But language is the tool of the philosopher, and we ought at least understand something of how it works, and seek to use it well. — Banno

And thinking is the tool of the human being…….

I don't understand what this says. — Banno

No problem, examples notwithstanding. That understanding is required nonetheless, in order for the argument following from it to hold. Basically all it says is an idea carries its own negation, a proposition carries its own negation, but an idea cannot carry the negation of a proposition, as you implied.
————-

I think that logic and philosophy of language have moved on considerably over the last two hundred years — Banno

No doubt, those being some of what we as humans do.

But one thing hasn’t, not one iota, that being how we do what we do.

An insult to our intelligence, I say, to move on from an inquiry into how we think, for no other reason than a satisfactory proof for it is inaccessible….a euphemism for ‘well geewhiz, it’s just too hard fur lil’ ol’ me to bother with’…..yet substitute an inquiry into how we speak, for which a satisfactory proof is not even required.

Or….how to dumb-down while attempting to maintain a respectable face.

…every idea contains the seeds of its own negation, — Janus

Then presumably there is an idea that negates "every idea contains the seeds of its own negation"...? — Banno

An idea is a “problematic conception”, a singular representation of the understanding, for which the intuition of an object belonging to it is impossible, or, the representation of an object inferred as belonging to it, does not relate, re: the idea is unintelligible.
(E.g., truth, justice, up)
(re: solid time)

A proposition is a subject/copula/object synthetic judgement, necessarily containing a plurality of conceptions in a relation to each other, and is for that, a cognition.
(E.g., idea/contains/seed)

To contain the seed of its own negation merely indicates the principle of complementarity intrinsic to the dualistic nature of human intelligence, insofar as the complement for any such problematic conception, is given immediately in the thought of the original, the complement, being immediately given, requires no thought at all, insofar as its representation is precisely whatever the original’s is not.
(E.g., fiction, corruption, down)

The negation of a proposition, on the other hand, is never given immediately by the construction of the original, but is itself a different judgement predicated on different conceptions, or different modalities of the same categorical conception, all of which, without exception, must be cognized as such.
(E.g., idea/contains/words; idea/does not contain/seed)

To posit the notion that an idea contains the seeds of the negation of a proposition, is a gross misunderstanding of the constructs of theoretical a priori human reason, to which the conflict properly belongs, by the insinuation of analytic language philosophy, to which it doesn’t.

every idea contains the seeds of its own negation, — Janus

Yep.

Such speculations are metaphysical, not physical. — Gnomon

Depending on whose terminology is used, such speculations are transcendental, insofar as ALL speculations, whether physical/empirical or transcendental, are metaphysical. Anything predicated on logic a priori, as opposed to observation a posteriori, is from a logical ground, hence the name transcendental. Other philosophies, or even other properly scientific doctrines, re: demonstrable cause/effect conclusions, may use other names, but reason itself remains as it is.

….was Kant saying that his own Transcendental Idealism is an illusion and an error? — Gnomon

No.

….was he merely warning about how easy it is for reason to accept "appearances" as reality, and also to imagine "ideals" as more real than the testimony of the senses? — Gnomon

Reason doesn’t concern itself with the reality of appearances, nor imagining ideals. Reason is a logical function, by which the principles we understand in support of science, are applied to that which science doesn’t support, or hasn’t yet supported. Sometimes it works, re: chasing light beams and standing in free-falling elevators, sometimes it doesn’t, re: an unconditioned cause.

The transgression occurs when we try to extend our metaphysical Minds beyond the physical limits of space-time-matter-energy. Is that excursion even permissible in modern empirical Philosophy? — Gnomon

From the prelude to the exposition of the antinomies….

“…. It may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in fact, a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being presented and intuited in a possible experience. But we should express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we said that we can have no knowledge of an object, which perfectly corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical conception thereof.

Now the transcendental reality at least of the pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something that we do know, to something of which we do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheless, by an unavoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although indeed, as regards their origin, they are very well entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of reason, but are necessitated by its very nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.…”
(CPR, A339/B397)

…..the argument is that it isn’t so much a question of whether or not our metaphysical minds are permitted to wander beyond the limits of space-time-matter-energy, but that it has a tendency to so wander in accordance with its own nature. The antinomies themselves merely demonstrate, on the one hand, reason’s proclivity to transcendental illusion, and on the other, the very same reason’s exposition of the error contained in it.

Humans do this all the time, albeit not necessarily on the extreme scale shown in the antinomies, in that no matter what anybody says, from deities to theoretical physics, odds are that somebody else will find something wrong with it.

Ok. Thanks.

You’re overthinking it, perhaps.

The context is…..what exemplifies philosophical thought, pursuant to the OP, or elaborations on it. This asks for something in general, not a specific theory or its predicates. I’m just saying the erasure of us from the picture of that which exemplifies philosophical thought, is impossible, in that whatever it is, without us, there isn’t any philosophical thought to exemplify.

Kant erased real human individuals from the picture in favour of an abstraction, the transcendental subject: — Jamal

The context is what exemplifies philosophical thought. Real human individuals, in the form of “finite human beings” never are alone sufficient for that which exemplifies philosophical thought, even if such beings are necessary for it, hence the erasure of such beings thoroughly eliminates philosophical thought, but doesn’t exemplify what it is. This ultimately reduces to…..we weren’t so much erased, as we were merely presupposed, as finite human beings, in a picture of that by which philosophical thought is first possible, and subsequently exemplified.

The claim that the erasure of us, which in the stated context is merely a plurality of selfs, was something accomplished with respect to that which exemplifies philosophical thought, is the absurdity…or, apparent absurdity…..needing address.

Knitted my eyebrows right there myself.

…..none of the supposed solutions is tenable. — Banno

Yeah, it’s pretty much established, via the historical record in general and this article by Chalmers in particular, that philosophy’s main claim-to-fame is to never leave well-enough alone.

Yeah, my mistake. The quote says not plausible, which isn’t the same as implausible.

So this must be the joke everybody’s talking about….all positions are implausible but any of them might be true. And if one of them turns out to be true, it mustn’t have been implausible after all.

Which just says substance monism is no better or worse than any other -ism. So what’s the point of it? How is it not adding another implausibility on top of all the others?

I’d hope a guy with his credentials would posit something useful. And if one of them must be true, does he make any headway in showing his position is?

Far FAR too many -isms and their respective -ists for me.

So if no position on the mind-body problem is plausible, and substance monism is a position that addresses that problem, what advantage does it hold?

Thanks.

As in, “…. the thesis that the universe is fundamentally mental….that all concrete facts are grounded in mental facts….”?

Substance monism arises from that?

Do you take 'transcendental' to mean beyond experience, unknowable? — Janus

It is a method, a type, of reason, of thinking, by which, first and foremost, the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions are proven. Subsequently, and using such cognitions as logical ground, transcendental this or that just indicates the conditions under which this or that is thought about.

So you can cognize beyond experience and knowledge by thinking transcendentally, but transcendental doesn’t mean a reality of things beyond even possible experience and knowledge, which technically, is termed transcendent.
————

All we know is that we think there must be such a reality, a transcendental (because unknowable-as-it-is-in-itself reality), but a reality nonetheless — Janus

Hmmm…..Do we think there must be, or is it more likely we only think it is not impossible that there may be?

that is why I say transcendental realism seems to logically follow. But again that is not an empirically established conclusion (…) It is, rather, an inference to the best explanation. — Janus

Interesting. Logically follow….from what? What do you think is better explained by inferring a transcendental realism?

Even more interesting….how does the consistency of our perceptual representations suggest our senses are representing the noumenal accurately enough for practical purposes?

I’m trying to think like you, so give me more to work with, maybe?
————

You said: This from the Chalmers paper seems to support my interpretation of Kant:

Kant’s transcendental idealism is not really a version of idealism in the metaphysical sense I am concerned with here.

What version of idealism in a metaphysical sense is Chalmers concerned with?

You agree the object in itself is transcendental (to experience) and real….so why not transcendental realism? — Janus

I suppose transcendental to experience just means has nothing to do with it. Transcendental merely indicates a method of reason, and is always a priori, so I’d agree the thing in itself has nothing to do with experience. Took me awhile to sort that out, and I’m still not sure if I read you correctly.

As to why not transcendental realism, is the assignment of a mere conception alone to validate a physical object, and as we all know, conception alone is in no way sufficient for empirical knowledge. On the other hand, the fact of perception makes explicit the reality necessary for its cause, which makes the thing in itself a necessary antecedent condition, even if nothing can be known of it in itself, insofar as it is the representation only, of the thing in itself, that is.

So….here we go.

There are established philosophies in which is found a mix of Kantian transcendental conceptions adjoined to real objects, re: Berkeley and successor dogmatic idealists, the ground of which is the attribution of Kantian transcendental conceptions of space and time as properties adhering in objects.
(The granting of singular space and time to an object, as opposed to the relation of object to space and time generally. This thing is right here, right now, therefore a space and a time belong to any object right here right now)

For those who think thus, a form of realism in which space and time are properties belonging to objects, they wouldn’t thereby consider themselves transcendental realists, insofar as, transcendentally, in Kant, space and time are two conceptions embracing the infinite, yet having no intrinsic substance belonging to them, the seriously contradictory results of that being quite obvious.

1.) If space and time are infinite, it is impossible to even think, must less determine, which space and which time belongs to a particular object immediately appearing to our senses.

2.) If a space and a time belong to an object, it is impossible to explain motion and duration, without claiming the space and time follow the object because it is a property belonging to it. But if that is the reality, it needs be said what fills the void left by change of position and change in successive durations of such object. While empty space is conceivable as having no object in it, it is impossible to conceive of no space at all, which must be admitted if a moving object includes its own space.
(Sidebar: back in my higher education days, in the theory of electron movement….electrons go this way, holes go the opposite way, insofar as a moving electron leaves a hole where it was. But this, just as for space and time, can be a misappropriated conceptual device)

3.) Without the possibility of determining which space and which time, of the infinite manifold of each, belongs to an object, it is impossible to prove that one and only one object can have that one singular spatial property and it is impossible to prove that an object can exhibit the very same existence in a succession of times. Before thinking this is preposterous, reflect on Feynman positing that if it is impossible to determine which path the particle takes through the slit, we must admit it took all of them., a.k.a., “sum over histories” hypothetical premise. And with that initial premise, is given the starting point for demonstrations otherwise.

So there may be a realism in which space and time are properties belonging to objects, but it is impossible for those holding with it to be transcendental realists in a Kantian sense. And if it be granted Kant defines transcendental philosophy, then the notion of transcendental realism itself, is refuted, from which follows necessarily, that those holding with it, have misunderstood the world.

For transcendental realism to be a valid doctrine, the concept of transcendental itself, and all that follows from it, must be conceived quite differently.
————

I'm not an adherent, so not what I had in mind. — Janus

Not an adherent taken to mean regarding the hard problem…..hence my question mark. So did you have something else in mind, as to where we are left when it is the case there is one world but for which we cannot have direct, unmediated knowledge?

If #1…..not so sure a reality is a collective representation.
If #2…..real, and indeterminable.
If #3….that object which appears to us is determinable/knowable. The object in itself is the object as it doesn’t appear, hence is not determinable/knowable.
————-

where does that leave us? — Janus

With the hard problem of consciousness?

It's an interesting question whether Kant's "in itself" denotes a reality — Janus

“…. The schema of reality is existence in a determined time….”
“…. For I can say only of a thing in itself that it exists without relation to the senses and experience….”
“…. we can have no cognition of an object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensible intuition, that is, as phenomenon…”

Put them together, you get an affirmation that the thing in itself denotes an existence in a determined time.

controversy as to whether Kant's emprical/ transcendental dichotomy should be interpreted as a "dual aspect" or a "dual world" proposition. — Janus

If there is no direct knowledge of the world, but only of its representations, there is no need for a dual world. There is one world affecting the senses, half of a dual aspect, and the system by which it is understood, the other half.

Lots between the lines in all that, if you’re inclined to dig it out.

Everything I said here seven hours ago, doesn’t relate to the content of the post it was in response to. You did some serious editing, I must say.

Anyway…..I’m not up for a do-over, so, thanks for the talk.

That the truth depends on something isn’t that it depends on the existence of something. — Michael

Be that as it may, isn’t the prerogative of intelligence, insofar as it deems truth to be a valid idea, to determine what it does depends on, from whence does truth receive its justification?

I suppose you could argue for mathematical realism and claim that mathematical entities exist as abstract objects, but that seems both unnecessary and fantastical. — Michael

I’d go with fantastical, but I’d be reluctant to deny necessity. Just as for truth, there must be something by which the comprehending the appearance of natural relations, becomes possible.

What else is there?
— Mww

Probably nothing. The mistake is in thinking that a statement's truth depends on the existence of something. — Michael

On the existence of something, agreed. But it does seem as though truth must depend on something, and absent mind and matter there is probably nothing, that leaves truth to be dependent on probably something. Which probably causes the critical thinker to raise one incredulous eyebrow and the average thinker to raise ‘em both.
————

….there is a square root of 2. Its truth just has nothing to do with anything that exists. — Michael

Truth, here, just indicates there is no inherent self-contradiction in the proposition, which, again, requires a mind, does it not? Whether mind or reason, even if not attributed with existence, must be something. Or maybe it’s better to say must be not nothing.
————

And as a related point, (…) idealism doesn't entail solipsism. — Michael

No, it doesn’t and shouldn’t, but typically it happens. Definition-specific apparently.

…….there is a truth to the square root of 2 and this truth is independent of all the minds that exist. — Michael

……there is a truth to the square root of 2 and this truth is independent of all the matter that exists. — Michael

What else is there?

I don't read that as Kant conceding dualism….. — Janus

“…..The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, may be an empirical realist, or as he is called, a dualist. (…) A370a

The transcendental idealist is, therefore an empirical realist, and allows matter, as appearance, a reality which does not permit of being inferred, but immediately perceived.(…) A371

From the start we have declared ourselves in favor of this transcendental idealism, and our doctrine thus removes all difficulty in the way of accepting the reality of matter…” A370b

A is B, B is C, therefore A is C? That’s one way to read Kant as conceding the dualism with which the present general dialectic is concerned.

But that’s not even the most important part. Notice no mention of particular things, no mention of determined objects, but only of matter. If one then concedes Kant to mean the appearance of matter is not, and cannot be, the perception of named things, it becomes clear in relation to your….

I would say that our senses are not pre-cognitively affected by objects — Janus

….that in a Kantian sense, our senses are indeed pre-cognitively affected by objects. Senses are affected pre-cognition. Affected antecedent to their phenomenal representation, hence, antecedent to being thought, which is antecedent to be cognized as a particular form of matter, or, which is the same thing, as a particular object.

You’re probably thinking along the lines that as soon as we know what a thing is, our senses are not pre-cognitively affected. Which is fine, as long as you don’t consider what happens within the cognitive system itself, that tells it it has nothing to do when it receives an input to the senses from something already determined.

All sorts of inconsistencies arise if one considers the system stops doing its job, no matter the reason. On the one hand we have a system that works one way for knowing a thing, and on the other hand we have a system that works some other way for remembering the thing it knows. So far, so good. But what tells the system the known thing and the remembered thing relate to each other, sufficiently enough to be identical, and furthermore, what happened in the case where they do not so relate?

What’s the difference between saying we know the thing as a tree and remember it as such, or, we cognize some matter as being, e.g. a tree, every single instance of that matter being an affect on our senses? If there is no difference, it then suffices to say the latter very well could be the case, the immediate advantage being the removal of any operational inconsistencies, insofar as the cognitive system works in its procedural entirety each and every instance of the appearance of matter to it.

And what entails that matter affects the senses in such a way as to be consistently represented? Why…its being given to us as extended and shaped in a certain way in space, of course. As such, as far as concerns the senses, there never is a tree, a branch, a leaf. Or even the dirt all that came out of. There isn’t even any “coming out of”. There is only matter of certain extension and shape that were once not given, then were.

In general, then, as long as the matter’s extension and shape don’t change, the representations of them won’t change, and they all will end up being known as a single consistent thing to all observers with congruent cognitive systems, so everybody experiences the same thing. So when you asked that guy how many branches he sees, by all accounts he should see just as many as you, insofar as his senses are affected in exactly the same way, by exactly the same matter, as yours. All else being given….language, rationality and so on.

TA-DAAAA!!!! I mean….how much simpler can it be!!!!

….could be interpreted to mean that they really are extended and that on account of that they can make their appearance to our senses. — Janus

That is what is meant by the term appearance, yes.

Not to take sides, but the question in this…..

What could it then mean to say that there was a time before human beings existed?
— Janus

I said that it is a matter of empirical fact. — Wayfarer

….is not supported by the answer, unless time is to be considered an empirical matter, a contradiction. A time before humans existed certainly has meaning, but the meaning is logical, in the form of inference to a self-sustaining series of regressive successions, which are not themselves matters of empirical fact, and that only possible insofar as there happen to be humans with the ability to think in terms of mere relations.
———-

given the challenging nature of the issue — Wayfarer

Yeah, about that. Humans: invent stuff to explain other stuff, but can’t explain the stuff they invent to explain that other stuff. They say that stuff is only possible for us if this stuff comes first, but can’t say how this stuff came first.

And that’s only the half of it, fercryin’outloud!!! On top of all that, they demand certain knowledge of that stuff, but predicate that very certainty on stuff the certainty of which is completely different in kind and measure than belongs to that which they want to know about!!!!

It’s what makes philosophy so much fun: finding out who’s got the most reasonable explanation for, and means for preventing, the nonsense we inevitably bring upon ourselves.
———

I'm also intrigued that Kant appears to concede dualism in that passage — Wayfarer

I’m intrigued as to why he said for the record he is a dualist in A, but sorta misplaced it in B. Maybe he figured he didn’t need to say it twice….dunno. But it is conspicuous in its absence.

The question about what the world would be like without any percipients in it seems unanswerable, even incoherent, — Janus

Agreed. Who what ask? Inferences as to what it might have been like without them, abound, now that there are percipients that do ask.

…..to my way of thinking extension just is spatiality. — Janus

That’s fine. Spatiality is merely another form of the conception of space, which we already have. Extension is spatiality and extended in space say the same thing. But do either of them tell us anything about space?
——-

With the "degrees of separation" thing I actually had in mind the simple fact that objects appear extended to us….. — Janus

As long as appears in “objects appear extended” means objects are presented to us as being extended. Or, objects make their appearance to our senses by being extended. And not…objects look to us like they are extended. Only in this distinction does ’s A369 quote make sense, and indeed the conception of spatial extension itself, re: “… outer appearances (if their reality is conceded)…”.

do we merely imagine that we know what we are talking about with such projections? — Janus

Ha!!! Saturn isn’t even thought about absent its rings, but there was a time when it didn’t have any. And I seriously doubt quarks are actually colored. One can possibly experience that which he imagines, but he can never simply imagine that which he has experienced.

If imagination as a faculty has the power attributed to it in theory, it occurs that one always imagines that which eventually he comes to know. But with respect to the projection of existence you’re asking about, though, there are serious contradictions if we deny the existence of the world before human experience, which at least allows us to project that it did, but the fact remains, we cannot possibly know the fact of it in the same fashion by which we know apodeitically that stupid-ass tree has three branches.
————

Kant could have said that the empirical world, time and space and all, possibly exist outside of human experience and judgement, whereas they necessarily exist within that context? — Janus

He does say that. Then demonstrates how it is impossible, iff a certain set of conditions are in fact the case. If they aren’t, well…..time for another demonstration of a different kind, and we find ourselves faced with stuff like logical positivism, OLP and quantum mechanics, in which case…..errr, you know…..we imagine we know what we’re talking about.
———-

Experience is of representations of objects in space, but not of space itself, which can never be represented in us.
— Mww

I think we do perceive dimension, or degrees of separation, which just is space, so it seems I disagree here. — Janus

Maybe, but you’re talking perception and I’m talking experience. Yours is on the one end of the cognitive spectrum, as means, mine is on the other, as ends. Nevertheless, I’d say we think dimension and degrees of separation, which are just representations for the appearance of one object’s relation to an observer, or objects in relation to each other, and for which we couldn’t represent at all if those objects weren’t to be found somewhere other than in the very system which is thinking about them.

Yes, we do perceive degrees of separation…this is closer than that, this is adjacent to that. This is of the same time as that. This is this now but was that before. But, what, in the most basic, primal way possible, makes all that, make sense to us? Gotta start somewhere, right?

….I’m not sure about universal truth as such.
— Mww

I'm assuming from this that you don't think there are moral or aesthetic truths? — Tom Storm

Deontological moral philosophy mandates compliance to a moral law, which is the same as there being a universal moral truth, that if one adheres to this mandate without regard for circumstance and therefore without exception, then he is a truly moral agent. It is in this case a universal truth but under entirely subjective conditions.

Needless to say, it follows that there may be as many universal moral truths as there are truly moral agents. And even if one guy recognizes another as adhering to his moral truth, is nonetheless disgusted by it, hence would never adhere to it, which is sufficient to render objective universal moral truths to vanishingly small possibility.

Aesthetic truths are very different in occasion even if similar in form, insofar as they merely reflect some condition of a perceiving subject prescribed by the feeling instilled in him through observation of something with which he had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do. A guy’s aesthetic truth may very well be that the Mona Lisa is the ugliest broad he’s ever seen, and enlightenment of him by established authorities regarding the artist’s technique, the physics of paint and application of it, physics of light and shadow, sway him not the least.

The mitigating factor is causality. In the former, even though the subjective condition is an aesthetic feeling, it is a feeing of satisfaction as an effect for being a moral agent, which he caused himself to be and for which no representation is possible; in the latter the subjective condition is still an aesthetic feeling, but of a relative pain/pleasure affect caused only by the object, but for which representation is necessary.

So…universal truths in Nature the causality for which has nothing to do with us? No, I don’t think there are any, insofar as the logic of pure speculative reason is against us, but if there were we couldn’t ignore them. Universal truths for which we ourselves are causality? Yes there are, insofar as the logic of pure practical reason demands it to be so, but those we can, and often do, ignore.
———-

“…. many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been intended to be so very clear….”

Or….sometimes you just want a simple yes or no, but you end up with a miniature dissertation.

If I claim that the Universe existed prior to humans that is a claim about existence outside of the context of human experience and judgement. — Janus

That’s technically a logical inference, hence certainly not independent of human experience and judgement. Nevertheless, with this, you’re attributing a justified universal claim to existence, when we’ve been relating justified universal claims to human experience and judgement. Which reduces to….the specified existence is outside human experience and judgement, but the claim is not.
————

Our notion of existence is derived from our experience and the concept is fine in that context. But are we justified in projecting that concept beyond that context, by saying things like 'the world existed prior to humans' or the 'the world didn't exist prior to humans'? — Janus

Good point. It is a different kind of logical inference, however, that our existence….not the notion of it, but the fact of it….derives from experience on the one hand, which is deductive, and existences outside our experience, which is inductive. So, yes, I think we can project the concept, but not in that context; we invoke the category of necessity in the former, but possibility in the latter.
————

Not all experiences are spacial, but the body and all other objects are experienced as existing in spacetime. Does it follow that we and all other objects can only exist or be in spacetime? — Janus

Another good point. Yes, and no. Yes according to certain theories, no if other theories falsify the one that says yes. But there haven’t been any falsifying theories, at least no paradigm shifting, everybody’s on the new bandwagon kinda theory, so it seems we’re pretty much stuck with the paradigm-shifting theory we’ve already been given.

If I were to go all nit-picky, on ya, quibble-y even, I’d bring to your attention that no experience is spatial. They are temporal, as you said. Experience is of representations of objects in space, but not of space itself, which can never be represented in us.
————-

such claims are justified only if you believe that the very fact that we can imagine certain things reflects some higher, human-independent truth. — Janus

Ehhhh…maybe. I’m in the nature-of-the-human-beast camp myself; maybe we can imagine just about anything we want, just because we can. Even if there is a higher, human independent truth, it would only be comprehensible if our intelligence permits it, and if it did, it wouldn’t be either higher or human independent. And if it didn’t, then we’d never know about it anyway. You know…the ol’ transcendental illusion trick: reason thinks this stuff up, which is quite obviously within its purview, because we actually do it, but then can’t do anything with it.

Anyway….good talk.

….there can be no justifiable universal claims that purport to obtain independently of the context of human experience and judgement. — Janus

Ok, close enough. There certainly are justified universal claims, but there are no justified universal claims independent of human intelligence. I mean…where else but from human intelligence can any claim come from, justified or not?

There could be justifiable universal claims about human experience, but I understand such claims to be phenomenological, not metaphysical. — Janus

Sure, I guess. There is no such thing as universal human experience is itself a justified universal claim about human experience. Still, being tautological, the claim tells us nothing we didn’t already know, given the infinite conditions of space and time, which are the necessary conditions for experience in the first place, both of which are implied by universality, and is certainly contained in a metaphysical doctrine.

If phenomenology justifies universal claims about human experience other than the one I just stated…..so be it. I wouldn’t dare say there aren’t any, but I would dare you to offer one that isn’t every bit as metaphysical as it is phenomenological.
———-

Heidegger equates phenomenology with metaphysics, but then that would not be the kind of traditional metaphysics that does make claims that purport to obtain independently of the human context. — Janus

Hmmm. That presupposes there is such a traditional metaphysics, which may be true whether or not I’m even the least familiar with it. Which puts me in a tough spot, insofar as if you offer such a justified universal claim that purports to obtain independently of human context, in a non-traditional metaphysical way, in accordance with the phenomenological doctrine, I’m pretty sure I won’t understand it. But others seems to well enough, so…there ya go.

….would that not be to posit that such reasoning yields universal truth, at least as regards the human? — Janus

That’s not what kills the definition. Independent of human understanding, in the original post’s wording, does. But I see you’ve added the qualifier later.

There may be things that are true universally, re: pure mathematical and logical propositions, in accordance with our intelligence, but I’m not sure about universal truth as such. What could be true under any possible condition, including whatever kind of possible intelligence, when the totality of possible conditions is itself inconceivable?

I see a priori reasoning to principles as phenomenological and pragmatic, not metaphysical. — Janus

That’s fine, but with respect to Kant, from whence this exchange originated, metaphysics is a priori reasoning from principles, and the latter would always and necessarily consider the former as merely the tail wagging the dog. Unfairly perhaps, but from the meager top-down predisposition, there it is.

My definition of what qualifies as a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. — Janus

That definition would certainly turn any metaphysical doctrine endorsing it into irredeemable junk. Thankfully there are definitions without those conceptual relations, which do not.

As Kant has shown us, no metaphysical views are supported, because they are the erroneous attempt to extrapolate to an "ultimate" "god's eye" view of reality — Janus

Dogmatic metaphysical views, and metaphysical views as an empirical science, are not supported. And the metaphysical view regarding pure speculative reason’s attempts to obtain the unconditioned in any form, is not supported.

Some metaphysical views must be supported, otherwise transcendental philosophy as a doctrine grounded in synthetic a priori principles, is invalid. And even if the validity is subjected to dispute, it can only be from different initial conditions, which are themselves metaphysical views.
———-

There's an expression that captures what I was getting at: Cartesian anxiety….. — Wayfarer

I hadn’t considered Cartesian anxiety; just lending credence to….“the idea that we see the world as it is completely separately from us, as if we're not part of it - is mistaken”.

I'm not saying that our designation as 'beings' means that we are beings in the causative sense…. — Wayfarer

Cool. Just me, personalized conceptual analysis.

idealists" of a certain variety (…) have to bite the bullet and say that non-living things have some sort of experientialness…. — schopenhauer1

I hate the taste of bullets.

….the idea that we see the world as it is completely separately from us, as if we're not part of it - is mistaken…. — Wayfarer

It must be mistaken; it is self-contradictory. Twice.

If it was completely separate from us, we wouldn’t see anything at all;
Insofar as we do see, it is necessary that we be part of that something which is seen.
———-

…..through rational sentient creatures such as ourselves, the universe comes into being…. — Wayfarer

This seems dangerously close to sentience as sufficient existential causality. Might be more the philosophical case, that the universe assumes a form in accordance with the rationality of sentient creatures.

…..which is why we're designated 'beings'. — Wayfarer

I fail to grasp how that explanatory qualifier justifies the original assertion. Maybe just needs an elucidation of “being”…..

Me: idealism not in its strictest sense….external material reality granted;
You: strict idealism….external reality is material, denied.

What’s the difference? Not strict idealism grants; strict idealism denies. We’re saying the same fargin’ thing!!
———

Why Kant proposes an idealism, and that of a particular kind…..is in dispute to the empiricists of the day.

In the idealism Kant proposes…..noumena are proposed, superficially, in that they represent what not to do; or technically, in that they represent what understanding is capable of if left unchecked by itself. They are, after the paint has dried, metaphysically insignificant.

What I'm pointing out is that the claims of the idealists, such as Magee and Kant, are themselves delivered as "what actually is" about humans. — L'éléphant

“…. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite, in the first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as possible, what our opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in general….”

“… This completeness of the analysis of these radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions à priori which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain, provided only that we are in possession of all these radical conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the synthesis…”

“… Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the building.…”

Nothing in Kantian tripartite critical philosophy asserts “what actually is” about humans, but is merely a domain-specific series of if-then logical syllogisms writ large, which at most, says what actually is about a speculative theory.
———

On the other hand, there are “….claims (….) delivered as “what actually is”.…”, serving as premises for the logical method following from them….

“…. That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience….”

….and this, with respect to his theory of knowledge alone, is not idealism in its strictest sense, insofar as external material reality is tacitly granted as a necessary condition.