I would not say that 'consciousness' is a capacity, but an activity. — boundless

….are conscious or can be conscious. — boundless

To be conscious is to unite conceptions in thought, an activity with a vast plurality of representations; consciousness is that by which conceptions can be so united, all under one singular, irreducible representation.

The first represents the activity “I think”, the second represents the capacity of the “I” that thinks.

Or not…..speculative metaphysics and all that.

Dunno quite where you want to go with this, but I wonder if positing “rational” consciousness implies a variety, but on the other hand, you’re trying for a bare-bones definition, which shouldn’t allow any.

Still, I grant the notion of rational consciousness, insofar as I hold there to be no other kind. Consciousness of empirical conditions, which is exemplified by your definition predicated on experience, is still a rational construct.

We’re paddling in the same philosophical canoe here, whatever our respective particulars be.

Consciousness is the capacity for experience — Wayfarer

I think it deeper than that: consciousness is the unity of all my representations.

….mind-created world thread. — Wayfarer

Link?

(Never mind; found it)

…..everyone freaks out. — Wayfarer

Ehhhhh…..not my problem. No one will ever find space by the bucketful, and if you ask a guy for a minute of his time, that is exactly what you won’t get.

Because, what can space be without scale? and time without duration? Both of these entail perspective, and perspective is what the observer brings. (I think this is also consistent with Kant’s analysis.) — Wayfarer

“…. if we take away the subject or even the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear.…” (A42/B59)

I'll take a look. — T Clark

I only brought it up, cuz I flashed on that being us, if your, “After all, objects of cognition are also objects of nature.”, happened to occassion an argument, because…..a-HEM, obvious to the most casual observer…..they are not.

All in the good spirit of my ol’ buddy Rene’s method for “rightly conducting reason and seeking truth in the sciences”, donchaknow.

Or did I misunderstand what you wrote? — T Clark

Or, I misunderstood what you wrote. I took…..

it is reasonable to call into question the mind-independence of the objects of cognition. — T Clark

…..as characterizing objects of cognition as already being mind-independent, which is possible if objects of cognition and objects of Nature are treated alike. If one thinks they cannot be treated alike, then questioning the mind-independence of objects of cognition is perfectly reasonable, insofar as it is impossible they are, while the questioning the mind-independence of objects of Nature, is not reasonable insofar as it is impossible they are not.
————-

After all, objects of cognition are also objects of nature. — T Clark

There’s a movie, 2011, “The Sunset Limited”, where the entire cast consisting of only these two rather excellent actors Jones and Jackson, engage in a pure Socratic dialectic, involving all sorts of one-idea/proposition-leads-to another kinda stuff, attempts by the one to get the other to concede a point, using premises without mutually granted relevance.

Surely you see where I’m going with this.

Anyway….hopefully the original confusion is cleared.

Yet between a pair of colours….there is a third…. — jkop

Hume, E.C.H.U., 2. 2. 16, 1748.

…..no way to systematise colours with their looks. — jkop

R.O.Y. G. B.I.V, from a prism?

In passing; just me, thinking out loud is all.

I also believe it is reasonable to call into question the mind-independence of the objects of cognition. — T Clark

To question the mind-independence of a thing, is to suppose the possibility of that thing without a mind.

To even state an affirmative belief presupposes the validity of each and every conception, and their non-contradictory relation to each other, which constitutes the judgement such belief represents.

If the major function of a mind is pure thought, and the major contribution of pure thought is cognition, and the product of any cognition is an object, albeit of a particular kind, how can it be reasonable to believe objects of cognition may be possible without a mind?
—————

Perhaps the stated belief is intended to indicate an affirmative questioning of mind-independence in general, of which objects of cognition are merely a part. But there is nothing in that form of belief that is sufficient to suggest contingently on the one hand, or prove necessarily on the other, that the belief is not itself a mind-dependent object of cognition.
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It is reasonable to question mind-independence in any degree, with respect to any supposed mind-related function, iff it is possible to question mind itself outside and apart from the glaring self-contradiction of having to use mind in order to deny the very possibility of whatever functionality is supposed as belonging to it.

In the interest of fair play, I can still ask how it is that you think it reasonable to question the mind-independence of objects of cognition, given the mutually agreeable presupposition that objects of Nature are not what is meant by objects of cognition.

Ok. Thanks for your time.

….the common-sense observation that a person is the subject of experience — Wayfarer

What if the person is me? Does common sense then say I am the subject of experience, or does it just say, I experience?

….’til tomorrow….

I can't understand the distinction you're trying to make here. — Wayfarer

And I can’t understand the distinction that has been made for me.

Color of ball…
Size of box…
Meaning of phrase…
Intent of speaker….

…in all of those, there is a condition assigned to a representation. Doesn’t matter what the condition is, only the relation it has to that which is represented by it. Color, among other conditions, belongs to the representation of ball; size belongs to box, meaning belongs to phrase, intent belongs to speaker, ad infinitum…..

…..but subject DOES NOT belong to experience, but is presupposed by it. A ball is never presupposed by its color, or any condition which represents it, as opposed to that condition by which it was even possible in the first place.

Minutia: that which Everydayman ignores but with which the critical thinker amuses himself.

The centrality of 'the subject' is fundamental to phenomenology…. — Wayfarer

I never would question the centrality of the subject, irrespective of the discipline used to describe it.

My contention is the relation of subject to experience, in which “subject of experience” makes no sense, under the assumption that “subject” here was meant to indicate a rational intelligence.

It is the subject to whom all this occurs or appears. The ‘unknown knower’. — Wayfarer

mind is not ‘a thing among other things’. — Wayfarer

That humans and other sentient beings are subjects of experience is both obvious and central — Wayfarer

The first two are logically obvious and metaphysically central, yes. That being said, there are various ways to affirm the conceptions of subject and experience, but I for one, am having trouble affirming the conjunction of them with each other:

……superficially, iff it is the case there is only and ever objects of experience, from which there must be as many experiences as there are objects, it is self-contradictory for there to be subjects of experience, for the “I” which represents the cognition of self or subject, must always be singular;

……while notoriously forbidding….a euphemism for the likely-ness for mistaking its intent…..the Kantian exposition detailing the cognition of the self as subject, re: B407, “Paralogisms….”, prohibits self from being thereafter cognized as extant object, it does not follow, at least from such exposition, that self is subject of experience, and self, being already denied as object of experience, leaves an apparent transcendental paralogism;

……taken at face value, “subject of experience” is a synthetic proposition, insofar as the conception of subject or self cannot be found merely in the conception of experience itself, but on the other hand, the proposition is an a priori judgement, insofar as the concern is the synthesis of abstract conceptions. Synthetic a priori propositions are first and foremost principles regulating understanding by the use of the categories in relation to appearances. But the self or subject is never an appearance, hence cannot have empirical conceptions subsumed under it as schemata, hence cannot be regulated by the categories, from which follows the impossibility of it being a judgement with respect to experience, for which the categories are the necessary ground.
—————

All that being said, I admit your reasoning for “humans (minds, selves, subjects) are subjects of experience” is probably justified from the mere historical scarcity of your making of unjustified claims, if only I were to understand how such reasoning comes about, my personal cognitive prejudices notwithstanding.

We do not arrive at knowledge except through a temporal, inferential process. — Leontiskos

All that, and it is absurd to then insist arriving at knowledge is something we do, as some post-moderns would have for us. The temporal, inferential process is the doing, the process merely belongs to us as a species-specific kind of ratiocination.

The world is what is the case. — Banno

To say the world is what is, presupposes “world”, yet still leaves “what” unanswered as to its case.

The world is what is the case is the analytical tautological truth we end up with, but says nothing about how we got there.

The world is all and any of that of which being the case, is determinable a posteriori.

Ok. Thanks.

I must have missed something, somewhere down the line. Just wondering why one would doubt something despite its various successes. Must be some subtleties involved I haven’t accessed.

…..every philosophy carries the seeds of its own destruction just by being philosophy. — Moliere

That may very well be, but as far as I’m aware, only one of any real significance puts the very ground of its own destruction in writing.

Gotta appreciate the forthrightness of the author of a philosophy, that says that even if one finds the supporting theory sufficiently justifies one’s own a-HA!!! moments, he’s still more than likely to ignore its lessons in toto.

I'd say the Enlightenment is over. — Moliere

I must agree, but with a touch of irony, if it be granted the single most influential textual representation contained an offer of benefit to posterity, and at the same time, the cause of its demise.
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….outside both of them….. — Wayfarer

Sorry to intrude, but to say outside both is to invite that pathologically stupid homunculus nonsense, and to some lesser degree, Ryle’s Regress and a Cartesian theater, for which there never was any admission.

All for which sufficient account had already been given….ironically enough…..in that self-same Enlightenment textual representation, which one should hope isn’t so much dead as neglected.

And that ain’t the height of irony, oh nosir-ee, bub!!! Simultaneity….misunderstood if not outright denied in its time as a justifiable albeit purely a priori condition in Enlightenment metaphysics, but subsequently given gasps of epiphanic revelation in post-Enlightenment/pre-proven therefore abstract, physical theory.

But I can dig it, donchaknow. We love our models, don’t we. Model for this, model for that. Model for every-damn-thing. All of which fails miserably, when we try to model the modeling, in which case we usually invoke the principle of sheer parsimony, insofar as the validity of our models is their non-contradictory relation to some empirical condition, re: its use, or what is done with it, when the fact remains any model, empirically validated or otherwise, is only non-contradictory, hence its very validity is even possible, iff its construction is in accordance with a set of rules.

So I now assume Rodin’s posture, and ask however rhetorically…..does it work to combine rule simultaneity with model construction? At worst, such feasibility removes the notion of “outside of” insofar as models and the rules to which all of them must conform are inseparable with respect to time (insert A/B reference as proof here), and from there, at best, it is not contradictory to posit that models and their intellectual constructions are exactly the same.

Kinda cool, though, in the end, when the original question regards fairness and justice, which are, you know…..always in accordance with somebody’s rules.

You are probably aware already of my disregard for the Kantian notion of the thing in itself. I can't see how to make sense of it in a way that enables it to be useful. — Banno

There is no reason to regard the Kantian ding an sich as anything other than a metaphysical construct a priori, the only usefulness of it being a representation of the limit of human experience.

Given the major premise, from a speculative metaphysical point of view, that human experience begins with the effect of things on sensibility, it does not follow that things that do not have an effect on sensibility therefore do not exist, for otherwise we must be sufficient causality for the existence of such things in Nature that are perceived, which is catastrophically absurd, but it does, on the other hand, follow without self-contradiction that things that do not have an effect on sensibility cannot be an experience.

So we cause nothing perceived, but experience only the perceived. Reason inserts…..er, manufactures….the thing-in-itself to reconcile the former with the latter, nothing more or less than that. Which does sorta make the concept, technically the transcendental idea, practically useless but nonetheless logically necessary, in order to invalidate any conclusion that affirms human perception is simultaneously causal.

So is the OP an attempt to provide a foundation for morality which somehow manages to quantify or capture freedom as something more than a contingent set of relations? — Tom Storm

I’m not really sure. It is described as a “…theory (…) (that) has advantages over other moral theories…” so it attempts to construct a moral foundation, yes, albeit predicated on consequentialism.

As for freedom arising as something more than a contingent set of relations, I’d agree with that. As I mentioned, I think freedom is that by which relations of a certain kind are even possible, which removes it from being a member of all such relations, which in turn makes it more than any set of them, contingent or otherwise. I just don’t know if that’s what the OP, as you say, manages to capture.

If the problem is….

…..how to weigh freedom over different things within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism. — Dan

….my view is there isn’t a problem, or at least there isn’t this problem, insofar as I do not treat freedom as weigh-able or relatively differentiated. It is merely an altogether fundamental, hence necessary condition, by which certain types of relations are possible, and these relations pursuant to aesthetic judgements alone.

On the other hand, even if I’m entitled to a personal view, I’m fully aware that not having any letters after my name sorta limits my scholastic value.

I think, these days, the professionals are less inclined to accept mere transcendental ideas as sufficient explanatory devices, and those of common understanding never heard of them anyway, so…..

Yes, sometimes I do ask for justifications, but these are asked from an interest rather than knowledge. This then gets me into a whole different class of cognitions and the logical grounds for them. In a matter of mere interest, I can be shown to be misguided but cannot be proven wrong, whereas in matters of knowledge I can be shown to be both misguided and wrong.

When justifying your own actions or statements, according to what factors do you formulate your argument? — Vera Mont

To formulate an argument, logic, specifically the LNC. To formulate an argument is, after all, merely to construct a judgement, which is nothing but to think a relation of conceptions.

On what grounds do you decide whether a justification is appropriate and valid? — Vera Mont

The validity of a judgement is not the same as its appropriateness, in that the former is given immediately from its construction, insofar as the validity of a relation is determined by its logical possibility, but the latter is determined solely by its mediated correspondence to experience.

What criteria do you use when judging someone's justification….. — Vera Mont

I cannot judge another’s justifications, in that I cannot know which relations he has employed in his internal constructions. All that is available to me, is the affect he has on me, so all I’m doing, is judging the effect, which resides in me, not its cause which resides in him.

In your 1-6, the subject is a person other than yourself. With respect to the general topic under discussion, shouldn’t the subject in fact be yourself? By what right does one have to say another ought, or is obliged, when the only possible way for one to say that, is by way of what he himself has already determined? So it isn’t really “you ought….”, but instead, is, “I think you ought….”, or, “if it was me you would have…..”, the truth of which in the former is in fact impossible to grant, insofar as the totality of conditions in one cannot be given in another. And this is readily apparent, for the internal relations necessary in the construction of a promise/obligation/etc., by one, can indeed be very far from those relations necessary for the experience of its object by another.

But then, it may just be the exposition you seek for the coherence of said conception(s) resides entirely in some metaphysical domain, from which the sum of raised participatory eyebrows inevitably takes away whatever power and justification that may have been contained in it.

For my money, ’s one-liner says it all. Or perhaps, establishes the groundwork for saying it all.

I don't understand what you mean by putting "knowledge" in opposition to "understanding." — T Clark

Not in opposition, as a consequence. Understanding is means, knowledge is ends, in accordance with Kantian theoretical metaphysics.

Perhaps one could say the usefulness of this theory is the explanation for how knowledge is possible.
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….what it might mean for a position to be useful — T Clark

I think to be useful is to explain something I want to know. But you’re right; some things can be explained quite well, without the possibility of ever being proven right or wrong. Admittedly, I don’t have enough experience with Taoism to know whether it explains anything or not, but I suspect that theory relies less on pure logical constructs than does speculative idealism, and because of that, is more susceptible to self-contradiction when reduced to principles, which may happen when one asks of it….well, just how does that come about?

Anyway….to each his own?

Fair synopsis, yes.

One man’s “absolute presupposition” is another man’s “principle”?
—————

In a sense, the world we know doesn't exist until it is named. — T Clark

Ok, I can live with that, as long as the world (as it is) and the world (as we know it), are taken as two very different things.
—————-

…..materialism's objective reality is not the only way of seeing things. — T Clark

Agreed, in principle, but with two distinct and separate paradigmatic conditions, re:
…..first, whether or not the senses are involved on the one hand, and “way of seeing things” is a mere euphemism for “understanding”, on the other. Understanding a material thing is possible without that which is objectively real, but for knowledge of that which is material, the objective reality of it is a necessary condition;
…..from which follows the second, insofar as for humans generally, materialism, being a monistic ontology, is necessarily conjoined with some form of epistemological foundational procedure, in order for the intellect, as such, to function.

Does your Taoist metaphysical theory satisfy these conditions? And if not, how does it get around them and still maintain its usefulness?

….judged (…) from each one’s internal logical consistency and each one’s non-self-contradictory construction.
— Mww

I would judge them based on usefulness. — T Clark

Ok, but how would you recognize usefulness? What does a metaphysical theory do, such that it is useful for that thing?

Maybe we can talk about this some other time. — T Clark

Sure. Whatever suits you.

I disagree with this….. — T Clark

Yeah, I get that a lot. But I don’t mind; it merely exemplifies the earlier blurb….

“…. those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being able to agree among themselves…”

….in Bxv, and this in Bxxxiv:

“…. useful truths make just as little impression (…) as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths…”

And while no metaphysical theory is properly judged by its true/false quality, none of them should be judged absurd, merely from disregard of that relative attribute, but from each one’s internal logical consistency and each one’s non-self-contradictory construction.

If it be granted the human mind is a purely logical system…..
— Mww

Do you believe this is true? — T Clark

I treat the concept of “mind” as something everybody knows what is meant by it even if there really isn’t any such thing, and from that, I prefer to say pure reason is a purely logical system, but the subject at the time this came up was mind, and the nonsense of getting beyond it, so……
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noumena are conceptually valid but still only intuitively impossible
— Mww

Does this mean you reject noumena as a useful metaphysical concept? — T Clark

Oh absolutely. I treat noumena as the proverbial red-headed stepchild….he’s here, by accident, can’t pretend he isn’t so obligated to set a place at the table for him, but no freakin’ way he’s gonna be included in a will. Noumena in the Kantian sense are born from the faculty of understanding over-extending itself into the forging of general conceptions for which neither the remaining components of this particular type of cognitive system, nor Nature Herself as comprehended by that same system, can obtain an object.
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Where is this quote from? I think it's wrong, or at least misleading. — T Clark

It is Kant, B422, and concerns expositions surrounding the self as a closed, private, all-encompassing concept represented by “I think”, what Kant calls the “unity of consciousness”, and how that concept is misused by treating it as an object, which is what I meant by reification of pure conceptions.

Gotta remember the times of the thesis, long before neuroscience and those fancy-assed brain waves the average smuck…..er, sorry, I mean “….those of common understanding…”, re: 99.9% of humanity….couldn’t possibly care less about.
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For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another….
— PeterJones

Is this from Bradley? Do you have a reference? — T Clark

Kant, Bxxxi, (translator-specific). Yeah, true, huh. Guy’s every-damn-where. Think of something having to do with theoretical human cognition, pre-quantum physics, morality/religion….plate techtonics, tidal friction, rotational inclination, relativity of space and time (sigh)……there’s a Kant quote relatable to it.

For non-dualism one has to look beyond mind to its origin. This cannot be done by the mind, of course,which is why scholars can never hope to understand non-duality in the way meditators and contemplatives come to understand it, as an actual phenomenon — PeterJones

If non-dualism is an actual phenomenon, according to meditators, what is it that appears? What is it that physically, quantitatively, exists, as effect on sensibility, which all an appearance was ever meant to indicate? Which sensory device is affected by a non-dual appearance, in order for the scholar or the regular joe to immediately intuit anything with respect to it?

While it is true the mind cannot look beyond itself, it is equally true the mind is that by which everything conceivable is looked for; there is no other irreducible originator of whatever it is that humans do pursuant to their intrinsic intellectual capacities.

If it be granted the human mind is a purely logical system, and as such, for any possible conception the negation of it is given immediately upon the spontaneity of the conception itself, it is then self-contradictory to suggest the origin of non-dualism can only reside beyond the mind, when it is necessarily the case dualism originates within it. If dualism is given, or if not given then at least determinable by the mind, and if the principle of complementarity holds, then it is necessarily the case the concept of non-dualism also originates under the same conditions and therefore from within that same mind.

So it would seem, despite what meditators and contemplatives would have it, the origin of non-dualism must be beyond the mind, or beyond the mind as scholars and regular joes understand it, for no other reason than that form of mind used by other than meditators cannot justify the conception beyond the principle by which it is a valid thought.

And from that arises the notion that the categories of thought, which legislate the speculative methodology of the scholar’s mind, in which the relation of conception and intuition are determinable, are not necessary functionaries for a mediator’s/contemplative’s notion of mind from which non-dualism would manifest.

Which gets us right smack dab into the phenomenal/noumenal dichotomy, insofar as, while it is irrational to degrade the distinction itself as impossible, re: noumena are conceptually valid but still only intuitively impossible, it remains the fact there is no non-contradictory means of constructing judgements with respect to empirical representations of them.

It follows that a mind predicated on an intrinsic duality cannot possibly originate that which is contradictory to it, but that in itself is not sufficient to prove another kind of mind also cannot, which immediately leaves it possible another kind of mind can originate a non-dualism absent its antecedent complement.

But how would an intrinsically dualistic mind, such as a human mind, which must include the minds of meditators and contemplatives insofar as these are humans, ever even enjoin to that which for it, is impossible?

“…. From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore the category of substance—which always presupposes a given intuition—cannot be applied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the foundation its own pure self-consciousness—the very thing that it wishes to explain and describe….”
————

On the other hand, of course in one respect you are quite right:

“…. those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being able to agree among themselves, but that, on the contrary, this science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted for the display of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests—a field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch of ground, in which, at least, no victory was ever yet crowned with permanent possession.…”

Hence the fun in philosophizing well, or, as ol’ Rene admonishes, “rightly conducting reason”: display of skill in which no one is embarrassed, and an exercise in strength in which no one gets hurt.

Kant places the Ultimate……
— PeterJones

What is this Ultimate? — Mww

This is the question metaphysics has to answer. — PeterJones

If Kant placed this Ultimate, wouldn’t he have already asked and answered as to what it is? I’m trying desperately to understand how Kant’s idealism could be tweaked to a non-dualistic system by placing the Ultimate beyond the categories of thought, when it is the case Kant never placed the Ultimate anywhere, insofar as, to my knowledge, he never mentioned the concept in the first place.

Now, Kant does indeed place the unconditioned beyond the categories of thought, that towards which pure reason always directs itself in its purely metaphysical exploits but for which it never attains an object, but even if this is the case enforced by transcendental logic, it still leaves vacant the notion of non-duality necessarily arising from it. Not that it couldn’t so arise, but that it hasn’t been explained how it could.

And no, I don’t reject perennial philosophy; I simply don’t have any use for it, that expositions on critical thought hasn’t already sufficiently dismissed.
—————

“…. For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error….”

Seems like Bradley’s “metaphysics does not endorse a positive result” isn’t quite right after all. Powerless for harm seems a rather positive endorsement, n’est ce pas?

The idea that the categories of thought are not fundamental immediately gives rise to the principle of non-duality — PeterJones

Oh. Ok. So if one holds with the idea that the categories of thought are fundamental and fundamental necessarily, the principle of non-duality fails.

Kant places the Ultimate…… — PeterJones

What is this Ultimate? By what other (non-Perennial philosophy) conception might it be understood, given that the Kantian categories of thought are the ground always and only for a posteriori cognitions?

It is not my wish to be contentious, but being embedded in Western Enlightenment speculative metaphysics in which rational extravagances are properly cautioned, sorta prejudices one against various and sundry forms of ineffable mystical experiences.

Kant's idealism (….) is quite a vague affair, but it could be interpreted as a first step towards non-dualism — PeterJones

Interesting notion. How would you suppose non-dualism to arise from it, on what….logical?…. ground would it be possible?

The issues are tricky, however, because of the words.;For instance, 'transcendental' or 'absolute' idealism is non-dualism. — FrancisRay

Tricky may be dependent on mere subjective inclination, insofar as there is an established transcendental idealism, while not “absolute”, is certainly dualistic. Or, perhaps, sufficiently demonstrates the intrinsic duality of the human intellectual nature.

As far as I can see (…), any philosophy that specifies how other people should behave, is not moral at all, or even really a philosophy. — T Clark

That's pretty much as I would have it as well. How people in general should behave is reducible to mere administrative codes of conduct, and THAT is reducible to a member-specific personal moral disposition.

The consequences related to codes of right action, is very different than the consequences related to one’s own code of proper action.

Yikes. Four years on. I was just thumbing through, like I always do, looking for something interesting….

I think the thread is, maybe I rephrase a bit, that *appearances* have a cause. Kant discusses this notion. The logic is that 'appearance' is what things look like or seem to be rather than what they actually are. — Dan Langlois

Appearances have a cause, yes: things.

Appearances of things, in the Kantian sense, is NOT an indication of what they look like, nor do appearances indicate what a thing is or seems to be.