From Wikipedia:

Rutabaga has a chromosome number of 2n = 38. It originated from a cross between turnip (Brassica rapa) and Brassica oleracea. The resulting cross doubled its chromosomes, becoming an allopolyploid. This relationship was first published by Woo Jang-choon in 1935 and is known as the Triangle of U.

Be aware of the mysterious "Triangle of U".

For example, the property of redness would be identified with the set of all red things, or the property of being a car would be identified with the set of all cars. — litewave

The op is messed up. You cannot identify the property of redness with the set of all red thing. The supposed conclusion would actually be inconclusive, requiring a definition. Further, "being a car" cannot be defined as a property.

No, rutabaga is a different plant, from the pictured turnips

Turnips, Purple Tops.

I don't believe you have any real doubt that the everyday objects we encounter constantly have their own existence, which does not rely on our perceiving them. — Janus

Don't say this to me. I firmly believe that an independent reality would be completely different from, and not at all similar, to the representations we have of it as the sense perception of objects. In direct contrast to what you say, I have no real doubt that the supposed independent reality would be in no way similar to the everyday objects we encounter in our perceptions.

For analogy, consider that a word, numeral, or any symbol, may be completely different from, and similar in no way to whatever it represents. Sense perceptions are representations. And in general, representations, like the symbols of language, are produced and maintained trough principles of use and efficiency, not by principles of similarity.

You are assuming that instants of time, static states of existence, are metaphysically possible. — RussellA

Why do you say that? It was your claim, not mine. You said that the verb "is" expresses a "state of existence". There is no need to assume any "instants of time", because the state of existence, such as the example the apple on the table, may last for a duration of time. My claim is that for this so-called state to become a part of an activity, causation is required.

It is more likely that there are not instants in time but rather durations of time. It would follow that the apple being on the table is part of an active situation. — RussellA

That does not follow. The apple is in a static condition, the state of being on the table, for a duration of time. By what premise do you conclude that it also takes part in activity?

Your argument is something like:

We derived our idea of existence from our cognitive experience, therefore nothing can exist apart from its being cognized. — Janus

I think that's one of the best examples of a straw man that I've ever seen.

We perceive the extendedness of objects; that is what space is. — Janus

The extendedness of objects is just another concept which you've swapped for "space". You started off by saying "I perceive the space between objects", and when I informed you that you do not actually perceive whatever it is that separates objects making them distinct, you changed your proposed meaning of "space", to define it as "the extendedness" of objects.

But the "extendedness" of objects is purely conceptual, just like "space" is. You do not perceive extendedness. To "extend" is to increase something. So to conclude that something has been extended, "stretched out spatially" requires an application of logic. It is not a perception but a logical conclusion.

You are still not distinguishing between perceiving, and applying concepts. I suggest, that once you recognize that this distinction is impossible to make at the foundational level, you'll understand the need for a priori concepts. The application of concepts is inherent within even the most basic acts of perception. This implies that conception is prior to perception, therefore conception is not dependent on perception. That is why Kant proposed the a priori, as intuitional 'concepts'.

It is an undeniable aspect of experience that people see the same things at the same time and place down to the smallest detail. — Janus

You keep saying things like this, but it is so clearly false. In fact, the argument that different people never see the same thing is far more sound then the argument that people see the same things. To begin with, if you point to an area and ask people to describe what is there, they will never use the exact same words. And even if we point to a location, and agree on the words to be used in reference to that location, this does not imply that the people see the same thing. It only means that they are agreeable. Therefore in reality, it is an undeniable aspect of human beings, that they are agreeable, and you falsely present this as "It is an undeniable aspect of experience that people see the same things".

Even though the verb "is" expresses a state of existence, the phrase "is on" suggests a temporary situation, as in the apple is on the table, the apple is under the table or the apple is on the floor.

The apple currently being on the table is part of an active situation. — RussellA

A static state of existence, even if temporary, is very distinct from an activity. In no way is a static state a part of an activity, as there is a causal relation which separates the two. A cause is required to bring the static thing into an active situation.

The separation of objects just is the space between them. — Janus

But there is not space between objects, only more objects, that's why you said you do not perceive empty space.

Suppose one object here, and another object over there. implying a separation between them. You perceive other objects in between, perhaps the movement of air. By what principle do you replace the objects you perceive between the two objects, with the concept "space", and then claim to perceive this "space".

This is the same issue I had with I like Sushi, only that was with the concept "matter" rather than the concept "space". I like Sushi claimed that we measure, and weigh matter, but we do not. We weigh particular things not matter. Matter is purely conceptual, as is space. The two being very good examples of universals. Now, you and I are going through the same thing with the concept "space". You claim to perceive space, but you don't, you have a concept of space which you apply when you perceive that things are distinct from one another. Application of concepts is not the same as perception.

On the other hand I can say I perceive the space between objects, albeit usually more or less filled up with other objects. I do perceive space but I don't perceive empty space. — Janus

I don't think so. We don't perceive space between objects, we perceive separation. And knowledge tells us that there is another, invisible object, air, which exists in the medium. And we actually sense that air, feeling the wind and the smells. We don't ever perceive, or apprehend space except as a concept.

So, you say that you perceive space, but not empty space. Imagine the space which you believe that the air occupies, or that some other object occupies. How do you think you are perceiving this space, rather than simply assuming it as a fundamental concept?

Yes, to express a complete idea, a sentence needs both a verb (an activity) and generally a noun (object).

There is no complete idea in "apple", but there is in "the apple is on the table".

As Wittgenstein wrote in Tractatus "the world is the totality of facts, not of things", where "the apple is on the table" is a fact because it encompasses relations between things. — RussellA

Are you saying "is on the table" is an activity? In predication the verb "is" does not express an activity.

What has never entered your mind is not anything, obviously. And when it has entered your mind, it has done so via the senses, and has been interpreted by your intellect. What is outside that, neither exists nor does not exist. It is not yet anything, but that doesn't mean it's nothing. This is not dogma. — Wayfarer

This is what I see as the greatest difference between Kant and Plato. Unlike Kant, Plato allows that the human intellect can have direct access to what Kant calls noumena, the independent intelligible objects. By Platonic principles, human beings can receive ideas through means other than the senses. This is where "the good" plays its role, and Plato\s "good" is absent from Kant. The good is what is intended, or desired, and as such it does not yet have material existence, and cannot be sensed. Therefore the source of these ideas is not sensation.

The nature of "the good" is not well understood because it avoids the grasp of knowledge, by Plato's description. as prior to knowledge. It illuminates intelligible objects like the sun illuminates sensible objects. Notice that we do not consider ideas to be knowledge until they are justified by empirical principles. So human intention and desire will create all sorts of fanciful ideas which cannot be justified, and will never be knowledge.

We can understand Kant's a priori intuitions of space and time as a replacement for Plato's "the good". Both perspectives realize that it is necessary to assume a principle, or some principles, which are prior to empirical sensation, which enable the mind's capacity to produce ideas and knowledge. For Plato this is the good, for Kant it is the a priori intuitions. We can see how Kant's imposition of space and time limits the scope of knowledge to the sensible world, while the more general, "the good", allows the potential for knowledge to extend beyond the limitations of empirical justification.

Then we can speculate that things in themselves may exist in their own space and time... — Janus

The problem, is that science demonstrates to us, that at the very small scale, quantum particles, and at the very large scale, spatial expansion, our intuitions of space and time are highly inadequate for understanding the presumed things in themselves. So we ought to think of these intuitions, space and time, as useful and purposeful, and highly evolved, but most likely not representative of the supposed things in themselves, because they didn't evolve for that purpose. Then to "speculate that things in themselves may exist in their own space and time" is really misguided speculation, because the way that these supposed things in themselves actual exist is probably not at all similar to how we understand them, through the intuitions of space and time. Intuition is known to mislead.

Kilograms. That is how we do physics. — I like sushi

Sure, i see a lot of things weighed in kilograms, but never matter. As I said, I've never heard of anyone trying to measure something called matter. I've seen people measuring and weighing all sorts of different things, but I've never heard of someone measuring something they call matter. Tell me where you think you might find matter being weighed in kilograms. I know a number of physicists, and never heard them talk about weighing matter.

Is this to say, in Aristotle things come with identity? — Mww

That's right one of the things Aristotle is famous for, is the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". This law puts the identity of a thing within the thing itself, rather than something which we say about the thing. Hegel was very critical of that law.

Identity being what a thing is, in Kant, identity is assigned to things, not for what it is, but for as what it is to be known. — Mww

This is how "identity" is commonly understood today, as what we assign to a thing in knowing it. But Plato showed how sophists abused this principle, because it annihilates the separation between what we say about things, and how things truly are. Truth gets dissolved into justification when we have no principles which stipulate that there is such a thing as the way something really is. So when a thing's identity is simply what we say about the thing, then as long as it is accepted conventionally (justified), then it is the truth, because there is no such thing as an independent "the way that the thing is".

That is why Aristotle insisted on the law of identity, which tells us that even though we don't necessarily know the way that a thing really is independently of us, there is such a thing. It sort of puts truth out of our grasp, but recognizes that there is such a thing. The ontological ramification is that this divides the assumed independent reality into a multiplicity of particular things, each with its own identity. Then those who hold "the One" as first principle would need to support this proposed unity. Kant's use of "noumena" and "noumenon", indicates that he supports this multiplicity of things. However, his principles sort of disallow us from even having that knowledge, of whether the assumed independent reality is simply one, or a multiplicity.

What happened with Whitehead, and process philosophy in general, is that when the supposed independent reality is understood to consist of process (consistent with "energy" as the basic foundation), then principles are required to explain and understand divisions and separations, individuation in general, because it\s all one big process. Then it becomes very difficult for process philosophy to explain why we perceive separations, and divisions which constitute individual things. However, substance philosophy really does not have any advantage in this matter, because they still have no principle to account for why we perceive individual things. Substance philosophy just takes the existence of individuals for granted, by the law of identity. But until we question this, what we take for granted, we won't figure out why we perceive individuals. Maybe, since things are supposed to have a 'centre of gravity', it has something to do with gravity, whatever that is.

That is a stretch too far. We can -- and do -- measure matter. — I like sushi

There is a large variety of things which we measure, and each has a name. There is also a variety of different types of measurements. I've never heard anyone claim to be measuring matter. What type of measurement do you think that would be?

Here he is explicit: sensation provides the matter of appearances, while space and time are the form in which that matter is ordered. — Wayfarer

I wouldn't say that this is explicit. "Form" and "matter" are terms you apply in your interpretation. Aristotelian terms do not correlate very well to Kantian terms, because Kant did not stay true to the Aristotelian structure. Aristotle was explicit in defining "form" with actuality, and "matter" with potential. But Kant blurs the boundary of separation with concepts like "forms of sensibility". Notice that "sensibility" is a potential, so his structure has 'forms of potential'. In this way Kant allows potential (matter perhaps) into the mind, as the a priori intuitions. But Kant is proposing a new way of dealing with the age old active-passive intellect dilemma. The need for "noumena" demonstrates that Kant's proposal, though novel, is not conclusive.

Looking at your statement now, you say "space and time are the form". And, yes, they are the "form", by Kant's words, but they are the form of sensibility, which makes this supposed "form" a potential, inconsistent with Aristotle. And, as potential, these forms of sensibility, space and time, do not possess the principle of activity which is required to order matter. So Kant's proposed system lacks this required principle of activity.

Notice it is "that which corresponds to sensation" which you give the name "matter" to, but in the Aristotelian hylomorphism, it is the form of the particular, not the matter, which is supposed to correspond. Because the form is received in abstraction, it is necessary that there is something passive, potential, within the intellect. That is the passive intellect, which gave the scholastics all the problems, because they wanted the intellect to be purely actual, an independent form, to support absolute knowledge, the afterlife etc.. The passive aspect for Kant is the a priori intuitions, space and time.

If it is true in Aristotle matter acquires form to become particular substance, and because it is true in Kant matter acquires form to become particular phenomena, then originally to both is matter, which leaves Kantian noumena, as it relates to matter, out in the cold…...right where it’s supposed to be. — Mww

I'd agree with this. The difference between Kant and Aristotle then, seems to be that "particular phenomena", for Kant is occurring within the mind, whereas Aristotle has instances of "particular substance" independent from the mind, things with an identity. The reality of the "particular substance" is supported by the concept of matter for Aristotle. Since Kant places the potential, which Aristotle assigned to matter, into the mind, as the conditions for the possibility of phenomena, there is no need for the concept of matter. The a priori intuitions take the place of matter. Therefore that entire Aristotelian world view, this assumption about 'the external', that it consists of particular instances of substance, things with an Aristotelian identity by the law of identity, supported by "matter", is thrown aside, to be replaced with "noumena".

If only those many people would just study the damn book. One does not have to accept what he’s saying, but should comprehend the point he’s making, the major premise in the “ground of the division of all objects”. — Mww

Philosophy, metaphysics and ontology especially, is extremely complex and difficult. A great philosopher is very difficult to understand, requiring much study, and usually subject to an array of different interpretations. However, what generally happens is that a very simple interpretation starts to develop, which clings to specific terms, and since it is simple and easy to understand it rapidly gains in popularity, becoming the conventional understanding of that philosophy. Of course "simple" is the converse of "complex" so the conventional understanding is never very adequate, or properly representative.

A good example is Plato, and Platonism. The simple, conventional interpretation, known as Platonism, holds that Plato promoted the philosophy of independent ideas like mathematical objects, derived from Pythagorean idealism. However, a thorough reading of Plato will reveal that he actually rejected this Pythagorean idealism, and provided refutation of it in his later writings. But even in those ancient days there was divisiveness as to what principles constituted "Platonism". Aristotle, whom many argue was a true Platonist continued with the refutation of Pythagorean idealism, while the Neo-Platonists, who maintained the "Platonist" name, persisted in promoting Pythagorean idealism.

I get your point, and your quotes support it. But I don't see things the same way, being more skeptical, or even cynical. Metaphor is an intentional 'misuse' (if you will) of words, to produce meaning in an unconventional way. That implies a sort of limited understanding. I apprehend your examples as unintentional misuse which annihilates meaning and misleads. And this implies misunderstanding.

So are we not forced to admit, insofar as Kant offers no definition of what a noumenon is, offers no descriptions of what a noumenon would be like, but authorizes (B115) its validity as a mere possible, non-contradictory, conception, there can be no talk of noumena as such, but only the conception itself, represented by that word, which is actually nothing other than talk of the modus operandi of the faculty of understanding in opposition to its own rules? — Mww

I think this is a very important point. "Noumena" for Kant is analogous to "matter" for Aristotle. They are strictly conceptual, not referring to any independent thing as people are inclined to believe. But "matter" is more like the limit of conception, the closest we can come to contradiction without crossing that boundary. Then many people assume these concepts to be a description of some independent feature of reality. But they are not descriptions at all, just concepts which somehow represent what cannot be described.

One might consider such a sentence to be superfluous considering, surely, there are people alive, perhaps even living quite well, who don't hold the beliefs you do. — Outlander

Surely you understand that each individual is a unique person in a unique position. The majority of the beliefs which are necessary for me to live my life are probably not even similar to the beliefs necessary for you to live your life. That's how varied life actually is, because we adapt ourselves to our environment, which itself is extremely varied.

Exactly, fulfils the definition of a metaphor.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that describes one thing as if it were another.

For example, saying "time is a thief" or "2+3=5". — RussellA

As I told you "=" does not mean "is". Therefore your proposed analogy is false. We are not saying 2+3 is 5, we are saying that they are equivalent, and that is the literal meaning, not metaphorical.

The metaphor
We understand abstract ideas by making them concrete, as described by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their book Metaphors We Live By 1980. For example, we understand the abstract concept of argument by making it concrete, as in "argument is war". We understand an abstract feeling by making it concrete, as in "I am feeling low". — RussellA

I would agree with you, that many people use this technique, but I would not say that it constitutes understanding, rather I would say that it is misunderstanding. Likewise, I argue that people who understand "=" in mathematics as meaning "is", or "the same as", misunderstand. And, people who understand numbers as mathematical objects, are making them concrete, and misunderstand.

Set theory
Frege and Russell proposed defining a natural number n as the collection of all sets with n elements. Set theory is foundational to mathematics. Set theory provides a framework whereby operations such as addition can be built from first principles (Wikipedia - set theory)

The abstract addition of the natural numbers 2 and 3 can be achieved within the framework of a set theory that is built on concrete first principles, similar to the function of the metaphor. — RussellA

According to what i said above, I believe that set theory is based in axioms of misunderstanding. You call it metaphor, I call it misunderstanding. It is misunderstanding rather than metaphor, because the users of it understand it as literal, not metaphor. The terms "literal" and "metaphorical" apply to the way it is interpreted. The users of set theory do not interpret the axioms as metaphorical, they interpret them as literal, therefore rather than using metaphors in their work, they simply misunderstand.

Not true―in the determinist picture there are both exogenous and endogenous causes of action. — Janus

Are you saying that the determinist perspective denies Newtons laws? Or, is it the case that "endogenous causes of action" are simply represented as interactions of internal parts, which are each external to each other. This would mean that the so-called "endogenous" causes are really just modeled as exogenous interactions. Therefore the "endogenous" is not true endogeny. Language police on patrol.

Potential is a different thing to the noumenal, which is what we have been discussing. If something has a potential it is built into the actuality of the thing, and is real in that sense. — Janus

This is not necessarily the case. That is simply how we represent what is named as "potential", as something built into the actual. This is because our knowledge is strictly formal, it consists of forms. And so any understanding of the potential of the world, must be approached through the actuality of the world. For all we know, the so-called "noumenal" could be the potential. Notice that Kant speaks of "the possibility" of sense appearance, and names space and time this way, placing them into the larger category of potential.

Furthermore, we notice, observe and experience sensation at the present in time, now. However, the potential for whatever happens at the present must be prior to it, therefore this can never be sensed, nor experienced in any way. So we cannot accurately understand the potential of a thing as being built into the actuality of that thing, because it is necessarily prior to the thing, temporally. Now we tend to represent the potential for one thing, as the actuality of another thing, in a the way of determinist causation.

But this cannot provide an accurate understanding either, for two principal reasons. First, it produces an infinite regress of "actual things" one being the potential for the next. That would mean that everything in the world is determined, but determined from nothing, no start, infinite regress. The second reason is more complicated, and requires an understanding of how we relate to "potential" in our active experience. Whenever there is potential (understood here as possibility), there is always a multitude of possible outcomes. That is the nature of potential. It implies that an active form of selection is required to produce the outcome which actualizes. If we say that this is an actual "thing" in the sense described above, we deny the reality of selection, and move back to the determinist infinite regress of things, described above. Therefore the active form of selection cannot be the actuality of a thing.

This is why Aristotle proposed two principal senses of "act" . The one sense is the "actuality" of the thing, as what the thing is, its form. The other sense is "activity". The two are fundamentally incompatible, as the thing's form is understood as static being, what the thing is, while activity is understood as the active cause of change.

So, I would say that actual potential exists, but that what it is potential for does not exist until it is actualized. — Janus

OK, this is a good starting premise. Now, you see that the potential for a thing is necessarily prior in time to the thing's actual existence. Do you understand the two reasons I provided above, as to why "potential" must be a distinct category, and cannot be adequately understood as "built into the actuality of the thing"? Even if we qualify "the thing" as a collection of all things, such that potential is passed from one thing to another as energy, we do not get the premises required to adequately understand "potential". We get lost in an infinite regress. Further, if you believe in the reality of potential, you must also believe in what this implies, the need for an act of selection any time one possibility is actualized rather than another. The act of selection cannot be attributed to "an actual thing", or else the reality of selection is negated.

Addition is a metaphorical concept, because one thing, namely 2 + 3, refers to a different thing, namely 5. — RussellA

I don't think so. "2+3" has its meaning, and "5" has its meaning. The two are distinct. The left side of an equation always means something different from the right side, or else the equation would be totally useless. Maybe some mathematicians will tell you that "=" means "the same as", but that is misunderstanding.

Explain to me then what it could mean to say that something is, and yet that it neither exists nor does not exist? — Janus

Are you familiar with the concept of "potential"? In Aristotelian philosophy "potential" names a category which is required to describe becoming, change. This is what forms the category for those aspects of reality which are neither being nor not being, but may or may not be. Potential is very real, yet it cannot be said to exist nor not exist. Therefore it "is" in the sense of real, yet it neither exists nor does not exist.

Matter is in this category. This is because particular things exist as forms, determinate this and that, but they each have the potential to be something else. That potential is attributed to the thing's matter. But the matter itself cannot be a determinate this or that, or this would negate its definition as potential.

Unfortunately that is not a sensible, or even meaningful, thing to say.. — Janus

Status quo for Janus, the standard reply.

When the discussion extends beyond the tight boundaries of Janus' preconceived conceptual enclosure, Janus recoils and strikes. Nonsense! There's something outside those boundaries Janus, or else you wouldn't need to be making those judgements. And dismissing that external world as meaningless and unintelligible, does nothing to propagate understanding.

I found Matt Strassler's article about matter and energy very interesting, as it casts doubt on the assumption that matter is energy. Perhaps the equation of the two is simplistic. I need to explore this question further. — Janus

Energy is taken to be equivalent to mass, and mass is taken to be the fundamental, essential property of matter. There is a difference, because it is only by removing "matter" from the conception, that "energy" is allowed to be the property of a bodiless substance, light. This allows the essential property of matter, mass, to be equivalent to bodiless motion, making energy and light the same thing, bodiless substance.

The problem is that the concept of matter disallows the possibility of assigning to it an essential property. Therefore the energy-mass equivalence simply evades the issue of "matter" altogether.

For me the fact that the mind is not "passive recorder" is uncontroversial. We are affected by what is external to our bodies via the senses... — Janus

Far more than this, living beings are active, as self-moving. This is the big difference between the determinist perspective and the free will perspective. The determinist perspective sees the actions of living beings as effects of external causation. The free will perspective sees an internal cause of action which has an effect on what is external.

Presumably it's possible because I have experienced the universe and I have registered that it can exist without conscious minds. — Barkon

But didn't you just say that the universe is a concept? Unless this concept is a true concept, by what means would you say that the universe can also exist without conscious minds? If you claim that you "have registered that it can exist without conscious minds", this means that you have judged it to be a true concept. How would you justify this judgement?

A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing. For example, the symbol "+" in mathematics refers to the combining of sets. — RussellA

Huh? I only see one thing, "the combining of sets". And that is how you defined "+". Where is the other thing, which makes it metaphorical?

The Vertiginous:

This section appears to describe an approach to truth. Vertiginous is distinguished from bottomlessness. And truth is vertiginous, (makes one's head swim) rather than bottomless as the abyss of untruth.

The last paragraph of the section appears to be describing the difference between coherency and soundness. The "frame of reference" provides the basis for a coordinate system, and everything within the system is consistent. But the soundness of the coordinate system, and the frame of reference itself, is generally not questioned. But, it may simply be a product of stipulated axioms.

That, the coherent coordinate system, is contrasted with a philosophy which throws itself at objects. This throwing itself at objects creates a vertigo described as "index veri" (index of truth). The index to truth is revealed in negativity, as untruth.

Fragility of the Truth:

Here we get a deeper look at truth. He appears to be saying that we must let go of what gives us comfort. Clinging to what gives us comfort, which is really untruth, is actually the bane.

With these human beings fear they will lose everything, because they have no other happiness, also none within thought, than what you can hold on to yourself, perennial
unfreedom.

Later in the section, this turns out to be what is popular, I'd say conventional.

Philosophy must "continually renew itself". It makes "few concessions to relativism", and "drives past Hegel".

Then there is a paragraph that I have difficulty to understand, which appears to be directed against the absolutism of Hegel. There is a jettisoning of that which is first to thought, but the jettisoning does not absolutize it. The jettisoning seems to be intended to remove the content of thought, from thought. But it's irrational to think that the content of thinking could be removed from thinking, because this would leave thinking as something other than thinking.

Even in the logical abstraction-form of the
Something, as something which is meant or judged, which for its part
does not claim to constitute anything existent, indelibly survives that
which thinking would like to cancel out, whose non-identity is that
which is not thinking.

So, it seems to me, that Adorno is criticizing this type of thinking, which conceives of thinking as having creative power to put abstractions outside the mind, as this is fundamentally contrary to the meaning of "thinking".

The objection of
bottomlessness needs to be turned against the intellectual principle
which preserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins; there however,
where ontology, Heidegger first and foremost, hits bottomlessness, is
the place of truth.

He then gets to the fragility of truth, "fragile due to its temporal content". Contrary to the beliefs of some, who say that truth cannot be lost, Adorno says that truth can be lost, and we can fall into the abyss. This is because truth requires great effort.

Only those thoughts which go to extremes can face up to the
all-powerful powerlessness of certain agreement; only mental
acrobatics relate to the thing, which according to the fable convenu
[French: agreed-upon fiction] it holds in contempt for the sake of its
self-satisfaction.

How it is, that thought can actually find truth, when it is easily led astray by what is popular, and "nothing notifies it that it has adequately satisfied itself in the thing", is another question.

The consistency of its execution, however, the density of the web, enables it to hit what it should.

Taking one example, that of the mathematical concept of zero.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing, such as "all the world's a stage".

As with Derrida's concept of différance, absence is as important as presence. It is the absence of meaning that allows the presence of interpretation to emerge (Wikipedia - Jacques Derrida).

Zero is metaphorical in that it turns absence into presence. Zero refers to nothing, but it has the sense of something. — RussellA

Sorry RussellA, but I'm not able to follow you. The concept of nothing is quite a bit different from the concept of zero. Sure you could use "zero" to mean nothing, and be using it metaphorically, but that would be to give "zero" a meaning outside of mathematics. But that's not to use mathematics metaphorically. When someone says "the rabbits are multiplying", that is to use the word "multiplying" metaphorically, not to use mathematics metaphorically. It takes the word out of the context of mathematics, it doesn't bring metaphor into mathematics.

That is the nature of language, where concepts are about the sense of things in the world rather than refer to things in the world (Frege). — RussellA

I really don't understand what you mean by "about the sense of things in the world". It seems to me that this is just a convoluted, ambiguous phrase, meant to avoid the issue of what concepts which do not refer to anything in the world, are actually doing. This would include concepts like mathematical concepts. Surely mathematical concepts cannot be classified as metaphorical.

I think that the following is still relevant to Berkeley's Idealism and ‘esse est percipi’.

A photon is an example of a massless particle.

A massless particle may be defined as immaterial.

I agree when you say "and suggested that if a person believes in the real existence of massless particles, then they believe in the real existence of the immaterial"

I believe in the real existence of the immaterial.

But you also said "In the first example there is thoughts, conception etc., and in the second there is God. Each case uses "Immaterial" in the same way, by the same definition."

So, both photons and God are immaterial, where immaterial means the same thing.

But if a person believes in the real existence of photons then they believe in the real existence of the immaterial.

But if a person believes in the real existence of the immaterial, and God is immaterial, then should not a person believe in the real existence of God? — RussellA

Your conclusion doesn't follow. If I list off three item types which are said to be classified as the further type, class A, and you agree that item type number 3 is a type of real item, of class A, I can conclude that you believe that there is real items of class A. This in no way implies that you believe that item type 1, and item type 2, are real items.

Notice, class A stands by the same definition throughout. The issue is whether item type 1, item type 2, and item type 3, which are proposed as items which fit that definition, are real items. For example, I could say that horses and unicorns are of the class "four legged animals". If you believe in the reality of horses, you believe in the reality of four legged animals. But this does not imply that you believe in the reality of unicorns. And, "four legged animals" has the same definition throughout.

As far as I know mathematics exists only in the spatiotemporal world. There can be no order without things to be ordered. — Janus

That conclusion is drawn from the unstated premise that "things" by your usage exist only in a spatiotemporal world. However, we are talking about immaterial "things", which are not spatiotemporal, meaning, value, and intention.

In classical metaphysics there is a very strong logical argument, the cosmological argument, which demonstrates that there must be something immaterial which is prior in time to all material existence, as active cause of the first material thing. This implies that we ought to conclude that your unstated premise is false. Therefore your argument is unsound.

And of course, those who practise mathematics demonstrate every day, that things being ordered need not be spatiotemporal things. So you really ought to reject your own argument.

The problem is that we have every reason to think there is a world prioir to perception... — Janus

Likewise, we have every reason to believe that there is an immaterial world prior to the material world.

First, denying this would require either that material things came into existence from absolutely nothing, or that they have existed forever. Both of these possibilities are contrary to empirical evidence. Material things do not come into being from nothing, nor do they exist forever.

Second, the nature of time indicates to us that actual material existence comes into being at the present time, now, while the future consists only of possibilities for material existence. This implies that the possibility for any material thing must precede, in time, the actual existence of that thing. Since the possibility for a thing is not necessarily a material thing in itself, we must conclude that there has always been something immaterial prior to any material thing, as the possibility for material things, in general.

Not that I think the question and the answer to it matter that much, at least not to those who just accept that we live in a material world consisting of many, many things which don't depend on us for their existence. — Janus

The philosophical mind however, wants to know the nature of these things which don't depend on us. To simply assume, and accept, that the nature of these things is adequately described by the concept "matter", therefore we live in a "material world", is not good philosophy.

Do we know of any meaning, intention and value outside the context of this spatiotemporal existence? — Janus

Yes, I told you, "order" itself. It is value not restricted by spatiotemporal context. It provides the foundation for mathematics upon which spatial temporal concepts are constructed.

Now you are contradicting what you said earlier. Differentiation just refers to the existence of more than one thing. So "selection" on our part is not logically required for there to be more than one thing. — Janus

For some reason, you have a tendency of stating things backward. You reverse the order of logic, presenting illogical statements. Here you say that the existence of more than one thing is required for differentiation. In reality though, the act of differentiation is an act that divides, thereby producing more than one thing. So you have the logical order reversed, to produce the illogical statement you make. In reality, for there to be more than one thing requires an act of differentiation, and this is an act of selection, the act which divides according to selected principles. Without this, your proposed "more than one thing" is an unintelligible infinity of divisions already made. An infinity already accomplished is illogical.

So "selection" on our part is not logically required for there to be more than one thing. — Janus

Selection on someone's part is required for there to be more than one thing. Someone has to choose by what principle one part is to be separated from another part, making more than one thing. How else could there be more than one thing, without assuming the infinity of divisions mentioned above?

Yes, there are at least two ways to think of gravity. One is as a force and one is as the curvature of space-time caused by the presence of mass energy. — RussellA

In other words, "force" is purely conceptual. It is only one of a number of conceptions which can be applied toward representing the effects of gravity, but not the only one. "Force" doesn't represent gravity, it is a method of categorizing the effects of gravity.

I think you are are making a logical leap too far.

The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines "immaterial" as "not consisting of matter".

As photons don't consist of matter, they can be considered immaterial.

The article Immateriality of God writes

The immateriality of God simply means that God is not composed of material.

Premise 1 - God is immaterial
Premise 2 - Photons are immaterial
Premise 3 - Photons have a real existence

Conclusion - as some immaterial things have a real existence and as God is immaterial then God has a real existence. — RussellA

I don't understand what you are saying here. Last post, you listed some things which are believed to be immaterial, concepts, ideas, intentions, also God. I explained why massless particles ought to be included in that list, and suggested that if a person believes in the real existence of massless particles, then they believe in the real existence of the immaterial. I made no conclusion about God.

Personally, I believe that massless particles are nothing but an idea, a conception, and not real in the sense of independent. I think "photon" is a concept created in an attempt to explain the photoelectric effect. The problems of quantum mechanics demonstrates that "photon" is a faulty concept for explaining how light energy transmits. Therefore it is false, and not referring to anything independent.

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Kant allows things in themselves, which Schopenhauer takes him to task for, because it is inconsistent with his claim that space and time are only forms of intuition and have no other existence, and you can't have things without differentiation, space and time. Schopenhauer then posits that there can only be a 'thing in itself', and that this is a consequence of Kant's own contentions. — Janus

Differentiation need not be spatial nor temporal. We have differentiation of meaning, intention and value. This is the basis of "order", "hierarchy", a differentiation of value. Spatiotemporal differentiation is dependent on, and derived, from this more basic form of differentiation based on value.

the point at issue is whether it follows logically from the accepted fact that differentiation is required for perception to occur, that there is no differentiation absent perception. — Janus

If the one is required for the other, and the other is not required for the former, then we can conclude that the one is prior to the other. In this case, since differentiation is required for perception, and perception is not required for differentiation (as explained above, differentiation may be based purely in order), we can conclude that differentiation is prior to perception.

I want to hear an actual argument for why space, time, differentiation, form, matter and all the rest cannot exist beyond the context of perception. And I should note, I acknowledge that if there is space, time, differentiation, things in general outside the context of perception, we should not expect them to be just as we experience and understand them. That would be naive realism, and I'm not arguing for that. I have in mind something along the lines of Ontic Structural Realism. — Janus

Above is an argument as to why the act of differentiation exists beyond the context of perception. It is prior to perception. This act of differentiation is intentional.

As I said, I simply want any kind of argument clearly laid out that demonstrates that space, time, differentiation etc. must be confined to the world as cognized. — Janus

Differentiation is necessarily an intentional act. It involves selection. Understanding what "differentiation" means is all that is required to demonstrate that it is confined to "the world as cognized". Differentiation is an intentional act carried out by cognition. Furthermore, differentiation in its basic form (order) as explained above, is necessarily prior to spatial or temporal differentiation. Therefore cognition is prior to spatiotemporal differentiation, and perception in general.

we cannot be certain that space and time and differentiation exist in the in itself, but nor can we be certain that they do not. There is no such thing as any definitive "misuse of concepts". That is purely stipulative. There are no "concept police"―we each decide for ourselves what makes most sense to us. It is just here that I see dogma creeping in―in notions of "philosophy proper" and "misusing concepts" and "cannot be applied beyond them". — Janus

We can be certain that these things, space, time, differentiation, do not exist "in the in itself". This certainty is supported by an understanding of what it means to differentiate, and subsequent form, "differentiation". To differentiate is an intentional act. Any attempt to portray it as something other than this ought to be immediately arrested. I am a self-declared member of the "concept police", and I hereby give you warning that you are in serious violation of the 'dogma of philosophy proper'. Without stipulation, dogma, any field of study loses all dignity. Without stipulations as to how words will be used, logic is impossible, and discussion rapidly degenerates into nonsense.

If you refuse to uphold a proper definition of "differentiation", as an act which requires selection, just so that you may equivocate, then you make philosophical discourse impossible.

We can quantify the force of gravity. On Earth, the average gravitational force is about 9.81 m/s². On the Moon, it is about 1.63 m/s². — RussellA

There is more than one thing involved in that formula which you call "gravitational force". There is space and time. The formula must be understood as conceptual, rather than something independent, because it unites these two features in an artificial way, conception. Notice that within the theory (conception) of general relativity, "gravity" is understood in a completely different way. It is not conceived of as a force, but as a property of spacetime. This is because space and time have already been united by the conception of special relativity, and this union must be adjusted to properly account for gravity. Therefore in general relativity gravity is already included into the conception of space and time. So we have two very different ways to conceive what you call "gravitational force". One is as a force, the other as a property of spacetime. The latter is distinctly not "a force".

Basically…

Mass-energy curves space-time — a new version of Hooke's law.
Objects trace out world lines that are geodesics (paths of least action in curved space-time) unless acted upon by a net external force — a new version of the law of inertia.
Gravity isn't a force, it's the curvature of space-time caused by the presence of mass-energy.

https://physics.info/general-relativity/

Even someone who believes in Determinism may know their past but cannot know their future. — RussellA

Right, so as I say, this presents us with a premise describing a real difference between past and future. Do you agree that this is a real difference? Can you agree that a person can know one's past and cannot know one's future, and because of this we ought to conclude that there is a real difference between past and future?

If we have agreement on this, then we can proceed to inquire exactly what this difference consists of.

The article What Sorts of Things Exist, & How? writes

But the immaterial things are the philosophically more interesting. These include consciousness, thoughts, words, meanings, concepts, numbers, emotions, intentions, volitions, moral principles, aesthetic experiences, and more. What would philosophy be without them?

However, the article Immateriality of God writes

The immateriality of God simply means that God is not composed of material. In other words, God is not made of any kind of matter, material, or substance which entails that he cannot be seen.

There are different meanings to "immaterial". — RussellA

I don't think those two examples constitute two different meanings. They are applying the same definition of "immaterial" to refer to different things. The definition is "not composed of material". In the first example there is thoughts, conception etc., and in the second there is God. Each case uses "Immaterial" in the same way, by the same definition.

We could add to that list of immaterial things, massless particles. And if such things are believed to be real, independent and not merely conceptual, then we'd have a belief in the real existence of the immaterial. Mass is the essential property of matter. However, many materialist/physicalists will insist that since there is a mass-energy equivalence then energy also is material. But this is a misunderstanding of "equivalence".

Equivalent means that equal things have been assigned the same value, it does not mean that the two things are the same. So if matter has mass, and energy does not have mass, therefore no matter,, and there is an equivalence between these two, this means that we have conceived of a mathematical relationship between the material and the immaterial. But it does not mean that the immaterial is material. We need to account for the specific postulates of that relationship.

n language, one can justly say that "the force of gravity causes a stone to move towards the ground". Some of these words are figures of speech, some are concrete and some are abstract. — RussellA

You are still not getting the distinction I explained to you. What causes the stone to fall is gravity. "Force" is not an independent thing in the world which causes anything. "Force" is a mathematical concept, how we quantify the effects of things like gravity.

It really makes no sense to say "the force of gravity causes a stone to move towards the ground". When we analyze that statement, it's plain to see that "force" has no meaning here. What would "force" refer to here, some invisible, unobservable property of an invisible unobservable thing, gravity?

However, when someone says something like that we easily understand it, because we can just ignore "the force of", and understand it as "gravity causes a stone to move towards the ground". "Force" has no intelligible meaning in that context so it is simply ignored.

When we consider the universe to be real or fake, what do we mean?

If it is real, does that mean it is all loaded in at once, in one big containment; and if it is fake, does that mean it's load is efficient, such as by having local systems load in and far away systems not loaded in? — Barkon

I think that our concept of "the universe" is a useful fiction.

I found your saying that rather amusing. — Janus

That's how it was meant, amusement. However, we must be careful with our use of such, because making fun of another is a form of amusement which is mean, and I don't mean to be mean.

I can understand your words easily enough, but they seem irrelevant and thus pointless, so I think our starting assumptions are probably so far apart that the effort required for me to unpack what you might be getting at seems to be not worth it. — Janus

OK, so you express the second option, rather than an intellectual disability, you have an attitudinal problem which discourages you from making the effort to understand.

Let me remind you of the issue, just so that you can see for yourself, that it is not a matter of what I say being irrelevant, but a matter of your attitude. You had refused to accept the importance of intuitional knowledge, claiming that only observation experience could provide reliable knowledge, i.e. empirical knowledge.

Let's grant for the sake of argument that (intellectual) intuition sometimes might give us an accurate picture of the nature of reality ("reality" here meaning something more than mere empirical reality, that is not merely things as they appear to us, but rather some "deeper" truth metaphysically speaking). How do we tell when a particular intuition has given us such knowledge?

I won't respond to the rest of your post as it seems like either sophistical nonsense or inaccurate speculations about my motives. — Janus

The problem with your attitude, exposed here, is that any knowledge we are born with must be intuitive. And, a certain basic knowledge is required even to support the human being's observational capacity. Note, that to observe is to take notice of, and this requires that your attention be directed by your intention, at the thing to be observed.

The basic foundational knowledge, which a person is born with, provides the substance, through this form of direction, upon which all observational (empirical) knowledge is constructed. Therefore it is impossible that the observational knowledge is more reliable than the intuitive knowledge, because the intuitive knowledge is what supports the observational knowledge. Your attitude demonstrates that you would believe that a logical conclusion is more reliable than the premises which it is drawn from.

My intention was that from the viewpoint of a human observer, even in a deterministic world, they cannot know the future. — RussellA

All right then, let's start from this premise. If a human observer cannot know the future, but can know the past, this implies a real difference between future and past. How can a determinist adequately account for this difference?

The free will believer understands that the future holds possibility, therefore the epistemic concept of truth and falsity is not applicable to the future. This accounts for that difference. So this difference is actually very simple to understand when we employ the right premise.

We don't need to know whether Newton's Laws apply to those parts of the Universe that we don't observe, we only need to know that they apply to the parts of the Universe that we do observe. — RussellA

If the determinist laws (the laws of physics which support one's belief in determinism), are not believed to extend to all parts of the universe, then how is the belief in determinism supported. Wouldn't it be possible that nondeterministic activity reigned in some part of the universe, and there could be some interaction between the various parts?

Remember, the principle you are supporting is superdeterminism, and this theory requires interactions with that other part of the universe, as hidden variables. The question is, what supports the belief that the supposed hidden variables are deterministic. The deterministic laws which we know, are Newton's laws. If the hidden variables are not acting according to Newton's laws, then why believe that they are deterministic?

I suggest to you, that you consider the basis of determinism, the primary premise, to be the inertia of mass, (matter), which is expressed by the first law. A person who believes in free will, and the reality of the immaterial in general, does not allow that Newton's first law extends to a living body moved by final cause. Also, this person is easily able to see that the problems of quantum mechanics arise from the physicists' experimentations which involve the massless, the immaterial. It is this determinist bias which you demonstrate, which makes people want to establish compatibility between Newton's deterministic laws, which apply to massive material bodies, and the massless immaterial substratum.

However, this is backward. Since the immaterial is the substratum, this means that the deterministic, the material aspect is what emerged from the immaterial. This implies that we need to understand the reality of the non-deterministic immaterial aspect of the universe first, and determine how a deterministic, material aspect could have come into being from it.

It seems that in In God's Will, the changes a human makes to their present are determined by the final cause, the unmoved mover. A human's will is free providing they use their will to move towards this final cause, this unmoved mover. — RussellA

I don't think that is correct. The concept of free will allows that we choose freely. This means that we can choose either way, bad or good, so we do not necessarily choose according to "God's Will". "God's Will" is a concept used to explain why material bodies of mass move in an orderly, deterministic way, in a universe where the substratum is non-deterministic. If, for example the universe is assumed to have begun as endless possibility, infinite potential, and some process started selecting from possibilities to create the actual universe, we need to assume some form of intelligence (Will of God for example) to account for the emergence of actual order, from the seemingly endless possibility. Without any intelligence, possibility would actualize in a random way, but this is inconsistent with our observations.

There is only one past, one present and several possible futures. — RussellA

How is "several possible futures" consistent with determinism? If determinism is the case, then the future has alredy been determined, as well as the past, and there is only one actual future, not several possible futures.

We could conceptualize possibilities, as logical possibilities, or epistemological possibilities, but these would be imaginary, and not the actual future, which is what I think you are talking about. Then there would be no difference between past and future. But this is clearly not consistent with our experience.

In free will, as there is only one present, one of the several possible futures must have been chosen, and it is this choice that determines the one present.

Even in fee will, the present has been determined — RussellA

This doesn't make sense either.

A choice doesn't determine the present because it gives direction to a very small aspect in a very big context which is "the present". Even with the large number of choices being made by human beings, there is still a massive aspect of reality which is modeled by Newton's laws of motion, and this aspect is active without human choice. Commonly, by those who believe in free will, this activity is accounted for by "God's Will".

But today not everyone agrees. Some believe in Superdeterminism, in that there are hidden variables that we do not yet know about. — RussellA

Yeah, yeah, that's the ticket, "superdeterminism". How is that any better than "God's Will"? It's not, it's much worse. It requires an immaterial, non-spatialtemporal force, which is active throughout the entirety of the universe over the enirety of time. That sounds just like "God's Will". However, there is one big difference. "God's Will" is consistent with human experience of choice, free will, the known difference between past and future, and our knowledge of final cause, while "superdeterminism" is not. That's a very significant amount of evidence which superdeterminism simply ignores, in order to keep up the determinsit premise. Meanwhile, "God's Will" is a sound theory, supported by the experience of every human being who makes choices. And "superdeterminism" is just the pie-in -the-sky clutching at straws of deluded determinists.

I hope you can see the problem.

Here's an analogy. Consider Newton's first law. This law is applicable to a very large part (if not all) of empirical (observable) reality. We can ask why is this law so effective in its descriptive capacity.

You can answer that the law corresponds with a hidden feature of the universe, which extends to all areas of the universe, over all time, and this hidden feature ensures that Newton's first law will always be obeyed, everywhere, all the time. That is analogous with superdeterminism.

On the other hand, we can say that Newton's first law applies only to the aspects of the universe which our sense capacities allow us to observe, and evidence indicates to us that there is an extremely large portion of the universe which we cannot in any way observe with our senses (the future for example). And, since we cannot in any way observe this extremely large portion of the universe, to see how it behaves, we have no reason to believe that it behaves in the same way as the part which we can observe.

So, superdeterminism, instead of following the evidence which we do have, evidence of free will and final cause, simply makes a ridiculous conclusion based on no evidence, that there is a law of determinism, like Newton's first law, which extends throughout all features of reality, even those which we cannot possibly obsevre.

This statement is incorrect according to Newton’s first law of motion (the law of inertia). — Wayfarer

My mistake, thanks Wayfarer. I think i was half asleep when I wrote that, glad you're checking.

But we still have the issue of self-caused acceleration, in living beings which are self-moved. This is a case of the acceleration of a body which is not caused by an external force. I will address this issue below in my reply to RussellA. I would appreciate if you could read that, and give me your opinion concerning my thoughts on this matter. If my speculations are unintelligible to you, I may be inclined to think that Janus is right in dismissing it as gobbledygook.

Kant in Critique of Pure Reason would agree that realism is grounded in idealism, in that the pure intuitions of space and time and pure concepts of understanding are the a priori conditions of experience.

But Kant would also agree that idealism is grounded in realism, in that there have to be experiences before they can be categorized by the pure intuitions and pure concepts. — RussellA

Maybe, but to avoid the vicious circle, the realism which grounds idealism cannot be experience based, which is what you say. It must be prior to experience, that's why it's a Platonic realism.

I don't think that this is the case. From Newton's Second Law, F = ma. If there is no force, then there can be no acceleration. — RussellA

Yes, Wayfarer corrected me on that. However, Newton's laws cannot account for the reality of free will, where the cause of motion is internal to the body which accelerates. Therefore we ought to conclude that Newton's laws of motion are not properly "universal", as they do not cover all cases of acceleration.

You can opt for determinism, deny that free will, intention, or final cause, is a valid cause, but this is what I argue leaves a hole in your ability to understand reality. This is why physicalism is commonly associated with determinism. If we accept that Newton's laws of physics cover all aspects of reality, then there is no place for final cause, and we have determinism. If we want to allow for the reality of final cause, then we need to open up Newton's laws, determine where they are inconclusive, and find out where final cause can have a position.

What I've explained already, is that Newton's first law is fundamentally determinist, and does not adequately represent the real difference between past and future. The difference is that the past consists of "actuality", what actually is, or has been, and cannot be changed, while the future consists of indeterminate "possibility". Representing time as a continuity from past to future, as Newton's first law does, assuming that what has been will necessarily continue to be as it has, unless caused to change by something else which continues to be as it has been, produces the determinist premise. But this form of "necessity" which Newton's first law is based in, is what Hume rejected, as a premise of attitude rather than truth.

The theological/mystical premise, which allows for the reality of final cause, also rejects this proposed necessary continuity of temporal existence, supported by a difference of attitude. In this perspective, since the future consists of possibility, and the past consists of actuality, a selective cause is required to account for the activity of the present. In Christian theology this selective cause is the Will of God, and it is understood that the continuity represented as Newton's first law requires an active cause.

The principal difference between the two perspectives is that from Newton's premise a cause is required to alter the continuity of existence known as inertia. Inertia is taken for granted as given. From the theological/mystical perspective a cause is required to produce the continuity of existence known as inertia. The Newtonian premise of continuity, if taken as absolutely universal, disallows the reality of final cause, so that is a significant problem for it. Furthermore, the modern physics of quantum mechanics indicates that the separation between past actuality, and future possibility, is likely very real.

Therefore, I believe that it is time for us to reject the universality of Newton's first law, as fundamentally insufficient, and representative of a misleading attitude toward reality. We also ought to accept the real separation between past actuality and future possibility as strongly supported by evidence, and this is inconsistent with Newton's first law. That change in attitude will provide a much more sound position for a true understanding of the nature of motion and activity, one which allows for the reality of final cause.

No, because I know my command of the English language is such that I would be able to understand any coherent explanation. It doesn't follow though that I would necessarily agree with it. Are you one of those who think that you are so right that if anyone disagrees with what you write, they must therefore not understand it? — Janus

Your replies are indicating that you do not understand what I write. They are not indicating that you do not agree with me. You say things like "that passage reads like nonsense", and "Gobbledygook".

The obvious conclusion is that either you are incapable of understanding me, or unwilling to try. Either way, to me, it appears as if you have an intellectual disability. I apologize for saying "mentally handicapped". Google tells me that this is outdated and offensive, and that I should use "intellectual disability" instead.

Do you recognize that replies like that would indicate to me that there is some sort of intellectual disability on your part?

Or, is it really the case, that you just disagree with me, but you are incapable of supporting what you believe, against my arguments, so you simply dismiss my arguments as impossible for you to understand, feigning intellectual disability as an escape?