Some people clearly know more about why things behave as they do, than do other people. — wonderer1

How so? Do you mean that you know more about why you behave the way that you do, than I know about why you behave the way that you do? But we're talking about "things" plural, and that would only be knowing about the behaviour of one thing.

Do you think that someone who knows about laws of gravitation, and knows how to apply some universal laws of gravitation, knows more about why things fall, then the person who only knows that they fall because of gravity?

But these days AI can take the labour out of refuting your theological nonsense. — apokrisis

The only thing that this demonstrates is that whatever AI you selected clearly hasn't read or understood Aristotle, and is probably relying on some less than mediocre secondary sources. Somehow that doesn't surprise me in the least.

Exactly, potentiality is without constraint. But events demonstrate that constraints can emerge in conjunction with their degrees of freedom – the actualising step that creates now a sea of concrete possibilities.

Once you have the thing of a fluctuation – an action that also has some direction – then everything starts to get going.

No action, no direction. No direction, no action. But actions in a direction? A whole flood of them. Complexity can start evolving. — apokrisis

You haven't addressed the problem which I explained as the issue of the cosmological argument. In the condition of absolute potentiality, (infinite degrees of freedom if you prefer), there can be no actuality whatsoever, because any particular actuality would be a constraint, therefore the potentiality would be less than absolute. Aristotle affirms that if this situation ever existed, it would always exist, because any material actuality requires a prior actuality as the cause of it. Since we currently observe the reality of actuality, we can conclude that it is impossible that there ever was a situation of absolute potentiality.

That is a summary of the argument found in Bk 9 of Aristotle's Metaphysics, where he demonstrates that actuality is prior to potentiality in an absolute sense. This rules out the possibility of "prime matter", through reference to current observations of actuality. If there ever was prime matter, matter (potentiality) without form (actuality), there would always be matter without form, but this is inconsistent with what we observe today, matter with form, actuality.

If this is not what is called "the cosmological argument", then maybe you can ask your AI to point me to where i can find the true version of it. I see your current report is quite vague, saying "The argument is primarily developed in his works Physics and Metaphysics". I've read all of those referred works more than once, and find the cosmological argument, as I've stated, in metaphysics Bk 9. I'm sure the AI has not read those works even once.

Time would evolve as cosmology tells us. It develops complex structure through the growth of topological order. As the Big Bang expands and cools, it undergoes a rapid sequence of thermal changes. — apokrisis

I think highly of you apokrisis, and I conclude that you are very intelligent. But statements like this just make me wonder if you actually think about what you are saying sometimes, or if you just want to fill some space with ink. Can't you see that this doesn't make any sense?

You have a number of temporal concepts here "evolve", "develops", "growth", and "rapid sequence". All of the things referred to here require time for their occurrence. How can you seriously propose that time is generated from something which requires time.

I mean maybe cosmology tells you that, as you claim, but don't you read your cosmology with a critical mind? Cosmology is speculative, you can't just read some random articles, and conclude that it is the truth. You need to approach cosmology with a very critical attitude, to determine logical inconsistencies in the speculative hypotheses. When you see self-contradicting propositions like "time emerges", doesn't this make you want to dismiss the entire cosmology which proposes this?

In the beginning, all the fluctuations are stuck at the speed of light. They experience maximum time dilation and length contraction – or rather, this relativistic dichotomy can't even apply yet.

Then you get the Higgs mechanism breaking this relativistic symmetry. Now suddenly it is meaningful to talk about objects at rest. Particles that move slower than c. Mass that lags behind the radiation setting the pace. A new topological phase where time has gained a whole new complex structure.

Time changes character quite radically. And it passes through other topological stages too with inflation, or when it is a quark-gluon plasma that may have Higgs mass and yet is still effectively relativistic.

So what is time when you step right back from the physics? It is a duration. A beat that lasts the distance of a cycle. A Planck-scale rotation in its Planck-scale expanse. The fundamental unit of ħ or the quantum unit of action. The spinning on the Poincare invariant spot that defines the gauge fundamental particle. The first moment defined in terms of the symmetry breaking of rotation from translation and thus the birth of concrete dimensionality itself. — apokrisis

Here you go, a fine example of spilling ink. What's the point?

All the empirical evidence is for states that were preceded in time by another state, so this pattern would not apply to a hypothetical initial state — Relativist

Then obviously, the concept of "initial state" is not consistent with physical reality. Truly it's just an ideal. This concept is a hypothetical tool. it's used in systems theory, arbitrarily applied as a boundary. It really does not correspond with anything that is actually first in reality, because there is a continuity which extends from it into the preceding state. So "initial state" is only an ideal which is arbitrarily applied in practise, depending on the purpose. When applied, we always know that something preceded the proposed "initial state", but the initial state is applied as a boundary, because what is posterior to it is what is being studied.

I suggest it's because of deterministic* laws of nature that cause the prior state to become the next state. — Relativist

This doesn't even make sense to me. We describe and understand the activities of natural things through the use of laws. But laws cannot cause natural things to behave the way they do, because this would require that the things could read, interpret, and feel inclined to obey the natural laws. How does this make any sense to you, to think that natural things are somehow deciding to obey some set of laws, and act accordingly?

Do you agree? If not, then give me your theory. — Relativist

Why do i need to present you with a theory about this? Isn't it just sufficient to say that human beings simply do not know why things behave the way that they do? And, that it would be foolish to pretend that they did? What would be the point of me offering up a theory, when I readily accept as fact, that me, nor any other human being, has even the vaguest idea, or any sort of knowledge at all, concerning why things behave the way that they do.

The absolute potential is the potential for the emergence of a hylomorphic order in a co-arising fashion. — apokrisis

This is the point I take exception to, by way of Aristotle's cosmological argument. With the cosmological argument he denies the concept of "prime matter", as physically impossible.

If the potential is truly absolute, then there is nothing actual, as anything actual would be a constraint to the possibility. But without something actual, to act as the cause, the emergence of something, anything, is impossible.

Time can get going as changes can be made that are also constructing a collective history. — apokrisis

How could time emerge? Isn't emergence a temporal concept, something which happens over time? It seems self-contradicting to talk about time getting started as changes happen.

I hadn't discussed "state of affairs" ontology with you, so had not used the term that way. — Relativist

You definitely discussed "state of affairs" ontology with me, in your reference to an initial state of affairs. You even defined it for me:

By "state" or "state of affairs", I am referring to the the totality of existence at a point of time.

...

There are various ideas about what it means to exist. My position is that existence entails objects which have intrinsic properties and that has relations to all other objects (at least indirectly). — Relativist

See, "state of affairs" implies objects and relations, two distinct fundamental ontological concepts. Then you go on to talk about the potential for change, in the future, which implies another fundamental ontological concept, the passing of time:

A brute fact initial state would have properties that accounted for its potential to develop into subsequent states of affairs. IOW: it initiates (=causes) the subsequent causal chain that you misinterpret. — Relativist

How can you deny what you yourself wrote?

I noticed.

State of affairs (so defined) is the most fundamental concept in the ontology. — Relativist

Your definition of "state of affairs", as stated in your reply to me, does not support your claim that it is the most fundamental concept in ontology. Your definition can be broken down in analysis into two distinct aspects, objects and their relations. These are two very different concepts, and since "state of affairs" is made up of these two, they are each more fundamental than "state of affairs".

Further, you determined another feature of reality, the potential for change, which was necessary for your ontology. This implies that time is another fundamental concept in ontology. You have provided no argument to demonstrate that "state of affairs" is more fundamental than "time".

I think this is all pretty thoroughly incorrect. You could start with just understanding Hegelian dialectics. — frank

I actually did a post graduate course specifically on Hegel's dialectics of being. The professor refused to give me the mark I needed, even after I defended my thesis in person. It seems like there is dogmatic principles concerning "the correct" way to interpret Hegel. The concept of "matter" is not allowed to enter into, or even be compared to Hegel's "becoming". I suppose this is due to an inclination to maintain a separation between Hegel and Marx.

But you appear to want to defend some version of ontic idealism. — apokrisis

You, yourself, actually "defend some version of ontic idealism". I'm surprised that you still haven't come to recognize this. Your first principle, absolute potential, the symmetry which is the foundation for symmetry-breaking, is nothing but an ideal. Therefore you place the ideal as prior to everything. That is common to physicalism, as physics leans heavily on mathematical ideals.

This is actually what happened to "materialism" over the years. People would grasp "matter" as the first principle of the material world, without realizing that "matter" was simply an ideal, as Berkeley demonstrated. Then materialism was reducible to idealism, and Marx demonstrated that the inversion of this is also true. The result is that materialism and idealism are actually equivalent. Aristotle demonstrated this as well.

Interesting point. I think it might be a bit misleading, and this hinges on whether such a fixed point can act as, or is equivalent to, a ground, foundation, or first principle, in the traditional philosophical sense that Adorno is addressing. I'm not sure it can. Determinate negation as fixed point is not so much a foundation—it is not a positive proposition on which a system can be built—but is more like method, critical orientation and commitment. — Jamal

The "fixed point" in negative dialectics which Adorno refers to in lecture 3 is definitely not a foundation or first principle. He explicitly says this. Rather it is an aspect. Nevertheless I would argue that it is a grounding, as grounding is not necessarily the first principle of a philosophy. Further, I would argue that since the true grounding must be the object itself, the grounding point must be just as variable as the variability of objects. This variability may even prevent the possibility of a fixed point which is first principle, or foundation.

I mean, you could take the fixed point to be the ground, but is it interpretatively useful to do so? — Jamal

It is useful, as a rebuttal to the accusation of groundlessness.

This is what turns around the objection of groundlessness. In lecture 3 he shows the deficiency of Hegelian sublation. When the thesis is defined by the antithesis this is what renders the concept as free-floating. The definition is within the concept, thesis defined by antithesis. But in so doing this does violence to the concept because it removes the concept from its true defining aspect, which is its relation to the object. This produces an evolving concept, but it is not a true representation.

So this process of becoming, by which the concept is supposed to evolve through Hegelian sublation is really a falsity. That is what Adorno expresses here

Moreover, one of the most astonishing features of the Hegelian
dialectic and one that is especially hard to grasp is that, on the one hand,
categories are ceaselessly promoted as things that are changing and
becoming, while, on the other hand, they are logical categories and
as such simply have to retain their validity, as in any traditional logic
or epistemology.

When the process which is the evolution of a concept is described as Hegelian sublation, the only thing which stays the same, is the process itself. This produces the groundlessness, as an endless process. That this therefore is a false representation, is the grounding of that aspect of negative dialectics which criticizes it. The falsity of Hegelian sublation is the object of that specific aspect of negative dialectics, and the truth of that falsity is a grounding point.

EDIT2: And there's another candidate for the ground of negative dialectics: material reality, or "the object" as in "the priority of the object". As he has been saying in the Frigility of Truth section, ND starts in the concrete and works out from there. So why not that? I happen to think this is wrong or misleading too, but I won't go into that now. — Jamal

The precise meaning of "object" is vague. As you say, ideology, and social structures, are objective, while I would say they are purely conceptual. Because of this, "object" might refer to ideology. In the case of Hegelian sublation, "the concrete" is that ideology. The jettisoning process described allows the concept to be free-floating, thus an "object". The supposed object must be approached as if it is the object, even though it may be a false object.

Psychology could be brought to bear to answer how this happened, but what Adorno focuses on is something that should have been obvious from reading Hegel: synthesis is not subject to the intellect. It's not that it's wrong, it's that the mind only deals with a dismantled world. — frank

I think the point is that "synthesis" in the Hegelian representation, is the subject of the intellect, and it is wrong. To make the representation work, requires that we do violence on the concept, falsely represent it. Synthesis falsely represents the 'logical' evolution of the Idea, as something free-floating, independent from the material world, manipulated by human reason. However, as experience demonstrates to us, the Idea does not evolve in a logical way, that is due to influence of "the irrational", which is the true reality of the material world.

So you're just making the modest claim that the argument convinces you of god's existence. You are not claiming that it constitutes undeniable proof that no rational person could deny. — Relativist

Of course, I said the proof is "irrefutable", I didn't say it was "undeniable". As you've aptly demonstrated, anyone can deny anything, no matter how irrefutable it is. All they need to do is fabricate a completely fictitious, imaginary "logical possibility", claim that they believe this "possibility" instead, and start denying. But denying it does not refute it, so I continue to believe that it is irrefutable.

Nevertheless, I did explain why it might be false: the possibility that there was an initial state of affairs that was physical (no gods). So there are at least 2 logically valid explanations for the existence of the universe: (A) God ; or (B) a physical initial state. — Relativist

I'll repeat myself. All empirical evidence indicates that any, and every, "physical state of affairs" is posterior in time, to the potential for that state. Since this is known with the highest degree of certitude possible, then we can conclude that any proposed "initial state of affairs that was physical" (simply interpreted as 'first physical thing') necessarily had a cause which was actual, and prior to it in time. That's a nonphysical cause. This conclusion requires the further premise that something actual is required, as cause, to produce any actuality from potential.

You haven't proven (B) false, so you should acknowledge that it is possibly true, and that this implies God possibly does not exist. Do you acknowledge this? — Relativist

I don't dispute (B), the "physical initial state". The point though, is that the argument demonstrates that an actual cause of such a thing is necessary. The potential for that initial physical state, by itself, does not suffice as the cause of it. That actual cause is something nonphysical, and what is commonly referred to as God.

Apokrisis will insist that a cause is not necessary, that the physical initial state just sprang into existence from infinite potential, as a quantum fluctuation, or some type of symmetry breaking. But this is irrational for the reasons I explained above. In a realm of infinite possibility there would be nothing which could actualize (select) one possibility (quantum fluctuation or symmetry breaking) instead of the others, all possibilities being balanced and equally possible.

When the argument of "chance occurrence", random event, abiogenesis, etc., is taken to the extreme, such as when it is taken to explain the very existence of "the physical universe", its irrationality becomes extremely evident. It's a matter of saying that something comes from nothing, where "nothing" is replaced with "potential". The physical universe comes from the potential for it. But this requires that we make "potential" into something real, and the only way to do this is to assign to it some degree of actuality, which is not physical. So we assume the actual existence of the nonphysical.

I feel like Adorno is saying, "they say that negative dialectics (or critical theory in general) lacks all foundations, but really it's their ontologies that don't have a leg to stand on, so you could say that it's their thinking which is groundless." They are looking for something that isn't there. Heidegger comes up against groundlessness but doesn't acknowledge it or only acknowledges it as a problem to surpass; he tries to uncover the meaning of being and doesn't realize that the groundlessness he wants to get beyond is itself the truth the philosopher ought to be looking for.

It was the alternative translation that put me on the right track: — Jamal

That's similar to the way I see it. But I think Adorno goes further, and demonstrates that negative dialectics is actually grounded, and that the other philosophies which absolutize thought and Spirit are really groundless. Those philosophies assume a foundation which is false. Those falsities assumed by the other philosophies, is the truth of negative dialectics. This truth, that their foundations are false, and that they are actually groundless, is the grounding of negative dialectics.

I'll refer to the Lectures, lecture 3, "Whether negative Dialectics is Possible", where he discusses Hegel's concept of the determinate negation. I believe that Adorno demonstrates the falsity of Hegel's conception of "synthesis". This falsity becomes the true determinate negation for Adorno, therefore a fixed point, a grounding for negative dialectics

But I believe that precisely
this aspect of positivity, which acts as a corollary to negativity, is
conjoined with the principle of negativity because it resists being fixed
once and for all in an abstract, static manner.

...

Hence, to make this quite clear, the issue is not to deny the existence of a certain fixed
point, it is not even to deny the existence of some fixed element in
thought; we shall in due course, I hope, come to discuss the meaning
whether negative dialectics is possible of such a fixed
element in dialectical logic in very concrete terms. But
the fixed, positive point, just like negation, is an aspect – and not
something that can be anticipated, placed at the beginning of every
thing.

...

At the same time, I should
like to draw your attention to the fact that the status of synthesis in
Hegel is actually somewhat anomalous. The fact is that, when you
read the texts closely, you find that there is much less said about such
syntheses, such positivities, than you might expect initially. And I
believe that if you were to trace Hegel’s use of the term ‘synthesis’
[Synthese] purely lexically – as opposed to the concept of ‘Synthesis’,
as used by Kant in his epistemology – you would find that it occurs
very rarely indeed, in contrast to such concepts as ‘positing’ [Setzung],
‘position’ or ‘negation’ – and this tells us something about the situation.
It is grounded in the subject matter; it is no merely external trait
of Hegelian language. In the three-stage scheme – if we allow for once
that such a thing is to be found in Hegel – the so-called synthesis that
represents the third stage as opposed to negation is by no means
simply better or higher. If you consider an example of such a three
stage dialectic – we might look at the famous triad of Being, Nothing
and Becoming16 – you will find that this so-called synthesis is actually
something like a movement, a movement of thought, of the concept,
but one that turns backwards and does not look forward and produce
something complete to be presented as a successful achievement on
a higher plane. Hegelian syntheses tend – and it would be rewarding
to follow this up with detailed analysis – to take the form that the
thesis reasserts itself within the antithesis, once this has been postulated.
Thus once the identity of two contradictory concepts has been
reached, or at least asserted in the antithesis, as in the most famous
case of all, the identity of Nothing with Being, this is followed by a
further reflection to the effect that, indeed, these are identical, I have
indeed brought them together – Being, as something entirely undefined,
is also Nothing. However, to put it quite crudely, they are not
actually entirely identical. The thought that carries out the act of
identification always does violence to every single concept in the
process. And the negation of the negation is in fact nothing other
than the α¸να′µνησις, the recollection, of that violence, in other words
the acknowledgement that, by conjoining two opposing concepts, I
have on the one hand bowed to a necessity implicit in them, while
on the other hand I have done them a violence that has to be rectified.
And truth to tell, this rectification in the act of identification is
what is always intended by the Hegelian syntheses.

On the contary. You assumed the burden of proof when you said: — Relativist

I have the proof which I believe is irrefutable. You dispute the truth of one of my premises. The burden is on you to demonstrate that the premise is false.

An "irrefutable proof" can't simply establish that the conclusion is possibly true; it must show that the conclusion is necessarily true. My burden is easy: I merely need to show that one of your premises is possibly false. — Relativist

You are speaking nonsense. To show my argument is unsound you need to demonstrate that the premise is not true, that is your burden. Otherwise, any argue may be refuted with the proposal of an imaginary "possible" premise which contradicts that of the argument. That is extreme skepticism, which you've already rejected as irrational. Therefore, if you desire to refute the argument, the burden is on you to show that the premise is in fact false, not just insist that there is a possible world in which the premise would be false.

If you don't understand that, then you don't understand logic. — Relativist

I understand refutation, and I also understand sophistry, which is what you appear to use logic for.

I profess to be a "law realist": that laws of nature actually exist, and this explains why we see regularities in nature. — Relativist

In no way does assuming that laws of nature actually exist explain why we see regularities in nature. This is because "explanation" requires that you show how natural things would have access to these "laws", would be able to read and interpret them, and have the urge to obey them.

To claim that there are laws of nature out there somewhere, and I don't have to say where they are, or how it is that things can understand these laws and obey them, does not explain anything about the regularities of nature. All you appear to be saying is that we describe natural activities according to laws, therefore there must be prescriptive laws which correspond with our descriptive laws, and natural things are obeying these prescriptive laws.

An infinite set of possibilities could fit any probability distribution. — Relativist

That's incorrect, it fits every set of probability distribution. If one is the correct distribution, the others are excluded as impossible. Therefore it is necessary to understand that it fits "every" set of probability distribution, not "any" one set. Other wise you misunderstand the meaning of "infinite set of possibilities". It is every possibility, not any possibility.

This is clear evidence of the way you behave. A small, intentional ignorance, turns everything around for you. Then you hope that I don't notice your sophistry. Just like above, you try to turn the burden of "refutation" around onto the person making the argument, by claiming that the criteria for "refutation" is to assert that the person making the argument hasn't demonstrate with absolute certainty that all the premises are impossible to be false. Your sophistry knows no bounds, as you've enabled yourself to refute any argument you want, with that simple assertion, simply through your sophistic manipulation of the meaning of "infinite set of possibilities".

There are various ideas about what it means to exist. My position is that existence entails objects which have intrinsic properties and that has relations to all other objects (at least indirectly). A brute fact initial state would have properties that accounted for its potential to develop into subsequent states of affairs. IOW: it initiates (=causes) the subsequent causal chain that you misinterpret. — Relativist

You state "what it means to exist", as a state. Then you propose "potential to develop into subsequent states". But this "potential" is not included in your definition of "exist", it is dependent on something else, time. However, "time" is not included as something which exists. Therefore you have a hidden premise, "time". We have "exist" according to your position, and also time, which is something which according to your position does not exist, but it is still necessary for you to account for the reality of things. Therefore you sneak it in as a hidden premise. This is the sophistry which you practise.

The initial state is causally linked to everything that exists. — Relativist

Sure it is, through your hidden premise of time, which according to your definition of "exists" does not exist. How do you account for the reality of time? You clearly need it for your argument, yet it escapes your definition of something which exists.

Yes that's what I believe too, it's not given, it is derived through the inner intuition. And that's why the knowledge of the object, as myself, is subjective rather than objective, as I explained, even though it is knowledge of the object (the subject is the object). We still cannot bypass the medium which is the inner intuition.

So the object is not directly given, it is understood through the temporal order of internal things, just like the outer object is understood through spatial relations. However, I do believe that since the inner intuition is a part of the object to be understood, there actually is an aspect of the object which is given, that's the inner intuition. But the inner intuition is proper to this specific type of object, a subject, and that's why our knowledge of the object (as the subject, oneself) is subjective.

Putting the two together is pragmatism/semiosis. — apokrisis

Putting the two together is ambiguity and equivocation.

You don’t seem to get the neat logic of what Peirce was actually up to here. — apokrisis

Peirce, like Wittgenstein whom some say derived ideas from Peirce, was a master of ambiguity.

My assertion was modest: an initial state of affairs is possible. — Relativist

That does not affect the argument. You just switched terminology from the existence of a physical thing, to a "state of affairs". By the inductive principle, the potential for each "state of affairs" is prior in time to that state of affairs. And, it needs an actual cause. Therefore even the proposed "initial state of affairs" has an actual cause which is prior to it.

Apokrisis avoids the cosmological argument by claiming that an actual physical state of affairs can come into existence from infinite possibility, as some sort of symmetry breaking. But this is illogical to believe that something actual could all of a sudden pop out of infinite possibility, a random fluctuation could suddenly occur in an infinite symmetry.

The nature of possibility is that each distinct possibility is possible. In infinite possibility each must be equally probable to allow that all are possible. Therefore not one could ever come into existence over another unless something selects, and actualizes one rather than the others. This is the issue, an actuality which causes one rather than the others is necessary. If possibility was infinite, then every possibility would be equal in that sense, and not one actual state of affairs could ever arise over the others, because that infinite possibility denies any actuality, and an actuality is required as cause.

By presenting an alternative you hadn't considered, I conclusively proved your conclusion false. — Relativist

You haven't presented any alternative. You only irrationally denied the inductive logic as black swan fallacy. However, there is no black swan fallacy here, because all experience and all physical evidence points to the truth of the premise. I agree that we can never know anything with absolute certainty, as you've been arguing, but this inductive conclusion we know with the highest degree of certainty of anything. You could argue that all knowledge concerning the physical world falls to the black swan fallacy, but you've already denied extreme skepticism, indicating that we can believe some facts. So if you reject this inductive premise, you're a hypocrite, rejecting it only because you do not want to face the reality of the conclusion it produces.

However, an initial state is also conceptually possible: we can conceptualize something just existing by brute fact*. — Relativist

This is false. We have an idea of what "existing" means. And, it is derived from our observations of the physical world. If we move to "conceptualize something existing by brute fact", then we violate, or contradict the meaning of "existing" which is supported by observations of our world.

Of course one might stipulate, like in the case of mathematical axioms, what "existing" means, and proceed to a conceptualization of something which exists simply because it is posited as existing, but what good would that do? This conceptualized existing thing, which exists because it is posited as existing by brute fact, would be something completely distinct and unrelated to the actual physical existence which we know. That is the problem with the difference between axiomatized ideals, and the real physical world, which 've been describing.

How is that ideal "something existing by brute fact" in anyway useful to this argument? It's like saying that you can posit a "possible world" which is completely different from the actual world, and use this to refute my description of the actual world. But this possible world is completely irrelevant, unless you can demonstrate some relation. That's the thing with fiction, we can make up whatever we want, including something which exists just by brute fact. But the fiction is irrelevant to our knowledge of the actual world, until you can show it to have some bearing.

So we have two contradictory metaphysical claims. Both are conceivable, neither is provable (short of making additional assumptions*), but one must be false. Reasoning can take us no further - so you can't rationally claim to show an initial state is metaphysically impossible. — Relativist

Again, this is false. Yes, we have two contradictory metaphysical claims. However, mine is proven through reference to the actual physical world, and the strongest inductive principle which we can know. Yours is just a fictitious "possible world" which has no bearing on our actual physical world, which you only proposed as an alternative to mine because you are afraid to face the reality of the actual world.

I could go further and show that an infinite past is logically impossible, but it's not necessary since I've already thoroughly refuted your claim. — Relativist

Your supposed refutation is like this: I can imagine a possible world which is completely different from your description of our actual world. Therefore your description of our world lacks the necessity required to be a true description, and your argument based on this descriptive premise is thereby refuted as unsound.

What you actually need to do to prove that the premise is untrue, is to demonstrate how it is inconsistent with the actual world. Thinking up an imaginary world which is different from my description, and claiming that the actual world could be like this instead of like my description, does not show my premise to be untrue.

Your understanding of the big bang theory is flawed. The theory of the big bang is based on general relativity: the size of the (currently) visible universe approaches zero at increasingly earlier states. So there's a mathematical limit of 0 size and infinite density. This entails a mathematical singularity - from which physicists infer general relativity breaks down. They also note that below a certain radius, quantum effects would dominate. This is currently unanalyzable because there is no accepted theory that reconciles general relativity and quantum mechanics. — Relativist

i don't see the flaw. You've just said almost the very same thing as me in a different way. The mathematical singularity is the mathematical ideal i referred to.

I quoted the Critique of Pure Reason here where the reality of time is discussed. The expression of "inner versus outer objects" is seen strictly as the activity of the intuitions as the possibility of our experiences. — Paine

Do you see that your quote supports what I said? Time has reality in regard to "inner experience". As such it supports the reality of "myself" the being which is I. This is the means by which the subject becomes the object. The intuition of time is a condition of "all our experiences" therefore it is the essential aspect of the being which is I. The intuition of "space" on the other hand is a condition of outer experience.

Notice that by making the subject the object, we allow intelligibility of the object. But it is done under this condition, the intuition of time. Therefore the reality of time, and the subject as an object, can be apprehended, but only intuitionally, not in an absolute sense because absolute objectivity is denied by the subjective nature (which is the nature of intuition) of this object, i.e. the type of object which has the intuition of time as an essential aspect.

The implication, I believe, is that the only true way to understand the nature of an object, is to understand its temporality. And this we can only achieve by understanding ourselves, not by understanding other things, because time is the inner intuition. The reality of that is due to the fact that intuition is always the medium between subject and object. But we can understand the object which is the subject, when we apprehend the intuition of time as the essential aspect of that object. That dissolves the medium, but renders the understanding of the object as necessarily subjective, limited to that type of object which is a subject.

Extremist magnet. — jorndoe

He was bought, for his ability to speak, and would speak about whatever he was paid to speak about, regardless of whether he had any real belief.

You just get angrier as the years go past. — apokrisis

You confuse a sense of humour for anger. Perhaps it's not a socially acceptable form of humour, but how does poking fun at someone, or ridiculing them, imply anger to you?

Again, just check out what I already told you seven years ago. Long before AI was around to deal with one's more mundane intellectual chores. — apokrisis

That statement really doesn't support your case. And repeating the same assertion you made seven years ago only indicates your unwillingness to adapt, and that your prejudice is well entrenched.

You are simply assuming the reality of the mathematical ideals which physicists apply (symmetries etc.). And you show complete disregard for the fact that the world which physicists apply these ideals to, reveals itself through empirical observation, to be fundamentally incompatible with those ideals. This has been pointed out to you many times, but you continue in ignorance.

it's just another form of physicalism, which by its very nature, ignores large tracts of empirical evidence, in an attempt to stuff the square peg (reality) into the round hole (physicalism).

The fact that the language of mathematics treats abstractions as "existing" does not entail that they do. — Relativist

Are you saying that the axioms of mathematics are irrelevant to the meaning of mathematical symbols, that mathematicians can interpret the rules however they want?

A physicist making a claim about the ontological status of mathematical abstractions is doing metaphysics, not physics. It's a question that cannot be settled by empirical evidence or scientific methodology. — Relativist

But you said explicitly ""physicalism defers to physics the identification of what exists". Therefore you (as physicalist) are assigning to physics, the responsibility of judging whether mathematical objects exist or not.

If you now claim that the physicist steps outside the boundaries of one's discipline, into metaphysics, in doing this, and ought not do this, then this implies that physicalism is absolutely incapable of making that judgement. The metaphysician who is physicalist leaves that judgement to the physicist to make, but then admits that the physicist is not qualified to make that judgement.

Agreed. — Relativist

i don't see how you can agree with me on this point, yet still believe that "physicalism" is the best ontology. By admitting that there is not one single ontology which supports physics as its grounding, you also allow that "physicalism" as an individual ontological base, will have internal incompatibility. That implies incoherency between various factions, but intrinsic within the overall "physicalism". Don't you think it would be better to choose one or the other form of physicalism, and adhere solely to those principles to avoid incoherency, or even better, to avoid physicalism altogether?

This actually relates directly to what you said above, about "the language of mathematics". We commonly allow interpretive variance in relation to mathematical axioms, as if interpretation is irrelevant. This allows for a wider range of applicability, that's what intentional ambiguity is useful for, a wider range of interpretation, therefore extended applicability. But it is ambiguity, and ambiguity is problematic when it comes to grounding. i suggest that you consider that this ambiguity contributes to the fact that there is a wide range of incompatible ontologies which consider themselves each to be a form of physicalism. This is because there is a range of different ways we can interpret the axioms which are indispensable to our understanding of the physics of the world.

And once we admit potential as ontologically real, we also re-introduce the idea of inherent directionality — Wayfarer

This "inherent directionality", within ontological potential, is why apokrisis' claim that physics speaks of "pure chance", and absolute necessity, is false. Physics never gets to "pure chance", nor do physicists assume such a thing. Apokrisis does, and some other cosmologists do, but that's not physics. Physicists have to deal with the reality of the less-than-ideal, which confronts them at every event. Pure chance and absolute necessity is never a part of that. The mathematics applied, of course, assumes ideals, but this does not equate with "the ontology of modern physics", it would be more properly called "the ontology of modern mathematics". But it's not common to base ontology solely in mathematical axioms, because these deliberately do not account for the reality of less-than-ideal physical world.


Are you claiming that some AI told you that Ontic Structural Realism is the ontology of modern physics? I think that AI needs some fine tuning in relation to its biases.

You're really not making any sense apokrisis. If you have an intelligent reply to my post, then please present it.

Until then I have only your demonstration that you know nothing about what physicists do. That is, your ridiculous claim that "the ontology of modern physics is pretty straightforward. It speaks of pure chance in interaction with absolute necessity".

But it does help to at least know the physics, wouldn’t you agree? — apokrisis

Are you suggesting that the metaphysician ought to be instead a physicist, and that being a physicist instead of a metaphysician would make the metaphysician a better metaphysician?

But it does help to at least know the physics, wouldn’t you agree? — apokrisis

Help who, the physicist?

The way I took it is that addition of numbers is sequential - first, 7, then 'add 5' giving the result '12'. It is the fact of the sequential order of mental operations that assumes time. The spatial representation (writing the numbers down) is only a useful aid; the grounding of number itself is in time, not space. — Wayfarer

Yes, I believe that's pretty much what Kant intended with the distinction between the inner and outer a priori intuitions. Internal ideas, as pure intellectual objects, are grounded in temporal order, therefore not requiring spatial features for understanding. The appearance of phenomena, on the other hand, requires that external, spatial aspect as well as the temporal aspect.

in terms of Kant's language. He made a claim of how little we can know about it since it is how we experience what we do.

Perhaps Kant is not accepting the speculation of your model. — Paine

I think that if you read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, you'll find that he characterizes space as the outer intuition (required for the appearance of outward sensations I assume), and time as the inner intuition (required for the appearance of inward sensations I assume).

Claims about "how little we can know about it" do not equate with 'we can know nothing'. And, Kant did make this distinction between inner and outer. I'd look it up for you, but you could Google it if you are interested. I believe the important point which Kant makes with this distinction is that even though both space and time are a priori, the intuition of time is in a sense prior to space. Time is fundamental to the being itself, as essential to internal processes, required for all types of experience, whereas space is necessary for a specific type of experience, the one we understand as the separation between myself and what is other than me.

So physicalism defers to physics the identification of what exists. IMO there's no epistemically superior means of doing so. That deference doesn't entail an ontological commitment to the specific things physics identifies. — Relativist

This is why physicalism is a very problematic perspective. Mathematical axioms assume the existence of mathematical objects. This is implicit in set theory. But physicists do not identify a number, or a set, as an object which exists and which ought to be studied in the field of physics. Yet physicists use mathematics. Therefore physicists in the application of mathematics, assume the existence of mathematical objects, which they do not identify and study as existents.

This indicates that what you state as the approach of physicalism, "physicalism defers to physics the identification of what exists", is mistaken.

So the ontology of modern physics is pretty straightforward. It speaks of pure chance in interaction with absolute necessity. — apokrisis

This is not true. Physicists do not work with pure chance and absolute necessity. That is simply your personal ontological interpretation of modern physics. It is not the ontology which actually underlies the work of physicists. In fact, the issues which are evident in the interpretation of quantum observations clearly indicate that there is no specific "ontology of modern physics". So how anyone portrays the ontology of modern physics is just a matter of personal preference.

That is very helpful - it helps me understand much better Kant's connection of time with number and space with geometry. :100: — Wayfarer

Simply put, Kant associates space, as the outer intuition, with external objects, and time, as the inner intuition, with internal objects. So, I would understand Mww's example like this. Time is already required, as the internal intuition, prior to writing a number, then when it is written, it is apprehended through the external intuition as having a spatial presence. This specific example is consistent with Plato's cave allegory, where the external object (sensible in Plato's terminology) is posterior to, and a reflection of the internal, which is the higher degree of reality.

Of course there's ways he could be unaware! — Relativist

He managed to get rich. I suppose maybe he thought all that luxury just fell at his feet.

On January 5, 2021, the day before the Washington, D.C., protest that led to the January 6 United States Capitol attack, Kirk wrote on Twitter that Turning Point Action and Students for Trump were sending more than 80 "buses of patriots to D.C. to fight for this president".[51][52] A spokesman for Turning Point said that the groups ended up sending seven buses, not 80, with 350 students.[51][53] In the lead-up to the storming, Kirk said he was "getting 500 emails a minute calling for a civil war".[54] Publix heiress Julie Fancelli gave Kirk's organizations $1.25 million to fund the buses to the January 6 event. Kirk also paid $60,000 for Kimberly Guilfoyle to speak at the rally.[55] — Wikipedia

But God is not an idea. And I am a rational human being who does not rebel against God. God is simple in being, yes, but I should think the creator of all things is even more complex than the greatest complexity found in creation. — NotAristotle

Good point, but for many rational human beings, God is just an idea. In that case God is very simple. So , amongst rational human beings there is discrepancy as to the meaning of "God". And many deny that "to love God with all your heart, mind, and soul and to love your neighbor as yourself" is the objective law.

This calls into question the relationship between rational human beings and objective law. Since human beings are subjects, and rationality is a property of subjects, rationality is fundamentally subjective. This implies a sort of gap between rational human beings and objective law, perhaps the ought/is gap.

It’s your prerogative to intensely dislike people, and to say as much. — Roke

The pivotal point being the ambiguity in "dislike people". To dislike a person, and to tell them this, is socially acceptable. To do this to multiple "people" is also in principle ok, though it may indicate that you have a problem, and you are not actually ok. To dislike people, and tell them this, is definitely not ok.

I hate you.” (Not hate speech?)

“That girl I made out with at the bar turned out to be a tranny!” (Hate speech?)

The word “hate” is a generally well-functioning word. Intense dislike. It’s your prerogative to intensely dislike people, and to say as much. — Roke

I think that the difference you are pointing to here, is the difference between how we speak to another individual, and how we speak to a group of people. There is a big difference here because it is necessary that we continually have interactions with individuals on a regular basis, daily, while we much more rarely need to address groups.

In our day to day interactions with individuals, our emotions influence us immensely, and often we are inclined to say hateful things to another. Because of this influence of emotion, and passion of the moment, the tolerance level, what is socially acceptable to say to another, is quite high. That is simply because most of us do not have complete control over our emotions, and we cannot punish everyone who loses a little control over one's tongue in the spur of the moment.

On the other hand, when we address groups and types of people, our actions and words are usually well thought out in advance, premeditated, and planned. Emotion does enter into this form of "speech", as this is what constitutes an impassioned orator, but the tolerance level of what is socially acceptable is much stricter due to the fact that the speech is deliberate.

The reason why the tolerance level of acceptability in prepared, deliberate speech, addressing a multitude of people, differs from the tolerance level of acceptability in the spontaneous speech of day to day interactions between individuals, ought to be obvious to you. There is no difference in the meaning of "hate" here, just a difference in the social acceptability of different types of demonstrations of hate.

By contrast, contemporary physicalism has quietly shifted ground. It still borrows the authority of science, but without committing itself to whatever physics currently says about the world. Instead, it invokes “the scientific worldview” in a more nebulous sense, using scientific facts when they support its claims, but disclaiming any dependence on physics when they do not. The result is less a rigorous ontology than a posture of allegiance: a declaration that, whatever reality ultimately turns out to be, it will count as “physical” by definition. This maneuver preserves physicalism from refutation, but only by reducing its content to a loyalty oath. — Wayfarer

Well, "materialism" seems to have been left behind. But probably, "scientism" is a better word for the modern form then, according to what you describe here. But for some reason, "scientism" has already developed negative connotations, and is generally frowned upon. So those who believe in this sort of ontology prefer to claim "physicalism" because this term has maintained some of that traditional acceptability acquired through that relationship with "materialism".

It's a shifting sea of names. because as that simplistic form of ontology gets exposed as insufficient, the believers adopt a new name, with minor alterations, in an attempt to cover over the insufficiencies.

Each of the postulates of physicalism goes beyond what physics can properly do: — Relativist

In other words, physicalism claims that physics can go beyond what physics can properly do.

I think the point is that we need to take a good look at stochastic terrorism and judge whether Charlie Kirk was getting more and more practised at this art. Isn't stochastic terrorism what Trump is accused of in relation to the Jan 6 event?

Firstly it is science that posits the existence of dark matter and energy on the basis of observations. So, they are considered to be a part of the Universe as understood by science. — Janus

Exactly as I said they are names applied to something not understood, nor observed, but the effects of them are observed. This is just like the theological "God", something not understood, nor observed, but the effects of God are observed.

If the guide includes evidence from the empirical sciences then the empirical sciences are guiding metaphysical speculation. Intuition is always itself guided by the current state of knowledge or scientific paradigm. Intuition in unconstrained speculative free play can come up with anything that isn't a logical contradiction, so by itself is not a reliable guide at all. I don't prefer referring to it as intuition anyway, but rather as imagination―creative imagination invents hypotheses designed to explain what is observed―it's known as abduction. — Janus

I see no point to discussing ambiguity in the meaning of "guide". I think I adequately made my point.

Lots of philosophical issues can be discussed without first establishing a common ontology. This includes discussions of epistemology and science. — Relativist

Of course, we discuss our philosophical differences. And if we proceed philosophically without differences its because our underlying ontological assumptions are compatible and there is nothing to establish.

The judgement is between 2 or more competing hypotheses, for the sole purpose of selecting one. — Relativist

That's not what we've been discussing. The judgement is whether or not to continue with the acceptance of the hypotheses, physicalism, when there is new evidence (relevant information) which contradicts it. We have not been discussing alternatives. I maintain, that when the operating hypotheses is demonstrated as deficient, it is time to seek a new one.

Consider the auditory evidence of a second shooter of Kennedy: this new information doesn't change my relative ranking of the 2 hypotheses. — Relativist

That judgement is irrational. The new evidence directly contradicts what you believe, yet you claim it does not change the degree of certainty in your belief. That, is being irrational, plain and simple.

We're just producing a relative ranking of the hypotheses based on whatever information is available. — Relativist

Again, you are making a strawman representation of our discussion, as if we are ranking competing hypotheses. We are not, we are considering the acceptability of one specific hypotheses, named as "physicalism". And, we are judging whether it is something to be believed, when we have "relevant information" which directly contradicts it.

Good description of what often occurs, but do you agree that it can be more rational to reevaluate the hypotheses (there need to be at least 2) than to "adjust and make an exception"? That's my point. — Relativist

Why do you think there needs to be at least two? That's not what we are discussing. We are discussing the judgement of one hypotheses. The scientific method works to judge one hypotheses, with experimentation. There is no need for at least two. That is some arbitrary condition which you are trying to impose, because you have a model which operates in that way, but it's just a strawman model, not at all representative of real judgement in this sort of situation.

How does the fact that there is an ontological ground to epistemolgy (invariably discussed as a supervenience relation) support your claim that physics can replace epistemology? — Relativist

That's not my claim, in fact it is the opposite of my claim. My claim is that believing in physicalism is believing that physics can replace metaphysics as the grounding for epistemology. And, I say that this is a false belief, not a true one.

Consider the relation between meteorology and the more fundamental science of thermodynamics and fluid dynamics - which obviously ground it - just one level down.. No one would suggest replacing meteorology with direct application of thermodynamics and fluid dynamics. — Relativist

Good example. Metaphysics grounds epistemology, which grounds the sciences and physics. You (through the means of physicalism), suggest that we can take physics a few levels down, and replace metaphysics with the direct application of physics. Does your example help you to understand why physicalism is unacceptable?

The context is that we're selecting a "best explanation" for a set of data that we are assumed to be facts, from a set 2 or more possible explanations that have been proposed. You still seem be treating this as traditional Bayesianism. — Relativist

Strawman! We are judging one hypotheses, physicalism.

Your inductive inference applies to all cases in which an object comes into existence from a state of affairs in which it did not exist. It does not apply to an initial state of affairs (Si); because there was no prior time at which Si did not exist. — Relativist

There is no initial state of affairs. Any such initial state would be arbitrarily imposed, and would be a "physical condition", so this is irrelevant to the argument, and you are using it as an attempt to impose a physicalist premise.

There's no objective reason to believe an initial, uncaused, physical state of affairs could not have existed. — Relativist

Yes there is a reason to believe this. The proposed "uncaused, physical state of affairs" is contrary to all the empirical evidence, which supports the inductive premise of causation. There is absolutely no empirical evidence which is contrary to this inductive premise. Therefore, that an "uncaused, physical state of affairs could not have existed" can be known with the highest possible degree of certitude.

I have just conclusively shown that your argument is non-sequitur. — Relativist

No, you have just presented me with an irrelevant and false proposition, that an initial state of affairs is required. The irrationality of an initial state of affairs, in the absolute sense, with no prior time, demonstrates that any proposed initial state, itself requires a prior cause. That is exactly the case with the proposed "Big Bang". It must be either reduced to a nonphysical mathematical "singularity" as the initial state (which is irrational because its a mathematical, nonphysical "state"), or else understood as having a prior cause, God or some other sort of universe creating mechanism.

Can you give an example of what the concept <universe> might be extended to in order to include things
other than what is either observable or the effect of something observable? — Janus

There is a huge part of the so-called "universe", dark matter, dark energy, etc., which is neither observable nor the effect of something observable. The effects of these are observable, but these are not themselves observable, nor are they the effect of something observable. We might hypothesize that they are the effect of spatial expansion or some such thing, but spatial expansion is not observable or the effect of something observable. From our observations, we conclude logically that there must be something (spatial expansion), which causes what we observe. This is what the theologists say about God, His effects are observable. but He is not Observable.

This common feature of "the universe", that there are thing which are not observable but have effects which are, I believe is due to the nature of time. The only things observable are things at the present, so all observation are past in time by the time they are noted as observed. However, there is a vast part of time, which is perhaps even bigger than the past, which is known as the future. The future is unobservable for the reason just stated. And, since the future consists of possibilities, this is not the effect of something observable, nor the effect of something observed.

So you acknowledge that science is a guide to metaphysical speculation. — Janus

No, science is not a guide to metaphysical speculation, just evidence to consider in metaphysical speculations. Both the successes and failures of science need to be considered objectively, and judged accordingly. Since it consists of both, and its parts must be judged, it cannot itself be the guide for that judgement. Metaphysical speculation is itself the guide, and intuition is what inspires it.

I personally don't think all objective laws are fictions. And I think you are correct that Adorno also believes in objective laws and truth. There must be a reality in the first place for the project of negative dialectics to make any kind of sense. — NotAristotle

Assuming that there is an objective law concerning social relations, how do you think it would it look? Traditionally, this would be God's law, and I discussed this briefly with Jamal earlier in the thread. But "God" is actually very simplistic, and just an easy principle which facilitates the assertion of objective law. As much as this principle is readily accepted by the followers, the sheep, it's not very appealing to the rational speculative mind, because it's really more of an avoidance of the problem rather than addressing it. Hegel attempted to provide a more rational principle with the Idea, or the Spirit, but it's not well grounded.

This way that "God" is unappealing to the rational mind is very interesting to me. God is an ancient idea, and as such it is ultra simplistic, and it actually becomes repugnant to the modern mind. Rational human beings rebel against this idea because it is ancient, simplistic, and produced by uneducated beings. This is how I see the movement of Jesus and his followers as a resistance against "God". They rebelled against those who held on to "God", and rebelled against the prevailing idea of "God". However, the human population in general, was not readily for this revolution, and Saul/Paul subverted the whole process, rendering Christianity, which was intended as a revolt against the God fearing religion, as a God serving religion. Some claim Jesus failed.

We can see a similar situation today. rational human beings rebel against the idea of "God" and desire to rid us of this artifact left behind from the uneducated. However, we can notice from the state of the world today, that the human population is generally not ready for this.

But this is where "objective law" is the crux. Anyone can offer up a version of "objective law" which is fictional, but over time the fictitiousness will be revealed, and the movement will be fruitless. There is however, one which always seems to escape this fate, God. So in this particular set of circumstances, charging that God is fictional, just like all the other fictional objective laws doesn't work, because we generally believe in objective laws and truths, and the habit is already, to fall back on "God". This means that a better, more true, or less fictional, objective law is required to avoid this trap.

I could be wrong but that's how I understood that section, at least. — Moliere

As usual, we disagree in interpretation.

I'm interpreting Adorno as noting a performative contradiction in the relativist. The consciousness must adhere to the law of exchange, but if the entrepreneur were to do that then there is not an equality between labor-power and a wage unless the entrepreneur were to erase himself from the equation. — Moliere

Why would you assume that there needs to be an equality? The inequality is what the capitalist lives on, and it is the basic feature of relativism.

But the capitalist is no relativist, after all -- there is only a very small part of thought which the capitalist relativizes, namely the Spirit and anything that has nothing to do with the productive process, such as the qualitative rather than the quantitative. — Moliere

The capitalist is the relativist:

The presumed social relativity of the intuitions obeys
the objective law of social production under private ownership of the
means of production. Bourgeois skepticism, which embodies relativism
as a doctrine, is narrow-minded.

You're skipping over my key point, in that quote:
that philosophical issues can generally be dealt with while ignoring ontology. Ontology could be more of a distraction. — Relativist

Philosophical differences are always deeply rooted, and unless the difference is very mundane (making it not a real philosophical issue) the differences cannot be resolved without addressing ontological principles. As you yourself admit, ontology provides grounding. And philosophical difficulties are issues with principles, premises, which require analysis of the grounding, to resolve the differences. You might have noticed that discussions at TPF generally end up becoming disputes over ontological differences.

This is a strawman simply because we have no more reliable, or even any other reliable, guide, to "how the universe truly is" than science. — Janus

This claim could only be justified by begging the question. If you restrict your definition of "universe", to that which is studied by the empirical sciences, then the claim is true. But if you allow that "universe" extends to all those aspects of reality which are hidden from the empirical sciences (a very large part of reality as Wayfarer has proven), then your claim that "we have no more reliable, or even any other reliable, guide, to 'how the universe truly is" than science', must be blatantly false.

The falsity is due to the fact that we need to include within our guide to understanding how the universe truly is, all the aspects which are hidden from the empirical sciences. Therefore the guide must include evidence from the empirical sciences, but not be restricted to those principles, thereby employing a method which extends beyond them. A common example is "metaphysics", which by its name goes beyond physics. This allows that the knowledge derived from physics gets incorporated into a larger field, ?metaphysics", which would provide a more reliable guide to how the universe truly is, by using the knowledge derived from physics, other sciences, as well as other fields.

The way I'm understanding that paragraph:


"... must calculate so that
the unpaid part of the yield of alienated labor falls to him as a profit,
and must think that like for like – labor-power versus its cost of
reproduction – is thereby exchanged"

is the law so described. "Like for like" is exchanged -- so a wage is set such that labor-power is sustained and reproduced and the wage is below the value being produced.

Ideologically "A fair days labor for a fair days pay" -- a falsity because if it were true then there'd be no profit, and thereby no entrepreneur. — Moliere

But Adorno clearly says: "it can just as stringently be shown, however, why this objectively necessary consciousness is objectively false". So isn't it the case that he is rejecting the Marxist characterization of the capitalist form of the "objective law of social production"? If so, what is he proposing to replace it with?

Clearly he is saying that it is some form of "objective law" which produces the "whole", which we know as society:

In truth divergent perspectives have their law in the structure of
the social process, as one of a preestablished whole. Through its
cognition they lose their non-committal aspect.

The described law, Marx's social production is a law of competition. So when Adorn says that it can equally be shown to be objectively false, therefore sublated, I think he means that we could equally replace it with a law of cooperation. Competition and cooperation are opposed. But the law of competition is the one accepted by the bourgeoisie which embodies narrow-minded relativism.

Then he goes on, in the final paragraph, to explain how this really is hostility to the Spirit. There is a concept which rationalizes these relations of social production, it may be "the idea of the autonomy of the Spirit". But this idea produces a self-loathing, because it has actually ended up inhibiting the development of freedom. So this is what actually refutes relativism, the proof is in the pudding, the consequences of what its own existence has brought upon itself "the proof of its own narrowness crushes it".

The objectively necessary consciousness is the thinking that goes in to sustaining the non-thought objectivity - that is, the ideology. That ideology could be capitalism as much as it could be Marxist communism. — NotAristotle

Right, I think that the "objective law" could really be anything. But then, are we speaking any sort of truth when we refer to the "objective law"? If we want to acknowledge "fictions as fictions", then why would we even talk about the objective law, if all objective laws are actually fictions. Notice the quote above, "In truth ... a preestablished whole". I think we ought to conclude that Adorno thinks some form of "preestablished whole" is the truth, but the question is, what form of objective law supports the reality of this whole. He doesn't believe that all objective laws are fictions, because there must be a true one to support the existence of the preestablished whole.

Only in situations where one has a choice of hypotheses is the degree of certainty needed. — Relativist

In this case, you have what you called good reason to believe that the hypothesis is false. How would this affect the degree of certainty? I think it is irrational to choose a hypotheses when there is strong evidence (good reason) which indicates that it is false.

However, the issue is really much more complicated than what you describe. What happens often, is that a person will select a hypotheses with incomplete data, as you suggest. The extent of the data which is unknown is itself unknown, so the certainty level may be higher than it ought to be. The relevance of the unknown data cannot be accounted for, because the data is unknown. Therefore the data which is judged is arbitrarily weighted relative to the unknown data.

Then, as time passes more data will become available to the individual(s) who made that judgement. The data may actually be directly contrary to the accepted hypotheses, but since the hypotheses is already accepted, and plays an active role in the lives of those who accept it, they simply adjust, make an exception to the rule to allow for the now evident contrary data, and continue to work with the hypotheses, which we now have data that confirms it is faulty. In other words, the hypotheses is judged with incomplete data, it is put to use, and with use, data comes out which falsifies it. But since it has become so useful, instead of going back to the original judgement and reassessing, we simply make an exception which allows us to work around the faultiness of the hypotheses. This is actually very common in physics.

Physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis. It's a gross caricature to suggest this means physics can replace epistemology. — Relativist

Yes, physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis. However, epistemology is what ontology grounds. Therefore it is you who speaks nonsense here.

You interpreted "good reasons" to entail facts that contradicted my prior judgement. I explained this was not what I meant by the phrase. I have identified no facts that contradict physicalism. If I use your private lexicon, I would not label the point a "good reason" to reject physicalism, but rather that it constitutes relevant information that should be taken into account (as I previously described, and you ignored). — Relativist

Your use of "facts" here is misplaced. You have talked yourself out of the usefulness of "facts", by insisting that beliefs are judged by degree of certainty. So if there is such a thing as a fact, it is irreleavnt because you do not consider any beliefs to be facts.

You have identified beliefs which you have, which contradict physicalism, i.e. that you have reason to believe that the mind has a nonphysical aspect. Therefore you believe contradictory things. To resolve the contradiction within your own beliefs you need to either demonstrate to yourself that the mind is physical, or else reject physicalism.

Yes, as you say, you have "relevant information that should be taken into account". That relevant information is that you now believe yourself to have evidence which contradicts that judgement you already made.

"Proven?" Do you mean that you judge some cosmological argument to offer irrefutable proof of God, or do you draw a less certain conclusion? — Relativist

Yes, I believe the cosmological argument provides irrefutable proof of God. In case your not familiar with it, here is a simplified version.

We observe that it is always the case that the potential for the physical object is prior in time to the actual existence of any physical object. We also know that something actual is required to actualize any potential. Therefore we can conclude that there is something actual which is prior to every physical object. That is what is known as God.

Does the fact I proved you wrong about this lead you to reevaluate your conclusion, or is this irrelevant to the particular cosmological argument you embrace? — Relativist

Duh. Your "proof" was the following:

No, it doesn't entail infinite regress. — Relativist

I think Adorno would say social process is equivalent to ideology. In that way, it is most distinct from Hegel's Absolute Spirit because Absolute Spirit thinks itself to have achieved objectivity. — NotAristotle

I don't see the difference. How do you explain the following?

"The presumed social relativity of the intuitions obeys the objective law of social production under private ownership of the means of production"

He explicitly says "the objective law of social production". So he is claiming objectivity just as much as Hegel does with Absolute Spirit. "Social production" has replace "Absolute Spirit".

Further, when you say "social process is equivalent to ideology", the specific ideology being referred to is the ideology of Absolute Spirit. This is what inclines the individual, divergent perspectives to lose the non-committal aspect. It is true that the ideology which serves this purpose could be something other than Absolute Spirit, but what would that be? Well, it's "the objective law of social production". But now we need to understand how this law could be objective.

I read that in a Marxist sense. So the entrepreneur must pay a wage which is below the value produced by the labor-power he employs, else he will not be an entrepreneur for long. "social process" I take it to mean "Capitalism" in the age he's writing in, but as Marx describes it. — Moliere

Then he says about this capitalist attitude, "it can just as stringently be shown, however, why this objectively necessary consciousness is objectively false". And so I ask, how does he show it. And he claims "The presumed social relativity of the intuitions obeys the objective law of social production under private ownership of the means of production". And I do not understand what he means by this. What is "the objective law of social production"?

So, in fact, we can't all just "have our own truth", at least in accord with this particular relativism, because there is one truth that we must insist upon -- which, more generally, I'd take from the Marxist notions to think about so the economic superstructure of some kind. — Moliere

"Economic superstructure of some kind" does not equate with "objective law of social production". If such a law exists shouldn't it be describable?