I think the intuitions of virtually everyone will concur. Yet on your view there is no such obligation. — Bartricks

Yup.

grotesquely so — Bartricks

What would be grotesque is if I said "You must not reach out and help". But that is not the case.

'if you only look at human suffering" — Bartricks

Because it's not clear to me other forms of it matter.

That's a different point, though equally implausible. — Bartricks

If the average person was a negative influence on others, then we wouldn't form groups, and we'd be better of as hermits. Or, at least, we'd be miserable in groups. Both are not the case.

Er, no, and that in no way followed from anything I said. If i reject as implausible the view that we are in no way obligated to promote pleasure, that doesn't mean that I think we are always obligated to promote pleasure. Likewise, if I reject as implausible the view that we are in no way obligated to prevent suffering that we're not the agents of, that does not imply that I think we are always obligated to prevent all suffering. — Bartricks

What you were rejecting is that we are only responsible for certain sufferings and not others. I thought this meant that you think we are responsible to alleviate all undeserved sufferings.

we obviously do sometimes have moral obligations to do alleviate suffering that we played no part in creating - that's why I ought to reach down and save the child who accidentally fell in the pond and is now drowning — Bartricks

I disagree.

I am talking about the relative moral weights of the suffering and pleasures that procreative acts create — Bartricks

But to someone who doesn't take created pleasures into account in the first place, it's not a compelling argument.

The result of your computation is determined by your frame of accounting. Mine is different; unlike you I include future joys in my computations — Olivier5

How many bullies do you require before the pleasure they get from bullying someone trumps the suffering they inflict and therefore makes it ok?

Or better, how much pleasure must I derive from getting a new PC that it becomes your obligation to get me one? My laptop is pretty old....

I would think it our moral duty to procreate — Olivier5

I think it's ridiculous to think this in any scenario. As ridiculous as thinking that because I would be overjoyed at having a new PC that that obligates you to get me one. And for the same reasons. Also I'm not a woman FYI, I remember you referring to me as "she" before too but I might be misremembering.

But additionally, since you accept pleasures as a basis for moral obligation, then the person getting bullied in the above example would have a moral obligation to continue to get bullied, as him not getting bullied would be denying people pleasure.

A whole lot of things start to go wrong when you say that harming people for joy is acceptable, nay obligatory.

Okay so accounting for future harm of hypothetical generations is something you can do but not accounting for their future joy, for some mysterious reason. — Olivier5

No. I am accounting for both. However you clearly defined a killjoy as someone who "reduces people's joy". That does not apply here. There is no joy getting reduced. There is joy not being created. There is a difference. The same difference between me taking 3 dollars from you, and me not giving you 3 dollars.

Well, all you're doing there is expressing a belief in a prima facie implausible view. — Bartricks

Why do you think it's implausible?

one would be responsible for the suffering that one's procreative acts create, wouldn't one? — Bartricks

Yes. But not procreating brings about arguably worse suffering (if you only look at human suffering). It depends on what your "system" consists of. If you are only concerned with the suffering of the child and the parent, then having children will always come out the more harmful option, so it would never be right. But if you consider the people the child would help, then you realize there is a risk both ways. So there will be situations where it is acceptable to have the child.

Even if your view is correct - and I see no evidence that it is - — Bartricks

So you believe we are obligated to reduce world suffering everywhere all the time? That all undeserved suffering everywhere should be treated equal? Caused or uncaused by us?

It's irrelevant too, because what I'm talking about is the moral value of the pains and pleasures such acts create, not the responsibility of the procreator. — Bartricks

Pretty relevant for me because I don't think the amount of pain and pleasure is created provides a basis for a moral obligation as long as it's not my responsibility. Example: By not donating to charity someone out there is getting harmed. Despite this, I don't have to donate to charity. Because that person is not my responsibility. However I still can, and it is good to do so.

Curiously, we find the reverse of your scenarios particularly praiseworthy: that is, risking harm to yourself or knowingly sacrificing your own well-being in order to benefit someone else. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes because you could have chosen to take account of your own suffering and not done the heroic act, but you went above the call of duty and helped people when you knew you didn't have to. Pretty praiseworthy.

What do we make of all this? — Srap Tasmaner

You tell me. You're the one that expressed surprise at my statement but it turns out to be pretty mundane. In everyday language I'm basically just saying "It's wrong to hurt others for your pleasure"

And yet you would want Adam and Eve to have killed all the joys ever to be had by the whole human race. — Olivier5

A killjoy is someone who decreases people's joys as you defined it. That clearly doesn't apply here. As there are no people.

If you want to count not having children as being a killjoy, and being a killjoy is wrong, you run into the absurd scenario where sometimes not having children is wrong.

And I have pointed out that living, at least in society, involves taking chances with other people's lives. By that I don't mean that it's okay to be reckless, so there should be limits — Olivier5

The AN argument is precisely that having children is always reckless.

A non-existing person has no dignity to lose, and as soon as she exists, her primary objective will be to stay alive. — Olivier5

So are you of the opinion that having a child is ok under any circumstance? If not then how do you explain it?

We must not have the same things in mind because examples are infinite. — Srap Tasmaner

We're not. I'm talking about joys and sufferings as considerations for doing things to other people, not for yourself. We make joy/suffering calculations where joy wins out for ourselves all the time.

But we don't have cases where A would be really happy if he did X to B but B would be harmed and doing X is ok.

Example: Bullying is wrong, no matter how much pleasure it gives the bullies. Illegal fighting pits are wrong, no matter how much joy they bring the spectators (assuming the participants are being coerced to participate). Etc

Non-deserved pleasures are still good or can be. But their being non-deserved typically means that we do not have any weighty moral reason to create them. — Bartricks

I’m of the mind that we have no moral obligation to create pleasure. Period. Furthermore that we’re not even obligated to alleviate all suffering, only that which we are responsible for. So I don’t find your distinctions very impactful.

But that's trivial. Yes, if we ignore all the ways in which we have a negative impact and focus only on the ways in which we have a positive impact, then yes, I would say that we have a positive impact. But that's to do no more than say "a positive consequence is a positive consequence". It tells us nothing about the morality of procreation. — Bartricks

I wouldn’t say it’s obvious that we should weigh animal suffering nearly as much as human suffering.

We make duties about not decreasing other people's joy though. It's not okay to be a killjoy. — Olivier5

Didn’t claim otherwise.

I find that we do this all the time. Dunno what you're talking about here. — Srap Tasmaner

Example?

Why would it not be right? We consume and kill our planet, and in the process are happy. What’s weird about that? Wreckless consumption is fun.

Note that when I say “most people are happy” I’m referring to the 1st world countries, because that’s where these surveys are taking place, and that’s where basically everyone on this site lives.

More harm, but also more joy. Why are you not counting the joys that life brings? If your only measure for life is the amount of tears shed, of course it's always going to be negative. — Olivier5

Because I find that we never use joys to trump considerations of suffering irl. And we never make duties out of providing pleasure but we make duties out of not harming. For example, no matter how happy I would be to have 3 dollars, you don’t owe me 3 dollars. However you do owe me not to rob me, as that is harmful.

You can have the intention to help someone, and then you can choose from many possible options what you're actually going to do in an effort to help them. — baker

I can intend to help someone, but if I pick something an act that instead harms them then I did something wrong. On the other hand if the act helps then I did something good. The variable here, is the consequence. Saying that the variable is the action is equivalent in this case to saying that it’s the consequence. Because you define what a good and bad action is by its consequences.

less convenient too though — Olivier5

So harmful to me?

All the time, without ever calculating them because it's impossible to do so accurately. We just figure it's gona be okay. — Olivier5

Too much of this is literally the definition of irresponsibility.

You and I do it all the time. Because we want a life too — Olivier5

Agreed. Where did I imply that we are not part of the calculation? If I purely wanted not to harm people I would kill myself. But I don’t. Because that would harm me. And I consider myself part of the calculation. Heck, I treat harm done to me with more weight than harm done to others most of the time.

It involves taking decisions with insufficient information. It involves taking the risk of harming others. And yet we go on living. — Olivier5

We have sufficient information to conclude that not having children results in less harm than having them. So to go on to have children anyways is irresponsible and immoral. Is the argument.

Yup. The planet is indeed fucked up. And people are also happy on average. Bizarre but it is the case

Then do reflect how come these, on average, happy (although unenlightened people) whose company is not conducive to suffering have made the planet the mess that it is. — baker

No contradiction there

If you can take chances with the lives of others because you need to do some shopping, you can take chances with having kids because you need kids. — Olivier5

No you can’t. Because you not having kids is less harmful than you having kids. On the other hand, you not shopping is more harmful than you shopping.

Key word: probably. What justifies taking the risk? — Olivier5

That I need food or I’ll die. So I’m going to go buy it.

Can you copy-paste based on which words of mine you surmise that? — baker

These:

If an action leads to harm and suffering for oneself, for others, or both, it's bad. — baker

Key words: Leads to. You define a bad action as something that has bad consequences. Which makes it redundant in the sequence.

But, barring either genocide or a 100% compliance with AN regulations, you know there's going to be a generation 2, and a generation 3, and so on. So your actions ensuring two further kids to supply these further generations with sufficient numbers are justified by the same logic — Isaac

Yup. Good point now that I think about it. Ignore my previous response.

Since there will be future generations regardless of what you do it’s good to try to create a “family tree of harm reducers”. Since by doing so, by following CN strictly or near strictly, at every step you will always be reducing harm. And since genocide and AN compliance are both impossible then NOT having that family tree around is the more harmful option, since every generation the number of people in the room grows ad infinium, and so does the number of people that you harm by having the child but a lot more slowly (by definition). Would be a pretty small one though due to the nature of CN.

Having a child now reduces suffering in their generation, but it also ensures that there are people willing to have children themselves to reduce suffering in the following generation. — Isaac

But the point is: it is still not good enough. Compare the suffering that Adam and Eve would have had to endure due to childlessness to the suffering of all mankind thus far. It pales in comparison. Even though Adam and Eve reduced the suffering of the population by having children. And even though at every step, having children is likely the less harmful option, in the end, their decision to have children resulted in way more harm than they would have had to endure at step 1. Adam and Eve can be Jeff and Janis and the result is still the same.

AN increases harm significantly, then goes to 0. CN keeps a mostly steady level of harm going forever. It is clear which is more harmful overall.

But considering real conditions, and not idealizations, it is clear that the next generations will exist anyways. In this case it also becomes clear that new people are added to the room each generation you consider. So applying CN is better in real scenarios, applying AN is better in ideal scenarios. A bit of a weird conclusion but one I can swallow.

Since you can be almost certain that no matter what you do, these generations are going to happen anyway, you can be almost certain that setting in motion a chain of events to ensure a continuous supply of harm-reducers is a moral choice. — Isaac

Well put. Otherwise by not having children, you create an ever growing room. Which is worse than the alternative.

If an action leads to harm and suffering for oneself, for others, or both, it's bad. — baker

Then the sequence is not incomplete. Good intention, bad outcome, wrong. You added “bad action” in the middle but if “bad action” is literally “bad outcome” (because that’s how you defined it) then it’s redundant.

So after more thinking I came to the conclusion that most of my arguments in the previous reply to shope and in the edit are flawed because they only consider one generation at a time.

Because if everyone abides by the rule: "Only have children when it is likely that doing so prevents more suffering than the alternative" then it becomes sustainable. Even a population of 1 billion would suffer less than the original 100 if everyone abides by the rule. — khaled

Is false. A more accurate statement would be "Each generation would suffer less by implementing CN rather than AN". But this is only true of one generation at a time. Say we start from a population of 100, and out of each 100 people 2 are miserable. If the 100 apply AN, they will all be miserable, then that will be the end. If they apply CN, and each have 2 children say, then the next generation (comprising of 200 people) will have 4 miserable people. 4 is a lot smaller than 100. But the number only grows. That is the problem.

So it is the case that having children is always the more harmful option. Even though having a child is the less harmful option most of the time only considering the current generation, overall it will eventually be more harmful. This small percentage of people that "slip through the cracks" leading miserable lives will eventually outnumber the number of people whose suffering we wanted to prevent in the first place.

@Isaac How would you respond to that?

You don't know for sure when you take the wheel to go do some shopping, that you will not kill a dozen people in some horrible accident. — Olivier5

But I can reasonably guess that I won't. The odds of this happening are so slim that the harm I bring to myself by not going to the store and doing that shopping is probably greater.

My reaction -- as already posted -- is that destroying somebody's eyesight is an act of violence, of life destruction. It is not comparable to act that affirms life, it's the opposite. — Olivier5

Handwaving. You never said anything about "life destruction" and "life affirmation". All you said was "If ANs don't like it so much they should just kill themselves". And I explained to you why that's a terrible argument.

If life had no inherent positive value, why would death have any inherent negative value? — Olivier5

Neither of these logically lead to the other.

IF an AN argues that the hypothetical life of a hypothetical child entails risks that are too great to take, why can't the same AN proponent conclude that her own life entails risks that are too great to take? — Olivier5

Because, for the third time, there is a difference between risks worth taking for YOURSELF and risks worth taking for OTHERS. Pressing the button is an example of a risk that you may find worth taking yourself but is wrong to take for others. Any risk is wrong to take for others, unless not doing it is the more risky option.

would most certainly — Olivier5

Key word: Most certainly. What justifies taking the risk.

Again, we don't take risks with others unless the consequences of not doing so are worse.

There is no having to compromise anything to do with violating harm or dignity. — schopenhauer1

Because you choose to only look at the child in your "system". We compromise the wellbeing of the people in the room, as well as the parents. There are people who exist already that would be harmed by the decision.

1) You have no choice but to do mini-versions of "kidnapping" someone against their will (causing indignity by overlooking the harm you do to someone), but you can try to do this as little as possible.. and 2) You have the ability to completely prevent kidnapping someone against their will if you simply don't do a certain action. — schopenhauer1

Both of these are true but only one is a moral claim. 1) says that you are obligated to cause indignity to reduce suffering elsewhere. I would disagree with this actually. My point is not that you must wake up the life guard or save the drowning person, I don't think there is an obligation there. My point is that you could. And that a system that has it where you cannot wake up the life guard or save the drowning person is ridiculous, I think we can agree there.

But 2 is only a statement of fact. Yes you do in fact have the ability to completely prevent kidnapping someone against their will. But in doing so you harm others. So it is not clear from this fact alone that the action should be taken (not having children) as we know there are cases where harm to others trumps "kidnappings" -as you called them- as a consideration.

2) The indignity comes not just from the kidnapping (the decision made for the other) but kidnapping with knowing of harm.. — schopenhauer1

Again, true, but only a statement of fact. This does not lead to it being wrong to nonetheless do that thing that enables harm, if the harm alleviated elsewhere is enough.

The indignity is putting someone else in a position of harm, putting other considerations above this. — schopenhauer1

Cool. But you don't mind doing this with the lifeguard. Why not with children?

My point is your argument is not unilateral. You cannot conclusively say "having children is wrong". Since you do not mind violating dignity elsewhere for the sake of preventing harm.

Unless you would argue that the child's dignity is somehow "special" and different from the lifeguard's dignity. I don't see a reason it should be.

If someone did indeed realize that the best scenario was the the least people being born bringing the least amount of harm, and this resulted in eventually no people born, would you accept it? — schopenhauer1

If he's correct sure. Have thought so for 2 years. But I doubt he would be. Since we have evidence to suggest that the average person is a positive influence. And especially since I only care about the "remembering self" as opposed to the "experiencing self" if you remember our first disagreement.

For example, if it was found that all the models noted that when you ran it completely, everyone suffered more by continuing the next generation rather than abstaining from continuing it, would you accept that model? — schopenhauer1

There is an important point here I think you're missing. I think you're comparing the antinatalist ideal with the reality of my rule (idk what to call it, "careful natalism"? I'll just use that for now: CN).

As I said, if everyone applies CN, every generation suffering will decrease. With AN, there will be a massive "surge" of suffering before going to zero. And they are set up so that, ideally, everyone applying CN is less (or equal) suffering than everyone applying AN, by definition.

But what you are doing here is comparing the ideal AN scenario with the realistic prediction of applying CN. Which is not fair. I am aware that if someone has children there is a good chance those children will not be CN, and so will result in more suffering overall. But on the other hand, even if we were to somehow try to enforce AN by force, this will realistically never work. All it will do is drastically reduce the population for the people who follow it and whoever remains who is not AN will make it all for naught. All the while all the followers suffered for nothing. We both know that realistically, most people would not able to actually enforce AN. But this cannot be used as an argument against it. So similarly, you cannot use the difficulty of enforcing CN as an argument against it.

This is what I meant when I added "much more effectively" here:

And saying "But there is no way everyone abides by the rule" is not an argument against this as it can also be used against AN (much more effectively). — khaled

Realistically speaking, AN is much less likely to be enforced than CN. And half-assing AN is worse than half-assing CN. Because with half assing AN, you end up with the current generation suffering severely, and the next generation still going on anyways. If you half ass CN at least the current generation doesn't suffer.

I think that there might be a "hidden assumption" in the model...something to do way back with how community is above and beyond the consideration of the child that will be affected here. So this presents as a straight up utilitarian thing, but is really more of an argument to "keep the community going at all costs". — schopenhauer1

There is no such thing. I have argued for why it can be expected that having a child can be expected to be the less harmful option a lot of the time (It was Isaac's argument). On the other hand you predict with no basis, that there is a "better model" out there that would come out with having children always being worse. It's like saying "I know God exists, because eventually there will be a scientific theory that incorporates him".

I agree that there might be a hidden assumption. But you have not presented any evidence that there is. Whereas all the evidence I presented only references suffering/happiness of real people. No considerations given to "the community" as its own entity.

You do it when you drive a car, you do it when you wear a mask in public (or not), when you teach others, when you take decisions for a collective (e.g. a general deciding to attack or something). — Olivier5

In all these cases NOT doing these things is more harmful. That's why we do them.

It's called taking responsibility. I don't see it as always morally bad. — Olivier5

And it would be very irresponsible to push the button for someone else. We use the word "irresponsible" when someone makes a decision for someone else that could harm them, when a safer alternative is available. Example: Pressing the button, wreckless driving, using other people's stuff without consent, playing with fire in a forest, etc.

Then I realized that, had this been the case I would not be me, but somebody else, so the thought morphed into: I could not have been born; the world would just exist without me. And such a thought led me to a sense of gratefulness for being alive, for existing. And I haven't lived a blessed life but I'm still grateful my parents took this decision for me (or didn't, I mean my mother wasn't taking the pill back then, but that too was her decision I guess). — Olivier5

Cool. Has nothing to do with anything. I am also grateful to be alive.

Suicide is only a bad thing if life is conceived as inherently good (as I do). — Olivier5

False. It is also a bad thing if death is conceived as bad. I never understood what "life is inherently good" even means. That it is enjoyable for most people most of the time, I get, but what does the word "good" even mean here.

You never responded to this argument though — Olivier5

why is that such a horrible horrible argument, pray tell? — Olivier5

Yikes.

I did. "If they don't like A they can kill themselves so it's fine to inflict A upon them" is a terrible argument because A can be anything. From rape to torture. So the argument is absurd. Not only absurd but also disgusting. What's your reaction to reading this: "We'll rip his eyes out and if he doesn't like it he can just kill himself". There is nothing that cannot be justified by this "argument".

Your own shock at the suicide argument only proves that you agree that life has inherent value — Olivier5

Just shock at how idiotic and disgusting the "argument "is.

you guys do — Olivier5

Who is "you guys"

But if you truly disagree with that, if you can put the life of a future child in a balance and conclude it's not worth living, why can't you apply the same logic to your own life? — Olivier5

Are you seriously not seeing the point?

For the same reason that I would not press the button for someone else even if I would press it for myself. It is irresponsible. Or so the argument goes. Because there is (supposedly) a safer alternative.

Mods, can anyone delete this?

I just thought of a rebuttal to your argument that I think shope hinted at but didn't expand on fully. If the argument is that not having children is the more harmful option that is patently false, despite of all the happiness surveys, and despite the fact that it is probably better overall for the current generation. That's because if you extend the "system" to also include your child's descendants, there is no way you can make up for the harm caused that way.

Say the human population is exactly 100 people. I can buy that those 100 people having children and increasing the population to say, 250 would overall reduce harm on the entire group. But I cannot buy that continuously having children can ever compare to the original suffering prevented by the first act. I cannot buy that a population of billions is suffering less than the original 100 suffering due to childlessness. As shope said: It's kicking the can down the road. In the end, if you look purely at consequences, having children is always the more harmful option.

Edit: Nevermind it doesn't really work as a rebuttal. Because if everyone abides by the rule: "Only have children when it is likely that doing so prevents more suffering than the alternative" then it becomes sustainable. Even a population of 1 billion would suffer less than the original 100 if everyone abides by the rule. Though we'll likely never get to 1 billion doing so. Which I think is a win-win honestly. And saying "But there is no way everyone abides by the rule" is not an argument against this as it can also be used against AN (much more effectively).

I'll just leave this here if anyone thinks of arguing along the same lines.

If life could be full of harms, and if that risk justifies not giving life to a child, why should the lives of AN be an exception? Why should they opt to live, when "life could be full of harm"?

"Do as I say, don't do as I do. Children can't take the risk of living but I can." — Olivier5

It's more like "You shouldn't take the risk of harming others but do whatever with yourself". This is common sense. For example: If there is a button that has a 98% chance of giving you 1000 dollars and a 2% chance of killing you, is pressing it for yourself wrong? No, if you see the odds are worth it go ahead, none of my business. Is pressing it for others wrong? Absolutely. Because there is an almost perfectly harmless alternative called "Not pressing the button"

Your first argument against AN is basically "If you don't like it kill yourself". Your second is "Because I wouldn't take the risk for others that means I won't take it for myself". Maybe you should read up on the subject matter a bit before presenting ridiculous arguments. Sincerely, Not an AN.

Because they think that life is full of harm, that's why. — Olivier5

False. They think life could be full of harm. Which is a fact. And it is wrong to bring in children because it risks them having a life full of harm, and there is a non-risky alternative (supposedly). So this:

They think it is better for a child not to be, and therefore, if they were presented with the possibility of erasing their own life (without harm), they should take it. — Olivier5

Doesn't follow. They would only take that bet if they were miserable. But people are mostly not miserable.

In my last response to khaled (not sure if he missed my post, or just hasn’t responded yet) — Pinprick

I didn't respond because I changed my mind so thought there would be no point to.

You misunderstand the argument. Why would they?

Fair enough. Doesn't really change the compromise that takes place in the room and bringing someone into the room who wasn't there before, so that they will now have to compromise, "for their own benefit". — schopenhauer1

So you are saying that there ARE cases where you would violate dignity to reduce harm.

So you are looking for something that has never taken place, a completely charmed life? — schopenhauer1

That is the hypothetical yes.

Are you really an expert in this kind of statistical analysis? Have you really factored in everything? With this kind of thinking, the person with the least knowledge is — schopenhauer1

Isaac’s argument is convincing enough. I have consulted statistical analyses of happiness. They all come back positive. This means that the average person is a positive influence. Your critiques against this have not been convincing.

If you absolutely "know" they won't be harmed, then you aren't violating dignity. — schopenhauer1

False. You’re still forcing them into a dangerous game. Just one you know they’ll enjoy.

To use the gaming analogy, you’re still kidnapping them, taping them to a chair, and forcing them to play the game, they just happen to enjoy this whole process. And you knew they would enjoy it.

With the almost near 0% chance the person born will have lived a life with no harm, this indeed would violate dignity if you knew how the world is. — schopenhauer1

“Near zero percent”. I’m saying that we know this very minuscule probability is what’s going to happen for your child. That’s the hypothetical.

However, there is only one case where we can ideally prevent this, procreation. It is bringing more people into the world who will then be harmed. — schopenhauer1

Again, false. You keep saying this but by not procreating you are harming the people in the room. And if harm done to the child should not be treated differently to harm done to the people in the room, then there will be cases where it is acceptable to have the child. And you can’t use the dignity argument either because there ARE cases where you would violate dignity to reduce harm as we’ve gone over. There should be no reason the dignity of the child is in any way different from the dignity of anyone in the room. So if you are willing to violate dignity in “inter-room interactions” there should be no difference between that and violating the child’s dignity with the goal of reducing suffering.

The metaphor implies that there is absolutely no pleasure that can be derived from interpersonal relationships, and that they are only done out of necessity. You can imagine the hedgehogs in this scenario being miserable, they are stuck between a harm and a worse harm. But for people it is not the case. It is pretty clear that we derive pleasure from relationships and that they are not made purely to avoid the greater harm of isolation. If that were the case, again, you'd find that most people are miserable, like the hedgehogs would be.

I meant that, waking the lifeguard up to save the person is not violating dignity — schopenhauer1

Why not? It is a harm (though a very slight one) inflicted for a purpose outside of the lifeguard. You are using the lifeguard as a means to an end.

The people in the room in the perfect life would presumably also be experiencing paradise no? — schopenhauer1

No. Perfect life =/= paradise. The situation is that you know your next child will not suffer at all. But it’s still the same game. It’ll just happen that your next child will never suffer while he is playing this dangerous and potentially harmful game called life. In this scenario, it is ok to have them, as they won’t suffer, and you yourself said this. Which leads to the conclusion that merely forcing someone into a game, even a dangerous one, is not problematic. What is problematic is that they are likely to suffer. But again, if you are concerned with preventing suffering you cannot ignore the people in the room either.

it doesn't negate the fact that a better calculation could indeed show that not having children is the best course for the least harm. — schopenhauer1

Who cares if it COULD? Until this better calculation actually DOES show this this is just idle speculation.

Aliens.. unless you pay attention to the historical conspiracy theories, aren't proven — schopenhauer1

It’s never a possibility until it is :cool:

Certainly, I will not enable all harm on his behalf for the people already existing. — schopenhauer1

There is a very important distinction here. Is your problem with enabling harm, or is your problem with someone being harmed?

Because if your problem is with enabling harm, then having a child you know will not suffer in an imperfect world is wrong, as that is still enabling harm. But I find that an absurd conclusion.

I don’t see why “enabling harm” should be worse than harming the people in the room. And it’s not even an argument of magnitude, you’re not arguing that “enabling harm” is nevertheless the more harmful option, no, you’re saying that “enabling harm” is fundamentally worse than directly harming. I don’t see why it would be. Why does the fact that a person doesn’t exist yet, make enabling harm for them fundamentally worse than harming people who do exist right now? The outcome is the same: someone gets hurt. Why does the fact that that someone doesn’t exist yet give their hurt some special value as opposed to the suffering of people that are here already?

how do you tell what a bad action is from a good one?

As far as I understand, it teaches that life is suffering
— khaled
No, it doesn't.
Life Isn't Just Suffering — baker

I was just quoting the first noble truth. I know it’s not meant to be taken literally.

Associating with run of the mill people (the average) is conducive to suffering — baker

Highly doubtful.

A band of gangsters are a bad influence on eachother, but they still stick together. — baker

That’s not what I meant by “good influence”. I meant “advantageous to live with”.

Living with others is a mixed bag of experiences: some good, some bad. — baker

But if it was bad on average we wouldn’t do it. Unless the alternative is worse. In which case we would do it and be miserable doing it. Which is not the case. Which is also why it is highly doubtful that associating with the average person is conductive to suffering.

You think the average human isn't miserable?? — baker

Yes. And they seem to agree when surveyed about it.

They are enlightened? — baker

Not necessarily. Just not miserable. Heck, happy on average even, as it turns out.

Because he already exists and so will have to live in compromised situations. One of the harms of coming into existence ;). — schopenhauer1

That doesn’t answer the question. How the heck is it that waking someone up is violating their dignity but breaking their arm isn’t? There is a person existing in both scenarios.

I patently think this is an extreme, to create a whole new life for the sake of the people in the room. — schopenhauer1

Why?

How about waking up the lifeguard for the sake of the person in the water? That was fine. EVEN THOUGH it is a violation of his dignity.

I don't pay attention to him anymore — schopenhauer1

I’ll just quote it then:

I can also say the social relations lead to suffering, as much as we are drawn to them.
— schopenhauer1

You could. But you'd be evidently wrong. If it we the case that social relations lead to suffering, as much as we are drawn to them then you'd expect on average about 50% of people to live as hermits. We see nothing of the sort, so the pros of social living clearly outweigh the cons, for most people. — Isaac

Starting harm unnecessarily when one could have prevented it, is that matters here. — schopenhauer1

It’s not unnecessary. It’s for the people in the room. Who already exist.

To force recruit and kidnap into the team/game is not justified. — schopenhauer1

Then having a child who will have a perfect life is not justified. But you have stated before that it is. So this cannot be your principle. It is not the simple act of forcing someone to play the game that is problematic. It only becomes problematic if there is a risk they get harmed. But if you’re only looking at risks that people get harmed then you cannot ignore the people in the room either.

Says you. Wait until the unexpected airborne Ebola happens or something.. It's never a real possibility until it is. — schopenhauer1

Says you. Wait until aliens come down and lead us to a new age of technological prosperity. It’s never a real possibility until it is.

Again, idle speculation.

which is in a manner that causes a great deal of undeserved suffering to other creatures (for I live a comfortable western lifestyle). — Bartricks

I am ignoring any non human suffering for now. I’d be very concerned if you were causing a great deal of undeserved human suffering...

As I said, ignoring non human suffering, you cannot deny that the average person is a positive influence. And so not having them risks becoming more harmful than having them.

Actually, early Buddhism teaches something similar (and it prescribes celibacy as a prerequisite for liberation from suffering). — baker

As far as I understand, it teaches that life is suffering not that people are on average bad for each other. On the contrary, Buddhism also emphasizes the Sangha or “community” as a very important tool for your journey to be free of suffering, definitely not as its cause.

Or perhaps this is backwards, and we ascribe positive influence of one person on another because to think otherwise, while inevitably living with one another, would be demoralizing. — baker

Well first off, it’s not inevitable at all. Maybe in the modern day it’s difficult to live as a hermit, but if humans were always a bad influence on each other on average we would have never formed groups. And secondly if it was inevitable, and it was also true that humans are a bad influence on each other, then you’d expect the average human to be miserable which is also not the case.

we just have a myopic tendency to focus only on human pains and pleasures — Bartricks

Using this myopic tendency:

I think we create far more undeserved pain than we prevent. — Bartricks

I think this is demonstrably false. If this were true then humans would be each better off living as hermits. And you would expect that when they live around each other that they’ll all be miserable since they create more undeserved suffering than they prevent. But this is not the case. So it must be that the average human is a positive influence on others.

Ergo, intensionalism is a more reasonable theory of morality than consequentialism. — TheMadFool

It seems unreasonable to me that intentions are all that matter. For example: If A is addicted to their phone I can intend to help them by taking it away, but then only result in A missing an important call and losing their job. Good intentions, bad outcome, and wrong.

I think the possibility of resulting in harm matters more than intention. Doesn’t matter how pure your intentions are, if they can result in harm it becomes questionable.

what about the rest of the comment?

Does the fact that acts of human procreation can reasonably be expected to create lots of undeserved suffering and non-deserved pleasure imply that they are overall morally bad?
— Bartricks

If you're only considering the child and parent, yes. But it becomes less clear when you generalize to the consequences of both acts. If you are a good parent, your child can be expected to alleviate a lot of undeserved suffering throughout their lifetime as well as create a lot of pleasure. By not having them, you are thus still causing undeserved suffering, to the people they would have helped. — khaled

Alright, I'm convinced you're a troll. — Cobra

Says the person harping about being an antinatalist without thinking that having children is wrong.

There is a difference between thinking that not having kids is altruistic and thinking that having kids is wrong. You can think both or neither at the same time. And neither leads to the other. Antinatalism is precisely the belief that having kids is wrong, not that not having kids is altruistic. You are not an antinatalist.

And stop personalizing the debate to convincing you, it’s rude and entitled. :wink: