• Belief in nothing?
    ...one would have to make the unwarranted assumption that "physical entities" are those thing that homo sapiens, the puny prime species of this tiny rock in space...is capable of detecting all entities that are physical!

    Why would anyone do that?
    Frank Apisa

    You're right in implying it's a bold assumption. I adhere to the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and do so based on my experiences and my rationalization of it all. It is not a belief denoting certainty because it isn't something that I could fully know. This is why I set my arguments as conditionals.
  • Belief in nothing?
    I’m not trying to determine the truth of anyone’s belief. I’m trying to determine if believing that there are no Gods is logically possible. I feel that believing in an empty set is equivalent to lacking belief. Therefore, Atheism (and possibly other terms such as Nihilism) are better defined as a lack of belief in X, as opposed to believing that not-X, when not-X implies an empty set. Believing that not-X, when doing so implies an empty set, is actually not a belief at all. That is my claim.Pinprick

    I may ponder:

    If all entities existing are physical then non-physical entities don't exist.
    If deities are non-physical entities then deities don't exist.
    If I hold the premises to be true then I hold the conclusion of deities not existing as true or in other words, I believe deities don't exist.

    Someone else may ponder that God exists:

    Deity exists.
    If all entities existing are physical then non-physical entities don't exist.
    If the deity in question is a non-physical entity then it doesn't exist.
    If I hold the premises to be true then I hold the assertion of deity existing not true or in other words, I don't believe deity exists.
  • Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century


    You: "Okay, don't take this the wrong way, but that gibberish didn't explain one's epistemic truth."
    Me: "What way should I take it given no explanation why it's gibberish?
    You: "Gibberish"

    You've replied with gibberish because it doesn't answer my question anyway whatsoever. See how this works!

    Anyway, could you point to where the big bwad atheist touched you?

    Life-size%20Anatomical%20Dolls.jpg
  • Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century
    ↪3017amen What way should I take it given no explanation why it's gibberish?

    It may be gibberish but you don't seem to be forthcoming on why so.
    Happenstance

    Tick tock, tick tock.
  • Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century
    That is very close to St Anselm's expression of God being "greater than can be conceived."
    Interesting in the present context of what constitutes evidence.
    Valentinus
    I do think what may be constituted as evidence as subjective.
  • Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century
    What way should I take it given no explanation why it's gibberish?

    It may be gibberish but you don't seem to be forthcoming on why so.
  • Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century
    A disbelief or lack of belief in the existence of God or gods.3017amen
    Personally I loathe to use the word God as I see it as a honorific title and myself would say a lack of belief in deity.
    And so my existential argument is, you have to define the nature of belief.
    I see belief as being a particular cognitive faculty I have and when faced with a specific question such as deity existence I'd say I lack that particular cognitive faculty for that specific content which is not equivalent to having a particular cognitive faculty for no specific content, hence why I wouldn't term atheism as a belief system and certainly not a religion.
  • Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century
    If I may, I'd like to ask you what your understanding of atheism is?
  • Design, No design. How to tell the difference?
    Sorry but, not to be disparaging, a certain level of education is a prerequisite for seeing the connection which is absent in your story. An interesting story. Thanks.TheMadFool
    You do seem fixated on the idea that order is sufficient for design, so say for argument's sake I agree with you that order is sufficient to imply design and because I'm such a curious cat, I have a question of my own: how would an intelligent designer go about creating this orderly design?

    I'm confident you'll have a certain level of education to answer this question.
  • How important is (a)theism to your philosophy?
    I've been an atheist most of my adult life and in the real world (that is, not on internet forums) it didn't, and doesn't, influence my decisions greatly. I started learning formal logic later on in life and came to take an interest in philosophy due to this, so I'm a newbie when it comes to philosophy. I've gone with the last option.
  • Design, No design. How to tell the difference?
    What does what you say make you but a designer?TheMadFool
    Yeah I suppose you could say that the kids and the hamster designed room A but the missus and I would like room B please. Should we add the clause that this intelligent designer must be an adult? But joking aside, my point is that it could be the case that either room A or room B were designed and so it’s not enough that order/disorder (one over the other) implies design. There needs to be knowledge of design also.

    You have a point but if order is insufficient to prove a designer can you give me a counterexample?TheMadFool
    I don’t understand what you mean by counterexample given that I think disorder either is not enough to imply design. If you mean an example of order not implying design then I know of a factual story:

    One day a Christian missionary in an Amazon Jungle observed a few tribe members digging a trench with their hands so he gave them a couple of spades. The tribal folk didn’t know what to make of the spades so the missionary showed them how to use such tools.
     
    Once they had been shown the function of a spade, the tribe members used them like they’d had spades all their lives. However when it came to the end of the digging, they threw the spades into a river much to the exasperation of the missionary. The reason they did this was because they didn’t realise that the spades had been designed artificially and thought they were just sticks with metal at the end that white folk had pulled up from the ground and so plenty more where they come from. And It’s not as if they had no idea of things being designed given their own huts, hunting weapons and tools.

    So the orderly shape of a spade, or its primary function of being a digging tool, didn't imply to this tribe that they had been designed because the tribe lacked the knowledge of spades being manufactured.
  • Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century
    Good to see you own your condescending attitude!
  • Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century
    Sir, I do not give one fig for your crappy argument or your condescending attitude.
  • Atheism is untenable in the 21st Century
    Atheism is a religion: :up:
    Obligatory Einstein quote: :up:
    NDE's: :up:
    Sense of wonderment: :up:
    obligatory condescending LOL in lieu of any understanding: :up:

    Such original argumentation!
  • Design, No design. How to tell the difference?
    Normal people, including people who make the above counter-argument, actually think the exact opposite. We can run an experiment with two rooms A and B. A is in disarray with things in no particular order and B is neat and objects have been arranged in a discernable pattern. If someone, anyone, were to be taken into the two rooms and asked which room probably had an occupant then the answer would invariably be room B. I don't think anyone will/can disagree with this deduction.TheMadFool
    Being a parent and a one-time pet owner, I’d have picked room A because things being in disarray is a sure sign of occupancy, I’d probably say, ‘Round up the kids and can someone put the hamster back in the cage!’

    To some there is design in the disorderly and no design in the orderly. What is orderly or disorderly isn’t sufficient for design nor is it enough to just say watches are made by watchmakers. I want to know the materials and processes used for the design of a watch, and why these particular materials and processes as opposed to other materials and processes. ID advocates are usually silent on these matters.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    In Aletheist's quote that you yourself quoted, s/he is saying that deductive arguments are non-ampliative, that is: there is nothing in the conclusion that is not already entailed by the premises, to which you thought that s/he was implying question begging. If you knew that deductive arguments are non-ampliative then you wouldn't have said that Aletheist was implying deductive arguments are question begging. But because of your incessant need for trying to play one-up-manship, you replied with your usual standard of bollocks. If you ditch your shitty attitude of, 'I know arguments better than you', maybe I would still be engaging with you at the level you seem to want. But everything you write just further belies any knowledge of logic that you may have and your shitty arrogant attitude doesn't warrant any thoughtful replies, hence me changing tact.

    And as for your so-called valid argument, you don't even know how the fuck one is constructed to be valid. You can't just come on a board with the attitude of you being the only one who knows logic when it is obvious, if you do a bit of reading, that there a great number of people here who are far more intelligent than you or I. It is a silly, self-conscious, stupid attitude that just gets you laughed at.

    But please do continue with your dance of the dodgers because it is entertaining.

    Anyway got to go now fella, but please don't ever change! :grin:
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    ↪aletheist
    Indeed. Should we reveal the big secret that in any valid deductive argument, there is nothing in the conclusion that is not already entailed by the premisses
    — aletheist

    Which, for you, means they're all question begging - right? You have such a poor grasp of how arguments actually work, that you think valid arguments are question begging by dint of being valid. That 's true isn't it - that's what you actually think. Be honest. And you're so confident you're right, you'll never be able to learn you're wrong.
    Bartricks
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    I'm confusing Happenstance for someone who gives a shit about my crappy argument!
    You really should get this tattoo to remind you. Maybe on your abnormal forhead wrote backwards so you can see it in a mirror
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    But I wormed and squared it for you! No gratitude some people.Bartricks
    ^ doesn't understand logic synbols. Shocker. I guess to someone like yourself, it would look like worms, much like a child's interpretation: 'Miss, them der writing looks like worms. Tee Hee!'

    Anyway tell us again how a definition of non-ampliative implies question begging. That shit was hilarious
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    I thought of another tattoo for you:

    I'm confusing Happenstance for someone who gives a shit about my crappy argument!
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    By your own admission you never took logic 101. Here's that quote from you that I am currently having tatooed across my buttocks:

    would it interest you that I've never actually took a course in formal logic?
    — Happenstance
    Bartricks

    :lol: :lol: :lol:

    You must have one seriously fat arse. How does that work? Do you have, ‘would it interest you that I’ve never’, on the left cheek and ‘actually took a course in formal logic’, on the right cheek?

    That reminds me of a joke: An airplane lands on a desert island to refuel and the pilot chances upon a castaway.

    ‘I’m so glad that you’re here. I’ve been stranded on this island for ten years’, said the castaway. The pilot, being a wag, replies, ‘I will rescue you from this island if you can name the people I have tattooed on my butt.’

    The pilot pulls down his trousers to show the castaway his tattoos. ‘The one on the left is Pope John Paul II and the one on the right is Nelson Mandela but I don’t know the one in the middle’ said the castaway. ‘Wait, I’ve got it! It’s Bartricks!’
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    ↪aletheist
    Indeed. Should we reveal the big secret that in any valid deductive argument, there is nothing in the conclusion that is not already entailed by the premisses
    — aletheist

    Which, for you, means they're all question begging - right? You have such a poor grasp of how arguments actually work, that you think valid arguments are question begging by dint of being valid. That 's true isn't it - that's what you actually think. Be honest. And you're so confident you're right, you'll never be able to learn you're wrong.
    Bartricks

    “(>ლ)”

    A deductive argument is non-ampliative which is what aletheist is stating in definitional form. This is logic 101. But the stolen valour and shitty attitude is entertaining!
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    Nah you're okay fella, I've got to go now but I'll be back with more vulgar insults seeing as you like me more now! :up:
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    Nothing like having your tongue stuck up your own arse, eh!

    You think laying waste every metaethical theory with five premises is nothing?!
    — Bartricks
    :lol: :lol: :lol:
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    Nah, You saying ' I dun don't know any greek symbols' and shitting your pants was funnier.

    'I thought I was done and dusted! Game over man! Game over!!'
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    Ladies and gentlemen, I give you the Pee Wee Herman of argumentation.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    That I do get! I do it all the time myself! :up:
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    I'm happy you got a laugh because you read like an uptight serious angry gobshite!
  • Metaphysics - what is it?
    Even though I don't adhere to any form of idealism, I quite like F. H. Bradley's quote:

    Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct; but to find these reasons is no less an instinct
    - Appearance and Reality, preface (1893).
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    You think laying waste every metaethical theory with five premises is nothing?!Bartricks
    :lol: :lol: :lol:

    I'm laughing at myself as well because I should've realised by now that I don't have the medical or clinical training to deal with you (nor the pedagogical training for that matter).

    Let's just say that I find no moral value in aiding your delusions :wink:
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    @Echarmion is right, your argument is valid (known as a reductio ad absurdum or indirect proof, not modus tollens) but it is trivial. All you're basically stating is that not all values are moral values and the example of liking cats rather than dogs is enough to show that what you're saying is trivial. To paraphrase Leonard Euler: sometimes an example is as good as a proof.

    You seem to be using value intransitively thinking that it is independent from a subject and then using value transitively, justifying subjective, thinking it 'refutes all subjectivist views bar mine' if the argument is valid, which is just baffling. Logic is a great tool for rational discourse and so is a hammer a great tool, but I don't think everything is a nail!

    Yeah typing all them symbols out is tiresome but, like yourself probably, I read what seems as @Bartricks nay-saying all talk of semantics and so I decided to tackle the syntactic of his arguments but this seems of no use either. :sad:
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    I'm off to bed now so I attempt an answer with more explanatory scope if possible in regards to your last question. Good chat though!
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values


    My point is about quantification of subjects being predicated. if a universal statement about all supermen or all Lois Lanes or all Bartricks then we can only make an implication due to the generality of the statement but if talking about specific subjects predicated, such as one superman, one Lois Lane or one Bartricks then we can connect the predicates rather than imply them due to being specific so your above argument would be:

    There is are singular subjects with the predicates superman, Lois Lane and Bartricks:
    P= (S&L)&(B&L), Q = (S&L)&necessarily(B&L).

    1. if (S&L)&(B&L) then (S&L)&necessarily(B&L) .
    2. (S&L)&not necessarily(B&L) this isn't not Q, not Q = not[(S&L)&necessarily(B&L)] = (by DeMorgan's theorem) not [(S&L) nor necessarily(B&L).

    You have made your predicates(S and B) in Q connectives by virtue of being singular subjects rather than universals/generalities so due to this connection, you need to negative S or B, not just B.

    Does this make anymore sense?

    It doesn't matter about DeMorgan. Via truth tables, not[(S&L)&necessarily(B&L)] as the same veracity as not [(S&L) nor necessarily(B&L) regardless whether true or false. Your version of . (S&L)&not necessarily(B&L) does not, therefore not modus tollens, that is , it isn't not Q, it's some other truth value.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
    2. If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable
    3. Therefore, moral values are not my values.
    Bartricks

    Like I mentioned before, I valuing something are singular subjects(I and something) being predicated(value), so you've made a connection between I valuing something and morally valuable rather than an implication. Therefore you cannot just say I don't find something morally valuable and ignore the I value something. You may say for line 2: I don't value something nor necessarily [find a subject] morally valuable, whether you think this subject Reason, objective, subjective, god, whatever you call your subject.

    So how does the argument fail to have this form:

    1. If P, then Q
    2. Not Q
    3. Therefore not P?
    Bartricks

    P=(M&V implies V), Q = [(S&V)&(M&V)].

    1. if (M&V implies V) then [(S&V)&(M&V)].
    2. not [(S&V)&(M&V)] = [not (S&V) nor(M&V)] (notice how the connective(&) changes to a disjunction (nor) via DeMorgan's Theorem. This means that you have to consider both in the negative, not just one. So you cannot write: If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable if indeed modus tollens is what you're after for justification for validity. Rather it should be: If I don't value something, nor necessarily morally valuable, which is something totally different.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    1. If superman is Bartricks, then if superman is in the grocery necessarily Bartricks is in the grocery.
    2. If superman is in the grocery Bartricks is not necessarily in the grocery.
    3. Therefore superman is not Bartricks?
    Bartricks

    When quantifying a singular such as superman we treat predicates as a connectives rather than implications because by saying superman is barticks, we are really saying: there is a subject that is predicated superman and bartricks. So with this in mind:

    P = S&B, Q = [(S&G)&necessarily(B&G)]

    1. (S&B)→[(S&G)&necessarily(B&G)]
    2. not[(S&G)&necessarily(B&G))]= [not(S&B) nor necessarily(B&G)] (DeMorgan's Theorem)
    3. Therefore not (S&B) = not S nor B (again DeMorgan's Theorem)

    This is modus tollens and should read in English as:

    1. If superman is Bartricks, then superman is in the grocery [and] necessarily Bartricks is in the grocery.
    2. Superman is in not in the grocery nor is Bartricks necessarily in the grocery.
    3. Therefore not superman nor Bartricks

    Which is something totally different than what I quoted from you which is not modus tollens nor is it valid. Basically, You've made the connection in line 1 so regardless of the word necessarily, you cannot say superman is in the grocery while Bartricks is not. It's as simple as.
  • The Subjectivity of Moral Values
    Thanks for the vote of confidence but I think I've made a couple of mistakes. I've misread premise 1). I read 'If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily[,] it is morally valuable' where I think Bartricks meant, 'If moral values are my values, then if I value something[,] necessarily it is morally valuable'. Also when quantifying at least one thing, I've treated it like an implication rather than a connective so instead I think it should read as:

    1. (Vx&Mx→Vy)]→ ( Vyz&¬∆(Vx&Mx)))]
    2. Vyz&¬∆(Vx&Mx)
    3.Vx&Mx→¬Vy

    But the argument is still invalid because it should read as:

    1. (Vx&Mx→Vy)→( Vyz&¬∆(Vx&Mx))
    2. ¬( Vyz&∆(Vx&Mx))= ¬Vyz or ¬∆(Vx&Mx) (via DeMorgan's Theorem, which is not the same as: Vyz&¬∆(Vx&Mx))
    3. ¬(Vx&Mx→Vy) = (Vx&Mx)&¬Vy (via truth tables, which is not the same as: Vx&Mx→¬Vy).

    In English the argument should read something like:

    1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
    2. I don't value something nor it is necessarily morally valuable
    3. Therefore it is not the case that moral values are my values

    Which is something different regarding truth values.
  • Help with Logical Notation
    I noticed that 3b. started with the connective word and. Also I put 3a and 3b into truth functional form, atomic sentences within if.. then conditionals whilst attempting to keep the semantics intact. Basically, writing them as propositions with no semantic loss, IOW keeping the meaning in the original statements. I also noticed that there was no change in what was being quantified in both statements hence wrapping around the conditionals within: ∃x∀y[...]