What - exactly - do each of us classify as a "red cup" if not red cups? — creativesoul

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?

I do not. — creativesoul

Here you emphasize that the experience (colour-wise) produced by the red cup can be different. So let me just call the experience of a red cup you have X. And let me call the experience of a red cup Janus has Y.

When you say

the experience of red cups always includes red cups — khaled

Can mean 2 things:

"X and Y are identical" which would be an unsubstatiated claim as you yourself said.
"X and Y are both produced by looking at red cups" which no one is disagreeing with.

Which is why I replied with "experiences of red cups always include what we call red cups" which removes the ambiguity, and only refers to case 2. I am basically saying that "When creativesoul has X, he says red cup, and when Janus has Y, he said red cup, but that does not mean that X=Y"

I'm puzzled as to why some seem to be so attached to a term, which is unclear, ambiguous and unnecessary, not to mention potentially confusing. — Janus

Because it has a certain meaning. When people argue "qualia doesn't exist" it makes it seem as though they are saying experience doesn't exist. As I said to creativesoul, Qualia is an umbrella term for experiences such as "pain", "bitter", "red", etc in the same way that mammals are an umbrella term including elephants. You do not need to talk about mammals to describe elephants however you can talk about mammals in general. So this is an unfair comparison:

'I experienced the taste of the apple' or 'I perceived the taste of the apple' (even there it would be better to simply say 'I tasted the apple') but how would you use 'qualia' in that sentence? — Janus

Is like asking "An elephant has 4 legs. How would you use "mammals" in that sentence?" See the problem?

Talking of Qualia in general you can say that they are private as:

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?

I do not. — creativesoul

for instance shows "privacy" is a property of these experiences or:

Sure, someone who has never seen a red cup before is going to be surprised by first doing so — creativesoul

Despite any amount of description of what "red" is like. Which shows ineffability (there is something new discovered when experiencing the thing that cannot be encapsulated in words).

etc...

Me too! I imagine there must be some emotional attachment to the term because it is thought to support some form of idealism. — Janus

It's more like being baffled at how hard people are trying to undermine a perfectly reasonable concept based on unsubstantiated claims that it is "confusing" when no one else is confused by it. I'd rather we stop psychoanalysing the other side though as it is usually a hidden ad hom that does nothing to further discussion.

Well considering I wrote it that won’t accomplish much. If you’re confused about something quote it, ask about it, do something specific.

Say what you mean. What’s confusing?

do you have a habit of reading the first line in a comment and not reading the rest? Go back and check yourself. You’ll find I said what I mean. You literally quoted the first letter of the line where I explain on accident.

come on now. You know what I meant. Identical as in you can’t tell the difference from a first person perspective.

Well the problem is that you’re quining Qualia while literally using it under a different name “experience”.

What you mean by “the experience of red cups always includes red cups” needs explanation. Do you mean “the experience of red cups for me is identical to others” in which case I think we both would disagree. Otherwise do you mean “the experience of red cups includes what each of us individually classifies as a red cup” which is literally what I said? Because it seems to be the latter from your replies.

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?

I do not. — creativesoul

I do not know what you’re experiencing when seeing a red cup — khaled

I meant it as you meant it here:

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?
— Luke

I do not. — creativesoul

Read the latest reply for detail.

Illusions and hallucinations of seeing red cups are not conscious experience of seeing red cups. — creativesoul

So what are they and how does one differentiate? If the experience is identical but in one there is a red cup in the other there is a drawing of a red cup how do we differentiate?

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?
— Luke

I do not. Nor need I. — creativesoul

In that case then, the experience of red cups does not necessarily include red cups, as “red” seems like to you, that’s what I meant. They include what each person calls red cups. If we were to take a “screen shot” (somehow) of everyone’s experience seeing a red cup and put the screen shots side by side, you might call some of those green cups or purple cups. It just means that what you call “green” the first person calls “red”, which is fine as long as everything that appears red to you (by your standard) appears green to him (by your standard).

You typically don’t need to talk about this until someone says “seeing grass produces the same experience as seeing blood”. In that case is the person lying or actually having that experience (synonym of Qualia)?

Which aspects of conscious experience of seeing red cups are we picking out and emphasizing - to the exclusion of all else - when we say "qualia"? — creativesoul

Qualia are an umbrella term to include these “how things seem to us”s. Like how “mammals” includes elephants. We don’t need talk of mammals to describe elephants. However we can talk of mammals in general. Same with Qualia. We can say for example that Qualia are private, since we can’t compare them, we can’t take a screen shot of what everyone is seeing. Yet.

Experience, at least insofar as we are aware of it, just is subjective, phenomenal, qualitative and felt — Janus

Then what you call “experience” we call “Qualia”

What would it mean to say that aspects of experience are illusory — Janus

That somehow you can think you’re experiencing something while actually you’re not experiencing anything. That’s what an “illusion” is, something that you think is there but isn’t.

Yes. Generally if something cannot be described fully without experiencing it then it refers to the experience. You can describe an apple in a fruit bowl using props or a black and white drawing however that won’t help someone understand what an apple tastes like or what its color or texture is. Shapes don’t refer to experiences.

Similarly, one could say that in vision, colors code for wavelengths. Tastes in the mouth code for certain chemicals in the food, etc. Qualia are symbolic in nature. — Olivier5

How come then that the word “red” preceded any understanding of light? And the word “bitter” preceded any atomic theory? I don’t see how these words could be coding for these properties as that implies that you need to know the properties to be able to use the words coding for them (just as you need to understand what altitude is to be able to read the map), but you don’t.

Bacteria swim towards chemical attractants. They need to move towards the higher concentration of an attractant, which means keeping track over time whether the concentration is higher where they are now than where they were some time ago. This is how it works: — Daemon

And there is no reason to assume that is not sufficient for consciousness. If you think there is then what is it?

Here you've broached a subject on which I am woefully ignorant. I find panpsychism to be deeply interesting, but I can't comment on it, since I haven't read the strongest arguments for it. — Alvin Capello

There just so happens to be a panpsychism thread pretty active right now. But what I would consider the best argument is that it is a simpler view. The "standard" view of consciousness goes like this:

1- I am conscious
2- That guy/gal over there is pretty similar to me so they are also probably conscious
3- That animal is somewhat similar to me so maybe it's conscious, but not necessarily in the same way
4- (and this is the problem) There is this arbitrary, hard to define point at which things just completely stop being consicous.

Panpsychism is simply not using that 4th unwarranted assumption. If we are willing to give that other people are consicous, that animals are conscious, etc etc, there is no need to assume a "stopping point". The standard view has so far failed to deal with this problem that is self-imposed and unnecessary of "what makes things conscious", so people are starting to just give up on the assumption that things stop being conscious.

Let's — Daemon

Again, can't speak for him. We just have to wait until he answers. I gave it a guess.

Olivier says that colours are symbols. How do colours point at certain parts of the experience? — Daemon

How do we teach children what "red" is? We point at red things correct? We do not teach them the electrochemical impulses that are happening in brains as red things are perceived.

Same with "pain", "bitter", "sweet", etc.... There are plenty of words where the only way you can understand them is by having the associated experience, and where explanations of electrochemical impulses that coincide with said experiences do not help the understanding at all. This leads me to conclude that the words are actually pointing at experiences, as the experiences are what mark whether or not you understand the word.

As for what "symbols" mean for Olivier, I can't speak for him. I gave it a guess.

It seems to me that there isn't anything left for symbols to do. — Daemon

The symbols are to point at certain parts of the experience.

light of a certain wavelength reaches the eye, initiating a series of electrochemical impulses which eventually result in the experience of seeing a colour. — Daemon

It is to be able to talk about that experience of seeing a colour. That is different from talking about the electrochemical impulses. If they were the same we would have to teach children neurology before being able to teach them what "red" means, but they clearly understand what "red" means without knowing the electrochemical impulses that are occuring in their brain as they see red things.

The process can be described exhaustively in terms of electromagnetic radiation, electrochemical impulses and the like. — Daemon

Incorrect. If this was correct then you would be able to explain to someone what "red" is without them ever seeing anything red. However we know that there are certain kinds of "curable" deafness/blidness and it is always the case that the patient is surprised when they hear sounds or see colors for the first time. Even if said patient had a PHD in neurology I suspect they would still be surprised.

without conscious experience — Daemon

What evidence do you have to support this claim? You already recognized that the electrochemical impulses in a human brain are sufficient conditions for consciousness. Why do you assume whatever the bacterium is doing is not also sufficient? That would be assuming that the complexity of the human brain is something necessary for consciousness, which I don't think we have enough (or any) evidence to claim.

Just something that's been bugging me since our discussion because I forgot to add it:

Notice that the explanation bit makes no use of qualia, only of pain. — Banno

Incorrect. Using the word "pain" when trying to describe to someone what "pain" is doesn't add anything to their understanding (because it's using the word to explain what it means). The explanation that I gave was:

“the experience that occurs when you stub your toe” — Banno

You insist that the word "pain" doesn't refer to an experience yet you seemed fine with that as an explanation, even though it clearly sets the referant of the word "pain" to an experience or other.

I still want to see how you explain to someone what "pain" is without referring to any experiences (because you insist that "pain", "red" and other such words are not referring to experiences)

That's not even remotely close to anything I've written here. It's closer to the exact opposite. — creativesoul

It's what I got from Banno. I assumed you were both arguing in the same style.

So let me get this straight:

There are no Qualia, but there are experiences

These experiences cannot be fully encapsulated in any description, as the actual experience needs to be had to understand the word associated with it. You don’t understand red until you’ve seen something red. Something new is found out upon seeing color for the first time that cannot be described.
(Ineffable and intrinsic)

There is no reason to believe that these experiences are the same for everyone as there is a difference between reports of conscious experience and conscious experience. All we ever have access to is the reports. And so we cannot compare the experiences, all we can do is compare the reports.
(Private)

And these “experiences” are radically different from Qualia?

The “Banno route” was to refuse to talk about the thing in the box under any condition as it is unnecessary (supposedly) which also seems to me to be what Dennett is doing. The “Isaac route” was to adamantly insist there is nothing in the box and that implying that there is anything in the box is somehow advocating for a certain neurological theory. What you’re doing just seems like Qualia under a different name for me, you're fine with talking about the thing in the box, but for some reason not fine with the word "Qualia" which is what I would define as "the thing in the box". I don’t see how talk of experiences fixes any of the problems that happen with talk of Qualia.

Cheers creativesoul.

Sure, someone who has never seen a red cup before is going to be surprised by first doing so — creativesoul

Why? I have a ready explanation: Because he’d never had that experience before. The experience being that thing in the box. And no amount of describing the color red would have had the same effect as seeing it (ineffable)

In your view, where there are only boxes and no need to talk of what’s in them, how can you explain why that person was surprised?

A better example: Assume for instance that there was a colorblind person so good at distinguishing shades of gray that no one knew he was colorblind.

You could put 100s of colored cups in front of him and he would be able to tell you the colors perfectly.

Why is he still surprised after undergoing surgery that allows him to see colors?

I do not see why not...

There are names and descriptions for and/or of unobservables. — creativesoul

Because there is something extra that they will always be missing with those explanations. Which is why when colorblind people see color for the first time they are surprised. Same with deaf people. You can’t describe the thing in the box. Just ask Amy about it.

I would agree, but when it comes to people who are supposed to be describing their own conscious experience of red cups, saying that that conscious experience is ineffable is considered a flaw, not a defining feature like it is with language less conscious experience of red cups. — creativesoul

People label certain experiences with certain words. And then use those words to tell which experience is occurring. But they mostly don’t attempt to describe the experiences (the thing in the box). They can estimate the thing in the box in terms of other things in other boxes (for example: coffee is bitter and sweet) but some cannot be explained in simpler terms. For example “pain” and “red”. There are no words that break down “pain” as an aggregate of multiple experiences

You try to say that all that exists is a box and that nothing more needs to be said about the thing in the box. But ignoring the things in the box results in problems. Such as not being able to explain why people are surprised when they see color for the first time. They knew the word “red” and knew which objects were “red” roughly. But they got something extra when they actually saw the color that surprised them. Your model fails to account for that. And so should be rejected.

You do not know what another's conscious experience of red cups is. — creativesoul

Right. I know they call it red. That’s it.

With such an admission comes the sudden realization that one has just conceded the argument, because you do know that another's conscious experience of red cups consists - in part at least -of red cups. — creativesoul

I don’t see how that’s the case. I know that their experience consists of what they call red cups. That’s good enough to communicate. But I don’t understand how that’s conceding the argument. Care to explain?

We know that all conscious experience of red cups includes red cups — creativesoul

I’ll only give that we know they call it red. That’s it. Seems to contradict what you literally just said above though. Unless by “we know you are seeing a red cup” you mean “we know that you are seeing what you call a red cup”. Which is fine in my book, but not necessary.

Ineffable" denotes that which is unable to be said; that which cannot be spoken. When pretheoretical conscious experience is ineffable, it is unable to be spoken and/or otherwise expressed by the creature having the conscious experience. This makes perfect sense. Some creatures cannot talk about past experience; all the language less ones — creativesoul

It also makes sense in the case of creatures who can talk about past experience. As long as those creatures cannot just express the experience to someone else such that they don’t need to have it. Again, you cannot explain what “red” is to someone who’s never seen a red object. So the experience is ineffable. You need to see a red object to understand what “red” is

Indeed; hence, "one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is". — Banno

But to say “I do not know what’s in your box” (private) also makes sense. One can divide through by the thing in the box. One can also not. It makes sense not to divide by the thing in the box sometimes. Because we can easily imagine what the world would be like if there were different things in the box. So to be unable to communicate what we’re imagining seems to be a waste to me. You still haven’t given me a good reason why we must divide by the thing in the box.

It only follows that we do sometimes know what others are experiencing — creativesoul

Not necessarily. Check my discussion with Banno about this. It is possible for us to be having a different experience and to still have no communication problems.

say the color of the cup, is private, ineffable, and intrinsic if the experience itself consists of, or is existentially dependent upon - in any way - external things like red cups. — creativesoul

Private: I do not know what you’re experiencing when seeing a red cup. As long as we both call it red that’s fine. Again:

The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something; for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (p.100)

Private would mean: I do not know what’s in your box. Doesn’t seem to contradict the quote above. Nor the dependence on red cups.

Ineffable: If it were effable you would be able to understand what “red” means without seeing anything red in your life as long as you’re given sufficient explanation. I don’t think either of us thinks that’s possible. There is some new knowledge added when you actually see a red thing for the first time (ask Amy). Again, doesn’t seem to contradict the dependence on red cups.

Intrinsic: The reason I cannot explain red to you without showing you something red is because there is nothing much to describe. You just have to see it. Again, doesn’t seem to contradict the dependence on red cups.

And I assume the “immediate apprehensibility” property is either clear or too boring to discuss so you didn’t mention it.

So which one of those properties is unconvincing? Which ones, in other words, are properties of “Qualia” but not properties of “Experience of red apples”? Because I would argue that the latter falls under the former.

It’s really weird to me that y’all are fine with “experience” but not fine with “Qualia”

So first off everyone here (except Isaac) has said that people experience things. Moreover everyone here has said that you cannot understand words such as “red” or “pain” without seeing a red object or being in pain. This indicates to me that this “experience” is ineffable (or else we would be able to just tell someone what red is without having to show them something red).

The fact that someone only needs to experience pain once to understand what pain means also indicates that these “experiences” are intrinsic.

Furthermore, at least Banno (and I suspect all of you share this opinion) said that the contents of our experience themselves are unimportant. However no one has been able to expressly deny the claim that they are private. Instead everyone has said that if they were private, that would be useless to talk about as there is no way of accessing them, so we should instead focus on the words we use to describe the experience rather than the “how things seem to us” itself. Something like this:

The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something; for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (p.100)

But then again, no one is talking about the thing in the box (Qualia), no one is trying to “eff” Qualia. What everyone here advocating for Qualia is trying to do is say that there is something in the box, labeled “Qualia”

I don’t know about immediate apprehension, haven’t seen anyone talking about it recently because it’s probably the most boring property

Personally I would rather obliterate any and all philosophical notions that lead to widespread confusion and false belie — creativesoul

Given that everyone here quining Qualia talks about experiences (except Isaac), what exactly is so problematic about Qualia that is not problematic about experiences?

To perceive things is not at all the same as to imagine things. They are different kinds of activities. — Andrew M

I didn’t say they were. But what is imagination without a phenomenological layer, still? Because without a phenomenological layer I don’t see how you can describe what imagination is like.

From Lexico, experience is "practical contact with and observation of facts or events." Note that there is nothing there about intermediary layers, phenomenalism, or minds. — Andrew M

But they’re not incompatible. This “observation” is taking place in an intermediary layer.

People's experiences sometimes differ in certain situations (reflecting differences either in the environment or in their physical characteristics). And that's a valid question to investigate. But in many situations we can predict what other people's experience will be like. I assume you and other readers would agree that the dress color looks blue and black in the image I posted. We learn which situations are like that and which aren't. — Andrew M

Cool but I’m not sure how that relates to what I said.

Fair enough.

I see no point in going over it again. Cutting it short, "red" refers to red things, not red experiences or qualia or anything else. The referent of "red" is the extension of "red". — Banno

The point is that I still don’t think it makes any sense. And I don’t see where they addressed the point. I’ll go scouring later but a link or a few quotes would be appreciated

Ok sure but you still haven’t explained some of the things you said.

Like how even if the light entering your eye has the wavelength which is typically associated with blue, if a device overwrites your speech and changes “blue” to “red” that that somehow means you’re seeing a red apple. And you haven’t answered whether or not removing the speech altering device, and instead lying about the results by choice means you’re seeing a red or blue apple. How about if the glasses were not even glasses but were just blocks of wood blocking my vision and I just said “I’m seeing a red apple” randomly and happened to be correct, am I still seeing a red apple?

Because your answer implies that “red” does not refer to any sort of middle man or experience produced by the wavelength entering your eye. In which case, again, what does it refer to?

Adding "qualia" into the explanation achieves nothing. — Banno

The point is adding that middle man there. Call it whatever you want. So in the color altering the device + speech altering device example, the person in question is seeing a blue apple despite claiming that they are seeing a red apple.

Without the middle man the explanation would make no sense. “The experience that arises when....” is a satisfactory explanation only if an experience actually arises. We refer to these experiences in general as “Qualia”. But you can just call them experiences if you want.

For instance my explanation would be unsatisfactory to Isaac, because he doesn’t believe (or I suspect just refuses to admit the reality of) that middle man. He would claim “Again, you don’t experience pain, there is no point in your brain that experiences pain....”. By adding the middle man inverted vision makes sense, even if it is untestable. I’m curious how Isaac would explain what “pain” means to a child without referring to any experiences.

Did you read The Mark of Zombie? — Banno

Yes. But that article relies on the assumption that you can make identical humans that are not conscious. Which is something I never claimed. And indeed sounds ridiculous.

Answer your own question; what is added to the understanding of pain by introducing qualia? — Banno

The middle man. The X and Y. That’s what Qualia is. And introducing it is what allows people to first understand words such as “red” “bitter” and “pain”. If you want to explain what pain is to someone you say something like “the experience that occurs when you stub your toe”. That satisfies as an explanation because there is a specific experience X that occurs every time you stub your toe. Without Qualia, without there being some middle man (an experience) that occurs each time you stub your toe, you would never be able to explain to children what “red” or “pain” or “bitter” means. The word would simply have no referent. What is added by Qualia is an actual referent.

Your turn. Without having this middle man, how do you explain to someone what “pain” is if they don’t understand what the word means. In such a way so as to make a distinction between actually being in pain and only pretending to be in pain that does not rely on a scientific explanation.

Also, again, please answer this:

Again, think back to the speech altering device + light altering glasses example, now imagine we removed the speech altering device and now I’m just straight up lying and saying the inverse color each time. Am I still seeing a red apple? — khaled

Well, in the one case, the person is in pain; whereas, and in contradistinction, in the other, they are not. — Banno

Correct. Now what’s the difference? Assume I do not understand what the word “pain” means. What does it mean to be in pain vs to not be in pain in the absence of a scientific method of telling the difference? You insist that there is a difference so what is it?

You keep saying “no mention of qualia” but as my first reply to you said: “red” “pain” “bitter” are all referring to Qualia.

Also please answer this:

Again, think back to the speech altering device + light altering glasses example, now imagine we removed the speech altering device and now I’m just straight up lying and saying the inverse color each time. Am I still seeing a red apple? — khaled

Sure, there is a difference between being in pain and pretending to be in pain. No one has denied that. — Banno

And what is the difference exactly? In both cases the outward action is identical. Given that there is no way to tell whether or not someone is in pain or only pretending to be in pain, what exactly is this difference?

The way I see it is: Things produce experiences which we use words to describe. So if I trip and smash my face into the concrete that would produce experience X. If I stub my toe that would be experience Y. We categorize both Y and X as “pain”. We could come up with more detailed words, such as how German has dozens of words that can only be translated to “Angry” in English, but there seems to be no practical need to describe our experiences in more detail in this case. Trying to remove the middle step (the experience of Y or X) makes it so that there should be no difference between someone pretending to be in pain and someone in pain (assuming we cannot test for pain).

However the problem is this is a self imposed limit that doesn’t need to be there. I can be in pain. I can also pretend to be in pain. There is a very distinct difference in my experience in both cases. Even if this difference was not testable for in a lab, I see no reason we shouldn’t be able to express it since we can clearly imagine the difference.

Again, think back to the speech altering device + light altering glasses example, now imagine we removed the speech altering device and now I’m just straight up lying and saying the inverse color each time. Am I still seeing a red apple? I can see a red apple and then describe it as “red”. I can see a blue apple then lie about it and describe it as “red”. There is a very clear difference in my experience there even if my outward behavior is the same. I see no reason why we shouldn’t be able to express this difference.

Additionally, how do you talk about imagination without talking about Qualia? If there was no X and Y, no “middle man” then what exactly is imagination?

It seems the dress retailers are not familiar with the Cartesian "facts". — Andrew M

When we ask “is this dress blue and black or gold and white” we ask what experience you are having. It is a fact that some people saw a white and gold dress, even though the dress was blue and black. It is furthermore a fact that you cannot tell if someone is actually seeing gold and white or only lying about it. That’s what it means that you can’t “read minds”.

That would be true if there were an intermediary (phenomenal) layer between the person and the world that they are perceiving. That intermediary layer is what I'm rejecting.

Now a color-blind person's experience... — Andrew M

I don’t understand how there can be no intermediary layer, but there can be an experience. Isn’t the experience the intermediary layer? Or else what does “experience” mean.

Also what is imagination without the intermediary phenomenological layer?

I’m just about to go to bed right now so a few questions about what you’re saying:

or language users who've yet to have the mastery required to talk about conscious experience as a subject matter in it's own right. — creativesoul

What does this mean “talk about experience as a subject matter in its own right”? Does it mean understanding words such as “red” or “bitter” etc? And you are claiming that without this understanding we cannot attribute conscious experience to people?

And I have no idea what you’re asking for. What is a “pretheoretical condition”? Could you give an example of some concept or other and what its “pre-theoretical condition” is? So I have a clue what you’re talking about

people claim they have been wronged, political systems intend to punish behavior, and people claim that these political systems are amoral — The New Publius

Does not lead to:

a Moral Law must exist — The New Publius

And I don't see how it has much to do with it.

What is a fait accompli here is that people feel that they have been wronged and have some sense of justice. That's it.

Or you can ask Amy who is not a thought experiment.

which means that if they can't, they won't know what it's like — Marchesk

Smells like a private ineffable experience which cannot be known by knowing the brain processes occuring as one experiences it to me.

Well, no, as your example showed -
the imposter is discovered by examining the structure of their eye. Which has nothing to do with qualia. — Banno

Please quote the full sentence. I said that’s the worst case scenario. As in even if we couldn't test for coloblindness we would still be able to imagine both alternatives. And being unable to express what we imagine seems like a waste. Inverted colors are one of those things we can imagine but cannot test for. Qualia would also be useful for expressing colorblindness before we came up with ways to test for it. It's a pretty old concept.

Given that we are in the 1200s and we do not know how to test for colorblindness. And given that the person I'm talking to is not lying. If he says "The sky is the same color as the grass", is he making statements about grass and skies or is he making statements about his experience of them. Based on that I can surmise that the person I'm talking to is experiencing different qualia from me (aka is colorblind).

But I think that the word still has a use. Outside of sci-fi shows, endless debate and expressing what we’re imagining (which in my book are good enough reasons to keep it around). I believe that a complete neuroscience will only ever show sufficient conditions for consciousness. It would still make sense then to ask whether other things are conscious. Are spiders conscious? Are computers conscious? Etc. These are questions asking whether or not something has experiences, aka whether or not it experiences Qualia. We cannot answer these by looking at human brains, as all that would provide is sufficient conditions for consciousness. How will we know whether or not an AI is experiences pain by studying human brains?


Also barring any mention of qualia, why do you think colorblind people are surprised when seeing color for the first time?

but there is no way to distinguish someone who stubbornly refuses to use the right words for the right colours from someone who is actually colorblind. — Banno

And yet there is a difference. That’s the key. We can imagine both possibilities (we can imagine stubbornly refusing to use the right words while seeing the right colors and we can imagine seeing everything in black and white ourselves). Even if we can never test which is the case I think there should still be language that allows us to describe what we’re imagining. Feels like a waste for me to not be able to.

What I’m getting from this is that the worst case scenario: Qualia is untestable or useless outside discussion of sci-fi shows and endless debates on philosophy forums. You think that’s grounds for saying they don’t exist, I don’t think so. If we can conceive of a P-Zombie we should have a word that can express that difference. If we can conceive of the difference between a stubborn confusing person and a colorblind person I don’t see why we shouldn’t be able to express the difference even if it is untestable.

Well when asking a colorblind person “What color is the traffic light?” and they reply “The same color as the sky” or something are they making a statement about the sky and traffic lights or are they making a statement about their experiences of them? Because if it’s the latter then that would be talk of Qualia no?

The way I see it: Without Qualia there would be no way to distinguish from someone who stubbornly refuses to use the right words for the right colors and someone who is actually colorblind.

Anyways I’ll have to pick this up later. Thanks for the discussion so far.