In case you don't understand the type/token distinction, "the same one every time" implies it is the same type of sensation every time. A token of the sensation is a particular instance of having that (type of) sensation on one of those occasions, or at one of those times. — Luke

I'm fully aware of the type/token distinction, and as I said you are incorrect. You didn't seem to notice that he says "a particular sensation", which is the same one every time. I hate to have to inform you of this Luke, but "a particular sensation" can in no way be interpreted as a number of different tokens indicating a "type of sensation", unless he qualifies the statements as "a particular type of sensation". He never mentions "type" of sensation. He talks about naming a sensation, and then refers to it as "the sensation" "The same one every time" refers to "the sensation", a "particular sensation". There is absolutely nothing to indicate that he refers to a type of sensation. You are simply fabricating this idea. You're wrong in your interpretation because it is based in your own fabrication, not in what was actually said. And I've tried to help you to understand what Wittgenstein is actually saying, but you refuse to be helped. I'm not surprised, you've demonstrated your helplessness many times.

I'm mystified as to why you come in these Wittgenstein threads, especially given that you see through the "sham of Wittgenstein." I'm genuinely curious, are you trying to convince us of your particular interpretation? You seem to be privy to some special knowledge of W. that none of us possess. I know I create these threads because W. really interests me, and sometimes I get new insights into his thinking. Sometimes I even revise my interpretation because my interpretation is just incorrect. — Sam26

I enjoy Wittgenstein's little word games, they make you think. I call his games a sham, because that's what they are a pretense. He pretends to be saying something which he is not saying, so one must be very careful to determine what he actually says. He intentional states things in ambiguous ways to trap people within their own preconceived meanings for words, meanings which are inconsistent with the way that he is actually using the words, leading people into traps which he has carefully laid. I call it a form of hypocrisy. What he is doing with the words is not the same as what the words mean to us. That's the basis of dishonesty and lying. When a person lies to you, what the words mean to you is something completely different from what the person is actually doing with the words.

So, you might say he has led me into a trap, and I would say that he has led you into a trap. However, as I disclosed to Banno above, my way has led me toward a vast problem involving identity and the Platonism which inheres within mathematics today. This is the illness which Wittgenstein mentions at 254-255. All I see from your way is a never ending argument as to what Wittgenstein really means, therefore a dead end.

When I use "the" in front of the word, in normal conversation, such as "the hammer", "the chair", as Wittgenstein does with "the sensation", I am referring to a particular thing which has been named by the word, I am not referring to a type.

In none of the references I have read in the subsequent discussion has the 'noble lie' been said to describe the arguments for the immortality of the soul.

Is it argued elsewhere that these arguments in the Phaedo and Meno can be taken to be examples of a 'noble lie'? — Wayfarer

I think that because the precise nature of "the noble lie" is not well established by Plato, it is just sort of allowed for in principle, through mention, this inclines people to judge anything in Plato which they think might be a dishonest representation (even if this determination might be produced from misunderstanding), as "the noble lie".

r. I don't see any reason to believe that Wittgenstein is talking about a single instance of a sensation over an extended period of days and weeks. — Luke

Then why does he repeatedly say "the sensation", and he ends this section with "And why a 'particular sensation,' that is, the same one every time?"? He says absolutely nothing to indicate that he is talking about types or tokens here, and he explicitly says that he is talking about one particular sensation "the same one every time". You are simply adding in this type/token change to what he says, so that the PLA makes sense to you and produces the meaning which you want from it. But that is to disregard what Wittgenstein is actually saying, and substantially change the nature of his demonstration.

Continue with your misinterpretation if you like, I am just trying to be helpful by pointing to the words he is actually using, what he actually said, to pull you away from what you think he is saying, which is incorrect, being inconsistent with the words he used.

So, consider his example at 257, a "tooth-ache". Is the tooth-ache I had yesterday not the very same tooth-ache that I had the day before, and the same tooth-ache I have today? I might sleep in between, so that my tooth is not aching at that time, or it might go away for a few days, and come back. Why would you assume that Wittgenstein is talking about distinct tokens of the same type, when he is very explicitly talking about naming something? "But what does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'?" He is very clear, and repetitive in his statements here. He is talking about naming something. Yet you infer that he is talking about classifying distinct tokens of the same type. Why are you inclined toward this incorrect understanding (misunderstanding)? I suggest that you are inclined toward this incorrect reading because it produces the conclusion you desire from the so-called private language argument.

↪Metaphysician Undercover has long had issues with identity, numerical equivalence, and material equivalence. Better not to go down the garden path with him. — Banno

Well, you know I'm in good company, because Wittgenstein has the same issues with identity. He's the one who got me started down that garden path. And it is evident that in order to understand what he is doing with the so-called private language argument, it is necessary that we go down the garden path where he is pointing. Have you yet come to grips with 253-255? Why is the substitution of "identical" for "the same" expedient? This substitution renders what mathematicians are inclined to say about the "reality of mathematical facts", as an illness which needs to be treated by philosophy.

I don't see your point, he's differentiating between one object which is the same, and two objects which are identical. So he's talking about both, and the difference between them.

I did, the same chair recurs to me day after day, week after week. There is no impossibility here.

He is talking about the same type of sensation; not the same token of sensation. This is evident because he speaks of the recurrence of the sensation. It is not possible for the same token of a sensation to recur. If it did recur, then it would be a different token (of the same type), instead of the same token. — Luke

His terms are "a certain sensation", "the sensation", "a sensation", "a particular sensation". Imagine if he started with "a certain chair", and proceeded to discuss "the chair". How could you ever believe he was talking about a type of chair. Nowhere does he refer to a type of sensation, he is talking about "the sensation". Your interpretation is completely unjustified, and obviously wrong.

Why do you impose this condition, that it is impossible for the same sensation to occur many times over and over again. Don't we see the same objects over and over again day after day, week after week. No one assumes that it's impossible that the chair you see here today is the same chair that was here last week. What support do you have for your claim that it's impossible that the sensation I have today is the same sensation I had last week? You are just making up, this so-called impossibility, as an attempt to justify your wrong interpretation.

You are talking about one exactly the same, so you have misread. — Luke

That's exactly what I'm talking about. Suppose I say this chair here is the same chair which was here yesterday. And you say, no it's not, it's exactly like it, but it's not the same chair (you think someone switched the chair for one exactly like it, I do not, I think it's the same chair). This is what you are saying about "the sensation", it's not the same sensation, you are saying, it is one like the other. But Wittgenstein is very deliberately calling it "the sensation", so he intends that what is meant is 'the same sensation', just like I say the chair is the same chair. He even ends this section at 270 with the passage I quoted already:

And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here? Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,— And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time? Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?

There is nothing else to say, except that you are very clearly misunderstanding this section if you think he is talking about "the same type of sensation". He is very explicit, I think he uses "the sensation" about four times in 258 alone.

In my view, this captures Plato’s intention much better than translations that insist on indiscriminately using “lie” to make Plato sound like Lenin or Stalin.

Once the meaning of pseudos has been clarified, the correct reading becomes obvious from Socrates’ own answer to the question “What sort of story?”: “Nothing new. A fairy story like the one poets tell”.

Clearly, what he has in mind is a story (literally, “a Phoenician tale”) to replace the existing one. Hence, “nothing new” (meden kainon).

If you take a look at the Talk pages where editors discuss Wikipedia articles you’ll get an idea of what’s happening behind the scenes. Below is a comment on “Noble Lie”: — Apollodorus

The actual format of the noble lie is a little difficult to distinguish, because Plato wants everyone to be fooled by it. I understood it as supporting his proposed eugenics. Breeding of human beings was to be controlled, like we would control the breeding of dogs. However, in order to be successful, the controlled breeding needed to be hidden from the public. The proposal was some sophisticated lottery system which would be held to determine who got to mate. The lottery would be rigged.

The difference is this: In these examples, Wittgenstein is referring to the PLA, as you correctly pointed out, and the point of the PLA is that one cannot privately create a language that correctly identifies sensations (of course it's more than sensations that goes terribly wrong). Hence, the doubt, but in this contrived situation (viz., the PLA context), which is, it seems to me, logically impossible. — Sam26

But we disagree on "the point of the PLA". I think the point is that no language can correctly identify sensations, not just the private language. Surely the demonstration which Wittgenstein makes shows that the doubt concerning "a particular sensation" goes beyond the private language, to language use in general. Look what happens when the person tries to justify, publicly, that "S" refers to a sensation, through readings of blood pressure measurement, at 270. If the justification is successful, then "S" simply refers to a rise in blood pressure, and the supposed "sensation" is now irrelevant.

What does "S" really refer to, the supposed sensation, or a rise in blood pressure? That "S" refers to "a sensation" is dubious privately and needs justification. Publicly, the justification of the usage, the rise in blood pressure, replaces the sensation, as what "S" refers to. Consider that at some time the blood pressure might rise, but the person does not have the sensation, and does not mark S. Then we must say that the person is not using S correctly. And the person cannot argue this because correct usage was dependent on that justification. So S really refers to the rise in blood pressure, not a sensation

So Wittgenstein's PLA demonstrates, as you say, that a person cannot assume to be able to correctly identify a particular sensation. But that is just the beginning. He then proceeds to demonstrate that if a person attempts to identify a particular sensation, justification of the usage of the symbol will be required. And if the usage of the symbol can be justified, then the symbol does not refer to the sensation anymore, it refers to whatever the means of justification is. Therefore we can conclude that a symbol cannot refer to a particular sensation.

For example imagine you have a sensation you are inclined to call "pain". To begin with you cannot be sure that the sensation you have is the real one which is supposed to be called "pain". But the use of the word can be justified publicly, so you show others your wound, to justify your use of "pain". Now "pain" doesn't refer to your sensation, it refers to your wound.

Now the contrast - the PLA must be seen against, and in the light of how we normally learn a language. So, in our normal everyday language-games about sensations and/or pains, which is not by the way, the PLA, can we doubt we're in pain? Emphatically, No! We can see how far out such doubts are, especially if we compare this with what Wittgenstein is doing in the OC. If we compare Moore's proposition "I know this is a hand," at least Wittgenstein gives a reasonable example of how a doubt can occur here, although one has a difficult time understanding how a doubt could arise in Moore's context. However, in the case of doubting one is in pain, Wittgenstein constructs a contrived example (the PLA), which cannot be done (a totally private language cannot be done), as he rightfully points out. It's only done to point out how language logically works, and how that logic falls apart in the PLA. — Sam26

I really think you are missing the point of the PLA here. Notice that the PLA is concerned with identifying a particular sensation, a certain sensation, or what Banno called a specific sensation. "Pain" is a very general class which consists of all sorts of different sensations. The problem which Wittgenstein is talking about in the PLA is the uncertainty involved in saying that this sensation I have today, is the very same as the sensation I had last week. This is the same type of doubt as in his example of the chair. The chair here today seems to be identical to the one here yesterday, but I can't be sure that they are the same chair, because they could have been switched in the meantime. So, the question is, what justification do I have in calling these distinct instances of sensation by the same symbol "S", in my judgement that they are "a sensation". I cannot appeal to the universal, and say that I know beyond the shadow of a doubt that these are instances of "pain", because there are many different types of pain, and the issue here concerns identifying one particular sensation, not a general class of sensations..

Also, I don't think it's likely that you have created a model that shows we can doubt being in pain. — Sam26

According to what I described above, Wittgenstein's PLA, 253-270, demonstrates very clearly that one can never be certain concerning one's own sensations, if certainty requires justification. Do you not agree, that Wittgenstein has created a model that shows we can doubt being in pain?

Consider the beetle in the box. Is a person not justified in doubting whether the thing in one's own box is really a beetle? Suppose we say that the person has named the thing "beetle" therefore it is impossible that the thing is other than the thing called "beetle". We could say that there is necessity here, so the person is certain. But what Wittgenstein is arguing, and Isaac as well, I believe, is that each time one looks into the box, the thing is a little different, so how is one certain that it is still the same thing in the box? Look at 253, how do you know that the chair in front of you today is the same chair that was there yesterday. That it is identical is just a judgement you make, which is fallible. Someone could have switched chairs over night.

So this is the issue at 258, and what Isaac brings attention to, the sensation from one day is not the same as the sensation of another day. They are similar but not the same. Therefore we do not have a thing named "beetle" in the box anymore, each day you look in, there is something different, yet similar in the box. Now, we cannot be certain that it is a beetle, (or "pain") because justification is impossible, as Wittgenstein describes.

Btw, thanks for the compliment above. I'll try not to push your buttons, to make you cranky. That kind of thing is really detrimental to constructive discussion, but sometimes it takes a long time to understand how to avoid it, especially with people who have very different perspectives.

Religions - and ideologies - can be confirmable and influential; hence they may be judged.

↪Metaphysician Undercover too, for what it's worth. — Banno

I'm sure that religions can be influential, and that they can be judged, but I'm not sure as to what you would mean by "confirmable". The point I was alluding to is that the process for judgement of religious ideology is completely different from the process for judging something like a scientific theory. That's why I asked you to prove your expressed principles, that books ought not be burned, and that rulers ought not lie to the subjects. We know that scientific theories are judged according to the scientific method, but did you know that religious ideologies are judged according to metaphysical principles? We don't judge religions according to our emotional feelings, we establish rational moral principles based in solid metaphysics, and this is how we judge them.

We are lucky to live in a society where we can choose our religions, or ideologies. So we are allowed to make our own judgements, and we are not necessarily born into a religion. But still our governments impose boundaries, preventing us from crossing the borderline into hate, for example. That would be a case where judgement is based in emotion. So the governing forces always must have the power to prevent transgressions which they apprehend as substantial. And, what constitutes a substantial transgression is not consistent through time, due to changing historical conditions, changing ideologies, and the relationship between the ideology and the historical conditions.

However, it is very clear that the ideology of an oppressed people, which leads them in revolution is not in the same relationship with the historical conditions as the ideology of a ruling class is. And "facts" will mislead us if they are related to ideologies in an unreal way. This misunderstanding is the result of the inaccessibility of intention, to the observer. What you do not seem to be recognizing is that early Christianity is an ideology of an oppressed people, not a governing class, Therefore the actions promoted by the ideology were revolutionary in nature. Early Christianity is very intensely revolutionary, (that's why Jesus was crucified), and this 'fact' must be respected when judging the actions of these people. The intent of a revolutionary is on the flip side in relation to the intent of a ruler.

Consider now, later Christianity after factions have been consolidated and central ruling power has been established. Here we find the Inquisition. This is a case of a ruling class enforcing ideological boundaries on the members of its society. Notice though, that the rulers only have the capacity to enforce these boundaries inward, as punishment, against their own members. So they have no real means for dealing with competing ideologies, as they stand alone, only the means for preventing the competing ideologies from intruding or infiltrating into their own ideological system. This ideology of exclusion is contrary to fundamental Christian principles of compassion, forgiveness, and accepting the differences of others, it has now become us against them.

Can we agree that "a religion" might be defined as "an ideology"? How can an ideology be something factual?

It is an inherited denial of historical fact. — Banno

I really don't see any sort of systematic "denial of historical fact" which you are so bent on. We do not need to go back, 1500, or more years to find abhorrent misdeeds carried out by those in the higher levels of Christian religious organizations, as you say right here. But I really don't see the denial of fact. They tend to rationalize the incidents or refuse to speak about them, which is still not quite denial.

I see The Inquisition as probably the worst institution established by The Church, but at the same time, I see the terribleness of it as having the reverse affect of that intended, as propelling the downfall rather than sustaining The Church. But where is the denial of fact in all this?

Pretending that religion is not factual leads to the denial of the results of religious belief.

I've pointed to the discussion of Confirmable and influential Metaphysics previously. Religious beliefs can be assessed by their outcomes. Christianity resulted in charities, hospitals, schools, persecution and oppression.

We've previously agreed that it behaves much as any other human institution. — Banno

I really cannot even imagine what you mean when you say "pretending that religion is not factual". How do you propose that an institution, a set of laws, or a code of ethics (which are all things similar to a religion), is something factual? How do you step across the ought/is divide as if it didn't even exist?

Of course it could be that MU is right and everyone else is wrong, it's logically possible. — Sam26

This is the root of the problem right here. "Correct" is determined through public justification, making "correct" whatever obtains social consensus. However, there is no consensus as to what Wittgenstein is actually saying. Therefore there is no "correct" reading of Wittgenstein. You, and your buddies, can argue endlessly about who's reading is "correct", and there will never be a resolution. Wittgenstein intended it this way. There's a way of speaking, an oratory skill, which employs parables, and ambiguity is essential. To be appealing to a wider audience one can choose words which different people will relate to in different ways, allowing that everyone might find something favourable in the same expression. But I see through Wittgenstein's sham, to see that true principles are derived from the minds of individuals, not from the public judgement of "correct".

When we think or talk to ourself, or perceive our surroundings, we know when an event is recognizable or unrecognizable, coherent or incoherent , consistent or inconsistent , with respect to our expectations. Aren’t these forms of correctness? — Joshs

Not in Wittgenstein's conceptual structure. Remember, to think that oneself is following a rule is not the same as actually following a rule. We must be capable of judging one's actions as being consistent with the rule, to be able to say that the person follows a rule. This is fundamental to Wittgenstein's form of justification.

So, for a person to recognize something as similar, or to make a judgement of consistency, this is not sufficient for justification. And if it is not justified we cannot say that it is a form of being correct. In other words if the person cannot be judged as following a rule, then "following a rule" is not justified, nor is "correct".

I really don't think that Wittgenstein intended to deny the reality of these forms of judgement, he is just not interested to move on toward describing these personal forms of judgement. He classes them as outside justification, and moves toward understanding the justification side, epistemology, rather than the metaphysical side. In the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, such personal judgements are judgements of "good". You can see that "good" has a pragmatic base, very much dependent on the particular circumstances, whereas "correct" is rule based, depending on universal laws. The two meet in moral ethics, morality being concerned with the personal decision of good and bad, whereas ethics is concerned with rules of correctness, though many do not care to acknowledge the difference.

This difference i reading has to do with what to make of rules, grammar, concepts , criteria. Do they have any existence outside of actual, contextual situations? This question would seem to apply equally to terms like model and representation as they are utilized in free energy approaches. Put differently, do you understand and concur with Antony’s objections to Luke’s reading of Wittgenstein on grammar and rules? — Joshs

The problem I see with Luke's reading of Wittgenstein, and Sam26's to an extent, is that they give priority to rules, as if rules are foundational to language, as required for language. But a careful reading of the first part of PI reveals that Wittgenstein intended something completely different. Rules are not foundational, and only come into existence as a feature of language. You might say that rules are the result of the public use of language.

Misunderstanding of the PLA leads one to believe that a private language is impossible. But this is not at all what Wittgenstein has demonstrated. What he has demonstrated is that a private language cannot consist of rules, so right and wrong within a private language is nonsensical. This does not mean that a private language is nonsensical, it just means that the ideas of right and wrong cannot be supported by the private language. So we have a deep division here, a fundamental divide between two very distinct types of language-games, the private game within which there is no such thing as correct and incorrect, and the public game, within which "correct" and "incorrect" appear to form the substance.

Yeah, I lose a lot of people at that point. — Isaac

However, it is the place where you find me.

You're still assuming that there's a physiological/mental state that answers to the term 'in pain'. What if there wasn't? How would that change things? — Isaac

This is the scourge of Platonism. We refer to things like Ideas, and sensations, as if they are things, mental states, subject matter, content, what Banno calls mental furniture. But this is a complete misrepresentation. It is a misunderstanding of the mind, and how the mind works, which Aristotle attempted to dispel us of, when he formulated the law of identity. The law of identity states what a thing is in a way which excludes ideas, and other subject matter from being classed as things. This is the category separation between universals and particulars. To understand a universal as a particular is the classic category mistake.

The issue which is alluded to at 270, in the quoted passage above, is that this way of speaking, because it provides us great convenience for speaking about internal feelings and thoughts, is very deeply rooted in our language-games, pervading them all. Aristotle proposed the law of identity as a way to exclude this type of speaking from formal logic, but as Wittgenstein implies at 254-255, it is an illness which has reestablished itself through mathematical axioms.

Wittgenstein suggests at 255, that philosophy needs to treat this illness. The illness consists of convenient falsities, and is therefore a form of pragmatic dishonesty, rooted in intellectual laziness. But how is it possible to treat such an illness, when these expressions provide us with such a high degree of convenience for talking about internal conditions? This illness, which has been allowed to establish itself at the highest intellectual levels, is allowed to permeate in a top down manner throughout all the different games. In the other thread Banno insists that burning books is not a good thing, it burns a hole into the culture. But how else can we destroy such a cancer?

But to them that's like burning a pile of trash. Ie., not a bad thing, not at all, but something useful.

Where you and the Christians differ is in the qualitative evaluation of some past events. — baker

This is what Banno doesn't seem to understand. He seems to think that he can make universal value statements such as 'burning books is bad', 'dishonesty from the rulers is bad', and since they are emotionally charged subjects which will elicit agreement from others, he believes these statements must be correct. However, he seems to have no capacity to support these value judgements with principles or logic.

I think we should rename Banno "Moses", and let him shout out his commandments. Thou shalt not burn books! Thou shalt not lie to the subjects! etc., as if they are facts.

And we have the hole in our literary heritage. — Banno

I can almost sympathize. I lost my copy of "Goodnight Moon". I think my evil brother left it out in the rain. Oh well, we're all grown up now, and we learn to get over such loses. As my mother used to say if I cried over such things, "it's not the end of the world". Get over it, Banno.

No; he's using "certain" in the attributive sense, as about a specific sensation. — Banno

I agree he uses "certain sensation" in the way of "specific sensation", or "particular sensation". The point being that any time he has an instance of a sensation, which he is inclined to label with "S", as the specific sensation, that it is the specific sensation cannot be justified. Therefore he can never be certain that the sensation he has, is that specific sensation. And his attempts to justify it reveal in the end, that he is not even justified in saying that "S" refers to a "particular sensation", or even "a sensation", according to the quote I provided.

Notice Wittgenstein's peculiar word usage at 258: " I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation." With the use of "certain" here it is implied that he might have certainty concerning his sensation. But as explained by Isaac above , there is no such thing as certainty in relation to sensations.

Further, Wittgenstein proceeds with "To this end I associate it with the sign 'S' and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation...". Notice his reference here to "the sensation" as if every time that he judges a sensation as being similar to a previous one, he might conclude that it is that very same, "certain" sensation.

What he has done here is set up a scenario, which appears to the untrained mind, to be a completely normal and acceptable scenario, the person is going to mark down every time they experience the same sensation. However, in reality it is an impossible scenario. No two sensations are the same, as Isaac explains, so in reality, he could not ever be using the sign "S", if he could only use it when he was certain that it was "the sensation".

Of course Wittgenstein knows of this impossibility, and he has set up this impossible scenario intentionally, because he knows that many people might believe the scenario to be really possible, and might picture someone in that scenario actually using "S" to signify a "certain sensation". So, he proceeds to question how one might justify the use of "S" to signify that a sensation on one day is the very same sensation as the sensation on another day. Of course this cannot actually be justified.

Now, justification he says, requires an appeal to something else, something independent. So it is a type of comparison, a matter of establishing a relationship. So we see at 270 a correlation between his use of "S" with a rise in blood pressure, as a possible justification for his use of "S". However, as described, this is not a true justification.. So long as his use of "S" is judged as coinciding with a blood pressure rise, his sensations become completely irrelevant. So his use of "S" to signify a "certain sensation" cannot be justified in this way.

In conclusion, that "S" signifies a certain sensation is just a faulty idea created by the language-game.

270 And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here? Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,— And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time? Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?

Banno demonstrates a very strange and unacceptable notion of "fact", as if a fact could be separate from the knower who knows it. But we all know that facts are known bits of information, truths, which do not exist separate from the knower who knows them. And Banno is just is trying to force some philosophical hogwash on us.

Banno's narrative is "fact". Any narrative which Banno doesn't like is "non-factual".

Why don't you get down to the task at hand, and demonstrate why you believe that dishonesty for the purpose of bettering mankind, is supposed to be some sort of oxymoron?

There's a reason I don't usually reply to your posts, Meta. It's because you are so comfortable with self-contradiction.

If you are happy to be dishonest to yourself, then then I will continue ignoring your posts. — Banno

Obviously, I am completely unaware of the purported self-contradiction within my posts. So where are you coming up with this idea that I'm being dishonest to myself?

I feel for you, you poor bastard.

The noble lie is told to others; of course, I had presumed you and I know the truth about the early years of Christianity. Or do you choose to lie to yourself? — Banno

The issue you brought up was whether or not honesty is necessary in the goal of the betterment of mankind. Those who believe in the value of the noble lie clearly believe that honesty is not necessary.

Whether or not you and I know the history of early Christianity, or whether we deceive ourselves in this matter is not relevant to the issue.

That's why Ennui Elucidator and @Metaphysician Undercover find themselves advocating telling lies. — Banno

I'm still waiting for justification of your opinion, that telling lies is bad, absolutely. Until you provide that justification, all you are doing is playing on the emotions of those who do not like to be told lies. Playing the emotions is not justification. We do not like to be punished either, but very few say that punishment is bad.

So until you provide an argument as to why the dishonesty, which is believed to be carried out for the betterment of human existence (the noble lie) is for some reason bad, I'll consider that you are just voicing an uneducated opinion. You're just like a little child, arguing with your parents, that they ought not punish you because you dislike it. You insist that the authorities ought not lie to you, because you do not like being lied to. Betterment often involves pain. That it hurts does not imply that it is bad.

IF a religion lies about its history then it may also lie about what it is doing now - it acts in bad faith. And indeed we see this in the many ways the various churches have covered over recent sins of maltreatment and pedophilia. — Banno

The noble lie is not an instance of bad faith so it ought not be compared with common instances of bad faith. Bad faith involves proceeding with an act which one knows to be wrong. The noble lie involves proceeding with an act which one believes to be right.

You seem to believe that the noble lie actually is wrong. Where's your proof? When the noble lie has been proven to be immoral, then we might class it as bad faith.

if one allows religion not to be factually correct, to consist in metaphor and allegory, for the betterment of mankind, then does that mean it need not be honest? — Banno

Your ideas about the value of honesty need to be supported. Being a philosopher, I'm sure you are aware of "the noble lie". That the noble lie is somehow wrong, or immoral, is a very difficult claim to support. We might support it with the principle of "equality", but equality isn't real so as much as it might provide a legal base, it provides no moral base.

We might try a Christian principle like love your neighbour, but for some reason we still see the efficacy in lying to those whom we love. Where do you derive the idea that the betterment of mankind might be accomplished without dishonesty?

You're implying that there are no natural human expressions or reactions. How are a tendency to say "ouch" or a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source [of pain] not natural expressions or reactions, but merely "something we construct"? Don't most animals tend to withdraw from perceived sources of pain?

Such general facts of nature (PI 142) are pivotal to Wittgenstein's work, especially his references to form of life and "shared human behaviour" (PI 206), or that we teach children sensation words on the basis of such shared behaviour (PI 257). — Luke

The distinction between natural and artificial is untenable in the modern world which has done away with the supernatural (God) as the support for the natural. So you are inclined to assign things like instinct and intuition to "the natural", even though they are more similar to "the artificial", by showing intention. The theist could attribute the intention displayed within "natural" things to God, "the supernatural".

Now we'd say that a human construction is artificial, but a bird's nest, or a beaver's dam is natural, though all of these ought to be classed as the same type, because they are purposefully created, therefore created intentionally. So instead of supporting all the intention which is evident within the natural world, with the supernatural, God, we have turned the other way, to say that human beings and their artifacts are a part of nature, natural. Clearly, the division you want, between the natural and the artificial is untenable in the modern world, where we see human beings and their artificial products as a part of nature.

Therefore your proposed division between natural (instinctual) reactions and learned reactions is not at all useful to the subject at hand. They are all intentional (purposeful), and your claim that "shared human behaviour" is somehow not natural is completely untenable without support from the supernatural, God. And to imply that such a division is "pivotal to Wittgenstein's work" is simply wrong. So it's time for me to turn the judgement you made against me, back at yourself. You have a very keen capacity to produce quotes, but ".I don't think you understand ... much of anything that Wittgenstein says."

In terms of PLA, isn't John's use is exactly a case of sensation S? Haven't we learnt to use the word pain appropriately by trial and error, I use it here it should do this...no, that didn't quite work out as I expected...perhaps here, like this...all the while watching other humans in our social group to see how they react. — Isaac

This is exactly what I've been arguing, but there's a tendency at this forum, to argue that certainty is prior to uncertainty, and that we cannot proceed with an action (such as speaking), without first being certain of what the outcome will be. But this is a complete misunderstanding of the nature of language use. It is the type of activity which if we make a mistake there is usually no serious consequence, or punishment. So there is no requirement of certainty in language use, and trial and error plays a significant role. In fact, the mistakes of young children are seen as humourous and entertaining, so they are encouraged to proceed in their trial and error of learning.

The whole idea that language use is rooted in some form of certainty which is produced from following rules, is simply a misrepresentation of language. And to say that Wittgenstein presents us with this model of language, as if it is a rule based activity, with all those rules being founded upon some rock solid indubitable rules, is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. He is actually exposing the flaws of this perspective, in order to discredit it, he is not supporting it.

This is a feature of philosophy which many people do not understand. To discredit an idea, refute an ideology, requires that one lay out for display the complete ideology, all of its features and aspects, in their entirety, revealing the faults. The trained philosopher will see the faults, as revealed, and understand that the person laying out the display is actually refuting the ideology by displaying its faults, rather than supporting it.

The way people relate to Plato is a prime example. Modern day "platonic realism" is really a replica of ancient pythagorean idealism. Plato laid out for display all the features of pythagorean idealism, complete with its flaws, and effectively refuted it. Aristotle formalized that refutation. But today, we learn pythagorean idealism through Plato's descriptions, and most people do not read Plato thoroughly enough to understand him, so they believe he is supporting that ideology, and we even attribute the ideology to him, as platonic realism.

Banno doesn't seem to understand that when there's a pile of crap out back you get rid of it. Sure, someone will tell you later that some of that crap actually had some value, but this doesn't mean that getting rid of the pile of crap was the wrong thing to do. If it's seen as a hazard the appropriate thing is to dispose of it.

You quote Wittgenstein saying that it is "possible for us both to have the same pain", but it could not be possible if there were no rule governing his use of "same". You seem to think that "same" must mean identical per the law of identity, otherwise it can have no meaning. — Luke

I don't see where you derive "it could not be possible if there were no rule governing his use of 'same'". That's utter nonsense. I can't believe that after so much time discussing this issue with me, you are still arguing such a lame point.

Anyway, I do not think that "same" has "no meaning" as you suggest. I think that it could have any meaning, depending on the context of usage, as Wittgenstein suggests. Do you apprehend the difference between having no meaning (meaningless), and having a vast array of different meanings depending on the context of usage? The latter is what Wittgenstein suggests happens to "same" when we reject the law of identity.

The vast array of different meanings is the result of the rejection of the rule (law of identity), i.e. it is the consequence of there being no rule. So the meaning in any particular instance of use is dependent on that particular context of use, not some sort of rule. Meaning is a feature of the particular context of use, not a feature of some universal rule. A rule might restrict the meaning, in the sense of providing a boundary, as a part of the context, but a rule is not a necessary part of the context. Therefore meaning is not dependent on rules. When you come to grasp this fact, you will see that context may provide all the restrictions necessary for the existence of meaning, without the requirement of any rules.

Then why did you say:

There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same. Luke supports this above with the quote from 216, the law of identity is a useless statement.
— Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think you understand PI 216 or much of anything that Wittgenstein says. — Luke

I don't think you understand the law of identity. According to this law it is impossible for two things to be the same. Only one thing can be the same as itself. Calling one thing, "two things", is contradictory. That's why I said "There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same", "Two things are the same" is a violation of the law of identity, and no new law has been proposed to take its place. So there is no other rule, or law which provides us a principle, or criterion, by which we can say "two things are the same", even though we commonly use "same" like this, in the vernacular.

Wittgenstein clearly understands the law of identity (216), and explains how he will use the word "same" in the vernacular way, which violates the law of identity (253-255), He even emphasizes this usage at 254 with "The substitution of "identical" for "the same" (for instance) is another typical expedient in philosophy." By this substitution, two "identical" things are said to be "the same" (in disregard for the law of identity).

He also alludes to the consequence of this action, that with this use of "same" which he has chosen, there is no criterion of identity by which the two things are said to be the same. Clearly, he is implying that since he has dismissed the law of identity, in favour of the vernacular use of "same", there is now no rule governing his use of "same".

253 In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is
also possible for us both to have the same pain.

You agree with Wittgenstein that the law of identity is - as you call it - "a useless statement"? — Luke

I don't agree that the law of identity is a useless statement. I agree with Wittgenstein that there is no criterion of identity by which we say that two things are the same. The law of identity states that one thing is the same as itself. It is not a criterion for judging two things as the same.

And this is what is discussed at 253, the possibility of a criterion for judging two things as the same. Since there is no such criterion, and people use "same" to refer to things which are obviously different, but are in some way similar, then it would make perfect sense to say that your pain is the same as my pain.

Furthermore, I am no more justified, or correct, in judging that one instance of my pain is the same as another instance of my pain, then I am in saying that your pain is the same as my pain. This is because we have no criteria by which we can judge two distinct things as the same, so any instance of doing such is just as absurd, and unjustified as any other.

Anyway, Wittgenstein didn't believe that the law of identity is useless, he just didn't like the way that it was stated, so he offered his own interpretation. If you read the rest of that passage, you'll see that he just preferred to offer his own way of stating it, as "every thing fits into its own shape" or something like that

You definitely have a unique way of interpreting Wittgenstein. — Sam26

So do you, so does Banno, and also Luke. In this sense we are all the same. Go figure.

My view is that another way we justify beliefs is by linguistic training, i.e., we learn how to use words. How do I know that that is a cup and that it's red? First, we learn to use the words in social contexts, so (as I point to a cup) it's what we mean by cup, red, etc. Whether it makes sense to say "I know this is a cup," depends on the context. If someone was learning a language, we could imagine where one might appropriately doubt whether X is a cup or something else. In other words, the doubt is about the use of that particular word, and its referent. — Sam26

You are making a big jump here, thereby avoiding the problem of justification which Wittgenstein is pointing at. We need to justify our use of words, as you say, demonstrate that we are correct in saying that X is a cup. This is the only way to quell the doubt about the use of that particular word. Now you cannot jump to "we justify beliefs...by linguistic training", as your answer to the problem of justification, because, 'this is how I learned to talk therefore it is correct', does not suffice as justification. It's an appeal to authority, and is really nothing more than circular logic. Why is this use of words correct? Because it's what we were taught to do. Why were we taught to do it? Because its correct. It's just a circle which really says nothing about justification. To understand what justification really is, we need to really look at why we use words the way that we do, rather than just saying that we use words the way that we do because we were taught to use them that way.

Wow, that's some statement. Now I understand how it is that you can make some of the statements you put forth. — Sam26

If you saw some of my discussions with Luke, you'd see that I've been arguing this for a long time. Wittgenstein is the person who gave me this idea. Look at what is said in 253-255. There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same. Luke supports this above with the quote from 216, the law of identity is a useless statement.

Bear this in mind when you read 257-264. There is no rule followed when the person in the example names a sensation with "S" To be named S requires that the sensation be judged as "the same" as the prior one named by S. But the person has no criterion of identity by which to make that judgement. Furthermore, as explained in 253 -255, there is no criterion of identity in language use in general, by which people in general might judge two things to be the same, thereby justifying the use of the same word for two distinct things. So, the example presented at 258 is a representation, or description by analogy, of language use in general. We have no rule, no criterion of identity, by which we say that this object (which we are inclined to name as a "phone" for example) is the same as the last object which someone used the same name on, as these two are clearly different objects, not the same object, therefore using the same name is unjustified.

So, we proceed to 261, the use of a word stands in need of justification. This refers not simply to the private language, which serves as the example by analogy, but language in general. And this is where we turn to others, the public, to derive justification for our private acts of word use. The point we are at now, is that word use itself is not necessarily public, it may be something private, but justification of that use is something public. This is the premise which Wittgenstein will proceed to argue in the next section, that justification is necessarily public. He is not arguing that language use is necessarily public, because he's already demonstrated that private use is exactly the same as public use, by showing that neither employs a criterion of identity. (Notice the twist here, "demonstrated that private use is exactly the same as public use", when there is no criterion of identity.)

However, this exposes a much deeper philosophical problem. If a criterion of identity is not employed when we name two distinct things by the same name, (or designate them as "exactly the same"), then how is one's use of words justified? So justification becomes a very deep problem with no immediate solution.

A private linguist, each time they make use of a sign to represent a sensation, would be engaging in an act of ostensive definition. Each use would be novel. Hence, there is no rule being followed. — Banno

Each use of the sign "S" is a novel use, because each instance of sensation is a new sensation. These sensations are only said to be "the same" through that sloppy use of "same", which follows from the absence of a criterion of identity. This sloppy use of "same" which says that two identical things are the same, is an illness which pervades mathematics, requiring philosophical treatment.

254. The substitution of "identical" for "the same" (for instance)
is another typical expedient in philosophy. As if we were talking about
shades of meaning and all that were in question were to find words
to hit on the correct nuance. That is in question in philosophy only
wherewe have to give a psychologically exact account of the temptation
to use a particular kind of expression. What we 'are tempted to say'
in such a case is, of course, not philosophy; but it is its raw material.
Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about the
objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of
mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.
255 . The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment
of an illness.

As you say Banno, there is no rule being followed, because there is no criteria as to what constitutes an S, because each S, as a particular individual is different from every other S. But that's simply the way language is, it does not consist of rules. Each person decides, based on one's own experience, what to call any different object, or any different feeling. We don't follow rules, each one of us follows one's own personal inclinations. Who, (unless there is a God), has the power of authority to say one is correct and another incorrect?

I believe the key to understanding Wittgenstein's PLA is to grasp what he says about a "criterion of identity, 253-255.

253 Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of "two exactly the same", for example, to say "This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it"

It is important to acknowledge here that when we speak of "two exactly the same", we are not adhering to the law of identity, which stipulates that only one thing is the same as itself. So when we talk about two things which are the same, this is not "same" according to a strict criterion of identity like the law of identity.

Further, it is in using "same" in this way, which implies that two similar things are "the same", as they are said to be "two exactly the same", when they are really two which are very similar, which allows one to say that my pain is the same as your pain. It isn't really the same if "same" is defined by the law of identity, but since they are said to be "exactly the same" in that other sense of "same", which really means similar, then my pain is the same as your pain.

253 In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain.

This is to use "same" without adherence to the strict criterion of identity, which is the law of identity. But since it is very common to use "same" in this way, and it makes complete sense to us to see it used in this way, because we are accustomed to it, then we can proceed in using it in this way.

Just be aware, when interpreting any supposed private language arguments, that "the same" for Wittgenstein, in the sense of 'the same sensation' really means distinct, but similar, sensations, in the way that we might say two different things are the same.

Wheatley's form of discussion, all talk, no listen. No wonder it is difficult for Wheatley to understand others.

Did you not read my posts? Metaphysics.

You said it is "self-correcting". It is not self-correcting, because the corrections come from outside science, as I explained, and this is allowed for by the fact that science is not self-contained, as T said. Is this difficult for you to understand?

It means that it is not self-contained. — Thunderballs

Where's the logic in that? — Wheatley

Exactly what Thunderballs says, science is not self-contained. The corrections to science don't come from science. Science has provisions for outside influence, in the form of hypotheses and theories which are not scientifically proven, they are metaphysical speculations.