, the two distinct games which are home to each, respectively. This means we must identify the game itself, and that's where the difficulty lies.

The various games of a language overlap, they share rules at some points and diverge at other points. And so a further problem develops. If the two distinct words, which appear to be the same, go by the same rule in two games, but different rules in another game, then why can't we say that they are actually "the same word" in those two games, and a different word in the third game. But if we adhere to the principle, a different game constitutes a different word, we must disallow this idea because the two games are distinct, constituting different homes, even though what is said of the two words, "appears to be the same" takes on an even stronger meaning.

What follows though, is that we lose all principles to distinguish one game from another, until we reach the point of "each particular instance of use must be viewed as a different game". Therefore the nature of "understanding" turns out to be comprehending how one instance of use overlaps, or relates to another, as the relationship between one game and another, as opposed to understanding the meaning of a word.

Yes, my point exactly. Yours is predicated on education, the qualifications above listed being more attributable to experience than mere education. One cannot even become properly educated without those qualifications. Or, in other words, becoming educated presupposes those qualifications. Either way, and however reduced. It is education that comes as a consequence, and never as an antecedent.

So any bias can be overcome, that's the nature of free will, and will power.
— Metaphysician Undercover

And that right there is the proverbial knife-in-the-heart of your predication on education. Will power cannot be taught. And while experience is a form of education, absent the stipulation that says otherwise, education as used herein indicates the formal, sit-down-shut-up-and-memorize brand of it. — Mww

What's with the inconsistency Mww? First you say that these "qualifications" are more attributable to experience than education, but then you proceed to say that experience is a form of education. If these "qualifications" are attributable to experience, and experience is a form of education, then such "qualifications" are necessarily attributable to education. What we cannot conclude is that they are attributable to all forms of education.

So you proceed to restrict "education" to a "sit-down-and-shut-up" form, attempting to deny that introspection and other forms of being self-taught are valid forms of education. And this is evident in your claim that "will power cannot be taught". In actuality will power is self-taught, through practise and exercise. We are given will, but the determination and persistence, which constitutes the will to succeed, will power, is developed through practise. And since this "power" can be freely transposed from one habit to another, it cannot be called a bias. It is the inclination to direct the will power in one direction rather than another, which is a bias.

.......the proposed counterargument suggests both a reevaluation of conditionals and a reassessment of the principle the conditionals endorse.

With respect to which, I offer, for your consideration: education in the minor and my experiences in the major determine the possibilities toward biases in general, my biases represent a rational determination from those possibilities, which is called persuasion, my innate predispositions judge a priori whether my biases conform to my nature, which is called interest.

Agree with any of that? — Mww

Inconsistency again? Above you said that experience is a form of education. This would put experience as the minor, and education as the major, education as logically prior to experience. You now look to reverse this, making experience the major, and education the minor. Are you now saying that education is a form of experience? Why not just equate the two? All forms of experience are education and all forms of education are experience.

If we take this position as a clean slate, I'd have to disagree with your proposal. I disagree because there must be a capacity which enables, or allows one to experience, or be educated. And this capacity is necessarily prior to experience and education. And, I believe it is quite possible that a bias could be inherent within such a capacity. In fact, upon analysis we might find that this capacity is best described as a type of bias in itself.

This is why, in philosophy we must doubt, or question this very capacity itself, the capacity which allows us to understand, because of the way that it may taint our knowledge. This is the tinted glass analogy used in theological metaphysics. It is proposed that the soul must be immaterial in order that it can understand and know all material things. However, since the intellect, which is the means through which the soul knows, is united with, and dependent on the material body, this material body acts like a lens through which the intellect "sees" the world. And since the lens is material rather than immaterial, it is as a tinted lens.

That the lens which we see the world through is tinted, does not necessitate that the world will be misunderstood by us. What is required is that we determine and understand the nature of the tinting in order that we can account for it, and adjust for it in our understanding. The "capacity to experience and understand" is that lens through which we "see" the world. And so we must learn to understand the biases which inhere within this capacity, in order to develop a true understanding. This is a matter of negating those biases.

The Platonist answer is that humans have a foot in both worlds - physically embodied beings who can by virtue of intellect peer into the realm of ideas. That is how we've been able to devise such amazing inventions. — Wayfarer

The past (observed) is the physical. The future (unobservable) is the realm of ideas. Human beings live at the present. However, it has become evident that the present, which the being occupies, is not a clean and precise, non-temporal point of division. In Peirce's words, it is a vague boundary, described by the ancient Greeks as the medium of "becoming", matter. This necessitates the conclusion that the human being, as composed of matter, has "a foot in both worlds", the past and the future, occupying a vague boundary between the two.

\It's quite clear that in physics a "wave" is a disturbance in a medium. Since the "wavefunction" describes waves, we can conclude that these waves require a medium (commonly known as the ether). Until this medium is identified and properly "observed", the wavefunction, and all the derivative principles in physics which depend on it, are based in unsubstantiated metaphysical speculation, and ought not be called "science".

The modern trend in metaphysics is to simple deny the reality of the ether. But since the ether is logically required, this trend is just bad (illogical) metaphysics, which many people like to pretend is science.

True enough, if one accepts that biases are innate. I don’t think I’d go that far, and apparently, neither do you, because you said, “inclined toward due to genetics or predisposition”. — Mww

Oh yeah, you can see right through me. Not. If one is naturally inclined in one way rather than another, that's a bias. But being inclined in one way or another does not necessitate behaviour in that way because we have the will power to resist such inclinations. So any bias can be overcome, that's the nature of free will, and will power. But just because these inclinations (biases) can be overcome, does not mean that they are not biases.

We naturally have feelings, but can certainly distinguish a good one from a bad one. It follows that how we feel about a bias may be exactly how we distinguish them from each other, by how the object of each affects us. — Mww

I don\t agree that we can "certainly distinguish a good feeling from a bad feeling". Sometimes the distinction is easy, other times not so easy. And if we start to analyze the criteria of what distinguishes the good from the bad, then sometimes we find out that some of the ones we have taken for granted as good or bad, have been misjudged.

And this prevents us from just going right back to a new bias, a new inclination of a different color, but inclination nonetheless? — Mww

Yes, but the decision is made from a more fully developed intellect, so it is more rational. That's the whole point. Biases developed when we are children are positions of judgement accepted by a juvenile mind, which has not necessarily developed the full potential of rationality. And innate biases are even less rational. So as we grow older, and develop the full capacity of logical reasoning, which is proper to an educated human being, we need to reassess any biases developed when we less capable of such reasoning. This is simply a matter of introspection, to distinguish bad habits from good, and use the will power required to reject the bad,

The problem is that one's own ways of thinking are always assumed to be good, or else the person wouldn't be thinking that way. And the same will power, or more, is required to break a good habit as is required to break a bad habit. But in the case of ways of thinking, the habit can only be judged as a bad way of thinking if one is not thinking that way at the time. So each way of thinking, be it good or bad, must be prevented before it can be properly judged as good or bad.

That we return to a "bias" after such a judgement is not an issue, because the practise of breaking the biases, and judging them has been developed, and this is what matters. So in a matter of time, the new bias will itself be blocked and reassessed, and this is what is important. This habit, of blocking the biases, and judging them cannot be said to be a bias itself. It is a way of thinking of a free willing mind, which cannot be called a bias because it is not directed in any particular direction.

True, but it serves no purpose to doubt ourselves into oblivion. If humans are naturally inclined to biases and cognitive dispositions, it seems rather futile to effect their collective demise. — Mww

It is not a matter of doubting oneself into oblivion. It is just the introspection of a healthy rational mind which does not want to be misled by itself, by trusting, and relying on, decisions it made when it was less capable. Once we realize that a mind keeps developing over a very long portion of one's lifetime, we ought to recognize the need to keep reassessing the principles we employ for making judgements.

Besides, I suspect there are some biases we refuse to over-rule, and in conjunction with them, the innate predispositions we couldn’t over-rule without destroying the manifest identity to which they belong. — Mww

Yes, most people refuse to judge their biases, that's why we call these people biased. But if you recognize that biases can be judged and over-ruled, then you'll see that this way of thinking, which engages in that procedure cannot be a biased way of thinking.

And the latter statement here is just a blatant denial of free will as an identifying feature of human beings. Are you determinist?

Doubt implies dismissal Without the opportunity for correction. — Mww

No, "doubt" implies indecision. This does not mean that the thing doubted, i.e. what the person is indecisive about, will necessarily be dismissed. Judgement is suspended, so the thing being judged (doubted) is held in a mental position where it is neither accepted nor rejected.

I get what you’re saying; I just think you’ve gone too far with it, in terms of practical purposes and the consequences for philosophy. — Mww

If the principles are reasonable, and there appears to be nothing wrong "in principle", then why not take them as far as one can go, in practise. If in practise, a brick wall is hit, where the principles have difficulty, and further process is prevented, then we need to reassess the principles to see what the problem is.

Go ahead, express something that is not already seated somewhere, somehow, someway. The notion of the ridding of all is absurd - impossible. One may attempt to identify biases and to work with, around or through them, but every gesture is biased is some way. Do you care to retreat from the categorical to something (more) reasonable? — tim wood

Obviously you are a very biased person if you are attempting to justify your biases in this way, instead of accepting the fact that you might be able to rid yourself of the bad ones if you would only submit to the process of doubting them all. This being required in order to identify all the bad ones as bad.

Not really, because quantum chemistry is energy based, while my description is mass based. This is a big difference because a molecule is understood to have distinct massive parts, therefore distinct "spaces" by my description. Even an atom is understood to have distinct massive parts. From the energy perspective, the interaction of electrons occurs in one space, rather than a number of different spaces according to distinct massive centers representing distinct spaces.

Actually my post was directed toward Bret and the op. I just inserted a line from your post. so I put quotations to give proper credit to you, for that phrase.

Still...can a innate predisposition, as such, be subjected to over-ruling, whether by education or otherwise? And what of a good bias? Should my innate predisposition to help the proverbial lil’ ol’ lady cross the street be educated out of me?

You made no distinction between the relative values of our individual biases, grouping them all as biases in general, the compendium of which we can be taught to overcome. To that alone, I make objection. — Mww

There is no doubt in my mind, that some innate biases can be overcome. The more pertinent question is as you say, "what of a good bias?" And of course the related question of how do we decide which are good, bad, or indifferent.

What you seem to object to is the idea that all biases ought to be overcome, even ones which might be good. The reason for this, and this takes us right to the foundation of skepticism, is that we cannot properly distinguish between good and bad biases, when we are already biased. This means we must rid ourselves of all biases, form an open mind, then reassess all those dismissed biases from this newly established position.

Skepticism instructs us to doubt everything, and this is because what appears to be knowledge appears to be knowledge, regardless of whether it is true or false knowledge. So we cannot distinguish between true knowledge and false knowledge by its appearance because it all appears to be knowledge. Therefore we must subject anything which appears as knowledge, to doubt. And this is a similar principle to rejecting all biases, because from the position of holding a bias one cannot properly distinguish which biases are good, and which are bad.