Then we might go back to the methodological point; what has not been shown is an equivalence between the set of signals detected by the doctor and the pain felt by the patient.

And of course there can't be any such equivalence, as is plain from Wittgenstein's analysis.

It seems then that your example is consistent with the the PI.

The difference is this: In these examples, Wittgenstein is referring to the PLA, as you correctly pointed out, and the point of the PLA is that one cannot privately create a language that correctly identifies sensations (of course it's more than sensations that goes terribly wrong). Hence, the doubt, but in this contrived situation (viz., the PLA context), which is, it seems to me, logically impossible. — Sam26

But we disagree on "the point of the PLA". I think the point is that no language can correctly identify sensations, not just the private language. Surely the demonstration which Wittgenstein makes shows that the doubt concerning "a particular sensation" goes beyond the private language, to language use in general. Look what happens when the person tries to justify, publicly, that "S" refers to a sensation, through readings of blood pressure measurement, at 270. If the justification is successful, then "S" simply refers to a rise in blood pressure, and the supposed "sensation" is now irrelevant.

What does "S" really refer to, the supposed sensation, or a rise in blood pressure? That "S" refers to "a sensation" is dubious privately and needs justification. Publicly, the justification of the usage, the rise in blood pressure, replaces the sensation, as what "S" refers to. Consider that at some time the blood pressure might rise, but the person does not have the sensation, and does not mark S. Then we must say that the person is not using S correctly. And the person cannot argue this because correct usage was dependent on that justification. So S really refers to the rise in blood pressure, not a sensation

So Wittgenstein's PLA demonstrates, as you say, that a person cannot assume to be able to correctly identify a particular sensation. But that is just the beginning. He then proceeds to demonstrate that if a person attempts to identify a particular sensation, justification of the usage of the symbol will be required. And if the usage of the symbol can be justified, then the symbol does not refer to the sensation anymore, it refers to whatever the means of justification is. Therefore we can conclude that a symbol cannot refer to a particular sensation.

For example imagine you have a sensation you are inclined to call "pain". To begin with you cannot be sure that the sensation you have is the real one which is supposed to be called "pain". But the use of the word can be justified publicly, so you show others your wound, to justify your use of "pain". Now "pain" doesn't refer to your sensation, it refers to your wound.

Now the contrast - the PLA must be seen against, and in the light of how we normally learn a language. So, in our normal everyday language-games about sensations and/or pains, which is not by the way, the PLA, can we doubt we're in pain? Emphatically, No! We can see how far out such doubts are, especially if we compare this with what Wittgenstein is doing in the OC. If we compare Moore's proposition "I know this is a hand," at least Wittgenstein gives a reasonable example of how a doubt can occur here, although one has a difficult time understanding how a doubt could arise in Moore's context. However, in the case of doubting one is in pain, Wittgenstein constructs a contrived example (the PLA), which cannot be done (a totally private language cannot be done), as he rightfully points out. It's only done to point out how language logically works, and how that logic falls apart in the PLA. — Sam26

I really think you are missing the point of the PLA here. Notice that the PLA is concerned with identifying a particular sensation, a certain sensation, or what Banno called a specific sensation. "Pain" is a very general class which consists of all sorts of different sensations. The problem which Wittgenstein is talking about in the PLA is the uncertainty involved in saying that this sensation I have today, is the very same as the sensation I had last week. This is the same type of doubt as in his example of the chair. The chair here today seems to be identical to the one here yesterday, but I can't be sure that they are the same chair, because they could have been switched in the meantime. So, the question is, what justification do I have in calling these distinct instances of sensation by the same symbol "S", in my judgement that they are "a sensation". I cannot appeal to the universal, and say that I know beyond the shadow of a doubt that these are instances of "pain", because there are many different types of pain, and the issue here concerns identifying one particular sensation, not a general class of sensations..

Notice that the PLA is concerned with identifying a particular sensation, a certain sensation, or what Banno called a specific sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

He is talking about the same type of sensation; not the same token of sensation. This is evident because he speaks of the recurrence of the sensation. It is not possible for the same token of a sensation to recur. If it did recur, then it would be a different token (of the same type), not the same token.

This is the same type of doubt as in his example of the chair. The chair here today seems to be identical to the one here yesterday, but I can't be sure that they are the same chair, because they could have been switched in the meantime. — Metaphysician Undercover

At PI 253, Wittgenstein asks us to consider "two exactly the same":

What counts as a criterion of identity here? Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”: for example, to say, “This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it”. — LW (my emphasis)

You are talking about one exactly the same, so you have misread.

He is talking about the same type of sensation; not the same token of sensation. This is evident because he speaks of the recurrence of the sensation. It is not possible for the same token of a sensation to recur. If it did recur, then it would be a different token (of the same type), instead of the same token. — Luke

His terms are "a certain sensation", "the sensation", "a sensation", "a particular sensation". Imagine if he started with "a certain chair", and proceeded to discuss "the chair". How could you ever believe he was talking about a type of chair. Nowhere does he refer to a type of sensation, he is talking about "the sensation". Your interpretation is completely unjustified, and obviously wrong.

Why do you impose this condition, that it is impossible for the same sensation to occur many times over and over again. Don't we see the same objects over and over again day after day, week after week. No one assumes that it's impossible that the chair you see here today is the same chair that was here last week. What support do you have for your claim that it's impossible that the sensation I have today is the same sensation I had last week? You are just making up, this so-called impossibility, as an attempt to justify your wrong interpretation.

You are talking about one exactly the same, so you have misread. — Luke

That's exactly what I'm talking about. Suppose I say this chair here is the same chair which was here yesterday. And you say, no it's not, it's exactly like it, but it's not the same chair (you think someone switched the chair for one exactly like it, I do not, I think it's the same chair). This is what you are saying about "the sensation", it's not the same sensation, you are saying, it is one like the other. But Wittgenstein is very deliberately calling it "the sensation", so he intends that what is meant is 'the same sensation', just like I say the chair is the same chair. He even ends this section at 270 with the passage I quoted already:

And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here? Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,— And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time? Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?

There is nothing else to say, except that you are very clearly misunderstanding this section if you think he is talking about "the same type of sensation". He is very explicit, I think he uses "the sensation" about four times in 258 alone.

What support do you have for your claim that it's impossible that the sensation I have today is the same sensation I had last week? — Metaphysician Undercover

The argument I gave about recurrence. Perhaps you'd care to address it?

I did, the same chair recurs to me day after day, week after week. There is no impossibility here.

I did, the same chair recurs to me day after day, week after week. There is no impossibility here. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I've just pointed out to you that Wittgenstein is talking about two objects the same; not one object the same.

I don't see your point, he's differentiating between one object which is the same, and two objects which are identical. So he's talking about both, and the difference between them.

For starters, chairs don't recur. If you were to see an identical chair "day after day, week after week", then it would be the same token of chair. I don't see any reason to believe that Wittgenstein is talking about a single instance of a sensation over an extended period of days and weeks. The problem is in remembering the sensation correctly the next time it occurs, so it must be a different instance, a different token, a different occurrence (i.e. recurrence) of the sensation at different times.

, ,

has long had issues with identity, numerical equivalence, and material equivalence. Better not to go down the garden path with him.

the extent to which active inference and enactivism differ is way out side the scope of this thread (which is already a little off topic), lets not make matters worse. — Isaac

I mentioned enactivism only because in the thread I linked to , I addressed the concerns of Hutchinson and Reid over a pervasive reading of Wittgenstein in which rules. , grammars , representational structures and concepts are claimed to be based on pragmatic ‘use’ but only within a conventional , normative , categorical framework. They see enactivism , due to its embrace of phenomenology, as giving priority to the personalistic over empirical, naturalistic accounts of experiencing. In other words , they argue that Wittgenstein , like the phenomenologists, believes the sense of a word, including empirical terms , is person-relative and occasion-sensitive. What the sense of a word points to is not a matter of belief , because belief presupposes the pre-existing sense of something that is or not the case, whereas the use of a word creates the sense. For a word to be is for a word to be used. Language does not exist external to its use by us in the world.

Your discussion of the treatment of pain seems to operate on two levels, a personalistic level of contextual language use and a naturalistic level of neurobiological entities( physiological signals, computational neural
networks). What I’m wondering is whether the concepts you utilize from the subpersonal , neurobiological level are presumed to have sense independently of their person-specific use in actual situations, that is, whether you prioritize a naturalistic over a personalistic account.

I'm arguing against the identification of a word with a referent. People can nonetheless use words wrongly, it's not a free-for-all.
When we use the word "pain" we do so as a result of a modelling relationship with a non-exclusive set of triggering physiological signals, it's one of the outputs from the model, a tendency to say things like "I'm in pain". — Isaac

This strikes me as the kind of reading of Wittgenstein that Hutchinson and Reid object to:

“The mistake here then is (Baker &) Hacker's thought that what is problematic for Wittgenstein—what he wants to critique in the opening remarks quoted from Augustine—is that words name things or correspond to objects, with the emphasis laid on the nature of what is on the other side of the word-referent relationship. Rather, we contend that what is problematic in this picture is that words must be relational at all—whether as names to the named, words to objects, or ‘words' belonging to a ‘type of use.'It is the necessarily relational character of ‘the Augustinian picture' which is apt to lead one astray; Baker & Hacker, in missing this, ultimately replace it with a picture that retains the relational character, only recast. There is no such thing as a word outside of some particular use; but that is a different claim from saying, with Baker & Hacker, that words belong to a type of use. For a word to be is for a word to be used. Language does not exist external to its use by us in the world.”

Arent you claiming that words belong to a type or category of use when you define use by reference to subpersonal physiological structures whose sense supposedly transcends situational contexts?

I claim that Wittgenstein is giving us a way to treat a notion like ‘correctness' that doesn't depend on the reproductive representation of an alleged ‘essense'( the essense of what cases have in common). Correctness would not be conformity to a categorical essense, but the fresh generating of a resemblance that produces the possibility of agreement, among other things.

and, by "certain", here you mean specific, which is a different sense of certainty
— Antony Nickles

How could I mean one sense instead of another? You just said that "Saying something particular is not caused by my intention". — Luke

I was attributing meaning (afterwards), not guessing at a "meaning" caused by you--I could have said "here in the sense of clear and precise". It is a claim open to debate, not an individual, unique instance. The way I put it sounded arrogant, but it exemplifies how the use or sense of something that is said is as available to me as to the speaker. You are the cause of the meaning of an expression in that you are the one answerable for it, responsible for having said it.

You are the cause of the meaning of an expression in that you are the one answerable for it, responsible for having said it. — Antony Nickles

How am I be responsible for it if I did not intend it?

r. I don't see any reason to believe that Wittgenstein is talking about a single instance of a sensation over an extended period of days and weeks. — Luke

Then why does he repeatedly say "the sensation", and he ends this section with "And why a 'particular sensation,' that is, the same one every time?"? He says absolutely nothing to indicate that he is talking about types or tokens here, and he explicitly says that he is talking about one particular sensation "the same one every time". You are simply adding in this type/token change to what he says, so that the PLA makes sense to you and produces the meaning which you want from it. But that is to disregard what Wittgenstein is actually saying, and substantially change the nature of his demonstration.

Continue with your misinterpretation if you like, I am just trying to be helpful by pointing to the words he is actually using, what he actually said, to pull you away from what you think he is saying, which is incorrect, being inconsistent with the words he used.

So, consider his example at 257, a "tooth-ache". Is the tooth-ache I had yesterday not the very same tooth-ache that I had the day before, and the same tooth-ache I have today? I might sleep in between, so that my tooth is not aching at that time, or it might go away for a few days, and come back. Why would you assume that Wittgenstein is talking about distinct tokens of the same type, when he is very explicitly talking about naming something? "But what does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'?" He is very clear, and repetitive in his statements here. He is talking about naming something. Yet you infer that he is talking about classifying distinct tokens of the same type. Why are you inclined toward this incorrect understanding (misunderstanding)? I suggest that you are inclined toward this incorrect reading because it produces the conclusion you desire from the so-called private language argument.

↪Metaphysician Undercover has long had issues with identity, numerical equivalence, and material equivalence. Better not to go down the garden path with him. — Banno

Well, you know I'm in good company, because Wittgenstein has the same issues with identity. He's the one who got me started down that garden path. And it is evident that in order to understand what he is doing with the so-called private language argument, it is necessary that we go down the garden path where he is pointing. Have you yet come to grips with 253-255? Why is the substitution of "identical" for "the same" expedient? This substitution renders what mathematicians are inclined to say about the "reality of mathematical facts", as an illness which needs to be treated by philosophy.

So, consider his example at 257, a "tooth-ache". Is the tooth-ache I had yesterday not the very same tooth-ache that I had the day before, and the same tooth-ache I have today? I might sleep in between, so that my tooth is not aching at that time, or it might go away for a few days, and come back. Why would you assume that Wittgenstein is talking about distinct tokens of the same type, when he is very explicitly talking about naming something? — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you call it "toothache" every time you have toothache? Why don't you call it something different every time (for each token of toothache)? Or do you just have one continuous token of toothache throughout your life but sometimes you don't notice it (and for some reason the pain is located around different teeth at different times)?

When I use "the" in front of the word, in normal conversation, such as "the hammer", "the chair", as Wittgenstein does with "the sensation", I am referring to a particular thing which has been named by the word, I am not referring to a type.

I commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation. — But “I commit it to memory” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the future. — PI 258

“Well, I believe that this is the sensation S again.” — PI 260

“Surely I can (inwardly) resolve to call THIS ‘pain’ in the future.” — PI 263

And why a “particular sensation”: that is, the same one every time? Well, we’re supposing, aren’t we, that we write “S” every time. — PI 270

Then why does he repeatedly say "the sensation", and he ends this section with "And why a 'particular sensation,' that is, the same one every time?"? — Metaphysician Undercover

In case you don't understand the type/token distinction, "the same one every time" implies it is the same type of sensation every time. A token of the sensation is a particular instance of having that (type of) sensation on one of those occasions, or at one of those times.

@Banno

I like the beetle in a box thought experiment. It goes like this: Exclusively private experiences (qualia and others) are hidden from the public eye i.e. it's impossible to crosscheck the referent for correctness. Yet, oddly, there are words that refer to private experiences like pain, joy, etc. How's this possible? Consistent external cues obviously.

So when I'm in pain, I wince, cry, and so on - these outward manifestations are observable and are the pseudo-referents of words that, purportedly, describe the corresponding inner mind states. However, intriguingly, there's no way I can tell that my pain is the same, qualitatively and quantitatively, as yours or anyone else - the contents of the box (beetle/whatever), according to Wikipedia, "...drops out of consideration..."

Pain (feeling) -> Wince & Cry -> "Pain" (word). Put simply, words that refer to inner experience must have some observable outer signs. If no such cues are available, inner experiences can't be discussed with other people or, if one insists that's not true, only at the level of visible external features.

A private language (specifically designed for pure inner experience that doesn't possess any kind of outwardly detectable signs) is untranslatable & incomprehensible (to others).

Now, if I construct a private language, what happens is I can't determine if I'm using the words correctly (consistently), necessary for comprehension. The only person who knows what words mean in a private language is myself and if ever I doubt the meaning of these words, I have only myself to consult but that's a dead end - that I doubt means I don't know and if I don't know how can I clear my doubt?

Hence, the nature of many experiences (religious, mystical, nirvana) :point:



Show, don't tell

if I construct a private language, what happens is I can't determine if I'm using the words correctly (consistently), necessary for comprehension. The only person who knows what words mean in a private language is myself and if ever I doubt the meaning of these words, I have only myself to consult but that's a dead end - that I doubt means I don't know and if I don't know how can I clear my doubt? — TheMadFool

When I perceive my environment my expectations guide and co-determine what appears to me and how it appears to me, visually, tacitly , auditorily. You could think of this as my perceptual language. Due to the anticipatory nature of perception , events can appear recognizable or not, coherent or not , correct or not with respect to those expectations. If I construct a new way of thinking , I will modify my langauge to express new ideas. Words now have senses of meaning foe me that are unique to my new outlook. If, when I read some of my written ideas , I encounter a word whose sense I am not sure of( perhaps I knew it and in the meantime forgot how I intended to utilize it , or only ever meant it in a vague and ambiguous way) I can read further into my written work and this may recall the context in which I used the word. Or I could decide that for whatever reason I had or finally used the word, I know want to choose a better or clearer
term. In any case , when I am in doubt about the uses of words in my private language , I consult a written text or my memory of the context of use of that word in sentences and paragraphs that determine its sense.

when I am in doubt about the uses of words in my private language , I consult a written text or my memory of the context of use of that word in sentences and paragraphs that determine its sense. — Joshs

You can't write about inner experiences because the definitions of the words are ostensive and that would mean every time you think of a word in your private language you would need to recall what it referred to but what if you're not sure? You would be stuck in a loop.

You can't write about inner experiences because the definitions of the words are ostensive and that would mean every time you think of a word in your private language you would need to recall what it referred to but what if you're not sure? You would be stuck in a loop. — TheMadFool

What is it that any groundbreaking philosopher is doing when they construct an idiosyncratic vocabulary? Even before they have written a word of it or even fully articulated their new concepts in words, they have an inner sense of this new way of thinking that they consult , refer to , modify. Ostensive definition is only useful
if you want to copy dictionary definitions. In terms of how we actually use words, we rely on their sense for us in relation to each of our unique ways of understanding the world. My sense of each word I write here is slightly different from your sense of these words as you read them. Ostension misses this about actual
word use. It is an abstraction that covers over what is really happening. Ostension is just a rickety, inadequate belief system about how we do what we do with words.

What is it that any groundbreaking philosopher is doing when they construct an idiosyncratic vocabulary? Even before they have written a word of it or even fully articulated their new concepts in words, they have an inner sense of this new way of thinking that they consult , refer to , modify. Ostensive definition is only useful
if you want to copy dictionary definitions. In terms of how we actually use words, we rely on their sense for us in relation to each of our unique ways of understanding the world. My sense of each word I write here is slightly different from your sense of these words as you read them. Ostension misses this about actual
word use. It is an abstraction that covers over what is really happening. — Joshs

I guess I should say that's exactly Wittgenstein's point - even words that have referents that all of us can see, point to (ostensive), we make errors. So, a fortiori, words that are about inner experiences fare worse.

But I see through Wittgenstein's sham, to see that true principles are derived from the minds of individuals, not from the public judgement of "correct". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm mystified as to why you come in these Wittgenstein threads, especially given that you see through the "sham of Wittgenstein." I'm genuinely curious, are you trying to convince us of your particular interpretation? You seem to be privy to some special knowledge of W. that none of us possess. I know I create these threads because W. really interests me, and sometimes I get new insights into his thinking. Sometimes I even revise my interpretation because my interpretation is just incorrect.

How am I be responsible for it if I did not intend it? — Luke

Because you are the person who said it (as in, not me). You didn’t keep it to yourself. The identity of the expression of pain is that it is yours, individually, not particularly. You own it--you either express or deny it. You stand by what you said or weasel out of it. If you can show you killed someone by accident or inadvertently, then you can avoid being punished for doing it with premeditation, but to be innocent/not responsible (in most cases), you have to show someone else did it (or that they could have).

In case you don't understand the type/token distinction, "the same one every time" implies it is the same type of sensation every time. A token of the sensation is a particular instance of having that (type of) sensation on one of those occasions, or at one of those times. — Luke

I'm fully aware of the type/token distinction, and as I said you are incorrect. You didn't seem to notice that he says "a particular sensation", which is the same one every time. I hate to have to inform you of this Luke, but "a particular sensation" can in no way be interpreted as a number of different tokens indicating a "type of sensation", unless he qualifies the statements as "a particular type of sensation". He never mentions "type" of sensation. He talks about naming a sensation, and then refers to it as "the sensation" "The same one every time" refers to "the sensation", a "particular sensation". There is absolutely nothing to indicate that he refers to a type of sensation. You are simply fabricating this idea. You're wrong in your interpretation because it is based in your own fabrication, not in what was actually said. And I've tried to help you to understand what Wittgenstein is actually saying, but you refuse to be helped. I'm not surprised, you've demonstrated your helplessness many times.

I'm mystified as to why you come in these Wittgenstein threads, especially given that you see through the "sham of Wittgenstein." I'm genuinely curious, are you trying to convince us of your particular interpretation? You seem to be privy to some special knowledge of W. that none of us possess. I know I create these threads because W. really interests me, and sometimes I get new insights into his thinking. Sometimes I even revise my interpretation because my interpretation is just incorrect. — Sam26

I enjoy Wittgenstein's little word games, they make you think. I call his games a sham, because that's what they are a pretense. He pretends to be saying something which he is not saying, so one must be very careful to determine what he actually says. He intentional states things in ambiguous ways to trap people within their own preconceived meanings for words, meanings which are inconsistent with the way that he is actually using the words, leading people into traps which he has carefully laid. I call it a form of hypocrisy. What he is doing with the words is not the same as what the words mean to us. That's the basis of dishonesty and lying. When a person lies to you, what the words mean to you is something completely different from what the person is actually doing with the words.

So, you might say he has led me into a trap, and I would say that he has led you into a trap. However, as I disclosed to Banno above, my way has led me toward a vast problem involving identity and the Platonism which inheres within mathematics today. This is the illness which Wittgenstein mentions at 254-255. All I see from your way is a never ending argument as to what Wittgenstein really means, therefore a dead end.

Something like that. Was there a question?

When I perceive my environment my expectations guide and co-determine what appears to me and how it appears to me, visually, tacitly , auditorily. You could think of this as my perceptual language. — Joshs

...and in being language it is already not private.

You expect to see a tree; and your expectation is satisfied. What you have done is to divide the world up as is customary in your language - into trees and not-trees. This is not an instance of a private application of a word. But moreover, your understanding of trees is built not just by seeing, but by feeling, climbing, cutting; and by doing this in the company of others. You were show what a tree is, and you still modify that understanding.

The tree is not private.

You consult your notes and find that the tree before you is similar in relevant ways to the one you found elsewhere. The similarities are all the sort of thing that can be shared - it has a certain bark, leaves of a certain colour and shape, and so on.

But the premise in the beetle example is that there is nothing that can be shared in this way.

What is it that any groundbreaking philosopher is doing when they construct an idiosyncratic vocabulary? — Joshs

They are showing others how to use that vocabulary. And hence it is public. Hence this is not an example of private language.

You didn't seem to notice that he says "a particular sensation", which is the same one every time. — Metaphysician Undercover

EVERY TIME implies more than one time. A token occurs only one time, so W cannot be talking about a singular token of the sensation. If he was talking about a singular token then the diarist would make only a single entry of ‘S’ in their diary, but W says “we’re supposing, aren’t we, that we write “S” every time.” EVERY TIME.

You expect to see a tree; and your expectation is satisfied. What you have done is to divide the world up as is customary in your language - into trees and not-trees. This is not an instance of a private application of a word. But moreover, your understanding of trees is built not just by seeing, but by feeling, climbing, cutting; and by doing this in the company of others. You were show what a tree is, and you still modify that understanding. — Banno

I do t just divide up the world according to discursive conventions. I subdivide the world in a much
more grained way within and outside the bounds of those generic conventions. Whatever I do with the tree either alone or in the company of others is done from my vantage in my own way in relation to my own overarching framework of goals, intents , relevances. These are not wholly alien to some languaged culture that I interact with ( there are actually myraid languaged subcultures that I interact with)
but neither are they simply ‘within’ the bounds of some normative frame. They are my own variation of practices and understanding and sense of the language. Becuase there is never ‘one’ language but as many languages as there are speakers of English. These are subtle but comprehensively unique variations.

You consult your notes and find that the tree before you is similar in relevant ways to the one you found elsewhere. The similarities are all the sort of thing that can be shared - it has a certain bark, leaves of a certain colour and shape, and so on — Banno

What I share with others( words like bark, leaves, etc) is understood by all of us in ways that are unique to each of us.

What is it that any groundbreaking philosopher is doing when they construct an idiosyncratic vocabulary?
— Joshs

They are showing others how to use that vocabulary. And hence it is public. Hence this is not an example of private language. — Banno

They may be disappointed for many years , since in most cases their use of the words is so profoundly different from the way that others demonstate their use that others’ interpretations are almost unrecognizable to them
for an long time. The question of public vs private comes down to the role of novelty in language and thought.
Public use of language must imply fundamental difference in sense also. Every time we participate in language we reinvent the bounds of that language in some fashion. Even when I am engaged in solitary thinking or talking or writing I am reinventing my own sense of my language.

:up: It is not a pedantic matter of "either/ or"; meanings are both public and private. We all have multitudes of associations with words that are unique to each of us. These are not public meanings, although they may be shared with those of sympathetic mind.