If we all accept that for Kant matter is empirically real, then how could it be the case that matter is empirically real yet the space and time that this matter is existing within is not empirically real? — RussellA

How could it be the case, that matter is real but space isn’t? That’s easy: come up with a whole bunch of ideas demonstrating how space isn’t real, let qualified investigators decide for themselves.

You know, like…..parts of space are just space, from which, incidentally, it acquires its ideality; space is no appearance or sensation or phenomenon, as do all real things; the space of a thing is one of two that cannot be thought away from the existence of a thing, hence cannot be the predicate in a judgement regarding what the thing is; space and time are not in the list of categories, hence are not, with respect to human understanding, necessary for the reality of things, but only for the knowledge of them. From which follows necessarily, that the knowledge of things is the determinant factor for their reality, the space of them utterly irrelevant, insofar as the thing must be whatever it is regardless of the space of it.

Better question might be….why does space have to be real? If you say, space is that which is contained in an empty bucket, what have you actually said? Even to say space is that which contains all things, doesn’t tell you a damn thing about any those things the totality of which is impossible for you anyway, which is the same as not knowing anything at all.

In the Introduction to CPR by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood is the statement that, for Kant, space and time are empirically real. — RussellA

“…. Our expositions, consequently, teach the reality (i.e., the objective validity) of space….”
(B44, in….well, everybody)

Validity being, of course, a logical condition. So yes, space and time can be thought as empirically real, such that the extension of things has that which is extended into, making the shape and/or motion of things comprehensible, yet they are not in themselves empirically real.

Parenthesizing objective validity also dissipates the necessity of implementing the category of quality under which is subsumed the conception “reality”, all of which is the functional purview of understanding, the faculty of logic, which Kant isn’t yet considering. In addition, the use of objective in the exemption subsidizes the use of empirical, such that reality in 44 becomes empirical reality in 45.

Imagine how practically impossible it would be to talk about things, if it were denied from the outset such things were not, and could not, be thought as extended in space. From the perspective of the thesis itself, it was never meant to imply there actually is such a thing as space into which things extend, but only that the constitution of the human intellect can’t function without the transcendentally given objective validity granting it.

a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter — RussellA

Exactly. Existence of matter. Things. Objects. That which appears to human sensibility. That of which sensation is possible. That for which phenomena are given. In Kant, space and time are none of those. And I warrant he more than merely concedes the reality of matter, but theorizes on the very necessity of it.

I would say that the above is some evidence that for Kant, as an Empirical Realist, space and time are empirically real. — RussellA

I understand you think that to be the case. The Critique, understood in its entirety as a system, disagrees with you.

If Kant's view on space and time was only pure intuitions, and there is no physical space and time as such, then he wouldn't have been taken seriously by recent science — Corvus

That argument may have some validity. In The Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science are the quite gentle objections, absent strict conclusive evidence, brought against Newton.

Kant was a dualist. Space and time was physical existence in empirical reality as well as pure intuitions for metaphysical knowledge. — Corvus

Those are not what Kant uses to describe himself as a dualist. Empirical reality yes; empirical reality of space and time, no. Empirical reality, that is, experience a posteriori, then, in juxtaposition to cognitive constructs, that is, pure thought a priori. THAT is the proper Kantian dualism.

….space and time and the matter within it are empirically real. — RussellA

….(not) denying space and time for empirical reality at all, but…presupposed it. — Corvus

Despite the direct textual references refuting that opinion, you both continue the misunderstanding. Or I do. One or the other.
————-

But he had to make space and time as pure intuition in order to give ground for necessity of a priori knowledge — Corvus

Absolutely. Why else to start a ~800 page treatise with something, re: sensibility, having nothing to do with the overall philosophical theme, re: reason.

If space and time are empirical realities they absolutely cannot be pure a priori conditions residing in the constitution of the subject, and if such were the case, that they are empirical realities, Kant could not justify them as antecedent conditions for anything of pure a priori content.

I might say, rather than being presupposed, the empirical reality of space and time was the standing hypothesis for the physics of the time, in which human knowledge was understood as being of things as they are in themselves. In which case, Kant’s entire academic exposure was in keeping with it, along with everyone else, and eventually becoming the starting point for refutation of that standing hypothesis.

“…. Reality (…) is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; that, consequently, the conception of which indicates a being (in time)….”

To establish the reality of space empirically, such that it may be an empirical reality, is to establish that space corresponds to a sensation. And, accordingly, each space its own sensation.
———-

“…. The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation….”

It follows that space, if it is an empirical reality and corresponds to a sensation, is an effect upon the faculty of representation insofar as we are affected by it, hence, is the effect of an object, from which follows necessarily that space is an object.
———-

“… In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. (…)

“….That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. (…)

Space, insofar as it is an empirical reality corresponding to a sensation, and insofar as space relates to an object via its sensation, is space therefore an empirical intuition.

“….The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter….”

Space, as an undetermined object of an empirical intuition, has that which corresponds to its sensation, and is its matter.
—————-

“….Those who maintain the empirical reality of time and space, whether as essentially subsisting, or only inhering, as modifications, in things, must find themselves at utter variance with the principles of experience itself. For (…) they must admit two self-subsisting nonentities, infinite and eternal, which exist (yet without there being anything real) for the purpose of containing in themselves everything that is real.…”
—————-
—————-

“…. Our expositions, consequently, teach the reality (i.e., the objective validity) of space in regard of all which can be presented to us externally as object, and at the same time also the ideality of space in regard to objects when they are considered by means of reason as things in themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution of our sensibility.…”

The expositions teach, from the perspective of 1780’s physics, but transcendental philosophy proves the expositions are wrong. In other words, Kant’s expositions merely reiterate the SOP of the day, given Newtonian conditions, which just is to profess that our knowledge is of things as they are in themselves. To remove the absurdities of operating with infinities, it must be shown space and time do not belong to things of which our knowledge consists. To show space and time do not belong to those things, it must be shown that it is not things as they are in themselves of which our knowledge consists. It follows that if it is not things in themselves we know, it is not necessary for that of which we do know, to have space and time attributed as belonging to them, even if it remains necessary for some account of them in relation to that of which our knowledge does consist.

If Kant were to think space and time inhere or subsist in themselves, and thereby they represent empirical reality, hence can be properties of things, he contradicts the tenets of his own epistemological metaphysics, not to mention it beggars the imagination as to why he would spend ten years constructing a philosophy in which it is proved they don’t, for the excruciatingly simple reason everything we know of empirical content, without exception….is in fact in reference to the constitution of our sensibility.

Numbers aren’t actually ‘objects’ in any sense other than ‘the object of thought’. — Wayfarer

Not that ‘schema’ is much of an improvement, but at least there’s no…or less….chance of confusing it with ‘object’.

Just wondering’, you know, given my philosophical proclivities….what kind of answer can one expect when asking about the status of reason?
—————-

I agree rationality doesn’t exist, per se, but without something carrying the implication of quality, such as the concept of rationality, then….

….the entire scientific project and empiricism is doomed from the outset. — Count Timothy von Icarus

….might actually be the case, as far as human intelligence is concerned, I’d have to say. Maybe rationality just is the degree of concordance with logical law. Problem then arises that there’s no proper deduction for the origin or formality of those laws without invoking that by which any deduction is possible, which leaves as the more parsimonious that human nature itself just is logical, and the fight with empiricists/materialists/physicalists continues unabated.

From which we might expect the status of reason to be:

“…. It is absurd to expect to be enlightened by reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the question she must adopt. Moreover, reason is sufficiently held in check by its own power, the limits imposed on it by its own nature are sufficient; it is unnecessary for you to place over it additional guards, as if its power were dangerous to the constitution of the intellectual state….”

Balboa Park, San Diego, 1971, windowpane. You know, laying in the grass, you can’t tell the difference between imagining the grass is growing or your head is shrinking?

True story. I missed most of the 60’s and all the 70’s, being as stoned as that person seems to be.

Oh. Good to know. But, seeing as how none of that’s in CPR, and that’s my only interest here, guess I’ll mosey along, leave you to it.

You are seeing an invisible object when you are seeing space. — Corvus

OK. So can I hear space? If I close my eyes I can’t see bacon frying, but I can still smell it. Space isn’t then, perceivable to all the senses? Or actually, it is only perceivable by one sense? But many objects are perceivable simultaneously by more than one sense. I can only see the moon right now, but I’m telling you I could stomp on it if only I could get to it. As well, am I to think the part of the moon I can’t see during some one of its phases, leaves the space of that part still perceivable, even though it isn’t really empty?

I’m beginning to think you’re pullin’ my leg here.

I use JMDM for its searchable text. Guyer/Wood has C & P but isn’t searchable. Plus, it has an outstanding editor’s synoptic introduction. Quite academic without appearing opinionated. When I’m given the Berlin Academy pagination, I have to use my hard copy Kemp Smith….a first edition 1929 red leather/ gold inlay, ex libris Cambridge University Library (he said, gloating like that was a big deal). Guyer /Wood has the pagination in the margin, but has to be scrolled, and higher A/B’s take forever.

I am not getting your point why you cannot see space when seeing a tree — Corvus

The very idea of seeing space is logically contradictory, re: impossibility of receiving a sensation from the inside of an empty bucket other than its bottom, and just plain silly otherwise. WTF would space even look like when I see it? If what I see can be described and thereby conforms to what you see, that makes sense. To be perfectly honest, I have no idea how to describe to you what space would look like when I see a tree.

Referencing an object to a space, like….over there, up there, next to, and so on, which is the relation of an object to something else, is not to see a space. All space was ever meant to do, was be that by which objects relate either to the consciousness of a perceiver, or to each other as determined by the consciousness of a perceiver.

That and of course, there must be that in which an object can be said to exist, as far as the consciousness of a perceiver is concerned, without which none of this even happens.

We are talking Kant's CPR here. You cannot perceive a tree without space around it. — Corvus

Yes, we are talking CPR, and in which we find….we don’t perceive a tree in the first place. We perceive “an undetermined object” by its appearance to our sensibility. The undetermined object doesn’t obtain its name, which represents how understanding thinks it, until further along in its systemic process. So not perceiving a tree without space around it is just nonsense, from the perspective of strict CPR textual reference.

It is not about precedence, but it is about different type of perceptions — Corvus

There is only one type of perception. What your intermingling with it, are apprehension, contained in sensibility when considered transcendentally, and apperception, also much further along in the systemic process. And there must be precedence somewhere along the line, in order for an “undetermined object of external intuition” to obtain a representation of its conception, from which follows the name for how that object is to be known.

Probably best that I grant you’re defining terms in nonconformity with CPR, in which case your seeing and visualizing means different things than that which is derivable from the text itself. In CPR, however, seeing is a perception for which the sensation is an image, the matter of which is given a posteriori. A visualization, on the other hand, is the mere thought of some possible object, its content, which would be its matter if it were perceived, is given as the schema of the conception understanding thinks belongs to it.

So it is that we do not see (perceive with eyes) with understanding but we visualize, and, we do not visualize (think with conceptions) with sensibility but we see. In CPR, then, insofar as the exposition on seeing and sensibility in general is ~90 pages, and the exposition on visualizing and understanding in general is ~200 pages, suggests the one has rather a greater precedence over the other. At ~400 pages of course, pure reason has the greatest precedence of all te members of the tripartite transcendental system.

Crap. I forgot Meiklejohn had two middle initials.

But seeing a tree in the garden is via your sensibility. You will always see a tree with space. — Corvus

A tree….with space. A tree with bark, a tree with leaves. A tree with branches, roots, cones/nuts. A tree with space? What does space do for the tree as those other properties do?

If I was visualising the cup, not seeing it….. — Corvus

Man, are you gonna have fun wading through the schematism of the pure understanding, wherein visualizing takes precedence over seeing.
————-

Here is another quote from CPR in JMDM version. — Corvus

Good quote. What…or who….is JMDM?

You do understand, right? That phenomena cannot be external? They’ve already been defined as representations, all of which are internal in the subject. By external phenomena, he means those external things which become those kinds of representations. Hence, because phenomena are internal, and space is the condition for phenomena, then space is internal.

He was not just saying, but he was asserting. — Corvus

Yes, he was, but to make the point that is not what it supposed to happen. Think of it as a minor antinomy. Something reason lets us do (think the empirical reality of space), before making us see that’s not the right way of doing it (space is not an empirical reality) but something else (space is a transcendental ideality in the form of a pure intuition) is better suited to explain what we want to know.

The bottom line is, you cannot see empty bucket without space around it. — Corvus

Nope, not the bottom line. I wasn’t talking about either of those things, yet you want to qualify something I was talking about, with something I wasn’t.

What is it with people…….

He "asserts space as Empirical Reality " for perception via sensibility….. — Corvus

That doesn’t relate to his maintaining the empirical reality of space? I couldn’t locate the exact wording he “asserts space as Empirical Reality” and highly doubt he would have capitalized it anyway, so I just figured it was your wording.

…..space for the objects in the empirical reality. — Corvus

You mean, like, space for this object, space for that object? Are you wanting the space an object is in to be as real as the object itself? How would that work?

“…. We maintain, therefore, the empirical reality of space in regard to all possible external experience, although we must admit its transcendental ideality; in other words, that it is nothing, so soon as we withdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all experience depends and look upon space as something that belongs to things in themselves…..”

Break it down, and see if you find, as I did: We maintain the empirical reality of space…..if we look upon space as something that belongs to things in themselves. Which, of course, we don’t, insofar as how can we know space belongs to things-in-themselves when our knowledge is not and cannot be of them.

Another way to break it down: it is nothing as soon as we withdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all experience depends. Which is the same as saying, it is only something iff IT IS the condition upon which the possibility of all experience depends, from which follows the whole reason for the transcendental aesthetic, re: to prove that’s exactly what it is….the necessary condition for the possibility of all experience. Withdrawing it as that condition makes it nothing, and if it is nothing, to then declare it an empirical reality, is self-contradictory, and if it is self-contradictory it is immediately false, and the whole aesthetic argument falls apart.

And that’s not even the hard part. What is this alleged transcendental ideality anyway, and where in the bloody hell does it come from, and why MUST I have to admit to it. (Sigh)

Some quotes are clear, others…..not so much.

Yet again, the relative obscurity has nothing to do with individual understandings. While it may be true there is no obscurity in the quotes, it remains, insofar as the quotes are minor extracts from a whole…..

“…. A philosophical system cannot come forward armed at all points like a mathematical treatise, and hence it may be quite possible to take objection to particular passages, while the organic structure of the system, considered as a unity, has no danger to apprehend. But few possess the ability, and still fewer the inclination, to take a comprehensive view of a new system. By confining the view to particular passages, taking these out of their connection and comparing them with one another, it is easy to pick out apparent contradictions, especially in a work written with any freedom of style. These contradictions place the work in an unfavourable light in the eyes of those who rely on the judgement of others, but are easily reconciled by those who have mastered the idea of the whole.…”

….by thinking Kant tributes to space as you’ve indicated, as one of those particular passages, the entire transcendental thesis self-destructs. It is the case Kant does not want it understood that space is external to the mind, that space has properties as do real objects, and foremost, that space has any meaning whatsoever beyond the human cognitive system, according to this particular speculative metaphysical theory.

THAT should be clear to everyone. Well, actually, everyone who “….rises to the height of speculation….”. Which leaves aside, as you say, the so-called “vulgar”, who do not.

Wrong. I’m not accepting what you think Kant is saying.

You probably want to say I’m not understanding what Kant is saying, and thereby I’m complicating the general discussion by not accepting your corrections.

Now, you may actually have a better understanding than I, but if you can’t convince me of it, trusting that I’d concur given sufficient reason, I’m at liberty to make the same attempt at convincing you.

All of which is absolutely impossible without dialectical consistency, in which each of our arguments relate to each other specifically.

the bucket and space in and outside of it are all outside of you — Corvus

Wasn’t what I asked.

What is it with people, who can’t maintain dialectical consistency. If a guy asks about a certain thing, but gets a response that doesn’t contain anything about that thing…..what a farging waste of the guy’s time, I would think.

Yep. Sounds pretty much like what I said 7 hours ago.
— Mww

No it doesn't. — AmadeusD

Hmmmm……

He said Kant said: Our exposition therefore establishes (…) the objective validity…
I said: The objective validity (…) is deduced
He said Kant said: …..presented to us outwardly as object….
I said: …..relates the objects as separate from the perceiver.

You’re quite correct; my fault. The pressure waves corresponding to the sounds of these two sets of words would be somewhat different.

Still, isn’t somewhat different synonymous with pretty much the same?

Jeeezz….and I thought I was the last remaining fundamental literalist in the generation infamous for them.

he had two cases of explanation for space….. — Corvus

Yes, he did. One was the transcendental exposition, the other the metaphysical exposition. The former concerns objects thought, re: your example regarding mere geometric figures, the latter objects perceived, re: your example of seeing the tree. Both expositions restrict space to the mind, or, as I prefer, the condition of the subject, and can only be attributed as external to the subject, iff it is a property of things-in-themselves, which, of course, cannot be determined as being the case.

So, Kant was not simply saying that all space is internal and necessary a priori condition for all perception. — Corvus

Sorry, but I cannot find a justification that it isn’t exactly that. In other words, I find that is precisely what he’s saying. And not only that with respect to perception, but indeed, because the space in which the extension of things occurs cannot be thought away as can all its properties, it absolutely must reside in the subject himself.

Guess you didn’t think about the empty bucket, huh? I was kinda looking forward to your account of what kind of sensation you got from its apparent emptiness.

Our exposition therefore establishes the reality, that is, the objective validity, of space in respect of whatever can be presented to us outwardly as object — Corvus

Yep. Sounds pretty much like what I said 7 hours ago.

Ok. Nothing untoward about that. It’s a footnote, and says nothing about perception of space or that space can be an appearance. It just says space with nothing in it is a valid conception, re: non-contradictory. In addition, the last sentence of the footnote warns that just granting the non-contradictory nature of the admission does not imply the possibility of the idea the antithetical argument presents. And in fact, the argument in the thesis denies such possibility.

Think….empty bucket. That the bucket itself encloses a space, and that enclosed space presents to sensibility no appearance, but without which that things could be put in the bucket that would be appearances, becomes impossible.

You’ve presented an antinomy justifying the antithesis of an idea. My response is merely a further counter-claim extending from the thesis of that idea.

Reason doing its thing, only this time from two different intellects, one on each side, rather than one intellect merely confusing itself by taking both sides. Or, maybe not being persuaded by one over the other.

Not from my point of view. That something appears inconsistent and vague may be my fault, in which case reading between the lines just shirks the responsibility of doing a better job.

Yes, isn't what exactly Kant was pointing out? — Corvus

What….that reason can do pretty much whatever it wants? Sure, but then what?

Space as object has its physical properties. — Corvus

Not in CPR, is doesn’t.
(Glances up at thread title)

Space is presupposed in the perception of the objects. — Corvus

Yes, but to presuppose is to deduce, it is not to perceive.

My point was that you cannot perceive objects without perceiving space. — Corvus

Then you must grant that space can affect the senses in the same manner as objects, which reduces to the necessity that space must have properties. At which point, upon determining that space cannot have properties, insofar as there is no possibility of space appearing to you as an object, you’ve contradicted yourself.

If space is incomprehensible….. — Corvus

It isn’t.

Isn't perception of space necessarily deducted in the perception of objects? — Corvus

No. The objective validity of that which relates the objects as separate from the perceiver, or as separate from each other, is deduced from perception of objects.

Deduction is a logical function; perception is a physiological activity. They do not relate to each other. A logical object cannot be perceived, a perceptible object has no need of being deduced.

Asked and answered.

I suppose the answer could reduce to…space is comprehensible, perception of space is not. Hence, the difference.

Perception is an activity; space is a pure representation.

In so far as space is merely itself a representation, and perception of representations is impossible, perception of space is incomprehensible.

Yours was valid as a question, but dialectically irrelevant.

So our perception of time is an illusion
— RussellA
So our perception of space is also an illusion.
— RussellA
But in Kant, Space and Time are a priori condition for our experience of the external world. He doesn't see them as illusion. — Corvus

Here is a perfect transcendental illusion:

One intelligence puts forth a certain proposition, in which there resides in the subject a certain conception.

Another intelligence, upon reception of the proposition as an appearance, attaches to the subject of the received proposition, a conception that was not antecedently contained in it, thus does not consequently belong to it.

PERCEPTION (of space is an illusion) becomes SPACE (is an illusion).

If it be assumed the second intelligence understands the conceptions contained in the originating proposition, and judges them as united without contradiction in it, but nonetheless projects an understanding of his in the form of his own proposition, in which the subject in his does not relate to the subject in the other’s, his reason has deluded itself without his conscious awareness.

Such is not the least a slight on intelligence in general, but on reason itself, to which every intelligence is susceptible. These, while entirely unremedial, can be nonetheless guarded against.

his distinction between the two terms — Wayfarer

Transcendent: one of two domains to which cognitions relate.
Transcendental: that mode of pure reason by which certain modes of cognition are determined.

Humans are a funny bunch. They create for themselves those things to which they actually attribute the impossibility of experiencing in the same way as they experience material things, from which follows they immediately prevent themselves from knowing those things they create, in the same way they know rocks roll downhill. That one domain in which cognitions of knowledge is abolished in favor of mere cognitions of belief, or, which is the same thing, any knowledge of its objects is impossible, is called transcendent.

But humans also create for themselves that which they may or may not then construct as things in the real world. Insofar as knowledge of objects in this domain is at least possible, it is called immanent.

Transcendent is that in the juxtaposition of domains in which experience is the arbiter.
—————-

That humans in general can create as thought, what is not yet, and even may never, be constructed in the world as real, is possible insofar as the human intellect is endowed with a particular capacity, and anything which follows in accordance with that capacity, regardless of the reality of its objects, is transcendental.

Transcendental is, then, the mode of pure reason as an intrinsic human intellectual capacity, by which all its exercises relate to those pure a priori cognitions it creates for itself, thus having nothing whatsoever to do with experience as such.

The discipline in which all such exercises of this one faculty relate to, and legislate the operation of, the other higher cognitive faculties, re: understanding and judgement, is metaphysics.

The system in which this discipline administers the natural world, and by which experience is possible, is transcendental philosophy.

Or not…..

Find A491/B519.
— Mww

Could it be the part of CPR where Kant explains the antinomy of Pure Reason? — Corvus

The explanation of the antinomies, the exposition of what they are, is A407/B434, wherein pure reason is concerned only with itself and the troubles it causes itself. However such examples of these conflicts manifest, isn’t as important as recognizing how they occur.

Kant states for the record he considers himself a transcendental idealist. Being that kind of idealist grants to empirical conditions their just warrant, so his favoring one name for a philosophy, doesn’t negate his regard for the world with the other.

What is Kant's own definition of Transcendental Idealism? — Corvus

Find A491/B519.

It will tell you what you want to know, but not what you should be asking, at least with respect to Kantian metaphysics in general and CPR in particular.

…."the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect"…. — Wayfarer

Instinct?

we are just to trying to find on what basis was Kant so and so-ist? — Corvus

Inevitably ending in making of him something for which he would be in no position to affirm or deny. So what’s the point? What does it matter with respect to his philosophy, which is all anyone should care about anyway.

I am not quite sure what the true definition of "Transcendental" in Kant exactly means either. — Corvus

It’s defined, without equivocation, in the very text from which his metaphysical philosophy gets its name. How could it be left to mere supposition, for his successors to guess about, that which is the formal ground of a paradigm shift in human thought? The fact of it, as you’ve hinted yourself, is completely irrelevant, even if its logical consistency and internal integrity are absolutely necessary.

Could Transcendental have implied "Anti"? — Corvus

No.
(I’m not aware of any indication that it does)

I am suspicious if it meant simply "prior to experience". — Corvus

It doesn’t.
(There is another term representing “prior to experience”)

What are your definitions….. — Corvus

Mine are his. But having the definition still requires understanding the myriad instances of the term in accordance with it. THAT’S the hard part.

Would it be the ground for making Kant an Indirect Realist? — Corvus

What would be the ground of making him anything but what he made himself?

Kant definitely says that TI is nothing to do with idealism in the Prolegomena. — Corvus

So a guy knows what TI stands for, then reads herein TI has nothing to do with idealism. What’s he to think, when he understands perfectly well that the I in TI intentionally represents idealism? Then, the poor guy, reading the reference material promising that TI has nothing to do with idealism, comes across “…The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism…”, aannnndddd…..he’s farging lost it. He slams the book shut, walks off, goes back to his comic books or video games, or whatever it is that doesn’t stress his intellect enough to discover that which is at least purported as “useful truths”.

Rhetorical. The answer is in the Critique, and “…. could have been very easily understood from the general bearing of the work, if the reader had only desired to do so….”.

Ahhh…so it was just my machine. It’s a clickable link now. Not that I’m anxious to partake in reinventing the wheel.

Thanks.

Your moderator’s move of some of the comments on here, to a different place on the forum. Usually that shows up as a clickable link, colored letters, underlined, and all. So a guy doesn’t have to cut and paste.

FYI, that didn’t come up as a link. Was it supposed to? Was mine the only machine where it didn’t?