So as I said, physical existence is a description, not any particular thing or type of thing. Physicists, and other scientists make models to represent what is described in observation, and in a very general sense, this might be called "physical existence". That's what I called "the way things are". They measure the different described parameters of things, length, height, weight, temporal duration etc.. Perhaps you might even say that they measure the physical existence of a thing, if there was some consensus as to which parameters constitute the physical existence of a thing, so that they could actually claim to be measuring the physical existence of a thing. So what are you having a problem with?

Yes I guess "physical existence", may be thought of as a description, or a term of designation, but physical existence is not a description. Are you familiar with the distinction between use and mention? — Janus

I don't know of any particular thing or type of thing called "physical existence". And, for the purpose of referring to a thing, is clearly not how the phrase is being used here. I believe I introduced it, and defined it here:

Simply try to imagine the universe without a temporal perspective. The way things are, what we call "physical existence", is completely dependent on one's temporal perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

You can see that it is clearly defined as "the way things are", which does not indicate a thing, but a description.

Tim went on to question my definition, asking what does "the way things are" have to do with physical existence, and so I proceeded in an attempt to justify the definition.

At no time in my discussion with you or Tim, has it been indicated that "physical existence" refers to a thing, or a type of thing. here is an example of your use.

. According to Special Relativity Theory, physical (spatio-temporal) existence has no general "now", so forget about a "now" being required for physical existence; it is is not even possible! — Janus

Clearly your use is consistent with my definition, "the way things are". If your claim now, is that "physical existence" refers to some thing, or type of thing, then you need to give me some indication as to how I can identify this thing. Either point to this thing which you are calling physical existence, or provide me with some descriptive terms so that we can determine whether you are talking about a real thing, or a fictitious thing. If you have in mind, some fictitious thing, which you have named "physical existence", all for the sake of misleading me in this discussion, I'd like to expose that attempt at deception. If there is some real thing, or type of thing which you are calling "physical existence", then you ought to be able to describe this thing in some way. In this way I could understand that you are actually using "physical existence" to refer to some thing, and not as I defined it "the way things are", and you are not simply acting in deception.

Odd that someone who denies that 2 + 2 and 4 represent the same thing, is willing to accept the Fourier transform. — fishfry

You clearly do not understand, if you think that I accept the Fourier transform. I accept it as an example of an unresolved problem. And when that unresolved problem is united with the bad metaphysics of special relativity, the result is the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics.

Relativist seemed to be arguing that a metaphysician is better trained to do metaphysics than a physicist, yet there is some metaphysics, such as the metaphysics of time, which a physicist is better trained to do. However, the uncertainty principle is clear evidence that physicists should leave the metaphysics of time in the hands of metaphysicians.

My understanding is that the zeroes might be distributed in many different ways. There might be one at every integer, say. Or what if there was a zero at each of 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, etc. But now what if there were those zeros, and you threw in at 1/4, a nearby sequence that converges to it: 14+1n14+1n. So the main sequence 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, ... could have little tendrils coming off it. And each tendril could have tendrils. Each tendril would be countable, but there would be a graph of unimaginable complexity to keep track of. — fishfry

Thanks for offering your take on this. I think this is exactly where the unresolved problem lies. It appears like the size of a chosen base unit might be completely arbitrarily decided upon. Yet the possible divisions are not arbitrary because divisibility is dependent on the size of the proposed base unit. Take 440 HZ as the baseline, for example. From this baseline, one octave (as a unit) upward brings us to 880HZ, and one octave downward brings us to 220HZ. So the higher octave consists of 440 HZ, and has different divisibility properties from the lower octave which consists of 220 HZ. This results in a complexity of problems in music.

But you appear to deny the existence of the thing described, which existence is usually called physical existence, and the fact of that usually called reality. — tim wood

You don't seem to understand. "Physical existence" is a description. Do you recognize the difference between pointing to a thing also giving it a name perhaps, and describing a named thing? If you do, then you should see that "physical existence" is a descriptive phrase, not a named thing. For example, if x is a named thing, x might or might not have physical existence. But what sense does it make to claim that physical existence is a thing, which may or may not have physical existence, unless by "thing" you mean a concept? But then you would not be talking about "the thing described" you'd be talking about the descriptive phrase as if it represented a thing, a concept.

You claimed that physical existence is dependent on a "particular now"; now you've changed the subject to "measurement of time". — Janus

There's no change. "Physical existence" depends on measurement of time, which depends on "now". Therefore "physical existence" depends on "now". When I first said that "physical existence" depends on "now", I thought you would understand, and that there would be no need to explain that this dependence is through the means of measuring time. There must be a "now" in order for us to measure time, and there must be measurements of time in order for there to be "physical existence".

I'm actually surprised that you didn't give the usual physicalist reply, that time is not something which is measured, it is only something which we use as a measuring device. But that just digs the physicalist into a deeper hole of denying the obvious.

Is this some Kantian-like point you're making? That the ding-an-sicht-selbst is "unknowable"? Or are you just plain denying reality? And if it's the Kantian point, then you do not understand Kant, because he did not deny knowledge qua, but that the knowledge of had to be qualified as to its ground. — tim wood

No, I'm not Kantian, though Kant's perspective is not so different, and consistent with mine. I'm simply describing reality. And since Kant's perspective is similar, it seems like you are the one denying reality. Look at what you're saying, knowledge has to be qualified as to its ground. Well it's ground according to Kant, is phenomena, appearance, how things appear to people from their particular perspectives. Any attempt to remove that ground (the perspective of the pure intuitions of space and time) leaves your claimed "knowledge" as completely unsupported. What kind of knowledge is that?

This is nonsense. According to Special Relativity Theory, physical (spatio-temporal) existence has no general "now", so forget about a "now" being required for physical existence; it is is not even possible! — Janus

There seems to be a big problem with what you are asserting. We can only measure durations of time at the present, now, as time passes. Any reference to a duration of time in the future, or in the past, not actually as time passes, is just a logical extrapolation through physical analysis, not an actual measurement of time.

You seem to be demonstrating my point very well. The capacity to predict, which relativity theory gives us, does not indicate an understanding of time. You have totally neglected the capacity to measure time, which is an underlying prerequisite to the capacity of prediction. When you can explain the capacity to measure time without requiring a temporal perspective (a now), then you might have something to argue. But I'll tell you now, that I've fully analyzed this already, and it appears to be completely impossible to measure a period of time without an assumed now.

So, it may be true that special relativity has no general now. But that just confirms my claims that the measurement of time is perspective dependent, i.e. dependent on a particular now.. The measurement of time is derived from the now, and all you have done with your reference to special relativity, is supported my argument that any sense of "physical existence" is dependent on perspective.

Why? We're talking about "physical existence" (PE), not perspective or products of imagination. — tim wood

But "physical existence" very clearly is a product of the imagination. What it means to be "physical", and what it means to "exist" are products of the human imagination, created from within the human perspective. To speak of "PE" outside the human perspective is complete nonsense.

It's like saying there's a "now" without a human perspective. Without you and I, or other human being saying this is now, thus determining the present, right now, as now, what time would "now" be? "Now' would be all the time in the complete extension of the universe. Where would any of the objects in the universe be in all this time, but everywhere? And what sense does "physical existence" have if everything is everywhere?

What do you mean "without a temporal perspective"? Do you mean try to imagine the world without myself being a temporal entity? Or try to imagine a world without time? Why would I need to do either of those impossible tasks in order to imagine a physical world without humans in it? — Janus

I mean imagine the universe without a "now", which provides a temporal perspective, as described above. "Physical existence" as we know it, is a description of our temporal position of being at the present, now. Remove the human perspective, and there is no "now", nor is there any such thing as "physical existence" which is a representation of the human perspective. .

What an odd thing to say, considering that you asserted physicists have been impaired by their ignorance of metaphysics, and your examples were a fail. — Relativist

I see you haven't addressed my examples, only contradicted yourself, saying metaphysicians are better trained to do metaphysics than physicists, yet physicists are decidedly better at some forms of metaphysics.

That is a novel view of an "uncertainty principle" That's interesting that you think that time can't be measured precisely. You're wrong, but it's interesting that you believe it. — Relativist

Are you familiar with the frequency-time uncertainty exposed by the Fourier transform? Once you familiarized yourself with this uncertainty principle, you'll see that what it says exactly is that time cannot be measured precisely.

Consider that to measure time precisely requires the ability to determine the shortest time possible. However, a time period is measured by means of some determinable frequency. How could we determine the number of cycles/time period (frequency) of the highest frequency, without having a higher frequency by which to compare it to, as a temporal measurement? To determine the frequency requires a measured period of time, and to determine the period of time requires a determined frequency. Hence uncertainty. So what the uncertainty principle says is that a precise moment in time cannot be determined because the frequency required to determine this, cannot be determined; and the frequency required to determine this, cannot be determined because the precise moment in time cannot be determined. Do you see the vicious circle which creates the uncertainty principle? Having a measured period of time is dependent on determining the frequency of something, and determining the frequency of something is dependent on having a measured period of time. Therefore as we move toward a shorter and shorter period of time (precise measurement of time), there is greater and greater uncertainty.

What do you mean, MU? — tim wood

How do you know that? — Janus

Simply try to imagine the universe without a temporal perspective. The way things are, what we call "physical existence", is completely dependent on one's temporal perspective. Without a temporal perspective there is nothing to indicate when "now" is, or how long of a time period "now" represents. The idea of something physically existing has no meaning without a particular temporal perspective. It's like when Wittgenstein says "stand roughly here", implying that the degree of precision is dependent on the application. With no perspective whatsoever though, "here" has no meaning at all because it could refer to anywhere. Likewise, without a perspective, "now" refers to the entire temporal duration of the universe. Any time we use "physical existence" there is implied necessarily a perspective which grounds the meaning, just like when we use "here" and "now", and it would be meaningless without that implied perspective.

Even though I know the two lettered squares are the same color, I literally cannot see it like that. — Wayfarer

When the two squares, A and B first come on the image you see them as the same colour. If you focus on them, and them alone, ignoring everything else which pops onto the screen, you'll continue to see them as the same colour.

You see what you want to see. If you want to see the truth, you find principles which are necessarily true, and focus on them and whatever is consistent with them as the truth. Ignore all the noise and distractions which the vast world and all its people regurgitate all around you, creating the illusion that what you know to be true is not.

Out of idle curiosity, what exactly is your objection to quantum physics? — fishfry

If you're interested, just go back and read the posts I made in this thread. They aren't large, and there isn't a lot.

That said science can develop understandings or theories about how it would be possible for the first person perspective to arise within physical existence. — Janus

This is the faulty assumption which idealism demonstrates as false. There is no such thing as physical existence without a perspective. So the perspective is necessarily prior to physical existence. You might qualify "perspective" with "first person", and insist that the "first person perspective" arises from physical existence, but this is to ignore the importance of the point that physical existence can only be a product of a perspective. So insisting that physical existence is prior to the human perspective only pushes the idealist to posit God, because a perspective is still necessarily prior to physical existence. Whether that perspective is properly called "first person", "first", "God", or whatever is not really relevant.

In moral philosophy we are always dealing with our moral sensibilities or feelings, so of course the "first person" perspective cannot be totally eliminated in that context, although we might be able to generalize to the inter-subjective commonality of moral intuitions or feelings. So the investigation would be more phenomenological than it would be determinately scientific. — Janus

The issue is that the "perspective" cannot be eliminated in any context. So the idea that science can get away from the perspective, and give us a perspective-free, "objective", approach to anything, is nonsense. On the other hand, moral philosophy considers the perspective as an unavoidable, real, and important aspect of reality.

Since the subject of study here, is the perspective itself, consciousness, we are far better off to approach this subject from the precepts of moral philosophy which accept the perspective as a true, important, and fundamental aspect of reality, than we are from the precepts of a science which pretends to remove the perspective, to see how a perspective might emerge from the self-contradicting perspective of no perspective.

Yes and no. Metaphysicians are better equipped for conceptual analysis, including developing general metaphysical frameworks, but they would be abysmal at the "metaphysics" that is part of the core work of theoretical physicists - the thinking outside the box. — Relativist

At the core of of theoretical physics are the concepts of time and space. We have no empirical access to time, we cannot sense it in any way. Nor do we sense space. The only approach we have to the nature of time and space is through conceptual analysis. So it is blatantly contradictory to say that metaphysicians are better equipped for conceptual analysis, but not equipped for the core principles of theoretical physics.

As I brought up earlier, no metaphysician would have thought up the Page-Wooter mechanism, had the insight about time that we gained from special relativity, predicted quantum uncertainty, nor proposed the nature of quantum fields as (possibly) fundamental. Metaphysicians can reflect on these advances, and perhaps propose a metaphysical framework (like ontic structural realism), but they won't actually be contributing to the advance of physics - even if you choose to label this "metaphysics". — Relativist

The problem is, that from the perspective of classical metaphysics, the "insight" of special relativity is not an advancement at all, it's a step backward, a rejection of discipline. Special relativity assigns ambiguity to the point in time designated as "now". But precise measurement of time requires precise determinations of the points "now", which mark the beginning an ending of the measured duration. Without such precision we have uncertainty. Hence the uncertainty principle, emerges as the result of the ambiguity which special relativity assigns to the point in time.

But you're wrong, so I infer that you have no actual cases in which an ignorance of metaphysics impaired physicists. — Relativist

Assertion will get you nowhere. Where's your evidence which demonstrates that the uncertainty principle is a product of good spatial and temporal conceptions? That special relativity is useful within some parameters, and not useful in others, is evidence of bad spatial temporal conceptions.

But even if you denied quantum uncertainty, you can't deny the existence of these particles. Furthermore, quantum uncertainty has been verified. — Relativist

I don't deny quantum uncertainty. I just explained how it is the product of bad metaphysics.

Sure, the so-called "first person perspective" gives us phenomenology, which is different than science. But what is found by each individual's phenomenological investigations must be parsed through comparisons with the investigations of others in order to have any inter-subjective relevance. — Janus

But the issue being discussed was whether science could fully understand consciousness. The cultural determinations you refer to, which form the basis of agreement, are better represented as features of morality rather than science. So there is a very large aspect of consciousness which is the subject of moral philosophy, rather than science. Trying to make morality and its various subjects into a discipline of science is a mistake because science, being empirical, has no real approach to intention. And science itself, being an intent driven activity, and a discipline, ought to be considered as a moral feature instead.

So, yes, all science is fallible, but it's all we have. — Janus

No it isn't all we have, that's the fallacy of scientism, and the point where I entered this discussion in the first place. When the subject of study is consciousness, we have the first person perspective, which gives us something that science does not give us. To begin with I described the insight into the active role of intention, which we get from the first person perspective, not from science.

We go by evidence. Say, findings like planetary orbits, quantumatics, ..., whatever. The world doesn't care about our metaphysics or whatever we think. Rather, our beliefs are the adjustable parts. — jorndoe

OK, so the evidence as I see it, indicates that rocks are deterministic, and human beings are not. It appears to me that mosquitoes are not deterministic either. Nor do plants appear to be deterministic. So I think that inanimate things are deterministic, and living things are not. Do you agree?

If you're going to label as "metaphysics" any work physicists do that is outside the box of established physics, feel free - but it doesn't change anything. — Relativist

OK, then let's call it metaphysics, if you're ok with that. Now, are you willing to recognize that a metaphysician, trained in the principles of metaphysics is most likely a lot more capable of doing this work (metaphysics), than is a physicist, who is trained in the principles of physics, and not in metaphysics?

You say it's "demonstrably false" that their ignorance of metaphysics has handicapped physicists. Please provide one or two good examples. — Relativist

I did, in my last post, it was your example of the standard model of particle physics. It incorporates uncertainty as a fundamental principle of quantum physics; obviously bad metaphysics.

The uncertainty principle isn't directly related to this, so perhaps you were mistaken. Nevertheless the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics has also been verified experimentally - so I'm sorry, but it's nonsensical to dismiss its reality based on some metaphysical principles. Physics needs to come first, and the metaphysics needs to be consistent with it. Not the other way around. As I said earlier, physics has proven the natural world is weird at the fundamental level, a fact that would never be exposed by pure philosophical reflection. — Relativist

The uncertainty principle is a feature of all quantum field theory, and therefore the standard model as well. Of course it's been verified experimentally, when you are uncertain of something it's easy to demonstrate this. But that doesn't mean that the uncertainty is not derived from bad metaphysics.

No, I do not agree that Einstein went beyond the accepted principles of physics of his day. He was addressing some outstanding problems in the physics of the day. — Relativist

Sure, he was addressing existing problems. But he came up with a new principle, which implies necessarily that his thinking went outside the box, represented as "the accepted principles of physics of his day". If it is required that his thinking went outside the principles established within the discipline of "physics", when he came up with his theory, we cannot say that he was doing physics at the time. If he was not engaged in metaphysics, then what was he doing? Why not call it what it is, metaphysics?

As I said previously, one can classify some of the work of physicists as "metaphysics", but what's the point? Physicists aren't typically trained in the field of metaphysics, they're trained in physics, and this does not seem to have handicapped them. — Relativist

The point is to demonstrate that you are wrong in your conclusion. Physicists do go beyond the work of physics, into the field of metaphysics. And, they aren't trained in metaphysics, as you accept. So why not accept as well, that their metaphysics is very often deficient, faulty in comparison with classical metaphysics, because they are not educated in some of the fundamental principles of metaphysics? And your conclusion "this does not seem to have handicapped them" is demonstrably false.

For example, when the standard model of particle physics was proposed, one could have called this an exercise in metaphysics (it proposed a suite of particles that constitute the fundamental building blocks of material reality), but it's not the sort of metaphysics a philosopher could do because it depended on knowledge of physics. — Relativist

The standard model is extremely deficient. It accepts uncertainty (the uncertainty principle), as inherent within the thing being modeled. What kind of a model is that? We're modeling something, but fundamental aspects of the thing being modeled cannot be modeled using our metaphysical principles, so we'll just incorporate "uncertainty" into the model. The problem here is that the metaphysics of time being employed in the standard model is very deficient in comparison with the classical metaphysics of time, and this produces an extremely deficient model, full of uncertainty.

You seem to think that because the metaphysics is produced by physicists rather than by metaphysicians, it is better metaphysics. However, you agree that physicists are not trained in metaphysics, so it appears like you would be very wrong here. Then, to support your claim you propose a model which has uncertainty as a fundamental principle. How does this in any way support your claim that physicists are better able to produce metaphysical principles than metaphysicians? The pervasiveness of the uncertainty principle in modern physics, and things like dark matter and dark energy in cosmology demonstrate very clearly that modern science is handicapped by its metaphysics.

What would a "full understanding" look like; how would we know whether the understanding we have is a "full understanding"? — Janus

I don't know, I was not the one arguing that a "full understanding "is possible. But I think I've demonstrated through the use of examples, that the capacity to predict does not indicate that there is anything which could be construed as a "full understanding". So let's just look at "understanding" in the conventional sense of the word.

What I'm arguing is actually a very simple and obvious principle with an abundance of evidence. The fact that a person can use mathematics to predict an event, does not necessitate the conclusion that the person understands the event, in any conventional sense of the word "understand". Understanding an event requires knowing more about the event, then predicting it demonstrates, such as knowing how and why the event occurred. Predicting requires the simple step of applying mathematics to patterns of occurrence, which does not require knowledge of how and why.

I am not arguing that in all case where a person can predict an event, that the person does not understand the event. I am arguing that in some instances a person can predict an event without understanding the event. Because these latter instances are very true and real, we cannot conclude that the capacity to predict an event indicates an understanding of the event.

So, where would we start? Rocks are deterministic, and human beings are not? How about a mosquito?

Non-contributions? Are you not the godfather of The Philosophy Forum?

The first part is mainly about optical illusions, but towards the end it gets into philosophically significant territory in talking about how people's inclinations and prior experience influence what they see. — Wayfarer

There's an old saying, "people see what they want to see", and it's very relevant because it discloses how one's intentions influence the way a person see the world. Put a number of different people in the same place, and ask each of them later what they saw, and there will be much difference.

From a scientistic perspective, we might say that different things attract the attention of different people. From an idealist perspective we would say that different people direct their attention toward different things, because they have different intentions. The former neglects the role of intention, the latter embraces it. When the role of intention is respected, it is completely acceptable to say that reality is constructed.

No, I would say that if a coherent and plausible physical theory of consciousness, which delivers predictions which can be confirmed by experiment and observation, then neuroscience would have done all you could expect it to do. — Janus

The capacity to predict does not constitute a full understanding. The ancient Greek, Thales, predicted a solar eclipse without fully understanding the orbits of the solar system. Clearly you over rate prediction as an indication of understanding. In reality the capacity to predict is only a small step toward understanding. I predict that when it turns cold in the fall, water will freeze. But being able to predict when water will freeze (when it gets cold) demonstrates very little understanding of the process which is the freezing of water.

Prediction is extremely useful, and facilitates the capacity to fulfill many of our intentions. But it doesn't fulfill the intent of the philosopher, which is to know and understand.

This is an obvious non-sequitur, even if the premise is true (which it very likely isn't). So, another extremely sloppy argument/comment. Par for the course on this thread/topic I'm afraid. — Enai De A Lukal

I wasn't making an argument, just pointing out what is obvious to many philosophers. If you close your eyes to the obvious, and deny it when someone points it out to you, what type of philosophy are you engaged in? A philosophy of exclusion?

My main issue is that the relevant paradigm shifts only occur because of new physics, not because of this philosophical reflection. — Relativist

I don't think that's the case, because to do work as a physicist is to follow the precepts of the discipline. Only if a physicist steps outside the discipline, to do metaphysics, could such a paradigm shift occur.

My initial comment in this thread was: "I don't think metaphysical analysis can provide definitive answers about time. On the other hand, physics may develop insight into its nature"

And I haven't seen any reason to think this isn't true. — Relativist

Again, I'll stress the point that the discipline of physics will follow the temporal concept which it has adopted. One doesn't develop any new insight into the nature of time, by adhering to the principles given. It is only by going beyond the given principles (practicing metaphysics) that such insight is developed.

My impression is that one could say physicists engage in metaphysics when they develop concepts (like the curvature of space and interpretations of quantum mechanics). — Relativist

Would you agree, that when Einstein went beyond the accepted principles of physics of his day, he was practicing metaphysics rather than physics? Since he wasn't following the conventional rules of physics, we cannot say he was doing physics. If you agree, then why would you think that it's physics rather than metaphysics which gives us insight into the nature of time?

I agree the "problem of time" implies deficiencies in our concept of time, but my point is that metaphysical analysis would never expose the deficiency. — Relativist

Isn't this a metaphysical analysis which is exposing these deficiencies?

Metaphysics consists of conceptual analysis, and in that regard it can help identify implications of concepts, but the paradigm shifting breakthroughs regarding our understanding of time has been a result of advances in physics - not metaphysics. — Relativist

Seems you don't know the difference between physics and metaphysics.

but it was physics - not metaphysics- that showed time is not absolute, that it is relative to a reference frame (i.e. special relativity). It is physics that showed space and time are coupled, and identified the "problem of time". — Relativist

That physics has identified a "problem of time" demonstrates that the principle they apply, are deficient. The "things" that you say physics has shown about time are the things which lead to the "problem of time", which demonstrates that despite your claim, these "things" are not truths. They are simply useful principles which are limited in their application, demonstrating their deficiencies.

What specific insights have metaphysicians provided regarding time? — Relativist

We could begin with the way that we apprehend the substantial difference between past and future. The past consists of events which have actually occurred, and the future consists of events which are possible, as indicated by human behavior. This means that the present as what divides future from past, is ontologically significant.

I don't think metaphysical analysis can provide definitive answers about time. On the other hand, physics may develop insight into its nature. — Relativist

I think this is actually the opposite of reality. Analysis of the problems which physics encounters with its representations of time, juxtaposed with the firmly established metaphysical conceptions of causation, is what develops insight into the nature of time. Physicists do not value metaphysical conceptions, metaphysicians do.

Oh brother. Obviously at no point have I even given the appearance of arguing against the proposition that "cognitive science is deficient or invalid or broken"- a proposition which had not appeared til you typed it just now. I understand quite well what you're saying and feel like my own remarks have been pretty clear.. and so I've said all I mean to say on the idea that 400 years of philosophy of mind + an incredibly productive last few decades in neuroscience has amounted to "no actual progress on how non-conscious stuff can produce consciousness since Descartes" (a statement of dogma if ever there was one). — Enai De A Lukal

The fact that the gap between what is believed by materialists, and what is believed by idealists, continues to widen, is clear evidence that progress has not been made. The fact that the materialists ignore this evidence to claim that progress has been made, is simple denial. So the materialists float off in their self-induced bubble, further and further from the idealist perspective, while all the time claiming progress is being made in closing the gap between them.

So, I am pointing out a distinction which you seem to be missing: that between explaining the phenomenon of first person experience from a physically causal perspective and explaining it from the first person perspective itself. The latter is not the business of science at all, so it is a category error to criticise science for not being able to do something outside its purview; much as it would be to criticise poetry for not being able to explain quantum physics or geology. Apropos of this distinction see Sellar's ideas of "the space of causes" and " the space of reasons". — Janus

Doesn't "fully explain consciousness" imply both? So if the scientisitc approach asserts that science has the capacity to, or will have the capacity to, do something which "is not the business of science at all", (i.e. understand the first person perspective), by claiming that it could fully understand consciousness, then this is a mistaken assertion.

I like this. I think it directs us back to how we first think of causes: something happens and we know it happened due to this other thing. It doesn't mean forensically establishing a necessary frame-by-frame progression, but simply recognizing that the presence of this led to that. That's it. How the one lead to the other depends on the case. Whether the one had to lead to the other also depends on the case. — csalisbury

"Necessitation" is a tricky word, because "necessary" and its derivatives have very many different uses. An effect, by that name is a contingent event, so if it occurs it has been necessitated by its causes. But I think what misleads people is the idea that an event, as an effect, has one cause. Contingent events generally require the fulfillment of numerous conditions, all of which can be called causes of the event. So the idea of a one to one cause/effect relation is what ought to be scrutinized.

What we commonly call "the cause" of an event is one of many contributing factors, and it is only within a very specific (subjective) perspective, that it is designated as "the cause". The experimental process which attempts to fix initial conditions for repetition, and note consistency and inconsistency in the results, is not actually looking for the cause of the results per se. The cause of the results is more properly attributed to the fixing of the initial conditions. What the experimentation is looking for is the cause of differences, the degree of consistency in the results. If there is inconsistency in the results, we want to know "the cause" of the inconsistency. If the single variant factor, which leads to an inconsistent event can be identified, it becomes known as the cause of that event, the inconsistent event. But to designate this as "the cause" is to neglect the fact that the more substantive "cause" is the prerequisite fixing of the initial conditions in such a way so as to allow "the cause" to produce its effect.

The salient point is that determinism is not found in classical physics but assumed. — Banno

As indicated in my first post, the conventional interpretation of Newton's first law is what produces the assumption of determinism. To get beyond this, we need an unconventional, or flat out denial of this law. The common theological/metaphysical/mystical perspective is to understand that the temporal continuity
of existence, described by this law, and expressed as inertia, (and in general, the existence of matter), requires a cause itself. So at each moment of passing time, a "cause" is required to ensure that things continue in an orderly manner, consistent with the last moment, instead of random difference at each passing moment. This "cause" is often expressed as the Will of God.

There's a simple argument to consider. The human will can create an action at a randomly determined time, therefore uncaused by any external physical force. Free will is demonstrated by the randomly determined act, and so that the causal force of the act must be the will itself. This action could change the world in a materially significant way (the POTUS could push the nuke button for example, at any random time). Therefore the continuity expressed by the law of inertia is not necessary. The human will can interfere with this continuity. So the law of inertia does not have complete, universal, and absolute application. It is not necessary. If the temporal continuity of existence expressed by the law of inertia is not necessary, it is contingent, and therefore its observed reality requires causation. Without this necessity the assumption of determinism is not supported.

There are clearly two distinct perspectives. One is that Newton's first law is true, absolute, and therefore expresses a universal necessity. This leads to the determinist assumption. The other perspective is that this law is incomplete, and the argument for this is that free will acts are outside the inertial framework. These acts are understood as constituting a force outside the concept of inertia, or perhaps a force internal to matter; as if a piece of matter can decide to start a new motion at any time. But more precisely, something outside the conceptual scheme of matter, can create matter with inertia, at a chosen time.

So the issue of determinism and free will, is how we approach and interpret Newton's first law.

The answer to the question of determinism could only be revealed with a thorough understanding of the nature of time, something human beings are very far from having.

Now the default position adopted in my high school physics class was that the error was introduced by a lack of precision in the measurement. The assumption was that there is indeed some real number that gives the exact velocity to infinite precision, and that the error represented the degree to which one could operationally approximate the actual velocity. The alternative explanation being offered by Del Santo is that the initial velocity does not correspond to some real number, but instead to some region of the real numbers. The boundaries of this region are also indefinite, but lies within the bounds of our arbitrarily accurate measurement. — Banno

There is another issue which needs to be considered, and that is the attempt to remove the margin of error through the manufacture of artificial initial conditions. This is what is done in experimentation, the apparatus is intentionally designed so as to supposedly give us the capacity to reproduce the same initial conditions over and over. This produces the idea that the error of measurement can be accounted for, or removed.

Consider your Galton box, the ball is channeled down the narrow throat, and positioned accordingly. This channeling is the creation of artificially limited initial conditions. If the ball is always dropped from the same height one might believe that the initial conditions have sufficiently been controlled. The point which that apparatus demonstrates is that no matter how well we control the initial conditions, it is always a simple matter to add an element of "chance" into such an apparatus which will render the outcome as unpredictable. This indicates that unpredictability is very likely an inherent feature of how we as human beings, produce and describe initial conditions. Therefore attempting to correct for the error is not the right approach, as it is an attempt to do the impossible, correct the uncorrectable. What is needed is a non-determinist approach which recognizes the reality of that unpredictability.

See, your guy. He, your guy in your quote, does not have a problem with real numbers as numbers. — tim wood

Why do you like to quibble tim? I could respond to your quote with the following quote:

In fact “as soon as one realizes that the mathematical real numbers are not really real, i.e. have no physical significance, then one concludes that classical physics is not deterministic.

But what's the point?

Whether or not a real number is or is not a "real" number is beside the point, and not at all relevant. What is relevant is the "natural uncertainty in all observations", which some use of real numbers tends to veil with the pretense of what he calls "infinite precision".

This natural uncertainty is true of all all descriptions of initial conditions, so it applies to all inertial reference frames. Since the uncertainty develops exponentially with the passage of time, we rapidly become deficient in the capacity to distinguish between an improperly represented inertial reference frame, and an external cause in the occurrence which follows. Determinism as an attitude, is dependent on the assumption of a reliable inertial reference. When uncertainty is apprehended as a feature of the initial conditions, (initial conditions being what limits future possibilities) rather than as a feature of the outcome of the activity, then determinism is vanquished. The certitude required to support determinism cannot be obtained.

Do you understand the ratio between the circumference and diameter of a circle to be a number? — tim wood

No, it's an irrational ratio, that's the point. You might call it an irrational number, but representing it as "a number" is exactly where the problem lies. Making it "a number", is to make it something definite, determinate, when the essence of the irrational ratio is that it is indefinite, indeterminate.

So, according to the above described principle of infinite precision, this irrational ratio, the quotient which proves to have infinite decimal places, indicating a division problem which cannot be resolved, this thing which is by its very nature indefinite, is made to appear as finite and definite. Therefore that principle is faulty.

The point of that part of the article is that in using the real numbers this way, the indeterminateness which exists within the real world (reality), is made to appear determinate.

..it's clear you did not take the time and effort to understand it... — tim wood

Now why would you say a thing like that?

The issue, as explained in the section following your quotes, is that in the application of real numbers, the infinite is represented as finite. (This is the point of the other thread, the infinite decimal extension of .999... is represented as 1).

Now, in philosophy we understand that what appears as infinite is really indefinite, or indeterminate, and this is a deficiency in our capacity to measure that thing. So when the application rules of the real numbers make what is really indefinite, or indeterminate, appear as definite or determinate, it is simply an illusion created by the customary use of that number system.

Del Santo's definition pertains to a finite number of decimal points, however large. 0.999... has an infinite number of decimal points, and so is identically 1. — Kenosha Kid

The problem though, is this:

However, the principle of infinite precision is inconsistent
with any operational meaning, as already made evident by
Max Born. — https://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Del_Santo_FQXI_essay_indete.pdf

So Del Santo suggests that the tiny uncertainty hidden by a faulty application of the principle of infinite precision, in an instable system, would increase exponentially with time, allowing for the appearance of indeterminacy.

The idea is that any initial position (inertial frame of reference) cannot be represented with infinite precision, so the notion that it might be represented in this way ought to be dismissed. Therefore to have the most accurate representation, which is consistent with the real possibilities of representation, we ought not try to represent it with infinite precision.

As we will show in the next section, one can indeed envision
an alternative classical physics that maintains the same general laws (equations of motion) of the standard formalism, but
dismisses the physical relevance of real numbers, thereby assigning a fundamental indeterminacy to the values of physical
quantities, as wished by Born. In fact, “as soon as one realizes that the mathematical real numbers are not really real, i.e.
have no physical significance, then one concludes that classical physics is not deterministic.” [13]. — https://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Del_Santo_FQXI_essay_indete.pdf

Del Santo's definition, all his own afaik, is that infinite epistemological precision means that the number of of decimal points has no finite lower bound, but may not be infinite. This is equivalent to saying that the error may be arbitrarily small, but not zero, which, to me, says it cannot be arbitrarily small. His infinite precision is that attained by infinite technological progress which always approaches, but never reaches zero uncertainty. It is in itself a reasonable definition, but he is using different language to cast doubt on determinism rather than using argumentation within the same language. — Kenosha Kid

If you read the ".999...=1" thread you'll see that Banno believes that a small nonzero quantity actually is zero, and considers the alternative as lunacy.

The upshot seems to be that determinism is a metaphysical assumption form which the classical determinist view of physics follows, and that this assumption can be removed with suitable mathematical alterations. — Banno

The determinist metaphysical assumption is very well expressed as Newton's first law. This law assumes as a given, the temporal continuity of any describable set of conditions, requiring a "force" to change anything. The prerequisite "force" is the cause of change, which the determinist latches on to. How do you expect to remove the requirement of a force as the cause of change, without denying Newton's first law?

Sorry guys, but I know you all honestly believe in the true and real possibility of forever, but I'm a mere mortal, and cannot possibly entertain you all forever. So... Intermission!

Alright I'll play. What is the nature of this deception? — InPitzotl

The idea that one is a product of zero.



By "poverty of metaphysics", I mean poor metaphysics. And I consider infinitesimals as poor metaphysics, being a compromise between the incompatible principles of continuity and discrete units. So to me, it's like a monism which instead of respecting the reality of the two distinct and incompatible aspects of reality, which dualism recognizes, the metaphysics of infinitesimals blends the two together in an unintelligible vagueness where the two are assumed to be one.

It is.
"the procedure proves what the procedure is supposed to", here, here, ...
Inconsistent. Recycle. — jorndoe

That the procedure produces an answer to the question, and the fact that the person uses the procedure to produce an answer, does not prove that numbers are objects. The procedure is designed to resolve a specific type of problem, not to prove that a number is an object.

Repetition: a person does not need to believe that a number is an object to carry out mathematical procedures.

Yes, but it's quite ineffective... we already knew you weren't here to learn. — InPitzotl

You mean, I am here to learn, and not to be deceived, don't you? To fall for a deception which has been proven on others to be an effective deception, is not an instance of learning, even if the others believe it to be an instance of learning.