I voted "no." One of the problems is that "infinity" has slightly different meanings depending on the context. In terms of future time being "infinite", it connotes an unending temporal sequence of events - so it entails incompleteness. This is the nature of the potential infiniite. Another sort of infinity is the number of real numbers between 0 and 1: this is a conceptual infinity, uncountable - and it may not correspond to anything in the real world (is there truly such thing as "length" below a Planck unit?)

The name for this type of argument is: valid logic. I'll demonstrate:
Where A is the non-preferred theory, B is the preferred theory, and x is a result of A but not a result of B:

1. If A then ~x
2. If B then x
3. B
4. therefore x (2,3 modus ponens)
5. Therefore ~B (2, 4 modus tollens)

The "problem" is that B is a premise, and its truth is not established. The argument just shows that A and B are mutually exclusive.

Other issues may sway one towards either A or B (ideally, the "best" theory is identified abductively as the best explanation for the empirical evidence - i.e. it has the greatest explanatory power and scope), but the reasoning cited is not actually a problem.

Can you describe how you think the classical world (with apparent particles and large scale structures) emerges from the quantum world (of wave function and superposition)? For example, when entanglement occurs is there always a quantum collapse such that the other eigenstates disappear - and the "object" takes on more classical properties? I've read descriptions in terms of Many Worlds, but my impression is that you reject that, so I'd like to understand your view.

Thanks for the description. Do you agree with the Quantum Field Theory view that quantum fields (waves) are fundamental, while particles are "disturbances" in a field? Your description sounds consistent with this view.

You seem to be talking around the topic, but not addressing it directly. Can you please succinctly tell us how you interpret the results of the double slit experiment, taking into account the perspective you have described. In particular, what (if anything) does the experiment tell us about objective reality.

By "emergent" - do you mean the mind is not reducible to the physical and operates (at least partly) independently of the laws of nature?

An infinite past seems impossible, because that would entail a completed infinity; it would mean TODAY is the conclusion of an infinite series of actualized past days.

What causes a person to be a person? — Waya

All of the properties you have is what makes you YOU. This includes the genetic makeup that started you off, and has changed over the years (yes, our DNA changes over time), as well as all the experiences you've had. Alter one property, or one experience and it's not you.

Are you now the same person you were when you were 2 years old? Yes and No. Your 2-year old self lacked the experiences (and DNA changes) that you've had - so in terms of strict identity, you are not identical to your 2-year old self. On the other hand, you have 2 years of common history with that 2-year old self. So there is a trans-temporal person-ness that is you, which is a looser identity - the trans-temporal identity has temporal parts (i.e. I subscribe to perdurantism).

for a true nothing to exist...

A "nothing" cannot exist. Nothingness has no referrent, because a referrent is something that exists. Nothingness is not a state of affairs- a state of affairs exists (at least hypothetically).

1. Was Jesus' resurrection only a work of literature with no physical grounds that such a thing occurred?

2. Was Jesus' resurrection a true story that transcended the realm of physical laws as we currently perceive them? — saw038

False dichotomy. The NT provides a basis for inferring the development of Christian beliefs, including the belief in a "resurrection." The basis of the belief in the resurrection is almost certainly not a work of "literature" - but was the consequence of experiences by some of Jesus' followers after his death. The nature of those experiences is a subject of speculation. The fact that some of his committed followers believed Jesus had (in some vague way) conquered death does not serve as evidence that he actually did. A Christian is free to continue believing it, since it can't be disproven - but the data is woefully inadequate to make a compelling case for it having occurred.

"Or maybe they saw the same events, and that is why they are similar..."
That does not explain the identical wording in Greek. This provides an example.

The purpose of baseball is to get people interested in probability and statistics.

Considering that the 4 Gospels are written as eyewitness accounts by separate individuals and generally agree on most points, that seems like good evidence that what was written is true. Decades is a very small amount of time, and the accounts still largely agree... — Waya

None of the Gospels were written by eyewitnesses, and they are not independent. The disciples were illiterate Aramaic speakers in Palestine; the Gospels were originally written in Greek, which was spoken outside Palestine. Analysis of the "Synoptic Problem" shows there to be a literary dependency, and the most credible theory is that Mark was written first, and that Matthew & Luke used Mark as a source - which explains the agreements. The relationship to John is more complex, but displays evidence that the authors were familiar with the synoptic accounts.

But the question is on what physical basis can we draw the distinction?

I lean toward the representationalist account of phenomenal consciousness. Objects in the external world are represented in our minds, and these representations are intentional (i.e. they dispose us to behave a certain way). It is the way we remember aspects of the world so that we are better equipped to act in it.

Reperesentationalist theory of consiousness doesn't solve all problems of consciousness, but it's a step in that direction.

Some forms of life went down that path (e.g. cockroaches), but that does't seem nearly as flexible as the sort of perception primates, and especially humans, have. It enables us to adapt to changing conditions.

Yet, when we see an apple, we become aware of the apple and not of our retinal state. How is this possible?

As I pointed out this distinction has no survival value, and so it is how to see how it could be selected by evolution.

There is survival value to perceiving the world as it actually is (or at least a functionally accurate representation of it), since we have to interact with it to survive. What am I missing?

Deleted

LOL! The help I received enabled me to go to college and get a well-paying job and pay lots of taxes over the course of my erstwhile career.

Handouts from the government do not solve the problems. — Sir2u

Sometimes they help, if structured right. I'm an example.

I agree with the concept that we have a "sphere of interest", but it seems based on emotion rather than reason. Consider a variation on the Trolley Problem: the trolley is heading down the track toward 5 people who are tied to the track. You have control of a lever that can divert it to another track with 1 person tied up: your child. The "rational" thing to do is to sacrifice your child to save 5 others, but - they aren't in your "sphere of interest" - so you won't.

I not suggesting we can or should abandon our emotions, but we should at least try to temper the impact.

I'm curious: what leads you to believe this?

All the information we have about Jesus comes from writings from early Christians, so one should expect consistency between what was written and what they believed - irrespective of the historical accuracy.

My favorite topic is theory of mind - particularly the problems and possible solutions to physicalism (on the one hand) and the mind-body problem (on the other hand).

Note that this establishes a potential basis for abductively (as IBE) judging metaphysical claims. — Relativist

Falsification is not abduction. It is the basis for a sound deduction by the modus tolens, — Dfpolis

I agree falsification is not abduction, and I never suggested it was. I said, "Clearly the theory must be coherent, and as I've also said repeatedly - it must also be able to account for all aspects of reality against which it can be tested.

How well each theory accounts for reality can often be judged, even if the judgment is subjective. That judgment is an IBE. The same process is involved with historiography (which is also unfalsifiable, in principle).

I'm sorry, but that's absurd - you have some beliefs about metaphysics, and you draw inferences from those beliefs. — Relativist

No, I have some awareness of how the world interacts with me and I draw conclusions based on that awareness. — Dfpolis

What you are "aware of" is belief. The conceptual framework in which you interpret this awareness is belief, and your conclusion is belief. Even if your belief has sufficient warrant for knowledge, it is still belief.

I gave you a link to an outline listing a variety of metaphysical accounts of natural law, this was to demonstrate to you that there are indeed contradictory metaphysical accounts - which demonstrates that metaphysical analysis can get it wrong, in spite of the fact they are constructed just as you describe - based on "awareness of how the world interacts" with the metaphysician. It may seem like an exact science to you, but it isn't.

So you're saying that Trump's collusion with Russia is actually one big trap that was set by Obama and Hillary in order to try and get him impeached once he won the election? — VagabondSpectre


Stzrok: “insurance policy”. — raza

I'm OK with drawing a connection and investigating to see where it leads, but you've a long way to go to connecting Strzok's comment to this meeting. This sounds along the lines of O.J.'s defense, which consisted of connecting one racist detective to a pervasive conspiracy to frame him.

Yes, a leap. You're passing along the distortion of events invented by Trump.
See this.

metaphysical theories are contingent upon the the imperfect mental processes that develop them. — Relativist
Following the method I suggested will avoid this. If you have a specific example of contradictory arguments, I would be happy to comment on them. — Dfpolis

A method to avoid imperfect metaphysical theories would be a monumental achievement - it would finally, after all these centuries, remove all controversy from metaphysical inquiry. I'm a wee bit skeptical.

Regarding examples: Metaphysical theories of natural law are a good example of disagreement. Here's a handy outline depicting the variety of metaphysical theories about natural law.

Since metaphysics is concerned with the nature of being, it must be based on our experience of being -- not on a priori assumptions, however "coherent" they may be. That's why I require metaphysical principles be abstracted (not induced) from experience.

I watched the second video, and noticed you asserting definitions of "existence" (power to act) and "essence" (specification of possible acts). These can be defined differently but equally plausibly, and this will lead one in different directions.

Coherence is no guaranty of truth.

Of course not, but the point is that incoherence is a guaranty of falsehood.

The coherence of truth derives from the self-consistency of reality.

Yes, but the truths of reality are not apparent, and much of reality may be hidden to us. Consequently we need to apply good epistemology to identify what should be believed, and when we should withhold judgment.

It's always good to give reality a bit of weight in your reasoning.
It is contingent on a particular metaphysical theory. — Relativist

No, it is not.

I'm sorry, but that's absurd - you have some beliefs about metaphysics, and you draw inferences from those beliefs.

You make a good case for looking beyond coherence -- considering adequacy to reality instead.

Instead?! Surely you misspoke. Clearly the theory must be coherent, and as I've also said repeatedly - it must also be able to account for all aspects of reality against which it can be tested. Note that this establishes a potential basis for abductively (as IBE) judging metaphysical claims. This can help us decide what metaphysical beliefs are worthy of belief, and on which we should withhold judgment. Your assertions have not given me any reason to change my view that judgment should be withheld, and the fact that you're unaware of alternative metaphysical theories makes me think that you may have settled on something a bit hastily.

"-1" electric charge is a property that exists in every instance of electron. Four-ness exists in every state of affairs that consists of 4 particulars. These are universals.
— Relativist

No, they are a bunch of particulars with the same intelligibility -- the same power of evoke concepts.

Until a concept is actually evoked, there is no actual universal.

I'm providing you a taste of a physicalist metaphysics. You have at least twice referred to my description as statements of faith, when all I've endeavored to do is to show there to be alternate metaphysical accounts. Your reaction here is pretty revealing about whose position is a product of faith.

1. I am not dismissing one "metaphysical hypothesis." I am dismissing any hypothetico-deductive deductive approach to metaphysics. The proper method of metaphysics is to abstract necessary principles from our experience of reality, then, applying them to concrete experiences, deduce necessary conclusions about the nature of being and our place in it.

And you overlook the fact that this "proper method of metaphysics" leads in multiple directions. I do not dispute that some paths lead in the direction you are defending, but merely point out that other paths do not lead there. You object to my label of "assumption" to metaphysics, but label aside - metaphysical theories are contingent upon the the imperfect mental processes that develop them. You would recognize this problem better if you would educate yourself in coherent physicalist metaphysics - this is a clear deficiency in your analysis. I strongly suggest you read A World of States of Affairs and What is a Law of Nature?, both by D. M. Armstrong. Then you could perhaps show why this path is a blind alley, but ignoring it doesn't make your perferred path any more credible - indeed, it makes it seem misleading.

2. Independently of the field of application, unfalsifiable hypotheses are unacceptable in the hypothetico-deductive (scientific) method because it can't be applied to them. The method works by feigning hypotheses, deducting consequences of those hypotheses, and testing the deduced consequences against reality. If a hypothesis is unfalsifiable, we can't test it, and so the method is inapplicable. Feigning an unfalsifiable hypothesis is simply stating a faith position.

Again, keep in mind that there are multiple metaphysical theories. If your arguments persuasive power depends on one such theory, and fails with another, how can it be said to truly have persuasive power? This is my issue with ignoring other metaphysical theories.

BTW - a metaphysical theory can be falsified by finding incoherence. Short of that, you can argue against it by identifying areas in which its accounts are deficient. I'll even give you a tip: physicalism has a problem with consciousness. If not for that problem, I'd lean more strongly toward physicalism rather than being on the fence.

3. The FTA is an argumentum signum quia. As such, it is not a sound deductive argument, or even a hypothetical argument. It is merely a persuasive case.

It is contingent on a particular metaphysical theory. That sums up my objection. I am agnostic to naturalism/deism specifically because there are coherent metaphysical theories for each. Your argument therefore has no persuasive power to me. I suggest that anyone who understands that there are indeed multiple (but incompatible) coherent metaphysical theories would agree it is unpersuasive.

[physicalism and universals]seem like incompatible positions. Physics has nothing to say about the logical order and universals belong to the logical order.

This has nothing to do with logical order, it relates what is. It just entails that the same property can be instantiated in multiple particulars. Look back at my example. "-1" electric charge is a property that exists in every instance of electron. Four-ness exists in every state of affairs that consists of 4 particulars. These are universals.

Someone actually claimed that Trump is always honest?

Zillions of untruths come out of his mouth, but I wonder how many of them are actually cases where he knows the truth but chooses to tell something else.

The other day, my wife got into an argument with a Trump supporter about his lies. The Trumpist said, "all politicians lie... look at that lie Obama told that we could keep our doctors." I tend to doubt Obama knew better and was intentionally trying to mislead. I expect a lot of Trump's untruths are of this nature. We see more of them because he's stupid and deludes himself.

Are Trump's untruths lies, or are they the product of stupidity?

The existence of an actual infinity (vs a potential infinity) is controversial among philosophers. I'm of the opinion an actual infinity cannot exist. I feel strongest about the impossibility of an infinite past, because that would entail a completed infinity: how could infinitely many days have passed?

Physicists accept the possibility of infinity in space and time simply because there is no known law of nature that rules it out. That doesn't imply the philosophical analysis is wrong, it just means that we don't know of any particular limits.

My opinions are consistent with the dominant opinion among philosophers prior to Cantor's set theory, but that doesn't seem like a very good reason to believe an actual infinity exists in the world.

Just who is this appealing to? Is his base that twisted?

Here's 3 quotes from Adolf Hitler:

All propaganda has to be popular and has to accommodate itself to the comprehension of the least intelligent of those whom it seeks to reach.

Hate is more lasting than dislike.

How fortunate for governments that the people they administer don't think.

Make the lie big, make it simple, keep saying it, and eventually they will believe it.


It seems that great minds think alike. So do not-so-great minds.

It comes down to semantics. Infinity can be considered a quantity in terms of transfinite math - so there are actually many "infinities" (aleph-0 is less than aleph-1; there are "more" real numbers than integers). But it's not a quantity in a sense that it corresponds to anything that exists in the material world.

His capitalization is just one more way he hypnotizes his base. The capitalized words convey another slogan, or meme. It is (unfortunately) effective.

No rational discourse comes out of him. Don't play his game- respond by being rational.

Trump to me is that he apparently has no idea how capitalization in the English language works

I wish that were the only gap in his knowledge.

Henri - How do you define "atheist"? I'm anticipating it won't apply to me. My position is that of "agnostic deist" - i.e. I acknowledge the possibility that there exists some sort of first cause, that either constitutes the world (such as in pantheism) or transcends the world. It is also possible that the physical world is all that exists (possibly with the addendum of some things that are ontologically emergent). I acknowledge this possibility because it's possible that one or more of the various arguments for "God's" existence is sound. Those arguments do not actually make a case for God (as usually defined by theists); they only make the case (say) for a first cause, or source of goodness.

This position puts me in the "atheist" category, because I think it's quite unlikely that a God exists - where "God" is defined in the usual theist sense of a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipresent.

I disagree that one can assign epistemic priorities consistently. This has been analyzed by epistemologists, and I think they've shown it to be untenable.

How can an agnostic and believer both be rational on this issue and come to different conclusions? It's because agnostic uses only basic assessment, and stops at first conclusion, without going further.

It's interesting you'd say that, because it is the exact opposite of what I think. The atheists and agnostics I've engaged with invariably consider themselves on a perpetual search for truth. For example, I wouldn't at all mind being shown I'm wrong - I invite criticism of my reasoning. I adapt what I believe based on what I learn. On the other hand, every committed theist I've engaged thinks they have the truth - and this certainty ends up being an end-point - they have no motivation or desire to look further. IMO, one should always be open to the possibility he is wrong, and it depends on seriously entertaining the possibility that one is wrong. Do you seriously entertain the possibility a God does not exist?

That said, I actually do agree that theism can be a rational position. So can atheism - at least per my definition (someone who believes God probably doesn't exist). That doesn't mean all atheists and all theists actually reached that position rationally.

"Given Hume’s critique of causality, our grasp of time-sequenced causality is not adequately based on observing physical events. However, it is warranted by our experience of willing. Being aware of our own committed intentionality and its subse­quent incar­nation, we expect analogues in nature. Contrary to de­terminists who give time-sequenced causality prior­ity over voli­tion, will is the prime analogue and causality deriva­­tive. Associ­ation plays a role, but, as Hume noted, asso­cia­­tion does not warrant necessity. The idea of causal con­nec­tion over time derives from our experience as agents."

Hume's view of causality is nominalist. Consider reading Armstrong's "What is a Law Of Nature." Armstrong (a physicalist and realist regarding universals) postulates that laws are relations between universals. For example, electron is a universal: it is a type of object with a -1 electric charge as a constituent property. Electrons and protons have as a relation between them: attraction. This attraction-relation is a relation between those two universals (electron, proton), and is therefore a "law." The law exists in its instantiations: each actual pair pf electrons have this relation. Armstrong's postulate is supported by the success of science (whereas Hume's constant conjunction makes the success of science surprising), and I suggest should be more compelling at least for realists. However, it doesn't appear to be consistent with your thesis of intentionality, and that seems a flaw for your position.

There is no attitude regarding relationships that correspond to truth: it's all about what we tell ourselves. So you might as well follow whatever path leads you to happiness.

I agree with what you said, but after all - we ARE human, so when we're speaking of "artificial" intelligence, it pertains to that which humans regard as intelligence (as opposed to dogs). That is at least the prototype, which can permit some deviation.

If the AI doesn't have intrinsic needs and wants, that is a deviation. We could consider an externally imposed set of needs/wants (like Asimov's 3 laws of robotics). The obstacle is for the AI to feel these needs, not just have them be part of the code that directs activity. It needs self-direction, or an analogue.

So a human would say. If it acquired all information..

I do not have all information, and I say it. Our one sure model of intelligence is the human mind, and in the human mind, the linkage is there.

what is existence beyond our wants and needs?

What does that have to do with intelligence?