Those two version of Alice, being in different worlds, cannot communicate or otherwise be aware of each other. But they behave exactly identically because they're keeping that knowledge a secret. — noAxioms

But note that they're not actually identical since they each have a different memory of what they measured. What Bob can do is reverse Alice's polarity measurement while retaining the record that the measurement occurred, which is identical for both Alices. This means that the two Alices will merge without memory of the polarity result and with all records of the polarity result having been erased. That is, there will be only one world branch again, with multiple histories, and with the record that a definite polarity result was measured by Alice.

This is analogous to the double-slit experiment where the single particle detected on the back screen had two distinct path histories (one for each each slit).

Anyway, point is, Alice learning of the measurement results splits Alice, but does not split the universe, as is commonly assumed. — noAxioms

Yes.

So yes to the three worlds if you count them that way: One for each Alice, and one for Bob. But there is obviously communication between the Bob world and both Alice worlds, but Bob cannot pass a message from one Alice to the other. With the communication, Bob's world is clearly not isolated from Alice's world, and hence doesn't really count as a separate world. — noAxioms

Agreed. Alice's worlds are separate from each other, but they are in superposition in Bob's world.

I don't think 'the Copenhagen interpretation' is, or attempts to be, a scientific hypothesis. It is just a collection of aphorisms and philosophical reflections, principally by Bohr and Heisenberg, which are about what you can and can't say on the basis of the discoveries of quantum mechanics. — Wayfarer

Maybe so, but the end goal is to have rigorously defined theories that can be experimentally distinguished. Part of that task is identifying the assumptions made by the various interpretations (like counterfactual definiteness, free choice, locality, observer-dependence, etc.). Researchers in quantum foundations use this data to come up with no-go theorems and experiments such as that in the OP.

Interestingly, the OP experiment is based on Deutsch's version of Wigner's friend which he proposed specifically to distinguish experimentally between Copenhagen and MWI. Caslav Brukner (mentioned in the OP article) discusses this in https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.05255.

What if the theory that needs to be ‘beaten’ is not a theory at all but an untestable metaphysical postulate? Then it might be better to simply ignore it, or proceed as if it says nothing. — Wayfarer

The main postulate of MWI is that the universe is represented by a unitarily evolving quantum state interpreted realistically. It provides empirical predictions that have been thoroughly and successfully tested (so far).

What I think you mean is that one of the theory's predictions can not be tested (that there are many worlds), at least at this point. But that prediction can only be eliminated by changing either the physical theory (as with Bohmian Mechanics, Objective collapse) or by interpreting the quantum state in some other way (as with Copenhagen, RQM, etc.) Neither of those changes are trivial and they have various consequences that need to be considered on their own merits.

No interpretation is a cop out, but MWI cannot have those observers in different world branches since they communicate. Alice knows the polarity and tells Bob that she does. Bob knows that the particle is still in superposition and tells Alice so. That cannot happen if the two are in different branches. — noAxioms

In the experiment, Alice can communicate to Bob that she has measured a definite polarity (without the polarity itself being revealed) while the lab she is in remains isolated (and Bob does not communicate back, which would presumably constitute a measurement entangling him with Alice). So there are actually three MWI branches here. One where Alice measures a horizontal polarization, one where she measures a vertical polarization, and one that is the superposition of those two branches where Bob detects interference (and knows that Alice has made a measurement).

Many Worlds has those observers in different world branches,
— Andrew M

I don’t regard that as an explanation so much as a cop-out. — Wayfarer

It takes a theory to beat a theory.

But Proietti and co’s result suggests that objective reality does not exist. In other words, the experiment suggests that one or more of the assumptions—the idea that there is a reality we can agree on, the idea that we have freedom of choice, or the idea of locality—must be wrong.

So much for freedom of choice. — Banno

Freedom of choice refers to an experimenter being able to choose what experiment to perform. All mainstream interpretations accept that assumption.

The assumption of reality, as defined in Bell test experiments, just means counterfactual definiteness. Most interpretations, including Many Worlds and Copenhagen, reject counterfactual definiteness. Bohmian Mechanics accepts it.

Physicists have long suspected that quantum mechanics allows two observers to observe different, conflicting realities. Now they’ve performed the first experiment that proves it by experimental realisation of what was previously a thought-experiment called ‘Wigner’s Friend’. — Wayfarer

Good to to see the experiment done. But as you might expect, the main interpretations already have standard answers for this. For example, Many Worlds has those observers in different world branches, RQM allows observers to have different accounts of the event as long as they don't compare their results, and Copenhagen would not regard the friend's interaction as a measurement (for Wigner).

I think it's overstating to say that Wigner and his friend experience conflicting realities. Rather, the friend just has more information than Wigner. The difference can be interpreted as purely epistemological. Wigner knows that his friend knows which way the spin goes, but Wigner doesn't know which way. So Wigner models the lab as a superposition while the friend does not. — andrewk

That would be a hidden variables theory (and thus non-local).

Can you provide a link or citation for this? Cause I was curious to read more, but I can't find anything. Thanks! — NKBJ

The formula for adding velocities in relativistic physics is
$u = \frac{v + u'}{1+\frac{vu'}{c^2}}$

It is described here. Like any other formula in physics, it depends on the ordinary truths of arithmetic.

If you are standing on a train platform and the train is travelling at 20km/h according to your reference frame, and the driver switches the headlamp on and emits light at the speed c, then in your reference frame you will measure the light as travelling at c, and not at c + 20km/hr. — Crazy Diamond

Yes.

That was the puzzling observed phenomenon in the Michelson-Morley experiment that led to Special Relativity in the first place. If something is travelling at the speed of light and it emits light, everyone will measure that light as travelling at exactly the speed of light, whatever their reference frame. No standard addition ever works with light. c + c = c, and that's the observation that led to the equation. I don't see how and why it can be dismissed as only a superficial feature of different reference frames. Please enlighten me! (Pun intended...) — Crazy Diamond

OK, think of the reference frame as an implicit aspect of the velocity that must be factored in to any calculation. The train is travelling at 20km/h in my reference frame (on the train platform) but is at rest in its own reference frame. That is, there is only ever a velocity relative to a reference frame. Just adding the velocities assumes that the reference frame information can be ignored, whereas the formula factors them in. That is, the formula calculates the velocity of the emitted light in my reference frame given the train's velocity in my reference frame (20km/h) and the velocity of the emitted light (c) in the train's reference frame. Which is (20 + c) / (1 + (20 * c) / c^2) = c.

It's like calculating the amount of US dollars given 20 US dollars and 100 Australian dollars. 20 + 100 = 120, but the answer to the actual question is 20 + (100 * 0.70) = 90 US dollars (assuming the exchange rate is 1AUD = 0.70USD). If we ignore the currency rates, and it so happened that they were the same, then just adding the dollar amounts would give the correct answer. Similarly, if we ignore the reference frames and it so happened that there was no maximum velocity across all reference frames, then just adding the velocities would give the correct answer.

This means that, for velocities, 2 + 2 does not = 4, instead 2 + 2 = $\frac{4}{1+\frac{4}{c^2}}$.
This has been investigated and found to be true. — Crazy Diamond

The difference occurs because the velocities are being added from different inertial reference frames.

Suppose I am standing on a train platform and the train is travelling at 20km/h from my reference frame. If it goes 10km/h faster (from my reference frame), then it will be travelling at 20km/h + 10km/h = 30km/h from my reference frame. Standard addition.

However if a person on the train subsequently moves forward at 2km/h in the train's reference frame, then that person will be travelling at less than 32km/h from my reference frame.

The formula just shows how velocities from different inertial reference frames should be added.

Didn't we do this already? (Or was it someone else?--I don't recall). It doesn't make sense to talk about the weight of all physical phenomena. I didn't pick apart each property he was listing in the post, and I didn't talk about the fact that mental phenomena are not identical to the entirety of the brain at all times--it's a subset of brain structure/function, because I knew it was pointless to get into details with him. — Terrapin Station

I don't think we've discussed this before. But note that it wasn't a minor detail, it was his main point. It doesn't make sense to talk about the weight, or volume, or solidity of thoughts, feelings, sensations or values at all. They are dispositions and occurrences, not substances.

Nonetheless they are still fully grounded in the physical and natural world. And that was also Aristotle's position as contrasted with Plato's.

There wasn't an epoch in which there were real abstracts or in which properties were somehow separable from substance, etc. It's maybe understandable why Aristotle made the mistakes that he did, but that doesn't make them not mistakes. — Terrapin Station

Aristotle did not say that properties were separable from substance, he expressly denied it. He was an immanent realist about universals and rejected Platonic realism.

Look, brains are wet, solid, made of neurons, weigh about 3 pounds on average, have a volume of about 1450 cubic centimeters on average, etc. Thoughts, feelings, sensations and values literally have none of those properties
— Theorem

Likewise, here, I simply have to say, "Thoughts, feelings, sensations and values literally have those properties"--why wouldn't that be a sufficient comment if your denial is a sufficient comment? — Terrapin Station

I think it's raining outside, but I'll go and check to make sure. I checked and, yes, it is. How much did my thought weigh? On your view, is that a meaningful question or is it a category mistake?

My intuition here, of course, is that time is a constant which is independent of any measuring devices and the conditions in which said devices operate.

Or have I missed something? — philosophy

Take a look at the twin paradox thought experiment. To magnify the example, in principle, a twin could depart in a spaceship, travel at close to the speed light for a few years, return to Earth and find that a million years had passed on Earth, with human civilization having died out.

So the time elapsed according to a clock on the spaceship and another clock on Earth would be very different. What they are measuring is the time elapsed in their respective reference frames.

The difference is that a substance is a composite of matter and form instead of reality being composed of just matter.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ — Walter Pound

Yes, but the materialist is simply including the characteristics of substances (i.e., their form) in his definition of matter. It's only a semantic difference.

The problem is that few today argue that carbon is a composite of matter and form; instead, anything that extends in space is considered to be part of the physical world and is classified as matter. Additionally, few today will say that matter's potential is "actualized" by forms and that matter has no causal power of its own- this is why I referenced electric charges and chemical bonds as examples of how Aristotle got matter wrong. — Walter Pound

He didn't get matter wrong, he simply defined it differently. For Aristotle, the same empirical observations find their explanation at the substance level, not the material level. To a first approximation, a materialist's matter just is Aristotle's substance.

So this statement:
So the same world is being described, but they are two different frameworks for understanding it.
— Andrew M
is not correct since Aristotle suggests that "matter" is impotent and can only ever be under the influence of a form. There is an asymmetric relationship between form and matter that I can't imagine most physicalists subscribing to. — Walter Pound

Maybe. There exist substances (rocks, trees, people, particles) and we observe that they interact, change, and can be created and destroyed. In Aristotelian terms, this is a transition of matter from one form to another. Time is a measure of that, the direction of which is also asymmetric. So think of it as a state transition. The state (or form) of a physical system at one moment in time determines what will happen at the next moment in time.

These words are only names for whatever is observed. They are all names of what matter is or does. You want to suggest that "arrangement," "regularity" and "structure" are not exhausted by matter and that these things must be evidence for something beyond matter and there is no reason for that conclusion. — Walter Pound

The difference between the modern view and Aristotle's view is that in the modern view, matter implicitly subsumes form (which is what talk of structure, properties and behavior relates to). Whereas Aristotle makes the distinction between matter and form explicit in his definition of substance.

So the same world is being described, but they are two different frameworks for understanding it. On an Aristotelian view, an independent carbon atom is a hylomorphic substance and, as such, has identifiable characteristics and behavior. But note also that carbon is matter relative to a carbon-dioxide molecule, itself a hylomorphic substance that, in turn, has identifiable characteristics and behavior.

This is also what Theorem was explaining earlier. The main point to keep in mind is that the term matter is being used differently in the Aristotelian and modern frameworks.

Is there anything that distinguishes matter in the hylomorphic composite of a tree or that of gold? Or is there nothing about matter that distinguishes the matter in the substance of an apple or that of gold? — Walter Pound

The matter is only distinguished by its specific form in a substance. For example, a house can materially be made of either brick or wood (or both). But bricks and wood also have formal properties. And bricks can materially be made of clay or concrete. And so on until you get to the basic elements (which were notably very different for Aristotle than for us today). So matter is an abstraction over bricks, wood, clay, gold, etc.

Perhaps a useful analogy here is with shape. A square could be morphed into a trapezium by a suitable transformation, i.e., its form can change. And they are distinguishable shapes. But there are no shapes independent of any form. Shape is an abstraction over squares and trapeziums.

What can be said of the matter that isn't just, "well, it is part of a substance..." or "its the part of the substance that makes the form feel solid..." — Walter Pound

I think that about covers it. The intended distinction is between the form of a house (which might also be captured in a blueprint, or as an idea in our minds) and the house itself, which is a material instance of that form.

A problem with this is we perceive properties. So if properties are form, we perceive form. Also "pushes back when you push on it" is a property, a property that we perceive. — Terrapin Station

I should have said that we don't perceive form or matter as independent things. I agree that we perceive that grass is green, etc.

What exactly is matter in Aristotle's eyes? — Walter Pound

A way to think of it is that we don't perceive form or matter (edit: as independent things), we perceive substances (like apples, people, etc.) Those substance have properties (form) that can be identified. But a substance is more than a formalism, it is also material - the substance pushes back when you push on it. This is Aristotle's hylomorphism.

Matter itself has no properties (the substance does) and can do nothing (it is the substance that acts or is acted upon). There's debate over whether Aristotle accepted the existence of prime matter. And it's difficult to see what sense can be made of it if it has no properties and cannot act.

Hope that helps.

Does mass cause space-time curvature, or does space-time cause the presence of matter? — wax

Perhaps of interest, John Wheeler's pithy summary of GR was "Spacetime tells matter how to move; matter tells spacetime how to curve."

Agreed. And to extend the idea further, suppose the robots take over, suitably programmed with Asimov's three laws. What nudges them back in the right direction if the rules they follow turn out to have unexpected and unwanted consequences for human beings?

Of course it is relevant. Without feeling a certain way, some humans might no longer care for their children. But it is the caring for their children that morality refers to, not the feeling.
— Andrew M

Yes, but if humans didn't care about how they and others behaved then there wouldn't be morality in the first place. Morality is thus dependent on care, or in other words, on feeling. — Janus

I meant care in the sense of, "The provision of what is necessary for the health, welfare, maintenance, and protection of someone or something." (OED)

So if humans didn't provide for and protect their children, there would presumably be no humans, let alone morality. So the feelings bootstrap that behavior. Yet a person can still act morally (e.g., provide for and protect their children) without the attendant feeling.

It's not some sort of pure intellectual thing, though. You don't just consider, you feel a certain way about it, and that's very relevant, perhaps more than you realise. — S

Of course it is relevant. Without feeling a certain way, some humans might no longer care for their children. But it is the caring for their children that morality refers to, not the feeling.

You haven't demonstrated that it's necessarily a value to begin with, so saying that it's a value which they forgo does nothing. — S

It's a hypothetico-deductive model and I've defined my terms. So you need to provide a counterexample that contradicts the model. All you've said is that you don't define value that way.

Your point that it works as an explanation is refuted by my point about Ockham's razor. — S

You can't explain moral behavior without appeal to values. But simply defining value as whatever their behavior is makes any explanation useless and devoid of content. Why did Bob drink poison? Because he valued drinking poison. Why did he value drinking poison? Because it was his preference. Why did he prefer drinking poison? ...

If you are interested in getting out of that subjective loop and gaining further insight, then you'll need to look for an explanation for his action in the natural world.

Yeah, that's a bit of a problem. You're not even talking about value, not like the rest of us. You should call that something else to avoid confusion. — S

You just need to pay attention to the context to avoid equivocation. Undervaluing something and perceived value versus actual value are conventional usages. (But perhaps you think that to undervalue something is a semantic contradiction.) As I'm using the term here, what is valuable (or of actual value) is that which satisfies the functional needs of human beings. Such as food and water.

Except that the way in which we judge whether the statement about rain is true differs in important respects from the way in which we judge Joe murdering Bill is wrong, ... — S

So it does. Nonetheless morality is an abstraction over actions just as truth is an abstraction over speech acts.

I reach a moral judgement through my moral feelings. — S

Whereas I consider the consequences of the person's actions in relation to people's life and well-being.

I said that by assuming that life and well-being are valuable for human beings, one can explain their observed behavior. It's an empirical model.
— Andrew M

No, you said that they're universal values. — S

Those assumed values are universal in scope, yes.

It's obviously not consistent with the model. It's an example of a situation where food isn't valuable to a human: it's the opposite of being valuable to them. It doesn't matter what you think is valuable. You don't get to decide. I'm telling you that food isn't valuable to them. — S

Have you ever put up with short-term pain for some reason, say, getting immunization shots or training for a marathon? Does it follow that life and well-being are therefore not valuable when you choose to endure the pain?

The hunger-striker is forgoing food - a value - but not because they regard starving and dying as an end in itself.

I don't think that you're going to be reasonable here. — S

I think the dispute is semantic. You define value in terms of opinion or preference, I define it in functional terms.

So now I'm expected to believe that your "wrong" is like rain? — S

No, I'm saying "right/wrong" is like "true/false". The former relates to actions generally, the latter to speech acts. Joe murdering Bill is wrong. And that statement is true.

And for the umpteenth time, you can't just take for granted what you're supposed to be trying to prove. What universal values? — S

I didn't say I'd proven it. I said that by assuming that life and well-being are valuable for human beings, one can explain their observed behavior. It's an empirical model.

Humans are individuals. Physiological needs aren't necessarily valuable for an individual. And they aren't in certain cases. If I'm on hunger strike, and that's the most valuable thing to me in the world right now, then the "need" for food isn't valuable for me. It's actually the antithesis of value for me. — S

The empirical issue is whether the reason for hunger strike behavior is consistent with the above model's assumptions. I would suggest that the most valuable thing for the hunger-striker is not that they suffer and die, but that an injustice be overturned (which adversely affects people's lives and well-being). Their hunger strike behavior is a means to an end, not an end in itself.

In other words, the reason he picks one over the other is because of his preferences. You don't have to personally query his preferences to make a prediction about which he'll choose with a great chance of success, because that's such a common preference. But that doesn't imply that it's not about a preference he has. — Terrapin Station

The reason Bob would drink the water and not the poison is because he has a physiological need for water. It would not normally even cross one's mind to drink poison, one would instinctively drink the water. He's not deciding between ice cream flavors.

At any rate, the model explicitly predicts what Bob will do, whatever is the case regarding his preferences. And what one does occurs in the world, not in one's mind.

Unless we want to know what we're referring to ontologically re something being valuable. That is, we want to know what's going on ontologically to make that the case if it is.

You can proceed where you don't care about it so you're just not going to bother figuring out what's going on ontologically there, but we can be interested in it. That's what I've been focusing on. — Terrapin Station

I think you misunderstood my comment. Human beings have physiological needs including the need for food and water, therefore food and water is valuable for humans.

So there's nothing that needs explaining if Bob drinks the water. That's just the expected outcome. Bob drinks the water because that satisfies his physiological need for water.

Just as a horse needs water in order to survive. It doesn't have to prefer it or value it (if horses can do such things), it just has to drink it.

OK, thanks!

I think Nietzsche would say that Joe should have a very good reason to kill Bill, and not act compulsively as a slave to passion, because such a disposition is not beautiful; it lacks aesthetic quality. Have you actually read much Nietzsche? — Janus

Not for a long time, but I'm happy to be convinced to take another look.

Do you think the crime of the century (a robbery, say) would count as having aesthetic quality? Well thought out and perfectly executed.

What I'm trying to understand is whether Nietzsche ends up endorsing a defensible morality or whether his aesthetics take him some place else.

An approach that might work is looking at capabilities. Martha Nausbaum. Usable stuff. — Banno

I notice that she incorporates Aristotle and eudaimonism in her work. So it seems we are in the same ball park.

Yeah, the counterfeiter made the Kantian “better calculation”, and if never found out, there is reason to suspect he was quite thoroughly pleased with himself, and only immoral upon reflection by another. — Mww

And similarly for a runner who cheats to win a race.

What I'm getting at here is that contrary to the counterfeiter's self-serving calculation, a moral calculation factors in the life and well-being of all relevant agents. The counterfeiter could have done that, but chose to reject it. For everyday purposes, most of us can correctly figure out what actions are moral most of the time. For Aristotle, moral action becomes habitual through practicing virtue.

And one might change one's feelings and then change one's judgements and the rules that proceed from them, and that might from the outside appear as an inconsistency, whereas it is actually a matter of remaining consistent with one's moral feeling. It would be like changing one's aesthetic tastes. The key to understanding Nietzsche is that for him everything is a matter of aesthetics. — Janus

The problem as I see it is that it is easy for people to be self-serving about what they feel. If Joe feels that he must kill Bill then, as far as Nietzsche is concerned, he should go for it, rules be damned. Aesthetics would seem to replace morality (and reason).

Here's the disagreement. What Bob values is just what Bob values. You haven't shown that this is evidence of a value independent of what it is behind the human valuing, namely preference and feeling. Bob probably gets enjoyment out of his life and is not suicidal. Otherwise, he might well choose the poison. — S

So an empirical model (in my view) should not only be predictive, but also explanatory. If Bob drinks the water then, on the model's premise that life and well-being are valuable for human beings, there is nothing that needs explaining. Whereas if Bob drinks the poison, then that does need an explanation. Perhaps Bob drank the poison simply because Bob wanted to drink the poison. But that's an a priori answer one could give for any behavior that someone exhibits, however strange, and so doesn't really give us any insight into what is going on.

Whereas the above model demands a deeper (causal) explanation that is consistent with its assumptions. For example, did Bob misread the labels, or did he have a mental illness, or an incurable disease that caused him great suffering? If a satisfactory explanation can be discovered, then we have potentially learned something new (about the accidental conditions that change its predictions) and the model has been useful. If no satisfactory explanation can be found, then we have a puzzle. Perhaps we just haven't figured out the explanation yet, or perhaps there is a problem with the model. If so, is there a better model?

If you point to behaviour, and to acts, like, say, kicking a puppy, then that's all you're pointing to: behaviour, actions, a puppy, a person. Where's the morality to be found there, independently, as though it has a place in nature? — S

Yes, I'm pointing to human actions. If Joe murders Bill then Joe's action is wrong. That's a perfectly ordinary example using a moral predicate.

What makes a specific action moral (or not) is a function of what is universally valuable for human beings (namely, life and well-being).

To make a parallel with your paragraph above, suppose Alice claims that it is raining outside. If you point to behaviour, and to acts, like, say, claiming it is raining, then that's all you're pointing to: behaviour, speech acts, rain. Where's the truth to be found there, independently, as though it has a place in nature?

Yet we do say that Alice's claim is true (or not) independent of her preferences or opinions on the matter.

Why couldn't it be that you're predicting what his preferences will probably be, based on knowledge of most persons' preferences? — Terrapin Station

If one simply prefers whatever one does, then the model will predict preferences as well. But the purpose of that model is to predict (and explain) behavior.

In other words we expect them to feel that value, and we expect their thoughts and actions to reflect that feeling. — Janus

Yes. And even if they do not naturally feel that value (such as with sociopaths and psychopaths) we still expect them to learn and act on that value. Just as we expect a colorblind person to stop at red traffic lights.

Exactly. Yet ethical subjectivism erases just that distinction by treating morality and the Will to Power as categorically equivalent.
— Andrew M

I think you are distorting the meaning of the Will to Power here. The thing is that though there are common moral codes that most of us accept as necessary for harmonious social life, each of us (those who think for themselves at least) has our own variant that diverges more or less from those common moral codes to enact our own conception of our individual flourishing. — Janus

That's fine. But I understand the Will to Power as a wholesale rejection of morality, not a tinkering at the edges. Do I have that wrong?

Eudaimonia is popular again. And that's fine - it's a worthy goal. But I would maintain that it's not what might be called a principle good. And I'd argue for that using the open question argument. — Banno

The full argument may not be there yet. But I think we should be able to say that the good has something to do with (sentient) life and well-being. A kicked puppy is not a happy puppy.

Just as knowledge has something to do with belief, reasons and truth, even if it is not straightforwardly reducible to those things (as Gettier showed).

Here are some things which it makes sense to call natural: trees, grass, oxygen, mountains, rocks, rivers. Morality is like this?? — S

Morality is an abstraction (or pattern or form), not a concrete particular like the above things. However it is an abstraction over particulars and natural processes and so is similarly natural. As a familiar example of a natural abstraction, consider the center of mass in physics.

The particulars in the case of morality are actions like murdering people and kicking puppies. These actions occur in the natural world.

So the issue, I think, is not one of natural versus artificial, but of whether there is a natural moral standard that is well-motivated (and useful) versus standards that are artificial (or subjective).

Which is where Schelling points come in. But I'll leave it there for now in case you disagree with any of the above.

“....Empirical principles are wholly incapable of serving as a foundation for moral laws. ..." — Mww

As the above attests to, Kant carved up the world very differently to Aristotle. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is a state of well-being only achieved by practicing virtue.

Consider the example I used earlier of the coin counterfeiter. He may appear to be doing well for himself and might eventually die at a ripe old age without ever being found out. But he did not achieve eudaimonia since that requires one to practice virtue.

Conversely someone may practice virtue but thus far failed to have achieved eudaimonia due to injustice or misfortune and not through any fault of their own.

Consider the analogy to a running event. One has to both follow the rules of the event and cross the finish line to successfully complete it. Neither someone who cheats nor someone that pulls out injured meets that criteria (though obviously for very different reasons).

Okay, so what is evidence of any implicit values of life and well-being, or where does that obtain/what is it a property of, etc.? — Terrapin Station

The evidence of those implicit values is that a model assuming them makes successful predictions (and, in addition, is explanatory). Suppose that Bob has a bottle of water and a bottle of poison on the bench and that he is thirsty. The bottles are clearly identified. I predict that Bob will drink from the bottle of water, not the bottle of poison. I would predict this, even without knowing Bob or asking him what his preferences are.

Yes, I'm also saying that the (implicit) values of life and well-being are part of the natural function of being human.

Make it valuable for a human being, if that helps. I'm talking about what is valuable for human beings independently of personal opinions or preferences.

Yes. And what is valuable to a human being is life and well-being, not death and suffering.

Yes. So?

Isn't it a fact that we need a lack of food and water to not survive (ceteris paribus)? — Terrapin Station

Your question makes no sense. We need food and water to survive. We don't need to not survive.

Yeah, but if you are aware of Aristotle well enough to come up with eudaemonia, I shall assume you are just as aware there is something antecedent to it, and necessary for it. Or at least qualifies its meaning. — Mww

Can you elaborate?

And I would also ask if you think ethics, the general domain from which eudaemonia arises, re: “living well” or some such, is the same as morality? If so, I submit that the participants in the train hypothetical and all such manufactured moral dilemmas have precious little to do with the general conception of “living well”. — Mww

I strongly disagree. One's moral judgments are informed by the rational understanding that everyone's life and well-being are essential values to them. Everyone has an equal claim here.

We just need to say how it would be that life (or anything) has value outside of what anyone thinks about it. — Terrapin Station

As I've already pointed out, food and water are valuable for human beings regardless of what anyone thinks about it.

You can lead a horse to water, but if he disvalues the water it will soon be a dead horse. Preference or perceived value need not be the same as actual value.

I don't know of anyone who thinks that moral stances are arbitrary, by the way. — Terrapin Station

You either appeal to something in the world that justifies why you think your moral view should be the standard. Or else you appeal to your preferences. The first characterizes moral realism. The second is just saying you like vanilla while someone else likes strawberry. Which characterizes ethical subjectivism.

Isn't it a fact that we need a lack of food and water to not survive (ceteris paribus, that is)? — Terrapin Station

Not sure of your point. You would forgo those things either because they are not available or because you choose to forgo them for some reason, against one's usual instincts. They are still basic human needs.

your antinatalism makes little sense — Terrapin Station

What are you talking about?

No, it's a natural and pragmatic standard. It's hard to get much useful work done when people keep randomly dropping in to pop you off and take your stuff.
— Andrew M

What? I don't understand why you think that it's natural, or rather, if you think that it's natural, why your analogy was with something obviously artificial, namely monetary value. — S

For why I think it's natural, see my earlier comment on natural focal points here.

The diamond ring example was just to show that there can be a distinction between perceived value and actual value (by some metric).