If you expect the precision of applied and theoretical math in philosophy you are likely to be disappointed. Metaphysics and ontology in particular are speculative. — prothero

I think that is well-stated. The problem is with being itself rather than objectified thing. That is an odd notion for even the most speculative I would imagine. We cannot help but put things in measurable, quantified, or tangible objects-forms.

Another avenue to look at it is that things don't have to be straight ontological fixed things. Rather, we know that there is at least one thing in nature whose process can experience. But experience coming from non-experience is tricky. There must be sub-experiential things going on, that works in degrees rather than a sudden burst (which invokes dualism unnecessarily and mystically unbeknownst and chagrin of the emergentists). Thus in some way processes themselves might be self-informing.

At the end of the day it is still who works for whom. People have to work is the real thing here. Besides allowing more chances for people from different backgrounds to do different types of work, what is the difference between capitalism structure and socialism? Some people are going to naturally be able to create things that are valuable for society. Other people will always demand things that generally make things more healthy, comfortable or will entertain them. Other people will fall in line with whatever specialty skill they can offer based on their experience. It's just reshuffling things for distribution. I don't see how it solves any of the existential things like having to work itself, and having to coordinate and distribute resources itself.

I see you deleted the posts I wrote. That's fine. Your thread. You are the moderator. I accept that.

I'll try to engage you regarding only what you want to talk about. So classes. What type of freedom do you think will happen in the idea socialist society? What salvation do you think will be had? I guess, what is the vision, the goal, etc.?

At the end of the day, it is who works for whom, what are the factors that force you to work for someone else. All of it is necessary due to our own needs and demands. There is no way out of that initial condition. What does it matter if you work for a nameless corporation beholden to shareholders, a small business owner, or some government organization? There might be more bureaucratic red tape, but that is micro-level stuff from management styles. Work is still going to be there. And guess what? You de facto have to do it.

I guess if the concern is with the "freedom" for more people to get to work certain types of jobs. Fine. But that's all that really comes down to. It isn't that interesting a question.. I mean I'm all for people born poor to get to be doctors and lawyers and such. I don't think anyone's going to disagree with that. And if possibly the best way there is redistribution and/or public takeover of certain types of industries. But at the end of the day, it is about people having a "chance" to do certain types of jobs. Goods and services can be redistributed all day, but someone has to make them and distribute them.

No idea what you mean by 'true freedom'. It's like asking for triangles without angles. — StreetlightX

Not having to coordinate at all.. No conditions needed. It's a non-starter, but who says it has to be :). We can think of things that don't exist all the time. It doesn't mean it's any less of a better situation.

Need to hit the sack but a quick comment: the exercise of force and coordination of power are the conditions of, and not constraints upon, the exercise of freedom. — StreetlightX

Hence my quote above here:

So when people want to change from one form to another, but feel they are stifled, they are not stifled from true freedom, but rather stifled from what way to de facto force people to coordinate. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I picked that up. — Pantagruel

Another formulation might be, "You are free to choose which form of coordination you would like to see people de facto forced by :).

Edit: So when people want to change from one form to another, but feel they are stifled, they are not stifled from true freedom, but rather stifled from what way to de facto force people to coordinate.

But isn't this the entire nature of freedom as it is really experienced? Sartre characterizes us a theoretically free, but at the same time constrained to choose within already well-defined material contexts, what he calls praxis. — Pantagruel

That's sort of what I was getting at above with "Coordination implies there will be de facto force".

Let's call a spade a spade. Any organizational setup of politics is to coordinate how resources are distributed. In ANY system, you still have to coordinate. Coordination implies there will be de facto force. If you do not comply with the way society is setup, you basically end up physically suffering and dying at the end of the day. So, I feel debating socialism and free-market capitalism, or mixed economies, or whatnot is never quite getting at the realities of having to coordinate in general. Nothing really solves the more existential problems. The first decision of being at all, was never even something we had a choice in. No one considers the idea of de facto non-freedoms expressed in all situations of human coordination (which is necessary but due to this is unsolvable).

Really thoughtful responses. I have sympathies with Whiteheadian process philosophy as it starts from experiential and/or occasional processes and goes from there.

While natural rights were originally grounded in the language of natural law theory, I believe even Enlightenment folks knew that this made little sense. Rather, they probably understood it more like, "Act as if we had natural rights". The "self-evidence" of this is people's tendency for making their own choices and decisions, their desire (as much freedoms as they can without infringing on other people's rights), and the theory's outcomes (a public with a variety of ideas, pursuits, and creative endeavors). Thus, natural rights was a pragmatic stance on how the best types of societies should be based. Of course, to these Enlightenment folks.. natural rights were "naturally" limited to the same type of people as themselves (highly educated, landed gentry, property-owning). Their conception was of a certain type of people with natural rights.. and this idea slowly spread to other people.

Well my point was that for all of Rome's dominating tendencies.. the dominating religious institutions of Church and feudalism with little by way of non-religious speculation, its rapid de-urbanization and decentralization of authority seemed to be a worse alternative. Sure, Aristotle was rediscovered in the Near East and Spain and slowly reintroduced into European universities, but the fact is it had to be rediscovered, besides which, Aristotle possibly lengthened the sclerotic emphasis on relying on only a few old thinkers rather than promote new discoveries based in empiricism. It wasn't until people like Francis Bacon, Galileo, and later Descartes, and Spinoza for this to be the new paradigm for how the Western world would proceed in its intellectual ideas. The LESS time devoted to theology and the more to the natural world, the more focus on practical use of materials and processes (engineering), newly mathematicized scientific method, and ideas on social institutions increased standards of living and knowledge of how the universe and humans work in general.

Of course, now that we have started the merry-go-round for technology for technology sake, we have lost our tendency to ponder existential matters, bigger picture ideas of why we choose to keep procreating and maintain civilization in the first place.

Oh there most certainly was. The entire society and civilization was besieged and destroyed. Just about 500 years later to the date. Give or take some. Just long enough for the followers to plan ahead based on what was foretold and maybe even enjoy a few generations or so. For what it's worth. Then again you could argue all that was commonplace at the time. — Outlander

Oh great, Rome was destroyed and we got the freakn Middle Ages.. a joy that was :roll:.

Why not go right to the father? Who cares about the son? Usually he's a bit spoiled and nepotistic. Best to just go to where the real source of wealth is generated.

I have wondered how Christians rationalized Jesus' last words --- "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" — Gnostic Christian Bishop

If this was said at all, it probably indicates that he thought there was going to be some sort of End of Times miracle that was going to happen around the time of his death that did not transpire. Of course all the christology over the years layers it with whatever makes the narrative of the trinity and resurrection story look good, so there ya go.

How can any state of affairs be better if no one can experience them? — Pinprick

I think that is something he mentions as being objectively good. See here:
http://belmont.bme.umich.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/377/2019/06/3.-Every-Conceivable-Harm-A-Further-Defence-of-Anti-Natalism.pdf
i) The asymmetry of procreational duties:
While we have a duty to avoid bringing into existence people who would lead miserable lives, we have no duty to bring into existence those who would lead happy lives.
ii) The prospective beneficence asymmetry:
It is strange to cite as a reason for having a child that that child will thereby be benefited. It is not similarly strange to cite as a reason for not having a child that that child
will suffer.
iii) The retrospective beneficence asymmetry:
When one has brought a suffering child into existence, it makes sense to regret having
brought that child into existence – and to regret it for the sake of that child. By contrast, when one fails to bring a happy child into existence, one cannot regret that failure for the sake of the person.

Because we can meaningfully talk about what could happen. It is always good that pain does not exist (in lieu of the possibility that it could exist). It is not bad that pleasure does not exist (even in lieu of the possibility that it could exist). The asymmetry is in the intuition that non-existent pain is valuable whereas non-existent pleasure is valuable in relativity to someone.

Again, with your objection, you would want to create something in order for there to be values like pain such that not having pain can have value. That is intuitively absurd though. For example, I can punch person X in the face a few minutes from now. Ceteris Paribus (let's say the person didn't deserve this), it is always good that I am not punching person X in the face. Me punching that person does not exist yet as an actuality, but certainly the fact that the potentiality of it being prevented is a good thing anwyays.

Well, as you’re well aware, it’s all absurd. I’m not really saying we should procreate in order to continue values. The idea is that it would be better if no one existed, but “better” makes no sense without existence. Better how, and for whom? — Pinprick

It's simply a better state of affairs. No suffering exists. No one needs to be around to now this is good. People being around or not does not change that fact. For example, say someone came into existence for five minutes and felt excruciating suffering and then was no more. The billions of years of states of affairs before and after that person can be said to be good that suffering is not occurring. That five minutes can be deemed as bad that suffering is occurring.

It seems to me that in order for anything to be good or bad humans must exist in order to experience it. Otherwise why is not suffering always good? That seems like a value you decide based on your experience of life, but you have never experienced nonexistence, so maybe trying to make any claims about what is good or bad for nonexistent people is flawed. I mean, you have an opinion of what is good and bad, but your opinion is entirely dependent on existing. All moral claims necessarily depend on our existence. The nonexistent Martians in your example have no concern or concept of good and bad. — Pinprick

It's just the bedrock of the axiom. It would be absurd to say that we should create people so that values exist like good and bad, thus creating the very harm that was better not to have existed in the first place!

You must be careful with your analogies. Most anyone would agree with you that such an infliction is bad, but consider another supposed example of inflicting harm for the greater good: childhood discipline. Of course it's the right thing to harm your child either indirectly by not giving them the treats they desire, or even by direct discipline (timeout, scolding, etc.). This indicates that there is a difference between your uncharitable example and mine, that difference being that in your example, you are giving them sickness just to alleviate them from the sickness you gave them. It's a reversal. In the case of childhood discipline, your aren't putting them in time out just to take them out, rather you are putting them there to, well, discipline, shape up their behavior so that they may lead better, ethical lives in the future. — QuixoticAgnostic

You can argue the child is not a full adult, and is obligatory once born to enact this. Once, born harm may be justified in non-adults, but the fact the deficit is created in the first place would then itself not be justified.

This is the difference in perspective, and I think the unspoken assumption that anti-natalists have that life is suffering. To give birth is to give them the illness of life, only to reverse that illness as best we can. But I don't think life is inherently suffering. Yes, life is fundamentally about avoiding pain, but that doesn't mean life is pain. — QuixoticAgnostic

It really works either way as to whether you believe in necessary forms of suffering (it is unavoidable), or contingent (it is practically unavoidable through circumstances of situation, cause and effect).

1. Is it possible that the good of existing pleasure outweighs the good of non-existent pain?
2. If life was inherently pleasurable, happy, and beneficial, with some pain and negativity, would you still agree that non-existence is better because there is no bad in non-existence, but still some bad in existence? — QuixoticAgnostic

I liken it to kidnapping someone in order for them to play a game you think they would mostly like. You smile as they play the game and start identifying with its obstacles and challenges to overcome. Is that justified? It can also be a like a slave who identifies with their situation even though they are being exploited. Is their own evaluation correct, just because its their own evaluation? I don't think so in both cases. Creating deficits so people can overcome them seems at best, a misjudgment.

So in this actual world, no I don't think it is the case that good outweighs the good of non-existent pain. But you know what? The collateral damage if I'm wrong is zilch, nothing, no one gets harmed. The collateral damage to your scenario is much more- someone definitely will get harmed. I do think there is an odd paternalistic vibe to these optimistic philosophies. Somehow the structures of existence are inherently "good" for someone to experience. But on examination, this really makes no sense for someone who never existed. No one needs to experience happiness prior to birth. It is only after birth that happiness becomes something of a vague goal, and certainly good experiences are sought out concretely.

Certainly we do not live in a utopia, but I guess if that was the reality, than I would be fine with procreation. I don't think this would even be a discussion, if that were the case though. However, that is not the current situation.

Assuming that, through some kind of argumentative miracle, we could convince all of humanity of negative utilitarianism and antinatalism, what would you actually want us to do? Humans stopping breeding is at best going to eliminate but a small portion of global suffering, and I wouldn't exactly be surprised if it ended up increasing it instead. — zookeeper

It's not about utilitiarian in the "greatest good for the greatest benefit" sense (in fact antinatalism doesn't have to rely on any utilitarian principle, though it does rely on cost/benefit analysis of benefits and harms in respect to the absence of a person vs. the presence of a person for sure). It is about not promoting suffering for each new person. It is individual-based.

Really, your question relies on what to do for the already living who are already in this situation. Antinatalism does not mean other principles are not also important once already born. I mentioned exploitation. Perhaps antinatalism can show other areas of exploitation (besides being born) like how social systems, and life itself is exploiting people in general (whether it be for their labor, their time, their health, etc.). Perhaps people will be more compassionate, less judgemental. Perhaps people will take life less seriously, and see it as the absurd merry-go-round of needs and states of lack that it is. Perhaps they will incorporate more Eastern ideas of lessening desires in general, but knowing that desire itself is pervasive and the root of human motivations. There can be many things that come out of antinatalism for the already born. One of the biggest ones is understanding the absurdity of things. The absurdity of the deficits to keep oneself alive, comfortable, maintained, and entertained.

Maybe it provides community, one where we can all see each other as fellow-sufferers. A shared value-system can be meaningful. It is unfortunate that the de facto systems of life don't care about values, as much as output. But there's more of the absurdity. In order to keep ourselves alive and maintained, we must make widgets- circuit boards and whatnot.. we need medical equipment and hospitals, and things. We need stuff that is not necessarily edifying in itself, but instrumental in keeping the absurdity of our own deficits (health, boredom, or otherwise) maintained and continuing. So, I guess unforunately, even with a shared sense of community, it is hard to overcome the minutia-mongering necessary to keep industrialized ways-of-life (mostly agreed upon as the best worst situation of economic necessity). But hey, that is part of the pessimism of life in general, that there is no utopianizing our way out of the situation.

Anyways, no one is holding you back from trying to maximize your happiness. It is simply stating not to bring other people unnecessary pain. No one needs happiness, if not born in the first place, but it does seem true that it is absolutely good to wholesale prevent unnecessary pain for others, where one can.

This is just an assertion that he doesn't back up with anything. Why is it that any badness immediately makes the alternative preferable? Again, he doesn't seem to be entertaining the idea that the dynamics between the good and bad of existence makes it preferable, despite the lack of bad in non-existence. — QuixoticAgnostic

It is simply an analogy to illustrate his point.

The claim is that the presence of pain is bad and the presence of pleasure is good. To never get sick is good (similar to never feeling pain). To never have recovered from a sickness is not bad, if one never needed to be sick in the first place (similar to never feeling happiness, if one is not around to be deprived of happiness in the first place). He is illustrating how not getting sick is an absolute good (in his terms it seems to mean something like good, in any state of affairs). Recovering from sickness is only a relative good (it is only good in certain states of affairs where one needs to recover in the first place). This is akin to the difference between the absence of pain and the absence of happiness in respect to states of affairs where someone could have existed but does not actually exist. That's all that analogy was as far as I see. So the conclusion really comes from his original claim, not the analogy. The basic claim is that the absence of happiness doesn't really matter in the situation of no person existing. What does matter is the absence of pain. The joys of life, would only matter once born, and thus are not a consideration for the non-born, as his analogy illustrates, it's only instrumentally good.

My own analysis is to think of this in terms of deficits. One doesn't need to be in a state of lack, discomfort, pain or the like if one is not born. Once, one is born, one has to deal with overcoming a state of lack, pain, discomfort, etc. If life represents a constant state of lack to be overcome and deal with, and this indeed is a type of existential suffering- to put someone in this situation unnecessarily, would be a bad decision to impose, as it is causing harm to others, unnecessarily. To make someone sick so they can recover from the illness, would be analogously a bad or immoral thing to do. To get even MORE "meta" here, if we live in a world where to get inherent meaning we must cause deficits for others in order for them to feel "meaning" in some way, it may be that the world is not as good as we assume or project onto it.

Firstly I'm not referring to existentialism or absurdism by "existential threat". I simply mean that pain is ultimately about death - pain is death's envoy and that's what makes it so unpleasant, so undesirable (to life) - and if one is in pain, either you're experiencing death itself or death is near. So, to fear/dislike pain is to fear/dislike death itself. — TheMadFool

I know you're not, but I am as part of a broader definition of suffering :grin:.

Secondly, given the above is true, imagine a person P who has an immense fears/dislike of pain, and by extension he greatly fears/dislikes death. If P were to seek advice for his problem from an antinatalist [with special powers over time] the antinatalist would say that he (the antinatalist) could travel back in time and prevent the P's parents from ever meeting and having P and since there would be no P to begin with, P would never experiene fear/dislike of pain and death. This course of action defines the antinatalists' agenda.

However, P is being offered a raw deal by the antinatalist, no? P fears/dislikes pain because pain is associated with death i.e. P's fear/dislike of pain is just a projection of his fear/dislike of death/nonexistence. In the setting of this realization, the antinatalist's offer to prevent P from existing i.e. making P nonexistent amounts to offering death to P and we know that's exactly what P fears/dislikes. :chin: — TheMadFool

Yeah but this is a scenario that is not the case of the never born. You can argue that once born, we fear death, and the idea of full annihilation might be something to fear. This wouldn't be the case for a situation where someone who could have been born from a parent was not (colloquially referred to for the sake of easy reference "non-existent people".)

I believe there was a philosopher, I forget his name, who claimed that the biggest problem in philosophy is suicide in the sense that not enough people are contemplating it in the face of the meaninglessness of life. People who are suicidal seem to see no purpose in their continued existence. — TheMadFool

Albert Camus said that in the Myth of Sisyphus in his first line: “There is only one really serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Deciding whether or not life is worth living is to answer the fundamental question in philosophy. All other questions follow from that” (MS, 3).

Meh. Seems to me that you are assuming the cartesian divide, when you should be demonstrating it. — Banno

I believe I have.. Lightwaves hit rods and cones.. goes through optical nerves to cortical nerves.. these nerves go through various networks and feedback loops...

Nothing seems experiential there because you simply assume it to be there when this type of activity happens. That would be a dualism of sorts. A property dualism in this case. That's odd though, as most scientific theories strive for a monism whereby what is assumed is physicalism. So, the Cartesian theater gets shoe-horned in somewhere.

Another interesting thing is these neural networks and inputs/outputs can be likened to a computer. Yet a computer is only ever interpreted by an observer. Someone has to see the outputs happen. The observe has to be in the equation. This is unlike the very basis of experience itself, which is not in the equation already before its supposed "emergence". Thus, it is not analogous to something like a computer.

Perhaps it's more like the emergence of snow flakes from a cloud; as a certain point the random movement of water molecules become ordered. Too much moisture and all you will get is hail. Too much heat and it will rain.

It does not have to be snow flakes all the way down. — Banno

It depends on how radically different experiential states are to physical states. You are still in the realm of physical arrangements of matter, not experience and internal feeling when discussing crystalline lattice structures or whatnot. Also, you have to remember, properties are wrapped in this whole conundrum of mind/body. See again here:

Are properties something inhering in matter or is it presumed to have something that gives the measurements property? I mentioned the possibly arbitrary divide in Locke between primary and secondary qualities, for example. But what are properties really without experiential knowledge? Properties seem to be something that are observed, not necessarily an actual "real" thing out there. — schopenhauer1

With that being said, it would be odd to talk about properties like liquidity, independent of mind if they are truly not something that inheres in anything but a mind. In fact, if that is the case, the only true property would be a mind, the rest stems from that (pace Locke and Kant). Talk about misuse of language.. Liquidity independent of observation might fall in your Wittgenstein misuse :).

'Not procreating' does not "prevent all suffering" because this abstinence does not prevent the suffering of the already born — 180 Proof

Red herring, as I've explained before.. when accounting for causing the conditions of suffering for others one's own suffering for not causing the conditions of suffering for others does not matter in the equation.

Extinction, like suicide, doesn't compensate for suffering already endured and is a reductio "solution" to 'preventing future suffering' by preventing life as if the fundamental problem, or illness, is living and suffering is only a symptom, when, in fact, they are independent variables. Do No Harm to the living denotes moral concern for extant potential sufferers (i.e. facts-of-the-matter) and not merely abstract "suffering"(i.e a hypothetical state-of-affairs). — 180 Proof

Well, sorry but living 99.999% of the time will entail some suffering, whether you define it as intrinsic to living (i.e. Buddhism, Schopenhauerean) or contingent to living ("common" notions of sickness, frustrations, or any negative experience one encounters in life).

I actually think we can come together on antinatalism.. it can be a sort of rallying cry for the living. 1) Recognize the situation of suffering we live in and 2) do something about it together by not breeding.

An example of this is that some people think that workers are getting exploited. Often times the workers themselves might not recognize this and even align politically against the view that would prevent exploitation. The job then of the person who believes the worker is being exploited is to explain how it is that they are exploited in the hopes that he will join the cause against the exploitation :D.

Yeah, but why would you want to prevent suffering? Why do you value preventing suffering? Presumably it would be because you believe suffering has a negative affect on those that exist. Therefore, the point of preventing suffering would be to make life better, but ending life doesn’t make life better. The solution to preventing suffering defeats the purpose of ending suffering. — Pinprick

No, replace preventing with simply "not suffering" if that helps. Not suffering is ALWAYS good, and this is NOT relative to whether there are people around to know this. Not happiness is only RELATIVELY bad in relation to if someone exists. If there were no one around to not experience happiness, that is NOT BAD.

The crucial point here being that in our heart of hearts we know our biggest pain in the neck is nonexistence. To then suggest the solution to our pain (death/nonexistence) is exactly that which pains us blows my mind. — TheMadFool

In a good or bad way :chin:? Anyways, Yes, nonexistence, at least as it refers to the next generation of progeny, is the best way to go. You don't need to overcome anything, if you don't need to overcome anything in the first place. Why put people in a deficit and see how well they fare? Why put people in absurdly repetitive needs of survival, maintenance, and entertainment-seeking, when you don't need to in the first place? Of course, he is less concerned with the issues I raise here of absurdity, and existential deficits. He seems to focus on suffering, although the extent of what suffering means can extend to the absurdities and existential deficits I mentioned.

Also, just so everyone can at least get some primary sources here, please read David Benatar himself. Unfortunately I can't PDF the whole book, Better Never to Have Been, but this is a summarized version in an earlier journal article:

https://wmpeople.wm.edu/asset/index/cvance/benatar

@TheMadFool In the very first paragraph, he pretty much addresses your objection.

That said, I wonder if there's a good reason why Benatar would think this way - switching his views on the potential of the unborn to feel from relevant to irrelevant depending on whether what is being felt is pain or pleasure respectively.

Comments... — TheMadFool

TheMadFool, I believe we went over the reason for this difference, based on the thought experiment of the Martians. This is all based on intuitions regarding the how we think about the absence of pain vs. the absence of pleasure. This comes from what he thinks is a difference in how these are weighted. The absence of pain is much more of an intrinsic good than the absence of pleasure is an intrinsic bad, and he thinks our intuitions and psychology support this asymmetry between the two intuitions. Again, I explained here his thought experiment:

There are no aliens having children on Mars to experience the joys of life. Does that make you sad, empathetic, or grief-stricken? The answer is probably no. No one intuitively seems to care whether "no one" is enjoying life. In fact a whole planet of no people enjoying life doesn't seem to bother us at all. That doesn't seem a moral obligation (that people must be born/exist to enjoy life).

If there were Martians having children on Mars and you knew they were suffering greatly, would that make you sad, empathetic, or feel bad in some way? It probably would to some degree.

There seems to be a difference in how we perceive "pleasure not happening" vs. "pain not happening" in the absence of an actual person. This leads to different conclusions for obligations to bring pleasure and prevent pain in the scenario when a parent has the potential to procreate and can prevent it. — schopenhauer1

So back, if we can, to my objection to panpsychism. We have a clear idea of what it is to be conscious, as opposed to being unconscious; but that's not the sort of consciousness a panpsychist might attribute to a rock.

So, what is this different sort of consciousness? — Banno

I would imagine that just as the consciousness of a fruit fly is different than a human, perhaps the experience of a cell is different than that of a fruit fly. It just doesn't have a clear distinction between arrangements of matter that are animals and not animals. Unless you are some sort of "vitalist" or something like that. It's more just process of elimination. I'm not even saying I am committing to panspychism, but I think it's better than other, supposedly more sophisticated theories that don't get at the hard problem at all.

So let's look at some ideas contra panspychism:
1) There is something special about biological organisms- specifically ones with neuronal activity. Great, what about neuron architecture makes it equivalent to mind?

2) There is something about interactions of body, brain, and environment (your embodied cognition). Great, how does this clear the assumption of mind either not already being in the equation somewhere when these things interact (hidden dualism), or at some point X "arising" (magic emergentism, which amounts to dualism anyways).

To be candid, my suspicion is that you have panpsychism were you should have embodied cognition. — Banno

I am reading Terrence Deacon's Incomplete Nature who commits to this kind of theory now, actually. I am not very far in it though. However, as I said above- the hard problem is often mistaken for easier problems. It all ends up being in the emergentist camp in one way or the other. You can re-arrange the furniture to whatever starting place you want, it doesn't change that. But if you would like to tell me how embodied cognition theories are not emergentist, and how they are not committing to a hidden dualism (by having X mind "arise" or "emerge" at some point), I'm all ears.

Then the point is moot. — Banno

I don't think so. Emergentism I see in various forms that are not panpsychism.. Really it's one or the other. It's more binary than what you are implying actually. I don't even see a third, fourth, fifth, sixth way.. those ways are not recognizing the hard problem for what it is and mistaking it for easier problems. That happens a lot in these discussions.

Can you set out why you think I am committed to emergentism?

I suspect it would be revealing. — Banno

I can't really say whether you are committed to emergentism, but it does seem like the logical foil to pansychism, which is as you say "turtles all the way down". With emergentism it's duck, duck, duck, TURTLE!!. So just giving the theory most directly opposite. Emergentism is often implied by most physicalist theories. Example:

C. Lloyd Morgan and Samuel Alexander
Samuel Alexander's views on emergentism, argued in Space, Time, and Deity, were inspired in part by the ideas in psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan's Emergent Evolution. Alexander believed that emergence was fundamentally inexplicable, and that emergentism was simply a "brute empirical fact":

"The higher quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its roots therein, but it emerges therefrom, and it does not belong to that level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existent with its special laws of behaviour. The existence of emergent qualities thus described is something to be noted, as some would say, under the compulsion of brute empirical fact, or, as I should prefer to say in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the “natural piety” of the investigator. It admits no explanation." (Space, Time, and Deity)

Despite the causal and explanatory gap between the phenomena on different levels, Alexander held that emergent qualities were not epiphenomenal. His view can perhaps best be described as a form of non-reductive physicalism (NRP) or supervenience theory. — https://psychology.wikia.org/wiki/Emergentism

I also brought up the idea that maybe properties are not "real" as in, inhering in the matter arrangements or matter itself, but observer-dependent. I've also mentioned this theory goes back to Locke and earlier, but Locke arbitrarily split primary and secondary properties. Of course, Kant has a full blown theory of it, but his "categories" are a bit too much of speculative idealism.

Don't pass it to me. — Banno

Exactly.. notice the wrong word there didn't change the semantics of what I'm trying to say :p.

The alternative is the argument that schopenhauer1 presents, which seems to be that since we can't solve the hard problem it must be turtles all the way down. — Banno

Well, again, how do you get past the homunculus argument against emergentism? Also, how do you NOT fall into dualism unintentionally (actually related to the homonuclus argument too).

I think for panpsychists, experience is different than consciousness. My question to you is how you get passed the homunuculus argument in regards to physicalist explanations: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument

You discussed Australian philosophers.. David Chalmers essentially coined the term "hard question of consciousness". You know the key points I think. I don't see how a misuse of language is necessarily the case. How is physical phenomena equivalent to "feeling" or an "inner aspect" without creating a dualism at some point? This is the problem with emergentism (an "emeregence" of a mind realm from a physical). The problem with most physicalist arguments is they are dualists and they don't even know it :lol:! So how do you address this?

I think using Wittgenstein to try to "dissolve" this is actually a misuse of philosophical methods. Rather, the question is posed to you regarding the hard problem. Can you answer it without hiding behind the idea that everything is just language games?

The justification for antinatalism seems logical to me, but where I would like more input is why antinatalists value the negation of suffering more than life itself. Suffering is only relevant if life exists. Antinatalists seem to promote the end of life (extinction), which implies that they do not value life. But if you don’t value life, I don’t see how you can justify any valuation of suffering whatsoever. The only reason you would make any valuation of suffering is because of its affect on life. — Pinprick

So Pinprick.. in the case of procreation, you have a chance to prevent all suffering. The Benatar Asymmetry is saying that suffering seems to have more gravitas than happiness. Where it is always good for state of affairs of no suffering. It is only instrumentally good in the state of affairs of no happiness.

As I said before, this is shown in the thought experiment about no life on Mars. Mars has no life. No one has any strong emotional reaction to this. But if Mars had life that was suffering greatly, I am sure we would at least react with some sympathy, sadness, and regret for the aliens. These are the kind of intuitions that would make it seem that indeed, suffering is NOT symmetrical in respect to benefits/happiness/goods. It is always good to not have pain, but not bad or good (neutral) if no one experienced pleasure/happiness/benefits/goods.

I would disagree with the implications of Benatar's thought experiment. Consider an exquisitely beautiful landscape you have the good fortune of beholding and also imagine you're the last surviving person in the world. Wouldn't it pain you to know that no one after your demise would ever set eyes upon it? It would, right? — TheMadFool

Maybe. The exquisite most beautiful landscape might be so beautiful I would want someone else to see. However, this seems less impactful than let's say people dying horribly from a mass epidemic on the landscape. That would be a terrible fate to have happen...Certainly, the gravitas of suffering seems of more importance in some way than not experiencing happiness. And obviously I think he has that asymmetry right.

I would like you to reconsider my point regarding Benatar's propositions.

3. Absence of pain is good [even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone]
4. Absence of pleasure is not bad [unless there is somebody for whom the absence is a deprivation]

The following are simplified versions of 3 and 4

3a. Absence of pain is good even if nonexistence

4a. Absence of pleasure is not bad unless existence

It follows then that:

For 3a, Benatar is saying your existence/nonexistence doesn't matter for absence of pain to be good.

For 4a, Benatar is saying your existence/nonexistence matters for absence of pleasure to be not bad. — TheMadFool

Yes I think that is a good interpretation.

This feature of Benatar's argument is what's wrong with it.

3. The absence of pain is good [even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone] implies that the absence of pain is good "even though" (despite) nonexistence. Benatar is concerned about something other than nonexistence.

4. The absence of pleasure is not bad [unless there is someboy for whom the absence is a deprivation] implies that the absence of pleasure is not bad because of nonexistence. Benatar is directly concerned with nonexistence.

5. I love L unless nonexistence
6. I love L even though nonexistence

In 5. nonexistence changes my emotional attitude towards L depending on whether nonexist — TheMadFool

Yes again, that is the difference here between absolute and instrumental, thus causing the asymmetry. Not experiencing pain is always good, even if there was no person around to know this. The absence of pleasure is not good, but it is not bad either, unless there is a person around. It is an absolute good to not suffer. It is not an absolute good to not feel happiness. Again, please re-read the thought experiment about the aliens on Mars. That is pretty much the kind of intuition that is his basis for this.

Yes, in a way, we are being used; society is what keeps human life healthy and flourishing, and in order to maintain society, we all must play a role, but the reason I don't find fault in this is because (1) I think procreation is a necessity for the good of current human life and (2) the existence of goods in life justifies the creation of new humans that will inevitably experience at least some suffering.

Notice, I might (strong might) agree that, if procreation wasn't necessary for the good of current life, then bringing in new life, even if they'd experience more good than bad, wouldn't be justified. Another thing to note, the necessity of new life is for a similar reason that anti-natalists don't promote suicide or active methods of removing human existence: because for the people that are living, we should still minimize suffering, in some sense. New life is necessary for this reason because, like it's been mentioned before, if we imagine a world where we stop procreating, even if its not all simultaneous, eventually our social structures preventing suffering will degrade and cause suffering to the final generations. Is this not indirectly an action we are taking that causes suffering?

I mentioned that I think there is good in life which allows us to comfortably procreate despite the inevitability of suffering. On this, you say:

Even so, there is built in systemic suffering not related to the usual contingent (read common) notions of suffering. There is the subtle suffering of the human psyche of desire, which is simply inbuilt.

I'm not sure how to respond to this as of yet. Although I agree that the pursuit of life is not to pursue happiness (for happiness is never achieved, as we continually desire something new), I believe that this state of mind may be fixed with a change in internal attitude. In general, I'm not convinced that if suffering merely exists, life isn't worth living, as you seem to claim. That is, that if there is any form of suffering, even suffering that ultimately leads to a greater good, then that's bad and no one should have to experience that at all. Perhaps you can argue why any suffering at all is bad? I'd like to also get into a discussion on some of these terms, because I think a lot of the terms like suffering and society are rather lofty and could do with a more precise and fundamentally rooted understanding. — QuixoticAgnostic

Yeah so this just goes to premises. I don't think it is fair to future people by using them to maintain civilization in general. At the procreational decision-making level, any consideration beyond harm to the future person would simply be overlooking the individual for some larger scheme. I find this ethical view untenable if we don't want to use people for some third-party ends (by third party I mean, some grand vision, or principle). I also would not use people for personal ends (I need someone to take care of me when I'm old). No one's future suffering is worth it for "humanity" or "because I'm going to get old". If Benatar did say this was a Ponzi scheme, then this idea is exactly justified. In order to alleviate X current suffering, you are going to create Y future suffering. Let's be more creative for the people still alive then. There is no reason to create suffering, and to use people, to impose survival, comfort-seeking, and entertainment-seeking needs onto another person who has to navigate and be enculturated into society.

I've also written many posts and threads about why the "inventory of goods of life" are not worth starting a whole "dealing with" in the first place. Look, I could kidnap you and force you into a game which maybe you will come to identify with as I look on amused that I brought you happiness by kidnapping you into this game. I see life as a bigger version of this. Much of these goods are unequally distributed (some have more than others). Also, I believe there is necessary suffering- suffering not contingent on circumstances. As Benatar points out. Not suffering is absolutely good. Not enjoying things is an instrumental bad. It's neutral in the situation of no person. Yes, once born you will want to try to maximize benefits of life, but at the cost of our own dissatisfaction, constant lack unfulfilled nature (what I call necessary suffering or Schopenhaueran suffering or Eastern philosophy versions of suffering) and will come with much contingent suffering (more utilitarian, "common" forms of a time and place like disease, mental illness, disaster, frustrations, every daily tedious event). All things trying to overcome the suffering is just coping mechanisms that come post-facto (after the fact), since we could have avoided it altogether, or rather we can prevent it altogether for a future person. But to create situations of "lack" and deprivation for another person, so they can overcome it and see the "joys" of life, I just don't buy that as a good ethical claim and am trying to show others this as well.

I finally got what's wrong with Benatar's argument.

In 3, he keeps nonexistence: nonexistence is relevant - it's not bad because of nonexistence

In 4, he discards nonexistence: nonexistence is not relevant - it's good, not because of, but despite, nonexistence

Benatar flip-flops between nonexistence being important (relevant) to nonexistence being not important (not relevant) . Benatar is being inconsistent in the way he uses nonexistence. — TheMadFool

No that's not what's wrong with the argument. It's not like he overlooked that. It's a feature of his argument. He explains in his book that not suffering is an absolute good and not enjoying good is instrumentally good. If you look at my last post, I give one of his examples of why he thinks this is so.

A good behaviourist would NOT define consciousness as behaviour, as that would be begging the question. — bert1

Right.. I was pointing out to @Isaac the circular reasoning explained here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument

Also this is a short definition here:
https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/logicalfallacies/Homunculus-Fallacy

In 3, Benatar claims nonexistent (unborn) people are the beneficiaries of an absence of pain.

In 4, Benatar claims nonexistent (unborn) people are not deprived of pleasure; that's why the absence of pleasure isn't bad. — TheMadFool

I wouldn't state it that they are the "beneficiaries". There is no they. It is just "good" that no new person is suffering (presumably when there could have been).

Statement 8 contradicts statement 5; statement 5 is Benatar himself and 8 follows from Benatar. — TheMadFool

No, because of what I stated above. No one is a beneficiary. It is just "good" (in an absolute sense it just "is good") that no one is alive to be harmed (presumably when there could have been).

On the other hand, it is not just "bad" (in any absolute sense) to not experience good. It is neutral. It is only bad if there actually was someone in existence to be deprived of the good.

He gives example of this intuition of suffering being absolutely bad (and prevention of being absolutely good) and pleasure/benefits being instrumentally good (and prevention of being instrumentally bad) here:

One of Benatar's thought experiments is this :

There are no aliens having children on Mars to experience the joys of life. Does that make you sad, empathetic, or grief-stricken? The answer is probably no. No one intuitively seems to care whether "no one" is enjoying life. In fact a whole planet of no people enjoying life doesn't seem to bother us at all. That doesn't seem a moral obligation (that people must be born/exist to enjoy life).

If there were Martians having children on Mars and you knew they were suffering greatly, would that make you sad, empathetic, or feel bad in some way? It probably would to some degree.

There seems to be a difference in how we perceive "pleasure not happening" vs. "pain not happening" in the absence of an actual person. This leads to different conclusions for obligations to bring pleasure and prevent pain in the scenario when a parent has the potential to procreate and can prevent it. — schopenhauer1