It doesn't matter if you have the same experiences as I, or if they are isomorphic, or anything at all about them, provided that you pass me the red apple — Banno

Which is to say that provided I don’t pass you the red apple those things matter. Why did I not provide the red apple? Is the disagreement at the level of the Ys and Xs (I am colorblind) or is it at the level of the words used (I assigned the wrong word to X). Both are conceivable as the cause of the issue. But provided everything is running smoothly we don’t need to talk about Qualia. When you call a red apple green, we might have to talk about Qualia, or your understanding of English.

I surprisingly don’t disagree with anything you’re saying. So I don’t see what your problem with qualia is. Qualia is just the X and Y in the previous example. Those definitely do exist no? And a P-Zombie is something that doesn’t have those Xs and Ys (which is not to say that they’re possible, only that they’re conceivable). The hard problem is why there are Xs and Ys in the first place (though I suspect that this is a question akin to “Why is there gravitational force?” Because there just is.)

We don't need to posit a shared experiences, or even hypothesis shared experiences, if instead we look at what we are doing with the words - the role they play in our language games. — Banno

I don’t think anyone here is positing shared experiences, just experiences. Every “Qualia advocate” has says “inverse vision” at least once here which means we don’t think that we need to have the same experiences to be able to communicate. I went out of my way to show that you don’t need shared experiences, just shared words. As long as red apples produce X for me and Y for you and we both respectively call the experience we’re having “red” there are no issues.

The solution I see, outlined above, is to treat physical explanations and intentional discussions as distinct language games, neither reducible to the other, but neither implying any ontological concerns for the other. — Banno

Thank you! And I’d say Qualia play a key role in language games about phenomenology and intentionality. And that that doesn’t imply anything about the brain.

but now you say we should use 'isomorphic'. — Banno

Isomorphic is just “homomorphic both ways”. Anyways I don’t plan to use technical terms anymore since they seem to just confuse.

It would be a great help if you articulated your argument. — Banno

I thought I did last comment.
I’ll just summarize:

We have the age old Mary’s room thought experiment which is no longer really a thought experiment. We can “cure” some forms of color blindness or deafness and you always see the participant being shocked at the experience. I’m pretty sure you’d still get the same reaction even if the participant had a PhD in neurology. Point is that there is some information that is present in the experience itself that is not present in a neurological description of the brain as it is occurring. Which is also to imply that they’re not the same thing (as clearly there is some information present in one not present in the other). Otherwise why are people surprised when the see color for the first time?

Another reason to believe this is simply that we don’t have to teach children neurology before teaching them colors. That is what leads me to conclude that “red” refers to a certain experience. It cannot refer to any property of the red object as children likely don’t understand that property, yet they understand red. They don’t know what wavelengths are for example so it can’t be that.

And so that’s where my argument on how we can still have no trouble communicating comes in

It doesn’t matter what I am referring to when I say red and when you say red as long as the relationship is the same. I’ll call my experience that red refers to X and I’ll call yours Y. As I was saying, X could equal Y. But even if they’re not, we will have no issues of communication if:

Everything that produces X for me produces Y for you. That’s roughly what an isomorphism is. That’s what I mean by “the relationship is the same”

If that is the case and I see blood for example, that would produce the experience X, and I would promptly call it “red”. If when you see blood you get the experience Y you will ALSO promptly call it “red”. Therefore there is no issue of communication see? — khaled

This X and this Y are qualia. They do not have to be equal for us to be able to communicate. And here is the interesting bit: It is possible for “blue” for me to be pointing to Y, and for “red” for you to be pointing to X. I mean this in the sense that the “values” are equal, not that I am accessing your experience somehow. So it’s sort of like (forgive the terrible illustration I’m on my phone)

My experience to word table

X -> “Red”
Y -> “Blue”
....

Your experience to word table:

X -> “Blue”
Y -> “Red”
.....

That would be “inverted vision”. If I were to have the exact experience you’re having I’d call the apple blue.


I also gave the example of the speech changing device + color inverting device to Isaac where you said you agreed with him. But that still seems absurd to me. If you were wearing color inverting glasses you’d call the apple blue. That would mean you are a seeing a blue apple yes? But then how does the addition of a speech altering device change that? If you were seeing (what you would normally describe as) a blue apple, and you were forced to listen to yourself lie about what you’re seeing, you’re not really seeing a red apple now are you? You’re seeing blue and reporting red. I’m speaking on a phenomenological level here, I’m not making up neurology as Isaac insists I am.

In other words, the color inverting glasses change Y to X and also change the word that you utter when describing the apple. However that doesn’t mean that you’re actually having the experience related to the word being uttered (you’re not actually having Y. You’re having X and saying “Red”)

The robot doesn't. — frank

Well we wouldn’t know about that. Which is what makes the problem hard. We can’t detect the property we’re testing for. At least not yet.

Now Marchesk offered this as a reply to my 'the meaning of "red" cannot be the experience it points to'. — Banno

You argued this is the case because otherwise we’d have communication issues. I showed why that doesn’t have to be the case. But I want to ask if red is not the experience it points to then what is it? I don’t think it can be the neurological process happening as you see red. Otherwise understanding that neurological process should be required to understand what red is but that is clearly not required.

There must be some information about red that is not contained in the neurological process that occurs when you look at red things. And I’d argue that understanding the process is not required at all to understand what “red” is.

Kindly ignore every mention of "homomorphism" and replace it with "isomorphism". I often confuse the two, but I actually mean the latter. JIC you look it up and don't understand what I'm saying.

The taste doesn't exist as an experience for someone. The taste is a public concept. — Isaac

The experience is a unique set of memories, emotions, desires, sematic associations etc resulting from the taste. — Isaac

So if someone doesn’t understand the public concept they do not have an experience? What about children then, do they have experiences?

And could you elaborate on what the “public meaning” of red exactly is? Because I would argue that the public meaning is a reference to an experience.

Anyways I just went to the "What is it like to experience X" thread and the first thing thing I find is this:

If I have experience X and I want to get another person to understand what it was for me to go through experience X, I have only two imperfect methods. Put them through experience Y which I think is similar enough to experience X to invoke the same feelings, or describe experience X in terms of experiences A, B and C which they've already had and recall. Neither are really any better than the other, they each have their merits in different situations, neither actually communicate what experience X was, for me. — Isaac

Do you still hold this position? Because it seems exactly like something I would say. Here you recognise that there is an experience X that cannot be communicated 100% accurately. Smells like Qualia to me. And you are not making up neuroscience, you're speaking on a phenomenological level.

It's not at issue. We don't just make up neuroscience to have a discussion about it. There is no part of your brain which shows you a colour, it cannot happen, brains are made up of neurons, not colours. — Isaac

I wasn't making up neuroscience, I was reporting phenomonological evidence for qualia. We certainly feel like we have some experience of "redness" when looking at a red screen (or else we would have never come up with the word "qualia"). I am not then saying "Thus this chunk of my brain has 'red' in it". You can talk about mental life without implying anything about the brain.

Also I don't see how model dependent realism would do away with qualia anyways. We can create a model that incorporates it. See the example I gave to Banno.

my entire comment could have been summed up as “We will have no issues of communication if our table of “experiences to words” was an isomorphism” that’s the relevance. But I explained without using the word so no worries

could you link it so I don’t have to rummage through 44 pages?

If the meaning of "red" is the experience it points to, then what you call red and what I call red are different - because your experiences are not mine. — Banno

That I own a car and you own a car does not eliminate the possibility that we own identical cars. But if you want to say that one car being “yours” and the other being “mine” makes them different cars then yes, we cannot be referring to the same thing when saying red

But overwhelmingly, we do get by talking about red things. — Banno

That we are referring to different things does not imply that we won’t get by talking about red things. It would seriously help if you knew what an isomorphism is.

It doesn’t matter what I am referring to when I say red and when you say red as long as the relationship is the same. I’ll call my experience that red refers to X and I’ll call yours Y. As I was saying, X could equal Y. But even if they’re not, we will have no issues of communication if:

Everything that produces X for me produces Y for you. That’s roughly what an isomorphism is. That’s what I mean by “the relationship is the same”

If that is the case and I see blood for example, that would produce the experience X, and I would promptly call it “red”. If when you see blood you get the experience Y you will ALSO promptly call it “red”. Therefore there is no issue of communication see?

However if grass produces Y for you you’re likely colorblind. And it is no longer an isomorphism

anyways

That's what 'a red apple' means. adding 'what we call...' to it implies that there might actually be a red apple other than what we call one.
— Isaac

Care to argue for why there is not such a thing? — khaled

That's rather the point at issue. — Banno

Anyways the main contention seems to really be this:

That's what 'a red apple' means. adding 'what we call...' to it implies that there might actually be a red apple other than what we call one. — Isaac

Care to argue for why there is not such a thing?

That's what 'a red apple' means. adding 'what we call...' to it implies that there might actually be a red apple other than what we call one. — Isaac

Not necessarily. If there wasn’t such a notion then both “red apple” and “what we call red apple” is identical

Colour doesn't go into your eye. Photons go into your eye. Colour is a public concept. — Isaac

I knew you were gonna nitpick but I just couldn’t edit it fast enough

Yes — Isaac

I don’t think many would answer that but if that’s your answer then I see why you’d say qualia don’t exist. Seems nonsensical to me to say that if I’m literally forced to lie about the color I’m seeing that I’m actually seeing the color that is the lie. If the speech transforming device was removed I’d call the apple “blue”

then what you call "red" is different to what I call"red"... — Banno

Not necessarily but it could be different. To say that they are different would mean you compared them and found that they are.

I'm not sure. I'm aware that it is a term used in maths — Banno

It’s something in set theory. It’s not about numbers. So using it here is fine since we’re not talking about numbers. I’d recommend you watch even a short 10 min video on it or something it’s not a difficult concept.

Are you familiar with Wittgenstein's, or Austin's, or any, of the large numebr of arguents form the middle of last century that laid to rest the notion that the meaning of a word is the thing to which it points? — Banno

I would be most familiar with Wittgenstein but even then not very.

Also I’m curious about how you respond to my example to Isaac so I’d appreciate it if you took a look. The question is: Am I still seeing red with both of those devices on?

Yes. A red apple. — Isaac

More accurately “what we all call a red apple”. Public meaning and all that.

If you ask people to pass you the red apple, do you generally find they pass you the one you were expecting? — Isaac

Correct. That is no evidence to indicate they have the same experience when holding the red apple as I do when I hold it.

How? We're you taught to use the word 'blue' incorrectly? — Isaac

No. I would be using it correctly even in that case. Again, if your red is my blue, we would have no issues of communication. We would both call the apple red despite having different perceptions of it.

Here is a simple example: Say I was wearing glasses that inverted all the color going into my eye. And at the same time, I had a device attached to my mouth that would change any utterance of color I make to an utterance of the inverse color. So if I was about to say “red” it would immediately and seamlessly translate that to “blue”

Now assume we both looked at a red apple and couldn’t see each other (so you don’t know I have those devices on). We are asked to describe the color of said apple. We both say “red”

There you go, an example of having different perceptions of the object but still being able to communicate.

Yes. We're experiencing the apple. As I said, our response to the colour of the apple will be different, but this is what our experience actually consists of, it's not the subject matter of our experience (that's the apple) it is the constitution of it. — Isaac

So in this previous example am I still seeing a red apple with those devices on? Even though the light coming into my eye is inverted? That’s really the point at issue here


If red was truly only public meaning and did not have anything to do with the experience itself then yes, I would be seeing red despite the fact that the color going into my eye is blue (not very technical but you know what I mean). Doesn’t seem plausible to me.

The intent is that the apple corresponds to the public meaning of 'red' — Isaac

Correct. That is exactly what I said.

When I tell you “the apple is red” I am saying “the apple produces the experience we all dubbed red”. — khaled

Does the apple produce some sort of experience (sight, taste, etc). Yes. So when you describe an apple as red you are saying that it produces the experience we all chose to call red right? That is the public meaning.

Does this imply that we are experiencing the same thing when looking at the apple?

there's no phenomenological evidence for it — Isaac

How so? I definitely see something when looking at a red apple. And I do not know if you see the same thing. Maybe what you’re seeing I would describe as “blue”.

This is why I went to all the effort of explaining the neurological process. — Isaac

And then conceded that the intent behind the expression is as I described. I’m not proposing a neurological theory here, I’m saying what the intent behind the expression “the apple is red” is.

It's the colour we call red, the colour of stop lights, the colour that the grocer reaches for when I ask for red apples. — Isaac

Agreed. But individually that color may be different. If your red was my blue, and stop lights and apples were both my blue from your point of view, there would be no issue of communication.

But qualia is there.

but like the little man who wasn't there and the Jabberwock. — Banno

I don’t know what those are so I don’t get what you’re saying.

qualia exist in a way not like smells and tastes — Banno

Smells and tastes are words that point to certain qualia. “Red” points to a certain experience. When I tell you “the apple is red” I am saying “the apple produces the experience we all dubbed red”. This experience itself is very real, yet incomparable. I don’t know whether or not you’re experiencing the same thing when looking at the apple. But I do know, assuming you’re not colorblind, that whatever experience you do have when looking at a red apple is the same as when looking at blood or certain parts of the US flag.

I really have to ask though, do you know what a homomorphism is?

and so far as conscious experiences are private, they cannot be a part of our conversation. — Banno

The problem comes when you say "and thus qualia do not exist". If you had said "And thus it is useless to talk about qualia" then I think this thread would have been dead by now. Notice how no advocate of qualia has made the attempt to seriously argue that anyone here has "inverted vision". Because they can't.

I honestly do not understand the objection. — frank

I think the whole thing with Banno is that to him "Qualia do not exist" and "It is futile to talk of or attempt to prove cases when we have different Qualia (when the same stimulus produces different conscious experiences)" are identical statements. The wittgenstein is strong in this one.

Read intuition pump #4, #5 and #6 — Banno

Which is why I said "sci-fi". You were fine with startrek having changelings. But I don't care to continue this because you said that there are language games about qualia (even if useless-which no one was arguing they weren't)

Otherwise how would we select the words which might constitute such a conversation if there were no public meanings to which they might refer? — Isaac

Here’s how I see it:

There is a public meaning for each, but that is not the experience itself. When people say “The apple is red” they do not really care about what color gets imagined in your head. They care about the relative position of that color in your map of experiences to words.

For instance, if we’re seeing inverted colors from each other and I say “the apple is red” then I don’t really care what you’re seeing, all I care about is to indicate a property of said apple relative to other properties. For instance: saying the apple is red is to say that it produces the same experience as blood when it comes to color. Also that it produces the same experience as parts of the US flag, etc. Basically, when I say the apple is red I am pointing to the corresponding element in a homomorphism.

However a problem arises when I say the apple is red, and then you think that that means the apple produces the same experience as grass. Then our experiences are no longer homomorphisms. What I would use “red” to describe is no longer what you use “red” to describe. Then communication problems arise. And we call people whose map of experiences to words strays too far from the majority “colorblind” in this case. But some straying is likely and not a big issue. For example here:

That apple tastes sweet to me, bitter to you. — Banno

However, whatever I actually experience as I’m seeing a red apple is qualia, and that is useless to talk about outside of a sci-fi setting.

There is no sense in which the notion that "the quali could be different" could be meaningful — Banno

Maybe if you’re making a sci-fi movie about switching bodies and the struggles that come with getting used to a new homomorphism of experiences. Seems like a situation where talk of qualia makes a difference. So “your blue is my red” would make perfect sense in that setting.

Let's say neuroscience has provided a complete and universally accepted description of human consciousness. — Kenosha Kid

Which is exactly what I think won’t happen but I’ll suspend disbelief for now.

So this proactive capacity is what I would include as an essential feature of consciousness. — Kenosha Kid

Interesting but I wouldn’t go so far. I’d put it in the same box as sight.

something else that is undiscoverable from the outside — Kenosha Kid

I’m more interested though in whether you understand what this undiscoverable thing from the outside that I’m referring to is. Note though: I haven’t said anything about consciousness that makes it undiscoverable from the outside by definition, though it is true that I have no clue how you would discover it from the outside.

Did the dream analogy work at all at clarifying what I mean?

Ultimately, you have to make a choice about what your language means: does your definition of consciousness admit non-living things or not? — Kenosha Kid

Well mine doesn’t require something to be living or inanimate.

If all is replaced, then how can there be anything that remains? — Harry Hindu

I am implying that there is something that is not replaced no matter how much of your body gets replaced by functionally equivalent parts

Information — Harry Hindu

Not a very good definition. Not all information is shapes. For instance the color of an apple is not the shape of an apple. It's like if you asked me to define consciousness and I said it was "an event" or "a phenomena"

What are all events? Information. Process. Relationships. — Harry Hindu

Have no clue what you're trying to say here. Each of those words can mean a whole world of things.

Information processing. — Harry Hindu

So consciousness is information processing? What does information processing mean? Is a white blood cell processing infromation when deciding whether or not to attack something? And if so does that make it conscious? Is my pc processing information right now? Does that make it conscious?

trying to make sense of it all with one word — TheMadFool

I still don't know what that means exactly. What is "it" and what is confusing about it? Is this something about the meaning of life? Anyways I'll just read on for now.

every attempt to find a common motif that completely permeates the all, the whole, the totality of the universe, will fall short of the mark. — TheMadFool

That is a motif that permeates all no? It's starting to sound like "There are no true statements" or other such sentences that seem to contradict themselves.

We can't just throw up our hands and give up, right — TheMadFool

We could, and that's what I'd argue some eastern traditions actually encourage in my limited understanding of them.

Thus, with no better alternative, we're left to assign a label, an empty name, for what is, at its core, The Nameless: Thing. — TheMadFool

Doesn't seem like a good option to me. If I was trying to find something similar between apples and oranges and utterly failed at doing so I'd take that as a sign that there is nothing similar not that there is something similar which I can't put my finger on which I shall dub "the nameless"

This is a looooong attempt to get you to talk about what you think it is in a way that I can understand. — Kenosha Kid

And what would be the purpose of that? You claimed that neurological progress would lead to a general theory of consciousness. I asked what you mean by that. Forget me, what do you mean?

But if I were to define it it would just be defined as "awareness" or "apprehention" as you used them. I can add to that that these things (qualia) being apprehended are a result of trained pattern recognition and recall. This is a sufficient condition but I don't know if it is necessary (and you haven't clarified that bit either). I would also agree that consciousness has this "unifying effect" you speak of, as in you can be aware of multiple qualia at once (the taste of a banana as well as its color for instance).

I think the most effective way to define what I mean by it would be by comparing it to a state where it doesn't exist. Consciousness is the difference between dreaming and the other stages of sleep. You are conscious when you dream as I define it (and it doesn't have to be a lucid dream).

Another definition could be "The thing that remains constant no matter how much the qualia change". So whether I'm listening to music or screaming in agony after breaking an arm, there is always the awareness of this or that qualia (pleasant in the former case, unpleasant in the latter(the qualia that is)). That is consciousness.

Does that make it clearer what I mean?

It's not possible to answer your question because it's about something you do not describe at all. — Kenosha Kid

My question was "What do you mean by....?". Which word in that question is hard to describe?

So clearly I'm not using the term "pattern-matching" in a way consistent with your counter-example. — Kenosha Kid

Fair enough. My bad on that one.

you were asking questions about a thing that is not identical to modern, scientific descriptions of it, nor with any certainty similar to any other particular notion — Kenosha Kid

I wasn't asking questions about what consciousness is or what brings it about. I was asking what you meant by "neurological progress will lead to a general theory of consciousness". Forget me, I want to understand your point of view. Which is why I didn't mention panpsychism at all at first, you brought it into the discussion and then asked me to define what I mean by consiousness. In your own words, what I mean by consciousness has nothing to do with what you mean by it.

I'm happy to reaffirm it here and now. — Kenosha Kid

Alright then. Let me ask some of the same questions about that again. Are we talking human brains only here? What happens if a part of the brain is replaced or lost? Does it have to be organic? In other words what exactly counts as a "brain".

Your eyes might physically move to focus on a secondary stimulus but, when asked, you will report no awareness of it. In terms of accounting for the difference, neurology seems to be the *perfect* framework in which to explain it, as it deals with the transmission of information between different parts of the brain responsible for different tasks. — Kenosha Kid

It could explain why certain information, despite being within your field of view, you remain unaware of. But what does that have to do with explaining what the necessary conditions are for this awareness? All you can get out of this is sufficient conditions for consciousness/awareness, not necessary conditions for them.

For sure, and that's what we have neuroscience for. I'm not going to reproduce every paper, which is what I suspect you're suggesting my burden entails — Kenosha Kid

No nothing like that.

out Isaac's Halle Berry detector description on the Quining Qualia thread for a great example — Kenosha Kid

I'll get back to you after I've found it, I don't feel like rummaging through 40 pages right now.

Why? What's there to be lost about? — TheMadFool

What does "ultimate reality" mean?

the so-called Ultimate Reality — TheMadFool

You lost me there,

No category would be sufficient for describing Ultimate Reality. — TheMadFool

Except the category "ultimate reality" apparently no?

I think a vaguely interested, vaguely intelligent human being can, if not fully understand what I meant, correctly establish bounds of possible interpretations of consciousness. — Kenosha Kid

First, I'd like to point out that this quote boils down to "I can't define it further so please stop pretending you don't get it" which I've been saying for a while.

Now, don't get me wrong, I understood what you meant, but I was pointing out that both of us understood it even though it doesn't pass your criteria of a definition. My reply was intended to point out how nitpicky your claims that "awareness", "experience" and "consciousness" are completely meaningless words that still need defining. They have SOME associated meanings and it is possible to narrow those down, but not without some ambiguity. However you seemed to pretend that they don't so I wanted to see how you would define them without any ambiguity at all which is the standard you set for me and failed to keep yourself.

I didn't want to write a wall of text like the one you wrote only for you to say something like "'apprehend' is an ambiguous word so I don't get what you mean". Your first definition of consciousness in that reply can be boiled down to "apprehention of qualia" but when I say "awareness of experiences" it is apparently vague and ambiguous. All you really added was "apprehention of qualia which is brought about (inexplicably) by (undefined) pattern recognition"

nor your more standard panpsychists — Kenosha Kid

I don't think so necessarily. Your description of consciousness was "consciousness is consciousness of something". And that that "consciousness of something" is a result of some pattern recognition. One argument for this description being consistent could for example be (note: I don't expect every description of consciousness to be consistent with panpsychism, I'm just making a case that this one could be): Is by defining "pattern recognition" in such a way so as to classify complex natural processes as involving "pattern recognition"

For instance: When a white blood cell attacks bacteria is it doing pattern recognition? It clearly doesn't just attack indiscriminantly.

Additionally, in this schema is pattern recognition a necessary or sufficient condition for consciosness? You didn't make that clear. If it is a sufficient condition then what exactly do you mean by it because depending on that answer white blood cells may or may not be conscious.

Btw, I never promised you a definition of consciousness because I'm not asking you questions about it. — Kenosha Kid

This doesn't even make sense. Remember how this whole conversation started:

So, in this context, toward a neurological basis of psychology.
— Kenosha Kid

How is that related to consciousness if at all? — khaled

You made a claim that neurological progress will lead to some theory of consciousness (not in that particular quote but earlier). I asked you how? In order to answer that question you need to define what you mean by consciousness and what you mean by neurological progress, as you are the one making the claim. You defined the latter but not the former.

Your definitions so far:

Consciousness-as-brainstates actually supports the statement that neurological progress will lead to a theory of consciousness, but I think it makes no sense and your continued reluctance to mention it again makes me think you think so too.

You would need to explain how consciousness as "consciousness of something which (somehow) results from pattern recognition (whatever that means)" is related to neurological progress. I don't see how perfectly understanding how the brain works will lead us to a theory about why consciousness arises form pattern recognition and what exactly counts as "pattern recognition".

For consciousness as "consciousness of a subset of consciousnesses" I don't see how neurology has anything to do with that. It vaguely reminds me of the neural binding problem but that's it.

For me, "I" refers to my body as a whole. — Harry Hindu

Really? So if you lost a finger you're not you anymore? Which part of the body exactly carries this "I"? How much of a body can you lose or replace to still be the same "I"? Whatever "I" remains after all is replaced or changed, that is "the experiencer".

I was asking what the event is, not what the scribble is. — Harry Hindu

Well at least we've established that there is an event. I thought you were one of those people who pretend that the scribble refers to nothing. But I still think "what is this event" is akin to asking "what is shape", It's one of those things you can't simplify further. Why don't you take a crack at it because I can't do it.

First you say, "Seeing is a type of experience", and then seem confused about what it means to experience eggs in the fridge! — Harry Hindu

It's just that when I'm talking definitions with someone I get really nitpicky about words. "experiencing eggs in the fridge" is sort of vague because it can either mean simply seeing eggs in the fridge or somehow literally "Knowing beyond all doubt that there are in fact eggs in the fridge". I just wanted to be specific that we're talking about seeing things here.

consciousness is consciousness of something — Kenosha Kid

You cannot use the word in its definition.

a reflexive, totalising consciousness of a subset of the consciousnesses — Kenosha Kid

You cannot use the word in its definition.

So far you've given me four definitions of consciousness:

1- Consciousness is brain states. You seemed to immediately drop this one as you didn't answer any of my questions about it (because it makes no sense). And you didn't use it in this reply to answer the question about computers either.

2- Consciousness is something caused by brain states. You didn't say this in my discussion with you but in another thread. Regardless, this is not a definition, just an outlining of conditions that are sufficient for consciousness (but not confirmed to be necessary for it)

3- Consciousness is consciousness of something. You were more than happy to say that "awareness" and "experience" are vague terms but somehow you entertain a definition of the word that uses that same word in its definition while simultaneously thinking that the word is ambiguous enough so as to require a definition.

4- Consciousness is a reflexive, toatalising consciousness of the subset of the consciousnesses. Same as above, you're using the word in its definition (twice) while insisting that it is ambiguous enough to require a definition. But whenever I try to do something similar (use "awareness" or "experience") you immediately point out how I'm deferring ambiguity to other equally ambiguous terms. Oh but apparently "apprehend" is not an ambiguous term while "awareness" is

When we apprehend multiple things — Kenosha Kid

So what exactly do you expect of me. Because so far none of your definitions pass your own criteria:

say anything about consciousness at all that would shed any light on your question, without just deferring the ambiguity to other ambiguous terms — Kenosha Kid

What surprises me even more is that you were able to use these supposedly ambiguous terms to answer the question of whether or not robots may have this supposedly ambiguous property in the future. Even though by your own criteria you have failed at disambiguating them in any way. This leads me to believe that maybe "consciousness" already has a referant or a two.

This is circular. — Harry Hindu

Of course it is. As is every definition ever (at least of these basic concepts)...

What is an experiencer? — Harry Hindu

No, because I thought that — Harry Hindu

Whatever "I" is referring to here.

Telling me that it's an "experience" just tells me what scribble I can use to refer to this event, but what is this event? — Harry Hindu

Oh so you understand what it means now all of a sudden? Yes, it is probably that event you had in mind while writing this (in a literal and metaphorical sense).

A sensible question. But consider this: maybe the reason we use that scribble only and we do not have accurate language to describe what is happening is because we don't know what is happening.

Is it the only event (solipsism)? Is it an event among many others (realism)? If the latter, how does this event relate to, and interact with, the other events? You might say that all this is unimportant — Harry Hindu

Not at all, I wouldn't say it is unimportant, I would say we can't know the answers to these questions. Because this isn't an event we can detect. Show me the "consciousness-o-meter" and then we might be able to answer these questions, or show me how to make one.

Sure. Let's just say "experiences" then. Do you get what that means?
— khaled
No, — Harry Hindu

Sure you do, you wrote that "experience" is a scribble that refers to an event.

No, because I thought that seeing is a type of experience — Harry Hindu

Seeing is a type of experience. However "seeing eggs" =/= "experiencing eggs in the fridge" (whatever that means). You experience a certain image, of there being eggs in a fridge. I don't understant what "experiencing eggs in the fridge" means. That image may or may not reflect reality.

No one is asking you to simplify anything. I'm asking you what you mean by a word — Kenosha Kid

Define, simplify, potato, potato. I cannot define it without referring to equally vague concepts becaue it doesn't get simpler than that.

The shape of an object is its outline — Kenosha Kid

Outline is just as ambiguous as shape. No one would understand what outline means and not understand what shape means. Same with consciousness and experience. If I asked you to define "outline" what would you do (without referring to shape or an equally vague concept of course)?

What does it mean for a thing to "have experiences"? — Kenosha Kid

Well I would use another vague concept here such as "awareness of qualia" but I think you already used it in another thread here (in reply to harry hindu):

By all means, point out where I suggested that I have direct awareness of, say, stabilising my field of view or whiteshifting the colours I see. My statement was that abstraction from subjective experience is a necessary part of understanding subjective experience because the causes of subjective experience are not part of subjective experience. For instance, I am not aware of turning the retinal image upside down; I am only aware of the transformed image (which is why I am happy to talk about qualia at all). — Kenosha Kid

If I asked you about what you meant by "experience" or "awareness" there what would you say (because you seem to be referring to the same things as me here)? Because "awareness" seems to me just as vague as "experience" so if one doesn't (pretends not to) understand one they likely won't understand the other. Also can you help me understand what this means:

abstraction from subjective experience is a necessary part of understanding subjective experience because the causes of subjective experience are not part of subjective experience.

Because here you seem to be suggesting that subjective experience is caused by brain states and is not somehow the exact same thing. So which is it?

How do you know that you are experiencing something? — Harry Hindu

Because there is an experiencer (me) who is aware (conscious) of these experiences. And that is the definition of "having an experience"

Your question implies that it is possible to have an experience but think you're not having an experience. Can you give an example of that?

You cannot be wrong that eggs are in the fridge if you experience them in the fridge? — Harry Hindu

I don't "experience eggs in the fridge". That's word salad no offence. I see eggs in the fridge. I cannot be wrong that I am seeing eggs in the fridge (Assuming I'm not blind of course). But I can be wrong about whether or not there are eggs in the fridge (could have been an elaborately placed cutout so as to make it seem like there are eggs there).

You need something else that isn't water — Harry Hindu

No. You decided to define it as "isn't water". I decided to include water. Anyways I won't bother with this pointless line anymore.

If all experiences are first person then it is redundant to even use first person as a qualifier to describe experiences. — Harry Hindu

Sure. Let's just say "experiences" then. Do you get what that means?

Then how do you know that you are conscious? — Harry Hindu

I know that I am experiencing something. I later call this ability to experience something "consciousness".

Do you know that there are eggs in the fridge in the same way that you know that you are conscious? — Harry Hindu

No because I cannot be wrong about the fact that I'm experiencing something.

Water isn't wet. Wet is a relationship between water and something else. — Harry Hindu

Or I could define "wet" as "in contact with water" in whichcase water would be wet unless it is just one molecule. Again, this is pointless.

It sounds redundant. — Harry Hindu

What sounds redundant?

Because in my view, states of consciousness are just brain states — Kenosha Kid

Very important distinction here: are they brain states or are they caused by brain states. Because for me it is the latter (note: I am not saying they are only caused by brain states). I cannot understand how it can be the former. So the experience of the color red is a 600nm wavelength entering your eye?

I'm assuming by brain state you mean the literal state of my brain as a certain experience is happening, and that that experience is (somehow) that brain state. So we are talking about the location and movement of particles here and additionally implying that having a brain means being conscious.

So let me pick your consciousness a bit here. What are the properties of brains that allow for consciousness, aka what passes as a "brain"? If someone had a steel rod fly through their head and survived their brainstate is obviously different from ours, are they still conscious/is their damaged brain still a brain? What about other animals or are we just talking about human brains here? If someone had a surgery that replaces a part of their brain with an electrical component are they still conscious/does that modified brain pass as a brain? And if so, that would mean that even non-organic components can pass as "brains" in whichcase how do we make a non-organic brain that produces consciousness?

with faux surprise — Kenosha Kid

Not so much surprise. I was just pointing out that maybe it isn't incompatable.

State what it is. — Kenosha Kid

The ability to have an experience. I know this doesn't explain any more than the previous "definition". But that's because this can't be simplified.

cannot or will not say what it is they are talking about, — Kenosha Kid

I would just like to point out that that doesn't make it meaningless. If I asked you to describe what "shape" is for instance you would also struggle. Because the concept is so basic any attempt at defining is going to require more complicated concepts which only make sense assuming you already know what "shape" means.

If we were to define a word by using multiple other words, then define each of those by using multiple other words, we would have an infinite loop where people can no longer understand the language because in order to understand any one word they must understand infinitely many. Which is why I think there is a "cutoff point", words that do not need definition just pointing. An example is "Red". You point at enough red things and anyone will understand what red means and you do not need a definition. I think "shape" and "consciousness" are such words among others. And that's why people use synonyms to describe consciousness.

you cannot say what 'it' is — Kenosha Kid

I have now answered what "it" is. The ability to have an experience. You will likely find that inadequate but on the off chance you don't: does a computer have 'it'?

Can you report anything that you aren't aware of, like being conscious? — Harry Hindu

I was not doing some reductio ad absurdum here. I was implying that this point of contention is useless. No one cares whether or not water is wet and it doesn't help in whatever discussion you decide to have about water. In the same way I don't think "are you aware of being conscious" is important.

Do you know anything when not conscious? — Harry Hindu

Depends on your definition of knowledge. And that says nothing about the original statement even if I answered yes or no.

is just a different location of the first person experience. — Harry Hindu

Oh so you understand what it means now all of a sudden? You just used it to form a correct sentence. Congratulations!

You're saying the same things over and over because you seem to be unwilling to even try to make any sense and be consistent. — Harry Hindu

No. It's because no matter how hard I drill down into this definition all I will do is make it more complicated and you will forever keep asking for more drilling. You clearly understand what "first person view" means since you just used it in a sentence, yet you keep asking for more and more pointless drilling.

But you are aware that you are conscious and you being conscious is part of your surroundings, no? — Harry Hindu

Saying "aware that you are conscious" is like saying "wet water"

Informed, as in possessing knowledge. Are you conscious, or aware, of your knowledge? — Harry Hindu

Can't remember a point where I possessed no knowledge so I can't tell you if you need to know things to be conscious.

Then what did you mean by "first-person"? You still haven't clarified what that even means, or how ti compares to zero-person or second-person experiences. — Harry Hindu

Zero person doesn't make sense. Second person also doesn't make sense in this context. Third person is your view of something from a distance. First person is the view from my perspective. I'm just saying the same things over and over again because this definition cannot be simplified. Maybe check what the difference is between "first person shooter" and "third person rpg"

And I don't get why this quote prompted your question:

as in only you have this view and no one else does? -> I don't know. Will get back to you after I become someone else and compare — khaled

What I meant there is that for example if we're both stuck in identical rooms in identical locations in identical positions in identical everything (physical), I cannot tell if we would have the same experience.