I know that but as I said, survival instincts are hard to overcome. So, unable to do it I do this. — Darkneos

Why do you set it up so that your survival instincts are not part of “you”? Why do you consider it an external thing that is burdensome instead of part and parcel of your identity? I can do that with anything and make it seem like a problem. I enjoy drawing, but the second I make it “The Drawing Instinct” it suddenly feels like I’m getting controlled and my enjoyment is not legitimate. That’s what you’re doing.

But still, as Kenosha kid said, unable to do it, you’d still have no reason to do this, specifically. I think you’re looking for someone to change your mind.

If logic can’t derive premises then what is it good for? If it can’t determine if a premise is true then what is it good for? — Darkneos

You think this is what logic is used for? If so, what is the process by which you can determine if a premise is true? You claim it’s possible to do that, so how?

Is there absolutely nothing which we have gotten right? — Pinprick

At what point can you be sure you got it right and are not just making a mistake?

those who do not accept their most intrinsic principles and values in their individuals because they do not want to categorize themselves as egoists — Gus Lamarch

Seems rather cynical to argue that that’s the only motivation behind not being dogmatic with your views.....

If one is a master logician, all knowledge would be one's (omniscient), and given that knowledge is power, one would also be all-powerful (omnipotent). — TheMadFool

I don’t see how these two follow from your or bartricks’ arguments either could you explain?

Being a master logician would mean that you can tell, given premises, whether or not the conclusion is valid, not that you know everything.

Similarly, “knowledge is power” is hand waving. An omniscient person still couldn’t lift an airplane. If omniscience really did lead to omnipotence then "omnipotence" would be obsolete as an attribute of God and wouldn't have been mentioned.

I want to know WHY people choose to go on. — Darkneos

Because they evolved to do so.

I hear that the good things in life make people stay but aren't those just to make life bearable? — Darkneos

I wouldn’t describe the best moments of my life as “bearable”. I’d give a bit more than that.

To me it seems like that is an argument only if you HAVE to live but from what I see it's optional. So why do it if it isn't mandatory. In death one doesn't have to seek good things or anything like that. Granted you don't feel anything else but still.... — Darkneos

Why do you do anything? Everything you do is optional.

This seems like one of those questions like “Why is there something rather than nothing” or “Why does gravity exist” etc. A dead end with no answer. It’s just the case.

I would say that probably some of our ideas matter to us more than others, because they are bound up with the way we see truth. However, the whole question of the emotional relationship with our personal systems of belief was one which I was thinking about as I lay awake, unable to sleep last night, so I thought I might as well offer it as another one for people to think about. — Jack Cummins

I don’t think the emotional relationship is correlated with how correct or incorrect your position is. It seems to be its own variable. One that I have found no good reason for increasing. Only thing you get by becoming attached to your ideas is distress when argued against, and I can’t see any advantages that come with it. Maybe some sort of “peace of mind” born out of an irrational confidence in your beliefs but is that really a positive?

dialetheism shows there are contexts in which contradictory statements can both be true. — Wayfarer

Example?

I still don’t see what makes things like the law of non contradiction an imperative. You two seem to, if not agree, at least understand what that means. I don’t. So could you help me understand?

Seems to me like the law of non contradiction is like the laws of motion. No one needs to issue it for it to function behind the scenes. 2 contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time, regardless of if anyone notices this to be the case. And no one issued a command to all propositions to work this way either.

You're just going to have to deny that there are imperatives of Reason — Bartricks

There are laws of reason. There is no such thing as imperatives of reason (unless by that you mean “imperatives to follow the laws of reason”). Because as I say for the 3rd time and you refuse to address: You still could not have had two contradictory propositions be true at the same time in the same sense EVEN IF no one commanded this to be the case. In the same way that objects close to the ground will accelerate at 9.81 m/s^2 regardless of whether or not Newton discovered the laws of motion. And no one is commanding the objects to move as such.

Do you think the law of gravity is an imperative?

But given you are convinced that I, who have argued all the way through — Bartricks

You’ve argued alright. But the arguments were terrible. And I can show you why they’re terrible if you quote one.

You're going to have to deny that normative reasons exist. — Bartricks

False. I’m just going to have to deny that God gives them.

you think there's reason to believe it is true - in which case norms of reason exist — Bartricks

Yup. God isn’t their source though. A desire to not look like an idiot is reason enough to believe the laws of reason, you don’t need God for that.

well, my argument proves that to be false, for if you were the source of the imperatives of Reason, then you'd be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, which you're clearly not. — Bartricks

Your argument would show that indeed. Because there argument is fallacious. So it leads to a fallacious conclusion. Its first premise is false. It fails to show omnipotence follows. And it completely flops on omniscience. I can talk about those in detail but first I want to attack the first premise.

If you think there's reason to think there are no imperatives of Reason — Bartricks

That's not what I think. What I think is that the laws of reason are not imperatives. They are not commands. In the same way that the law of gravity is not a command. It did not need to be issued to rocks in order to function. It is just an attempt at a description of how the world works. And so are the laws of reason. Even without any formalization or statement of the law of non-contradiction, you still cannot have two contradictory propositions be true in the same sense at the same time.

However "follow the laws of reason" is an imperative. Not issued by God though. Just issued by people. And often not followed.

But, you know, if you want to just ignore arguments and insist that I am just asserting things — Bartricks

If you think you made an argument for why the laws of reason (things such as excluded middle) are imperatives then quote it and I'll show you why it doesn't work.

No, but I have provided you with arguments for thinking them so. — Bartricks

False. You kept restating it. That's all you did. Here were your "arguments":

They are directives — Bartricks

So, they are directives. — Bartricks

They are directives and simply saying they're not won't alter that. — Bartricks

On the other hand I've shown why they are not:

Even if Plato had not pointed it out, two contradictory statements still could not be true in the same sense at the same time. — khaled

If I order you to do X, you do not thereby have a reason to do X, right? — Bartricks

Not right. You, personally, yes. But depending on the person I could have a reason to do X just because they told me to. Like a robber holding a gun out for example.

And that mind will, by dint of that fact, be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (see argument above for the explanation). — Bartricks

It's a terrible explanation.

Being able to control what constitutes as reason doesn't make you omnipotent. You handwaved it as "This mind is not bound by the laws of reason so it can do anything". Idiots have minds not bound by the laws of reason. They can't lift planes all of a sudden.

Omniscience does not follow from being able to determine what beliefs count as knowledge. You handwaved it as "has power over all knowledge" but all you actually showed is that the mind who dictates the laws of reason can figure out if a belief counts as knowledge or not. That is not omniscience.

Another way to make the same point: the mind whose instructions are the instructions of Reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (see proof above of that). I am not omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Therefore I am not the mind whose instructions are the instructions of Reason. — Bartricks

First premise is false.

They are directives. — Bartricks

You saying it doesn't make it so, but even assuming this:

Anyone giving directives on how you should reason becomes omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent by your premises. They don't have to be God. They could just be Plato.

"The laws of reason are directives. So the mind issuing them is omnipotent (since they control how reason works), omniscient (since they determine what classifies as knowledge, this is total BS. Determining what classifies as knowledge doesn't mean you actually know everything) and omnibenevolent (because morality is a matter of logic, apparently, and they control the laws of logic)"

However this doesn't distinguish between God and Plato. Since all the requirements for being omnipotent/omniscient/omnibenevolent stem from the fact that this mind issued the laws of reason. However anyone can issue instructions and call them "laws of reason" and your argument would apply to them too. And the issuer would have the power to change his mind which, by some manner of BS, makes them omnipotent :rofl:

But it doesn't matter, because I take it that you agree that you ought to believe them and that if you do not you are irrational? — Bartricks

It does matter. Because you need them to be directives for them to require a mind. They are not directives. Therefore they do not require a mind.

In the same way that the law of gravity was still working before Newton discovered it. Even before Plato stated the laws of contradiction and excluded middle, they were still working. Even if Plato had not pointed it out, two contradictory statements still could not be true in the same sense at the same time.

And even if they were directives, it doesn't follow that the mind issuing them is God.

but you can't shove its muzzle into the water and say "drink it you stupid horse!!" — Bartricks

You could.

I assumed by the laws of reason you mean things like excluded middle, or non-contradiction. Those aren't directives. And couched ad-homs don't make them so. Your first premise makes no sense.

You're not going to defend what you said?

I explained. The laws of Reason are prescriptive laws, not descriptive. That's why you can flout them. — Bartricks

It's neither, because it's not a directive. "You should follow the laws of reason" is prescriptive. "People follow the laws of reason" is descriptive (and false). The laws of reason are neither of these statements.

A directive requires a mind to issue it. Take this "give me all your money!" If I'm a bot, is that a directive? No. If I'm a mind, then it is. If I'm not, then it isn't. — Bartricks

The laws of reason are not directives. "You should stick to the laws of reason" is a directive.

If there are laws of Reason, then there is a mind whose laws they are — Bartricks

Why? Why must a law be housed in someone's mind somewhere? Did the law of gravity not exist before Newton discovered it?

The mind whose laws are the laws of Reason is omnibenevolent. — Bartricks

?

In the case of the not yet born, "unnecessary" becomes "not being born into harm" as it was unnecessary at the level of hte interests of that person for that person to be brought into the game. In the case of those who exist, unnecessary becomes "least amount of violation when possible to play the game". — schopenhauer1

Well, it would be unnecessary to bring about a whole lifetime of pain to ameliorate the people who already exist. — schopenhauer1

Is the disagreement. The distinction between what “unless necessary” means for before and after birth is what I don’t get.

We are purely, that is to say, "absolutely" creating from "scratch" ALL instances of harm for a person rather than mitigating and ameliorating something. — schopenhauer1

We are doing both.

How do you know that your computer/BASIC program is not aware when it says "I am aware that you have now pressed so-and-so key!"? — SolarWind

I don’t

but you cannot choose to remain conscious no matter how drunk you get. Which shows that they are interconnected. You also cannot choose to stop being conscious at any time you wish.

So as I said: if you get the body right consciousness follows.

I think if you get the body exactly right you will inadvertently get consciousness. It’s not like consciousness is some magic sauce you add at the end that you can do without. It’s deeply intertwined with the body. In other words: p-zombies are conceivable (not logically contradictory) but not possible.

Because the people alive already have an interest. — schopenhauer1

The lifeguard did not have an interest to save the person in the water. But you didn’t care. It is true that the lifeguard had interests in general, but the only way to NOT have any interests or intentions is to not exist. So the difference again boils down to: “Is the person to be harmed born yet? if so, it becomes wrong to do unilaterally, if not it’s ok to balance”. Which I disagree with. Because it is special pleading.

In not drawing a sharp distinction there, you join both the pro-life movement — Srap Tasmaner

No. I don’t mean it literally. Me and shope understand each other. And I didn’t say anything about rights or dignity, those were introduced by him.

False. I balanced the harm done to the lifeguard against the harm done to the child — schopenhauer1

But you refuse to balance the harm done to the child vs the harm done to the people in the room. Why? Because the child isn’t born yet? I don’t see that as an important difference. And I can’t detect any other difference in your responses. And if that’s the only difference you go by then I think we won’t get anywhere. I don’t think it matters but you do.

I don’t have a problem with using people for the sake of other people. I have a problem with using people for “causes” like “for the country” which are abstractions that cannot suffer, so shouldn’t be considered when talking about morals.

But you also clearly don’t have a problem with using people for the sake of other people, or else you would not have woken up the lifeguard. It’s not the case that having children is “using someone” and waking up the lifeguard is not. They’re both cases of using someone for something outside themselves. So your problem cannot be with that. Your problem is with using someone that doesn’t exist yet for a purpose outside themselves. But again, I don’t care if the person to be used is here now or not.

I don't think so. This has a lot to do with the heuristic we are using to analyze the moral case. You are using a purely aggregate heuristic and I am using a dignity violation one. — schopenhauer1

Not the way I see it. You admitted that waking up the lifeguard is a violation of dignity right? Yet you are fine with doing so.

You seem to be using an aggregate heuristic for people that exist, and a "violation of dignity" heuristic for people that don't. As in, once you exist, it's fine for your dignity to be violated left and right if it is to prevent sufficiently greater suffering. But before you exist, the initial violation is for some reason a tier above the others and is completely taboo.

To press that button would, in aggregate prevent the most harm — schopenhauer1

Not in the way I define it. Harming someone is simply doing to them something they don't want done to them. Most people don't want to die.

It would never escape the fact that this person would thus be used, because there was no interests beforehand for which there needed any amelioration to take place for this person. — schopenhauer1

Neither were there any for the lifeguard. The lifeguard didn't have an interest in saving anyone before you woke him up. But you didn't care because there was a boy drowning.

Yet you refuse to apply the same logic in the case of birth. The "unborn person" (you know what I mean) has no interests, but when I say "But I don't care because there are people in the room" you bring up that the child is not born yet, which is supposed to matter for some reason.

It is purely for a reason outside of the person in question where people already born are a balance between all parties. — schopenhauer1

False. There was no balancing between parties for the lifeguard. You favored one party (the drowning boy) completely over the other (the lifeguard). You used the lifeguard for a reason purely outside of himself. There is no getting around that.

But you refuse to apply the same logic for having children. Which I think is fine, but you need to make it explicit that you consider the initial violation for some reason much more grave than all the others. Because that is a premise you require for your argument. You need it to matter whether or not the person whose dignity is being violated exists yet. Because that is the only difference between the lifeguard situation and birth. Unless you can show some other difference.

is about a mother discovering that her fetus is suffering from a grave genetic disease or disability. Should she abort or proceed with the pregnancy? — Olivier5

I would go as far as to say that if she is pro-choice, her not doing so is outright wrong.

Similarly, in India many female fetuses get aborted because having a son is seen as leading to better consequences for the child and the family. Is abortion based on the sex of the fetus a moral course of action? I don't think so — Olivier5

I don't mind it. If abortion is considered not harmful then why you do it shouldn't matter.

However, recruiting someone into the game with suffering so that I can help the people already in the game is a no go. — schopenhauer1

But harming the people in the game for the sake of other people in the game is fine?

You have somehow narrowed a lot of arguments I've made into a lifeguard that is woken up. — schopenhauer1

Because I needed to keep reestablishing that you find it fine to harm people for the sake of other people in the game, to show that you need an extra premise to take having children off the spectrum. That premise being, that for some reason they get special value in the calculation because they aren't born yet.

The only consideration here that would violate what would be the child's dignity is putting anything above harm, as there is nothing to "ameliorate" for the child. — schopenhauer1

Who cares? There are people in the room. Similar to how you didn't care about violating the lifeguard's dignity because there is a person in the water. But we're just going around in circles now, the main disagreement is this:

I do. If the lifeguard can prevent all harm for a future person — schopenhauer1

Your premise that if all of the suffering can be prevented then that somehow makes it "special" in comparison to partial suffering prevention.

Does the individual count that you are harming? — schopenhauer1

Of course.

I am saying, while the aggregate could matter due to the constraints of being alive with interests, no such thing is the case for considering a future child who is not born. — schopenhauer1

This is just bizarre to me. Who cares if the child doesn't have interests? The lifeguard didn't have an interest in saving anyone either (because he was sleeping). But you didn't care. Once he woke up, he probably would, but that's not an argument for the same reason that "Once the child is born he probably would like life" is not an argument.

But for some reason, the child not existing makes his interests "special" and impositions on him worse than on anyone else.

Way I see it, there is only the first 3 groups. No one would ever identify as someone from group 4 or 5. Group 4 is group 2 that you don't agree with. And group 5 is group 1 that you don't agree with. Sounds to me like a spectrum of how seriously you take your ideas, with 1/5 (arguably, 2/4) being the most and 3 being the least.

Does the life guard exist? Does the child exist? — schopenhauer1

I don't think it should matter. Never have. I don't think that just because the child doesn't exist his suffering gets special value in the calculation.

Their interests are more than "not being woken up". — schopenhauer1

But that IS one of their interests. But you consider more than just their interests and so wake them up, for a purpose outside of themselves. But refuse to do the same with the child because the child doesn't exist yet, but again, I don't think that should matter.

Rather, it becomes a much more stark, "Do not enable harm, if it can be prevented". — schopenhauer1

I don't agree that "enabling harm" is the problem as I said. If it was then having a child who would lead a perfect life would be wrong, because harm is still being enabled there.

In other words, you can't actually compute harms and joys because the story never ends, and is not predictable. — Olivier5

Yup.

One thing leading to another, an event that looks good as and when it happens may lead to unsavory consequences later, and vice versa something that feels wrong or painful can help cause a good (or harm reductive) consequence later, and nobody can tell for sure. — Olivier5

Sure.

We're all guessing. — Olivier5

But the point is to not guess ridiculously. I can't justify killing someone because "maybe it's actually gonna be a good thing later". ANs think that guessing that having children is fine is akin to that, is guessing ridiculously.

Though I'm not sure why I'm even arguing with you anymore tbh seeing as I don't agree. I think I'll stop now.

You don't look out for certain interests of people already born, like letting them die, you are violating the dignity. — schopenhauer1

That is what I do when I consider the people in the room.

However, in deciding on procreation, harm is the only consideration for that child, not whatever else you might want to "see" happen from its birth. — schopenhauer1

This is the exact point I disagree with.

Because it leads to things like: The lifeguard did nothing wrong, therefore when considering whether or not to wake him up, the only consideration is harm for that lifeguard, not whatever else you might want to "see" happen from waking him up. Anything else is violating the lifeguard's dignity.

Point is you consider it fine to violate dignity sometimes, and to consider harms outside of the lifeguard. Why not the child?

There's no universal metric to measure harm, and therefore one cannot actually compute harms. — Olivier5

That's not the critique I'm talking about. I'm talking about the "Colosseum" argument. "How many spectators must there be in the Colosseum before their pleasure from watching someone get mauled by a lion justifies having someone get mauled by a lion". We don't have Colosseums anymore so I changed it to bullying.

Incidentally, this also applies to pleasures. And you are supposed to be calculating with both.

There's a story about a zen farmer whose horse ran away. Upon hearing the news, his neighbors came to visit. "Such bad luck," they said sympathetically. "We'll see," the farmer replied. — Olivier5

I know the story. However it is crazy to use it as a justification for stealing people's horses. There may not be a universal metric here but we can make pretty good guesses on which is more harmful, to steal or not to steal.

And, again, you supposedly use both harms and pleasures in your calculations, even though there is no universal metric to measure them by. Doesn't stop you though does it? So why use a critique that can be used against your own position?

For the reason I wouldn't make a society of life guards to defend the public or cannabilize a person from the next tribe to help my tribe out. — schopenhauer1

But you would wake up the life guard. How come? This is a quantitative difference. You only make it qualitative in the one case by giving harm done to people that aren't here yet special value over harm done to people that are here.

Because in the procreation decision, there is only one way to violate dignity- overlooking harm of that person for any other reason. — schopenhauer1

False. What about overlooking harm of the people in the room for that one person? What's the difference here?

That is a qualitative difference, not one of degree. — schopenhauer1

That I don't think should matter. Just because my child isn't born yet, doesn't mean he gets special treatment in the calculation.

For the same reason that just because the lifeguard wasn't doing anything wrong doesn't mean he gets special treatment in the calculation. I won't absolutely abstain from harming the lifeguard at any cost just because he did nothing wrong. And neither would you, as you would in fact wake him up.

There are two scenarios here. One can absolutely be prevented. One can only be relatively prevented. Always do the absolute if it's available. If it's not available, that is indeed an impossibility. — schopenhauer1

This is effectively special pleading though. Because in no other scenario is it possible for harm to be absolutely prevented. I don't understand why the child's dignity and suffering should be placed above the dignity and suffering of the people in the room, just because one can be prevented entirely and one partially.

Again, I see ethics as person-affecting, not aggregate. — schopenhauer1

There are people in the room, not some mass of goo.

However, if we were starving, I am not going to justify killing someone from a different tribe and eating them as the solution to our problem. That is essentially what you are doing here. — schopenhauer1

Yup. To a much smaller extent.

But that is also what you are doing when you wake up the lifeguard to save the drowning person. It is only a matter of extent, not principle. Though you make it a matter of principle (in the singular case of having children) by saying that if suffering can be prevented entirely, then that for some reason makes it more valuable to prevent than suffering that can only be partially prevented. That's something I don't agree with.

At the same time, do you see there to be a qualitative difference in (since I'm already born) waking up the life guard, and then kidnapping the life guard and forcing him to save everyone I can think of? — schopenhauer1

No. Quantitative difference.

But no, that would be violating his dignity in a MAJOR, reckless, and unnecessary way. — schopenhauer1

So the difference is between a major violation and a minor violation. That is a quantitative difference not a qualitative one. The this is on the same spectrum as cannibalism and having children. We both have points on the spectrum at which we consider this type of action ok (that being, harming someone for the sake of reducing suffering elsewhere). Yours for example at least includes that it is acceptable to wake up a lifeguard who is sleeping to have him save someone. And does not include forced kidnappings of lifeguards (neither does mine for the record).

However you take having children off this spectrum entirely by proposing a rule I don't agree with:

One can absolutely be prevented. One can only be relatively prevented. Always do the absolute if it's available — schopenhauer1

I don't see why the fact that harm can be absolutely prevented in an instance makes it more valuable to prevent than harm that can be partially prevented. You make it a qualitative difference when it is a quantitative one in every other scenario.

That is not true. — Olivier5

That is not true. I am accounting for both, instances of harming people and instances of "reducing pleasure". Because the latter is a harm. Sorry if I was being cryptic.

But you are not able to understand anything I say right now, obviously. — Olivier5

Doubt it. You said you take pleasure into the calculation. So there will come a point, where the number of people benefiting from one person's suffering trumps the consideration for that person's suffering. It's one of the most classic critiques of utilitarianism, which negative utilitarianism doesn't suffer from.

Thanks for cheering me up! — Olivier5

No problem.

Ok.

Well initially I wanted to point out this:

But not procreating brings about arguably worse suffering (if you only look at human suffering). It depends on what your "system" consists of. If you are only concerned with the suffering of the child and the parent, then having children will always come out the more harmful option, so it would never be right. But if you consider the people the child would help, then you realize there is a risk both ways. So there will be situations where it is acceptable to have the child. — khaled

But if you want to consider non human harm then yes any form of procreation will be unethical right off the bat, people have to eat. Have a good day.

doing good for another at no cost to yourself is good, but even better at great cost to yourself — Srap Tasmaner

Not sure I agree. Just more praised to do so at great cost to yourself. I am reluctant to say that self-sacrifice is a good thing in itself. There is nothing good about flogging yourself.

A person who jumps into the water to save a drowning person despite being a terrible swimmer himself is not any more "heroic" than the person who calmly wakes up the lifeguard who is sleeping on the job. The first is just being stupid.