I'd want to know why, but evidently you're not much interested in that question. — Isaac

That would be the hard problem. Which I am interested in.

I'd want to know how I came to learn to use such expressions, but evidently you're not much interested in that either. — Isaac

Yea I'm not really interested in that one.

If all you want to do is say "the world seems like X to me" — Isaac

I want to emphasize that the statement "the world seems like X to me" is not negated by any neurological evidence you can throw at it. The world still seems the way it seems. The statement "qualia does not exist" implies "the world doesn't seem like anything, there is no X", which is absurd.

How is you having an experience evidence of "stimuli cause experiences and also responses"? — Isaac

I don't think I need to present to you evidence that stimuli cause responses.

Your claim was about the cause, not the mere existence. — Isaac

Oh that's easy. When I close my eyes I do not have the experience of color. Additionally I know there are certain ways the biological machinery can malfunction to make me colorblind. Therefore the stimuli and biological machinery must be causing that experience.

The inclusion of an aparrently direct route from stimuli to experience — Isaac

I'd say the experience is a side-product of whatever our brain is doing. As in this:

Photons hit the retina, they fire a chain of neurons in the V1, these (depending on previously cemented pathways) fire a chain of other neurons (with the important backward-acting filters). Some of these neurons represent things like the word 'red', images of other things which caused the same initial V! pattern, emotions attached to either the current image, or remembered ones... All this is held in working memory, which is then re-fired (selectively) by the hippocampus. It's this re-firing which we are aware of when we introspect, not the original chain. — Isaac

Causes the experience as well. Is there a problem now?

I've cited several papers which you've declined to read. — Isaac

All of those papers attack the model stimuli>qualia>response or stimuli>response>qualia.

we can't speak about pain - which you just did. — Banno

Ineffable =/= We can't speak about. And I already gave you a model where we can have ineffable experiences and still have meaningful conversations.

Ineffable means not fully describable. And I bet you if you asked any layman whether or not they can describe what color is like to a blind person they would say no. And I also bet you that if you asked them whether or not they can imagine what "inverted vision" would be like they would say yes. And if you explained to them what a p-zombie is they would probably say it makes sense.

The small group of philosophers is the one claiming otherwise.

You can't tell us what qualia are, because they are ineffable.

And you cannot show them to us what they are, because they are private. — Banno

But we have a large number of people reporting to have them. How did that happen?
And, again, I can tell you what qualia are. The experience of pain is ineffable. "Qualia" the word isn't. Or else we wouldn't have been able to say anything about them.

This sounds to me like theMadFool's post about how the concept of nothing is a paradox.

Understanding why the issue is important enough to take up over sixty pagrs is directly relevant. — Banno

How does understanding why people are responding for 60 pages affect whether or not qualia exist?

The "you" was generic; if you took it to be a reference to you, that's your issue. — Banno

Generic implies that it applies to all the people advocating for qualia. I wasn't offended by it, but it's still psychonalaysing that doesn't add to the discussion. Also congrats for 10k posts

You can't tell us what qualia are, because they are ineffable.

And you cannot show them to us what they are, because they are private. — Banno

I can tell you what the category means but not its memebers. As in I can't describe red to you but I can tell you what Qualia are. And no I can't show you what they are but I'm pretty sure I don't need to. They are what you refer to as "experiences".

Ockham's razor applies. — creativesoul

I don't think it does. How do you explain the phenomenology otherwise?

Tell us exactly what it is that is missing.

And if your answer is "the qualia", then...

...all you have done is engage in the circular argument that the biological machinery cannot tell us about the qualia, and the qualia are what the biological machinery cannot tell us about. — Banno

Or I've simply stated a matter of fact. Like if someone says "A triangle has 3 sides and the sum of its internal angles are 180, and the shape which consists of 3 sides with a sum of internal angles adding up to 180 is a triangle"

You think there must be something more; you need there to be something more. Otherwise it's all just physics, and you think this would make it all pointless, meaningless. — Banno

I really don't appretiate when people turn a debate into psychoanalysis. Don't be presumptuous. At least for me I'm here because all the quiners have successfully convinced me of so far is that qualia are mostly useless to talk about. But you all still admit "experiences" which you admit are uncomparabe when pressured. You spend the whole thread arguing that "Inverted vision means nothing" but when actually questioned concede that "Inverted vision is untestable for, but I can imagine it, and it makes no difference to talk about". The first statement is not the latter. But then you immediately go back to saying "Inverted vision means nothing"

You start with:
"Inverted vision makes no sense"

And end with:

I ask you to pass me the red apple. It doesn't matter if you have the same experiences as I, or if they are isomorphic, or anything at all about them, provided that you pass me the red apple. — Banno

Which is clear recognition that there may be experiences, just that they're useless to talk about outside of a sci-fi show. Then go back to the starting point. It's tiring.

Nerve endings can distinguish between those different types of pain, plus the thalamus helps to distinguish based on experiences. — Isaac

But the patient didn't examine nerve endings. So how come he was able to distinguish?

I'd 'faked' the experience, you wouldn't know what on earth I was talking about? — Isaac

Again, this use doesn't imply "fake experiences" it implies fake sources of experiences. Experiences are the way things seem to you. Those can't be fake. If it seems to you one way then that is the experience you're having. For you to have a fake experience would mean something seems to you one way, but actually doesn't seem to you that way, instead, seems to you another way. That makes as much sense as "married bachelor"

There's just no evidence of this — Isaac

I am having experiences. That's evidence. Which you recognize here:

I am having a mental experience, as a matter of fact, and I am reaching for the word red to explain it.

Yep. Those two things are happening. — Isaac

So I AM having a mental experience now?

Seriously though which is it? Am I or am I not having experiences?

if it goes stimuli>experience>response — Isaac

If it goes stimuli>response>experience — Isaac

Point me to the point where I said either of those things. Otherwise please stop misrepresenting. I'll repeat it again. It goes stimuli>experience+response. What's weird here?

assuming not, then you have to at least take seriously the evidence from neuroscience which opposes this view. — Isaac

Present me the neurological evidence that says that our brain activities cannot coincide with an experience. What theory breaks if I propose that at the same time my brain is processing color, I am having an experience of red?

Without biological machinery there is no conscious experience of seeing red cups; however differently they may appear to each individual. — creativesoul

What I mean is that knowledge of the biological machinery doesn’t allow us to know how the cup appears to people. We can know the sufficient conditions for being able to act as though you perceive the red cup. That’s all neurology can tell us.

For statement 2 to be falsified, we need to have "something" perceivable that doesn't exist — TheMadFool

A hallucination.

To be physical -> To be perceivable [matter, energy and the laws of nature are perceivable] — TheMadFool

Again, I think this definition of perceivable is confusing. Being able to see the effects of something doesn't mean you saw the thing. If I hear knocking at my door I can postulate that there is a thief there. That does not make it the case that I perceived a thief there. I could also postulate that it's Amazon. Again, that does not make it the case that I saw an Amazon employee there.

In other words, Physicalism is a circular argument — TheMadFool

Not much of an argument then.

before proceeding to expound exactly how an understanding of X — Isaac

When did I do that? As in even claim that an understanding of X (qualia that is not my own) is possible. I only know what experiences I am having, I don't know what experiences you're having. What matters is the words you use.

And besides:

"X is not amenable to empirical evidence from the material world of the physical sciences" - before proceeding to expound exactly how an understanding of X should impact our behaviour in the aforementioned material world. — Isaac

There is a non sequitor there. Why is it the case the if X is not amenable to empirical evidence that that should not impact our behaviour?

From where are you getting this empirical data about 'common', 'colloquial' use of the expression 'to understand the meaning of a word'? — Isaac

Sigh.... Fine you win. A 3rd grader with a calculator understands integral calculus. And a blind person equipped with a spectrometer that says the associated color of the wavelength it receives knows what color is.

He would know this no less if he didn't consider 'experience' at all. He has no need of it. — Isaac

Fair. But how does the patient tell between blunt force pain and stabbing pain? He doesn't know what condition he has nor has he performed any physical tests (which is why he has gone to the doctor). And despite this the patient always has enough information to distinguish between the two different ailments (he doesn't know how to use the info, the doctor does). How come? Where did he get this info that is so crucial to the diagnoses?

were actually experiencing was a virtual reality set-up. You're saying that my use of the term 'actually experiencing" there would make no sense to you at all, you wouldn't know what I was talking about? — Isaac

No. In that context "actually" could indicate emphasis. Like saying "This actually tastes so good". As proven by the fact that if you had just said "You are experiencing a virtual reality set-up" I would have understood you just fine.

Or it can be indicating that the source of the experience is actually virtual reality not the real world. As proven by the fact that if you had just said "The source of your experience is actually VR not the real world" I would have understood you just fine.

Neither of these uses implies "fake experience". Which is what I say doesn't make sense.

Other people may not have the experiences you have. — Isaac

Correct. I assume others experience things (have qualia). It is not proven. And the more I talk to you the more it seems like it was a mistaken assumption :rofl:

You may not even have those experiences in the next five minutes. It might seem to you that the colour 'red' has an experience associated with it, it might not seem that way to others, it might not seem that way to you tomorrow. Others might feel that talk of 'experiences' at all doesn't make sense. You might feel that way tomorrow. — Isaac

Sure. But one thing is a matter of fact: "Right now it seems to me that the color red has an experience associated with it". Try as you will, that is a fact. I didn't claim that qualia are constant. Maybe I wake up tomorrow colorblind because of a stroke or something. Who knows.

This gives you no information whatsoever about mental 'experiences'. — Isaac

I am not basing my information of whether or not I have mental experiences on whether or not I reach for the word red. I am having a mental experience, as a matter of fact, and I am reaching for the word red to explain it. I don't know about you, but I assume you do too.

Because it is a trivial matter to prove that the way things seem to you (at time t0) will definitely not always be the way things seem to you (at time t1), even on the subject of exactly the same stimuli. — Isaac

I am only claiming that the way things seem to me at time t0 is the way things seem to me at time t0. I do not understand what is so difficult here. When did I even insinuate that our experiences don't change over time?

'Stimuli cause experiences which then cause responses' — Isaac

How about "stimuli cause experiences and also responses"? That's more what I think is happening.

There's no need to introduce an artificial "phenomenal layer" to account for that difference. — Andrew M

I keep hearing this argument by all the Quiners here. I want to instead ask, what's the problem with introducing that layer anyways, even if we don't need to (not that I'm convinced of that)? What are y'all afraid might happen? What confusion have you been trying to avoid?

That's all that counts. — TheMadFool

So when an artist imagines something and draws it that counts as "perception of effects" right? (since they couldn't draw it without imagining it). That would mean that by your definition their mental image is a physical thing.

Similarly according to your definition hallucinations would be physical things (since they can be perceived, by definition)

Also numbers now become physical things, since the effects of using them are observable.

Once you start including things like imagination among the set of things that are "physical things" the word physical becomes redundant. We're just talking about things in general now. The way you define it, there is no such thing as a non-physical thing in the first place. Which means you're not a physicalist, it's more accurate to call you a "thingist".

I don't think that when non-physicalists propose a non-physical concept they would do so despite the concept not having any effect. Since any concept with any effect will always be "physical" to you, it must follow that even these "non physical concepts" (numbers, imagination, etc) are physical. At this point you've blurred the line between physical and non-physical and are now just talking about things.

In fact, the two seem to be synonymous with each other for the perceivable are classified as physical. — TheMadFool

We don't "perceive" energy, or probability waves, or the gravitational curvature of space-time. We hypothesize them and perceive their effects. This is highlighted by the fact that there are different theories of mechanics and different quantum theories. There are Newtonian mechanics, Hamiltonian mechanics, Lagrangian mechanics, etc. These don't use the same concepts. Where is the space-time curvature in string theory? All of these theories explain the same phenomena by proposing differnt (unperceivable) concepts and variables.

But to say "physical laws don't exist" sounds like you're saying "physical things don't obey laws", i.e. "don't follow patterns in their behavior", which is of course not what is intended. — Pfhorrest

Well you know it's not what is intended meaning you probably know what IS intended. What is intended is that physical laws are not physical things.

But also, meaning is related to use, so any (intentionally) successful use has to have an element of understanding meaning, — Isaac

An element of understanding doens't translate to the colloquial use of "Do you understand X". Being able to use the word correctly in one sentence doesn't show understanding as it is commonly used. Just like knowing that the derivative of x with respect to x is 1, doesn't mean you understand calculus. Passing a test would.

I bet those patients who were accidentally merely paralysed complained a great deal afterwards. Again, you're applying arbitrary parameters to make the evidence match your model. Why place an arbitrary time restriction on complaints? They are clearly not behaviourally equivalent at all. — Isaac

Fair enough. But then again, a couple comments ago you said that if a colorblind person says "Hand me the red apple" that that does the same job as an ably sighted person saying it. Even though the colorblind person would clearly behave differently from an ably sighted person upon being handed a green apple.

How does he know this? — Isaac

From noticing that everyone complaining from a stabbing pain usually has this ailment but if they're complaining about blunt force pain then they usually have this other ailment.

"Actually, you're not experiencing red, you're... reaching for the word 'red' as a model to help you explain, predict and act on your actual experience which may or may not have included stimulation from some particular wavelength of light". — Isaac

The "actual" in "actual experience" is redundant. Experience is talk on a phenomenological level. Your experience is your experience (another way of saying "the way things seem like to you is the way things seem like to you"). Saying "actual experience" makes no sense as it implies a distinction between "fake experience" and "actual experience". Fake experience would translate to "The way things seem like they seem like to you but don't actually seem like that" which makes no sense. You cannot think you're experiencing something and actually not be experiencing that thing.

You cannot conclude we have 'red' quale from that. You might, other people might not. — Isaac

The fact that I cannot conclude what other people's experiences are like is why qualia are private.

On the one hand you want to establish a discursive reality to your experiences as they appear to you to be, then on the other you want to use this to make claims about our shared experience (there is such a thing as qualia, we experience redness, we have experiences etc). — Isaac

These claims that I am making are based on the (what I think is a reasonable) assumption that our experiences are similar in structure (unless either of us is disabled). This assumption stems from the fact that, on average, we all call the same things red. I cannot based on that conclude that your experience of red is my experience of red, nor did I, all I can conclude is that we both call them "red". In other words, that whatever experience we are having, we both tell the same story about it. What is the issue? How does this lead to the conclusion that we are not having experiences which we tell these story about (again, to have an experience is for it to seem like X or Y, it is not a neurological statement, but a phenomenological one)

If you want to divorce the actual mechanisms from your experience of them (the story you tell yourself about them), then that's fine, but all you have left is a story, you can't then treat it as some matter of fact that can be further investigated. For one it will change minute-to-minute. — Isaac

What do you mean here? The way things seem like to me, is, as a matter of fact, and always will be, the way things seem like to me. I don't see what's non-factual about this.

why are you setting arbitrary limits to what constitutes understanding a term? I've answered for me, but you've not given me your answer. — Isaac

I have repeatedly. You have yet to give an example where knowing a list of things and their colors, but never actually having seen the color results in the same behavior as people who’ve seen that color. I keep giving you examples where colorblind people may know that lakes are blue but will still repeatedly fail a test where they're shown drawings of purple lakes and red skies. I am saying that without having seen something red, you will never be able to use the word as appropriately as people who've seen red things.

Your reply was: Give them a spectrometer. But if "understanding" for you means that a kid with a calculator understands math despite not being able to solve any problems without the calculator, then I think the definition is ridiculous and misleading.

All that pains have in common is that we use the same word for them. — Banno

The point is that there is a "them". There is an experience behind the word. And when we have that experience (or range of experiences) we say "Ouch". So far your objection to the idea that there is something that pain is like is simply that the category is vague:

"How do you teach someone what pain is" assumes that there is some thing that is had in common by a scratch, a broken arm, a bowl perforation, a broken heart, a betrayal; and of course this is wrong. — Banno

but we can always narrow it down more. "Feels like a stabbing" is different from "Feels like blunt force trauma" for example and so on. And furthrmore we can say that there is something common to all those forms of pain: They are all unpleasant, and all bring some sympathy when someone is seen to experience them.

I still don't see how this will end up being:

do you think there is a phenomenal aspect to my detecting abilities?
— frank

Yeah, I've shown, at least to my own contentment, this question has no sense nor reference. — Banno

Do you agree? — creativesoul

Yes

Do you agree that all conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups? — creativesoul

We went over this. Yea sure.

What has convinced you to believe otherwise? — creativesoul

I don’t believe otherwise. What you said doesn’t contradict what I said.

We don’t know the connection the biological machinery has to the experience. For instance: we feel like we’re in a theatre, watching things (a Cartesian theatre), however we know the brain doesn’t have that structure (there is no “control room” where our senses come together). So it remains a mystery how the biological machinery produces this unified experience.

So what is the camera? — creativesoul

The eye. I am making Cartesian theatre metaphor. Your eye is the camera and it is projecting footage on the screen which you watch. This “footage” is Qualia. What I have just said is not a statement of neurological fact, but of phenomenological fact. I am perfectly aware there is no “control room” in the brain where all our sensations are gathered. However that does not change the fact that it feels that way. And it is a mystery why it feels that way, as far as I know.

Why invoke "qualia" here? What does it add that "footage" lacks? — creativesoul

Qualia IS the footage.

It has everything to do with the privacy aspect of conscious experience that we've been touching upon. — creativesoul

I don’t think it does. As in it doesn’t add anything new. We already agreed how “private” private is.

that we cannot know what they experience when doing so. We've agreed since, I think, that despite that, we can still - at the very least - know that they're seeing red cups, — creativesoul

An explanation of the underlying biological machinery doesn’t help here. Because we don’t know what connection the biological machinery has to the experience. We only know its connection to behavior.

That capacity includes the individual's own biological machinery as well as their skill with common language use. — creativesoul

Again, an explanation of the underlying neuroscience doesn’t help to explain the phenomenology. As in, me knowing your eyes cannot perceive red light does not allow me to imagine your experience. So nothing new about privacy is said by explaining how we see.

I am reading Isaac’s explanations and I find them interesting, just unrelated.


The more I talk to you the more I don’t understand what your gripe is with Qualia. It seems to be minor at best.

He's explaining how the 'camera' works 'inside all of our heads'(the biological machinery - 'private' - aspect of experience) — creativesoul

And I still don't see what that has to do with anything. And furthermore it seems to me like every two paragraphs he insists that there is no such thing as "experience". With infamous quotes like "You don't see red"

It's worth setting aside presuppositions, opening up your defenses, and allowing a bit of knowledge in. — creativesoul

He's explained to me how people see things like 3 times now. And every time I ask what that has to do with anything. How does an explanation of how the camera works imply that the footage on said camera (qualia, metaphorically) doesn't exist?

Parrots may make the sound, but correct word use requires a bit more. — creativesoul

Ask Isaac. I wouldn't be so sure. After all if a colorblind person says "I can't see color" then that apparently means the colorblind person understands color according to him.

Anyways parrots are pretty intelligent so I wouldn't put it past them to actually know what they're quacking about.

I think there is no point in speculating. Will get back to you after I'm dead if I can.

Why? — Isaac

I could ask the same of you. Why is your standard so low?

One prevents either nociception or working memory function (depending on type), the other prevent muscle function. — Isaac

Anesthesia prevents both (you don't move during surgery). And in that case we have behavioral equivalence (the complaints are removed). However if all there was to anesthesia and pain killers is complaint removal then it shouldn't matter which is used in surgery. But I'm positive you'd rather have anesthesia than be paralyzed during surgery, even though it's behaviorally equivalent (which apparently according to you means the pain doesn't exist)

We've just been through this. It is not "regardless" of their emprical knowledge. You've not demonstrated at all that surprise is not eliminated by empirical knowledge. All you've shown is that two states of empirical knowledge both show surprise, ie neither have acquired sufficient knowledge to eliminate surprise altogether. You haven't even shown that the neurologist is not less surprised. It's all nothing more than armchair speculation. — Isaac

So you are seriously suggesting that with enough knowledge the surprise would be eliminated. I think that's a much less reasonable expectation.

Does it also follow then that we can teach children colors by having them look at enough fMRI scans and reading enough neurology books?

If they referred to private experience then the doctor will have learned nothing whatsoever from your answer. — Isaac

Incorrect. The doctor knows that the private experience we each describe as "like knives" is indicative of a certain condition that is not the same as the descriptor "like blunt force". However we do in fact need to be having an experience to make this distinction.

Not as I intended it they're not. — Isaac

Fair enough.

Look at the inferential method she demonstrates. The same thing applies to 'red'. — Isaac

Give me a quote or something I don't know what you're referring to.

I'll dig out a paper specifically on perceptual features if you're having trouble making the cross-over — Isaac

Don't, I won't read it. One is enough for now since I already think it will be a waste of time from reading the first bit.

I'm saying they're not the way things actually are. — Isaac

Let me just dig into this a bit. So if I say "I am experiencing red", you would reply "Actually, you're not experiencing red, you're.....". What is the ......? Could you do that for "I am in pain" too? What exactly would you put in place of those dots?

You haven't answered my question on this. What exactly are you investigating if you're going to assume that the way things seem to you to be is the way they actually are? — Isaac

The way I see it is that there are two different domains here. One can talk about phenomenology or one can talk about neurology. When I say "I am in pain" I am talking phenomenologically, meaning, I am talking of the way things feel like. And usually doing so to get some sort of sympathy or help in this case.

Me saying "I am in pain" however is not to say "There is this hunk of brain that's active right now that is making me in pain". That would be false (there is no specific point in the brain where pain happens) and would be implying that the way things seem to me reflects the structure of my brain, a completely unwarranted assumption. So just because I feel distinct experiences doesn't mean that they are traceable to distinct patterns or chunks in my brain (fear and excitement for example are very similar from my limited reading on the subject)

However you seem to me to be doing something weird. You are saying that the neurology somehow implies phenomenology. That since there is no specific point in my brain governing "pain" there cannot be a distinct sensation of pain in my experience. I think that's an equally unwarranted assumption.

So your question makes no sense to me in the first place. On a pheonomenological level, the way things seem to me is the way they are, by definition. On a neurological level, I don't know much nor do I care to investigate further.

"Understand it fully". Now you've snuck in a 'fully' which wasn't there before. — Isaac

Yea but it's what I meant.

Colour-blind people understand the meaning of the word 'red'. Normally sighted people understand more. Artists (arguably) understand more still. Colour scientists understand even more. Why draw the line at some arbitrary point? — Isaac

Because you're gonna have to draw it somewhere. You draw it at being able to use it correctly literally once. I draw it at whether or not you've seen something red.

Not one of us has that level of understanding. To use the word well in 'every' situation. — Isaac

Sure but a colorblind person will use the word wrong consecutively if you just keep showing them pictures of things painted in colors that are usually not the color of those things. To say they understand color is like saying the person who gets 10% on a calculus exam understands calculus.

Not understanding the word as sufficiently as all other users of it has, thankfully, never been a criteria for understanding the meaning of a word. — Isaac

I would argue it is somewhat. You have to be at an average level at least. A parrot doesn't understand what a shark is because he learns to use it in one sentence such as "Sharks swim in the sea". And if your definition of "understanding" means that that parrot knows what a shark is I think it's ridiculous, even while recognizing that that parrot did in fact use the word correctly.

Give them a spectrometer and tell them that anything with a wavelength of approximately 625-740 nanometres is called 'red'. — Isaac

That's like saying you can teach a kid math by giving him a calculator. I obviously meant for them to be able to distinguish it alone.

They'd be indistinguishable from your someone who'd never seen anything red. — Isaac

In behavior yes, but you know they have never seen anything red. I would say then that they don't understand the word.

I don't know why you'd add something where there's no cause to. — Isaac

There is plenty of cause to.
The difference between anesthesia and paralysis
The surprise experienced by people when they first see something regardless of their empirical knowledge about it
The fact that doctors talk about qualia all the time (does it feel like stabbing or blunt force?)
etc

All of these seem to indicate that there is some experiential content that the words refer to or at least are associated with.

A neurologist does not know everything there is to know about red either. Just fractionally more. — Isaac

I never said "everything there is to know about red". I was not repeating mary's room. I said that understanding of neurology does not remove the surprise of actually seeing/hearing for the first time. Which suggests that something happens when seeing/hearing for the first time, although you keep denying there is.

I didn't say ineffable. I said 'not perfectly communicable'. — Isaac

Those are the same thing.

The paper I cited. — Isaac

Might get back to you on that.

EDIT: Read until the first table. Don't see anything contravertial here. So far the only thing Lisa has said is that our emotional categories are man made and do not need to exist in nature. And that we cannot locate certain emtions in the brain. Both are things I knew already and I don't see a problem with. If anything she admits that there exist such emotions as "fear" and "anger". That there is some experiential content behind those words. Which already seems to disagree with what you're saying. That emotional categories are man made or that we cannot find "fear" in the brain is no threat to the claim that there is experiential content behind the words.

Nothing. The sentence is nonsense. There's no such thing as 'the phenomenonological experience of 'red''. — Isaac

I could train a parrot to say 'red' every time a bell rings, doesn't mean it's having a phenomenological experience of 'red'. — Isaac

Here you said that training a parrot to say red repeatedly doesn't mean it has "the phenomenological experience of 'red'". In other words there is this thing, that is not nonsense, that the parrot doesn't have. What is that thing? It makes no sense to me to say somthing doesn't have X if X doesn't mean anything.

If you're just going to take everything you feel like is the case to actually be the case then there's no further work to do is there? — Isaac

That's not what's happening. Talk of phenomenology is talking of everything you feel like. It does not imply anything about the mechanisms causing it. Which is why I think your connection between neurology and phenomenology is fundamentally misguided.

The whole point of any investigation is premised entirely on the idea that what feels like it is the case might not actually be the case. If you're going to respond to any such suggestion with "but it doesn't feel like that's the case" — Isaac

But that's not what's happening. I say "it feels like X" you say "No it doesn't feel like X, nothing feels like anything". If you want to say "Sure it feels like X but that's not what's happening in your brain" no one would disagree. You are debating whether or not we have experiences in the first place.

Of course they know. "It's the colour of stop signs, blood, teacher's ink..." that's an answer a colour-blind person could give. — Isaac

That's like me saying topology is an area of math. Or citing some of its uses. It doesn't mean I know what topology is don't you agree? I know things about topology in general but I don't know what it is. Similarly, colorblind people know things about color but don't know what it is.

A colour-blind person could say "pass me the red apples" and the same job would get done as if a normally sighted person said it. — Isaac

Not really. If I passed him the green apples he wouldn't complain but a person who can see color would. There is a difference there. But fine let's say that the same job gets done. And I know that to you that means they understand the word. However, being able to use the word well in one situation does not show full understanding. Being able to use it well in every situation does don't you agree?

So for instance if someone drew a red lake and asked the colorblind person "What color is this?" and the colorblind person said "blue" that would be evidence that the colorblind person does not understand the word "color" sufficiently to accomplish the same job as an ably sighted person would doesn't it?

So how might we teach the colorblind person to be able to distinguish all the colors perfectly in each situation? And that includes seeing new things for the first time too? Answer: We can't. In other words we cannot teach someone to fully understand "red" if they've never seen red things.

"topology" have they misused the word because their studies are incomplete? — Isaac

No but as I said, their understanding is rudamentary and far from perfect. And I'm sure you'd agree that the only way for them to understand it perfectly is to be able to use it in every scenario. For topology this is easy, they just finish the course. For color not so much.

Now you're saying instead that a taste is "associating the concept with it". What is "it"? — Luke

:up:

Complaints — Banno

I'd like to direct you to this article: https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190313-what-happens-when-anaesthesia-fails

It's an article about when anaesthesia fails and instead of no longer being in pain, the person is simply paralyzed. Say I have a bottle of working anaesthesia and a bottle of paralyzing anaesthesia. According to you the only purpose of anaesthesia is eliminating complaints (as I understand). So for you it shouldn't matter which one I use right? But I am positive you wouldn't want to be treated by the latter. What is the difference?

Maybe painkillers and anaesthesia kill more than complaints. Maybe that's why they're not called complaint-killers.

So the colour-blind can't know that they're colour-blind? — Isaac

I don't see how that follows. Ask a colorblind person what "red" is and they'll probably think you're rude because you're pointing out that they don't know.

Ask a colour-blind person what it is that they don't see, they will answer "colours". — Isaac

That is not the same thing as knowing what colors are. If I never studied topology, and you asked me what I don't know about math, and I said "Topology", do I know what topology is? No, the exact opposite, I don't know what topology is, that's why it was the answer.

If not, then it seems they know what colours are sufficiently to use the word. — Isaac

Knowing that you don't see something doesn't mean you know the thing you're not seeing.... In fact it means the opposite.

All I know about topology and all color blind people know about color is that they don't know what it is but others claim to do so.

Disclaimer: I still don't have much time so my reply will probably seem rushed.

how would we ever learn what word to use if the only thing they referred to was private experiences? — Isaac

I'd ask how we learn to use the words without having the experiences? Why is it that when we want to teach a child what "red" is we point to red things? If someone has never seen something red before, but just has a list of words he memorized as "red objects" (for example blood) none of which he has seen does that person understands what "red" means? I would say no and I'm guessing you'd say yes.

All we have is someone who obviously doesn't know all there is to know about red and you're assuming the reaction would be the same in someone who does know all there is to know about red. That's just begging the question. — Isaac

Are you seriously suggesting that if the patient was a neurologist he wouldn't be surprised? I think it's pretty reasonable to assume that among those patients at least one knew how their own illness worked from a neurological perpsective and were still surprised.

I don't think I've ever denied that our full experience at any given time may not be perfectly communicable. — Isaac

Ok so we have this word "Experience" you assign the property "Ineffable" to. Let's see what other properties we can discover for this word "Experience" (which is of course radically different from Qualia).

Would you say that it is possible to compare these "experiences"?

There's no evidence at all that you feel it at the time, phenomenologically. — Isaac

I don't see where in your reply to Luke you showed this.

If one of those responses is to reach for the word 'redness' or talk about qualia, that's no reason to draw any ontological conclusion. I could train a parrot to say 'red' every time a bell rings, doesn't mean it's having a phenomenological experience of 'red'. — Isaac

I agree, but I want to know what, by your standard, would it take to say "Isaac is having the phenomenological experience of 'red'".

So when the evidence we do have from neuroscience suggests that there's no such event — Isaac

Thing is, I don't see how neuroscience can provide any sort of evidence about phenomenology. Sounds to me like asking "The mathematical evidence for why you should vote for Biden".

Disclaimer: I still don't have much time right now so sorry if my reply seems a bit rushed.

Are you going to argue that “red” and “bitter” and such are similar to “hello” in that they are simply words that do things, and they don’t need a referent? — khaled

What I would ask you to consider is that the deep grammar of "I have a pain in my hand" is not so much like "I have an apple in my hand" as it is like "Ouch!" That is, that it does not work by referring so much as by exclaiming. — Banno

I guessed right.

But the question remains: How do you teach someone what pain is without them ever being in pain? There is a difference between a child saying "Ouch!" to skip school and someone saying "Ouch!" because they ran into a wall.

Even if it were true that when someone says "I have a pain in my hand" they are effectively saying "Ouch" that cannot be said of other sentences. For example: "It feels like I'm being stabbed with a knife" is different from "It feels like someone whacked me with a baseball bat", they cannot just be reduced to the same "Ouch!" In these cases the person in question is asking you to imagine a certain experience. Doctors ask about these all the time in diagnoses, so there is another language game for Qualia.

Edit: The more I think about it the more it seems that these words without referents are used to make the other party imagine a certain experience or image. In which case, sure, pain may not have a referent, but there is a distinct experience of pain still. Saying “Ouch” just brings that to the mind of the listener.

intuition and introspection seem to be important yes. The other two not so much. Never heard of a scientist who didn't use their intuition to come up with theories, or a philosopher that didn't introspect.

All just seem like tools in a toolbox to me.

At the least, can you consider the possibility that there are parts of language, things we do with words, for which the meaning is not given by the referent, but is instead found in the role these utterances and scribbles play in our day to day lives? — Banno

Sure. Definitely those exist too. I realized I was mistaken when you pointed it out a long time ago. Some words just don’t have referents or definitions. But I still think words such as “red” or “pain” or “bitter” refer to experiences rather than being properties of the objects. Because as I said, “red” is not really a property of the apple. If you wore blue sunglasses the apple would appear blue (purple?), but since the apple didn’t change, only its color did, that leads me to believe that apples are not red, they just reflect high wavelength light. And since everyone here, quiners included, seems to agree you don’t really understand “red” without seeing something red, I believe the word must refer to the experience, not a property of the apple.

Are you going to argue that “red” and “bitter” and such are similar to “hello” in that they are simply words that do things, and they don’t need a referent?

At least this is my initial reaction, I'll probably edit a good bit of this in the future but I don't really have time right now.

I personally don't see a satisfactory definition of "physicalism" in terms of an ontological commitment. — SophistiCat

:up:

For me that's also the case with idealism.

Alternatives to physicalism generally suggest that there are mental or spiritual aspects of the universe itself.
Do you think probability waves count as evidence for *that*? — Mijin

You'd first have to tell me what a "mental aspect" is because everyone seems to be using it but I don't get what it is. If you mean something like consciousness, then there are some interpretations of quantum mechanics that emphasize consciousness as required for wave function collapse.

I don't want to see any handwaves of it being purely physical until we have a model with explanatory power of subjective states. — Mijin

Me neither, but it won't be handwavy. I suspect it will be some form of panpsychism given actual mathematical equations. Someone will propose a theory, which will include some form of awareness or proto-awareness as a fundamental part of the universe and explain in great mathematical detail how our consciousness arises from it and what role it plays similar to how string theory attempts to reconcile quantum mechanics with general relativity. Then show that somehow by some uncertainty principle or other we will never be able to compare other people's subjective experience with our own for instance. Basically, that theory will not change our predictions, but will account for consciousness so will be preferred.

The way I think of it is that whatever role consciousness plays right now (if any) has been lost in our physical theories, but eventually someone might come up with some mathematical model or other that has a well defined concept of "consciousness" that matches what we know about it (ineffable, private, etc)

My point is, whenever something was considered "beyond physics" physicists proposed some mathematical structure or other that accounts for what we know about it and proceeded to define that "beyond physics" thing as something physical. Look at dark matter for instance, matter that just seems to phase through other matter. Pretty sure if you asked a physicist a couple hundred years ago whether two masses can occupy the exact same space they would have said no but apparently now they can. Maybe if you ask a physicist whether or not our subjective experiences can be accounted for physically a couple hundred years from now they will say "yes" but at that point "physical" doesn't mean anything really.

It's late where I am so forgive me if I just wrote nonsense.

So the question it prompts, for me, is how can physicalism, as a philosophical principle, be credibly maintained in light of these conjectures? — Wayfarer

Well you can define physical things so as to include it. That's usually how physicalism continues. At first "physical things" were rocks and such, then they became the less intuitive waves, then the non-inuitive "Probability functions" and now "physical things" pass through each other apparently.

I never got the split between physicalism and idealism for this reason, it seems physicalists are playing dirty by changing what counts as "physical" every few decades, leaving no room for something to be "non-physical". Eventually we're going to say that consciousness is a "Physical thing". But at that point the word "Physical" becomes meaningless and redundant, as it should, and so will "Idealism". We'll just have "thingism"

I know that both experiences include red cups and people seeing red cups in whatever way they appear to them, each and every time. — creativesoul

Fantastic. Thanks for clarifying. That's exactly what I meant when I said "The experience of red cups includes what people call red cups" but I can see why that would have been confusing.

That's why it's not a problem for someone(like me) to make both claims you're asking about. — creativesoul

Isaac or Banno would say that both claims are identical. That's why I needed to differentiate. Isaac would go further to say that X and Y don't exist so both claims are non-sensical from what I gather.

So far of the "Qualia Quiners" I've talked to Banno did it on the basis that it is useless to talk about. Isaac insisted we don't have experiences, which seems crazy to me. You seem to just think the term is redundant at best - as there are other ways to encapsulate what it is supposed to be referring to - and confusing at worst and based on that say it doesn't exist. I don't really have a problem with that.

Conscious experience of red cups includes more than just red cups — creativesoul

Sure but I'm not sure what that has to do with anything.

Anyways I have to run now. I edited my last comment a bit hopefully that makes it clearer. Good talk.

and my seeing red cups always always always includes red cups. — creativesoul

Let me rephrase. Here you say "includes red cups". And also you say:

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?

I do not. — creativesoul

Therefore what I call "red" may not be what you call "red" correct?

Therefore when you say "experiences of red cups always include red cups" do you mean red as it seems from your POV? As in "experiences of red cups produce the exact same experience in me as they do in everyone"

I would be pleased if, to satisfy my curiosity, you would tell me whether you are an idealist or believe in an afterlife. — Janus

Not afterlife but I'm not sure about "idealist". I never got the split between idealism and materialism. They both just seemed to be using different words for what is practically the same thing, if not exactly the same thing.

It seems to me you are thinking that because I could hallucinate a red cup on the table when there was no red cup; and that I would be unable to tell the difference by visual appearance alone, that what I see when I hallucinate is exactly the same as what I see when I am actually seeing an object. — Janus

Yes.

But such hallucinations are rarely so stable, and also the rest of the environment would not usually be an hallucination, just the red cup. — Janus

Which is why it was a thought experiment assuming said hallucinations were stable.

Anyways I lost track of what this has to do with the overall argument so I suggest we leave talk of hallucinations on the backburner until it comes up again.