That sounds absurd to me. Does he provide some epistemological assumption for this claim? — Relativist

If I may, with apologies to , the gist of the argument resides in the fact nothing comes to the human intellect already named, and from that comes the notion that things become named in accordance with some initial idea in that mind determining what it will be. Classic cases-in-point….quarks, and Slinkies. Donut holes.

The fact kids are informed of names of things from rote instruction, or the familiarity with things otherwise through indirect experience of them as is the case with Everydayman in general, is beside the point.

While it seems superfluous to assert we must first learn what we know, centering on the known disguises the necessarily antecedent priority of how knowledge is possible. Kant set the stage for speculative epistemological metaphysics, which theorizes on how knowledge is possible, Schopenhauer the soonest worthy expansion….or criticism…. of it.

Both these philosophical pioneers agreed on this major premise: that which is first given to the senses is undetermined. From there, it’s off to the races…..

…..a problem with Kant's and similar views. (…) it seems that the 'ordered world' of experience arises from the 'interaction' between the mind and 'the mind-independent reality', which is never truly presented 'as it is itself' to the mind. — boundless

Not too sure what form the problem is supposed as having, but at first glance:
So if the ordered world of experience arises from the interaction between the mind and representations of the external domain….the problem disappears?

It seems in fact to assume that there is, indeed, a mind-independent reality which is then 'represented' by the cognitive faculties of the mind. — boundless

That which is mind-independent cannot be represented. With respect to Kant’s view alone, reality is not mind-independent, by definition hence by methodological necessity, the content of which remains represented not by the cognitive faculties, but sensibility. From which follows the ordered world of experience arises from that which is always truly presented to the mind, and from that, appearances to the senses are not merely assumed, but given.

The 'represented' world of exprience is thus like an interface (…) and for the knowing subject it is impossible to know what the world is like independent from the mental categories. — boundless

From whence, then, does the interface arise? If the represented world of experience is all with which the human intellect in general has to do, there isn’t anything with which to interface externally, interface here taken to indicate an empirical relation. And if the only possible means for human knowledge is the system by which a human knows anything, the interface takes on the implication of merely that relation of that which is known and that which isn’t, which is already given from the logical principle of complementarity. Does the interface between that out there, and that in here, inform of anything, when everything is, for all intents and purposes, in here?

….to the strict epistemic idealist, I would ask: how do you explain the 'arising' of the 'empirical/experienced world' without positing an intelligible mind-independent reality…. — boundless

If by epistemic idealist is meant that purely subjective position holding with a representational system of human intelligence, however speculative such system may be, in which all empirical knowledge of things is predicated on, and thereby resides within, that system alone, he must at the same time posit that to which those representations, hence his knowledge, relates, which cannot be contained within, therefore must be external to, the system itself.

Empirical/experienced world, and the variated iterations thereof, is a conceptual misnomer, though, I must say, a rather conventional way of speaking, not fully integrating the development of the concepts involved. That, and the notion of “intelligibility of the world”. Which sorta serves to justify why the good philosophy books are so damn long and arduously wordy.

Anyway….just me. Rambling.

…..loses sight of the deeper point that 'substance' is not mere particularity, but what something is in virtue of its form and actuality. — Wayfarer

“…. substance is the permanence of the real in time….”

Sight regained?

Is there any reason among all reasons which cannot influence a decision? -- I don't think so. — Quk

But I’m asking about the possibility of there being one reason which always influences any decision.

There's always a cause or a reason for a decision. It's impossible to inhibit all causes and reasons of the universe. — Quk

If it is impossible to inhibit all reasons, is there a single reason, or a manifold of reasons under a particular rubric, necessary in itself, to cause any decision? Is there one reason impossible to inhibit for decision-making?

To arrive at the possibility of a singular condition is the very epitome of specialized, insofar as the will’s freedom, and the will’s limitations thereby infused into it, are given.

Does this agree with Dawnstorm's idea regarding "trigger"? — Quk

Ehhhh….dunno. Maybe. Smacks of psychology to me, while I’m more inclined toward speculative metaphysics for its explanatory power.

I can only desire something that is feasible? — Quk

No, I think the definition implies one can desire in accordance with whatever idea crosses his mind, but that desire doesn’t mean he has the capacity to cause, or to will, those ideas to manifest objectively.

On the other hand, one can attain only that which is feasible, or possible, which could be said to be the limitation of practical desire.

I can't desire what I want. — Quk

Desire: in general, a subject's capacity to become, by means of his ideas, the cause of the actual existence of the objects of those ideas.

A related effect does not necessarily follow from having a causal capacity, but for that subject attaining the effect related to an idea, a causal desire for it is necessarily presupposed.

A guy passes up a parking spot, without knowing the availability of any other, has immediately the idea of a shorter, post-parking, walk, the desire for which can only be satisfied by causing himself to look for a closer spot.

A guy takes the first parking spot he comes to, the idea of cruising the lot in vain hope of finding a better one insufficient causality for a very contingent effect, expresses a more relaxed desire, but a desire nonetheless.

I can't switch my desire for women over to men. — Quk

Yet, there are instances of record of those that desire the switch, and of those there are some that will themselves to cause the attainment of the idea contained in that desire. From which follows that the concepts of desire and will having the same meaning is not necessarily the case, and if not necessarily the case, then possibly not true at all.

Is this a good analysis? — bert1

I think not, insofar as that situation whereby a choice MUST be made contradicts the fundamental idea of choice itself.

MUST choose. The impossibility of NOT choosing. Therefore, MUST choose is the same as not NOT choosing. Which answers the thread title: apparently we are not entirely free to choose, because we are not free to make no choice.

But of course…we are.

Desire and will have the same meaning. — Quk

If I may desire whatever I want, but it is altogether impossible to will whatever I want, then the two concepts cannot have the same meaning for me.

….it is the case that this stone cannot move itself. It must be moved by something else, and this holds true by necessity, so how can I know this apodicticity that is IN the stone when the stone stands outside of the logic produced in my mental affairs? — Astrophel

The certainty isn’t in the stone…. — Mww

Of course it is. What is the stone? It IS sensate intuitions and concepts. And so the stone IS whatever the concept is, and the concept IS its apriori structure. — Astrophel

In the first, I am to suppose there is a movable object. In the second I am to suppose the said movable object is sensate intuition and concepts. Which leaves me to wonder….how are sensate intuitions and concepts movable?

Having exposed the, dare I say, grotesque!!!, categorical error, it follows from the fact that all knowledge, and antecedently all a priori principles by which empirical knowledge is possible, resides in me, the certainty an object of whatever name cannot move itself but must be moved by something else, which is a representation of one such a priori principle, must also reside in me, and not in that object to which the principle merely applies.

The stone is an intuitive/conceptual construct, and if you remove all perceptual presence, the stone is no longer there. — Astrophel

Precisely the categorical error. Without perceptual presence of things, and forthcoming experience, it can only be a priori that I still know with certainty nothing in space moves itself.

The stone is not; that which is represented by the word stone, very much is simply out there, independent of my mental affairs. Stone is from those very affairs.
— Mww

Well, you may think this, but Kant doesn't. Being "simply out there" is, where, in space? But read the transcendental aesthetic: Space is an apriori for of intuition. — Astrophel

Oh, I’m pretty sure he thinks, and is trying desperately to impress upon the rest of us, “simply out there” indicates “simply not in here”. I didn’t mention space, only referring to that which must be “….something external to me, to which I must look upon myself as being related…”, and that by means of the logic intrinsic to my mental affairs.

The thing out there IS your mental affairs. — Astrophel

Oh dear. The thing out there is nothing but the appearance to, the effect on, the occassion for, my mental affairs, but is not them, “….for, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd.…”
————-

It is ungracious to critique the Critique?? — Astrophel

…..ungracious to suggest later that he forgot something. — Mww

Since when is ungracious to suggest the same as ungracious to critique? As long as we’ve been here we’ve both been critiquing the Critique, but only one of us suggests a flaw in the memory of its author. Without knowing the totality of what he knew, what could possibly be said about what he forgot?
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….when you see an object, you generally are not "thinking the concept"…. — Astrophel

Correct. “…Intuition cannot think, understanding cannot intuit…”

….but rather, the recognition is spontaneous. — Astrophel

When I see, or perceive by any sense, the affect on my senses is immediate. So I would only say the recognition my senses have of been affected, re: sensation, is simultaneous with such appearance. The spontaneity of concepts takes place in understanding, and so has nothing to do with when I see an object.

If it is me that is thinking the concept, does it make any difference to then say it is me recognizing the spontaneity by which the concept is thought?
————-

Have a good trip.

But his Deduction is analogized to a quid juris legal affair, which has "no clear legal title, sufficient to justify their* employment, being obtainable either from experience or from reason." — Astrophel

The lament, “no clear legal title sufficient to justify their employment, being obtainable from experience or reason”, was a slam on Hume, who posited mere “constant conjunction” of sense to experience on the one hand, and his rejection of pure a priori conceptions of reason entirely, on the other.

It is that the categories are analogized to a quid juris deduction, or, which is the same thing, it is that a sufficient warrant, a clear right, that the categories are the necessary conditions, not for experience, but for the invocation for synthesis in understanding of the sense of a thing to the cognition of it, and THAT being the logical necessity for experience.

It seems to me by your words, you’re saying the categories have no clear right to do what Kant intended for them, re:, his deduction of them is suspect, or downright illegitimate, therefore they have no sufficient warrant for their employment.

…..it is the case that this stone cannot move itself. It must be moved by something else, and this holds true by necessity, so how can I know this apodicticity that is IN the stone when the stone stands outside of the logic produced in my mental affairs?…. — Astrophel

The certainty isn’t in the stone, it’s in the truth of the necessity, which is not outside the logic of my mental affairs.

…..It MUST be that the stone is not simply out there in a world that is independent of my mental affairs. — Astrophel

The stone is not; that which is represented by the word stone, very much is simply out there, independent of my mental affairs. Stone is from those very affairs.

Rather, there must be a relation that binds the two. — Astrophel

There is a relation, but not between the thing out there and my mental affairs with respect to it. The relation binds, through synthesis, the phenomena of intuition in sensibility to the logic of cognition in understanding. The ground for that function of synthesis, is imagination, the rules by which all synthesis abides regarding empirical content, are the categories.

….he misses the need for a transcendental deduction of the totality of experience. — Astrophel

If he thought there was a need for it, wouldn’t he have included it in what he’d already said was a completed metaphysical system? Besides, the pertinent fundamental transcendental deduction concerns the possibility of experience, the totality of each being no more than just itself, and of course, the totality of experience in general, is unintelligible.

Totality of experience is not a thing to which transcendental deductions can apply, but rather, represents an aggregate of individual things, to each of which such deductions would apply. In the thought of them. Experience is merely an end, given from a certain methodological means, hence, being an end, or, object of, is not itself subjected to, the means.

Why is there a need, and what form would restitution for that need take?

I mean, it took him ten years and 700-odd pages to construct what he thought he needed, so it seems pretty ungracious to suggest later that he forgot something. I know I’m barely smart enough to understand what he did, but I’m certainly not smart enough to question what he should have done.
————-

But his Deduction is analogized to a quid juris legal affair, which has "no clear legal title, sufficient to justify their* employment, being obtainable either from experience or from reason." — Astrophel

So all you’re saying is that he didn’t really deduce anything, when he states for the record that transcendental deductions are “…. an examination of the manner in which conceptions can apply à priori to objects…”, which appears to presuppose the conceptions being applied.

If appearance tells me a thing exists, logic tells me its existence is necessary. I have no need to deduce any of those pure conceptions justifying my logic, beyond the authority they impose on my thinking. This is what his successors meant by telling us all about what we couldn’t talk about. It isn’t and never was what we can’t; it’s because there no need.

The term 'exist' itself is concept; what isn't? and thus it gives us a principle of subsumption for particulars. — Astrophel

The term “exist” is a conception, yes, which can be predicated of things. Existence gives the principle of subsumption for particular things as a condition for them, yet can never be itself a predicate. It follows that the criteria for a pure conception, is that it is always the subject of a proposition and from which is given a principle in relation to time, and cannot be a predicate in the cognition of things. Existence is, therefore, not just a conception, but a pure conception.

In much the same way is “space” a conception. But insofar as space is the condition of the sensing of things rather than the thinking of them, it is not a pure conception, but instead, a pure intuition, holding to the same transcendental manner of applying a priori to objects but not contained in them.
————-

when you are not thinking of a pot and you see and know what it is you are not actualizing the empirical concept 'pot' but ignoring it, at least until, someone says, hand me that pot! and you explicitly hear the word. — Astrophel

Ok, so if I see a thing and know what it is, that’s called experience and makes explicit the thing I see has run the full gamut of cognition. It follows that if I’m seeing a pot, I must be thinking the concept in order to know what I’m seeing this time conforms to the thing I saw at some antecedent time and by which I first knew that thing as a pot. If I see and know a thing I must have actualized the concept.

On the other hand, what do I care about not actualizing a concept when I’m not thinking about some thing? I can almost guarantee I’m NOT thinking about a hellava lot more things than I am.

When I’m looking at and knowing a pot, and the guy says frying pan….why is it that I don’t hand him the pot? I didn’t hand him the pot only because what I heard him say doesn’t sound like the name of what I see? Wouldn’t I have to actualize both concepts, think the thing belonging to this sound and think the thing belonging to that sound, in order to judge whether or not the sound I heard properly represents the thing I see?

If I have to actualize concepts for the relations of different sounds, why wouldn’t I have to actualize concepts in the relations of what I know?

Is it that once there was no word for anything? — Astrophel

That’s my opinion.
————-

Kant looks at experience and "observes" Aristotle's logical structures. So he identifies logical structures and ask about their genesis---but why is the palpable world not given the same due? Logic is just "there" and we call it apriori because of the necessity of it. — Astrophel

The world is not given the same logical structure because we don’t know enough about it. Still, what we do know about it can be said to demonstrate logical structure in its relations to us, the simplest being near or far.

The genesis of logical structure is in us, and it is impossible that we do not know that very structure which we construct for ourselves, the simplest of that being A = A.

The world is just there, and we determine for ourselves how it is to be understood. Just because we say roses are red doesn’t indicate the impossibility that they be anything else, but only that they are that for us. By the same token, if the rose is red regardless of what we say, it is red necessarily. Our intelligence is not equipped to say which is the case.

“….That metaphysics leads to divinity is not an accident of history but is intrinsic to the very enterprise of metaphysics…”
(Link, intro., lower pg 3)

It has been intrinsic historically, but would you agree it isn’t so much anymore? Seems to me the logical ens realissimum doesn’t necessarily indicate a divine being, but merely an irreducible one, re: an ideal.

Might just be me, but when I see “divine” I feel like I gotta say some kinda prayer to it or something. Offer up burning incense.

Be that as it may….good reference material, as usual.

Note that when you think you are speaking to yourself. — Astrophel

I was hoping, by my mention of shoe-tying and book-reading, you might note that my position has always been that humans generally think in images.

If one speaks to himself, how does he know what to say?
If to think is to speak to oneself, why not just say one thinks to himself?

What seems like the proverbial voice in your head is merely extant experience doing its thing, taking up the time when the cognitive part of the system recognizes it’s only repeating itself.
—————-

But "beneath" this is impossible to talk about. — Astrophel

“This”, here, is thinking, and your idea that what’s beneath thinking is impossible to talk about. I would extend that to your question, “what is logic”. Other than bare definition, what’s beneath logic, is impossible to talk about.
—————-

The world IS givenness, and thus, transcendental thinking is not to be treated abstractly, but existentially, and this changes everything. — Astrophel

I’m not sure what you mean by transcendental thinking. All transcendental is a priori and belongs to reason but thinking both a posteriori and a priori belongs to understanding. In the former is the complete determination of all things in general; in the latter is the determination of one thing at a time. It is by the transcendental substratum for the determination of all things, are given the rules for the possibility of determining particular things. The completely determined in general is an idea; the completely determined in particular is the ding an sich, neither of which is a possible experience.

If we were in the weeds before, we’re damn near being choked out by them now.
—————-

Ethics' essence is found in affectivity, the kind of thing Kant strictly and explicitly dismisses. — Astrophel

I don’t know what affectivity is. What does it mean for ethics to have an essence?

What is the case is the synthetic apriority in language relations with the world. — Astrophel

Perhaps, depending on context, but I’m claiming the irreducible case, hence regardless of context, is Nature. Language relations with the world presupposes the world, and world being the representation of Nature in general, gives the irreducible.

Which gets us to….by quid juris is it, that synthetic apriority in language relations with the world, is the case? Which in turn requires the answer to, the case….for what?

Then what kind of deduction is this? — Astrophel

The kind of deduction is transcendental, insofar as it is free of any empirical conditions. It’s right to be a deduction of this kind, is to serve as explanation for possession of the conceptions required in a complete system by which the possibility of human experience is determinable.

”….But there are also usurpatory concepts, such as fortune, fate, which, though allowed to circulate by almost universal indulgence….” (B117)

That is a big confession. — Astrophel

Ehhhhh….methinks ‘tis not so much a confession as a sad commentary on the sorry state of speculative metaphysics. Funny, too, in that the historical record exhibits that Kant allowed himself precious few indulgences of any kind, so there wouldn’t be anything of the sort to which a confession of his would refer.

I’d also like to revisit your quote in which he says, “…(…) if such exist….”. At the time, as you well know, synthetic a priori cognitions hadn’t been entered into the philosophical vocabulary. He had to prove the validity of the concept, and he said “if they exist” because no one had yet thought about them as existing. And they don’t “exist” in the strict categorical sense, but I already spoke to that.
————-

So reason asking about the nature of reason really is nonsense. — Astrophel

The circularity of human reason has been long established and thoroughly understood. It is, in fact, the ultimate transcendental illusion not to acquiesce to its inevitability. It is the case, then, the nonsense resides in the continued engagement with the illusion, re:, that pure reason affords absolute certainties, in spite of being given the means to avoid doing so.

And such is the reason metaphysics cannot be a proper science on the one hand, and the transcendental philosophy is above all a purely speculative system on the other.
————-

Ask what any of this is, and you will find more language. Language never really "touches" anything beyond language, and yet, as Dewey et al held, it "works"! — Astrophel

Yeah, it works because the human has this incessant need to express his opinions on every damn thing.

See https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0111332
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BUT, does this mean the world as it "really is" is just a nonsense term? — Astrophel

Yep, pure nonsense. But to ask or tell of the world as it really is, is something we do all the time. Sorry, had to; couldn’t help myself. Scare quotes….conspicuously absent in those philosophical texts I’d invite on a second date.
————-

put your finger over a lighted match. Can one doubt this? Now THAT is apodicticity! There is no historicity and its contingency of language here that gives rise to doubt, nor is this an abstraction. It is the opposite of an abstraction, the clearest most vivid thing one can imagine. — Astrophel

Doubt what? I doubt I’d do it. I don’t doubt it’d hurt, but the apodeicticity (speaking of quid juris, by what right is there some concept to which this word belongs????) here presupposes experience.

There is no historicity (oooo….there’s another) of language here, because there’s nothing to be said about the pain….and foolishness…of putting one’s finger over a lighted match.
(Why not contingenicity???)

So if the clearest most vivid thing one can image is that which he cannot doubt….wasn’t Descartes right after all?

True apodicticity is found existentially in the only absolute there is, which is outside language. — Astrophel

Sorta where I’ve been coming from since the beginning. True absolute certainty is found outside language because there never could be anything absolutely certain about it.

What the source is presupposes there is such a thing as absolute certainty, which, according to Kant’s definition is the unconditioned, and that is proved existentially unattainable, and THAT is the purpose of the critique of pure reason.
————-

Please forgive my frivolity. If one can’t have fun with this stuff he shouldn’t be doing it.

Right? — flannel jesus

Sure. Everydayman won’t have a problem with that, but the philosopher might.

While it is necessarily the case, e.g., “Neytiri”, is subjected to the exact same cognitive system as, e.g., a basketball, hence manifests as an experience in exactly the same way, the philosopher understands the object initially subjected to the system is already nothing more than a representation, while the “vulgar understanding” treats that same object, not as a representation but as a first-order real existence.

All that being given, I’d say it is by reason one distinguishes between the real and the seemingly real, not conceptually.

That opinion , while apodeitically certain
— Mww

Only in a relational sense, and the opinion wasn't worded as a relation, so I very much question it. — noAxioms

The opinion in question is relational, re: what I see is what exits, and it is apodeitically true, from the LNC. But that is not to say what I see is only what exits. Or, is all that exists. And it isn’t that what I don’t see doesn’t exist.

How is the apple not having objective existence contradictory? — noAxioms

If an apple didn't have objective existence it wouldn’t be an apple. Without descending into abysmal nonsense, we must grant that for a thing to be give a name presupposes at least that there is a thing, or at the very least a possible thing, to which a name can be given.

To say 'what I see exists' is fine, but to say 'only what I see exists' is another story. Which is why I ask where the line is drawn between existing things and not. — noAxioms

Another story indeed, in that I am not authorized to say what I don’t see doesn’t exist, while it being perfectly legitimate to say what I don’t see I don’t experience.

Perhaps experience is the line to be drawn, then. For any subject, any experience is necessarily of an existence, and for that subject, without experience is the same as without its object. Still, this is epistemological, that of which a subject knows as existing or not, rather than ontological, that of which the subject merely infers as possibly existing or not.

All that being said, it must be the case that whatever the line is, it relates exclusively to, and is derivable only from, the subject inquiring about its establishment. Me, I opine it doesn’t much matter what doesn't exist, that being nothing but an exception to the rule for what does. And…..YEA!!!!…..again, for me, the establishment for the rule for what does exist is already given by the LNC.

Easy-peasy.

….which justifies the claim there is no language in pure thought.
— Mww

No language in pure thought? But what is Kant "talking" about? — Astrophel

Are we mistaking the description of a system, for its operation?

Kant is “talking” about his own idea of what’s happening when the human animal uses his intellect.

What’s the problem with talking about pure thought using language, and exercising pure thought without it? Please don’t tell me you talk to yourself, prescribe in words or logic symbols the individual actions required to tie your shoes. Odd that you can tie your shoes faster than you can prescribe each act required in order to tie your shoes, innit?

When you’re reading something particularly engaging….ever notice the words merely represent a certain assemblage of conceptions you already have, and the author is only trying to make you mentally image what’s he’s already done for himself. And it’s only in the case where you don’t have for yourself this certain assemblage, that you have to stop and read again, or look up to the sky and….you know, think….about what the author wants you to imagine.

I have no problem whatsoever asserting that’s the way my system works, and I’m almost as certain that’s the way your system works, too. That language must take precedence, is “….beneath the dignity of philosophy….”**, yet at the same time perfectly authorized to ground “…..philosophizing in an orderly manner….”***
(**1787; ***1644)

Clearly, one has to "talk" to conceive of pure thought at all, — Astrophel

Nope. One has to think to conceive of pure thought, which may then be talked about. One doesn’t talk about that of which he has no conception.

Can one meaningfully talk about something that stands outside of talk?…. — Astrophel

You’re asking about justifying a contradiction? Of course one cannot talk about what stands outside of talk. You must realize we invent the objects used to represent our thinking, the words. For whatever is used for thinking, a word can be invented to represent it. Whatever is thought about, a word can be invented to represent it.

There are no words possible to represent, we cannot meaningfully talk about, only that which cannot be thought, on the one hand, and, we never invent a word then think a conception belonging to it, on the other.

….and it is Kant's own transcendental Dialectic that weighs down on this. In the end, he is just as bad as Descartes. — Astrophel

Given the subject matter of the Dialectic, I gather that somehow you’re saying Manny’s exposè demonstrating the illegitimacy ol’ Renè’s cogito principle, is just as bad as the principle itself.

Interesting, but I’d have to think awful hard nonetheless about how sophistical arguments and paralogisms are just as bad as that which guards against them.
————-

It is IN tthe rules for speaking that logic is discovered in the first place. — Astrophel

Ya know….Kant used mathematics to prove the very possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions. Once their possibility is proved, he then goes about finding them in cognitions other than mathematical. So if it is proven there are rules for understanding, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose there are rules for speaking. On the other hand, while it is perfectly reasonable that to misuse the rules of understanding results in incorrect thinking, it is absurd to suppose the misuse of the rules for speaking results in incorrect speech, or language in general.

And if I don’t agree logic is discovered, then it follows that the discovery of logic in the rules for speech is beyond the agreement pale.
————-

The categories have no use. They are theoretical postulates. — Astrophel

Maybe they are, but why can’t a postulate have a use in keeping with the theory to which it belongs. Sorta like Newton’s g: no such thing but a necessary component in the law of universal gravitation.

No one can ever "see" such a thing, nor use it. — Astrophel

It isn’t a thing to see, and one doesn’t use it like a tool or a device of some kind. It is….they are…..merely explanatory devices used by the intellect, in accordance with a particular theory. Avoided or dismissed by a different theory of course, but no less a component of the theory to which they belong.

The evidential basis for any discussion about it lies in exclusively in language…. — Astrophel

Yes, but the evidential basis for their use lies exclusively in some speculative idea of a system. One who thinks a metaphysical system comes to be on account of the speaking of it, still has to explain where the speaking came from. Not only that, but how to explain, in one example of a veritable plethora thereof, how Joyce and Gell-Mann related the same word for entirely different chains of thought.

…..if such exist, cannot indeed contain anything empirical; yet, none the less, they can serve solely as a priori conditions of a possible experience. Upon this ground alone can their objective reality rest…. — Astrophel

A proper understanding of the theory in its entirety leads to the recognition that “exist” is not meant in its categorical sense. One is supposed to connect the conceptions in conjunction with the context of their appearance, rather than strict accordance with some classification which forces a contradiction.

It is nonsense like that, for which the supposed remedies were to be found in “language games” and “intentionality”. Which reduces to….paraphrasing his words…..don’t bother with the rationality of theoretical speculations, but instead, waste effort on faulting its presentation.
————-

The issue was whether or not the understanding attends spontaneous events like hearing a loud bang. I said it did, for hearing at all, for us, is a structured affair, that is, when we "experience" anything at all, there is the implicit understanding thta this fits into a familiar course of events, and is not alien or threatening. — Astrophel

It doesn’t. Cognitive faculties attend mediately to first-order events, immediately to second-order events that are representations thereof; sensibility attends immediately.

Hearing is indeed a structured affair, a physiologically structured affair predicated on physical attributes.

For any experience, yes, there is an implicit course of events, pursuant to the method by which experience is even possible. What those events are, and the course they take, depends on the theory in which they are the constituents.

And yes, threats may themselves be experiences. And technically, any experience having no antecedent consciousness relating to it, is alien. Foreign. Previously unaware.

Kant had it right in that metaphysics had to go…. — Astrophel

He was quite explicit in declaring that there will always be some form of metaphysics in any human who “…rises to the height of speculation….”.

Metaphysics had to go iff it was intended as, or attempted to be made into, a science. So don’t; no problem.

First was…..

Kant's is an extrapolation from what is the case, to what has to be the case to explain this. — Astrophel

Nope. Extrapolation from what is the case for us, to how the case is to be known by us. — Mww

….second was….

Extrapolation is the move from what IS the case to what must be the case to account for this. — Astrophel

Except Kant’s is a speculative metaphysic, in which the transcendental philosophy constructed to account for it, may not properly account for what is the case. Thus, your notion of extrapolation can only refer to the move from what is the case, not to what must be the case to account for it, but only to a possible accounting. Regardless of how exact and internally consistent his system may be, it may not be what’s actually happening between our ears. He’s very specific in saying, if this way is sufficient then it is so only if it is done right. Hence, if pure reason is the way, then to critique it leads to doing it right.

What must be the case is determinable by the physical sciences alone, and he makes it quite clear that metaphysics is not a proper science, nor can it be, from which it follows that metaphysics alone cannot necessarily be the case that accounts for what is.

Knowing metaphysics is not necessarily right in accounting for what is, all that’s left to us is to make it less wrong.
————-

What is the case is is judgment. — Astrophel

Technically, what is irrevocably the case, is Nature. What must be the case to account for Nature, is guesswork originated by our intellect, and that conditioned by time and circumstance. Thus, what must be the case, is in fact quite contingent, the more parsimonious way to account for our intellectual errors.

If the perspective is limited to the human himself, Nature being given, what is irrevocably the case is nothing more than sensation, insofar as that is the point at which the internal mechanisms of human intellect….of whatever form that may be….become first apparent.

If you’re referring to aesthetic judgement as what is the case, as opposed to discursive judgement of the understanding, then we’re talking of two different conditions. But in relation to what is, aesthetic judgement respects only how we feel about it, rather than how we account for it.

What must be the case given the way judgment is structured is pure reason, loosely put. — Astrophel

Gettin’ pretty far into the weeds here, so “loosely put” is quite apropos. Those judgements structured by pure reason are principles, therefore called apodeitic or necessary, which serve as rules for the function of understanding in its empirical employment. The structure of judgements in general, called either problematic or assertorical, merely represents the unity between the conceptions in the subject to the predicate of any cognition, a function belonging to understanding alone. Whether or not this conception belongs to that conception, hence the truth or falsity of the cognition relative to those empirical conditions from which they arise, re: phenomena, THAT is the purview of reason.

When I think, and my thoughts succeed each other without conflict, my judgements are rational and/or logical. If I think, and then I have to think again or think otherwise, in which case there is a conflict in my judgements, it is reason’s judging that informs of the conflict, either regarding my understanding with itself, or my understanding with experience. Not what such conflict is, how it has manifested itself, but that there is one. Hence the transcendental nature of those judgements structured by pure reason as principles, that by which those discursive judgements is informed of its errors.

But all things are first evidenced in the "world" and and here is where judgments appear — Astrophel

If it is the case all things are first evidenced by their effect on the senses, where does judgement appear? Do we really need to judge whether or not our senses have been affected? That they are or that they are not, to be considered as judgements as such? If such is the criteria for the structure of judgements in general, on order for them to appear, what is to be done with the relation between a phenomenon and the conceptions by which it is cognized? And if such is the case, what does pure reason have to do with it?

It is the case, however, that judgement does appear by the cognition that the “world” is that in which all possible things are first evidenced, but that merely treats “world” as a general condition for things for which evidence is possible. In other words, “world” is the predicate of a principle given a priori in transcendental logic. There remains the need for the intuition of that space in which a thing is first evidenced, and a time by which that thing relates to a perception of it, in neither of which does a judgement manifest itself.
(Sidebar: here, “world”, in Kant, is “reality”) For whatever that’s worth…..

No manifestation in phenomena, then no ground for apriori argument. — Astrophel

No manifestation of discursive judgement in phenomena, but there is imagination, every bit as facilitating as judgement, for a priori argument. As I mentioned above, aesthetic judgement is manifest in the subject as his underlying condition, or, which is the same thing, how he feels about what he perceives. But that relates more to what he feels ought to be, rather than what is.
—————-

Nope. What he means by “first” here, is merely that occassion given to a theoretical systemic procedure.
— Mww

I wrote this: ""So when Kant says something like, "What must first be given with a view to the a priori knowledge of all objects is the manifold of pure intuition," this sentential construction is itself bound to the categories."

Obviously this is true since all sentential constructions are so bound. "First" here refers to what is logically first, or presupposed, as when reading this sentence there is a logical structure presupposed in the understanding of its meaning. Logical presupposedness is what the Critique is all about, this digging deep into what must be the case IN the presuppositional underpinning of everyday speaking. — Astrophel

This part of the conversation originated in….

….when one asks basic questions about the world…. — Astrophel

…and my “Nope” referred to my contention Kant wouldn’t have constructed that sentence. But I guess that wasn’t the point, in that whatever the sentence being constructed by anybody, it must first accord with some logical or presupposed condition by which the subject doing the sentential constructing understands himself.

Now, I’m summarily rejecting that idea, because I contend he who constructs a sentence already understands himself, the constructed sentence merely an expression of that understanding. I’d further stipulate that he wouldn’t construct a sentence at all if he didn’t understand himself, or, if he did stab at in in hopes of expressing himself accurately, he wouldn’t have a clue whether or not he actually did.

So when I, e.g., tell you about the time I fell out of a tree, there would certainly be a logical structure presupposed in the construction of the sentence by which I relay my experience, but if we both look a little closer, we find that all I’ve done is replicate the very logical structure and presuppositions which gave me the experience to tell you about. And here, the categories would fill the bill as logical structural predicates and necessary presuppositions.

But if I tell you about, e.g., the merely qualitative effect imposed on me by the observation of Starlink…..breathtaking, by the way, jaw-dropping in its unexpectedness. I mean…WTF was THAT??? I had to look it up. Didn’t know there was such a thing. Too far removed from my acid days, so I wasn’t afraid I’d lost it. Anyway….point being, categories required for the observation, but not for the qualitative effect of it on me.

So, while I might agree logical presupposedness is what the Critique is all about, I’d maintain it is the logical presupposedness of thought and reason, and thought, in its turn, is the presupposedness of language.

And ya know what….logical structure presupposed in understanding a sentence’s meaning, might be restricted to the form of logic, yet the sentence itself by which it is expressed, necessarily concerns the content of that logic. I mean…you can’t really presuppose content, can you? It being as varied and indiscriminate as circumstance permits.

I am just looking for an opinion of mind-independent existence (….) other than "what I see is what exists". — noAxioms

That opinion, while apodeitically certain, again, insofar as its negation is a contradiction, re: what I see is not what exists, or, what I see does not exist, has to do with that which exists without regard for whether such existent is mind-independent. To satisfy that condition, “what I see” must be isolated from the mind in order to be independent of it, from which follows the necessity for proving the mind absolutely cannot itself be sufficient existential causality for what I see.

And that’s pretty easy…..just close my eyes and I see nothing, so if the mind is itself sufficient causality for what I see, I cannot explain why it is I no longer see anything when my eyes are closed while there remains no indication whatsoever my mind is not still fully functional. Which it must be the case because I am quite aware I’m no longer seeing anything and that directly and immediately related to the closing of my eyes. The other senses are, of course, somewhat more difficult to exemplify, but the principle holds throughout.

All of which kinda begs the question…..why seek an opinion regarding mind-independence of existents in general, that isn’t covered by the opinion that human perception alone, by which the existence of anything at all is already provable by the LNC, is itself mind-independent?

And if the question concerns mind-independence of existence, in and of itself, as a stand-alone pure conception in general, then the notion of what I see becomes immediately irrelevant. I see things that exist; I can say I see existences, but I never see existence itself. From which follows, a valid opinion would be that existence itself cannot be mind-independent iff it is the case the mind requires it as a condition by which things are given to my senses.

But anyway, the thread title asks about the mind-independence of reality, which presupposes the existence of what I see, that being the initial condition I supported.

I have no problem at least holding to a mind-independent view or notion or idea, of reality…..
— Mww

Cannot parse this. — noAxioms

You asked for a defense of a strictly metaphysical condition, re: the mind-independence of reality, which cannot be justified without sufficient criteria for the relation of the conceptions involved to each other.

By stipulating the kind of intelligence involved….you know, in this case, the human kind….and iff it is the case logic is the necessary determining condition for it, the relations determinable by that condition suffice as ground for the presuppositions upon which such intelligence operates and from which all else follows.

On the one hand, then, by saying I hold with a mind-independent view of reality, the only relation I need is apprehending the distinction between me and not me, which in itself doesn’t need any defense, insofar as the negation of it, is impossible.

Publicly defending the judgement (yes, reality is mind-independent), on the other hand, which is not the same as the constructing of it, which is merely my private thinking, requires I define the conceptions involved in order to validate their relation to each other, which I’m not inclined to do, for the simple reason no one is obliged to agree with them, in which case, and absent such agreement, my defense must fail.

Is anyone willing to defend a mind-independent view? — noAxioms

I have no problem at least holding to a mind-independent view or notion or idea, of reality, given a particular set of presuppositions, those in turn given from the kind of intelligence supposed as immediately in play.

Perhaps the key to the inevitable circularity of human reason, is not to get spun out by it.

It expands the ontology slightly, to be sure, but Maxwell did the same thing.

As did Penrose/Hameroff , “Orch OR”, 1994.

Rebutted, or not depending on who’s commenting, in Tegmark, 2000;
Also by Churchill, the female edition, 1996; supported by a whole bunch of analytic types, so…..

Minor contribution, of no particular import. Theories do abound, though, don’t they.

Page two:

The pure conceptions of the understanding are transcendental deductions of reason. Understanding uses them, but they are not given from understanding itself.
— Mww

You mean they are deduced, not that they are deductions. Understanding doesn't "use" them. They are of the structure of the understanding itself. I don't know what you're talking about here. — Astrophel

Po-TA-toe, po-TAH-toe. Anything deduced is a deduction. They are deduced transcendentally by pure reason; they are transcendental deductions of pure reason.

“…. Thus, the same understanding, and by the same operations, whereby in conceptions, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgement, introduces, by means of the synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition, a transcendental content into its representations, on which account they are called pure conceptions of the understanding, and they apply à priori to objects….”
(A79/B105. So the categories, the pure conceptions of the understanding, are used by it. Used by still is not origin of, worth keeping in mind)

As to the structure of the understanding itself….that is a very tall order. I submit that all the understanding does, all the constituents of its function, reduce to what can be called the transcendental unity of self-consciousness.
(Nobody said this was gonna be easy. Or, necessarily the case. But logically coherent nonetheless, hence at least theoretically reasonable)

Understanding is not about explicit analysis. — Astrophel

That’s in fact all understanding is about. It is the analysis of all that contained in the primitive representation “I think”.

“…. And thus the synthetical unity of apperception is the highest point with which we must connect every operation of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and after it our transcendental philosophy; indeed, this faculty is the understanding itself.…”

Thus it is that the function of understanding is distinct from that to which it directs itself when it thinks, or, when the subject exercises his innate capacity for thinking. To understand, on the other hand, presupposes the completion of that analysis, the affirmation or negation of constructed judgements relative to empirical conditions, not yet verified by experience.

All without a single solitary word, either expressed, or merely thought.
————-

If a newly born were to hear the loud noise, she would clearly react, register the event, but it would not be a loud noise. It would not BE anything. — Astrophel

This is in part contradictory. To react, to register an event, makes explicit something being sufficient causality for such reaction to even obtain. It may not register as a loud noise, insofar as this describes a judgement of relative quality conjoined with a specific mode of intuition, which an infant would not possess the rational ability to construct, but it would still be something for him.

Aren’t babies given hearing tests, to discover whether their ears work, rather than the brain? Be funny as hell….give a baby a hearing test, then ask him what he thinks he heard.
————-

Note how I have here and there criticized the thinking in the Critique for conceiving the world in a vacuum of meaningless form…. — Astrophel

And I reject that criticism, in that the thinking in CPR resolves the illusion of conceiving the world in any way except as the form of all that is relatable to it, hence hardly meaningless. We perceive things in a world; we don’t perceive worlds. From which follows world is conceivable only as the form of that in which all things are contained, but is not itself contained by it.

…..I do this because the true philosophical ground for the ansalysis of what and who we are lies in this dimension of our transcendence, which he mostly ignores. — Astrophel

He ignores it in CPR because the analysis of who or what we are is properly the concern of his moral philosophy, which is not transcendental.
————-

Even if you speak of a "pure phenomenon" this never occurs to us outside of, if you will, the purity of the language that grasps it — Astrophel

The name given to it presupposes the grasp of the conception to which the name relates. It’s occurence in thought, its conceivability, is explicitly the very purity by which the language describing it, is even possible. Language doesn’t grasp, it merely represents what’s already been grasped.

The purity of language is in thought; the purity of thought is in logic; the purity of logic is in pure reason; the purity of pure reason is the irreducible human condition.

…..realizes where Kant's ontology takes one…. — Astrophel

CPR doesn’t treat of empirical ontology; it is a purely epistemological thesis, from a metaphysical perspective.

Kant's greatness lies in attention to ordinary judgment in common experience (…). But his conclusion are literally vacuous. — Astrophel

What…..not a fan of freedom as sufficient cause?

If you and I were principally agencies of logic, synthesizing and analyzing the data afforded by the senses, then Kant would have nailed the human condition. — Astrophel

91 pages on sensibility, just under 400 pages on logic, all integral to the human condition. Fine if you wish to deny we are agents of logic, but I’m happily convinced human agency is necessarily predicated on it.
————-

Kant's is an extrapolation from what is the case, to what has to be the case to explain this. — Astrophel

Nope. Extrapolation from what is the case for us, to how the case is to be known by us. We understand the world; we explain the understanding. Language for the second, not for the first.
—————-

what must first be given is the object itself, insofar as it appears to sensibility. That which is representation must first be perception.
— Mww

What he means by "first" is presupposed by the possibility of aprioity. — Astrophel

Nope. What he means by “first” here, is merely that occassion given to a theoretical systemic procedure. There happens to be a particular theoretical system which presupposes a priori conditions, turning sensation into representation according to pure intuitions and productive imagination.
————-

The categories are ALWAYS involved. As I write and think. (…) When you awaken, notice a world around you, you are already "in" Kantian categories as the logic of affirmations seize upon intuitions. — Astrophel

When I write and think, about my notice of the world. While it may that the categories are always involved when I write, it being a phenomenal exercise, it is not the case for when I think, for it is possible that I think in pure a priori terms, that is, non-empirical, for which the categories are not involved. The logic of my a priori judgements still requires affirmation, at least to be productive, but there is no occassion to seize upon intuition.
—————-

What is IN phenomenological possibility? I don’t recognize phenomenological possibility, and I certainly have no idea what is IN possibilities. Nothing is IN a possibility, it is never schema but has schemata under it….
— Mww

No, possiblility here refers to what is necessary for something to be possible at all. — Astrophel

I need not go beyond relations in time, to discover what is necessary for something to be possible, as I already mentioned. For something to be possible at all its representation must be determinable in any time. Necessity: determinable in all time; existence: determinable in a time.

Categories "themselves" are transcendental, and cannot be spoken….. — Astrophel

Agreed, which justifies the claim there is no language in pure thought.

…..so when they are spoken "about", the speaking is subject to their own manifest rules. — Astrophel

Correct, from which follows the rules for speaking are very far from the rules for transcendental deduction.

"If, therefore, we seek to discover how pure concepts of understanding are possible, we must enquire what are the a priori conditions upon which the possibility of experience rests" — Astrophel

Wait…..so all you’re talking about is justifying the origin of the categories, while I’m talking about justifying the use of them? What is necessary for the possibility of things makes little sense to me, but what is the ground for the possibility of transcendental deduction of the categories, is a whole ‘nuther ball of wax.

Dunno where your quote comes from, but in A88/B120 in Kemp Smith is shown that is precisely how the deduction is NOT served.

“…. they make affirmations concerning objects not by means of the predicates of intuition and sensibility, but of pure thought à priori….”.

Your a priori conditions upon which the possibility of experience rests”, are precisely those very intuitions my quote denotes as “not by means of”.

This is the nature of an apriori argument. The whole argument of the deduction in an extrapolation. — Astrophel

Nope. This is the nature of a transcendental argument, which is a priori. But not all a priori arguments are transcendental, re: those of understanding in its categorical judgements. Transcendental arguments originate in, and are the exclusive purview of, pure reason alone.

Page one.

…..this exhausts the understanding. — Astrophel

That phenomena must meet the criteria of the categories doesn’t exhaust understanding, it enables the manifold of conceptions understanding possesses to be synthesized in the construction of a judgement on the one hand, or, enables an appeal to experience in the case of repetitive perception on the other.

In order for the affect of the thing on the senses, and the representation of that thing as it is understood, be sufficiently congruent to be knowledge of the thing, there must be rules by which one relates to the other, and, that by which the conceptions annexed to the phenomenon relate to each other. Something must have already prohibited the conception “round” from being imagined as belonging to the conception “tall”, when the thing perceived ended up being cognized initially, or remembered as post hoc experience, as a dinner plate.
—————-

….whatever is said at all must be found to exhibit this categorical adherence….. — Astrophel

Whatever is said of gods and tooth fairies is possible without reference to phenomena representing an object cognized as belonging to those conceptions, such object being all that requires exhibition of categorical adherence.

The pure conceptions of the understanding are transcendental deductions of reason. Understanding uses them, but they are not given from understanding itself. These in opposition to conceptions arising spontaneously within understanding itself, in response to the influx of intuited representations. Pure conceptions condition sensibility, empirical conceptions condition thinking.
—————-

So when Kant says something like, "What must first be given with a view to the a priori knowledge of all objects is the manifold of pure intuition," this sentential construction is itself bound to the categories. — Astrophel

Kant wouldn’t say something like that, for knowledge of all objects is always empirical, and what must first be given is the object itself, insofar as it appears to sensibility. That which is representation must first be perception.

You more than likely meant to say, what must be given with a view of knowledge of all objects is the manifold of pure intuition a priori. Or even, what must be given a priori with a view to knowledge of all objects, is the manifold of pure intuition.

As for the sentential construction being bound to the categories, considering this proposition is a tenet in speculative metaphysics, for which there is no empirical proofs for its objects derived from experience, the categories are not involved, from which follows the construct is not bound by them. Every object of theoretical speculation is transcendental; there are no faculties of human intelligence in concreto.
————-

The "pure" categories (…) cannot be warranted because they can only be derivative of what is IN phenomenological possibilities. — Astrophel

What is IN phenomenological possibility? I don’t recognize phenomenological possibility, and I certainly have no idea what is IN possibilities. Nothing is IN a possibility, it is never schema but has schemata under it, re: the schema of possibility is determination of a representation in any time. Common-speak being…that thing that doesn’t appear to me is no possible experience for me.

In things that are possible is not the same as what is in possibilities. I mean….what sense does it make to ask if a thing has possibility, when all we want to know is if the thing is possible. The former presupposes the thing being asked about, which proves it must be a possible thing.

Which reduces the whole mess to the notion that categories can never be predicates, but only subjects, in logical propositional constructs, and as such, derivatives of what is IN possibilities becomes unintelligible.
—————-

Phenomenology, of which Kant is the, well, grandfather…. — Astrophel

If that’s the case, his successors treat it as the proverbial red-headed stepchild, to which Kant would have vehemently objected. Ripped the concept of phenomena right outta its old-fashioned sandbox, consigned it to a post-modern tarpit.

Something does not appear unless it is understood. — Astrophel

So that which is not understood never appears? Guy’s walking down the street, hears a loud bang from around the corner. An appearance to his ears, manifesting as a sensation of sound is immediately given, without him immediately understanding the cause of it.

Something does not appear iff there is no effect on the senses. If there is an effect, if the senses are affected, there is necessarily an appearance. Full stop. There is no cognitive power in mere perception, therefore any cognitive function is irrelevant with respect to it. On the other hand, something does not become cognized until it is understood.
————-

what is you opinion on the presence of, or the validity in conditioning the human cognitive system on, imagery?
— Mww

Those thoughts I had about Kranky's OP didn't register, eh? — Astrophel

You mean this?

So thought and the senses can all be doubted. The trick for philosophy is to discover something that can affirmed that stands outside of language, but this discovery can only be "discovered" in language, a thesis, a proposition. — Astrophel

Fine. Doubt abounds. What’s that got to do with imagery?

What you specify as a “trick” of philosophy, is nothing but some arbitrary, indiscriminate iteration of human intelligence bringing itself to the fore. Different human, different iteration, different form of the same intelligence. Another one might say the duty of philosophy is to discover apodeitically that by which such intelligence manifests, but for which language has no relevance except for expressions of such discoveries.

And the beat goes on……..

But pure apriori cognition is only conceived in thought. This is the point. The prison. — Astrophel

Conceived in thought. I don’t know what that means. There are so many forms of pure a priori cognitions, or so many dissimilar applications of them, I wouldn’t be so ready to call out their conditions. But generally, pure a priori cognitions belongs to reason, which eliminates them from the spontaneity of conceptions, hence “conceived in thought”, which belong to understanding.
—————-

phenomena are representations, (…), long before understanding exercises its logical function.
— Mww

There is no representation long before the exercise of the understanding's logical function. That is impossible. — Astrophel

Actually it isn’t, given the tenets of this particular metaphysic. Conceptions alone constitute the representations of understanding, from which it thinks, and of course, as we all know….or should know….understanding cannot intuit and intuition cannot think.

Phenomenon is the undetermined object of intuition**, which makes explicit no conception is as yet thought as belonging to it. It is merely the matter of sensation given a posteriori, synthesized with the some relevant form residing a priori in the subject himself. To say it is blind is merely a euphemism indicating nothing can be done with representations in this condition, until understanding gets its grubby paws on it and does its rule-bound logical thing. It thinking thing, donchaknow, by which conceptions are connected to that phenomenon, the condition for a possible objective, that is, empirical, cognition.
(**depending on translator; some call it appearance. Either way, the salient point is, undetermined)
————

There is no interest here in the difference between talking, thinking, writing. In all of these we find the evidential basis for postulating underlying structure. — Astrophel

The underlaying structure determines how the differences manifest. It is absurd to suppose, given the biological structural congruency of all humans in general, that there resides manifestly different underlying intellectual structure, simply given the invention of different words representing common things.

Your interest may lay anywhere you like, but mine is centered exclusively on the structure of thinking, from which all else follows in accordance with its structure, including the names by which I represent to myself its collective entities and functions.

Which leads me to this: what is you opinion on the presence of, or the validity in conditioning the human cognitive system on, imagery?

But what are the categories if not the essential structure of ALL that thought can think? — Astrophel

Not all thought; thought determined from sensibility only, related to appearances. The categories do not have anything to do with pure a priori cognitions.

so what is representation? It is essentially defined by what the understanding can say, speak, judge. — Astrophel

Nahhh….phenomena are representations, defined by the synthesis of matter and form, long before understanding exercises its logical function. We are not cognizant of phenomena, which is what you mean by saying they are blind, so…..

It is the very nature of speaking at all I refer to. — Astrophel

Ahhhh…..speaking. One can construct his thoughts without speaking, but he cannot speak without constructing his thoughts.

Why are we continuing this conversation, when you can’t seem to find anything good about it?

Just out of curiosity, what is your answer to the thread title?

"Inside/outside" is relative to whichever point of view we adopt. — J

Isn’t there only one point of view, when examining, scientifically?

I might be missing the deeper point here. — J

If there was one, it’s that the subject, having always been first and foremost, isn’t anymore.

….when they are examined from the outside, scientifically….
— J

Surely you realize the contradiction. To do anything scientifically is merely to do something in a certain way, but no matter what way it is done, it is still only a human that does it.
— Mww

This would only be a contradiction if we accept a very stringent definition of "objective" as meaning something like "untouched by human perception and thought." — J

I meant the contradiction to refer to examining from outside. No examination by a human is ever done from the outside, but always and only from the inside, re: himself. We examine the outside; we do not examine from the outside. Hence the contradiction.

"Doing something in a certain way" is, sorry, not nearly enough of a description — J

Agreed. The point being, it is we that does whatever it is that’s being done.
—————-

There's no required way to reduce either the mental or the neural to each other. — J

True, but the problem….problem here indicating reason’s aptitude for putting itself between a rock and a hard place….being there is, as yet, no possible way to reduce either to each other.

Imagine, if you will (in best Rod Serling impersonation)….the guy’s Nobel acceptance speech, after proving mental events are reducible to brain states in universal one-to-one correspondence (you know, scientifically speaking), concluding with the fact that for all recorded history of human thought….there never was exactly any such thing.
(Sigh)

So the concepts involved in some matter or other are not found in the scope of Kantian critique.
— Astrophel

Concepts involved in some manner or other are found in every aspect of Kantian critique. — Mww

No, the meaning here is that Kant is talking about a specific critique, not some matter or other that is merely incidental. — Astrophel

Oh. My bad. I took your “some matter” as a misprint, changed it to “some manner”. Concepts involved in some matter is rather ambiguous, wherein lay my justification for taking it upon myself to change it. Doesn’t make much difference, though, really. The concepts involved in some matter or other are still found in the scope of Kant’s critique, as the a posteriori side of the synthesis of phenomenal representations in general. Concepts involved in matter being distinct from concepts contained in matter.
————-

Not all thinking for anybody is synthetic, re: principles.
— Mww

No. All thinking is synthetic. A thought at all is the application of a universal. — Astrophel

The analytic/synthetic dichotomy only refers to the relations of subject/predicate conceptual content. Any thought, that is, any cognition by means of conceptions, is analytic if the conceptions in the subject relate in a certain way to the conceptions in the predicate, but synthetic if they do not.

A thought at all is the application of a universal. 'Tree' is a universal — Astrophel

Tree is a particular thing, of all possible things; thought of things in general is possible only under a universal conception, a category. Thought is not always of things, but may be of ideas or mere notions, for which no thing is cognizable as relating to it, in which case understanding has no need of the categories, and the idea is itself the universal, re: justice, beauty and the like. The categories belong to understanding and apply only to phenomena; the universals belong to pure reason alone and never apply to phenomena.

Even when one is talking about things in a most particular way, zeroing in on the uniqueness, one is making a synthetic judgment. — Astrophel

Thinking in a most particular way #1: A = A. Analytic judgement, a priori through identity;
Thinking in a most particular way #2: 1 + 1 = 2. Synthetic judgement, a priori through contradiction.

In talking of things in a most particular way describes experience, which is always grounded in synthetic judgements, yes.
————-

Transcendental thinking is just a higher level of plain ol’ thinking.
— Mww

No, it does not refer to a certain mode of cognition. It refers to the structure of thought itself. — Astrophel

Ehhhh, so it might seem. But the words in the text say otherwise; see A12/B26. Cognition generally belongs to understanding, of which we are conscious; transcendental cognitions belong to pure reason, and of those we are not. Hence the higher level.

Not that thought doesn’t have a structure. But one must decide as to whether the structure is represented by the subject/predicate propositional construct, which is the synthesis by productive imagination, or, the relation of units contained in those propositions to each other according to rules, which is logical inference, or, the origin of that which unites and regulates propositions within certain limits, which are principles as such.

But thought, in and of itself alone, in its empirical nature, is the act of referring a given intuition to an object by means of a conception. It is absurd to suppose we cannot have any such thought, nonetheless in and of itself alone, as doesn’t have an intuition given from an object of the senses.

What of that thought represented by a single concept? We can certainly think “round” without that to which round is intuited. While it is true such singular concept is empty, insofar as it has no accompanying phenomenon, it is still a valid thought, hence can be legitimate content of a priori cognitions.

I might be inclined to accede to the idea that transcendental refers to the structure of thought of a certain mode, but less so as reference to the structure of thought in general. In general, transcendental refers to the structure of experience, in that by it certain kinds are either impossible, or merely illusory.
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Calling all phenomena not what things really are in themselves, puts human knowledge in a place where thought cannot escape TO the things themselves. — Astrophel

True enough. What’s the problem? That we’re trapped in our own heads? Like….wishing we weren’t is enough to negate all the philosophy predicated on the necessity that we are? It makes much more sense, and is very far more productive, to organize the mechanisms we’re stuck with into an error-correcting method, than to pretend we can withdraw from them.
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Interesting perspective you got on this subject. We may not agree, but that doesn’t make it less interesting.

So the concepts involved in some matter or other are not found in the scope of Kantian critique. — Astrophel

Concepts involved in some manner or other are found in every aspect of Kantian critique.

Thinking for Kant is synthetic, and to think about how this is so, or what its nature is, must be done in the very medium that is under analysis. — Astrophel

Not all thinking for anybody is synthetic, re: principles. But I agree all analysis of the nature of thinking must be done from within the medium being analyzed.

Thinking for Kant is synthetic… — Astrophel

Not all his thinking is transcendental? Well, it's all analytic. — Astrophel

It’s all both?

Transcendental refers to a certain mode of cognition, so, no, not all his thinking is in that mode, even if he made a name for himself by rebutting Hume in the proving the possibility of it and validity of its use.

Transcendental this or transcendental that merely describes the origin of, and the limitations for, the conceptions in use. There is empirical thinking, rational thinking….hell, there’s magical thinking. Transcendental thinking is just a higher level of plain ol’ thinking.

Michel Henry calls "the lost desert of the Dialectic" where subectivity and everything else goes to die, because nothing escapes prison of representational status — Astrophel

A ultra-modern phenomenologist chastising an Enlightenment continental philosopher. Where’s the news…or indeed the value….in that?

What he got wrong is that noumenon is supposed to be an all encompassing metaphysics entirely outside of possible understanding. — Astrophel

Supposed to be? Who says? How can anything entirely outside possible understanding be supposed at all, much less supposed as an all-encompassing metaphysic? Noumena is nothing but a conception, for which there is no possible representation, which, incidentally, falsifies the claim that all subjectivity is imprisoned by them.

Doubt is something that comes into play in a setting where things that are not doubted have some reasonable status. — Astrophel

If there is a thing having reasonable status by my understanding of it, which implies a non-contradictory judgement, why would I invite doubt to come into play? Doubt arises when the status of a thing is understood as something less than reasonable, meaning, in short, the concepts under which the representation of the thing is subsumed, do not belong to each other with sufficient justice.
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This is why his thinking is called transcendental: reality is not seen, doubted, affirmed, denied, and the rest. Reality is entirely "other". — Astrophel

Reality is entirely other, by definition, re: that which corresponds to sensation in general. How he came up with that definition is an example of his transcendental thinking, but it is not a proper indication of why his thinking is called transcendental. Given his definition of what thinking is, it is clear not all his thinking, nor anyone’s for that matter, is transcendental, but is only so from the relation of conceptions, or the origin of the ideas, contained in it.
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Kant's fatal flaw was in not seeing that this radical other cannot be other than that which is called representation, for nothing can stand outside of this other. — Astrophel

This other….the aforementioned “other”, as in, reality? That which corresponds to sensation in general can never be representation, so you’re saying Kant was mistaken in not realizing it actually is? So he got his entire paradigm-shifting, drop-your socks, OMG metaphysical do-over….wrong????

Nahhhh, he didn’t get it wrong; other folks just think they got it more right, when all they really got, was different.

….when they are examined from the outside, scientifically…. — J

Just a quick fly-by here:

Surely you realize the contradiction. To do anything scientifically is merely to do something in a certain way, but no matter what way it is done, it is still only a human that does it.

If the human never within himself attends to the natural laws he has already mandated as legislating his relation to all material substance, and he is scientifically investigating the machinations of a particular kind of material substance…..how is he ever going to relate what he claims to know, with what is never within his conscious attention?
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Why is the "seeming" of a mental process less actual than the "reality" of a neural process? — J

It isn’t. Each is actual in its own domain; it is the interaction between those domains, that seems to be a problem. Hell…why not just say the problem seems to be that there are two domains.

Let’s not sugar-coat it: the brain is at bottom what allows the intellect to discover natural laws by which it understands its world, and, at the same time, it is the brain that prohibits the application of the very same natural laws, by the intellect attempting to understand how the brain allows the discovery of laws.

Hence AI. We can’t fix the irreconcilable problem of our own intelligence, so we just create a different one, which in fact doesn't fix anything at all, but instead, merely reverses the problem.

Objects of perception are not to be denied empirically…. — Astrophel

That’s all I meant to say, in negating the claim the senses can be doubted.

…..philosophically, doubt is a mild word for what he thinks. — Astrophel

Which would be a more appropriate word, do you think? And, to what would that word be applicable?

What he thinks….covers a lot of ground. Got something in particular in mind, relative to his doubting?

Given that substance dualism immediately supposes Descartes’ “First Principles…for philosophizing in an orderly way”, 1644, is found the definitions by which such dualism is meant to be understood, re: 1, 7-9; 1, 51-54.

“…. Some philosophers don’t see this, but that’s because they haven’t done their philosophizing in an orderly way, and haven’t carefully enough distinguished the mind from the body. They may have been more certain of their own existence than of the existence of anything else, but they haven’t seen that this certainty required that ‘they’ were minds. Instead of that, they thought that ‘they’ were only bodies—the bodies that they saw with their eyes and touched with their hands, the bodies that they wrongly credited with the power of sense-perception. That’s what prevented them from perceiving the nature of the mind….”
(P. P., 1, 12)

Hence the partial qualifier** for the Kantian classification of “problematical idealism” attributed to him, insofar as if he’d only thought to make it clear, that ‘they” were not only bodies (objects) but also subjects, rather than also minds, then his definition of substance itself would have been far easier to argue, that is to say, far easier left to itself as a mere category, while the idea of dualism would have been unaffected.
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(**)…another being….

“… At all events it is certain that I seem to see light, hear a noise, and feel heat; this cannot be false, and this is what in me is properly called perceiving (sentire), which is nothing else than thinking….”
(Meditations, 2, 9, 1641)

…the conclusion, of course, being disastrously false according to subsequent versions of idealism which retain their respective ground in a universal and necessary dualism.
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Me, here and now, I think he infused into the notion of substance more, or other, than I would grant, but if I was a 1644 philosophy peer, I might not disagree so much. Terminology aside, in principle, logically, he wasn’t that wrong.

….."perceive" as in "correctly identify an object of the senses." — J

Even if that were the case, isn’t it necessarily presupposed there is an object to identify, correctly or otherwise? If so, then deny that very same necessary object as a content of perception, is contradictory, from which it follows…..barring absurdity….that object itself cannot be doubted.

Our senses can be doubted. But if I 'experience' a thought, then it is certain that that exact thought is happening. — Kranky

So if you perceive something, it is not certain you perceived it? Some thing….don’t matter what it is….gets right in front of your eyes, but you doubt that thing made the trip from the front to the back of your eye? Why wouldn’t it? What’s to prevent it? All necessary presuppositions being given, of course, re: awake and aware, intellectually/physiologically functional.

How does your eye know how to deceive you? How….indeed, why….would your fingertips, when sensing roughness (of sandpaper), pass on to your brain the sensation of smoothness (of the fridge door handle)? Why is it always that the odor of bacon is never sensed by the ear?

In the same way it is certain for any thought that exact thought is happening, it is just as certain for any perception that exact perception is happening. By the same token, that the content of thought is impossible to deny, so too is the content of perception impossible to deny.

Nobody said, nor is anyone justified in saying, the mere reality of empirical content of sense, nor the mere rational content of thought, means knowledge of what either one is, and, with respect to the original question, the difference between our thought and our senses cannot be determined by whether or not their respective content is susceptible to doubt.

Since at least Plato…knowledge that is not the same as knowledge of, more recently, in Russell 1912, knowledge by acquaintance vs knowledge by description.

he couldn't have had been overly and unfairly critical to Kant. — Corvus

I dunno, man. He spent 184 pages rippin’ Kant a new one. Right after page one, where he says Kant’s the greatest philosopher ever ….until he came along to show how he could have been even better.

Peculiar for us, maybe? Wonder what the peer-group at the time thought. Truth be told, I don’t know S’s relation to H as well as I know his relation to K, other than in the former he is not gentle in his derision.