Which is why I now do my most important banking where there is decent brick and mortar access. — Pantagruel

And you and me likely aren't alone. Which I think puts this to a more correct perspective: everything that theoretically could be replaced by AI, won't be replaced by AI and robots.

it might in fact flip the other way and be the last nail on the coffin for NATO. — Tzeentch

What history has told us with the failure and abolution of NATO's sister organizations, CENTO and SEATO, the real cause is not having any common objectives (and having revolutions, that put you against the US).

My expectation is that NATO will see a brief surge in unity as a result of the the Ukraine war — Tzeentch

Putin can still win, don't forget. If he gets that landbridge to Crimea (that he already has), he can argue it was worth it. And he can always point out that he faced the West alone, economies 40 times bigger than Russia "all attacking peaceful Russia, which then Russia victoriously defended".

Customer service - particularly technical support - is already in the shitter. Does it really matter if it drops out of the toilet bowl into the sewer? — Pantagruel

Think about it when it's your money, debts, financial investments, something quite important to you. Imagine your bank has no people that you can talk to.

I don't mind the grocery store being run by a computer. Even if the interactions there are easily handled by AI and robots, I simply wouldn't go and buy all my stuff from a service that doesn't have any people. I guess I assume I will be rich enough to decide that. But with larger issues, it sucks.

Or let's say would you be OK with a judicial system which would be totally run by smart AI, perhaps the first humans working on secondary courts / in appeals?

Excellent documentary! The obvious philosophical problem is that the simple AI hasn't actual artificial intelligence, cannot understand the context of the question.

And of course, modern states understand the propaganda value of either search engines or AI systems. They surely will want to control what is given to us as AI, because they can sit down and have a chat with the actual human beings who own and operate the AI system.

We're in no danger from AI any time soon.... — Pantagruel

What the real and present danger is the following.

Company CEO's and organization leaders have a "revolutionary" idea: Let's replace ALL customer service with AI. The cost benefits are amazing!

And then @Pantagruel, you have no choice, no ability to get what you want if the AI won't understand your question. There exist now many companies that offer services without any kind of way to contact them. And AI can be the answer to many more. Only hope for that niche entrepreneur who offers you actual humans for customer service.

I wouldn't like to be in Animal Farm at all.
Where we actually are, I don't get a lot of choices of where in society I would rather be. — Vera Mont

The problem with animal farm, as with marxism, is that there simply aren't any of those safety valves that you have in a democracy and in a justice state. Especially when you start with a Dictatorship of the Proletariat, you simply will get a dictatorship. Has happened so every time. People not agreeing with you aren't people, they are the enemy.

You might argue that every society has it's pigs leading us, but that's not the case. The pigs can act and behave quite differently. In a perfect society, we will feel that our pigs are incompetent in many things, but somewhat OK. Yet they aren't thieves and murderers. In a democracy, it doesn't get better than that.

People have inherently different objectives, agenda and ideas of how things work and what ought to be done. Yet the modern society gives those in power a lot of power, far more than the "Sun King" Louis XIV had in his time. Hence systems should be built to limit the powers of those that have it and have safety valves. Democracy as a safety valve can work. And can the separation of powers.

Egalitarianism, democracy and all these positive and morally just ideas can end up to be simple rhetoric that has nothing to do with reality. Power is so intoxicating for some that they will hold on to it until they die. All other desires, be that sex, fame, wealth, aren't so intoxicating. People will kill others for power, if they can achieve it with murder. Hence there simply has to be ground rules and idea in the minds of the leaders that they have power for a limited time and then it goes to the next people.

A system without those safety valves can easily create autocrats.

You blame Ukraine for this war. You justify the annexation by force of the Crimean peninsula (last example ). You oppose definitions of words in the dictionary.

That's enough of a clinical assessment of you.

So what price ssu? What level of human cost do you want to pay for this brilliant goal of creating a post-Afghanistan Russia? — Isaac

It's quite futile to argue with a person that totally declines to see the objectives of Russia in this war. (The actual ones declared by Putin himself)

If the war would stop on the lines that we have now, Putin can claim to have been victorious. Yet Putin can still hope that he gets more.

Sounds like you're on a warpath. Who should be next? China? — Tzeentch

A totally crazy idea.

China hasn't attacked anyone since 1979, and then it was it's former ally Vietnam. Before that China fought with the Soviet Union (hence the relationship hasn't been so great in hindsight, actuallly). It has a border dispute with India that has lead to border skirmishes, yes, but India isn't an ally of the US.

With Taiwan basically the civil war hasn't ended between the two sides: there is no armstice or no peace agreement. The state of war continued until 1979 between the two warring parties. There was a thawing period, but things have deteriorated after 2016. Yet unlike with North and South Korea, the two sides haven't come to shooting each other. Hence China has shown restraint.

The US hawks have for long craved to focus on China and to leave Europe. Unfortunately in Europe we do have a country, Russia, that doesn't accept the sovereignty of European countries and has attacked it's neighbors, unlike China. The posturing with China is the powerplay US has been committed, whereas in Europe you are dealing with actual present wars and hostile annexations of territories that have happened. The difference should be obvious to everybody.

Any idea how many lives your lovely plans would cost? — Tzeentch

Likely more when you drag a war to continue. For the war to stop Putin should achieve his objectives. And if Ukraine does fall and Putin can claim success, this will huge consequences. Above all, might makes right and Russia's imperialism works. The next step is then Moldova, Georgia and perhaps an "anshcluss" with Belarus. See here. And the totalitarian system in Russia will continue.

Wars can come to an end militarily. For example the civil war in Ethiopia ended, did you notice that? Yet Putin can still believe that the West will back down and he will be victorious. There are enough confused people in the West who think wars just go on eternally and look at the example of Afghanistan, which was a totally different war (an insurgency). Giving too little too late can make Putin to believe that this war can be successful. Ukraine cannot win the war with one modern tank battalion or with just 20 HIMARS systems. Political micromanaging will just lengthen the war.

Different peace scenarios and conditions are also influenced by a different understanding of the threat Russia poses to Ukraine. — neomac

How can some productive progress be made? — jorndoe

Supporting Ukraine would be productive:

Russia has made many times true progress after having disastrous defeats in wars that it has itself started.

- After the failure of the Crimean war, Russia later abolished serfdom. Had Russia been victorious, it perhaps might not have happened when it did.

- After the failure of the Russo-Japanese war, Russia experienced a revolution and took first steps towards democracy were made with the creation of the Duma, yet then came WW1.

- After the failure of the Polish-Russian war, the export of the Communist Revolution to Europe was set aside and only decades later after the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement Stalin continued the expansion of the Soviet realm.

- The defeat in Afghanistan is one reason for the Soviet Union to collapse, even if there are many others.

Best thing to happen to Russia would be a disastrous, humiliating defeat which would make to rethink just how sustainable is the present imperialism of Putin. Russia has already suffered more casualties than in all the wars it has fought post-WW2 combined. It has had to rely on drafting reservists to the war, hence this isn't something that the people will be ignorant about (as the American population can be when the military is an all-volunteer force).

Otherwise it will simply continue to be a potential threat to it's neighbors. Anyway, I think authoritarian dictatorships are bad and they should go. Modern day Russia has more political prisoners than Soviet Union had in it's later post-Stalinist era. The propaganda in Russia towards it's own people is surprisingly similar as it was during the last times Russian Empire.

Hence the solution would be to give Ukraine the ample resources to make this one of those defeats that Russia has suffered before... and has had to change course afterwards.

Let’s first clarify terminology. How do you understand the notion of “hegemonic”? And what constitute evidence of “hegemonic ambitions” to you? — neomac

Isaac has serious difficulties in understanding definitions of English. He doesn't accept the definition of "imperialism" in Merriam-Webster dictionary.

And how does he blame this war on the Ukrainians?

Pretending the world is something it's not.

I ought not have to worry about bad drivers, but if I send my kids out to play in the road, are you seriously suggesting I share none of the blame if an accident happens?

Ukraine ought to be able to enjoy its sovereignty without being threatened by powerful neighbours. Pretending that's how the world is when it blatantly isn't is reckless.

But then everyone knew that, back before we had to pretend we live in Disneyland. — Isaac

This is quite illogical, which doesn't actually surprise me.

So I guess that Isaac's answer to there being reckless drivers is to keep people inside and away from roads, because reckless/bad drivers just exist. Not people having to take driving lessons to have a driver's license that can be revoked, even face legal punishment for their actions alongside teaching children to be careful in traffic? Such actions have actually decreased the amounts of accidents compared to the traffic.

So with Isaac's words Ukraine's fault was that it "pretended the world to be something that it's not"? Too naive to trust what Russia agrees on a written formal agreement? Curious way how to blame Ukraine for this war.

Depends on who wins the US presidential election in 2024, right? — frank

Oooh... the omnipotent American President and the godly powers that he has to fix things in the World. Or create every problem there is or has been. Right? :smirk:

One year mark.

Few to go?

Am I the only person out here who feels that there is plenty of blame to spread around on both sides for causing this tragedy? — EricH

Please inform us what blame the Ukrainians have / the country of Ukraine has for this war.

The one "blame" I can think of is being so naive to give it's nuclear deterrence away and trust Russia (and the US and UK) for sticking to treaties they have signed. (In fact, Mearsheimer's earlier argument).

Yet I wouldn't blame a country of being so naive that believing when one Superpower, one ex-Superpower and a great power promise to uphold your territorial sovereignty.

I think the NATO expansion argument has been quite extensively been discussed. Very enthusiastically from a small part of the crowd here.

Besides your argument looks questionable for 2 reasons: on one side, it recommends not to be dismissive toward views alternative to the ones spread by mainstream outlets while suggesting to be definitely dismissive toward the mainstream outlets (“mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can’t)” as if mainstream outlets are like astrologists). — neomac

When your argument is weak, that is something that you have to do.

Comes very well to mind how on this thread people believed Putin and laughed at American and Western warnings that Russia was going to invade Ukraine. The "alternative outlets" believed (as some PF members) that this was just hype that US was manufacturing.

Scott Ritter on prior to the Russian invasion (in December 2021): Russia won't invade Ukraine, it's a manufactured crisis (by the West) and if there would be war between Russia and Ukraine, Russia would defeat Ukraine in 6 to 7 days (If Ukraine made an attack in the Donbas). And so on...

the further we get from a plausible negotiating position on either side, which literally every expert consulted agrees is the only way out of this. — Isaac

The Treaty of Portsmouth is a perfect example what Russians can do when their war doesn't go the way they hoped.

You can't seriously expect me to take those sources seriously in the circumstances. — Isaac

I seriously don't consider you taking anything seriously. But I put the articles and links for others to look and make their mind, if they are interested on what Russia has actually done. You continue with your selected Mearsheimer quotes.

I just started to answer to your overall question:

how deep Russian influence operations in Ukraine went. — ssu

Evidence. — Isaac

But very well then, if you specifically want to about the coup 2022 attempt:

At the beginning of Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and recruited ATO veterans attempted to overthrow the Ukrainian government and install pro-Russian rule in various cities for their further surrender to the Russian Army. The coup plan was ultimately cancelled following the detainment of its participants by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).

Coup plan
Planning began no later than the summer of 2021. According to a detained agent who was set to participate in the coup, Russia was to send an appeal to current Ukrainian authorities and call on them to surrender; in the event that Ukraine declined, pro-Russian agents would stage a coup. The attempt would begin by creating incidents in Kyiv and along Ukraine's border with Transnistria, creating a pretext for invasion. Once the invasion started, agents would begin seizing administrative buildings in various Ukrainian cities, followed by the installation of pro-Russian leadership in them and the surrender and transfer of Ukrainian cities to Russian troops. Mass riots with the use of fake blood, clashing with law enforcement officers, terrorist attacks and assassination of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky were to also take place to further destabilize the situation. After the coup, the Verkhovna Rada would be dissolved and replaced by a pro-Russian "People's Rada" playing the role of a puppet government on the occupied territory of Ukraine and the newly created people's republics in Western Ukraine. A pro-Russian president was also to be installed in Ukraine.

The plan was eventually cancelled once the organiser and key persons of the plot were detained by the SBU in the Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi and Odesa Oblasts. Prior to their arrests, the agents managed to conduct one successful operation to ensure the capture of Chernobyl.

Of course, this coup attempt didn't happen as it was surfaced before. Naturally an unveiled coup plot has the obvious deniability of it not happening! And when there happened a full conventional invasion afterwards, possible coup plots aren't so important anymore. Other references:

More details emerge of alleged coup plot in Ukraine

Russia’s FSB agency tasked with engineering coups in Ukrainian cities, UK believes

Besides, it's totally logical for Putin to try a coup and when that option fails, the final "logical" option is an all-out conventional attack. Which happened on February 24th 2022.

But the obvious examples of the 2014 Ukrainian military leaders that became turncoats and landed in officer positions in the Russian military shows just how much ability to influence Ukraine Russia had. Hence the idea of a quick, short operation isn't as delirious as it now in hindsight can be seen.

A part of me wants to say the idea of owning anything is a bit of an illusion. — Mikie

Ownership is an agreement between humans that in part makes our society work. But of course you can teach for example your pet that what's yours it has to leave alone. And animals are territorial, so it's just not something related to us humans. When humans and animals share something in common, it's likely not an illusion. Of course, is this "ownership" is another question.

Evidence. — Isaac

Lol! :rofl:

Are you serious? Do you have any remote idea of Ukrainian post-Soviet history? You really think Russia hasn't meddled in Ukrainian politics? Or in your mind just the West and the US do it?

(Ahh.. I forget that I'm talking to a guy who insists that the definition in the dictionary for imperialism is wrong.)

First of all, Russia has obvious interests towards Ukraine, and unfortunately Putin's Russia has chosen an aggressive, violent imperialistic stance here, not to build warm relations with a country that it has so many ties with. And that's the real tragedy: this war didn't had to happen as the last Soviet leaders avoided a civil war when the Soviet Union collapsed and things didn't go as in Yugoslavia. But Putin did what he did. So there wouldn't be good, warm relations between two countries that have so much in common. These ties include (from one article):

Family ties. Russia and Ukraine have strong familial bonds that go back centuries. Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, is sometimes referred to as “the mother of Russian cities,” on par in terms of cultural influence with Moscow and St. Petersburg. It was in Kyiv in the eighth and ninth centuries that Christianity was brought from Byzantium to the Slavic peoples. And it was Christianity that served as the anchor for Kievan Rus, the early Slavic state from which modern Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians draw their lineage.

Russian diaspora. Approximately eight million ethnic Russians were living in Ukraine as of 2001, according to a census taken that year, mostly in the south and east. Moscow claimed a duty to protect these people as a pretext for its actions in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014.

Superpower image. After the Soviet collapse, many Russian politicians viewed the divorce with Ukraine as a mistake of history and a threat to Russia’s standing as a great power. Losing a permanent hold on Ukraine, and letting it fall into the Western orbit, would be seen by many as a major blow to Russia’s international prestige. In 2022, Putin cast the escalating war with Ukraine as a part of a broader struggle against Western powers he says are intent on destroying Russia.

Crimea. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 to strengthen the “brotherly ties between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples.” However, since the fall of the union, many Russian nationalists in both Russia and Crimea longed for a return of the peninsula. The city of Sevastopol is home port for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the dominant maritime force in the region.

Trade. Russia was for a long time Ukraine’s largest trading partner, although this link withered dramatically in recent years. China eventually surpassed Russia in trade with Ukraine. Prior to its invasion of Crimea, Russia had hoped to pull Ukraine into its single market, the Eurasian Economic Union, which today includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Energy. Moscow relied on Ukrainian pipelines to pump its gas to customers in Central and Eastern Europe for decades, and it paid Kyiv billions of dollars per year in transit fees. The flow of Russian gas through Ukraine continued in early 2023 despite the hostilities between the two countries, but volumes were reduced and the pipelines remained in serious jeopardy.

Political sway. Russia was keen to preserve its political influence in Ukraine and throughout the former Soviet Union, particularly after its preferred candidate for Ukrainian president in 2004, Viktor Yanukovych, lost to a reformist competitor as part of the Orange Revolution popular movement. This shock to Russia’s interests in Ukraine came after a similar electoral defeat for the Kremlin in Georgia in 2003, known as the Rose Revolution, and was followed by another—the Tulip Revolution—in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Yanukovych later became president of Ukraine, in 2010, amid voter discontent with the Orange government.

And for anyone that actually is interested to know more about these actions, here are some links:

THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA ON GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN UKRAINE

And since you likely won't read, just a quote from the 2008 paper:

Ukraine remains vulnerable to subversive Russian influence deriving from cultural, structural, organisational and societal similarities, as well as from a deep connection between the business elites and populations of both countries. Since the Orange revolution, Russian-Ukrainian relations were increasingly shaped by conflicting political processes under way in both countries with Russia aiming to retain Ukraine within its sphere of influence by creating and strengthening anti-western platforms inside the country.

Russian Preinvasion Influence Activities in the War with Ukraine

Russia's modern-day KGB started massively expanding its Ukraine unit years before the invasion, hinting at a Putin plot long in the making: report

And prior to February 24th 2022:

Why Ukrainian forces gave up Crimea without a fight - and NATO is alert

10 facts you should know about russian military aggression against Ukraine

And the list could go on and on...

You keep focusing on the number of deployed ground troops as if my argument essentially hinges on that. But that’s not what I argued (nice strawman). Russia might have had a complex strategy wrt Kiev (based on different possible scenarios), which include regime change. — neomac

Tzeentch keeps desperately trying to argue this, which just shows his total lack of understanding just how deep Russian influence operations in Ukraine went. Prior to the February 2022 assault, there likely was a coup attempt in the works in Ukraine, hence that card was on the table before the conventional attack (but didn't go anywhere). And Russia had lots of willing Quislings on it's side, starting perhaps from Viktor Yanukovich himself.

And one should notice that afterwards the FSB department responsible for handling covert operations in Ukraine had it's leaders "heads dropping" in the spring 2022, obviously showing that they had botched the operation. Unlike in 2014, when the coordination between the intelligence services and the armed forces succeeded brilliantly.

For sure. But this was often at play, Pauline Kael made a similar argument over 40 years ago in 'Why Are Movies So bad? Or, The Numbers'. She was politically incorrect and brazen. Obviously written before TV got good. — Tom Storm

Earlier it was the idea that the studios have the "blockbusters" and then you can dare to have something interesting on a "smaller" budget.

Best cast?

I'd go with what @Mikie noted, the Godfather.

Older era actors ensemble might be "A Bridge too Far", even if the film isn't great, but just good. (Thin Red line had also a stellar cast ...of men, not surprisingly.)

Pulp fiction had a good cast too.

Yeah, he actually did argue that Russia was a potential threat to Ukraine, at least back in the 1990s. Russia loves to cite his work in regards to NATO expansion but quite conveniently forgets to mention that right after the end of the Cold War, he also argued in favor of a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent. If only someone would remind Russia of this. Seriously. A deal where Ukraine gets eventual EU membership, Austria-style neutrality, and its own nuclear deterrent seems like a great deal for both Ukraine and the West and would be a viable alternative to Ukrainian NATO membership! — Xanatos

EU membership and Austria-style neutrality could have been a great option... prior to February 24th 2022.

Now Russia simply can repeat the Russo-Japanese war and accept something similar in the peace terms as in that war. Or then something similar to the Peace of Riga in 1921. There's ample examples of Russian wars that they have started and which haven't gone as well as they thought at first, but have ended in defeat.

Until the war of 2022 started, the financial and military flow from the US was constrained by 3 factors (type and volume of military aid, lack of wider support from the West), the political pressure from the West was constrained by the fact the Western Europeans wanted to keep their business with Russia (which Nord Stream 2 would have further encouraged) and by the fact that Russia could still pressure the Ukrainian domestic politics due to pro-Russian propaganda and parties. — neomac

Yes. Back then as Russia hadn't gone on an all-out conventional attack, worries about escalation were obvious... I remember especially the Obama administration was very worried about escalation. Prior last year there for example was no air warfare from the Russian side. Before the February 24th assault the military aid was more about other things than those that go boom, yet this aid consisted for example modern communications and radios and training, which are surprisingly important. Now it's nearly full spectrum assistance. The US has given about 26,7 billion dollars in military aid to Ukraine since February 24th of last year.

Let's put that to perspective: during 2001 to 2020 the US gave Afghanistan military aid about 81 billion (dollars in 2019 dollars). To Israel the US gives military aid about 3,8 billion dollars annually.

26,7 billion dollars is 40% of what Russia's defence spending in 2021 (66bn USD), before the special military operation.

Add to that what Ukraine gets from West Europe and other countries. European countries seem to want a decision from the US before they make the same decision (just as Germany did with finally accepting to send main battle tanks). Likely they don't want to be the sole country that "antes up" and faces the wrath of Putin.

I think that supports my claim.

Mearsheimer explains how controlling a country as large as Ukraine with 190,000 troops is military fantasy, especially considering the expected resistance from the Ukrainian population. It doesn't even come close. He even states he doesn't believe the Russians had any major territorial ambitions in Ukraine for the very same reasons. — Tzeentch

And how many troops did it take to grab Crimea?

Then the admiral charge of the Ukrainian navy joined the Russian fleet as an admiral, so the idea of the cakewalk to continue isn't so far fetched, especially when Russian intel had what seemed to be plenty of people "friendly to Russia", starting from the former chief of staff to the Ukrainian president and a personal friend of Putin, Viktor Medvedchuk (who later was swapped for Ukrainian POWs).

It's fantasy ...in hindsight. Remember that the West thought that the only defense that Ukraine could stage was an insurgency.

And Putin's anger at bad intel given to him was obvious, btw, from the way he handled with those in charge of Ukraine prior to the February invasion.

We're on the verge of entering a period of major geopolitical strife, in which Russia and China will likely band together against the U.S. to challenge its position as hegemon. — Tzeentch

China is correct to keep it's distance from Russia.

In fact for China to get closer to Russia just then alienates European countries and pushes them to have similar stance as the US has against China. For a long time European countries didn't have the aggressive stance that President Trump had against China. Russia will have to sell it's natural resources to China in any case now, so there's no reason to get behind the disastrous decisions that Putin made when invading head on Ukraine. There's far better ways to be a counterweight to the US, like with the BRICS.

The US always will have these fears and angry fits about a potential competitor taking it's lead position. In the 1980's the fear was Japan, now it's China. Far better for the Chinese communists to keep their cool when it comes to the US and get their economy in order. Bullying at your neighbors will just make things worse. The worst thing possible to do is to use a Sino-US conflict as a distraction to domestic economic problems. Previous Chinese leaders were far better in this.

Australia, or the Chinese - Australian relations, are a great example of this. Covid-19 was (and is) a disaster for China. That really put a strain on Australian - Chinese relations as Australia demanded an independent inquiry on covid and then China decided to take retaliatory measures with sudden tariffs and bans on Australian exports. This likely drove Australia to the AUKUS agreement.

Stop referring to Mearsheimer when he says something about Russia being a potential threat to Ukraine in the 1990's. Mearsheimer can be only quoted or referred when he argues now that this war happened because of the US. :wink:

“One-sided” in what sense? Take the example of the Orange Revolution. This was an example of competition between West and Russia prior to 2008, because Putin publicly campaigned for Yanukovych in Ukraine and Russia, while Western pro-democracy organisations were supporting Yushchenko. In other words in Ukraine there were 2 foreign powers taking sides wrt domestic political competitors. 2 foreign powers are 2 sides, not one. — neomac

You cannot debate people who reject that a) Russia has had long standing objectives and an agenda towards Ukraine and b) Ukrainians themselves are actors in their own country and in their own politics. Everything is just the US, nothing else matters. If you argue something else, you must be a US fanboy.

Not surprising.

And for Hersh to be commenting something that nobody else comments isn't the first time, actually.

I remember Hersh was one of the only one's commenting when Israel destroyed Syria's nuclear program with a strike (just like they did with Saddam Hussein's nuclear program) when it happened in 2007. Only years later you can find documentaries about it and a wikipedia reference about the strike.

I'm pretty confident that if it was the US, we'll know about it after some years.

Yet if it was the US, this seems to be an overreaction as there wasn't any energy crisis and no rolling blackouts in Germany or Europe. A warm winter and the anticipation of an crisis half year before the winter worked. Hence Germany didn't to cave back for Russian gas as the supply of energy didn't collapse in Europe.

Which is even more confusing as you don't make sense.

Putin wrote that article far before the special military operation, the "artificiality" of Ukraine as a state and the "illegality" of giving Crimea to Ukraine during the Soviet Union was rhetoric that the Kremlin used far longer. The intent to take territories from Ukraine and to dominate Ukraine is obvious there to see.

Arguably, Iran is technically in a proxy war against Ukraine, yet saying so is kind of misleading (incidentally, analogous to some comments hereabouts). — jorndoe

Exactly. Just selling arms to a participant in a war doesn't make the seller of these arms to have a proxy war against the other side in the conflict.

With that faulty reasoning I guess the Soviet Union / Russia, France and the US has had a lot of proxy wars... and many times both sides have been proxies.

I am interested in your reasons for preferring one interpretation over another — Isaac

Lol.

What other interpretation?

So Russia has annexed territories from Ukraine starting from Crimea onwards. So tell me, how is this just an interpretation???



Love to hear your interpretation that an annexation isn't an annexation. :razz:

Yep, and evidence/arguments have been posted throughout the thread already. — jorndoe

Extensively, again and again.

So? Is that your threshold for considering a theory to be such that "you cannot deny it"? — Isaac

I think the annexations, all the ceremonies, the fake referendums and the actions of Russians in the occupied territories are quite real, reported by a multitude of observers and thus seems that you really can say "you cannot deny it".

That inexpert laymen have posted what they consider to be evidence on an internet forum. — Isaac

Comes to mind one inexpert laymen here that started arguing that the agreed definition of imperialism (in the dictionaries like Merriam-Webster) is wrong. :snicker:

Assume a large number of players, choosing randomly. Then the average will be 6. Half six is 3, so one should say 3. But folk will think of this, and say 3; so I should say 2 (1.5 rounded); but then everyone will say the same, so I shoudl say 1.

As will you. Everyone wins. — Banno

Yep, that is what game theory says.

I pick number 10.

As @Agent Smith didn't choose a number, it's a bit one sided as there are so few players.

If we would have had the option of starting from 0, then the "Nash Equilibrium" would have been 0 and indeed everybody choosing 0 would have won, assuming that all people pick that. Still I would have chosen 10. Why? Well, my preferences isn't to play along the Nash Equilibrium line, but to give the person (if there is one) not taking the "Nash Equilibrium", but a higher number to win. Yes, I'll surely loose, but for me all those picking up the Nash Equilibrium losing gives far more pleasure / utility. Hence if @Agent Smith would have chosen 2, he would have won because average from 13 is 4,333... and divided by two is 2,1666... thus the correct wouldn't have been 1.

And this underlines the fact that when dealing with people, just like when dividing money among a group of people, the utility function and the utility which people have differs from simply maximizing behaviour that simple game theory assumes them to have. Maximizing profit is so easy to mathematically to calculate, but it's utility, not only profit, in the real world.

In physics the math works, but in economics the models are far too simple to take into account reality. The error is to think that the crude simple models of economics really portray reality and you can use math like in physics.

I've not denied anything Russia has been shown to say or do. I've denied your interpretation of what those actions indicate about intent. — Isaac

Which is hilarious.

Yes, Putin has mentioned also NATO, but the reasons which he has given for the "special military operation" and the actions of annexation are quite clear and obvious. The intent is crystal clear. You simply cannot deny it.

From speculation:


To reality:


The simple problem you have is that you cannot accept that Russia has imperialist aspirations towards Ukraine and it's territories, be it neutral or whatever, and that Russia doesn't like the enlargement of NATO (which you think is the sole reason for this war). It should be obvious that these two motivations can coincide and fit perfectly to each other: an imperialist nation doesn't want any other Great Powers (or a Superpower) near them. Yet if left alone, it will try to dominate what it can.

But be then the apologist to Russia and deny the existence of the imperialist agenda and go with the line that Russia would had left Ukraine in peace if the latter hadn't tried to approached NATO, or rather that the US hadn't pushed Ukraine into NATO (as obviously Ukrainians don't have a say in their own matters), hence everything is the fault of the US and the West.

Another example, which shows what I'm talking about is the following game (which I learnt in economics class in the university), which we could even try to play here:

Participants pick any number they want between 1 and 10, then the average is calculated from the answers and divided by two. Who gets closest this number wins.

Does any want to play? I will answer if at least two play this (so we get what could be called an average) or the time when I read this again.

So @Banno, @Agent Smith and others, try your luck and give a number!

What this shows is that ubiquitously, folk do not make decisions on the basis of rationally maximising their self-interest. Some other factor intervenes. What that is, is open to further research. — Banno

This is a classic example of a simple game when done with people has far more to it that simple math would apply. The obvous place where it went wrong is here:

. To keep the money, I must divide it with you. I could give you a dollar and keep nine, and we would both be better off - you get a dollar that you would otherwise not receive, I get nine dollars. — Banno

As already said on the first page, there's more to a game when you divide money among people. There simply ought to be a reason why you would get somehow more than others: you found or organized the event, somehow you have more claim to the money. In fact, it could be that the other person thinks it's right for you to get the nine dollars, if he or she thinks it's just.

Hence the economists would say that people maximize utility, not cash. When dividing money among people, in that utility there is also how others view you: do you seem to be fair and respectable or are you a greedy bastard.

How much is what people think of you worth?

Eight dollars?

re you seriously suggesting that your preferred yhriry — Isaac

what is yhiry?

What a dictator of Russia says and does isn't an opinion.

What Russia wanted is not a fact of history, it's an opinion. — Isaac

I think that "opinion" is quite well shown from the actions and the reasons given to those actions by the leaders of Russia. Putin's article Article by Vladimir Putin ”On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians“ shows perfectly what he thought of the Ukrainian state. Among the multitude of other obvious examples.

Hence when the attacker annexes parts of a country, calls it artificial and says it has been all along Russian, it's not just an opinion. What Vladimir Putin has done, has said, has implemented as policy, is far more than just "opinion". But accepting what Putin has done and said breaks with your agenda of saying that everything is the fault of the US. (And note, you don't say US administration)

Not s single historian in the world would claim that a nation's intentions are facts of history. — Isaac

Now for your strawman that we cannot talk about countries and obviously mean their leadership. But somehow you talk about the US having an agenda.

People are disagreeing. — Isaac

People disagree about the World being round shaped. Some say it's flat.

Russian vital interests were protected with a neutral Ukraine. — Tzeentch

You are either forgetting or simply denying (which is likely) that these "vital interests" meant also obtaining territories from Ukraine and Ukraine to be tightly under Russian control... not just being neutral.

But admitting these facts somehow go against the NATO enlargement argument, so you keep denying them.

There'd be little to gain and much to lose for them to change that status quo, so incorporating it into their sphere of influence would not have been desirable at all. — Tzeentch

Seems that you don't know much about post-soviet era history of Russo-Ukrainian relations. Russia wanted to have Ukraine under it's influence, even if it was actually neutral, as actually the country was in the 1990's and the 2000's, before the current war. (Wanting to join NATO, by one Ukrainian president, and getting vague promises of something in the future doesn't make the country a NATO member.)