I am not subsuming the hope that P under the same category as P. — Pierre-Normand

I am glad to hear that, but it seems to me you did:

judgements are intentional attitudes ... the very same proposition P can be the content of different sorts attitudes other than judgements, such as the hope that P, the fear that P, ... — Pierre-Normand

In this account p, the hope that p, the fear that P, etc. are all equally in the category of attitudes. Have I misunderstood, or have you changed your position?

Judgements don't make assertions. People make judgements and assertions, and they can assert the contents of the judgements that they are making. They can also assert the negation of a judgement that they are making, in which case they are lying. — Pierre-Normand

This is a quibble over words, not a substantive difference. I agree that judgements are not agents, nor, in the sense I am using "judgement," need judgements be expressed; nevertheless, they can affirm, which is the first meaning of "assert." As language primarily deals with intersubjectively observable reality, in dealing with mental states we often use analogical predication. Such is the case here. "Assertion" is being predicated by an analogy of attribution as judgements are the source of linguistic assertions.

To judge <A is B> is to think that the source of concept <A> is identically the source of concept <B>, so the cupola in the proposition expressing a judgement expresses identity, not between A and B, but in the source of A and B. Similarly, to judge <A is not B> is to think that the source of concept <A> is not identically the source of concept <B>.

Sorry for the late response, busy few days. — MindForged

No problem some of these matters have waited decades or even millennia. A few days doesn't matter.

Except that our justification about what's possible and what's not is usually grounded in the same thing as what we justify our belief about the actual world. — MindForged

Good point. So, we can agree that the real world is logically prior to any possible world.

P is possible with respect to a set of facts or propositions, S, if P does not contradict S.

I do think "facts" should be restricted to intelligible reality. — Dfpolis

This makes total nonsense of everyday uses of modality. — MindForged

You misunderstand the "or" here is not a clarification, but indicates "alternatively." So, when you say "if the laws of physics were different," you are excluding from S any proposition specifying the actual laws of physics, the evidence leading us to them and their implications. Thus, my definition is perfectly suited to your example.

gnoring the fact that outside of modal realism possible worlds aren't postulated to be literal places, your criticism is clearly that lack of epistemic access to possible worlds is a problem for using possible world semantics. — MindForged

No. That is not my objection. I assume that we know what we imagine possible worlds to be (even though we can't know that they're self-consistent). My objection is that the construction of possible worlds does not add to our knowledge of the real world, which remains the same (except for our mental state) no matter what we imagine. In other words, imagining a possible world can give us no new data on the real world, which alone is relevant to understanding our experience consistently. So, while we have more factors to process, we have no more information than we started with.

Saying we have no epistic access to a possible world means that while we can inform it, and know how we are informing it, it can't inform us, because it does not exist. As a result we are tempted to to use imagined data as real data. My example is a possible world in which life evolved, but in which the physical constants are slightly different. The calculations underlying the fine tuning argument show such a world is not self-consistent -- even though it appears quite possible when we imagine it. The real world can surprise us and tell us that what we imagine is not so. Imagined worlds can't.

My point was that we don't have direct access to the actual world either — MindForged

I rebutted this objection, and you ignored my answer. If you are going to persist in asserting this dogmatic claim, please do me the courtesy of responding to my rebuttal. It is in my 5th post of this tread.

So if I'm eight years old and I say "I could be a doctor", this can be understood as saying that there is some possible world (however you understand those to be) where I am in fact an MD. — MindForged

Why bring in a construct of dubious ontological status? Why not be more parsimonious and say it means "I see nothing to prevent me from being a doctor"? What does the construct add to this besides an unnecessary discussion of the ontological status and semantics of possible worlds?

And then say I eventually do become a doctor, meaning the actual world is one such possible world where my claim turned out true. Well that's perfectly obvious justification for my original modal statement being thought true. — MindForged

Yes, but not in any essential way. Think of all the things we imagine that do not turn out. That some imagined possibilities become actual does not justify the claim that all imagined worlds are possible or self-consistent.

Whether it's conceivability or similarity or perception, there are any number of proposed ways one can access possible worlds — MindForged

None of these access possible worlds because you cannot "access" what does not exist. We can and do access our thoughts, including our imaginings. To call our imaginings "worlds" is misdirection -- precisely what I'm complaining about. They have no more epistic value than normal (non-modal) epistemology can give imaginings.

"access" here is not causal, other worlds aren't "out there" acting on us in the actual world any more than other abstract objects act on us to give us access to them. — MindForged

If you think knowledge is causally justified true belief, this should give you pause. I think knowing is awareness of dynamically present intelligibility, but the same conclusion follows on my account. The only thing dynamically present is our own thoughts, and so any knowledge garnered is of our subjective state -- not of the external world.

There's no reason to suppose that our sensory representation of an object is identical to how our sense's are modified by the object in question — MindForged

Yes there is: The Principle of Identity. A modifying B is identically B being modified by A. "Our sensory representation of an object" is just another name for the modification to our sensory state brought about by sensing that object. What else can it be?

It's not identical, you're simply pointing out an inverse relationship — MindForged

The inverse relationship is the reason for the identity. Lest you be confused, I am not saying A is identically B. I am saying the event (A modifying B) is identically the event (B being modified by A). So, my being informed (by an object) is identically the object informing me. Because these are identical there is no space for an epistic gap between the object's informing action and my being informed.

But the point being made is there's absolutely no way to know that our representation of the small amount of sensory data our representational apparatus uses to construct our perception is infallibly done. — MindForged

You are confusing two issues: The infallibility of the sensory datum, and the fallibility of consequent judgements. We perceive infallibly. The object necessarily has the power to present its self as it does present itself. That does not mean that we class the presentation infallibly. I mistook a horse for a dog once and it scared the hell out of me! That does not mean that i was wrong in perceiving something suddenly appearing over my shoulder.

Even if we suffer from delusions, there is something (say a trauma or intoxication) that is adequate to cause what we perceive. It is just a matter judging what kind of thing it is -- and that comes from experience. In A Beautiful Mind we see how John Nash learned to recognize his delusions as such, and so avoid being deceived by them.

Without that infallibility, we don't have even quasi-access to the world. — MindForged

Of course, this is blatantly false. It's like saying, if we have a noisy connection, we aren't talking to our mother. In other words, it's nonsense.

Oh my god, so your argument is, literally, that the world "possible" is there. — MindForged

Hardly! I've explained many times now that since they are not actual, possible worlds aren't "there." I've made it clear that their only existence is intentional -- the unparsimonious imaginings of overwrought philosophical minds.

P is possible if there is at least one world in which P is the case — MindForged
— Dfpolis

Still, they are not our world, as, if they are different in any way, they are not identical to our actual world. Any world that is not identical to our world is a different world. As each is a different world, each (actual or potential) object in them is a different object from any object in out actual world. — Dfpolis


The worlds aren't identical, that wasn't my claim. But the object with the name "Venus" is picked out by the same name no matter the world. — MindForged

This is inadequate as, unless P is actually true, there is no world in which P is the case. What you need to say is "P is possible if there is at least one possible world in which P is the case" -- and that is circular. — Dfpolis

You aren't making any sense. In modal logic, "truth" is always relativized to worlds in which the proposition is true or not.

My point is simple: Independently of whether or not there is such a thing as modal logic, only one world exists simpliciter -- ours. Thus, unless you do add "possible" to "world," consideration is restricted to our actual world. So, using your definition, if p is false in this world, it is impossible. Appealing to modal logic is irrelevant misdirection and distraction.

Still, they are not our world, as, if they are different in any way, they are not identical to our actual world. Any world that is not identical to our world is a different world. As each is a different world, each (actual or potential) object in them is a different object from any object in out actual world. — Dfpolis

The worlds aren't identical, that wasn't my claim. But the object with the name "Venus" is picked out by the same name no matter the world. — MindForged

Which means that "Venus" picks out multiple objects (one real, many imagined) and so it is a universal, not a proper name. The only alternative is to say that an imagined Venus is numerically identical with the actual Venus -- but to say this is to deny the difference between reality and fiction.

"The oldest child [in a particular family]" is description, not a proper name, — MindForged

I understand that. But, it may still be the condition that specifies to whom the proper name is assigned. If we are to pick out which object to call "Dennis" or "Venus" in a modified world we need a well-defined set of criteria. Lacking such criteria, who or what is designated by these names in some possible world is indeterminate. What if we imagine a new second planet; is it, or the third planet, to be called "Venus"? You may choose to ignore such niceties, but if you do, the possible worlds construct is ill-defined.

"Disposed" is a modal notion itself, meaning to be "inclined towards" or something one might do given their characteristics. — MindForged

Inclinations are not a species of modality. They are actual. They determine how an object will act in well-defined circumstances. They are no more "modal" than the laws of nature. If we bring two particles of the same charge next to each other, they will exert a repulsive force according to Coulomb's law. That is a fact about the contingent structure of nature which requires no reference ot possible worlds.

Does this sentence literally mean that "gato" means "cat?" No – it just means "the cat is sleeping." However, from the true utterance of that sentence in that context, I learn something other than the literal content of the sentence, viz. something about how the words used to express its literal content are used. — Snakes Alive

OK. That is quite sensible. I am not sure it is applicable here.

And indeed in saying such a thing, my primary intention may to to impart this information, not the (trivial) necessary proposition. — Snakes Alive

I would say that, in normal intercourse, the contingent meaning is the literal meaning. In fact, until the contingent meaning is grasped, the trivial necessary meaning cannot be grasped.

You have not commented on my claim that proper names need not refer to individuals simpliciter, but to individuals as known -- because covert guises do not elicit the idea expressed by the name.

I was thinking of propositions as Fregean propositions: or as ways the world (or aspects of the world) might conceivably be thought to be. — Pierre-Normand

How would one distinguish Fregean propositions from judgements? If they aren't judgements, what reality do they have?

Of course, the very same proposition P can be the content of different sorts attitudes other than judgements, such as the hope that P, the fear that P, the conjecture that P, the antecedent of the conditional judgement that if P then Q, etc. — Pierre-Normand

Putting, "the hope that p" in the same category as p is surely an error. Why? Because <the hope that p> is a concept, while <p> is a judgement. Judgements make assertions about states of affairs and so can be true or false, but concepts make no assertions and can be neither true nor false, only instantiated or not. Thus, the judgement <p> has a very different logical status than the concept <the hope that p>.

We can correct this by comparing p to "I hope that p," which expresses the judgement <I am hoping that p>, where "am" is a cupola. The only way to put expressions of "propositional attitude" in the same category as p is to convert them into judgements that can be true or false -- judgements about attitudes toward propositions. While the content of p is, say, the reality of some world state, the content of "I hope p" is not the reality of that world state, but the reality of an intentional state.

So, the contents of these various forms differ. The are not elicited by physical states, but by intentional states so they do not reference the same state as p. Thus, they are not different "attitudes" they are different concepts actualizing different kinds of intelligibility in intentional states.

It seems to me that proper names (and every other sort of singular referring expression or device, such as demonstratives, indexicals, definite descriptions, etc.) can be construed both as referring to particulars and to intelligible aspects of reality. — Pierre-Normand

I would say intelligible aspects of particulars. My model of meaning is that a concept refers to the intelligibility that can properly elicit it. ("Properly" is meant to exclude psychological aberrations and the like.) This seems a simple and reasonable operational definition of reference.

Since, even under ideal circumstances, Jorel's son in the guise of the man of steel does not elicit the idea <Clark Kent> in one ignorant of the secret identity, "Clack Kent" does not designate Jorel's son in the guise of the man of steel. If one learns the secret identity, the eliciting conditions change, and with it the reference of "Clark Kent."

There is no way, on my view, to refer to any empirical object other than referring to it as an intelligible aspect of reality. — Pierre-Normand

Agreed.

we can't refer to (or think of) a determinate object without subsuming it under some determinate sortal concept that expresses this object's specific criteria of persistence and individuation. — Pierre-Normand

I agree that to communicate about an an object, we often need sortal terms to direct attention to this rather than that. I do not see them as absolutely necessary as we can just point at an object to indicate "this." In the same way when we have a unique new experience, we may not have any other experiences to group it with, and so no applicable sortal concepts.

I am sure how a sortal concept "expresses this object's specific criteria of persistence and individuation." Concepts do not imply existence, let alone persistence. Further, sortal concepts are universal, and so have abstracted away all individuating notes of intelligibility.

that although the references of both names don't change (and still remain numerically identical to each other), the user of those names, who previously was using them with distinct senses, now comes to be able to (and indeed becomes rationally obligated) to use them both with the same Fregean sense since she can no longer rationally judge something to be truly predicated of one without her also judging it to be truly predicated of the other. — Pierre-Normand

My point is that the reference of a name is not the object simpliciter, but those aspects of the object that elicit the idea associated with the name. So, as we learn more, the reference changes. "Sense" is, of course, different than reference. Reference spans all the instances that can elicit the concept. Sense is the intellectual analysis of the eliciting conditions. As eliciting conditions are not eliciting instances, these are distinct concepts. Still, nether requires that referenced objects elicit concepts simpliciter, but only according to the sense of the concept.

I think the difficulty here is the same as Descartes's in thinking that "body" and "mind" had to reference two things instead of two aspects of the same thing.

It seems to me that you are using "materially the same" and "formally the same" roughly in the same way in which a Fregean would use "having the same reference" and "having the same sense", respectively. — Pierre-Normand

No, these terms are different. A name materially considered is the name itself (the words), a name formally considered is what is named (its reference).

I am unsure how this follows since I don't hold the world (or objects) to be something other than the intelligible world (or intelligible objects). We don't have empirical or cognitive access to pure noumena. — Pierre-Normand

I addressed this in my 5th post on this thread. We have dynamic access to noumenal reality. The object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object. So, there is no room to insert an epistemic gap. What we do not have is God-like, exhaustive access.

However, the cognitive significance of a sentence, i.e. what we're capable of learning from the fact that the sentence expresses a true proposition, outruns its literal semantic content. — Snakes Alive

This seems a contradiction in terms. Semantically, we have a sign (the sentence), the interpretation (the intentional state elicited by the sentence), and reference (the object state intended by the intentional state). So, I do not see how it is possible to say that what we learn "outruns" the literal semantic content, when what we learn (the intentional state elicited) we learn from the literal semantic content. What cpuld you possibly mean by "literal semantic content" other than the intentional state that a literal reading elicits? It seems to me that any division of the elicited content is arbitrary and artificial, and not based on any facts of the matter.

Also, you did not comment on my key claim: that the reference of a proper name is not an individual simpliciter, but to an individual under a certain aspect (only to certain notes of intelligibility). Thus, the reference of "Clark Kent" is not the reference of "Superman" unless one knows they are the same person -- and learning that they are changes the reference of the terms.

This has been my point from the beginning, i.e. that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" do not designate Venus simpliciter, but Venus as appearing at certain times. This is not explained by the distinction of sense and reference, because the reference is not an object, but only certain intelligible aspects of an object.

I have no doubt that the two readings express different judgements (intentional existents). Still I have several questions.

Can one distinguish two identically written propositions without reference to the intentional states they express? If one can't, isn't linguistic analysis (formal or informal) derivative on intentional analysis? Alternately, to what does "proposition" refer, if not to judgements?

I think the underlying problem here is the assumption that proper names refer to things, rather than to intelligible aspects of reality. "Clark Kent" refers to Jorel's son in his guise of newspaper reporter, not to Jorel's son simpliciter. "Superman" refers to Jorel's son in his guise of the man of steel. By ignoring the aspect under which Jorel's son is designated, the notion of rigid designator distorts the intent of the designating agent.

It is not even true that Jorel's son in the guise of newspaper reporter is Jorel's son in the guise of the man of steel -- even though both designate Jorel's son. In other words, when one learns that Clark Kent is superman, the conditions of designation of each term change. What "Clark Kent" means to the speaker after leaning that Clark Kent is superman is more than what it meant before. So, while "Clark Kent" is materially the same before and after the revelation, it is formally different. This is seen by examining its scope of application. Before the revelation, the speaker would not apply "Clark Kent" to Jorel's son in the guise of the man of steel, but would after the revelation.

I conclude that the analysis of rigid designation is defective because it it mischaracterizes what proper names refer to. They do not refer to objects, but to intelligible aspects of objects.

There is confusion because ethics is not about convincing people what to do. It is about deciding what is the right thing to do. Plato believed that if a person knew the good, that person would invariably do good. There is no evidence that this is so.

Every person's fundamental option is between seeking the good and and being free from the constraint of good and evil. Aquinas speaks of it as a commitment to God. To be committed to God, one does not need to know that it is God that one is committed to. This distinction is made in the judgement story of Matthew 25, where many of those judged did not know who they "served." (I'm not making a faith claim, but citing a historical example of the distinction.)

A second problem is the contemporary belief in Hume's, or in G. E. Moore's, "Naturalistic Fallacy." Hume believed that one could not conclude what "ought" to be from what "is." Moore believed that "good" could not be defined in terms of what is. This effectively disconnects morality from cognition. Since we can only know what is, we can't know what is good.

A third problem is the prevalence of irrational ethical theories. I am thinking specifically of various forms of utilitarianism and consequentialism. Utilitarians insist on optimizing some utility function, assuming without warrant that it is meaningful to speak of optimizing something that cannot be measured, or in many cases, even rank-ordered. Consequentialists want to judge moral decisions on the basis of consequences that, in many cases, are unknowable at decision time.

Our concern for the good need not be "disinterested." For one who has chosen the fundamental option of seeking the good, seeking it is the essential to self-realization.

You might still convince me if you clarified what you mean by "objective" and provided a rational argument instead of a dogma to be accepted.

For me, being "objective" is being an object in a possible subject-object relation. As all knowing involves both a knowing subject and a known object, every act of knowing is both objective and subjective. Thus, it is an oxymoron to say knowledge is not objective.

It really does not matter what I believe, what matters is what it is rational to believe.

Exactly. By specifying S we can easily define what we mean by possibility in various contexts.

Given that they co-refer or not, they express necessarily true or necessarily false propositions. That you are unaware of which it is, and that this depends on the meaning of the words, is where the feeling of contingency comes from. For it is contingent whether the sentence expresses a necessarily true or necessarily false proposition. — Snakes Alive

It seems to me that this analysis is incomplete. It's surely true that Donald Trump is Donald Trump, no matter what you call him. So, if you read the terms in "Donald is Mr. Trump" formally (as referring to the person), this is simply an instance of the Principle of Identity and so necessarily true. The problem is that is not the only reading. One could read it as "The name 'Donald' refers to the same person as the name 'Mr. Trump.'" In that case, it speaks of a contingent reality, for naming conventions are contingent -- this person could well have another name, like "John Smith" -- or even "David Dennison."

The justification is that we don't have Objective access to "the world". — Pattern-chaser

So, I am to accept this as a faith claim? And, with no explanation of what you even mean by "Objective access to 'the world'" -- despite my explicit request that you tell me what you mean by "objective" so that I could address your concern?

As a faith claim, I do not find it worthy of belief.

most philosophers do not think that possible worlds are literally real worlds that they inquire about. They think of possible worlds as more akin to logically consistent stories about how things might be. — PossibleAaran

I have been thinking about this since I started the thread. In never thought of possible worlds as real, because what is merely possible is not actual. I did, however, think of them as numerically distinct modified replicas of this world. I have been told on this thread, by those more familiar with the matter than I, that this is not how Kripke thinks of them. If I understand aright, he thinks of them as this one world as it might have been.

That got me thinking of the Sea Battle problem in Aristotle, which is resolved by saying that the Principle of Excluded Middle applies to actual existents, but not to future contingents because they have no actual existence. This means that while multiple futures as possible, no present or past but those actually obtaining are possible.

My current definition of possible is:
p is possible with respect to a set of propositions, S, if p does not contradict the propositions of S..

S may be defined either explicitly, or as the set of propositions expressing a set of facts, F. This allows the definition to be applied to both factual and counterfactual situations.

Putting these pieces together, with respect to ontological possibility (meaning F is the actual world), no world other than the actual world (F) is ontologically possible. This is because altering some fact f, expressed by p, into f' expressed by ~p will invariably contradict p ∈ F.

But what about the notion of it could have been? This is expressed by the subjunctive mood, which can express imaginings as well as possibilities. Since we have just ruled out possibilities, we are left with imaginings. So, insofar as we we are considering what is possible with respect to the actual world, there are no other worlds are ontologically possible. Still, many imagined worlds are possible.

There is no reason why we cannot imagine another world just like ours, with objects called by the same name (rigidly designated), as long as we do not think they are ontologically possible.

Some philosophers think that Philosophy involves making "discoveries" about "possible worlds" — PossibleAaran

I think philosophy is the attempt to develop a consistent framework for understanding of all types of human experience.

I think possible worlds talk is usually intended as talk about logical possibility. I can't remember an article in which that isn't quite clear. — PossibleAaran

I had an exchange with Alvin Plantinga in the early 1990s in which he appealed to possible worlds to justify Bayesian probability.

philosophers will use technical language where plain language would do, and this has the effect of making philosophy seem incredibly convoluted to those outside of it, and even leads to errors for those within it. I think possible worlds talk is like this. — PossibleAaran

We agree.

we don't have Objective access, so everything you say about "the world" is necessarily speculative, and will always be so. — Pattern-chaser

You have to define what you mean by "objective" before I can agree or disagree with the premise. As for the conclusion, it is clearly in error. As it is unargued, I can't direct my response to the cause of the error. So, please justify your claim.

without the jargon, can you say what it would mean to say that this physical world has physical or ontological reality or existence that the hypothetical logical system that I described doesn't have? — Michael Ossipoff

The "symbolic jargon" was not used to define the real world, but "possible."

I have said earlier, that the referent of "reality" is what is experienced in reliable experience. there is nothing exotic about "reliable" here. It just means that our experience is not delusion as commonly understood in psychology and medicine.

Yet, even the experience of a pink elephant is an experience of reality. It's just not an experience of external reality. The reality experienced in the pink elephant case is probably the effect of alcohol intoxication. A person familiar with severe alcoholism would interpret it so.

The sense of "real" is being capable of acting in any way. So, what acts to inform me is real by this definition.

So, I know physical reality is real because it can act on my senses (is sensible). Hypothetical systems cannot act on my senses in that way, and so have no reality outside the mind thinking them.

Is there a physics experiment that can establish that this physical world is other than a logical system, a system of logical and mathematical relation--as physicist Michael Faraday suggested in 1844? — Michael Ossipoff

Metaphysical questions are outside the competence of physics. However, every laboratory experiment observes actions and so confirms the reality of is objects.

And if you say that the difference is that this physical world is "actual", then of course I'll ask what you mean by "actual". — Michael Ossipoff

I already said, "By 'actual' I mean operational or able to act."

You asked if actors acting are actual. Of course they are. They're doing things.

If you want to know if mental constructs (hypothetical systems) are actual, of course they are, but as intentional, not physical, objects. They do not act on our senses, but in our minds.

or even independently.

I interpret that as referring to other possibility-worlds, logical systems. — Michael Ossipoff

That is not what I meant. I meant that there could be universes with no dynamic connection to ours in which things act on each other -- as opposed to the the mere possibility of such a system.

As David Lewis suggested, each such physical possibility-world is “actual” for its inhabitants (if it has any). The word “actual” is best defined as an adjective to denote the physical possibility-world in which the speaker resides. — Michael Ossipoff

No one resides in merely possible universes for the simple reason that "merely possible" means that they do not actually exist or contain actual objects. In other words, there are no actions or operations happening in them. Their only reality is intentional -- in the mind imagining them.

I am only saying that, as we are not in dynamic contact with them, they are epistemologically irrelevant.

…whatever that means. Their “existence” as systems of inter-referring abstract implications is uncontroversial. They’re relevant because we live in one of them. — Michael Ossipoff

It means that only objects we are in dynamic contact with can act on us to inform us. So, objects that cannot act on us (that we are dynamically isolated from) can't inform us and so are epistemologically irrelevant.

Of course abstractions do not interact. They can only inform our mind, so that our mind (not the abstractions) acts in a certain way. Therefore your claim is baseless.

It is unparsimonious to posit the existence of objects that can't act to inform us.

We live in a universe that can act to inform us -- not one that cannot.

By your definition, then, hypothetical physical worlds are real, because their constituent things act on eachother — Michael Ossipoff

This is incorrect. Since hypotheticals have only intentional existence, they have no acts of their own. Any acts associated with them are the acts of the mind thinking them -- not acts of the hypotheticals. If you conceive them to have acts, the only real act is you conceiving.

That’s circular. It assumes that your experience-story itself isn’t an abstract logical system. — Michael Ossipoff

Abstractions are the result of attending to some notes of intelligibility present in experience to the exclusion of others. So, the existence of abstractions, and of abstract systems, is logically dependent upon the existence of intelligible experiences. Thus, the experienced world is logically prior to any abstract world you may hypothesize.

Looked at in a different way, my experience of reality is that reality informs me -- sometimes in very surprising ways. My experience of hypotheticals is that I inform them our of my wealth of experience and am never surprised.

That hardly can be given as a reason to say that it’s more than a hypothetical story about you and your surroundings’ interaction with you. — Michael Ossipoff

I have just explained why experience is prior to any hypothetical story.

Of course they can. They can and do act on other hypotheticals, — Michael Ossipoff

No, they don't. Any action you hypothesize is your action, not the action of the hypothetical.

”Do you believe in unparsimonious brute-facts and unverfiable, unfalsifiable propositions?” — Michael Ossipoff
.
No.

Good. Then you don’t believe in an “objectively existent” (as opposed to hypothetical) physical world whose existence you can’t explain, and whose more-than-hypothetical “reality” and “objective physical existence” you can’t define. — Michael Ossipoff

Of course I know (not merely believe) that there is an objective reality because I am involved in any number of subject-object relations that could not exist absent object that can act to inform me.

As for explaining the existence of contingent reality, sound deduction shows that it is maintained in being by a necessary Being whose essence is its existence.

I have defined all of the terms you have questioned and pointed out phenomenological differences between reality and your hypothetical systems.

Finally, no, I am not a materialist. I maintain the existence of intentional operations irreducible to physical operations.

Right at the beginning, you include assumptions such as "actual world" and "real world". What are these worlds, and where is your justification for their "real" or "actual" existence? — Pattern-chaser

I responded to this question at length in my 5th post on the thread (a response to MindForged). He did not respond to the points I made on this topic. If you wish to respond to those points, I will be happy to discuss them with you.

I want to thank all the participants of the thread for an illuminating discussion and some of you for correcting some ignorant misunderstandings on my part.

Dennis

But you don't know what you mean by "actual". Or, if you do know what you mean by it, you're keeping it to yourself. — Michael Ossipoff

By "actual" I mean operational or able to act.

As mere hypotheticals can't act, the aren't actually facts.

"Fact" is often or usually defined as a relation among things, or as a state-of-affairs. — Michael Ossipoff

OK. As long as the things and states are actual, I have no problem with this.

in what regard, in what manner, do you think this physical world is different from merely the setting for your hypothetical life-experience-story, consisting of a hypothetical logical system such as I've described? — Michael Ossipoff

Because a hypothetical story represents actions and states of affairs that did not occur.

Saying that something is metaphysically possible just is to say that it isn't inconsistent with the way things can be in accordance with the constitutive rules that govern how those things fall under concepts. (For instance, it is a constitutive rule of bishops, in chess, that such pieces only moves legally along diagonals; and it is a constitutive rule of the concept of a human being that it is an animal). — Pierre-Normand

I understand what you are saying, but it is not how I'd define "metaphysically necessary." There is no metaphysical reason a chess bishop can't move like a knight, rook or in any other way. It is merely a convention.

I would say that metaphysical necessity can make no reference to contingent constrains. It is what is required by the nature of existence per se. For example, it is metaphysically necessary that a potential be actualized by something already actual, because actualization is an act, and only actual beings can act.

I think it can be shown that if "A" and "B" are meant to function in the way ordinary proper names are used, and they both actually name the same individual, then it is metaphysically necessary that A and B are numerically identical. — Pierre-Normand

I agree, because this is just an application of the ontological principle of identity.

You seem very sensible, and I don't object to what you are saying.

I have no problem in saying that if I'm talking about possibilities with respect to an individual, I am still talking about that individual -- and that is true whether I am naming the individual or describing the individual. It does not matter if I say "Pierre," or "the man on the corner with the tan jacket." Even if the man moves and changes his jacket, I am still intending the same person.

My objection is a practical one against bringing in the unnecessary baggage of possible worlds to express such a simple idea.

Kripke would readily agree that the statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus" expresses a contingent identity in the case where "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are shorthand expressions for definite descriptions that merely happen to have the same reference in the actual world. — Pierre-Normand

ok

It was that, and hence my response regarding how you do not have direct epistemic access. If this access isn't infallible then there's no particularly superior access to your purported knowledge of the actual world over what is possible. — MindForged

This is like saying that a map with a misprint is not worth anymore than a possible map.

Do you ever stick to what you say or do you change it on a dime when an objection surfaces? Here's what you said before:

Yes, I used "possible" -- not essentially, but to avoid circumlocution. So, here's the same definition restated: "P is possible with respect to a set of facts, S, if P does not contradict the propositions expressing S." — MindForged

Touche! Fair enough. I was imprecise. Mea culpa. I had my doubts about "facts" when I typed it, but couldn't think of a better term. I thought of "set of propositions," but I wanted to be open facts in reality not yet discovered. So, try this one:

P is possible with respect to a set of facts or propositions, S, if P does not contradict S.

I do think "facts" should be restricted to intelligible reality.

The reason why you required infallibility (whether you acknowledge it or not) is because your initial claim in the OP was this:

First, it is unnecessary. As we can have no epistemic access to any world but our own, actual world, anything we can learn, we can learn from the real world. — MindForged

There is no claim of infallibility here. If you think there is, explain how.

The actual world is actual because it acts to inform us. Merely possible worlds do not act, let alone act to inform us. Instead, we inform (or perhaps misinform) them.

My point was that we don't have any better epistemic access to the actual world because of the limitations of perception. Without infallible means of accessing the states of affairs of the actual world, what we perceive to be the case can easily fail to be so. Whatever you mean by "direct access" is completely opaque, and so recourse to reliability here is equally so — MindForged

We have no access to any possible world. We only have access to our imagination, which can easily be inconsistent. What we know of the actual world cannot "easily fail" if we exercise due diligence. It fails occasionally, but it is usually interpretations and constructs that fail rather than experiential data.

I have said exactly what I mean by "direct access." I said that a sensory object's modification of our sensory state is identically our sensory representation of the object. I said that the object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object. I said that a single act actualizes both the object's intelligibility and the subject's capacity to be informed. You have objected to none of these claims.

Possible worlds can do none of these things, because, being merely possible, they cannot act to inform us.

Possible worlds as a means to give semantics for possibility is not circular. The only way you could claim that is because the word "possible" is part of the name of the concept. — MindForged

It is the name of the concept because the employment of the tool requires one to construct, or at least recognize, worlds that are possible.

P is possible if there is at least one world in which P is the case — MindForged

This is inadequate as, unless P is actually true, there is no world in which P is the case. What you need to say is "P is possible if there is at least one possible world in which P is the case" -- and that is circular.

Possible worlds are not (unless you're David Lewis) being posited as literal other worlds in the same sense as the actual world. It's right there in the name, there's only one actual world. Venus in another possible world is still Venus as it might have been, the individuation conditions return the same object (that's why the names are a rigid designator). — MindForged

Obviously, possible worlds are not actual worlds. I do not imagine them to be so. Still, they are not our world, as, if they are different in any way, they are not identical to our actual world. Any world that is not identical to our world is a different world. As each is a different world, each (actual or potential) object in them is a different object from any object in out actual world.

Venus in another possible world is still Venus as it might have been, the individuation conditions return the same object (that's why the names are a rigid designator). — MindForged

Objects are individuated by the network of relations that contextualize them. If you change one relatum, you change the object's individuation conditions. So, the individuation conditions may not return the same object. E.g. if I am the oldest child in the real world and in the possible world I have an older brother, the individuation condition of being the oldest child will not return me.

Further, Venus as it might have been is no longer possible. Future contingents are possible. Past contingents have already past into necessity. It is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not, but the battle of the Coral Sea is history. Only in other worlds may similar events turn out differently.

"Second planet" and "morning/evening stars" are not proper names. — MindForged

No, they are not. There are the kinds of properties you called upon to justify the "rigid designator" property of a term many posts ago -- what you're calling "individuation conditions." (Which are relational descriptions.) And, in the case of my example, they do not return objects supporting your case.

the identity holds across worlds (i.e. trans-world identity) because they have the same essential properties which make it Venus. — MindForged

If they are properties, we can describe them.

Counterfactual propositions can be judged on the basis of real-world potencies. Steve would have enjoyed the trip even if he did not go on it because he is actually disposed to enjoy such trips. If we did not know his relevant dispositions, we could not say whether he enjoyed the trip or not. So, there is no need for possible worlds talk to deal with counterfactuals.

You are under the impression that a rigid designator is a term that could not have meant anything other than what it actually means. — Snakes Alive

No, I am not under that impression. I think all terms are conventional. Only ideas cannot mean anything but what they mean, because their whole being is meaning what they signify.

It depends on how you define "same". Lewis's suggestion was that "same" doesn't meaningfully apply to someone or something in a different possibility world, It's a different world, necessarily with different (even if identical) things. — Michael Ossipoff

Exactly. Therefore, they can't have the same proper name, only homonymous proper names.

Which child, if either, am I in each world? Is it simply a matter of stipulation? Do we simply say that I’m one or the other (or neither)? — Michael

Precisely. It is a matter of how one constructs their possible worlds and then chooses to identify their components. As there is no reality involved, there can't be any facts of the matter.

You believe in an un-acknowledged and unsupported assumption that the physical world that we live in is the "actual", "existent", "physical" and "real" one, in some (unspecified) sense in which the infinitely-many other possibility-worlds aren't. — Michael Ossipoff

I do not deny the existence of other universes in a multiverse, or even independently. I am only saying that, as we are not in dynamic contact with them, they are epistemologically irrelevant.

I also note that there is a difference between knowing as awareness of present intelligibility, which is an act of intellect, and believing as a commitment to the truth of some proposition, which is an act of will.

there's no reasons to claim that they're "real" or "existent", whatever that would mean. — Michael Ossipoff

Anything that can act in any way exists. That is sufficient reason to think that things that act to inform me are real.

There's no reason to believe that your experience is other than such an abstract logical system. — Michael Ossipoff

Of course there is. The things I experience act on me and I am aware of their action on me. Abstract logical systems do not act on me in the same way.

If you claim that this physical world is more than the setting for the hypothetical logical system that is your experience-story, then in what respect to you think that this physical world is more than that. — Michael Ossipoff

Because mere hypotheticals can't act on anything.

Do you believe in unparsimonious brute-facts and unverfiable, unfalsifiable propositions? — Michael Ossipoff

No.

speaking of worlds as simply "possible" allows one to confuse logical, physical and ontological possibility. — Dfpolis

...distinctions whose advocates can't specify what they mean by them — Michael Ossipoff

I can. I said :

"P is possible with respect to a set of facts, S, if P does not contradict the propositions expressing S." — Dfpolis

Logical possibility means the proposition is consistent with S = the facts we know.

Physical possibility means the proposition is consistent with S = the laws of nature.
Alternately, one may mean the proposition is consistent with S = the laws of nature plus the facts we know about a physical state.

Ontological or metaphysical possibility means the proposition is consistent with S = the nature of being qua being.

This is all consistent with Kripke's claim that proper names function as rigid designators, and also with his claim that statements of identity of the form "A is B", where "A" and "B" are proper names, are metaphysically necessary. — Pierre-Normand

It depends on how you define "metaphysically necessary." Can you define it without invoking possible worlds semantics? If not, how can this claim be relevant to reality?

That's not what I said. I said that perception is not identical to reality, which is what you said. — MindForged

OK, but that leaves me wondering how it was an objection? You also said:

We don't even have direct access to our own world, so are we able to learn anything about the actual world? — MindForged

This seems an attempt to give possible worlds the same epistemological status as the real world, hence my justification of direct epistemic access.

A consistent "set of facts" is one way of articulating what a possible world is so I don't even know what you think you're arguing against at this point. — MindForged

Facts are actual, not merely possible. Possible worlds might be a consistent set of posits, they are not a consistent set of facts.

Naturally "reliable" is doing all the work here, being used to obfuscate the fact that there's no guarantee that perception maps to reality such that we can have an infallible means by which to say some experience is reliable. It's like you've never considered any objection to your views ever. — MindForged

If I didn't consider objections, I wouldn't have said "reliable." Yes, it's doing a lot of work, but that doesn't mean that we can't have true knowledge, where "truth" is understood as adequacy, not as exhaustiveness or infallibility. I've made no claim of infallible human knowledge, so the notion of infallibility is a straw man -- effectively replacing human knowledge with divine omniscience. Primarily, "knowing" names an human activity, so requiring infallibility as you seem to is a bait and switch tactic.

Necessity is indeed defined as truth in all possible world [of the set of world being quantified over], and yes X being necessary entails that it's negation is not possible. Where is the circularity? — MindForged

If you can't see that using possible worlds as the ultimate basis for defining possibility is circular, I can't help you.

it's nonsense to say that "Venus" names the same object in every possible world because Venus does not exist in every possible world. — Dfpolis

This is exactly what I was talking about, you don't understand this topic. — MindForged

Thank goodness! I understand logic instead. Predicates predicated of multiple subjects are universals. Without equivocating, names can only be predicated of one individual. A "Venus" in another (possible) world is not our Venus. Therefore, one can only be call both "Venus" by equivocation or by universal predication.

But that's not how proper names work, they pick out a specific object in the actual world, and the meaning of that name is fixed in modal logic — MindForged

I am not disputing that the meaning of "Venus" is fixed. I'm asking that you look at how you fixed it. You told me that in each world where "Venus" designated, it designated the second planet from the sun. That is the definition of a universal. If you'd brought me out and pointed at Venus, and said "I call that thing 'Venus,'" you'd be giving it a proper name. But, when you say, "whenever there's a second planet, I'm calling it 'Venus,'" you're either defining universal term, or a set of homonymous names. If it is a set of homonymous names, you can't treat them univocally, which is what you're doing when you say the meaning is "fixed."

Now you say that I don't understand. Am I supposed to understand that the canons of logical predication do not apply to possible worlds? If so, on what factual basis? Surely it can't be because "Kripke has spoken"?

So, we come back to the definition from the SEP article: "A rigid designator designates the same object in all possible worlds in which that object exists and never designates anything else." The "same" of "same object" can't mean "identical" because if the Venus of a possible world were identically our Venus, that world would be identically our world. So, "same" must mean generically the same, not the identical individual. A term that designates generically similar objects univocally is a universal, not a proper name.

Obviously "Hesperus=Phosporus" isn't true in the possible worlds where the references to the terms do not exist. — MindForged

But, in my example, the terms are referential via the same types of experiences that give them reference here. Each rigid designator names is appropriate object: There are morning and evening stars and a second planet. It is just that the references are not what you want them to be. You response will define my possible world out of consideration. So, again, the conclusion is based on how you choose to construct a set of possible worlds, not on any observable facts of the matter -- and that is precisely my objection.

I am sorry, I accidentally clicked post before I was done, and there seems to be no way of undoing a post. So I continued in another post.

Your objection seems to rely on analyzing "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" as definite descriptions rather than proper names. — Pierre-Normand

That part of my objection is that words express concepts, so if you want to know what they mean, you have to examine the concepts in terms of the experiences that elicit them. The reason that an empirical discovery is required for the identification is that the concepts are anything but identical.

The full objection was:

how does Kripke know what "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" mean in any possible world? As their meaning is conventional, the denizens of each possible world might use them to designate other objects or not use them at all. Kripke has no way of knowing. So, when Kripke says they designate the same object in every possible world in which the object exists, he means he has decided to use the terms in this universal way. So, there is no fact of the matter beyond Kripke choice of naming conventions. Thus, all Kripke has done is define his conclusion into existence: the claim "'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is metaphysically necessary" has no factual basis beyond Kripke's choice of naming conventions. — Dfpolis

I am sorry if my shorthand reference to my objection was misleading. The objection is that since we can't know what the denizen call things, "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are applied as a result of Kripke's fiat and not as the reflection of any known fact. In other words, they designate, not the same thing, but the same kind of thing, in all possible worlds in which that kind of thing exists solely by fiat. So, there is no fact of the matter -- only an arbitrary convention.

which would have told you that this purported objection is misguided:

Or, how anyone can know what "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" mean to the denizens of a possible world. — Snakes Alive

If you read the full objection, you'd see that this is a rhetorical step, not the full objection.

The SEP article is what I read.

Possible worlds are pieces of a technical apparatus that allow a model-theoretic interpretation of a language with modal operators. They have no metaphysical or ontological import in of themselves – only a supplementary theory as to what they are intended to model can provide this — Snakes Alive

I agree. My main problem with possible worlds semantics is pragmatic. By placing a layer of construct between reality, which alone can be a source of actual knowledge, and theoretical conclusions, it obscures the irrationality of conclusions such as Kripke's that "'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is metaphysically necessary."

There's no need for possible worlds in that interpretation. I can't personally see any value in the possible worlds paradigm. — andrewk

We agree. If it does not help clarify, but does help obscure, it is of little value.

Well the value is giving real, rigorous definitions of these notions that allows us to be confident in using them in theorization. — MindForged

But, how can we be certain about anything that does not really exist? We know our world is possible because if it were not, it would not be actual, but when we are dealing with possible worlds all we have is worlds we imagine to be possible, but which might have covert inconsistencies. The idea that there could be worlds with slightly different physical constants and life seems possible, but it's not. Another example is the problem is making proper names universal to apply them to individuals in other worlds a la Kripke. A third problem, the one that got me thinking about this, is using possible worlds to give meaning to subjective probabilities.

Dfpolis: you can stop writing paragraphs and paragraphs of text. Read my previous posts – you're uninformed about this matter. Read up on it. — Snakes Alive

Feel free to tell me why 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is metaphysically necessary when it is actually false. Or, how anyone can know what "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" mean to the denizens of a possible world. Or, how a proper name can be universally predicated and remain a proper name.

There's no possible way to justify this, you only have access to your perceptions. — MindForged

Perceptions aren't simply physical states, they're intentional states. While physical states have no intrinsic significance, intentional states do. Perceptions are invariably perceptions of something. (Think of Brentano and aboutness.) Whatever you may think of that something, it's what we mean by "the object of perception." So, to say that we do not perceive what we are perceiving is an oxymoron and an abuse of language.

Consider this in a different Aristotelian way: In coming to know, we are informed. Whatever informs us must have the capacity to inform us (intelligibility), or it couldn't inform us. Further, in coming to know, a single act actualizes both our capacity to be informed and the intelligibility of the object. Since the identical act makes both the object's intelligibility actually known and informs us, there is no epistic gap between knower and known.

Locke was wrong in saying we only know our ideas. Rather, our ideas are means or instrumentalities by which we know. It is only in retrospect that we realize that some means, which we call "ideas," must have been employed. So, ideas are not the primary object of our knowledge, but only inferred retrospectively as means.

The world of perception is not identical to the world itself. — MindForged

On the Kantian interpretation, this is meaningless. Meanings need to be cashed out in terms of human experience. What possible experience could cash out "the world itself," when, by hypothesis it is inaccessible to experience?

By "reality" we mean what's revealed in reliable experience. So, to say that what we experience is not "real" is an oxymoron. It's a sign of deep confusion and wanton disregard of parsimony to posit something intrinsically unknowable -- all the more if one thinks the posit is more "real" than reality.

On a different interpretation, perception is not identical with, nor does it exhaust, reality. Still, it is a projection of reality in two senses: (1) It is reality dynamically projecting itself into us. (2) It provides a projection (a dimensionally diminished map) of reality. Perception presents only part of reality. Full identity would be an absurd claim. Still, the world informing us is identically us being informed by the world..

Lack of full identity is not an epistic gap. Thinking knowledge can't be true unless it is exhaustive is the Omniscience Fallacy -- making divine omniscience the paradigm of human knowing. We're not omniscient, but that doesn't mean we're out of touch with reality -- as "gap" implies.

Possible world's really just a tool to explain set of concepts. — MindForged

Yes, most of which are modal concepts, hinging on possibility and its correlative, necessity. So, yes, possible worlds talk is circular. I have seen "necessary" defined as true in all possible worlds. Since "necessary" means the contrary is not possible, this is circular.

I do not define "possible" in terms of worlds. P is possible if P does not contradict the set of propositions which it is possible with respect to.

That isn't an explanatory definition at all. You just defined possibility and used possibility within the definition. — MindForged

Yes, I used "possible" -- not essentially, but to avoid circumlocution. So, here's the same definition restated: "P is possible with respect to a set of facts, S, if P does not contradict the propositions expressing S." Again, there is no need to violate parsimony with the possible worlds construct.

It means the same thing if I define that way. — MindForged

No, a circular definition is no definition, whereas my proposal is an actual definition.

The issue is you getting hung up on the word possible appearing in the name of the concept. — MindForged

No, what I'm "hung up" on is the construct of unknown and unknowable worlds when all actual knowledge is based on the one real world. The more "moving parts" in your philosophy, the more there is to go wrong. Still, one can't know if a world is possible unless you know what possible means.

The criterion of consistency doesn't favor your definition at all because it was a circular definition. — MindForged

Really? My definition uses no modal concepts. So it reduces modality to more fundamental, non-modal concepts. It does not assume, as possible worlds definitions do, that one already knows what "possible" means.

Lack of parsimony as compared to what? — MindForged

Compared to not positing an indefinite number of "possible worlds" when we don't know that even one beyond the actual world is possible.

Not only are the usual definitions of the various modalities almost exactly as you defined them in your post — MindForged

Doesn't this contradict your earlier claim: "no one uses that understanding of modality in philosophy"?

No intelligible property? Seriously? So taking a particular path in the sky, being the second planet from the Sun, having a particular level of brightness, having a certain atmospheric composition (etc) are unintelligible properties? The whole point is that we are talking about worlds in which Venus (and the solar system) exists and that the identity statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is therefore necessarily true because they pick out the same object *in worlds where the relevant objects exist*. So when you say things like this: — MindForged

I stand by what I said. "Rigid designator" is supposed to be a property of a term. The properties you mention are properties neither of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus," nor of the concepts, <Hesperus> and <Phosphorus>, they express. They are properties of reality (which you inconsistently claim is not knowable). Further, they are not metaphysical properties (as would be required by Kripke's claim of metaphysical necessity), but contingent physical properties.

Neither the concept <Hesperus> nor the concept <Phosphorus> necessarily includes notes such as <taking a particular path in the sky> or <being the second planet from the Sun>. These are empirical discoveries.

While "Hesperus," "Phosphorus," and "Venus" all name the same planet, they don't all express the same concept. Concepts are elicited by specific kinds of experiences. <Hesperus> and <Phosphorus> are elicited by the experience of seeing a light in the evening and morning skies respectively. So, "Hesperus is Phosphorus," literally means "The experience of seeing a light in the evening sky is the experience of seeing a light in the morning sky" -- a claim that is not only false, but nonsensical.

What Kirpke did, then, is ignore a conceptual analysis in favor of a theory of meaning based on logical atomism. In it, "Hesperus," "Phosphorus," and "Venus" all have the same meaning because they all name the same planet. He sees meaning as no more than naming objects. Venus seen in the morning is not Venus seen in the evening, even though both are seeing Venus.

As I pointed out in my critique, your analysis does not consider all possible worlds, only those consistent with certain contingent facts. As you are constraining possibility with contingent facts, the result is only necessary contingently, not metaphysically necessary. For there are possible worlds in which the light in the morning sky has a different source than the light in the evening sky -- even though they both exist, along with a second planet from the sun.

Propositions are only metaphysically necessary if they are true independently of contingent facts.

I can only conclude you don't know what a rigid designator is beyond reading the introductory sentence on the SEP — MindForged

No, I used the SEP quote to define "rigid designator." Let's look at the argument you go on to quote.

Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is necessarily true if true at all because ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are proper names for the same object. Like other names, Kripke maintains, they are rigid: each designates just the object it actually designates in all possible worlds in which that object exists, and it designates nothing else in any possible world. — SEP

This is a baseless assertion by Kripke.

First, proper names name one, not multiple, individuals. So, to say it's nonsense to say that "Venus" names the same object in every possible world because Venus does not exist in every possible world. We might find a planet corresponding to Venus in various possible worlds (if there are any), but they would be different individuals (because things are individuated by their relational context and the worlds would not be different unless they provided different contexts). Calling them all "Venus" means that "Venus" ceases to be a proper name and becomes a universal term.

Second, as I argued above, "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" express different concepts and so they are never identical.

Third, how does Kripke know what "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" mean in any possible world? As their meaning is conventional, the denizens of each possible world might use them to designate other objects or not use them at all. Kripke has no way of knowing. So, when Kripke says they designate the same object in every possible world in which the object exists, he means he has decided to use the terms in this universal way. So, there is no fact of the matter beyond Kripke choice of naming conventions. Thus, all Kripke has done is define his conclusion into existence: the claim "'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is metaphysically necessary" has no factual basis beyond Kripke's choice of naming conventions.

There's is no world where the planet Venus and our solar system exists like ours and in which "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is false. — MindForged

And there is none in which it is true, because merely possible worlds do not exist.

We don't even have direct access to our own world, so are we able to learn anything about the actual world? — MindForged

Of course we have access to our own world. The dogma of an epistic gap is nonsense to anyone schooled in Aristotle. For example, an object's modification of our sensory state is identically our sensory representation of the object. As one state belongs both to the sensed object and to the sensing subject, there is an existential penetration, not a gap. This analysis can be elaborated at length and extended to cognition, but I've already done so recently in other threads.

Yes modal semantics are used to define modal terms like "possibility" and "necessity" and the like. That doesn't mean you cannot understand what possible worlds are, they are part of how you define the terms. How does this even follow? I could just call them "alternate world" and use the same definitions of these terms, so surely the argument isn't that the world "possible" is used to refer to these. — MindForged

No, it is not confused. If you do not understand "possible" or "necessary" you will not understand "possible world." I do not define "possible" in terms of worlds. P is possible if P does not contradict the set of propositions which it is possible with respect to. P is metaphysically possible if it does not contradict the nature of being. P is logically possible if it does not contradict what we know. P is physically possible if it does not contradict the laws of nature. No appeal to "alternate facts" a la Kelly Ann Conway.is required.

Further "alternate world" does not mean "possible world." I may imagine any number of alternate worlds that are not self consistent, and so impossible. If you want to bring in the concept of self-consistency, you may, but then you're not defining modality in terms of a set of worlds, but following my definition of the last paragraph.

Then just stipulate what type of possibility intended. This doesn't seem like a real worry. — MindForged

Yes, it is, because it leads back to circularity. To define any type of possibility you must specify what makes a world "possible" in that way -- which means that you need an independent definition of that mode of possibility -- in other words, the worlds cease to be a primitive, and are merely an unparsimonious wart on your theory.

If possible worlds talk is nonsense, then rigid designators are undefined.

Um, didn't the SEP define it in your quote? — MindForged

Yes, in terms of the nonsensical concept of "possible worlds." Let's take Kirpke's famous example, "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus." According to the SEP "an identity statement in which both designators are rigid must be necessarily true if it is true at all, even if the statement is not a priori."

Is there an a priori possible world in which one planet appear in the sky in the evening and another in the morning? I don't see why not. It might be argued that such a world would violate some law of nature, but the laws of nature are known a posteriori. So, if you use this argument, "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus" not by necessity, but contingently.

So, Kirpke is pulling a swindle. There is nothing about "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus" that makes it anything but contingent. "Hesperus" does not mean "Venus." it means a planet seen in the evening, which we have since identified as Venus. Similarly, "Phosphorus" does not mean "Venus." It means a planet seen in the morning, which we have since identified as Venus.

Now you can say that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are "rigid designaters," but there is no intelligible property that allows us to determine one way or the other if they are. Then, you can hypothesize people in all possible worlds will apply these terms as we do. Again, there is no factual basis for doing so. Then, because of these arbitrary and baseless constructs, you can say that "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus" is necessarily true.

Clearly, the conclusion is nonsense, because "necessarily," does not even follow the norms of possible worlds talk. There are many worlds that seem perfectly possible where this is not so, but they are excluded by hypothesis and arbitrary dictate.

According to the SEP:

A rigid designator designates the same object in all possible worlds in which that object exists and never designates anything else. This technical concept in the philosophy of language has critical consequences felt throughout philosophy. In their fullest generality, the consequences are metaphysical and epistemological. Whether a statement's designators are rigid or non-rigid may determine whether it is necessarily true, necessarily false, or contingent. — Joseph LaPorte

If possible worlds talk is nonsense, then rigid designators are undefined.

He he

The argument seems to be that it is a way of explaining modality and subjective probability. E.g. "necessary" means in all possible worlds. A subjective probability of 50% would mean in half the possible worlds.

However we wish to categorize the matter, even in reality there is a difference between subject perceptions of the world, and subject-generated experiences independent of perception. Dreams exist in the real world, but they are still different from perception. — Marchesk

Yes, there is a difference between perception on the one hand and imagination or delusion on the other. I just don't think that it is philosophically interesting. Maybe I'm missing its importance.

Linguistic competence exhibited by tool design and fire use. — Galuchat

I don't see that this implies "linguistic competence."

Obviously there is some historical point at which language use began. I don't think that that point can be determined from the level of tool construction and usage. I might be willing to see etching, drawing and painting as signs of representational thought that could be related to language.