Well it is in layman's terms, not typically in philosophical circles though, I would venture to guess... — creativesoul
What's interesting here, at least for me, is not the exegesis so much as the notion of someone who has no interest in right and wrong. What might that look like? — Banno
I don't think Nietzsche accepted the validity of systems; where systems are understood to be universal, overarching. It doesn't follow from that that his thinking was not systematic. — Janus
Yep.
We will disagree on rules, since private rules are not rules or not private. That's another discussion.
What's interesting here, at least for me, is not the exegesis so much as the notion of someone who has no interest in right and wrong. What might that look like? — Banno
I don't think Nietzsche can rightly be characterized as someone who had no interest in right and wrong: he could be said to have no interest in general rules of right and wrong, though, that would fit I think. — Janus
Here's the disagreement. What Bob values is just what Bob values. You haven't shown that this is evidence of a value independent of what it is behind the human valuing, namely preference and feeling. Bob probably gets enjoyment out of his life and is not suicidal. Otherwise, he might well choose the poison. — S
If you point to behaviour, and to acts, like, say, kicking a puppy, then that's all you're pointing to: behaviour, actions, a puppy, a person. Where's the morality to be found there, independently, as though it has a place in nature? — S
Why couldn't it be that you're predicting what his preferences will probably be, based on knowledge of most persons' preferences? — Terrapin Station
An approach that might work is looking at capabilities. Martha Nausbaum. Usable stuff. — Banno
Yeah, the counterfeiter made the Kantian “better calculation”, and if never found out, there is reason to suspect he was quite thoroughly pleased with himself, and only immoral upon reflection by another. — Mww
And one might change one's feelings and then change one's judgements and the rules that proceed from them, and that might from the outside appear as an inconsistency, whereas it is actually a matter of remaining consistent with one's moral feeling. It would be like changing one's aesthetic tastes. The key to understanding Nietzsche is that for him everything is a matter of aesthetics. — Janus
On the face of it, I don't see that anything but a general rule could be properly called a rule. The general form of a rule is perhaps a conditional: If X do Y; and the "if X" bit is general.
Further, if what is proposed is to be a moral rule, it perhaps has an additional clause such that anyone who finds themselves in situation X ought do Y. — Banno
The problem as I see it is that it is easy for people to be self-serving about what they feel. If Joe feels that he must kill Bill then, as far as Nietzsche is concerned, he should go for it, rules be damned. Aesthetics would seem to replace morality (and reason). — Andrew M
I think Nietzsche would say that Joe should have a very good reason to kill Bill, and not act compulsively as a slave to passion, because such a disposition is not beautiful; it lacks aesthetic quality. Have you actually read much Nietzsche? — Janus
So there is no morality beyond conceived morality? — Janus
So you believe that concepts somehow exist prior to people constructing them? — Terrapin Station
To put it bluntly anyone who has an articulated opinion such that they are beyond good and evil or that they are nihilists sort of betrays in that act that they are more interested in right and wrong than most people are. — Moliere
I would argue that we already have some crude sense of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour prior to language acquisition. — creativesoul
I don't know why you would want to avoid talk about feeling. Compassion and empathy are fundamentally feelings no matter how conceptually elaborated they might be. — Janus
If one simply prefers whatever one does, then the model will predict preferences as well. But the purpose of that model is to predict (and explain) behavior. — Andrew M
I'm more comfortable not calling it a "moral" feeling. More like rudimentary thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. — creativesoul
on the model's premise that life and well-being are valuable for human beings, there is nothing that needs explaining. — Andrew M
We don't agree re concepts being language constructs, but what I'm interested in is what you're taking to be evidence of morality existing outside of/prior to the concept of it. — Terrapin Station
I'm more comfortable not calling it a "moral" feeling. More like rudimentary thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.
— creativesoul
That's simply terminological whims. The different terms aren't picking out different phenomena. They're simply different terms. — Terrapin Station
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