(iii) "the words of this language refer to what can only be known by the person speaking".

How does this fit in? Is it another condition? How does it differ from (i) and (ii)? — Luke

You can take it as another condition if you want, that might be best way.

Nonsense. You cannot have a language-game without a language, and you cannot have a private language-game without a private language. — Luke

Where's your proof of this? If a language consists of a multitude of language-games, then most likely there was a first language-game prior to there being a language.

It is supposed that the person knows what "S" refers to at 258 because they are associating
"S" with a certain sensation and "writ[ing] this sign in a calendar for every day on which [they] have the sensation." — Luke

It is explicitly stated at the end of 258, that there is no such thing as the correct use of S, there is no right here. "There is no criterion of correctness" Therefore we can conclude that the person cannot "know" the sensation called S. You seem to be missing the gist of the example. "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation", does not mean that I actually can do that. "Want" implies a lack of. That I want to know my own sensations implies that I actually do not know them. The conclusion at the end of 258 is that I cannot come to know "a certain sensation" in the way proposed by the example.

The language is not private because a person might appear to understand? What does "appear to understand" mean in terms of a private language? How can an outsider know how it appears to understand a private language? — Luke

Have you read 269 yet. I keep referring to it, and you refuse to acknowledge it, insisting that we must understand what "private language" at 243 means first. But you need to accept that "private language" as described at 243 is incoherent, and move along to Wittgenstein's next proposal of "private language", the one at 269, which is inconsistent with 243, as different from it. The definition at 243 has been demonstrated as incoherent because the person cannot "know" what the words refer to. So at 269, there is a proposal that the "private language" user has a "subjective understanding" of what the words refer to, rather than actually knowing what the words refer to as "private language" at 243 requires . In this sense of "private language", at 269, the person might "appear to understand", rather than actually "know" which is required at 243.

You said that a private language was an incoherent concept and that we cannot understand what Wittgenstein means by it, but you are now speaking as though it is not only a perfectly coherent concept, but that a private language could actually exist. That's quite a turnaround. Next you'll tell me that square circles can exist. — Luke

Yes, the revised definition of "private language", offered at 269, is coherent, and describes something which could actually exist.

So it's a private language but the speaker does not know what the words mean? How is it a language? What is it used for? — Luke

Perhaps you ought to read Wittgenstein a little bit closer, to provide yourself with a better understanding, then the answers to these questions might be revealed to you.

There is no language-game described at 258. There is nothing more than an association of a sign with a sensation. — Luke

Why do you think that associating a sign with a sensation does not qualify to be called a "language-game"?

Well, I think I have made myself clear on what I believe Plato’s framework to be.

But here is another example in connection with the Forms:

(A). Sensibles are “in flow and motion” and always changing (Theaet. 152e).

(B). Therefore, knowledge of them is not possible.

(C). But knowledge is possible.

(D). Therefore, there must be non-sensible objects of knowledge that are changeless.

(E). These non-sensible, changeless objects of knowledge are the Forms.

Plato is clearly committed to Forms as principles of explanation for knowledge or aspects of knowledge.
— Apollodorus

I pretty much agree with all this.

He is also committed to certain Forms like the Good (or the One), Beauty, Justice, etc. — Apollodorus

Where I disagree with you is in how you present this aspect of Platonism, as being "committed to certain Forms". This would be the way that Forms are related to each other, perhaps as a hierarchy of Forms. Plato presents the good, not as a Form, but as the material thing desired by a man. So there is no equivalence between the One, which is the Form that supports mathematics (for Plato), and the good.

Therefore your proposed hierarchy which places the One as the highest Form, as derived from Neo-Platonism, is not necessarily what Plato intended. I think Beauty, for example, and even Justice, as closer to "the good", being what is desired, are higher Forms than One, .

The fact that Plato did not explicitly produce a hierarchy of Forms, is one reason why there is a division amongst "Platonists", as Aristotle described, and why "Neo-Platonists" are called by that name, not "Platonists".

Socrates’ real complaint is against poets. This is why he begins by saying that he is delighted that all dramatic representation has been banned from the Ideal City. — Apollodorus

I agree with this. The complaint which Socrates has, is against this description of reality which is twice removed from the truth, but presented as a direct representation of the truth. This is presented as "narrative" in common translations, and can be understood along the lines of a representation of a representation. Or in the cave allegory, the cave dwellers see a reflection of reality, and the narrative would be a representation of this reflection. The cave dwellers would think of it as a direct representation of reality, not grasping that what they see as "reality" is already just a reflection.

There is a very similar situation with the artists. The artist, or poet, might present us with a representation of reality, but it's really a representation of the artist's opinion, which is itself a representation. The double representation is a common theme for Plato.

We can see the importance of this in Aristotle's interpretation of "the good". Ethicists will present us with what is "good". But any particular ethicist is just presenting us with a representation of one's own opinion of "good", which is itself a representation of the "real good". So what is presented to us by ethicists is something twice removed from the real good.

Philosophers must not follow the masses. They must use their own judgement that has been honed through specific methods of inquiry, and separate what is good in poetry – and in all forms of transmitted knowledge – from what is bad. The whole dialogue has an ethical theme which is the Good and the Just and how they can be integrated into human society by means of education, philosophic inquiry, etc. — Apollodorus

Yes, I agree completely with this, and I think it is the principal message presented to us from Plato, which keeps him relevant today and into the future. In our world of mass communication and mass media, it is very important to keep in mind the multitude of layers of representation. A report in the media is a report on someone's interpretation, it is not a direct representation of reality. If we want to understand reality, we need to go beyond the layers.

As I said, I don’t see carpenters looking to a “Form of Bed” made by God as a template. They normally have a catalogue of templates most of which are copied from other carpenters. — Apollodorus

I think you are missing the point. When we take words like "just", "good", "beauty", "knowledge" and look for their meaning, we see that different people have different ideas. That is what Plato does in many dialogues, looks to the meaning of a word by analyzing the opinions of people who assume to know it. It's called platonic dialectics. The issue is that with any such word, if there is supposed to be an objective meaning, what the word actually refers to, there must be an independent Form of that thing. The independent Form is supported by the divine mind, how God would define "just", "good", etc..

So when we practise platonic dialectics, in the attempt to go beyond, the opinions of individual people, we must assume that there is a true Form, the divine Form, as the third layer. Otherwise nothing justifies the assumption of the third layer, or "Truth". We have what is reported to us in the media, and this represents the many different opinions, but we have nothing further assumed, to validate a judgement, only one's own opinion, the person judging. But one's own opinion is just another part, one of the many, in the second layer, and does not support the assumption of the third layer. That is why we need to assume a "Form", made by God, in order to validate this whole idea of "narrative", or layers of representation, which Plato presents us with.

So, whether or not the individual poet, artist, or craftsperson, looks to the divine Form, to produce one's own template, is irrelevant. In fact, the vast majority would not, having no education in philosophy one would not even know about such a thing. The person would learn one's own trade through education from others, such that one's opinion would replicate another's opinion, and this propagates what you call "the masses". There is no need to assume a divine Form here. However, the philosopher, who wants to judge the opinions of others, for truth, must assume a divine Form, or else one's own judgement is just another opinion, amongst the opinions of others. There is nothing to validate Truth.

If we cannot understand what Wittgenstein means by a private language, then how does his private language have two conditions as you claim? — Luke

Just like any logically incoherent proposal can have two conditions. That's why I presented the square circle example. In this example, the one alone is not logically incoherent, it is the inconsistency between the two which produces the incoherency.

How can the concept of a private language be incoherent on the one hand, but then a private language can exist and become integrated into the common language on the other hand? How can a private language exist if the concept of a private language is incoherent? — Luke

This is why I explicitly referred to it as a "private language-game" rather than a "private language", to avoid this problem. What is presented at 258 is a language-game. A "language" consists of a multitude of language-games. The example at 258 is not an example of a "private language". We discussed this already, it is an example of a private language-game (the private use of S to name something) within the context of a common language (S is a sensation).

In what sense could a person "have" this language? They don't know or understand the language, but yet they "have" it? How? — Luke

The person can have, and use this language In the same sense that the person has and uses the private language-game described at 258. We can imagine that a person might have an entire language full of such private language-games. This person does not know or understand the use of "S", but is still using "S".

But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right' — PI 258

What produces the incoherency in Wittgenstein's "private language" definition, is the condition that the person "knows' what the words refer to. If we remove this condition we could define "private language", such that the person has a "private" language, and does not know what the words refer to, as in the example at 258. But the person might still "appear to understand" what the words refer to (269). That is why 258 is not an example of a "private language" as defined at 243. The person at 258 does not "know" what the symbol "S" refers to, as required by 243.

I believe that what Wittgenstein was trying to demonstrate is that any proposed form of a "private" language could not produce "knowledge", as knowledge is understood in epistemology, requiring justification. The proposed form of "private language", defined at 243, requires that the speaker knows what the words refer to, and so is ruled out as impossible. But other forms of "private" language, similar to the language-game described at 258, which consist of word use without knowing, might be very possible and very real.

Don't you think that Wittgenstein's private language argument is an argument against the coherency of a private language; against the coherency of a language that another person cannot understand? — Luke

Let me reply to this in a way which might be more clear to you Luke. A person could have a language, which oneself does not know or understand the usage of the words, yet the person could appear to understand the usage of the words (269), and Wittgenstein does not provide the required demonstration to show that it is necessarily the case that another person would be able to understand that language. So there is no argument "against the coherency of a language that another person cannot understand". That the person cannot know and understand one's own usage, in a private language-game (which is what is demonstrated), does not lead to the conclusion that another person will necessarily know or understand that language-game. So the person would have a private language-game, and it is not necessarily the case that others could understand it. Therefore "a language that another person cannot understand" is not ruled out as incoherent, but this language would not be known or understood to the person using it as well.

They don't want to be spammed. I'll wait to see your posts, try them one at a time.

Luke, the concept of "a private language" is incoherent from the outset, so there is no point in trying to determine what Wittgenstein means by "private language". There is nothing there but an incoherency, and we would go around in circles forever trying to understand a logical incoherency, when such a thing is impossible.

Suppose he had said 'Can we imagine a square circle? And what I mean by a square circle is an equilateral rectangle which has a circumference with each point equidistant from the centre.' You would see right away that we cannot imagine such a thing as the named "square circle" because it is logically incoherent, so there would be no point in discussing what does he mean by "square circle" because it's an incoherency. There would be no such thing as what he means by "square circle", because he has presented us with something incoherent.

This is exactly what he does with the proposition 'could we imagine a private language, and by "private language" I mean...'. He presents us with something logically incoherent and asks us if we can imagine such a thing. Of course the incoherency is a lot more subtle, and difficult to apprehend, and this was intentional by Wittgenstein, to create the appearance that what he proposes might actually hold the possibility of being logically coherent. But once the description given is understood as logically incoherent, then we must conclude that it is impossible to understand what Wittgenstein means by "private language".

Don't you think that Wittgenstein's private language argument is an argument against the coherency of a private language; against the coherency of a language that another person cannot understand? — Luke

No, I do not think it's an argument "against the coherency of a language that another person cannot understand". When the hypothesis of the conditional (the words refer to what is only known by the speaker) is demonstrated as incoherent, there is nothing we can logically say about the proposed conclusion of the conditional. So there is nothing presented to validly produce the conclusion you present me with. What is demonstrated is that a person who is privately using symbols (call this a private language-game if you want), cannot actually know or understand one's own usage, because knowing and understanding requires an independent justification.

There is no demonstration whereby we might conclude that other people cannot come to know or understand the private language-game. And so, "sounds which no one else understands but which I
'appear to understand''' (269) might become understood and known by others, as this private game is endowed with rules, becoming part of a common language.

Furthermore, I think that Wittgenstein presents this as a common occurrence and feature of natural language, that a private language-game (one in which the user of the language-game cannot be said to understand or know the language-game being played) gets integrated into the common language. And I think he presents this as a possible reason why the common languages consist of so many different language-games. .

As a result of this premise, the language cannot be understood by another person. — Luke

That is the second condition.

You see the two as one, because you think that the second necessarily follows from the first. But the second does not follow from the first, because of the incoherency of the first. If the hypothesis of a conditional is incoherent, then the proposed conclusion does not follow, and the two must be apprehended as distinct.

So your statement "As a result of this premise, the language cannot be understood by another person" is a false statement. This does not follow from the premise, "as a result", because the premise is incoherent so nothing can follow logically from it. You want to reject the incoherency of the premise as irrelevant and claim that the second thing "the language cannot be understood by another" follows logically from the premise, but we cannot proceed from an incoherent premise to claim that anything follows logically from it.

You continue to ignore the fact that Wittgenstein asks a question at 243. Can we imagine such a language? He is not telling us to imagine a language such as..., he is asking if it is possible to imagine a language such as... Do you grasp the difference?. He is not telling us that the second follows from the first, he is asking us if it does. Of course he knows that it does not, because he is about to demonstrate that the first is incoherent. So he would be a fool to stipulate that "the language cannot be understood by another person" follows necessarily from the premise, as you insist, because he is about to demonstrate that it does not.

The premise is not only that the language refers to one's private sensations. The premise is that the language refers to "what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations". — Luke

This premise is the one shown to be incoherent, at 258. Remember, there is no "right" here, so a person using a private symbol cannot be said to "know" the thing referred to with the symbol. It is impossible that only the person speaking can know one's own sensations. This is due to the way that Wittgenstein describes understanding and knowing, as requiring justification and rule-follow, which is something requiring the judgement of another person. And this is why Wittgenstein's "private language" is logically incoherent.

Read 269, and the relationship between what he calls "subjective understanding", and the private language. The person using the private language cannot be said to "know" his immediate private sensations, he only appears to, as it is a subjective understanding, not true knowing.

The Question: How might a layman be provided with basic tools to aid in successfully navigating the world, and most importantly, be aided in being independently capable of sustaining critical thinking, to the point of possessing and learning to use an initial approach to debunking and evaluating beliefs and belief systems? — William Wallace

Isn't the best answer to this question years of institutional education?

Platonists like Plotinus and Proclus tend to dismiss this passage. Personally, I don’t think it should be dismissed, but we should take a second look at it and see if it can be interpreted in a way that is consistent with Plato’s general framework. — Apollodorus

Of course there is another possibility. This possibility is that what you call "Plato's general framework", is not consistent with what Plato has written at all. Therefore what you espouse as "Plato's general framework" is the product of a misunderstanding of Plato. I propose that it is not by mere coincidence, nor by some mistaken strokes of Plato's writing hand, that some of the most important passages in Plato's dialogues are not consistent with what you call "Plato's general framework".

What language? We need to know what sort of language it is before we can answer the question of whether we can imagine such a language. Wittgenstein tells us what sort of language it is at 243: — Luke

Yes, the question Wittgenstein asks at 243, is can we imagine a language such as the one described . Do you see this question at 243? Wittgenstein is asking us, can we imagine a language such as the one described, meaning is such a language logically possible.

The second sentence can be seen as a consequence of the first: The language refers to what can only be known to the speaker; to his private sensations. So [consequently] another person cannot understand the language. — Luke

Right, so the question. Can we imagine a language which has words that refer to a person's private sensations, and this produces the consequence that every other person cannot understand the language? Remember, with a common language a person uses words to refer to one's private sensations, but this does not produce the consequence that other people cannot understand it.

It is common in language that people use words to refer to their private sensations, and
this does not lead to the consequence that others cannot understand. But Wittgenstein is asking can we imagine a situation where this will lead to the consequence that others cannot understand.

Do you agree, that this is the question being asked at 243. Is it possible that a language which refers to one's private sensations could produce the consequence that no one else could understand? In common language a person refers to one's private sensations, but it does not produce this consequence.

He doesn’t actually say “Form/Idea of Bed”. So, the reference to “bed in itself” may simply be an illustration that need not be taken literally. — Apollodorus

Maybe you ought to reread this, starting at 596, Bk 10. "There are many beds and tables...But there are only two forms of such furniture, one of the bed and one of the table." And surely the craftsman does not make the form itself. Then who is this craftsman who makes the form? 597: The craftsman doesn't make "the being of the bed", which is equated with the form of the bed, he makes a replication, a copy, just like the painter makes a copy. Further, the being of a bed, the form, made by God, is one only.

Now, God makes one bed, "the form", and the carpenter makes "a bed", and may make many beds, and the painter imitates a bed, painting a picture of it. Being third from the natural one makes the painter an "imitator", and what is made is an imitation. And the painter does not imitate "the form", which is created by God, the painter imitates one of the many beds created by a carpenter, and the imitation imitates the way the bed appears, not the truth. Being third, it is far removed from the truth.

What I propose is that you carry the analogy further. The carpenter employs "a form", a blueprint, which is 'one' template by which he makes many beds. But the carpenter's template is a replication of the one "Form of bed", which is the perfect template, God's bed. Since there are many carpenters there are many templates, or forms of bed, each carpenter having one's own. Then the material bed produced by the carpenter is twice removed from the truth, and is third, as an imitation.

So when the carpenter makes a bed, it is not an imitation of "the Form of bed", created by God, it is an imitation of the template of the carpenter, one of many such templates, or forms (because there are many carpenters), which is each a representation of the one Form of bed, created by God. So the material bed, made by the carpenter is just an imitation of how the perfect bed, the Form of bed, from God, appears to the carpenter, manifested as the carpenter's template, or form of bed. The carpenter's from or template is one of many, as there are many carpenters, and the bed produced is an imitation of this, which is how the Form of bed appears to that particular carpenter.

Do you acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations? — Luke

Yes I agree, but "known" is being used as indicated by258, as I explained. To know the sensation called S is to to be able to identify it and correctly apply the symbol. For instance, 'I know I have a toothache' means that I can correctly identify my sensation as a "toothache". So the phrase "the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking" can be interpreted as meaning only the person speaking can identify the things being referred to by the words. "Know" means to be able to identify.

Wittgenstein describes what he means by a private language at 243. How is it ambiguous? — Luke

I interpret 'known' such that "to know" one's own sensations means 'to be able to correctly identify them, therefore to know what the words of the private language refer to. You seem to interpret "to know" in some other way which you have yet to explain. Unless we can agree as to what "known" means here we must concede that it is ambiguous.

And if you acknowledge both of these things, then you must acknowledge that there are not two separate conditions of Wittgenstein's private language, but that it refers to one's immediate private sensations and that another person cannot understand it (both) because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking. — Luke

How do you draw that conclusion? I think you can only draw that conclusion by omitting the fact that he is asking a question. 'Can we imagine such a language?' This question indicates that we are being asked to assess the validity of your use of "because". You say "another person cannot understand Wittgenstein's private language 'because' it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations". The "because" separates two distinct things which are implied to be causally related with the use of "because". When Wittgenstein asks 'could we imagine this' he is asking whether we can validate this supposed causal relation as logically necessary. That's what you are ignoring.

You appear to ignore the question, and assume that the necessary relation is dictated, or stipulated. Let's assume the following:
X=the words refer to what is known only to the person speaking, to his immediate private sensations.
Y=another person cannot understand the language.
Your use of "because" indicates that you interpret this proposition as a conditional statement If X then Y, Y is the necessary conclusion from X. I agree that this proposed "private language" can be interpreted as such a conditional proposition. However, you seem to take this proposition as a premise, from which to proceed, without recognizing that Wittgenstein has asked, could we imagine such a thing. So instead of stating as a premise, 'if X then Y', he is asking us to separate the hypothesis "X", from the conclusion "Y", to examine the validity of the proposed conditional statement. That's what he means by 'could we imagine such a language?'. He is asking, is it logically coherent.

I’m talking about what is included in our concept when we use a word like magnitude. It may refer to one unit of measure, but when it does, built into its meaning is a multiplicity. If it didnt imply a relation to multiplicity , then there would be no point in saying ‘this is a magnitude’, rather than ‘this is a something’. Even saying ‘this is one unit’ implies multiplicity , because the concept of unit is incoherent without implicit reference to measure. It is one unit OF measure.

I understand the distinction you’re making between a quantity of units and magnitude as one unit , but both of those concepts fuse multiplicity and singularity ( in different ways) when we invoke either of them. The first concept involves a multiplicity OF singularities , the second a unit abstracted off from a multiplicity. But if we think ONLY the single something we are not thinking the concept of magnitude.

And of course I didn’t mention that it is not just multiplicity that belongs to the concept of magnitude whenever we think it , it is NUMERIC multiplicity. If numeric multiplicity isnt part of the concept of magnitude as we invoke it , then we are not thinking of a magnitude but a part. — Joshs

What I tried to explain, is that I really don't agree with your way of conflating singularity and multiplicty within both, the thing measured, and the measurement. There is no multiplicity implied by, or "built into" the meaning of "magnitude'. The magnitude is always one, as the thing which is measured, and the multiplicity is of the units of measure. So the thing measured might be measured by a countless number of different types of units of measurement, such that the measurement of the thing might be numerous different multiplicities, but that is strictly a property of the measurement. The magnitude itself cannot be more than one, or else the thing being measured would be distinct magnitudes, and this is contradictory.

It is clear to me that when you refer to "NUMERIC multiplicity", you are referring to the measurement of the magnitude, not the magnitude itself. Magnitude is a property of a thing, which a thing has regardless of whether or not it has been measured, while the numeric multiplicity is a property of the measurement. Since the magnitude is a property of the thing, it is one, as the thing is one., despite the fact that the magnitude might be measured in many different ways. The "many different ways" is proper to the measuring, not to the magnitude.

It is this order I’m referring to with the name totality. What I mean here is that an order is a category of meaning. Motion, for example , is a category of sense. The behavior of motion can be potentially infinite , but the concept of motion , as a category , is bounded by its definition. It is a totality , or better yet, the category is a finite entity, as are all categories of meaning. — Joshs

This looks mistaken to me as well. We can define something as unbounded, "infinite", like the natural numbers. So defining does not necessitate "bounded". Likewise, a defined thing is not necessarily "a totality", because a thing might be defined as incomplete. What this indicates is that your definition of "definition" is somewhat faulty. A definition does not necessarily create something bounded, nor does it necessarily produce a totality. This is important because it is the only way that we can have concepts of things like "infinite", and "incomplete". In order to have real concepts of these, we need to allow that the definitions actually produce something (a concept) unbounded, or incomplete. so for example, if we are to conceive of motion as "potentially infinite", we must provide something within the definition of "motion", which will allow that motion has some freedom from being bounded, and this is a feature of the definition. So as much as boundaries may be created by definitions, a lack of boundaries is also created by definitions. A deprivation in terms of boundary is often seen as an imperfection, or incompleteness in a concept. But it is sometimes intentional to a concept, depending on what is seen as useful for the intended application.

If we substitute the order of time for the order of motion, we have the same situation. Within the category of time, we can talk about an infinity, but the category of time itself is finite , it is a single concept. — Joshs

So I don't see how this could be the case. If the category of "time" is defined as an infinite category, then the category of time is not finite. Whether the category is finite or infinite depends on the definition.

This might all seem obvious as well as irrelevant to the issue we began with concerning Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, but if time for Aristotle is built on the model of either motion or magnitude , then numeric multiplicity is intrinsic to the invocation of the concept of time , just as we saw with the concept of magnitude. — Joshs

I completely disagree. I think it is wrong to think that multiplicity is intrinsic to magnitude. I think it is very clear that "one" is intrinsic to magnitude. A magnitude is necessarily one, otherwise we'd have to say that there is a multiplicity of "magnitudes". And it would be contradictory to say that both one and many are intrinsic to a magnitude. The numeric multiplicity you refer to is produced by the act of measuring, and is a property of the measurement not of the magnitude.

And this is exactly what Aristotle explains concerning our conception of time. We need to distinguish "time" as a tool of measurement, in which case it is a multiplicity of units of measure, from "time" as the thing (analogous to magnitude) which is measured, in which case it is one undivided continuum, therefore not a multiplicity.

Imagine an infinitely long freight train passing by your window. Each car is loaded with something different. From your window you can only see a single
car. So from your window of ‘now’ it appears as
though there is only ever the same car but with always changing contents. If you choose to you can count these changing items, and you can count changes in the rate of change if you like. — Joshs

This analogy doesn't work. Either you see separate cars going by, with the boundaries between them, or if the train were fast enough, you would see a blur, not seeing any cars. Never would it appear like the train is just one car. And if you could see the contents of the cars, the same thing would be the case, either separate cars with distinct content, or a blur.

To count "changing items" is no different from counting distinct cars. You need to be able to distinguish between them. And if it's a blur, you cannot do that. You'd be just throwing numbers at the train with no justification for your supposed "count".

So if I understand correctly, Aristotle has two concepts of time , time as continuity and time as discrete measurable changes. Each concept of time by itself is necessary but not sufficient. Both are needed. — Joshs

You do not seem, yet, to be distinguishing between the count, and the thing counted. This distinction is the one Aristotle based his two senses of "time" on. Each is a very distinct conception of "time" Here's an example which might clarify. Suppose that from the point in time that the sun rises, until that point again, constitutes "one day". We can employ "one day" as a unit of measurement, and compare how many days it takes for an occurring event. Notice that "time" in this sense, as a tool of measurement, must consist of points of reference (sunrise in this example), or else it cannot be employed for measurement. So whenever we use time to measure with, hours, days, seconds, or whatever, we employ points of reference, that's what a clock does, counts cycles or whatever. Now consider that the passing of time is an actual thing which we want to measure. Time seems to go by continuously without any inherent points of reference by which we might measure it. All those points of reference which we employ when using time to measure. are really derived from the motions of things, not from the passing of time itself. So "time" in the sense of something that is measured has no real points of reference, and the points which we use to measure time are referenced from recurring motions.

The word "So" indicates that another person cannot understand the language because, or as a consequence, of the preceding sentence, which states that the language refers to "what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations." — Luke

Right, that is what he is asking, if we can imagine such a language. Is it logically possible that a language which refers to inner sensations would make it so that the language could no be understood by others. And as I said a few days ago, the answer is yes, if all the words of the language referred only to inner sensations, because justification requires something independent. However, as I said yesterday, even the person using this language could not be said to know or understand the language (269). But this conclusion is due to Wittgenstein's definition of knowing and rule-following, which is not really consistent with common usage.

1. Do you acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations? — Luke

You are continuing to separate this phrase "what can only be known to the person speaking" from its context. It makes no sense to say that a person's private sensations can only be "known" to oneself. I can't even imagine what this could mean, to know one's own sensations. And it's clearly demonstrated at 258, that such a thing is impossible. There is no criterion of identity, no justification, and no such thing as "right". From the context, at 243, it appears very clear to me, that what Wittgenstein is talking about "knowing", is what the words of the private language refer to. He is not talking about knowing the private sensations themselves, whatever that might mean.

We might say that the passage at 243 appears ambiguous, if we were reading the book in order and hadn't gotten to 258 yet. But then, at 258 it is made very clear that what he is talking about is knowing what the words refer to, the particular thing referred to with "S", "the sensation" which gets named this way. What else could "know that sensation" mean, other than to be able to identify what "S" refers to? Now it ought to be clear to you that "what can only be known to the person speaking" is how to identify the thing called "S", so as to apply the name correctly. Therefore, 'I know that sensation', means I know how to identify it and properly apply the name. So, the ambiguity is resolved, "known" in the context of "only be known to the person speaking" means being capable of identifying, and applying the name, which is the same thing as knowing what the words refer to.

2. Furthermore, do you acknowledge that another person cannot understand Wittgenstein's private language because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations? — Luke

Yes, but this is the question he is asking. Can we imagine such a thing, is it logically consistent, that if only the person creating the language can know what the words refer to, does this necessitate (your use of "because" above) that the language cannot be understood by another? The answer is yes, but there are repercussions, the person speaking the language cannot even understand one's own private language. (But that is the consequence of another premise, Wittgenstein's restricted sense of "rule following", and "knowing" being dependent on justification and therefore rule-following.

So in reality Wittgenstein demonstrates the fault to be in the very first premise, 'the words of the private language refer to what can only be known to the person speaking'. This is incoherent, because "knowing" requires justification, which is a judgement of rule-following, implying more than one person, making "knowledge" necessarily something shared.

This is probably why the first premise was expressed a little bit ambiguously, to disguise the fact that his use of "known" is already logically inconsistent with the principles of rule-following which he has already laid down, and therefore incoherent.

I haven't removed the phrase from its context. That's a non-argument. If you think that "what only the speaker can know" does not imply or is not equivalent to "what other people cannot know", then explain why not. — Luke

The incoherency is clear in your question here. "Knowledge" for Wittgenstein is necessarily something public. That's the way he defines his terms, "rule-following", "criterion" "justification", etc.. Therefore, "what only the speaker can know", is in itself incoherent. There is no such thing as something known to only one person. The speaker can believe oneself to know something privately, and even act as if something is known privately, but as my quote from 269 demonstrates, for Wittgenstein this is just the appearance of knowing, it is not really knowing, just like thinking that oneself is following a rule, is not really following a rule.

I don't think we should rush to discuss other sections until we have clarity on what Wittgenstein means by a private language. — Luke

I know that you think this way Luke, your private mode of understanding is to remove passages from their contexts, to ensure an interpretation which is consistent with your preconceived ideas. You have to look at what Wittgenstein says about rule-following and justification to understand what he means by "know".

Sure, but you are neglecting that you said you could not see the relevance of sensations in relation to Wittgenstein's private language, so let's get clear about that first. — Luke

"Out of context strawman." This phrase must mean something to you by now. What I said is that whether the words refer to inner sensations, or external things, is irrelevant to the meaning of 'only the person speaking can know what the words refer to'.

i agree, i cannot split now further is one whole thing
if you are one guy whole life, is now always the same ? you grow, go slimmer, fatter, change some personalities,.. you changed but still the same guy, is now always the same ? what do you think. — Nothing

I can't grasp the comparison because a now is like a point, while a person is a thing. There;s a categorical difference here.

Tell me how you would define or explain what a magnitude is to somebody who was unfamiliar with the concept. How does one make it comprehensible without invoking a multiplicity of a certain type , a continuous succession that differs from a randomly changing flow in a specific way. — Joshs

A magnitude is anything measurable, it is size. As such, a magnitude is one single thing to be measured. But the measurement of the thing is expressed as a quantity of units of measure, and this invokes a multiplicity. So a magnitude is one, but a measurement of that magnitude is a multiplicity. If we say that a unit of measure is itself a magnitude, this is one unit of measure, not a multiplicity.

What I am trying to get at here is that whether we are talking about a continuity or your example of a non-continuous succession in the form of something that separates the before from the after, in each case we have examples of a unified totality. — Joshs

The point I was making is that there is no "unified totality" in this portrayal. If before is separated from after, in the way described, then it is impossible that these two are unified. That which is divided is not unified. Note that the portrayal is not of the potential for division, or divisibility, it is of an actual division between before and after. So if it is a succession, it is a succession of distinct things, and nothing to make them unified except that they are understood under the precepts of "one order". The order, being potentially infinite, is not necessarily a totality.

If I move a marble from here to there and describe the path in terms of a continuous linear trajectory , notice how this flow of change is different from my me telling you to now imagine a rock, then a movie you saw, then tell you to look at your finger. There is constant change here but no continuity , no enduring identity like in the example of continuous motion. Also notice that even through the continuity is. it itself divided up , it is in the nature of this continuity that it less itself to measurement. — Joshs

The two examples are clearly distinct, but this is the incompatibility I referred to. If you represent the "continuous linear trajectory" of the marble, as being at point A at time 1, and point B at time 2, and so on, then you have the same problem of change without continuity. What happens to the marble between A and B? We say it "moves". But to have the continuity, we need to account for the movement. If we posit a point halfway between A and B, and half the time, we still don't account for the movement, because we might still ask how the marble gets from A to this point, and the answer is that it moves. So we might divide infinitely, and we still would have the movement actually occurring between the points, and the actual movement would never be accounted for, despite invoking an infinity of points to plot the trajectory.

This is the same issue as the incompatibility between the point and the line. Any line segment might be represented as an infinity of points. But an infinity of points does not produce a continuous line. The line is always what occurs between the points. So despite the assumption of an infinite number of points in a finite line segment, the line itself, which is what lies between the points, is never accounted for..

Now let’s look at before, after and the third thing that separates them. Can we talk about this structure in terms of an enduring pattern that stretches indefinitely , or infinitely long? However long we define the duration of this pattern of repeated before, during and after, notice that the pattern as a whole is a unity, a self-identical object, even though it is composed of a non-continuous sequence of events. — Joshs

Like I explained above, the only thing which allows us to say that these separate entities are unified, or are a unity, is that they are of one order. But then the unity is in the order, and if the order is allowed to be infinite, or "stretches indefinitely", there is no whole. So there is no self-identical object, just an order. If it were "an object", the order would be constrained within the defined boundaries of that object.

For Heidegger, time cannot be counted or measured because it is not an objectively present series of before after and during. And it is not a continuity akin to the behavior of a moving object. — Joshs

In other words, Heidegger describes time as absolutely unintelligible, i.e., outside the limits of intelligibility. What point is there to that?

Methfhisical undercover what you referat as "now" can be split into smaller now ? Or is one whole thing impossible of division ? — Nothing

I don't know how one might split a now into a smaller now. Can you think of a way to split a point into a smaller point?

It doesn’t have to be a continuous line. It can be a series of lines. Magnitude , as the basis of continuity, is a more complex notion than a simple plurality or multiplicity. To construe a multiplicity as a magnitude requires that we assume numeric iteration, the ‘how much’, quantity. Numeric iteration implies identical repetition, the identical ‘again and again’ of number. Magnitude also implies the earlier and later, the less and the more. — Joshs

I really don't understand what you're saying Joshs. If it's a series of lines rather than a continuous line then we are not talking about a continuity anymore. That's the point which Aristotle made. If before is distinct from after, as A is distinct from B, then there is necessarily a third thing which separates the two. That there is something else distinct from A and B which is intermediary between A and B, negates the possibility that A and B are a continuity.

The quantitative ‘same again and again’, that the continuity of magnitude assumes implies discrete units. — Joshs

But that is not a continuity. In the case of a series of lines, each segment is different and distinct. So you cannot describe it as "same" again and again, each is different. A continuity composed of discrete units is incoherent as self-contradictory.

Otherwise , we couldnt equate magnitude with quantity. — Joshs

We cannot equate magnitude with quantity, this should be obvious to you. Magnitude is what is measured, quantity is the measurement.

The after succeeds the before. This creates a continuity akin to motion and magnitude , as you point out. — Joshs

This is highly doubtful. Before and after require the application of a 'now', and the 'now' divides the time so that it is not a continuity. Therefore the assumption of before and after actually negates the possibility of continuity. This is described at 219a, 26. The before is segment A, and the after is segment B. That A is different from B implies that there is a third thing intermediate between them. That third thing necessarily breaks the continuity between A and B. The conclusion then is that time is bounded by the 'now'.

And since there appears to be no such thing as time without before and after, the whole idea that time is continuous is cast into doubt. Then 'now' appears to be ambiguous, having two meanings, one accounting for time as continuous, without before and after if there is such a thing, and the other accounting for time as divided, (therefore not continuous), in relation to before and after.

Motion and magnitude cannot be thought without presupposing an objectively present basis for motion and magnitude. motion and magnitude are changes in something that remains self-identically present through its changes. What difference does it make whether I mark off ‘now’ points on a line. It’s the supposition of the line ( the geometrical — Joshs

The thing which moves is said to be real, the motion is not 219b, 30. So Aristotle assumes a separation here between magnitude and motion, and that is why motion is a property of magnitude. So what is presupposed as "objectively present" is the magnitude, not any sense of "time" itself. But the magnitude itself is a contingent thing with generation, corruption, and changes, it cannot be represented as a continuous line.

Used for counting time, exactly. I don't see the problem. — Xtrix

The issue is that there are two senses of "time", one as a tool for counting, and the other as the thing counted. The 'now', in proper use, is a part of the former, but not a part of the latter. When we try to make the 'now' into a part of the thing which is counted, (as in 'the now is a continuous present moment'), then we have the problem of incompatibility.

Your accusation that I’m misreading is supported by a fictional quote. He does not say “refer to what can only be known to the person speaking”. Get the quote right before you accuse me of misreading, otherwise you might be accused of misreading. — Luke

Those are the exact words of the translation I am using. The complete passage is: "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." The key sentence is the last one, "So another person cannot understand the language". This provides the context which indicates that he is talking about knowing what the words refer to, not knowing the things themselves (whatever that might mean).

No, he is talking about “what only the speaker can know.” An actual quote carries a lot more weight than your constant misinterpretation and made up quotes. — Luke

Right, and "what only the speaker can know" is in the context of the language proposal, and what the words of the language refer to. So he is saying that only the speaker can know what the words refer to, so "another person cannot understand the language".

That is not a valid response because Wittgenstein tells us that the language refers to “what only the speaker can know”, which implies that it refers to what other people cannot know. — Luke

You have removed the phrase from it's context, to give it your own private meaning. This I've noticed is your habitual way of arguing. It is a type of strawman procedure. Here you are strawmanning what Wittgenstein has written, by removing the phrase from the context which he provided, for the sake of supporting your misunderstanding of what he wrote.

In the context he is talking about what the words refer to, and he is saying that only the speaker can know this, such that only the speaker can understand the language. It is proposed that this (only the speaker can know what the words refer to) is the result of the words referring to inner experiences. However, it is demonstrated at 258-270, that this is not the case, others can know what the words refer to when they refer to inner experiences. So long as there is something independent to act as justification, having a word which refers to one's inner sensation does not render the word incomprehensible to another, when there is something independent to justify the use.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein suggests at 269, that the phrase you quote, "what only the speaker can know", is itself incoherent, because knowledge requires justification, and one cannot justify ones own use of words. This is only a case of the person "thinking he understands", which does not qualify as actual knowing, or understanding. "And sounds which no one else understands but which I
'appear to understand' might be called a 'private language'.

Nonetheless, the point remains that he is talking about what only the speaker can know (and, therefore, what other people cannot know); he is not talking about what the speaker does know or what other people do not know. The point is that this language is private in principle; it cannot possibly come to be understood by others and it has no possibility of translation into another language. — Luke

Sure, but you are still neglecting the context. He is asking at 243, a question, could we imagine such a language. This means that he is asking whether we can conceive of it, is it logically possible. He shows with the demonstration 258-270, that if all the words of the private language refer only to inner experiences, with no words referring to anything independent to act as justification, this language could not be understood by anyone else. However, the person using the private language could not be said to "know" or "understand" one's own private language, the person would only "appear" as if the language was understood.

But we need to acknowledge that this conclusion is due to the way that Wittgenstein restricts "know" and "understand" to rule (criteria) following activities, and claims that a person cannot privately follow a rule. Thinking that one is following a rule does not qualify as actually following a rule, therefore thinking that one knows does not qualify as actually knowing. But the fact that one can choose not to obey one's own 'private rule', and choose to act either according to one's 'private rule', or not, implies that if this cannot be called acting by a "rule" , we must still allow that it is something similar to a "rule". And since Wittgenstein offers no alternative to "rule", for describing why a person would appear to act as if one is following a rule, when the person is really doing something other than following a rule, the "private language" demonstration is really useless.

That wouldn’t work. The words of such a language would not refer to “what only the speaker can know.” Other people can know external things. Other people cannot know one’s immediate private sensations. — Luke

You're misreading again Luke. The phrase "refer to what can only be known to the person speaking" ;means only the person speaking can know what the words refer to. He is talking about knowing what the words refer to, not knowing the things themselves. Whatever knowing the thing itself would mean, I don't know, but it's clearly not what is indicated by the context, talking about language. This is clarified by the sentence which follows. "So another person cannot understand the language". Knowing the thing itself (whatever that is supposed to mean) is not necessary for understanding a language, knowing what the words refer to is.

One can make up a language with words that refer to external things, so that other people do not know what the words refer to, and therefore cannot understand the language.

Obviously, we can and do talk about pain and other sensations using our public language. — Luke

So, do you apprehend the two distinct conditions now? 1) the language talks about inner experiences (which we might do with our public language), and 2) another person cannot understand the language (which also could be the case with a language that refers to things other than inner experiences).

What Wittgenstein is investigating is the logical relationship between these two, whether a language which uses words only to refer to "immediate private sensations", would necessarily be a language which no one else could understand.

But it is a continuity based on the continuity of magnitiude. — Joshs

What does magnitude have to do with "now"? The point was that Heidegger wrongly portrayed Aristotle's conception of the continuity of time as a continuity of nows. "The 'now' is no part of time...any more than points are parts of a line..." Physics 220a, 18.

"Continuity without any nows" is what, exactly? Perhaps citing Aristotle to support whatever claim you're making would be helpful. — Xtrix

Read Physics 220a, 13-23. Here's a sample: "In so far as the 'now' is a boundary it is not time, but an attribute of it..." 220a 20.

The conclusion here is that time is "a number" with respect to before and after, ('before and after' having been distinguished by the application of a 'now'). It is continuous, because it has been designated to be an attribute of motion and magnitude, which are continuous. And it is in theory, divisible by the application of a now which separates before from after.

The issue I had was with Heidegger's portrayal of a succession of nows as being proposed as an objective present. I do not think that Aristotle proposes any objective present because "present" is defined as the time "not far from now". But the objectivity of "time" is based in "before and after", not on the application of a 'now'. The 'now' is simply used for marking before and after, and in counting time.

These "two distinct things" are both described and/or entailed by: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know" (PI 243). Therefore, one "distinct thing" does not necessitate the other; instead, both "distinct things" are necessitated by "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know".

You have a lot of trouble accepting all of 243. You first ignored that the words of the private language refer to the speaker's immediate private sensations. Now you are ignoring that the words of the private language refer to what only the speaker can know. — Luke

You Luke, are the one not accepting "all of 243". You don't seem to recognize that 243 is asking a question, and that the question contains two parts. 1( Can we imagine a language in which a person gives expressions to one's inner experiences, and ,2) That another person cannot understand the words of this language.

That these are two distinct parts is clear from the fact that Wittgenstein answers 1) with "Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?". Then he proceeds to the second condition "the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking".

Obviously, these are two distinct conditions. And, as I explained to you already, this phrase "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know", does not necessitate that the language refers to inner experiences, as you claim. One might make a language referring to external things, in which no one understands what the words refer to.

That's a different question from what Wittgenstein means by a private language, which is the question we were previously discussing. You initially thought that it did not matter what the words of the language referred to and all that mattered was "only I can understand". You have now tried to change the subject. — Luke

Since, I've always been arguing that there are two distinct conditions of the private language described at 243, this is obviously a strawman representation. I "changed the subject" to adopt a new approach, because I was not getting through to you the other way. The new approach was to show that you ignore the essence of Wittgenstein's question, 'could we imagine such a language', with your claim that you have already imagined it. Therefore you are begging the question, claiming to have the answer to Wittgenstein's question, prior to going through the logical process required to answer the question.

The point being that we need to determine whether there is logical consistency between 1) and 2), before we can answer whether such a language can be imagined. If you simply assume that 1) and 2) are united in a logically coherent way, as you do, you beg the question, claiming to have already imagined such a language.

Incidentally, it may be worth noting that, as observed by Aristotle, Plato does not suggest that there are Forms for artificial or man-made things such as table or bed. These can be explained by means of the combined Forms of Shape, Size, etc., that the human craftsman combines in his mind to form an image of the object to be crafted. — Apollodorus

I think that this is contrary to what Plato describes in The Republic. He says that when the carpenter makes a bed, as a material thing, he holds in his mind an idea of a bed, a form which he copies when producing the bed. In coming up with his idea of a bed, the one which he will make, he tries as much as possible to replicate the Divine Form, the idea of the perfect bed, or Ideal.

But Heidegger claims that for Aristotle time itself is derived from motion, a continuous change within something enduringly objectively presence. So it would seem for Aristotle the scene of being and becoming is the objectively present frame of time as motion. — Joshs

This is not really the case, because Aristotle distinguished two senses of "time", the primary sense as a tool of measurement, and a secondary sense as the thing measured. The secondary sense is often overlooked, in modern interpretations, but it is important to his physics and metaphysics. When we assume an "objectively present frame of time", this is "time" in the primary sense, a conceptual presupposition, assuming a 'point of being at the present', from which we may observe and measure. Assuming this point of unchanging being, at the present (within which no time passes) enables us to produce principles of measurement.

Notice in your quoted passage, the human act of measuring is what is referred to by Aristotle: "the now...always measures..". This describes how we apply a "now" as a point in time, then some particular motion occurs (the apparent movement of the sun for example), and we apply another "now" to mark off a measured time period (an hour or something). These are like non-dimensional points on a line, there is no line within them, but a continuous line between them.

This application of "nows" in relation with motion provides us with a number which is used as a principle of measurement. The nows are an aspect of the measuring tool, the conception of "time" as a tool of measurement, just like "points" are an aspect of the spatial conception which is a tool for spatial measurement..

If we move to the secondary sense of "time", as what is measured, we find the conception of a continuity without any nows. The nows are seen as artificial. Therefore, when Heidegger says “The succession of nows is interpreted as something somehow objectively present..." in your quoted passage, this is a misunderstanding of Aristotle. It conflates the distinction between the primary sense of "time", and the secondary sense of "time", which Aristotle tried to establish.

.

Husserl and Heidegger derive mathematical continuity from the idea of enduring objective presence, on which the vulgar concept of time is based. They deconstruct the idea of objective presence and determine that authentic time can’t be likened to a mathematical continuity. — Joshs

The problem which Aristotle demonstrated is the fundamental incompatibility between the two distinct ways of describing what you have named as "enduring objective presence". The one way is based in an assumption that what remains the same as time passes (being) provides the fundamental description,, and the other way assumes that things not remaining the same as time passes (becoming) provides the fundamental description. These two fundamental descriptions are incompatible ways of describing the proposed "enduring objective presence".

The issue you point to, with Hegel and Heidegger, is that "enduring objective presence", or what we commonly call "continuity", is itself a descriptive phrase which implies "remains the same as time passes". Therefore this description, "enduring objective presence", get's placed in the category of "being", and is rejected as a true representation of temporal existence, when one is in favour of the other category, becoming.

Rejecting one for the other does not resolve the incompatibility, which Aristotle exposed though. What Aristotle showed, which was derived from Plato, is that it is necessary to allow that the two fundamental, and inherently incompatible descriptive forms, are both real. So the solution is not to reject one for the other, but the arduous task of determining which parts of reality require the one descriptive form, and which parts require the other.

To make "change" intelligible requires that we assume an aspect which remains the same as time passes, and an aspect which does not stay the same as time passes. So physics for example, assumes laws which stay the same (being), and a thing which does not stay the same (becoming), as the physical world. It does not help to say that one assumption is more real or "objective" than the other.

But is there a preference for temporality, or is that a misunderstanding on my part? And if so, why? — Banno

Time is what provides us with change, and that is what you might call the spice of life. Wouldn't life be an absolute bore if nothing changed? Time provides us with the ability to do things, change things, want things etc.. The reason why temporality is commonly given priority in philosophy is that this is the only way to make sense of spatiality. Spatial existence can then be seen for what it is, a construction, created by the sensing being to provide it an advantage in its temporal existence. What we sense is the passing of time, but we create a spatial representation which allows us to understand the passing of time. Once we see temporality as the true reality, spatial representations can be understood as just that, representations. And the vast majority of humanity takes these spatial representations to be reality, as Plato's cave dwellers, not having seen through to the temporal reality on the other side.

Now that’s what I call garbled. It’s garbled but I can still recognize the traditional notion of time dating back to Aristotle in it. This is what Heidegger calls the vulgar concept of time and Husserl calls constituted or objective time.

Heidegger, in a move similar to Husserl, traces the origin of the mathematical and of empirical science to the concept of enduring objective presence undergirding constituted time (what Heidegger calls the vulgar concept of time). — Joshs

I believe the separation between what you call "the vulgar conception of time", and the modern conception of time, is initiated by Hegel. He's the one who firmly rejected Aristotelian principles, offering an alternative starting point.

Aristotle maintained a categorical separation between being and becoming, commonly presented to modern philosophers as the ontologies of Parmenides and Heraclitus. He demonstrated a fundamental incompatibility between the two, which was elucidated by Plato. This was represented as the incompatibility between 'points' of being, and a 'continuous' line of becoming. The incompatibility was manifested as Zen's paradoxes.

Hegel dissolves the separation by allowing that 'being', along with 'not-being', might be subsumed within the category of becoming. And modern mathematics allows an infinity of points within a continuity. This also provides the foundation for Heidegger and phenomenologists to portray 'being', and consequently 'beings', as forms of becoming. For Aristotle, becoming is neither being nor not- being (apparent violation of the law of excluded middle). For Hegel, becoming is both being and not-being (apparent violation of the law of non-contradiction)

In one sense, Banno represents this correctly

Asking "what is being?" is asking "How do we use the word 'being'?" — Banno

To know what "being" is is to know what is referred to with "being". But when the uses of "being" are distinctly divergent, then no amount of endless analysis of use will determine what "being" is. The word refers to distinct things (or conceptions). Then we must turn to something other than use (which only leads us into confusion), to determine what being is. And in this sense Banno is clearly incorrect

I am suggesting that an examination of the language of being looks more productive than musings about time. — Banno

The problem with Banno's perspective is that it has become evident that any attempt to understand the nature of becoming, will lead one into the realm of the unknown, and the unintelligible, as what violates the fundamentals of logic, and consequently the principles of what can be said. However, this does not lead to the conclusion, as some believe, that these things cannot be talked about, it leads to the conclusion that the principles of what can be said are wrong, and need to be altered.

Since the human understanding of time is infantile, the principles we hold as to what can be said, in relation to time, are very crude and immature.

You haven't been addressing anything I say, only tediously repeating that nonsense, so it appears there's no discussion here.

We were discussing 243, not 256. Remember? You said: — Luke

Luke you're being ridiculous, the quote from 256 is a reference to what was meant at 243. Do you think that 256 is referencing a different type of private language from the one mentioned at 243? If so then we have intentional ambiguity. Clearly 256 indicates that referring to one's private sensations, and "only I can understand" are two distinct things. The issue is to determine whether there is a relationship of logical necessity between these two, as proposed at 243. Does "referring to private sensations" necessitate "only I can understand".

Wittgenstein does not talk about "describing one's private sensations in words which another person can understand" at 243. If another person could understand the language, then the language could not "refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations." — Luke

Of course not, that's already given, It's a known fact that we can talk about private sensations in words that people can understand. That's the reason for the second condition of the private language. 1. It refers to private sensations. 2. it uses words which no one else can understand. The second condition is necessary to distinguish the private language from a common or public language which refers to private sensations. This would be using words like "pain".

To repeat: Another person cannot understand the language because it refers to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. — Luke

You are begging the question Luke. The question at 243 is "can we imagine" such a language. Is such a proposal a logical possibility. Would having a language which refers only to one's private sensations cause that language to be only understandable to that person. At 265 you'll see that the answer implied is "yes". Justification requires reference to something independent, so if the language referred only to one's private sensations, it would be incomprehensible to others.

You need to respect exactly what he is asking at 243, "can we imagine" such a language. He is not asking you to imagine such a language. The answer he reveals is that though we can imagine such a language ( justification requires something independent, 265), as it is fully logical, such a language is not a real description of language. In reality, having the words refer to one's private sensations does not necessitate, or cause, the words to be incomprehensible to others because we have independent sources of justification. Therefore we can imagine such a language one which reference only private sensations making it impossible that another person cannot understand the words, but this is not a real language, in the sense of how languages actually exist.

You seem to have jumped the gun, and actually proceeded toward attempting to imagine such a language, prior to determining whether it is logically possible to imagine such a language. So you beg the question, assuming that such a language is logically possible. If you didn't already assume that this language was logically possible, you would not proceed toward imagining it.

Wittgenstein does not mention internal/external or what "a person can talk about". He mentions "what only the speaker can know". — Luke

You're just being tedious Luke. He does mention "inner".

"256. Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand?"

Notice that he says my inner experiences "and" which only I can understand. There are two described features here, " describes my inner experiences", and, "only I myself can understand".

Why do you refuse to recognize that a person might describe one's private sensations in words that another can understand? And so, "describing one's private sensations", and "describing one's private sensations in words which another person cannot understand", are two distinct things.

Beauty and Good are not identical in every respect but they are closely interconnected, especially on higher levels of experience, with consciousness and experience becoming increasingly unified. In the Philebus, the Good is described as a mixture of three Forms, Beauty, Proportion, and Truth, and Beauty and Good appear together in other dialogues.

The combination and (partial) identification of Beauty with Good is particularly obvious in the Symposium.

To begin with, the dialogue takes place at the house of the “Good and Beautiful” Agathon. Beauty and Good are combined in Agathon himself, the party host, who is said to be “beautiful” and whose name means “good”. This could not have escaped Plato readers even under Roman rule when all educated citizens, including Christians, spoke Greek. Moreover, Socrates himself calls Agathon “very beautiful and of good nature and breeding” in the Protagoras (315d-e).

So, there can be no doubt that we are in the realm of the Good and Beautiful from the start. Socrates himself is dressed in beautiful clothes for the occasion. — Apollodorus

I suggest that you consider the passage in The Symposium in the following way. There is a separation described by Diotima between the good and the beautiful. Hence the necessity for good "and" beauty. The good is not necessarily beautiful, and the beautiful is not necessarily good. This is why Socrates could not say why a person would desire the beautiful, but could easily say why a person would desire the good. The good is desired for the sake of something, happiness/. But beauty, if it's desired, is desired for the sake of itself.

This is why Diotima places the good in the human realm, what is desired by people, while beauty is placed in the realm of what is godly. Now, human beings do not necessarily desire what is godly, so the good, what a human being desires, is not necessarily something godly or beautiful. It might still be something ugly. "The good" being what a human being determines as desirable, might not be godly or beautiful.

So when we look at the phrase "beautiful and good", what is described here is a consistency between what is desired by a human being, "the good", and what is godly, "Beauty". At this point, the beautiful (what is godly) is the good (what is desired by a human being. Though the good and the beautiful are not necessarily the same, they may be the same, and when they are, we might call this Truth.

You'll see that Aristotle described this principle in a slightly different way, and his description was adopted into Christianity, especially from Aquinas and later. He distinguished the real good from the apparent good. In Christianity the apparent good is what a human being desires, and the real good is what God determines. The goal of moral philosophy is to shape the apparent good so that it conforms to be the same as the real good.

He thereby prepares the ground for Socrates’ own speech, in which Socrates takes the theme to the highest level where the philosopher who has set out on the quest for Beauty has found the Good and the Good and the Beautiful combine together with Truth to form one reality. — Apollodorus

I think this is the point here. Truth is elusive to the intellect, difficult to understand. The good is always present, so it is apprehended first. To move onward from the good to Truth, we must give to beauty what we find in the good, thus uniting Beauty and Good.

Explaining it again does not change the fact that you described the same condition twice.

You claimed that a private language had two conditions but you repeated the same condition of privacy twice. What's the other condition? — Luke

I can't believe how you stubbornly resist understanding something so simple. Words can refer to internal things or external things. That the proposed private language uses words to refer to internal things is one condition. Also, a word might be understood by someone else, or it might not. That the words of the private language cannot be understood by another, is a second condition.

That these two conditions are not the same condition, as you seem to think, for some strange reason, is evident from the following. A person can talk about internal things in words which others can understand. And, a person can talk about external things with words that someone else cannot understand. Therefore the two conditions are not the same condition, nor are they equivalent.

It's very clear that the necessary relationship between the one and the other, required to say that they are the same, is simply not there. It is simply not the case that "referring to internal feelings" is equivalent with "not understandable by others". What makes a word understandable to someone else, rather than not understandable, is not that it refers to something external rather than internal. Understandability depends on the mode of learning which the person has undergone, not whether the thing referred to is internal or external.

For example, physicists give names to external things which I cannot understand. Obviously, it is not because these things are supposed to be internal and private, that I do not understand these names, it is because I do not understand the conceptual structure which provides the context where the names have their positions. That is what makes a name understandable or not, to another person, whether the person understands the context. And the case is exactly the same with names of internal things. That the name "S" refers to something internal does not make it fundamentally impossible to another person to understand. You argued this incessantly already, that we can understand "S" through the understanding of "sensation". However, Wittgenstein makes it appear like we cannot understand what "S" refers to, through the use of ambiguity.

That the use of ambiguity makes it impossible to understand what a word refers to, while internal/external is completely irrelevant, is irrefutable evidence that the two conditions are separate conditions.

I haven't neglected anything. I stated that the two separate conditions - privacy and the reference to sensations (assuming this was your second condition) - are actually inseparable. In contrast, you said that sensations are irrelevant. — Luke

The separate condition I'm referring to is "another person cannot understand the language". That's why I said you are completely neglecting this phrase. And, in insisting that the second condition is "privacy", rather than "another person cannot understand the language", you continue to neglect that condition. What's with that? You quoted my statement as "another person cannot understand the language", and you referred to it as "privacy"

That a person owns something as "private" does not necessitate that others cannot have access to it. The person can allow another access to one's private property, or another might take it with the use of force. So, stating the second condition as "privacy" is a straw man misrepresentation. "Private" is not the same as "another person cannot use it".

A person may intentionally allow, what is held as private (the use of S in this example), to be shared by others. That the person shares it does not negate the fact that the thing shared remains that person's private property. And, of course this is why the example is not an example of a "private language", as defined by "another person cannot understand the language". It is allowed that the person with the private naming ("S"), shares the use of the name, through the means of the common understanding of "sensation". Therefore the condition "another person cannot understand the language" is violated, despite the fact that the naming itself is something private.

Do you understand this? The naming is something "private", it is a private language-game. But it is described as occurring within the context of a public language. This private language-game, expressed at 258, is not "a language", and therefore not "a private language". The private language-game is not "a language", because a language consists of many different language-games, and the private language-game is just one language-game. This is an example of the difference between one and many, explored by Plato in "The Parmenides"

What private word is being integrated into a common language at 258? — Luke

Luke, the private word is "S". The word of the common language is "sensation". The private word "S" is made public (integrated into common language) through the proposition "S is the sign of a sensation". However, this proposition ought to be justified, and that's where we find a problem. How do we confirm that the thing referred to with "S" conforms to the grammar of "sensation"?

Hint: 258 has nothing at all to do with integrating a private word into a common language. You are lost. — Luke

Your proposed "hint" is obviously misunderstanding misrepresenting itself as guidance. That's a very good example of what fuels my attitude of condescension, and why it is "not misplaced when directed towards you", despite your implication that you know what I know.

You still refuse to acknowledge the last line of 257 despite the fact that I've quoted it a number of times now. I'm going to keep repeating it, over and over, until you accept that it is relevant to the example expressed at 258:

And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed. — PI 257

You have not described two conditions. You have described the same condition of privacy twice. — Luke

If the words of a language which talks about inner feelings could not be known to another, we could not coherently talk about our inner feelings. Therefore, what makes the private language incomprehensible to others must be something other than that it refers to inner feelings.

These two conditions are inseparable in Wittgenstein's description, and they are therefore not two separate conditions. — Luke

You are neglecting the statement "So another person cannot understand the language."

Obviously we understand another person's language when they talk about their private sensations. Talking about our private sensations, and understanding each other is a common part of natural language. Therefore, "so another person cannot understand the language", is a condition other than referring to one's immediate private sensations. The language has to refer to private feelings in a particular way so that others cannot understand.

How many times do you need to be told that he attempts to give the private language advocate what he wants but fails, because he is showing us the incoherency of the concept of a private language? THAT'S THE POINT. And yet you still complain that it isn't really a private language. Well, no shit. — Luke

There is no attempt to give the private language advocate what he wants, that's nonsense. What is provided as an example at 258 is not even close to an example of a private language, as indicated from my quote of 257. It is an example of something completely different.

That the concept of a private language is incoherent is self-evident. This requires no demonstration, it's obvious. Private language is an oxymoron. The demonstration is not meant to show that a private language is incoherent, it is meant to show that something very similar to private language, the integration of a private word into a common language, is a very real aspect of language, even though "private language" itself is incoherent.

Here's a proposal. Let's look at the word "only" at 243. Let's assume that all the words of the proposed "private language" can only refer to private sensations, nothing else. Every word in this language can only refer to a private sensation, just like "S", and this might be the reason why the language cannot be understood by others. We can see why Wittgenstein would say that such a language would not be understandable to others, at 265, because he says justification requires reference to something independent. But the demonstration at 258 shows one private word, "S", in the context of common words, "recurrence" and "sensation", so it is clearly not an attempt to portray a private language.

There are not two conditions.

When he says "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know", the word "this" is indicative of the language he mentioned earlier, namely: "a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use". — Luke

Luke, think about what "only the speaker can know" means. If I talk about my pains, can you know what I'm talking about? Of course you can. Then I am not using a private language, despite talking about my inner feelings. Therefore, the conditions for being a "private language" must be more than just a language about one's inner feelings. The second condition is that only the speaker can know what the words refer to. Obviously this second condition is not fulfilled when "S" is described as a "sensation". This is because "the existence of the grammar of the word...[sensation]... shews the post where the new word...(S).. is stationed." (257).

Describing S as a "sensation", "a word of our common language" (261), so that we can all know what "S" refers to, negates the possibility that the demonstration is intended as an example of a private language, as defined.

All you have is misplaced condescension. — Luke

My condescension is aimed only at those who assume to have a thorough understanding of what Wittgenstein has demonstrated when they obviously do not. I don't think that's misplaced when directed toward you.

You cannot ignore these parts of 243: — Luke

I don't see your argument. A private language is a language in which a person speaks about one's inner sensations, and no one else can understand the words (243). At 258 is given an example of the naming of an inner sensation in which we have the ability to understand the name, as the name of a sensation. You seem to conclude that since they both concern inner sensations, the latter is a private language.

It's ironic how we've changed positions. I spent days arguing that we cannot know exactly what "S" refers to because of ambiguity (we can't understand the meaning of S), while you argued that we can understand what S signifies, a sensation. Now you're saying that this is an example of a private language. If this is the case, then you must concur that we cannot understand the meaning of S, as indicated by the description, or definition of "private language".

The difference between us, is that I attribute the inability to understand "S" to intentional ambiguity by the author, and you seem to think that this is because it is supposed to be a private language. We could discuss whether intentional ambiguity constituted a private language, to see if there is consistency between us, but we wouldn't get far. With intentional ambiguity the words cannot be understood by others, as required for a private language, but they do not refer to private sensations. As I explained earlier, with intentional ambiguity the word has no proper referent, its meaning is ambiguous.

To have a private language, as defined, both conditions, must be fulfilled, reference to inner sensations, and impossible for others to understand..

You are ignoring everything here except "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know". How can you possibly think this gives you a better understanding of the text? — Luke

I'm not ignoring it, I'm just pointing out the insufficiency to you. It's basic logic. If a definition stipulates two requirements, then fulfilling one of the requirements is insufficient for designating that the thing meets the conditions of the definition.

I agree. As I said, he tries and fails to provide an example of a private language according to the description he gives at 243 which includes the word "sensations". — Luke

You continue to refuse to consider the immediate context of the example. As I've explained already, 257 makes it very clear that he is not trying to provide an example of a private language with the first person perspective laid out at 258. The existence of the grammar of the word "sensation" is presupposed, and it acts as a post where the new word "S" is stationed. That's made very clear at the end of 257. Obviously this is not intended to be an example of a "private language" as defined. And, from 260 onward, when he looks at the example from the third person perspective, he discusses justifying the use of "sensation" for the positioning of the new word "S".

You might see the mention of "private language" inserted at 259, and think that this means 258 is supposed to be an example of a private language, but this is only evidence of intentional ambiguity. Clearly Wittgenstein indicates at the end of 257, that the proposed new word "S", is given it's position relative to the grammar of "sensation". To suggest that the new word is given position according to some sort of private system of rules, directly contradicts this.

Now, do you see what Wittgenstein intends, for us to do, in understanding, to avoid the apparent contradiction creating the appearance ambiguity at 259? We must reject the notion of private rules, as explained earlier in the text, and reject that there is even impressions of rules (259) involved here. "The balance on which impressions are weighed is not the impression of a balance". Therefore we are left to conclude that the new word "S" finds its place according to the grammar of "sensation", as described at 257. And so there is no intent that 258 is an example of a private language, because this would require that the position of S would be done through some private sort of balance. That is not the way that the example is expressed.

Why is it only the word "sensation" that requires justification at 258? Why not all the other words too? What makes this word so special? — Luke

The use of the word "sensation" requires justification because it is the word used to describe the thing which S is directly related to, as the name of. That is the layering of reference. The diarist names something S, then tells the public that the thing named S is of the type "sensation". The diarist cannot point to the thing named by S, to show that it is an example of a sensation, demonstrating that the use of "sensation" is called for (the thing is correctly classified), so "sensation" must be justified in some other way, i.e. we turn to something independent.

Does the "sensation" at 243 also require justification? And what is this process of justification? How are these words justified? Please answer these questions to help support your argument. — Luke

Justification of such words is done through reference to something independent, as explained by Wittgenstein. This is actually quite similar to scientists making revelations about things which cannot be directly observed. These things are in a sense "private", as not directly revealed to to the senses of any human being. They are as the religious would say, private to God Himself. Through hypothesis, the scientist will name such unrevealed things. giving the newly named things contextual position by means of the grammar of the words of the hypothesis. The name of the thing is positioned within a conceptual structure of other known names. Then the hypothesis, that the newly named thing deserves that contextual position which it is given, must be justified through independent experimentation.

Nice cherry picking. Are you blind? How many times do I need to quote the passage from 243 before you comprehend that it contains the word "sensation"? Look: — Luke

I don't see how the mention of "sensations" at 243 is relevant. The words of this proposed "private language" cannot be understood by another person. "Sensation" is not such a word. But "S" at 258 is said to be the name of a sensation. Therefore 258 is not an example of a private language.

No shit, Sherlock. But "sensation" is given as part of the description of a private language at 243 that you agreed to. Did you agree to that definition by mistake? — Luke

The description, or definition, of "private language", is not itself a private language. So "sensation" might be used in the definition of a private language, but since it is a publicly understood word, it cannot be part of a private language. This is very simple. Do you understand this?

That's why he tries to provide an example of a private language and fails. — Luke

As I demonstrated with the quote from the end of 257, he is not at all trying to provide an example of a private language. Please read 257 again. He is showing how a new word, produced from a private experience might fit into, or receive a place. in an existing public language, as indicated by the last sentence in 257.

Once you understand this, you might then move on toward understanding why he says at 261, that the use of "sensation" as the word for what S is, must be justified. "S" is the new word with the private referent, and "sensation" is the public word. That the thing, if there even is a thing, which is named by "S", is consistent with the criteria of "sensation", must be justified. This is how "S" might receive a place in the public language.

There is an explicit connection between desire and the beautiful and the good from the start. — Apollodorus

Of course there is a connection, or relationship, the point though is that Beauty and the good are not the same.

It follows that it is wrong to claim that intelligence is the product of knowledge just as it is wrong to claim that imagination is the product of the imagined image. Intelligence and imagination are the faculties, knowledge and imagined image are the products of, and therefore posterior to, their respective faculties. — Apollodorus

I see what you mean, "intelligence" is ambiguous. You are using "intelligence" as synonymous with "intellect", and I thought you meant "intelligence" in the sense of the property of an intellect

Compare 243 with 258. He is clearly talking about the same thing here: — Luke

Why would you say this, right after insisting that he is talking about a "sensation" at 258? When he talks about the private language at 243 he says "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know". Obviously "sensation" doesn't refer to something only he can know, and S is described as a sensation.

Ask yourself why a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. — Luke

The reason why a definition cannot be formulated is because what is proposed is a direct relation between a word and a thing (a sensation in this case). So the situation is a naming, like what a proper noun does. There is no definition in this type of usage, just a direct relationship between the name and the thing named, such that the thing named defines the name. That's why he proceeds to say that he can give himself a sort of ostensive definition by pointing to the thing inwardly.

However, the thing is described as "a sensation", or an "inner experience", and these are words of a public language, Therefore there is no real attempt at exemplifying a private language here. There is a private naming, within the context of a public language. The parameters as to what type of thing is being named are laid out by the public language. This he describes at the end of 257, just before launching into the example.

"And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed." ---257

As explained, "sensation" shows the post where the new word "S" is stationed. This is not a private language.

Luke, your post is so confused, and your replies so brief and unexplained, that I cannot even begin to understand what you are trying to express, in the majority of your replies.

We have two principal disagreements. First, how Wittgenstein uses "S", and "the sensation" at 258, and second, whether 258 is meant to be an example of "a private language".

Let's start with the first. Do you agree that "S" is supposed to signify, or be "the name of" whatever it is which is described as recurring? This is not only consistent with, but very clearly what he is talking about in the context, i.e. 256, 257. He is talking about establishing a direct relationship between a name and a sensation, and that's what's meant, and described at 258, establishing a direct relationship between a sensation, and its name "S", by giving that sensation a name, "S".

So, from the first person perspective which Wittgenstein provides us at 258, we have a recurring 'thing' (whether type or token is irrelevant here), we have "S" as the sign, or name of this thing, and we have the person referring to this thing as "the sensation", in telling us about the thing he has named "S".

Do we have agreement on this, or not?

I think that if we cannot come to some agreement on this fundamental understanding as to what Wittgenstein is giving us as his example, there is no point in going further. We'd have such completely different ideas about what is going on in that example, that any discussion of the example would be completely pointless. Accordingly, discussion of our second principal disagreement, whether this is meant to be an example of "a private language" or not, is pointless until we have agreement as to what has been given to us in the example.

If you don't agree with what I propose above, there is still another possibility for agreement. We could simply agree that the example is ambiguous. If we agree on that, then we can conclude that discussion of the second disagreement will be fruitless, and therefore unnecessary, because there is no correct understanding due to the ambiguity.

What do you say?

This is not how Wittgenstein dictates the example. He associates "the recurrence of a certain sensation" with the sign "S" and writes the sign "S" in a calendar for every day on which he has the sensation. — Luke

You are not grasping this correctly. He does not associate "the recurrence of a certain sensation" with the sign "S". "The recurrence of a certain sensation" is a phrase of language. This is not what he marks with an "S", but he uses this phrase to describe to us what he marks with an "S". He has something (private) which he signifies with "S". He is telling us (publicly) about this activity of marking in the diary, with that phrase, and is calling it (the thing signified by S) "the sensation". Therefore this phrase, "the recurrence of a certain sensation" refers to the thing he is signifying by marking with an "S", as does "the sensation", not vise versa.

What definition of a private language are you using? Earlier you said you agreed to Wittgenstein's description of a private language that he gives at 243: — Luke

Yes that's the one, 243: "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be
known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language".

The example at 258 is not such a "private language" because he explicitly states: "Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation." He is talking about "a diary", and "a certain sensation", He is not using words which another person cannot understand. Nor is he even attempting to do such. He is arguing that the concept of a private language doesn't even make sense, words are already public, by the nature of what words are, they exist in the context of other words which provide grammar (257), so it doesn't even make sense to speak of words which another person can't understand.

It's not at all accurate to say that the demonstration at 258 is an example of a private language, nor is it an attempt at exemplifying a private language.

We don't know what "S" refers to, so how is it not private? — Luke

It's not private because we have a public word which refers to the thing named "S", it is "sensation". But you can't seem to get the referencing right. The issue though, which Wittgenstein brings up, is are we justified in using this word.

If he applies it to whatever he wants, then he is not applying it only to his immediate private sensations, as per the description of a private language at 243. — Luke

I know, it's not an example of a private language. How many times do I have to demonstrate this to you? See, "private sensations" is a public concept, and it is the confines of that public concept which restricts the way that he may use the name. So even the idea of "private language", as described, is self-refuting, as nonsensical. Why would the person with the supposed private language be restricted only to naming private sensations with that language? If "private language" made any sort of sense we couldn't say that this language would be restricted by any conceptions imposed by the confines of our public language. It couldn't be restricted at all. But then how could it be a language?

So you're saying that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S" he has Something — and that is all that can be said? — Luke

Sorry, I just can't help you. I don't know what you're asking.

It is "S" which supposedly refers to the sensation, not the sensation which refers to "S". — Luke

That is how Wittgenstein dictates the example. There is "a certain sensation" which is signified with "S". Then Wittgenstein refers to this sensation as "the sensation". So, in the demonstration "the sensation" refers to a particular sensation which has been named with "S". You can't change the way the demonstration has been written just because you don't like it, or it's "not how English works" in your opinion.

He tries his best at 258 to depict a private language scenario based on the assumptions of the private language advocate without it turning into a public language. He does not succeed, but that's the point. — Luke

He does not "try his best at 258 to depict a private language scenario". He already knows that as impossible, so he is depicting something different. He is depicting a private game (though he doesn't call it a game) within the context of a public language. He starts with the premise of "a certain sensation", a public name, and he assumes that thing which is described by the public word "sensation" is something private.

That is why there is two layers of representation, "the sensation" refers to "a certain sensation signified with S", and this refers to what we know not, something private. But to understand the context, and therefore the meaning of the demonstration, you need to order the layers correctly, because each layer opens up a wider context. So, naming something with S is the immediate, direct description of what the person is doing. Referring to that named thing with "the sensation": is the way that the person is describing that activity to us. So this, describing the thing as a sensation, is less immediate and therefore a wider context. The fact that he in no way points to, or otherwise signifies the thing which "the sensation" refers to (as this is meant to be private), leaves "the sensation" as ambiguous.

What would be an example of a private language? — Luke

One cannot give an example of a private language, because "give an example" is something already public. You are just giving a person an impossible (self-contradicting) task by asking for this. It is the same issue as to why the type/token distinction is not applicable to Wittgenstein's demonstration. A "token", under the confines of the type/token distinction is necessarily an example of a type. And "a type" is something public, being limited by rules, or criteria.

If Wittgenstein wanted to portray a private language, he would have to remove the naming of a thing from the confines of these public rules, to make it something private. He'd have to name a thing without naming it as a member (token) of a type, because that would put it within a public language.

He doesn't do this. The premise states: "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation." So the thing is clearly named in the context of a type (public language). Therefore the idea of a private naming has already been defeated by the premise. However, he proceeds to show that since the thing named is hidden from the public (kept private), it cannot be a token or example of a type. The ambiguity as to why the thing is not a token of a public language throws you off. It is not as you seem to think, that the naming is an act of a private language, which makes it that the thing cannot be a token of "sensation", it is the case that the thing named is kept private, and cannot serve as an example, which makes it so that it cannot be a token.

You did not seem to grasp this the last time I brought it up. A token is an example of a type. A type is public, and an example of a type must be public as well, only being "a token" in relation to the conception of the type. The thing named with "S", though it is stipulated by the person naming it, as a member of a type, is held private by that person, and therefore cannot serve as an example (token) of that type. The thing cannot be considered as a token of a public language, because the thing itself is held private. This is not an example of a private language because that would require that the naming of the thing would be held private. It is impossible to exemplify such a thing.

A true "private language" would require that the naming of the thing be private. Wittgenstein does not keep the naming of thing private, he only keeps the thing private. The result is the problem of justification. But this is not at all an example of a private language, it is an example of naming a private thing through the use of public language, and this is meant to portray what commonly occurs in language use. It is not meant to portray a private language, which is something which does not occur.

You already said this was denied at 258. Your position at 261 is that we are looking to justify that "sensation" fits what the person has. — Luke

Yes, this is the switch in perspective which I described to you. At 258, from the first person perspective, the use of "S" cannot be justified "there is no right here"; "I" can apply S to whatever I want. But at 261, from the perspective of the observers, "we", that the thing named with "S" has been called a "sensation" and this needs to be justified.

These are the two layers of representation described above. The first layer is naming something with "S". The second layer is the person claiming that the thing named as S is a sensation, thereby referring to the thing as "the sensation". The first is portrayed as a private act, but it is not an activity of a private language, because according to the parameters of the example, the person already apprehends the thing as a "sensation", which is the word of a public language. The second layer, the use of the public word "sensation" to refer to the thing, requires justification.

How is what you said different to what I said? I said that "S" cannot refer to a sensation if "S" is supposed to have only a private use. You just repeated it back after saying it's not true. — Luke

Consider that the person could be using "S" completely privately without knowing that "S" refers to something which we would call a "sensation". The use of "S" could be completely private, yet from our perspective, "S" refers to a sensation. That is the difference.

You have reversed the layers of representation so that "the sensation" is between "S" and the object named. This makes it so that "S" cannot have a private use without excluding "the sensation". But this is an improper representation of the layers. When properly represented, "S" refers directly to the object, and "a sensation" is a description of that object. Then we can portray the private application of "S' to an object, and allow that this object may or may not be a sensation. That is why our use of "sensation" to describe this object needs to be justified.