I appreciate your comment, and I offer these rejoinders just to demonstrate a conformity.

S says…..The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks…..
K says……(to cognize) as attested by experience, or à priori, by means of reason…..

To cognize by experience is intuitive; to cognize by pure reason is abstract, hence the difference is not entirely overlooked.
———-

S says….the opposition and incommensurability between these terms….
K says…. inasmuch as, if this condition is removed, all significance, that is, all relation to an object, disappears, and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think…

One says they are opposed and incommensurable; the other had already acknowledged the case and says why it is so.
———-

Wiki says…..the object of an act of thought….
K says….the understanding (…) takes for granted that an object (…) must be capable of being thought (…) and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible existence….

One must already grant that understanding just is the faculty of thought, without which the comparison doesn’t work.
————

Feser says…..For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one….

K says….. No image could ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. (…) the image would always be limited to a single part of this sphere.

While it is true we think in images, as soon as we present to ourselves a representation of a triangle in general, it is a particular instance of a universal idea. In no other way than by means of principles, is it possible to think things in general, the backbone of pure transcendental cognitions.
———-

it seems to me that 'noumenon' as 'intelligible objects' in the sense of those two quotations make sense to me, but that does not seem to be what Kant meant by the term, as Schopenhauer said. — Wayfarer

“…. The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis…”

“…. I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an entirely different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis, which quite departs from the meaning of the ancients—an acceptation in which, indeed, there is to be found no difficulty, but which at the same time depends on mere verbal quibbling….”

Kant wanted noumena to be understood only as intelligible objects, and the conception of strictly intelligible objects in general does make sense, insofar as Kant was an admitted dualist, so if we can come up with this, then we damn well better be able to come up with non-this but that, other than as a form of mere negation. But the fact remains, it is impossible to cognize a noumenal object, no matter how much sense the notion makes.

I always wondered….who is doing the quibbling? Those who question his use of the terms, or himself for using them as he does?

I bow to your expertise on all things Schopenhauer. And thanks for not rippin’ me a new one for misconstruing his philosophical value.
————-

Y….is mediated reality. X…..is direct reality.

KANT: Noumena(X)-->Phenomena(Y) — ENOAH

The others I leave to others, but in Kant, while phenomena as mediated reality is correct, it is not the case noumena represents direct reality. Noumena are nothing more than a conception understanding thinks on its own accord, for no other reason than there is no reason it can’t.

“…. In order to cognize an object, I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its reality as attested by experience, or à priori, by means of reason. But I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself; that is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities….”

“…. I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no contradiction (…) but whose objective reality cannot be cognized in any manner. The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but….solely through the pure understanding…..is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition….”.

If noumena are instances of direct reality, why is it there is never an example of a noumenal object? Everybody talks of noumena as a general kind of thing but no one ever gives a name to what a particular noumenon might be. Because no one can, under the auspices of Kantian transcendental idealism pursuant to a posteriori cognitions, re: experience.

Anyway….in trying to help sort it out I might have just made it worse.

your standards (of which I've always considered to be extremely high). — Manuel

And I, yours even moreso. One had better appreciate and respect those with far greater formal training than himself.

Do you have a valid objection to what I wrote? — creativesoul

Of course I do, to some of what you wrote. We call it a mere difference of opinions, but that reduces to a disparate sets of logical inferences, which are, in my case, themselves the valid objection. Just as are yours relative to me.

No harm no foul?

Unless the thing K said we couldn't possibly "know" we simply "are". — ENOAH

Empirically, to know is to represent phenomenally. That which we simply “are” cannot be represented phenomenally, insofar as such representation is given from sensation alone, and we obviously cannot sense that which has no perceivable matter or substance.

On the other hand, derived from a long convoluted transcendental argument, if we think of ourselves as subject to which all representation belong, united under a single consciousness, we cannot possibly discover a conception by which it becomes possible to know “what” we are. It is then the case we, thought as subjects, can never be objects, which is the same as never knowing ourselves as such. So it is that we must be content to know we are nothing more than a mere transcendental idea which functions as subject. All this because when we try to know as something, the very thing that knows anything, we are met with an impossible situation.

Thing is, in juxtaposition to S, re: questions about knowledge of the world and that which is unknowable in it, these are strictly empirical questions, which cannot include mere transcendental ideas. So it is that a quite similar notion, unknowable as the what we “are” that is unknowable, which gets us to the mistake I hold S to have made, for he wants to force a purely transcendental idea into a necessary ground for a strictly empirical domain.

Furthermore, S couldn’t have even forged his personal philosophy if he didn’t de-construct what Kant intended the ding an sich to be. The thing-in-itself, in Kant, is a real existence, unknowable merely from the fact that thing has never been an appearance to our sensibility, has never run the gauntlet of the human cognitive system. As soon as the thing-in-itself is presented to sensibility, it is no longer -in-itself, it becomes a yet undetermined thing -in-us, and we can intuit, thus represent it as phenomenon, subsequently experience it and know it as a certain thing. S, on the other hand, wants all things as representations of will, which removes the very construct of representation from the cognitive system itself. Under these conditions, and in anticipation of Kant’s concept that no knowledge is at all possible for that without representation, we find the thing that was unknowable because it wasn’t representable, now is the very representation that was formerly unavailable to us.

Instead of things being given to sensibility, it is representations that are so given, which leaves the gaping explanatory hole in the form of…..how the HELL can a mere representation be of physical substance???????? How does a sensation follow from a representation, in the same manner as a sensation follows from a real physical object’s affect on the sensory apparatuses?

And if S’s representations are conditioned by space and time in order to make them appear real for our senses, as Kant’s things appear to us, then it remains questionable how the will can be a source of such conditions insofar as will is the origin of them. And if will doesn’t originate space and time, in that they still belong to the subject as pure a priori intuitions of transcendental deduction….S hasn’t done anything Kant didn’t already do.

Kant took Plato’s forms from the external instances of universals and made them internal a priori content of the mind; S took Kant’s internal representations as content of faculties of mind and made them external objects of will. Turn-about is fair play? If he can do it so can I, kinda thing? Dunno, but maybe….

Anyway….opinion. I’m entitled to mine no matter how misguided….prejudiced….it may be. (Grin)

Hey you…..

Would I have preferred S not to write? Great big emphatic no; it’s not for me to say.

From a personal point of view, would I have preferred he not write what he did? From the perspective of German idealism…the philosophy of the day, so to speak….what he wrote was inevitable; it’s what happens when one guy sets the world on fire, but the next guy wants to say something to make a name for himself by either making the fire bigger and better, or by demonstrating the ease of extinguishing it.

If S didn’t write what he did, somebody else would have written something; the enemy you know is easier to combat than the enemy you never met.

Ok, so…what. There’s an Enlightenment-era paradigm shift in metaphysics. It’s recorded history, not open for debate. The philosophical world is on fire. Every peer group member says to himself….why the HELL didn’t I think of that??? Ironic that Einsteins’s physics’ paradigm shift had to wait 30 years to be sustained because the technology of the day wouldn’t allow it even given the understanding of the primary ground, re: the math, but Kant’s metaphysics took 30 years to obtain even a respectable glimmer of comprehension because the peer group of the day couldn’t wrap their collective heads around even the basic conditional predicates.

If one has a background in K before studying S, he should recognize that S understood K pretty damn well, above and beyond the fact that S merely says he does.

Odd, innit, that a paradigm shift in metaphysics with a predication on empirical knowledge, logically proves as irreducibly the case that there is something the human intellect doesn’t know, and never can?

Given a system by which all empirical knowledge is possible, then defeat that system by making it impossible to know this something….why not make it so that something unknowable, actually is? Well, shucks, it can’t be the same as the unknowable thing, so what best to be exchanged for the unknowable, than the absolutely knowable, without question or exception, logically proved by the conclusion that the negation of such knowledge is impossible?

Those with sufficient exposure are already familiar with what the unknowable is in K, and also just as much what erasure of the unknowable is in S. Bottom line….if we know our will indubitably, and if it is possible to make the will, as it is known, to represent what K stipulated as unrepresentable, then the thing K said we couldn’t possibly know, just disappears, and with it the entire Kantian epistemological dualism.

My bitch? Kant’s will, re: the very thing we know best of all, can never do the job S’s will is called upon to do, re: replace what we don’t know at all. Kant’s will belongs to moral philosophy, and has nothing whatsoever to do with German transcendental idealism writ large, hence can never be, as a perfectly well-known conception, a substitute for a perfectly unknown conception.

But, you know as well as I the pervasiveness of cognitive prejudice. Pretty hard to dislodge what’s first absorbed.

Your proposal has several layers of complexity; several layers of existential dependency. We're looking for a bare minimum form of meaningful experience. We start with us. We set that out.
— creativesoul

I agree we start with us, because “us” is what we know, it is that by which all else is judged. When we examine “us”, we find that the bare minimum form of experience is the very multi-layered complexity of the human cognitive system. — Mww

In the examination of “us” as the bare minimum form of the possibility of experience is itself a multi-layered complexity.
————

My own view (….) allows much simpler iterations/forms of human experience than yours can.
— creativesoul

Mine doesn’t have form at all — Mww

In the first exchange, the subject was “us”; in the second exchange the subject is…..I understood to be….experience. I guess I figured you’d distinguish the first as the form of the possibility of experience, that is, the necessary conditions for it, while the latter presupposed experience as given. Dunno how to think a form into that which either is or is not.
————

I’m never going to be happy with that approach.
— Mww

Individual personal happiness is not necessary. — creativesoul

C’mon, man. Really? Would you rather I said…..here is an perfect example of an aesthetic judgement of mine in complete irreconcilable discord with a phenomenal observation?
————-

Picking oranges on a rainy day is neither an abstraction nor a mental construct. It's an experience — creativesoul

There is a physical activity understood by a certain relation; the relation is then cognized as picking oranges, and THAT is the experience.
————

Certainly, at numerous times prior to the emergence of humans, oranges were picked. — creativesoul

No, there was not. Never before humans were there oranges; there was, after humans, only non-contradictory inference for the existence of a certain kind of thing, eventually cognized post hoc as an orange by a human. Conception of a thing is not proof of existence.

Picking an orange implies intentionality. Before humans, from whence would intentionality in fact arise such that picking oranges was an existential activity?
————

All abstract conceptions are existentially dependent upon language use. — creativesoul

No, they are not; they are entirely dependent on deductive thought alone, from which they obtain their logical validity whether or not there ever is any existential representation at all.
————

Where there has never been language, there could have never been any notion of "picking oranges". — creativesoul

Notions, insofar as the conceptions representing them are predicated on sensuous image, re: phenomenal intuition, don’t need language anyway. The notion of “picking oranges” makes no sense to me; we pick oranges or we don’t. Picking oranges makes explicit we know what we’re doing; “picking oranges” implies we don’t. What’s the big deal?
————

The group itself consists of all the separate instances of picking oranges. They do not require being taken account of. — creativesoul

Maybe not, but the metaphysics of it all, does.

Now, given that the maladies of human beings…. — Shawn

Personally, I find the relative value of S’s philosophy not related to human maladies, but to the general human investiture in transcendental idealism.

in your opinion, is his enduring influence to this day due to him being right? — Shawn

Nahhh, not from this armchair. Whatever influence he has, is due to his being Kantian. And Kant is on record as denying to himself any certifiable empirically-grounded correctness….being right…..re: metaphysics as a doctrine cannot stand the tests of being a science, and insofar as if it is the case that the apple doesn’t fall that far from the tree, then S should also deny being right to himself.

On the other hand, to posit for the record his philosophy is more right than Kant’s**, which is simply to say Kant was wrong about this or that, merely reflects conclusions from disparate initial conditions, but that doesn’t make S’s PSR or WWR any more or less “right” than CPR, CpR, or CJ.

That any of us these days think one or the other right, is a different story altogether, predicated on mere aesthetic agreement, rather than factual correctness.

** “…. What I have in view in this Appendix to my work is really only a defence of the doctrine I have set forth in it, inasmuch as in many points that doctrine does not agree with the Kantian philosophy, but indeed contradicts it. A discussion of this philosophy is, however, necessary, for it is clear that my train of thought, different as its content is from that of Kant, is yet throughout under its influence, necessarily presupposes it, starts from it; and I confess that, next to the impression of the world of perception, I owe what is best in my own system to the impression made upon me by the works of Kant….”
(WWR, 2, App., 1844, in Haldane/Kemp, (pub) 1909)

As I said: personally…..

Very nicely worded…. — ENOAH

Thanks; much appreciated. But in all honesty, taken from a moldy Enlightenment tome, formerly a positive paradigm shift in philosophical thought but now in somewhat diminished favor.

The very notion of mental implies internal, in the sense of residing/existing/happening completely in the brain/mind, body, etc. I've a more holistic approach that makes the most sense of meaningful experience as neither exclusively internal nor external, but rather - consisting of both….. — creativesoul

I’m never going to be happy with that approach. Experience is an abstract conception, is entirely a mental construct, hence exclusively internal. What the experience is of, that which is represented by the mental construct, is not, hence is exclusively external.

It is impossible to arrive at experience without an object, but the object itself is not the experience. So rather than consisting of both, I find the one’s relation to the other to have the more explanatory power.
————-

My own view (….) allows much simpler iterations/forms of human experience than yours can. — creativesoul

Mine doesn’t have form at all; there is, or there is not, experience, period. In that respect, mine is far the simpler iteration. Yours might be simpler iff you meant to say the process by which experience occurs. Still, whatever process you might invoke should capture that which is established as human intellectual composition, such as judgement, understanding…..those abstract conceptions manufactured in order to comprehend something we know so little about we are forced to speculate if we wish to say anything at all.
————

Question: of all that supposedly attributable to lesser animals, in your opinion which is the primordial consideration such creature must attain antecedent to all else, in order for him to be afforded meaningful experiences? — Mww

In other words, what is it about a candidate that experiences, such that he must consider something, the negation of which is impossible.

Answer: he must consider himself as subject. He is that to which all representations, all objects of consciousness belong, such that there resides an implicit unity in the manifold of all rational/intellectual doings.

What is authorized for humans to claim, is that iff lesser animals do not consider themselves as subjects, they will not experience in the same manner as those higher animals that do. Which is all the original claim meant to emphasize in the first place.

No so called lesser animal (a label which I dispute) has any hope/fear of having meaningful experience because meaning is precisely what distinctly human mind constructs out of its incessant and autonomous dialectical processes. — ENOAH

My sentiments exactly.

And I mean “lesser” animal to indicate precisely that missing primordial consideration. And I mean “consideration” insofar as only in speculative metaphysics is that missing piece proven logically necessary.

The primordial consideration such creature must attain antecedent to all else if they were to similarly construct meaning….. — ENOAH

While this is sufficient cause for a given effect, whatever form the cause has, is reducible. I want to know to what it is reducible, such that THAT is irreducible, hence, primordial.

Part of the evolution of that system of signifiers involved meaning. — ENOAH

That’s gonna get a great big HOOYAH!!! from my most worthy dialectical cohort, .
——————

So that it seems like they are not expressing a single linguistic representation. But they are. If not the words….. — ENOAH

The words just ARE the linguistic representations, of the conceptions apprehended as belonging to each other, from which a cognition, hence a possible experience, follows. Before they become words, they are schemata, that which as a multiplicity of minor conceptions, is subsumed under a major. You touched on it with your “image-ing”, which I hold as a requisite component of human intelligence, in that we actually think in images. But we cannot express an image, project it beyond ourselves, so we developed language to do just that.
——————

That this seemingly silent apprehension, is in fact, yet a subtle description. — ENOAH

Pretty much, yep. A strictly internally constructed, and systemically employed, description. To descend another step into the metaphysical morass…..

…..the relation between the apprehension, re: the thought of “this” (an iteration of your “from the source, Reality”),
…..and the description, re: the cognition (your “constructed meaning”) of “this” as “that”…..
…..resides in pure reason, which subsumes the correspondence between “this” and “that” under pure principles a priori, in order for the ensuing experience, whereby “this” becomes knowledge, to be non-contradictory, not with itself, but with some other extant experience “that”, albeit of the same perceived thing…
…..and herein is a form of your implication of time, which follows from my position that experience is an end, a terminus of a speculative procedural methodology.

(From the cognitive neurobiology point of view, “this” is some initially stimulated neural pathway, “that” is a previously enabled pathway, the correspondence manifests in the meeting of the two pathways into a common network, from which the currently perceived thing becomes the same as, or sufficiently congruent with, the “dump truck”….or whatever….. experienced last week)
—————

….indirect realism gets my vote. — ENOAH

Mine as well. The real that is direct is so from its perception; the real that is indirect is so from its representation. It is by representation alone that knowledge of the real is possible, and knowledge is what we’re after, the real be what it may. The dual nature of human intelligence is required for these to subsist at the same time with respect to the same thing.

Anyway….fun to play with, plus, it’s legal.

My thesis is simple: moral subjectivism is internally inconsistent. — Bob Ross

You’ve stipulated conditions under moral subjectivism, but you haven’t stipulated moral subjectivism itself. What if moral subjectivism, as a self-consistent doctrine, has nothing to do with mere belief?

How does the internal inconsistency of moral subjectivism fare under the auspices of, i.e., a deontological moral doctrine predicated on necessity of law alone, which makes the contingency of mere belief irrelevant?

What makes subjectivism “moral” anyway? What it is that makes subjectivism in general reducible to a particular instance of it?

Would any of that matter with respect to your thesis? I think it does regarding when subjectivism is adjoined to moral predicates, but…..maybe not.

Meaningful experience requires….. — creativesoul

I agree with all that, which means I accept your general argument, perhaps while disputing the minutia of the grounds for it.

We must first have an experience as well as the ability to reflect upon it prior to being able to describe the conditions thereof/therein. — creativesoul

Would it have been better for me to have said the conditions for the possibility of our experiences must be apprehended beforehand, rather than described?

The candidate….must only be capable of drawing correlations…between different things in order to attribute meaning to different things. — creativesoul

In my world, apprehending the conditions for, manifests in the same mental process as drawing correlations between. I overlooked the pervasiveness of language-use conjoined to descriptive practices, insofar as I see no reason why the human cognitive system in itself, in its synthesis of conceptions to each other, have not in effect described the conditions by which an experience is given, without ever expressing a single linguistic representation of those conceptions or the cognition which follows from them.

The language less creature has no inkling of just how important a role the sun plays in its own existence. — creativesoul

I submit that kind of creature has insufficient rational capacity to apprehend the conditions by which the sun attains its role in a necessary relation to said creature’s existence, from which follows the only creatures known to function under such criteria, is the human creature.
————-

Question: of all that supposedly attributable to lesser animals, in your opinion which is the primordial consideration such creature must attain antecedent to all else, in order for him to be afforded meaningful experiences?

They can recognize their own offspring and kin. If these don't qualify for you as meaningful experiences, I'd be interested to hear why not. — Janus

Because they are all reducible to instinct. Meaningful experience implies reason, or at the very least, understanding, which is not a component of mere instinct.
————-

…..but Mww may correct me on this. — Janus

Thanks for the nod, but I wouldn’t ever be so presumptuous as to say I’m right. That being said….

So, on that account perceptible things become meaningful, and are thus perceived. — Janus

….might be better spoken with perceptible things become meaningful and are thus understood. That which has become meaningful, at least empirically, must have already been perceived, which makes “are thus perceived” superfluous. In short, meaning is not a quality of perception itself, but may be for that object which appears to it.

On this account there must be some pre-perceptual interactions already going on of course — Janus

There are pre-perceptual conditions, but not as yet interactions. If pre-perceptual, then there isn’t anything to which the pre-perceptual conditions can be connected. They’re there, ready and waiting, but idle, so to speak.

…..they involve the objects and the senses but are yet to reach the status of perception. I think Kant refers to this as "intuition" — Janus

It is not actually wrong from a Kantian point of view to say intuition involves objects and the senses. Nevertheless, to be technically correct, one should say, that which Kant refers to as intuition, re: “….the faculty of representation….” involves synthesis in imagination the object of which is a phenomenon. As you can see, this procedural episode is after, thus apart from, perception. That is to say, because they are given from perception, it is impossible that they reach the status of perception. Probably more simply understood by relegating perception to physiology, while holding intuition to mentality, each maintaining its own ground.

…..a bare minimum criterion for experience - shared between all individual cases thereof, is that the experience itself is meaningful to the creature having it. If all experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience, then the candidate under consideration(the creature having the experience) must be capable of attributing meaning to different things. — creativesoul

I agree that for a creature to have a meaningful experience, such creature must be able to at the very least describe the conditions of that experience, even if only to himself, in order for the meaning of it to be given.
— Mww

I don't agree with that. Weird way to use "I agree". — creativesoul

Ok, so how would you attribute meaning to an experience without a description of its conditions? If meaning is a relation, wouldn’t the relations need to be describable in order to comprehend that they belong to each other, which just is the meaning of it?
—————

Your proposal has several layers of complexity; several layers of existential dependency. We're looking for a bare minimum form of meaningful experience. We start with us. We set that out. — creativesoul

I agree we start with us, because “us” is what we know, it is that by which all else is judged. When we examine “us”, we find that the bare minimum form of experience is the very multi-layered complexity of the human cognitive system. No experience is possible at all, without the coordinated systemic process incorporated in human intelligence. Which is why I maintain the position, that without the complexity, experience, as such, the kind we know best and by which all other kinds must be judged, is undeterminable at least, and altogether impossible at most.

Bottom line….in examining meaningful experience the first thing to be done is to eliminate instinct, or any condition that could be attributed to mere instinct. And the best, more assured way to eliminate instinct, is to ground the necessary conditions for experience, as such, in reason alone.
————

I think one important thing to keep in mind is that meaningful human experience happens long before we begin to take account of it.
— creativesoul

Oh, absolutely.
— Mww

How do you square that with your minimum criterion presented earlier which demanded being able to describe the conditions of one's own experience in order to count as meaningful experience?

You see the problem? — creativesoul

There shouldn’t be one. I said describes even if only to himself. To describe conditions to oneself, is to think; to think is to synthesize conceptions contained in the conditions into a cognition.

Perhaps you’ve subbed in accounting for the experience insofar as it must be meaningful, while I’m accounting for the conditions by which being meaningful is possible. Meaning must be cognized insofar as it is a relation; experience is not a relation hence is not a cognition, it is an end, a terminus, of cognitions.

F’ing language games. When I hear “long before we begin to take account of it” I think long before we talk about it. To account for is to determine conditions; to take account of implies the determinations have been met. Dunno….maybe too analytical on my part.

…..for whatever a purpose is supposed to be follows from the kind/content of the judgement from which it is given.
— Mww
Ok, but this would seem to cover everything — tim wood

My teleological/aesthetic to your purposivity/purposefulnes…..don’t we want all our bases covered?

…..predisposition in accordance with subjective moral law.
— Mww
Hmm. There is in this a question of governance. — tim wood

Yes, undoubtedly. Or, if not governance per se, then at least legislation.

About ol’ Sydney’s last act: where/how does he fit into your notions of purpose with it?

Hey…..
Good to see you once again.

And purpose comes with – or is invented by – mind. — tim wood

Agreed. However purpose is understood, it follows from judgement alone, and for whatever a purpose is supposed to be follows from the kind/content of the judgement from which it is given.

Can we do purpose without first doing teleology on the one hand, or aesthetics on the other?

Invented or discovered? Neither: they follow implicitly and necessarily from that which is the condition for them, that being….a-hem…..predisposition in accordance with subjective moral law.

Not much more I can contribute here, however interesting the topic is. I have neither opinion nor knowledge regarding purpose in and of itself, so….

…..a bare minimum criterion…. — creativesoul

I agree that for a creature to have a meaningful experience, such creature must be able to at the very least describe the conditions of that experience, even if only to himself, in order for the meaning of it to be given.

I'm saying that direct perception of distal objects is necessary for all cases of human perception, and that there are many other creatures capable of it as well. — creativesoul

I agree with that as well, with the caveat that mere direct perception is very far from meaningful experience. It would be far less contradictory to posit creatures with eyes directly see things, than it is to posit that same creature that directly sees things obtains a meaningful experience from that direct perception alone.

Are you saying that direct perception of distal objects is not necessary for meaningful experience….. — creativesoul

Assuming the possibility of experience in general, yes, not necessary for meaningful experience, re: echolocation in bats and whales. Direct perception is an unmediated receptivity by the creature, whereas echolocation is direct receptivity of that which has been initially projected from the creature.
(awful loosely-goosey here, cuz the counterpoint will inevitably take the form….light reflected off objects enabling direct perception by vision is no different in kind that echolocation reflecting off objects. Depends on how precisely one needs his definitions to be, I guess, and their relation to a complete system)

…..or that direct perception of distal objects is insufficient for meaningful experience…. — creativesoul

In humans, yes, it is very much the case that very much more than mere perception is necessary for experience. In any other creature, it is impossible to justify with the same irreducible certainty, in that it is not so certain that other creatures have experiences, as such, in the same form as those creatures which require more than mere perception for the meaningfulness of their experiences to even be possible in the first place.

…..or that direct perception of distal objects is something that is exclusive to only humans? — creativesoul

We are entitled to say that direct perception is necessary for human experience, but we are not entitled to say experience predicated on direct perception is exclusive to humans.
—————

I think one important thing to keep in mind is that meaningful human experience happens long before we begin to take account of it. — creativesoul

Oh, absolutely. One of my philosophical pet peeves is the gross mistake in thinking a speculative prescription of the human cognitive system, which requires language use, is how the damn thing actually works, which needs no language use whatsoever. I’ve said in this conversation, that we in fact do not know what experience in humans really is, but that doesn’t dissuade us from inventing stuff in order to relieve the itch of wanting tell ourselves at least something about it.

So, yes, I agree without equivocation that whatever human experience is, it happens long before it can be talked about. And if such is the case, and is the case beyond legitimate scepticism, what does that say about our talking about those creatures, the only indicator for the possibility of experience in them, manifests as nothing more than mere behavior? From which logically follows…plants have meaningful experience insofar as they behave in a very specific fashion in relation to sunlight.

How dare we, from no more than perceiving whales in the motionless vertical position, suppose they are experiencing sweet dreams over gruesome nightmares.
—————-

Again, I think that one basic necessity for having meaningful experience is the ability/capability of attributing meaning to different things. I do not see how it is possible for any creature that is inherently incapable of perceiving different things. — creativesoul

This still leaves the problem of attribution of meaning even when the perception is given. It now becomes the situation where the perception is merely the occassion by which a meaningful experience is possible, but in itself, perception does not give whatever meaning the experience will end up having.

This relates to our conversation because in humans there is an established methodology for attribution of meaning to experience predicated on biological structure, and it is always and only by this methodology we can say what experience is. It is, therefore, illegitimate to attribute this known established methodology to those creatures the biological structure of which cannot support the conclusions thereof.

Ya know….if we say other creatures have meaningful experiences, just not like ours….what have we really said? Nothing. Not a damn thing. Who the hell cares about an experience that isn’t like ours, when it is ours alone by which we can understand anything at all?
————-

And how do we get our experiences right?
— Mww

That's a great question. Methodological approach matters. Guiding principles matter. Basic assumptions matter. Comparison to/with current knowledge base matters. — creativesoul

Do you have, can you iterate, offer examples of, those?
————-

…..a priori and a posteriori are used to distinguish types of knowledge, justification, or argument by their reliance on experience — creativesoul

Distinguish types, yes, but not by reliance on experience. By the origins of conceptions and their relation to each other in cognitive propositions which are one or more of either knowledge, judgement or argument. All of which is a function of understanding alone, not of, hence not in reliance on, experience. This minor rejoinder would have been different if you’d said distinguished in relation to, rather than by reliance on, experience.

…..we must first get our own meaningful experience right prior to being capable of discriminating between experiences that only humans are capable of and experiences that some other creatures are as well. — creativesoul

And how do we get our experiences right?
——————

Direct perception of distal objects is one physiological capability that all experiencing creatures must possess. This points towards the irrevocably important role that biological machinery plays. — creativesoul

This presupposes all experiencing creatures experience via direct perception, which makes explicit there is no other way to experience, irrespective of the type of creature. We have no warrant for claiming that is a valid condition, from which follows there is nothing necessarily pointing to the irrevocably important role biological machinery plays. Just because it is so for humans does not mean it is so for all intellects.

Do you restrict experience to only humans? Are non human animals forbidden, by definition, from having any experience? — creativesoul

Experience, as such, yes, the reason being, all of that by which experience is considered a valid concept is derived purely a priori from the nature of human intelligence alone, and insofar as this concept is a priori, it can never apply outside the intelligence from which it arises. That being said, experience, as such, is forbidden to non-human animals, but that does not preclude them having something conceptually congruent with it, albeit exclusive to their kind of intelligence.

Besides, and we’ve previously agreed on this without equivocation, to profess that a human condition may also be assigned to non-humans, is anthropomorphism, the bane of good philosophizing. So while other animals may have something, we aren’t qualified to say what that something is, even if logically we are authorized to say what it is not.
————-

For my part, although we cannot know everything, we can surmise one very important feature of our own experience. It is meaningful to us. — creativesoul

Yes, I suppose experiences are meaningful, but to surmise meaning from experience is to presuppose experience, which still leaves the primary question of what it is, which just means that in order for experiences to be meaningful, experience would need to be defined in such a way as to accommodate meaningfulness in it.
(Sidebar: my definition of experience is unlikely to meet with more than your passing glance, which is fine; I don’t mind. No theoretical philosophy is correct, after all, right?)

I rather attribute meaning to conceptions, in that whatever is represented by a conception is the meaning of it. To attribute “round” to an object just means that object is understood to have a certain shape and no other is attributable to it without self-contradiction. This pertains because we can attribute concepts and thereby meanings to a thing without ever actually experiencing it, that is to say, we can merely think it, re: algebra. Or, heaven. But I guess all that just reduces to all experiences are meaningful but not all meaningfulness is experiential.

Anyway…..for what it’s worth.

It's the direct perception part we agree on, I think? — creativesoul

Ahhhh….yes, sounds good to me.

We differ when it comes to what all is involved in/for experience. — creativesoul

It’s tough, innit? On the one hand we just don’t know, on the other we make stuff up to tell ourselves at least something.

What all is involved? That’s gonna be a pretty long list, I should think, depending on what one thinks experience is. In my world, experience is an end, the terminus of the human speculative intellectual methodology, from which follows, all that is involved for that end, is the sum of the means necessary for the attainment of it.

I know you’re not a great fan of this kind of method, and you’re certainly not alone. But we’ve all got our favorite persuasions, for better or worse.

This topic finds agreement between us. — creativesoul

Hopefully you’ve understood and I were both talking about human experience related to things active in the world, re: “what a cow is doing”, and its manifestation as an appearance to people such that experience of it is possible.

Under the assumption you’ve understood that, it causes consternation when juxtapositioned to…..

….whether or not cows can have experience…. — creativesoul

…..which is quite disconnected from human experience, and for which….

Biology looms large. — creativesoul

……would have no apparent relevance insofar as all humans have the same biology.

Help me understand what agreement we’re having here?

I don’t understand how you get from “unmediated empirical affect” to “mediated representation”. — Luke

From the object’s point of view, it is an effect on human sensory devices. From the point of view of those devices, the object is an affect on them, they are affected by it. Upon transformation by the components of the system, the object that effects has become a mediated representation, called phenomenon.

Just as perception is that by which the external object passes into the internal domain of sensation, so too is intuition that by which the sensation passes into the domain of representation. Perception is where an object is sensed, intuition is where the sensed object is represented.
————-

Are you talking about the mediation of our perceptions of objects? — Luke

Not exactly. Perception is just like a knock on the door, letting you know there’s someone on the other side wanting something from you. Also called the veil of perception, the epistemic problem, when all it really is, is an occassion for initiating the use of the intellect under empirical conditions alone.
—————

What is being mediated here? — Luke

The effect the object has on the human sensory receptivity, called sensation.
—————

What are they mediated by? — Luke

Scientifically, this sensation goes to this part of the brain, that sensation goes to that part of the brain, so as not to confuse one with the other. Sensation, then, is mediated by the section of the brain to which it is sent in accordance with the nerve bundles in the body responsible for transferring from one place to another.

Metaphysically, hence the implication of indirect realism itself, sensations are mediated by that which arranges the content of a sensation according to its form, meaning from which apparatus the sensation arose. All this is doing, is informing the downstream cognitive part of the system which conceptions belong to which kind of sensation, such that those related to the smell are not adjoined to what is heard, and so on. It is the reason we never associate the concept “loud” in the determination of an object’s sensation delivered by the nose. Understanding, according to rules, donchaknow.

Some folks have better luck with, and actually this whole snafu originated from, the conceptions mediate and immediate, rather than direct and indirect. Objects are given to us immediately….they are there or they are not, no gray area, nothing controversial, insofar as it makes no difference what the something is, but only that something is there. Objects considered, contemplated, conceived, judged, experienced, whatever……are mediated, meaning something is being done to the given by that which is not contained in it.
————-

…..I am not an indirect realist. — Luke

Oh, but as soon, or as long, as you talk about this kind of stuff, you must be. The really real is the brain at work you can’t talk about because you don’t know what to say, the indirectly real is the brain at work that you can talk about because terms are invented in order to make it possible.

Brains aren't presented with cows. — Michael

Correct; you’re preachin’ to the choir. See my comment to Banno three days ago, pg. 66.

The difference now is, you said “talk of what the cow is doing”, which presupposes it as an extant experience.

We don't need to talk about what a cow is doing to talk about what the brain is doing. — Michael

Nope, we sure don’t. To talk about what the brain is doing there doesn’t even need to be a cow to talk about. But to talk about what the brain is doing when presented with a cow, there damn sure better be one.

Good on ya for “acquaintance”. Might be useful to juxtaposition with “description”; all the cool kids have already done it.

On the sense datum view, seeing an object, O, is a matter of having some visual experience, E, that has been caused by O in the appropriate way (whereby E's intrinsic nature can be characterised independently of O).

Caused by O in an appropriate way…yes.

Whereby E’s nature can be characterized independently of O….not a chance.

There must be something given by O, first, that makes E possible, and second, grounds that by which the knowledge of O becomes possible.

E’s nature cannot be characterized independently of O. If E could be characterized well enough independently of O, there wouldn’t need to be an O in order to have an E:

(“….We would find ourselves in a position whereby we would require to affirm an appearance without that which appears, which would be absurd….”)

O’s causal conditions must be determined, in order for E to be determinable.

If you want to argue for indirect realism, then you must hold the view that our visual perception of material object is mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (or mental representations). — Luke

….mediated by the perception of synthesis with some other entities, such as representations.

We don’t perceive both the object and the representation of the object. We don’t mediate the perception of the object, re: direct realism of the given; we mediate the affect the object manifests via its sensation, re: indirect realism of the phenomenon, or image, but either as representation.
———-

Then where is the mediation of our perception of visual objects by the perception of some other entities such as sense-data? — Luke

All representation is mental; “mental representation” is redundant, confusing and unnecessary;
Sense data is one thing, representation is quite another; if all representation is mental, then it is the case all sense data is not;
To mediate is to arbitrate or condition; that which is a perception cannot arbitrate or be arbitrated by, another perception. Perception mediated by perception is improper and confusing;
Sense data just is the unmediated empirical affect the object has, that data, that affect, conditioned by something very different, is the subsequent mediated representation of the perceived object. This is indirect realism.

Only in this way is it possible for the object to be external, re: in the world, but the experience of the object internal, re: in the brain. Which, of course, is exactly the way it is for humans, and probably for every intelligence of any kind.

Direct realism has to do with perception of objects; indirect realism has only to do with conditions by which the system continues is procedure, insofar as without something to work with, the system stops, and in the case of humans there would be nothing beyond sensation, which is absurd. The realism of representation merely expresses a necessity for the internal systemic process, the external world be whatever it may.

All good.
—————

….we never see shoes. — Banno

Correct. We see things. Undetermined things. Through metaphysical systemic functionality, we cognize representations of those perceived things, in this case as “shoes”. Nothing is lost in conventionally saying we see shoes, insofar as merely saying stuff takes no account of, thus has no appreciation for, the origin of what is said.

However speculative it may be, there’s nothing amiss with the system, hence no infinite regress. And no idiotic homunculus argument, the proverbial red-headed stepchild of the ill-informed.

And what lies downstream? — NOS4A2

Speculative metaphysics, a complete, logically consistent, sufficiently explanatory theory on the one hand, scant but progressive empirical knowledge on the other.

You sense sensations, then? — NOS4A2

Mmm…….no.

At any rate, it’s closed system. — NOS4A2

Metaphysically, yes, downstream from that which is not physiologically conditioned; scientifically, yes, downstream from nerve endings.

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object.

That which appears….

the object stimulates the body's sensory organs.

Perception….

These sensory organs transform the input energy

Sensation….

This raw pattern of neural activity

Intuition….

These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed

Productive imagination…..

The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

Phenomena…..

Full stop.

Of particular note is the resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus, as yet has no name, but is merely the instantiation of the system operational parameters in general, constant over every “distal stimulus”, a.k.a., sensibility. In other words, the brain has only been informed that there is an object, which has been transformed into something it can use, as opposed to the object’s real worldly material composition, from which follows the properties which define the object, or articulate how the material composition is to be comprehended, are not included in, nor are they available from, the mere sensation of it.
————

the grammar of "I experience percepts" that just isn't there…. — Michael

This is correct, insofar as experience cannot be of mere precepts, iff the above is the case. By experience is made explicit knowledge of what that distal object is, which cannot occur from mere nameless presentation to the brain without the brain then doing something additional to it, by which a name is given. In metaphysics, this is the domain of cognition; in neuroscience, network enabling, and tacit explication that experience should never be part of the systemic process itself, but is the end obtained by it.
————

And what is seen is the shoe; what is heard is the phone - not the percept. — Banno

What is seen and heard is sensation in general, derived from the stimulus of the distal object, in general. It has not been determined, i.e., as “shoe” or “phone”, or as any particular named objects.

Is it not the precept that is seen or heard, or, in general, it is not the precept that is sensed. It is the sensed that is the precept, non-fallicious cum hoc ergo propter hoc, upon arrival in the brain (in fact), or, arrival in understanding (metaphysically).

The definitive footnote: it can only be said what is seen is the shoe iff there is already extant experience of that particular distal object, and even so, such is merely facilitated convention, and not the technical operation of the system itself, which remains ever constant.
————

Indirect realists aren't idealists. — Michael

They must be, albeit of a specific variety, insofar as indirect realists, as such, cannot be proper scientists. Following the “science of perception”, only an idealist will be inclined to assign conceptual systemic representations to the operation of the brain without ever taking a single measurement, whereas the measurements with which a scientist concerns himself do not have the same names as the idealist’s representations.
———-

All this has been done already. Only the names have been changed to protect ignorance of its ancestry.

….you clearly don't know anything about the religion Flawlessism….. — Echogem222

Nor do I have to, in order to argue the philosophy of its ground.

All we have are "stories" that are constructed and enacted in experience and we argue about their merits. — Apustimelogist

That’s half of what we have, albeit the more important half. It is necessary there be that which serves as the occassion for the construction of the stories, therefrom the experiences we argue about. If there weren’t things to be experienced as trees, there wouldn’t be trees.

…..it just means that you'll never think about it. — Echogem222

If it is the case to think just is the employment of the faculty of understanding, then the negation would be necessarily true, in that to not think is to not employ that faculty. So it isn’t so much a lack of understanding, which implies an attempt, but rather, understanding, with respect to this certain thing, is never even brought to bear.
————

we could all have been created by something that we have no awareness of, which would be nothing to us, therefore, nothing creating everything is reasonable — Echogem222

This could only be justified by changing “nothing creating everything” to nothing to us creating everything. Otherwise, there is something that creates us but nothing creating everything, a blatant contradiction.

Or so it seems…..

But I don't want to go further and impute a dualistic structure to the mind-independent actuality. — Janus

A perfect example of the difficulties with language: to impute dualism to actuality is metaphysically disastrous, re: whatever is just is, Aristotle’s A = A, but when actuality is qualified by “mind-independent”, a dualism is automatically given.

An overly-critical analyst might even go so far as to assert there is no such thing as “actuality” without an intelligence affected by it, the repercussion being non-dualism is impossible, from which follows A = whatever I think it is.
———-

It seems that language is dualistic in its logical structure, its grammar. If that is so, then all of our discourse will be dualistic also. (…) I don't think our mindsets are that far apart. — Janus

Respectfully, I submit that our intelligence is dualist in its logical structure, and language merely represents the expression of its employment, so our mindsets are at least that far apart. Dualistic in logical structure just meant to indicate the rational/empirical grounds for proof, the former being necessary from which follows the possibility of truth, the latter contingent from which follows the possibility of knowledge.

Anyway….historically we’ve noticed between us the pitfalls of OLP, so in that respect, we’re not that far apart.

…..accept a set of principles that increases the prospects of others….. — Rob J Kennedy

A set of principles? Given the fundamental nature of principles in general, why would a set of them benefit the opportunities of one person over another?

If it is the case “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” is a fundamental principle, and each member in a community is subject to that principle, why would I need to relinquish anything in order for any of them partake in it?

No, I would not be willing to give up my job, such that the next guy could claim the income from it. On the other hand, I might be willing to relinquish something in order to facilitate the opportunity for another to be subject to that fundamental principe, ranging from going to war, or merely going to vote.

Hardly a simple question, methinks, insofar as the domain of the query itself is more anthropological/psychological than philosophical, but the response is predicated entirely on a moral disposition, which is altogether philosophical. The ol’ apples/oranges thing.
————-



HA!!! You beat me by scant seconds.

Our own notions of representations will constantly come up against fuzziness and exceptions to rules. All this suggesting that what we think of as representations are redundant to whatever is going on underneath the hood — Apustimelogist

No disagreement from me here. Nevertheless, we don’t know what goes on under the hood, yet we rise to the occassion of making it comprehensible to ourselves, in some form, by some method. Representation is merely a component which fits into one of those methods. Besides, and quite obviously, we do not think in terms of neural activity, even if that is exactly how the brain works, which is perfect justification for a substitute descriptive methodology. To be a rationally adept human is to be discontented with no understanding at all, so we throw stuff at the wall, see what sticks, and whatever does is what we deem as understandable. Hence, speculative metaphysics; been that way since Day One.
—————

a tacit admission that whatever is said from a purely speculative point of view…..cannot possibly be the method the brain…..actually uses.
— Mww

I'm not understanding this. Could you say more? — frank

Maybe what I said just above is sufficient? Enlightenment philosophy in general understood the brain’s overall necessary functionality without knowing hardly a single thing about the brain, so whatever we say about what’s going on between our ears is a fiction with respect to the physical operation of material substances. All Kant wanted to state as a warning to his peers, is to be careful in the construction of those fictions, one of which….his in particular it so happens….is what you already said regarding a built-in a priori framework.

The more I think about it, the less I think representationalism makes sense. — frank

Think about what? Representationalism makes perfect sense metaphysically, which just indicates an logically necessary method describing how our intellect works. But to think about how the brain as a physical substance works, as that by which our intellect is possible, representationalism wouldn’t even be a theoretical condition, hence wouldn’t make any sense to include it in an empirical descriptive method.

In A4/B8 Kant says, “…..(may be avoided if) we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account.…”, a tacit admission that whatever is said from a purely speculative point of view, sufficient for us to comprehend what it is we do with our intelligence, cannot possibly be the method the brain, in and of itself, actually uses to provide it.

I don't like to assign locations to things like ideas or experiences — Janus

Understood. Concepts. Intuitions. Judgements. Representations. Numbers. Pretty hard to pin down the location in the brain of those thing that don’t even exist in concreto anyway, except as explanatory devices in abstracto.

OK, fine. Experiences don’t exist in the brain, but the things the brain does, whatever that is, that makes it seem like experiences exist in the brain, exist in the brain.
————-

I am no dualist, though, except when it comes to our thinking and judging. — Janus

In for a penny, why not in for a pound? Thinking and judging is just about the entire human conscious intellectual environment anyway, isn’t it?

At least now I have a better idea regarding your mindset, so, thanks for that.

…..it doesn't follow that experience is in the brain. — Janus

The implication being, it is possible experience is not in the brain, which is the same as outside the brain, or in a place where the brain is not. If one maintains that he experiences things in the world, in conjunction with the implication his experiences are not in the brain, and, if he maintains all his experiences belong to him alone, then it is necessarily the case he himself is not in his own brain.

I’m sure you do not hold with that perfectly justified logical deduction, or at least its conclusion. So which is the false premise?