The definition provided is not mine; it is the standard definition in modal logic. It has nothing to do with correspondence, since truth in such systems is model-theoretical. — Banno

That's right. It's exactly what I pointed out in my post.

This does not claim that there are multiple concrete universes out there and that truth “corresponds” to each. It is a semantic model, a mathematical structure used to evaluate formulas. Model-theoretic “worlds” are not metaphysical worlds. They are semantic devices, exactly like the points on a truth table are not little universes. — Banno

I don't care what you call it, a "semantic model" if you want. However, if you choose to use "true" in that way, we must adhere to that for the purpose of our discussion here, so that we do not equivocate. That is the reason why I asked you to provide some principles or definitions, so that we have something concrete to go by.

That's exactly what the accessibility relation is for. — Banno

Well give me the "accessibility relation" then. I don't think it's going to change the meaning of "true".

Frankly, your attempts to show that modal logic, and possible world semantics, which are accepted fields of study in mathematical logic, are somehow inconsistent, is just a bit sad. — Banno

I am not trying to show inconsistency in modal logic, I am trying to show incorrectness in your presentation of it. And, in case you didn't notice, that is what I did in my last post.

You are here confusing "true in a model" with "true in reality".

Again, a bit sad. — Banno

Ha ha, I'm staying consistent with "true in a model". From here, there is no such thing as "true in reality", because that would be equivocation. That's the problem, your realistic tendencies make you want a "true in reality", while you argue modalities. That is your inconsistency, your incorrectness, which I am trying to help you to understand.

Are you ready to proceed with the "accessibility relation" now?

The way that antirealism usually avoids omniscience is by rejecting classical logic. That for instance is the approach in Kripke's theory of truth, which has some merit.

In effect, in talking about the medium-size goods around us, we have a choice between using classical logic and accepting that there are truths we don't know on the one hand; and supposing that there are no such unknown truths and rejecting classical logic on the other.

Ether will do, but the former seems more intuitive, less sophistic and simpler. — Banno

In the way that "true" is used in your definition of "possibly", how does "truths we don't know" say anything meaningful? Since truth is relative to the specified world, and "true" means what is consistent with that world, and we can imagine any type of world, than anything, and everything is true. How does "truths we don't know" say anything meaningful, when everything and anything is a truth?

Yeah, I did, you missed it. It's the standard Kripkeian definition:
In Kripke semantics, “possibly p” means that p is true in at least one world about which we can talk.
— Banno — Banno

From the perspective of truth by correspondence, these appears to be incoherent. How can we talk about things being true in more than one world, when "true" is determined by what corresponds with "the world"? I thought you were realist. No? Are you saying that there is a whole bunch of contradictory truths depending on which world we are talking about?

Regardless, I'll accept this definition as a working platform. But I'll warn you that it will be very hard to support any type of realism which could be consistent with this definition. So a "world" is a product of the imagination, and "true" means consistent with that specific product. This is a reflection of the basic idealist assumption covered in the thread called "The Mind Created World". The difficulty with this approach is to find principles which would provide "correctness". that is because my proposed world produced from my experience may differ from your proposed world produced from your experience. Each is " a world about which we can talk".

We cannot us "true", to talk of the "true world", or "real world", in the sense of correspondence, because "true" is already used in the sense of coherence, as consistent with the proposed possible world. Furthermore, we cannot refer to an independent "actual world", because all we have is the different proposals from different people, based on their experiences. By what principles would we say that one person's experience represents "the actual world", over another's, when they contradict?

We know that Branson's missus has died. But it could be the case that we did not know she'd passed on. — Banno

You are mixing up tenses and not properly representing what I said. I said "we know X" means that it could not be the case "that we do not know X". You have replaced "do not" with "did not". Sure it is possible that we did not know what we do know now, but that's not what I'm talking about. If we know X right now, it is absolutely impossible that we do not know X right now. Of course if we allow different imaginary worlds, we could have one of each, but those two different cases would not be in the same world.

Here's the problem, then - your incapacity to understand a simple situation; or is this the doubling-down I spoke of earlier? We can happily consider what might have been the case had you not read that post. I would not be writing this, for starters. That does make sense. — Banno

Your claim here is incorrect. What you insinuate is contrary to your definition of "possibly". Notice, "possibly" refers to what is true "in at least one world". It does not provide the principles to cross from one world to another. In one world I read the post. In another world I did not read the post. "True" refers to consistency within the referred to world. Therefore if it is true that I read this post, (meaning in that world where it is true) it is not possible that I did not read it. So your claim that what I said was wrong is incorrect. Your incorrectness is the reason for my doubling down.

You seem to misunderstand "true" in the context of your proposed modal logic. Notice in your definition of "possibly", "true" is relative to the specified world. Therefore if it is true that I read the post, it cannot be the case that I did not. "True" indicates what is the case within a specified world. You can go ahead and talk about other worlds, in which I did not read the post, but in those worlds it is not true that I read the post.

What to make of that. Modal logic not relevant to possibility and necessity. — Banno

The words "possibility" and "necessity" were being used long before modal logic was invented, so it is clear that those words can be used in ways not at all related to modal logic. If you want to limit use specifically to modal logic, then to avoid ambiguity we need principles or definitions. So, if you want to bring a specific form of modal logic to bear on this discussion, you need to provide some principles or definitions, as you did with "possibility" above.

However, you need to respect the consequences of these principles. Notice for instance what becomes of "true" under your definition of "possibly". "True" becomes relative to the specified world, it is not absolute, or relative to any sort of supposed independent actual world. If you use "true" in a number of different ways you likely equivocate.

And the answer, overwhelmingly, is "yes". If we know something then by that very fact it is possibel for us to know that thing. — Banno

You have not yet defined "possible" to support this, as I asked. What you are saying here is that "it is possible that we know X" is implied by "we know X". I've already explained to you over and over, why this is incoherent. The two actually contradict each other because "it is possible that we know X" means that it could be the case that we do not know X, while "we know X" means that it could not be the case that we do not know X.

I've shown you the logic. Continuing to assert something completely illogical is pointless. You need to back up your claims, show how you understand the meaning of "possible" in such a way which allows what you assert to somehow be coherent.

No — that conflates truth with necessity. “p is true” does not mean “p cannot be false.” It means only that p is not false in the actual world. Something can be true without being necessary, and false without being impossible. — Banno

Your mention of necessity is a distraction of sophistry. If p is true it very clearly does mean that p cannot be false. Notice "is" and "be" imply the present time. If p is true, p cannot be false, because that would mean that p is true and false at the same time.

Furthermore, truth and falsity are determined by the actual world, as correspondence. I'm very surprised that you, a self-proclaimed realist would suggest otherwise. If truth is not determined by the actual world, realism has no standing.

But that issue is which I told you about yesterday, your tendency to say one thing, then argue principles which explicitly undermine what you claim. It's a sort of hypocrisy on your part.

It is true that you read this post. It is also possible that you might not have read it. — Banno

What? How does that make sense? If it is true that I read this post, how is it possible that I did not read it?

'Did' marks what happened, not what had to happen. Saying 'Jill did push Jack' tells us what actually happened, not that her pushing him was necessary, inevitable, or impossible to be otherwise. Confusing tense with modality is exactly the same mistake as treating 'true' as meaning 'cannot be false.' — Banno

I agree, "did" marks what actually happened, and this is the truth. As it is the truth, it is impossible to be otherwise. If Jill did push Jack, then that is the truth, and it is impossible to be otherwise. True does mean, precisely and exactly, "cannot be false". If what is true could be false we would have contradiction. If you really believe otherwise, you have some explaining to do.

And I don't know how "modality" is related here. You haven't provided any definitions or principles of relations. All you have done so far is made absurd assertions.

Unfortunately, no. Your ignorance of modal logic stands alongside your denial of instantaneous velocity and insistence that 0.9... ≠ 1. — Banno

You keep bringing up "modal logic" but you have done nothing to show how this is relevant. We have been talking about what it means to know p, not to know p, and the possibility of knowing p. That is what we are talking about, what these propositions mean. If you want to apply modal logic, then you need to provide some principles, definitions, and structure. To simply keep on asserting that what I say is contrary to modal logic is pointless if you cannot prove your claims with reference to some principles or definitions.

If we know shit at time t, then clearly at some time prior to time t it must have been possible to know said shit - otherwise there's no way we could know said shit at time t. This is the plain language interpretation. — EricH

That is not the issue. The question is whether at the same time, "We know shit", and "It is possible that we know shit", could both be judge to be true.

So I'm trying to figure out how P1 would not automatically imply P3 at time t. Are you saying that prior to time t we were somehow able to figure out the shit, but that at time t the situation has changed and we whatever means/mechanism we used to determine the shit prior to t is no longer applicable - and thus P1 no longer automatically implies P3? — EricH

The issue is if, when you judge that p is true, you can also judge that it is possible that p is true. I think that this is dishonesty and contradiction because "it is possible that p is true" contradicts "p is true". This is because "p is true" means that it is not possible that p is false, whereas "it is possible that p is true" means that it is possible that p is false. Therefore contradiction.

No, it doesn't. It might have been the case now that we didn't know stuff. In some other posibel world we might not have known stuff. Tensed logic, if needed, is constructed separately to modal logic. But your not seeing this is yet another example of your eccentricity. — Banno

For God's sake Banno, what are you talking about? "Did" is the past tense of do. "Did not know" refers to the past. It does not refer to the present, which would be "does not know".

Are you suggesting that the past tense "did" can refer to the present, but in another world? So that "we did not know" doesn't refer to us in the past, but it refers to us at the present, but in another world? So right now, we know shit, but in another world there's another us that does not know the same shit, right now. And somehow it seems reasonable to you to say that this other "we", at the present time "did" not know shit right now, because the usage of the past tense creates the illusion of a temporal separation between one thing referred to with "we" and the other as if it's a temporal extension of one thing referred to with "we". But the illusion of the temporal separation only really helps to veil the absurdity of two versions of 'we" existing at the very same time. Why not just say what you mean, there's one "we" which knows, and another "we" which does not know.

In my last post I warned you about using ambiguity. See here, "we" refers to two distinct groups of people, one which knows stuff, and the other which does not know stuff, both at the same time. Can you see that you are intentionally proposing ambiguity? That fills the criteria of sophistry.

"My eccentricity"? Is that meant as a joke? You are the one talking about the 'we" which know stuff at the present time, and another "we" which does not know the same stuff at the same time. And to cover up the absurdity of this you say that the one "we" does know stuff right now, and the other "we" did not know the same stuff right now. Don't you admit that that is very strange "stuff" which you are on about?

Please Banno, try to provide something more reasonable.

I think it's actually about drugs... — frank

Check this:
President Donald Trump said Friday that he will be pardoning former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez, who in 2024 was convicted for drug trafficking and weapons charges and sentenced to 45 years in prison.

...the bit where if you know stuff, then it thereby is possible to know stuff. Yes, it might have been that we did not know stuff, but as things turned out, we do know stuff. Either way, it is possible - that is, not impossible - to know the stuff that we do indeed know. — Banno

Look at the temporality of your statements; "it might have been that we did not know stuff", refers to past time. All three of the propositions refer to current time. The propositions refer to our knowledge of "shit" at the present time. That we might not have known, in the past, what we do know now, is completely irrelevant.

Statements like "if you know stuff, then it thereby is possible to know stuff" indicate to me that common usage has corrupted your understanding of "possible". Common usage propagates ambiguity, so "the stuff" which you refer to as the stuff that is known, is not the same stuff as "the stuff" that it is possible to know. If I know 10 cars (stuff known), you might conclude that it's possible for me to know another 40 cars (stuff possible to know), but clearly "stuff" refers to something different in each case, the 10 cars that are known , and the 40 cars that are not known, are completely different things. That's ambiguity in "cars", just like the ambiguity in your use of "stuff".

So I think you need a good clear definition of "possible" which would support your usage. I've already explained my usage. The proposition "it is possible to know p" indicates that we have judged that p could be known, but is not known. This is because "it is possible that p is known" would indicate that we do not know whether p is known or not, and that would be somewhat incoherent, implying that we know without knowing that we know. So we must settle on an altered version, "it is possible to know p", but "possible" maintains the same meaning. "Possible" indicates that we do not know whether p is true or not. That is why it is inconsistent with the judgement "p is known", as this implies that we know whether p is true or not.

Can you provide me with a definition of "possible" which supports your position, so I can understand what you are trying to say?

Note that it's "shit may not be known", which is quite valid, and not your "shit is not known", which implies that you only know shit that it is not possible to now. — Banno

This is an indication of the ambiguity which is disturbing you. Shit is the subject, and known is the predicate. I believe, "Shit is not known" is a valid predication. The ambiguity described above, is making you think of "shit" as a multidimensional object, in which each dimension is called "shit", and some dimensions may be known while others not. That is very confused shit, which you are proposing.

This is tedious, Meta. But good for my post count. — Banno

Personally I don't give a damn about any thread counts or anything like that. But if it pleases you, it makes me happy too. The pleasure is ours, and it may help you to overcome the tediousness. I'm tedious by nature, so I'm pleased that you give me the opportunity to be that way. Therefore I suggest that we keep the posts short and to the point, quicker reply etc., as that would be preferrable to you. The next point would be for you to provide a definition of "possible" so that I can question you on it, to gain an understanding of what you mean. Then I can examine and analyze your usage to see if your definition is coherent and consistent with your usage.

For anyone watching on, (well, there may be some...) Meta's argument relies on treating “◊Kp” as if it meant “we do not know p, but could.” But that is not what the modal operator means — not in Aristotle, not in modern modal logic, not anywhere. — Banno

OK, so let's see what "the modal operator means". Can you define "possible" in a way which makes sense of what you are claiming, without the appeal to ambiguity demonstrated above? Can you keep the subject (or object if you wish) which is referred to, as one subject, and not make it refer to many things (as you do above). After you've been informed of this ambiguity, it would be a case of intentional ambiguity if you continue to utilize it. Intentional ambiguity will surely support the charge of sophistry.

It does, for your purpose. Perhaps that's the issue... I think what you're getting at is essentially the problem of other minds. I don't even know that 'red' is the same for you, as me. — AmadeusD

It's you who has insisted that knowledge is the property of a single subject. Look, I am happy to discuss with Banno, propositions like "we know...", which implies that knowledge is a property of "us". However, we must keep these two discussions separate, because "know" refers to two very distinct things in the two cases of "I know...", and "we know...".

So I am not bringing up any "problem of other minds", just informing you of the obvious, that the knowledge in my mind is different from the knowledge in your mind. And if you make claims, like you did, which indicate that you think that you and I have the same knowledge, I will ask you to justify such claims because they are inconsistent with your starting premise, that knowledge is the property of an individual subject.

Banno, on the other hand has started with a use of "know" which indicates that knowledge is a property of us, "we". So if Banno starts to say that I can know different things from what you know, then I can likewise ask him to justify those assertions, as they are inconsistent with that starting premise.

Curiously, Aristotle was at pains to disagree. — Banno

I don't see how any of your free floating quotes from Aristotle are relevant, because you and I are discussing epistemic possibility, and your quotes from Aristotle concern ontological possibility. These two are very different. Clearly Aristotle believed, as you indicate ""If a thing is or has been, then it is necessary that it was possible for it to be". But Aristotle was very interested in change, and the temporal aspect of reality, physics. So he was concerned with how a specific possibility is actualized, rather than some other possibility, and he also stipulated that the possibility of a physical thing is always prior in time to the actual existence of that thing, as your quotes indicate.

You gallantly attempt to make a coherent account in which knowing that p is possible is logically incompatible with knowing that p. But this requires a reversal of modal logic and the standard view of the last 2300 years - that what is actual must be possible. — Banno

It's not my fault if the so-called "standard view" is misguided and obviously incorrect. Your appeal to authority does not stand up very well to my well-formulated logical argument. Look again:

P1. We know shit.
P2 We do not know shit.
P3 It is possible to know shit.

If we judge 1 as true, then we know that we know shit. Further, if we then proceed to judge 3, we already know that we know shit, and 3, "it is possible to know shit" implies that shit may not be known. That shit may not be known is impossible by our judgement of 1, a judgement which makes it necessary that we know shit. So 1 and 3 are incompatible. However, if we judge 2 as true, then we know that we do not know shit. But even if we judge that we do not know shit, it might still be possible that we could know shit. So 2 and 3 are compatible.

As for your use of Excluded Middle, "It is possible that we know that P" is not a third state between "We know that P" and "We don't know that P". It is a different proposition about the modal status of Kp. It is ◊Kp. — Banno

OK, now we're getting somewhere. I will agree, that "It is possible that we know that P" is a different type of proposition, categorically distinct from the pair "we know that p", and "we do not know that p". So, you need to treat them that way, and stop declaring that one is "derivable" from the other. That is your category mistake, Look:

Kp is read "p is known", and ◇Kp, "it is possible that p is known". They are not the "represented by the same proposition". But the latter is derivable from the former. — Banno

I'm happy to concede that both "we know that p" and "we do not know that p" are categorically distinct from, and incompatible with, "it is possible to know p", but then you must agree that we cannot draw inferences across that category boundary.

This is why I "double-down". You say things like "It is a different proposition about the modal status of Kp", and "This is a category error", which indicates that you actually recognize the principles. But you refuse to apply these same principles to your own erroneous statements. So it's a type of hypocrisy. You make claims and assertions which are contrary to the principles which you employ in arguments against others. Doubling-down is necessary to help you to reflect.

That category mistake is what Sirius pointed out to you.

"Every Truth is knowable" is subject independent. It does not presume the existence of knowers.

"Every truth is known" is subject dependent since it presumes the existence of knowers.

Note : I'm not making a tensed argument.

So you can't claim both are represented by the same propositional form "kp" without justification. — Sirius

The consequence of this is the term k will be different for one of the two.

To illustrate,

(K(p),x) =: There exist x which knows p, for truth is known

K(p) =: p is knowable, for truth is knowable


Now, there is no way to draw an inference from the latter to the earlier since the total variables are different

If this argument isn't mentioned in SEP (I haven't checked it yet) then it doesn't show it's invalid. It could be out there, somewhere else. I don't think I'm the first one to ever raise this rather obvious objection. — Sirius

The alternative... if we know that p, and yet it is not possible that we know that p... is risible. — Banno

Another fine example of sophistic abuse of language. The correct statement would be ... if we know that p, it is not possible that we know that p is possible. This is because logically, if we know that p is possible, then it is the case that we do not know that p. "We know that p" is not consistent with "we know that p is possible". Difficult to understand? I think not. Common sense will tell you that if we know that P is possible, this is consistent with "we do not know that p", and it is inconsistent with "we know that p".

This is the problem with your representation, from the start, which @Corvus very adeptly points out. You start with the subject "we", and the predicate "know that p". Then you unsoundly step outside that predication, to qualify it with "it is not possible that". Nothing that I said supports this strawman representation. The "knowable" in your representation is not a predication of any subject, because you attempt to remove it from "we". In fact, this representation is illogical, being excluded by the law of excluded middle if we adhere to the need for a subject in predication.

The two alternatives are "we know that p", and "we do not know that p". Representations such as, "possible that we know that p", are explicitly excluded by the law of excluded middle. For the umpteenth time, do you recognize this reality, that "possible that we know that P", in this basic form, violates the law of excluded middle? Therefore, if it happens to be the case that the truth of the matter must be represented with "we know that p is possible", then we must categorize this as a form of "we do not know that p", in order to remain consistent with the law of excluded middle. That is because, if you stipulate that "we know that p is possible" is consistent with "we know that P", as you do with "If we know that p, then it is possible that we know that p", you implicitly contradict yourself, because because knowing that p is possible is not knowing that p. Therefore "we know that p is possible" must be classed as a form of "we do not know that P".

This is such simple, basic reasoning, developed thousands of years ago, so I cannot honestly believe that you actually do not understand it. And especially after its been so thoroughly explained to you numerous times. Therefore I can only conclude that you intentionally deny fundamental logical principles for the sake of sophistry.

...without the curtesy of flagging mentions of me... — Banno

You tend to ignore mentions, so I've reverted to reverse psychology. It seems to be working.

"known" cannot apply except to an S. — AmadeusD

Yes, I assumed that was the perspective you were taking from the start.

I don't think the rest needs treating with this in mind. — AmadeusD

The rest of my post assumes that position, that knowledge is particular to the individual subject. I described the problems with this, what is known to me is not the same as what is known to you. Reread the post.

Or you're barking up a really weird and uninteresting tree. To say "the colour of the surface of Mars is known" doesn't mean anything. Known by whom? — AmadeusD

Look, I say that I know Mars is red, and you say that you know mars is red. The fact that we use the same words, "Mars is red" doesn't mean that we both know the same thing. The words represent what is known as proper to each subject who uses the words. What I know as "Mars is red" is completely different from what You know as "Mars is red".

I see you're still having difficulty understanding. Either that or you've retreated into some form of denial. So, let me lay it out very succinctly.

Take any proposition, "the cup is red" for example. The truth of this proposition means that the situation cannot be otherwise from the cup being red. Now take the alternative proposition, "it is possible that the cup is red". This means that the situation can be otherwise from the cup being red. One says it can be otherwise, the other says it cannot be otherwise. Therefore the two contradict each other in meaning, an implicit contradiction.

We can see a very similar situation with "p is known", and "p is knowable". Truth of the former indicates that the situation cannot be otherwise from p is known, while truth of the latter indicates that it can be otherwise from p is known. Therefore one contradicts the other and they cannot both be true at the same time. One is not derived from the other, it implicitly contradicts the other.

If I know X, then it is trivially possible that I know X. — Banno

How can you honestly say something like this? If you know that Jill pushed Jack down the hill, and someone asks you about what happened, then you are being untruthful if you say that you believe it is possible that Jill pushed Jack. Obviously you do not believe that at all, because you know that Jill actually did push Jack. To say that it is possible that Jill pushed Jack, is to be deceitful, because it contradicts what you know. To insist that "I know X" and "It is possible that I know X" are consistent with one another is blatant deception.

"Known" indicates that some S knows it. It also indicates that another S could also know it but does not currently. — AmadeusD

How does "known" indicate these things to you. If it indicates that some S knows it, it doesn't in anyway indicate that another S could know it. That would require another premise. So your argument is based in hidden premises.

The problem I see with this approach, is that if we define "known" as the property of one S, then when we introduce other Ss we have no way of validating whether what one S knows is actually the same thing as what another S knows. So, S knows something, and teaches it to another, T. Now what T knows is not the same thing as what S knows, even though S taught T. It doesn't make sense to say that another knows the same thing that S knows, in any logically rigorous sense of "same".

Any piece of information can be known many times over by different people or animals. So I'm with him here. — AmadeusD

This is not true, for the reason i just explained. The information I receive is not the same as what you receive, because we each have distinct spatial temporal perspectives. Therefore it is false to say that many different people know the same piece of information.

If this were so, you would not know any things that are knowable. — Banno

That's exactly right. "Knowable" excludes "known" because knowable allows for "not-known". Every proposition which I know, is actually known, that's what "known" means. However, "knowable" means that it is possible that the proposition could be known, and this implies that it is not actually known. Therefore I do not know any propositions which are knowable, (possible to be known) because every proposition that I know is actually known, therefore not-possible that it is not-known, and knowable implies that it is possible that it is not-known.

You are treating “Possible to be known” as if it meant “not known”. — Banno

Of course, "possible to be known" is categorically distinct from "known". Therefore it is a form of "not-known", in the sense of other than known. To allow otherwise would create all sorts of epistemological problems.

Consider your example. I know something, and it is possible that I know it. We can represent these as the two following propositions P1, "I know X", and P2, "It is possible that I know X". Clearly, if we judge P1 to be true, we cannot honestly judge P2 to be true, because the truth of P2 allows that P1 may not be true. We cannot say that it is true that I know X, and also that it is true that it is possible that I know X, because the latter judgement implies that it is possible that I do not know X, thereby ruling out the possibility of former judgement, that I know X.

Therefore "it is possible that I know X" must be taken as a form of "I do not know X", because "possible that I know X" implies necessarily that I may not know X. So "I know X" and "it is possible that I know X" cannot both be true at the same time, because the latter allows the possibility that "I know X" may be false, and that would contradict "I know X". In other words, claiming both provides the premises which allow for contradiction.

Or do you know only things that are impossible to know? Perhaps you think you do. — Banno

Who said anything about "impossible"? Like you, and everyone else, I only know things which are known. I do not claim to know things which are possibly known, because possibly known implies possibly not known as well. Then I would be claiming to know things which are possibly not known, thereby allowing for the potential of contradiction.

It is very obvious that the difference between actual and possible indicates that if p is knowable (possible to be known), then p is not known. Conversely. if p is known, then p is not knowable (possible to be known) because it is already actually known. I illustrated this very clearly in my reply to Sirius, which it appears that you did not take the time to understand. To conflate these two is an abuse of language, which you do with the intent of sophistry.

Back to ignoring you. — Banno

You obviously didn't address what I wrote. And, it appears like you didn't even attempt to understand what I wrote. Despite pretending to consider what I wrote, and adding your two cents worth, your ignorance is continuous.

@Sirius
Here's an illustration to demonstrate what I'm talking about. Suppose we take a simple proposition P, and say that it is possible. We therefore must also allow that not-P is possible. In the basic form, we have a relation of equality between them, each is equally possible. This equivalence between the two allows us to apply mathematics, 50% probability at the fundamental level. It is fundamental to the nature of "a possibility", that there is at least two, and this allows us to apply the mathematics of probability.

Now, we can add secondary propositions which would alter the weighting, making one possibility more probable than the other. We can add as many secondary propositions as we like, and apply formulae to figure probability. However, if we go to the point of saying either P or not-P is true, that it is what is actually the case, then we assign 100% probability to it. This negates all other possibilities, and since the one assigned 100% is necessarily the one and only, it loses it's nature of being a possibility.

So in Banno's example, P is actually known. But Banno wants to derive from this truth, that P is also possible to be known (knowable). But of course, by the logic of the above example, if P is knowable, (possible to be known), it is impossible that P is actually known.

If not, then it's the worst case of question begging & the formal logic showpiece is nothing short of sophistry. Symbols can only take you so far, what matters more is semantics, epistemology & metaphysics at a deeper level. — Sirius

Now, there is no way to draw an inference from the latter to the earlier since the total variables are different — Sirius

After years of explaining very similar issues to Banno, Banno simply chooses to ignore, rejecting Aristotelian bullshit. As you accurately point out, "known" and "knowable" are defined by distinct relations, with distinct variables. You say, one is subject dependent, the other is subject independent. This makes them categorically distinct. Therefore there is nothing within :"known" which implies "knowable". And since "knowable" is supposed to be subject independent, it must be defined by some other relation.

I explained this problem thoroughly to Banno already, as the incompatibility between what is actual, and what is possible. If, for instance, we say that X is actually the case, we cannot say also that X is possibly the case, due to contradiction. What it means to say that X is an actuality contradicts what it means to say that X is a possibility. The principles required to make it true that X is an actuality, negate the possibility that X is possible. But Banno continues to insist (sophistically), that the latter is "derivable" from the former.

You may regard this as an outdated Aristotelian objection, but it has actually inspired modern relevance logic [which extends to modality] — Sirius

That's Banno's usual, reject outdated Aristotelian principles, in full ignorance of the fact that these principles were established for the purpose of combatting very similar sophistry.

Two men, two goals, same means, kill two birds with one stone.

You don't recognize how Trump is obsessed with oil? "Drill, baby, drill." And, "We will export American energy all over the world." In Trump's mind, oil and power are equivalent. That's why he's mad at Europeans who buy Russian oil.

Do you know why the US is involved now? — frank

Trump wants more oil.

Go ahead, laughing is good. You know, when Trump first jumped in, to run for president 10 years ago, we thought it was such a big joke, and laughed so hard.

How comforting it must be to think the world is only a mental construct, and how blithe you must feel when you hear of those who claim to suffer in it! — Ciceronianus

Perhaps, by denying the reality of the unity which is the prerequisite presupposition for "the world", I allow that there is a very real separation between me and others who are suffering. I can also separate myself from all the wrong doers. At least i am afforded some comfort that way.

I'm curious: as someone who is more familiar with Aristotle than me, how would you evaluate Adorno's interpretations? — Jamal

I'd say he's well above average in his interpretation of Aristotle. Relative to the way that I understand Aristotle though, I think that he doesn't quite grasp the reasons why form is assigned priority by Aristotle. The reason for the priority of form is given by the cosmological argument. It shows why actuality (form) must be prior to potentiality (matter) in an absolute way. Now Adorno grasps this priority as stipulated, but interprets "form" in this context as a type, universal, whereas I interpret this sense of "form" to be the form of the individual, the particular. So Adorno ends up imposing his concept of mediation on Aristotle, and says that motion is eternal in Aristotle, as the continuous interaction of matter and form.

My interpretation justifies the priority of the One as the particular, in the sense of an individual unity. And, the particular form of the individual, as immaterial, is prior to the material existence (composition of matter and form) of the individual. Aristotle distinguishes "one" as a unity, from "one" as a mathematical ideal. So I interpret Aristotle as proposing a duality of form, the form of the particular, and form as the type, the universal, or human concept, formula. This duality of form is a somewhat unconventional interpretation though.

Anyway, Adorno goes on to discuss Aristotle's divine unmoved mover, as analogous to the one God of monotheism. But there is ambiguity in Aristotle's Metaphysics, because each orbit of the planets is said to involve a distinct unmoved mover. And ultimately, if we extend Aristotle's metaphysics the way that I do, there must be an unmoved mover (eternal Form or actuality) for each and every object, as a distinct particular with its own identity.

What I'm not quite clear about is what he thinks a contemporary metaphysics should be like. — Jamal

I'm reading that part now, and I'll report back. But it seems to be basically negative dialectics.

There's a misunderstanding here. Our digestion has the function of extracting nutrients from food and disposing of the waste. That is the goal or aim of the system, isn't it? Our balance organ controls our actions so that we don't fall over. That is it's goal or aim. — Ludwig V

Right, therefore intention is implied. Is that difficult to understand?

Yes I am suggesting exactly that. Evolutionary purposes are an extension of the paradigm of conscious purpose. I hate to complicate things even more, but I am also suggesting that the purposes of our physiology are not evolutionary, but are about establishing and maintain our bodies. That's also an extension of conscious purposes. This in the context of unconscious purposes, which was raised earlier. — Ludwig V

I would make the opposite conclusion, The conscious mind, along with the purposes which it determines, are an extension of the underlying, unconscious intention. The latter being more fundamental, therefore the base, or foundation for the former.

conventions...might mislead the philosopher" tells me that sometimes it doesn't. So it makes a good starting-point.
I don't see that I'm being misled by the idea of language games. — Ludwig V

How does "maybe right, maybe wrong" make a good starting point? Wouldn't it be better to find something more sound as a starting point?

So what is learned is not what is taught? I think, however, that you are forgetting that many people, perhaps most people, do not learn language by being taught. They learn it from interacting with their environment. Actually teaching language is a different kind of exercise. — Ludwig V

What's the issue here? "What is learned is not what is taught", is completely consistent with "many people ... do not learn language by being taught". Why do you think I am forgetting the latter? I even said that people learn language by copying. That's implied when I say learning is guided by the free will, not the teacher.

How on earth did people get on before philosophy was invented? — Ludwig V

I suppose, what is implied is that philosophy is prior to language. Is that difficult for you as well? Art appears to be prior to language, so why not philosophy as well?

Not quite. "300 miles" is a distance which can be regarded as a measure of the space that separates them, or a measure of the space that unites them - they are both in the same state, though not in the same country. Separation and unity are two sides of the same coin. — Ludwig V

You have not explained how "space" unites, and you seem to be having difficulty understanding the problem. Take your example, "two sides of the same coin". We could measure the thickness of the coin, and say for example X mms of coin separate the two sides. The distance here is the measurement of an object, and we say that the two named thigs, "the sides" are both parts of the same thing. In this way, we have a distance which unites, by saying that the two are parts of the same thing, "the coin", and what is measured is "the coin".

In the case of measuring the distance between two cities, we have two distinct things, and a measurement of "space" between them. To make this similar to "the coin" we need to assume substance between the two, which unites them as one object. We could say for example, that the two cities are both a part of the same "country", and what we are measuring between the two cities is "the country", rather than "the space". Then we have a principle of unity, like "the coin", it is "the country", and it is not accurate to say that we are measuring "the space" between the two, we are measuring "the country" which lies between the two, just like we measure "the coin" which lies between the two sides.

This brings us squarely to the issue of the op. Suppose the two cities are in different countries. Then we might say that what we are measuring between them is "the world". Now we have assumed a principle of unity, "the world", and we are measuring the distance between different parts of "the world". Notice "the world" is just an assumption, a principle we take for granted, which provides us with unity. But "the world" is supported by "the earth" as a real object in this case. "The universe" is also a principle which serves that purpose when we extend ourselves beyond our own planet. However, if what we measure between the parts of the universe is assumed to be "space", then we assume that the parts are distinct objects, and we forfeit the principle of unity. In this way we invalidate the principle of unity, and "the universe", as well as "the world" are no longer supported ontologically.

I suggest, that this is what relativity theory does for us, it invalidates "the world", and "the universe" replacing it with a law, a principle, that states that the laws of physics will be consistent in every inertial frame. The problem is that this law is not true, as spatial expansion demonstrates. So what we are left with is a false proposition, "law", which support "the world", and "the universe". That's very clear evidence that "the world' is just a mental construct.

We don't. :mask: — 180 Proof

Kill them then?

If you're interested, there's a book of his 1965 lectures on metaphysics, which seems to be mainly about Aristotle: Metaphysics: Concept and Problems. — Jamal

I made it through the majority of the lectures. There is very good background material here. He develops the concept of mediation, which he claims is derived from Aristotle. Aristotle he claims has a metaphysics of mediation. Matter has priority in the sense of its proximity to the individual subject, but form has priority in the temporal sense. Adorno sees each, matter and form, as mediated by the other.

After this, he goes on to discuss the need for contemporary metaphysics. The temporal conditions, dictate metaphysical needs, so the metaphysics of today needs to be completely different from the historic. This is the part I am reading now.

And how do we get evil people to do good things?

Of course, one must decide which words to use. Don't you agree?

I think you might not accept my premise, which is that all of the points you raise in your last post apply to the human acting in history, i.e., the processes taking place in human mind.

In nature/human nature, there is neither judgement nor decision making. There is drives and response which, if functional become conditioned. — ENOAH

I do not understand how you can make this division, the separation between "the human acting in history", and, "In nature/human nature". Isn't it the case that it is human nature to have a history? If so, then to separate "human nature" from the human acting in history, is a mistaken approach. They are one and the same thing, human history is human nature.

No, not in the context we’re using here. It says nothing about brussels sprouts or eggplant. It only says something about me. I am not judging eggplant. If I said “eggplant is bad,” that would be a judgment about eggplant. — T Clark

I can't grasp what you are trying to say about the context. To differentiate between this object, as a brussels sprout and that object, as an eggplant, is to make a judgement. This is regardless of whether you are saying that you prefer one to the other.

To me, they look stern. Not to you. That's OK. We're both just speculating. — J

I see that misuse often produces rewards, like in the examples I mentioned, of trendsetters and influencers.

I think whatever it is that is inherent, stops being that once we apply "judging." — ENOAH

What do you mean? I don't understand this. If judging itself is inherent, then we have to account for this or else our assumption of what is natural is wrong.

Im saying we don't have a natural tendency to judge period. — ENOAH

How can you say that? Even other animals judge. It's the essence of decision making. And other animal species clearly judge just as much as human beings do, though we might say that their capacity for judgement is not as highly developed.

Once names and forms arise [and they only do in history] that drive/conditioning becomes displaced by judging, so that its is conceivable one might judge apples as bad and shit as good. (very oversimplifying but to illustrate) — ENOAH

I think you are making an arbitrary division between judging and not judging, within acts which are all forms of judging. This appears to be misleading you. I suggest that you start with the assumption that all decisions making involves judgement.

If I choose brussels sprouts over eggplant, that doesn’t say anything about eggplant except that I prefer brussels sprouts. — T Clark

That is clearly an act of judgement. Judgement is generally defined as discernment. If you differentiate between brussels sprouts and eggplants, then you have judged.

Im suggesting both are constructions. Our inherent nature requires/permits no judgement. So saying we are inherently evil or have a nature incapable of avoiding evil, is inaccurate. — ENOAH

But isn't judging inherent within or nature? It's just what we do, we judge all sorts of things.

Im saying that because bonding is inherent, we recognize the so called "good" as preferable. So if anything, we are inherently [so called] good — ENOAH

Are you saying that we have a natural tendency to judge things as good, and judging things as bad is artificial, or unnatural?

By bonding being the "real" source of ethics (and the conditions you refer to), I mean in nature, "before" history proceeds, where "evil" does not yet exist. — ENOAH

I'm trying to make sense of this. Are you suggesting that "good" existed before "evil"?

Or, as I suggested to Metaphysician Undercover, if you continue to say such things you may well be institutionalized. — J

I don't think you're getting the point J. Most likely, you could keep on saying this, and never get "institutionalized". And, people very often get institutionalized for other things. Therefore there is no necessary relationship between saying things like that, and the punishment you propose. There really is no "stern consequences" for common misuse of language.

"intentional" in some sense, I suppose. I would prefer "purposive". It's a process of developing a functional mechanism and the process is set up by DNA (roughly) and includes control mechanisms. But it's very different from purposive activities at a conscious, everyday level. Our growth processes are not controlled by the conscious being that is being created. That would be impossible. — Ludwig V

I look at this perspective as very problematic. "Purpose" is usually defined by "intention", and "intention" is defined by "a goal", or "aim". This implies that "intention" is the broader term because some goals or aims may actually be without real purpose, but acting purposefully always implies a goal. It appears like you want to make "purposive" the broader term, and have two types of purposiveness, one of which does not involve intention. But this makes that second type of purposiveness unintelligible.

You propose a type of purposiveness which is not set toward any goal or aim. It's just a "functional mechanism", a "control mechanism", which does what it does, without any further goal, or aim.

But this is completely contrary to what evolutionary theory demonstrates to us. Evolutionary theory shows us that these mechanisms do have a goal or aim. Some have survival of the organism as their aim, and some have reproduction as their aim. Therefore it is contrary to evolutionary theory to remove intention from these mechanisms. They clearly act with a goal, or aim, and therefore are intentional.

Furthermore, your proposal is contrary to the spirit of evolutionary theory, which strives to show how the various parts and activities of the different living beings are all connected at a fundamental level. But you propose a division of separation between "purposiveness" at the conscious level, and "purposiveness" at the level of the DNA. And this drives a wedge of unintelligibility between these two, within an individual living being. So within myself, for example, I have purposiveness within my DNA, and also a completely separate and unrelated purposiveness within my conscious activities. How is that reasonable in any sense, to drive such a wedge and produce a dualism of purposiveness within an individual being? This is why I say that this proposed division of purposiveness would leave one type as unintelligible. Unless one is understood as an extension, or subtype of the other, then the one is left as aimless and unintelligible.

I don't see how that's possible. We don't learn philosophy on its own. We have to learn ordinary language first. — Ludwig V

I don't see why this is difficult for you. You do understand that there is a separation between the act of teaching and the act of learning, do you not? When people learn to talk, they learn by copying, they do not learn by definition. However, those who teach do so on principle. So the teaching may be based in philosophy, while the learning is not. The children do not necessarily "learn philosophy" even if philosophy is the reason for the specifics of what is being taught. That is why philosophy is prior, it guides the teaching, while the learning is based in the activities of the free will. What is learned is "ordinary language", what is taught is principled speaking (philosophy). Therefore ordinary language is based in a foundation of philosophy as the guiding principles, what you call rules, even though the learner may refuse the rules.

If there is a medium that separates us, it also, at the same time, unites us. It's just a change in perspective. London and Edinburgh are separated by a bit more than 300 miles. At the same time, they are joined by those miles. — Ludwig V

I explained to you the principles of separation. You are claiming that the principles of separation also serve as unification. That is what I insisted, is unjustified. Obviously, "300 miles" refers to a spatial separation between two distinct and separate places. Please explain how you conceive of "300 miles" as a union between these two.

But it is useful to think of language as a set of rules - grammar. — Ludwig V

This may be useful for some purposes. But in philosophy when we want to understand the true nature of something, what is conventional for other purposes might mislead the philosopher. That is what I think is happening here. This idea, which is useful for some other purposes, is misleading you in your philosophy.

In the case of the signs, I was imagining dying in a crash because of not following the speed rules. — J

The probability of that is extremely low. The vast majority of people speeding would have no consequences. And even if not speeding, one could still die in a crash. So that is really not relevant.

. In the case of language, someone who didn't follow the rules of their language would likely be ostracized or oppressed -- at least it they did it a lot. — J

But people do it all the time, and some, instead of being ostracized, become trendsetters and influencers.

Anyway, the severity of the consequences isn't the point. Rather, it's that there is no automatic enforcement of these rules. — J

No, the point is that there is not any rules which we must follow, and no real punishment if we do not follow the rules which are there.

Compare, for instance, using a passport. There are rules and you have to follow them or else you can't use a passport. No one is ever in a position of being told, "Fine, don't present a valid passport, you'll be sorry." They're simply prohibited from playing the passport game. — J

Right, in the case of language, you can still use it freely without following rules. By the passport analogy, you can still play the game, even without the passport.

Or, if it's merely a matter of "Either follow them or face the consequences," then this applies equally well to ordinary language, which exacts stern consequences for the non-followers. — J

I don't see that there are any "stern consequences" in the case of ordinary language. It's just like in my example of the speed signs, where there is no stern consequences for driving fast. People use language any way they please, and unless they go beyond the boundaries of hate speech, or something like that, there are no stern consequences at all for stepping outside the norm. In fact, many even get rewarded as trendsetters or "influencers".

The strange magic of evolutionary theory is that it creates a sense of purpose, of intent, that does not depend on any conscious activity. Whether, and how far, that coincides with un- or sub-conscious activity, I couldn't say. — Ludwig V

What evolutionary theory provides in relation to intent, in my opinion, is a better understanding of how intent underlies all living beings, and how conscious intention is just one specific manifestation of that more general purpose (intention) which underlies all life.

But I don't think that it makes philosophical sense to say that an unconscious purpose is just like a conscious purpose, but unconscious. It needs a bit more explaining than that. — Ludwig V

Sure, a bit more explaining would be useful, but it's really not difficult to understand through the use of a few examples. It is very common for the more specific to be a type of the more general. So for example, the human being is a type of animal. Likewise, walking is a type of activity. In the same way, we can understand that consciously willed acts demonstrate a specific type of intentionality. In reference to the examples now, walking is a consciously willed act which is a specific type of intentional activity, whereas growing is a type of intentional activity which is far more general. And, the human being is a type of animal which we know has a far more developed capacity for consciously willed acts, in a very specific way, in comparison to the more general intentionality of other animals.

I don't think it is necessarily wrong to develop variant uses of ordinary concepts for philosophical purposes. But it would be a mistake to think that philosophy can just sail off on its own, losing contact with the ordinary world and ordinary language. Ordinary language, because it is the first language we learn, is the inescapable bedrock of everything else. — Ludwig V

This is exactly what I disagree with, seeing things in the opposite way as this. I believe that philosophy forms the bedrock usage, and ordinary language sails off, losing contact with the philosophical roots. This can be understood historically. Ancient philosophy established the conventional meaning of many common words in modern society. Those with ruling power, the Church for example, historically enforced rules of language usage and this created a class distinction between the illiterate and the literate. The Church took its rules of language use very seriously, as is evidenced by The Inquisition. Eventually though, the human will for freedom of speech and expression overcame this, allowing language to fly off in all sorts of different directions. However, it's not difficult to see how strict enforcement of basic grammar is the only way to provide a foundation for higher education.

Why can't our individual worlds all share in the public world? — Ludwig V

This is a good question, commonly asked because "the public world" is often taken for granted. Because of that presumption, what is taken for granted, the answer is most often not well understood.

The answer itself, is that we do not have acceptable ontological principles required to support the reality of a united, shared, "public world". We must start with the individual mind as the most immediate, and this often leads to some form of idealism. However, we do have very good reason to accept the minds of others, as well as the medium between us, which separates my mind from your mind.

The problem though, is with the assumption of unity, required to create "the public world". Yours and my minds are separate, allowing us each to have private thoughts, so there is necessarily a medium which separates us. But these are terms of separation, not terms of unity. So until we can show that the medium which appears to separates you and I, in actuality unites you and I, we do not have the ontological principles required to support the reality of a united, shared, "public world".

This is the ancient problem of the One and the Many. Our inclination is to take "the One" for granted, as the united whole, the universe. But empirical evidence demonstrates to us that "the Many" is what is real.

That doesn't mean there are no rules. It just means that the rules can be misused and misinterpreted. Some of these misinterpretations become new, or extended, uses. Others are ignored or suppressed because they are not accepted (taken up) by the ultimate arbiters of correct and incorrect - the community of users. — Ludwig V

The nature of "ordinary language" is that the users are free to decide which rules to follow, or whether even to follow any rules. This freedom leaves any rules as ineffective, effectively not "rules". Imagine if the speed limit signs on the highways were just there to inform people what speed someone, somewhere, thought people might like to drive at, but had no power of enforcement, allowing that people would drive whatever speed they wanted anyway. We couldn't call these signs "the rules", because "the rules" implies principles which people are obliged to follow.

But we need to link back to ordinary language (or experience) or world, or philosophy becomes a pointless exercise. — Ludwig V

This is very ambiguous. These words "language", "experience", and "world" have very different meaning. And, the scope of all three together is very wide. However, the three together do not cover everything, so that implies that we could still do meaningful philosophy without referring to any one of the three. The philosophy might refer to "mind", or "concepts", "objects", and many other similar things, making it very meaningful without reference to the things you mentioned.

I think ambiguity and misconceptions arise when ordinary language is misused in philosophy, myself. — Ciceronianus

I don't see how ordinary language could be misused, because the nature of "ordinary language" is that there are no regulations to distinguish between use and misuse. That's why deception is common with ordinary use. Philosophers strive to exclude such misuse, and that's what separates philosophical use of language from ordinary use of language.

For the record, I don't assume there's a world "external" to me. I'm part of the world, like everything else. I'm not sure what you mean by an "internal world." It wouldn't be surprising if you assume there's one though. It seems you think worlds abound. You have a rococo conception of reality, or realities. — Ciceronianus

This doesn't change anything. It's just more evidence that your world is not the same as my world. Therefore it's more proof that "the world" is actually a false conception. No matter how much the belief that there is just one world, is a shared belief, it's contrary to reality, as demonstrated by what you wrote here.

But regardless, I think you define and use "intend" and other words in ways I think are so beyond ordinary use I don't think further discussion would benefit either of us. — Ciceronianus

To properly study philosophy, it is of the utmost importance that we do not adhere to "ordinary use" for our definitions. Ordinary use is so full of ambiguity that attempts to apply logic would be fruitless.

Sure, but @AmadeusD just laughs at this very serious problem.